MindPapers: 8.1d. Neural Timing and Consciousness

Banks, William P. & Pockett, Susan (2007). Benjamin Libet's work on the neuroscience of free will. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell. (Google)

Bittner, T. J. (1996). Consciousness and the act of will. Philosophical Studies 81 (2-3):31-41. (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)

Bolbecker, Amanda R.; Cheng, Zixi; Felsten, Gary; Kong, King-Leung; Lim, Corrinne C. M.; Nisly-Nagele, Sheryl J.; Wang-Bennett, Lolin T. & Wasserman, Gerald S. (2002). Two asymmetries governing neural and mental timing. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):265-272. (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)

Breitmeyer, Bruno G. (2002). In support of Pockett's critique of Libet's studies of the time course of consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):280-283. (Google)

Chalmers, David J. (online). Determining the moment of consciousness? Commentary on Valerie Hardcastle. (Google | More links)

Abstract: It's very interesting to see neurophysiological evidence brought to bear on the puzzling question of conscious experience. Many have observed that information-processing models of cognition seem to leave consciousness untouched; it is natural to hope that turning to neurophysiology might lead us to the Holy Grail. Still, I think there are reasons to be skeptical. There are good reasons to suppose that neurophysiological investigation contributes to cognitive explanation at best in virtue of constraining the information-processing structure of cognition. Of course this is a very large and significant role for it to play, but it may be over-optimistic to suppose that it can play some further explanatory role, taking us where information-processing theories cannot. If so, then neurophysiological accounts will be no more and no less successful at dealing with consciousness than information-processing accounts are

Churchland, Patricia S. (1981). Discussion: The timing of sensations: Reply to Libet. Philosophy of Science 48 (September):492-497. (Google)

Churchland, Patricia S. (1981). On the alleged backward referral of experience and its relevance to the mind-body problem. Philosophy of Science 48 (June):165-81. (Google | More links)

Churchland, Patricia S. (1981). The timing of sensations: Reply to Libet. Philosophy of Science 48 (3):492-7. (Cited by 17 | Google | More links)

Dennett, Daniel C. & Kinsbourne, Marcel (1992). Time and the observer: The where and when of consciousness in the brain. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15:183-201. (Cited by 394 | Annotation | Google | More links)

Abstract: _Behavioral and Brain Sciences_ , 15, 183-247, 1992. Reprinted in _The Philosopher's Annual_ , Grim, Mar and Williams, eds., vol. XV-1992, 1994, pp. 23-68; Noel Sheehy and Tony Chapman, eds., _Cognitive Science_ , Vol. I, Elgar, 1995, pp.210-274

Durgin, Frank H. & Sternberg, Saul (2002). The time of consciousness and vice versa. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):284-290. (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)

Elitzur, Avshalom C. (1996). Time and consciousness: The uneasy bearing of relativity on the mind-body problem. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness. MIT Press. (Google)

Fingelkurts, Andrew A. & Fingelkurts, Alexander A. (2006). Timing in cognition and EEG brain dynamics: Discreteness versus continuity. Cognitive Processing 7 (3):135-162. (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)

Abstract: This article provides an overview of recent developments in solving the timing problem (discreteness vs. continuity) in cognitive neuroscience. Both theoretical and empirical studies have been considered, with an emphasis on the framework of Operational Architectonics (OA) of brain functioning (Fingelkurts and Fingelkurts, 2001, 2005). This framework explores the temporal structure of information flow and interarea interactions within the network of functional neuronal populations by examining topographic sharp transition processes in the scalp EEG, on the millisecond scale. We conclude, based on the OA framework, that brain functioning is best conceptualized in terms of continuity-discreteness unity which is also the characteristic property of cognition. At the end we emphasize where one might productively proceed for the future research.

Glynn, I. M. (1990). Consciousness and time. Nature 348:477-79. (Cited by 19 | Google | More links)

Gomes, Gilberto (2002). On experimental and philosophical investigations of mental timing: A response to commentary. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):304-307. (Cited by 3 | Google)

Gomes, Gilberto (2002). Problems in the timing of conscious experience. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):191-97. (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)

Gomes, Gilberto (2002). The interpretation of Libet's results on the timing of conscious events: A commentary. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):221-230. (Google)

Gomes, Gilberto (1999). Volition and the readiness potential. Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (8-9):59-76. (Cited by 17 | Google)

Abstract: 1. Introduction The readiness potential was found to precede voluntary acts by about half a second or more (Kornhuber & Deecke, 1965). Kornhuber (1984) discussed the readiness potential in terms of volition, arguing that it is not the manifestation of an attentional processes. Libet discussed it in relation to consciousness and to free will (Libet et al. 1983a; 1983b; Libet, 1985, 1992, 1993). Libet asked the following questions. Are voluntary acts initiated by a conscious decision to act? Are the physiological facts compatible with the belief that free will determines our voluntary acts? What is the role of consciousness in voluntary action? In this paper I will discuss these questions and the answers that Libet gave to them

Green, Christopher D. & Gillett, Grant R. (1995). Are mental events preceded by their physical causes? Philosophical Psychology 8 (4):333-340. (Google)

Abstract: Libet's experiments, supported by a strict one-to-one identity thesis between brain events and mental events, have prompted the conclusion that physical events precede the mental events to which they correspond. We examine this claim and conclude that it is suspect for several reasons. First, there is a dual assumption that an intention is the kind of thing that causes an action and that can be accurately introspected. Second, there is a real problem with the method of timing the mental events concerned given that Libet himself has found the reports of subjects to be unreliable in this regard. Third, there is a suspect assumption that there are such things as timable and locatable mental and brain events accompanying and causing human behaviour. For all these reasons we reject the claim that physical events are prior to and explain mental events

Haggard, Patrick & Libet, Benjamin W. (2001). Conscious intention and brain activity. Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (11):47-63. (Cited by 22 | Google | More links)

Honderich, Ted (ms). Is the mind ahead of the brain? Rejoinder to Benjamin Libet. (Google)

Honderich, Ted (2005). On Benjamin Libet: Is the mind ahead of the brain? Behind it? In On Determinism and Freedom. Edinburgh University Press. (Google)

Abstract: Benjamin Libet and also Libet and collaborators claim to advance a single hypothesis, with important consequences, about the time of a conscious experience in relation to the time when there occurs a certain physical condition in the brain. This condition is spoken of as

_neural_

_adequacy_ for the experience, or, as we can as well say, _neural adequacy_ .⁵ This finding has been taken to throw doubt on theories that take neural and mental events to be in necessary or lawlike connection, and also certain identity theories of mind and brain, as well as determinist theories

Honderich, Ted (1984). The time of a conscious sensory experience and mind-brain theories. Journal of Theoretical Biology 110 (1):115-129. (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)

Hoy, Ronald C. (1982). Ambiguities in the subjective timing of experiences debate. Philosophy of Science 49 (June):254-262. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)

Joordens, S.; van Duijn, Marc & Spalek, T. M. (2002). When timing the mind should also mind the timing: Biases in the measurement of voluntary actions. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):231-40. (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)

Kiefer, Markus & Spitzer, Manfred (2000). Time course of conscious and unconscious semantic brain activation. Neuroreport 11 (11):2401-2407. (Cited by 50 | Google | More links)

Klein, Stanley (2002). Libet's research on the timing of conscious intention to act: A commentary. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):273-279. (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)

Klein, S. A. (2002). Libet's temporal anomalies: A reassessment of the data. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):198-214. (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)

Klein, Stanley (2002). Libet's timing of mental events: Commentary on the commentaries. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):326-333. (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)

Levy, Neil (2005). Libet's impossible demand. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (12):67-76. (Google)

Libet, Benjamin W. (1996). Commentary on free will in the light of neuropsychiatry. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 3 (2):95-96. (Cited by 7 | Google)

Libet, Benjamin W. (2004). Mind Time: The Temporal Factor in Consciousness. MIT Press. (Cited by 53 | Google | More links)

Abstract: Over a long career, Libet has conducted experiments that have shown, in clear and concrete ways, how the brain produces conscious awareness.

Libet, Benjamin W. (1993). Neurophysiology of Consciousness: Selected Papers and New Essays. Birkhauser. (Cited by 46 | Google | More links)

Libet, Benjamin W. (1978). Neuronal vs. subjective timing for a conscious sensory experience. In P. A. Buser & A. Rougeul-Buser (eds.), Cerebral Correlates of Conscious Experience. Elsevier. (Cited by 24 | Google)

Libet, Benjamin W.; Wright, E. W.; Feinstein, B. & Pearl, D. K. (1992). Retroactive enhancement of a skin sensation by a delayed cortical stimulus in man: Evidence for delay of a conscious sensory experience. Consciousness and Cognition 1:367-75. (Google)

Libet, Benjamin W. (1985). Subjective antedating of a sensory experience and mind-brain theories: Reply to Honderich. Journal of Theoretical Biology 114:563-70. (Google)

Libet, Benjamin W.; E. W, Feinstein & B., Pearl (1979). Subjective referral of the timing for a cognitive sensory experience. Brain 102:193-224. (Google)

Libet, Benjamin W. (1981). The experimental evidence for subjective referral of a sensory experience backwards in time: Reply to P.s. Churchland. Philosophy of Science 48 (June):182-197. (Cited by 30 | Google | More links)

Libet, Benjamin W. (2000). Time factors in conscious processes: Reply to Gilberto Gomes. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (1):1-12. (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)

Abstract: The critical reinterpretations of Libet's research by G. Gomes make speculative, unwarranted, and untested assumptions. These assumptions and arguments are analyzed and their status relative to Libet's findings is criticized

Libet, Benjamin W. (1993). The neural time factor in conscious and unconscious events. In Experimental and Theoretical Studies of Consciousness. (Ciba Foundation Symposium 174). (Cited by 59 | Google)

Libet, Benjamin W. (1981). Timing of cerebral processes relative to concomitant conscious experiences in man. In G. Adam, I. Meszaros & E.I. Banyai (eds.), Advances in Physiological Science. (Google)

Libet, Benjamin W. (2003). Timing of conscious experience: Reply to the 2002 commentaries on Libet's findings. Consciousness and Cognition 12 (3):321-331. (Google | More links)

Libet, Benjamin W. (2002). The timing of mental events: Libet's experimental findings and their implications. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):291-99. (Cited by 16 | Google | More links)

Libet, Benjamin W. (1985). Unconscious cerebral initiative and the role of conscious will in voluntary action. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8:529-66. (Cited by 3 | Google)

McKeen Cattell, James (1886). The time taken up by cerebral operations. Mind 11 (42):220-242. (Google | More links)

Mele, Alfred R. (2006). Free will: Theories, analysis, and data. In Susan Pockett, William P. Banks & Shaun Gallagher (eds.), Does Consciousness Cause Behavior? MIT Press. (Google)

Mele, Alfred R. (1997). Strength of motivation and being in control - learning from Libet. American Philosophical Quarterly 34:319-32. (Cited by 4 | Google)

Miller, Jeff G. & Trevena, Judy A. (2002). Cortical movement preparation and conscious decisions: Averaging artifacts and timing biases. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):308-313. (Cited by 3 | Google)

Mortensen, Chris (1980). Neurophysiology and experiences. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 58 (September):250-264. (Google | More links)

Oakley, David A. & Haggard, Patrick (2006). The timing of brain events: Authors' response to Libet's 'reply'. Consciousness and Cognition 15 (3):548-550. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Pockett, Susan (2002). Backward referral, flash-lags, and quantum free will: A response to commentaries on articles by Pockett, Klein, Gomes, and trevena and Miller. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):314-325. (Google)

Pockett, Susan (2004). Hypnosis and the death of "subjective backwards referral". Consciousness and Cognition 13:621-25. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Pockett, Susan (2002). On subjective back-referral and how long it takes to become conscious of a stimulus: A reinterpretation of Libet's data. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):141-61. (Google)

Pockett, Susan (2006). The great subjective back-referral debate: Do neural responses increase during a train of stimuli? Consciousness and Cognition 15 (3):551-559. (Google)

Pollen, Daniel A. (2006). Brain stimulation and conscious experience: Electrical stimulation of the cortical surface at a threshold current evokes sustained neuronal activity only after a prolonged latency. Consciousness and Cognition 15 (3):560-565. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Pollen, Daniel A. (2004). Brain stimulation and conscious experience. Consciousness and Cognition 13 (3):626-645. (Google)

Proust, Joelle (1994). Time and conscious experience. In C.C. Gould (ed.), Artifacts, Representations, and Social Practice. Kluwer. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Ramakrishna, Chakravarthi (2002). Real latencies and facilitation. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):300-303. (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)

Rossi, E. L. (1988). Paradoxes of time, consciousness, and free will: Integrating Bohm, Jung, and Libet on ethics. Psychological Perspectives 19:50-55. (Google)

Rosenthal, David M. (2002). The timing of conscious states. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):215-20. (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)

Abstract: Striking experimental results by Benjamin Libet and colleagues have had an impor- tant impact on much recent discussion of consciousness. Some investigators have sought to replicate or extend Libet’s results (Haggard, 1999; Haggard & Eimer, 1999; Haggard, Newman, & Magno, 1999; Trevena & Miller, 2002), while others have focused on how to interpret those ﬁndings (e.g., Gomes, 1998, 1999, 2002; Pockett, 2002), which many have seen as conﬂicting with our commonsense picture of mental functioning

Shariff, Azim F. & Peterson, Jordan B. (2005). Anticipatory consciousness, Libet's Veto and a close-enough theory of free will. In Ralph D. Ellis & Natika Newton (eds.), Consciousness & Emotion: Agency, Conscious Choice, and Selective Perception. John Benjamins. (Google)

Shevrin, Howard; Ghannam, Jess H. & Libet, Benjamin W. (2002). A neural correlate of consciousness related to repression. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (2):334-41. (Google)

Trevena, Judy A. & Miller, Jeff G. (2002). Cortical movement preparation before and after a conscious decision to move. Consciousness and Cognition 10 (2):162-90. (Cited by 31 | Google | More links)

van de Grind, Wim (2002). Physical, neural, and mental timing. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):241-64. (Cited by 14 | Google | More links)

Wolf, Fred Alan (1998). The timing of conscious experience: A causality-violating interpretation. Journal of Scientific Exploration 12 (4). (Google)

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