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8.1g. Consciousness and Neuroscience, Misc (Consciousness and Neuroscience, Misc on PhilPapers)

See also:
Alkire, M. T.; Haier, R. J. & Fallon, J. H. (2000). Toward a unified theory of narcosis: Brain imaging evidence for a thalamocortical switch as the neurophysiologic basis of anesthetic-induced unconsciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (3):370-386.   (Google)
Abstract: A unifying theory of general anesthetic-induced unconsciousness must explain the common mechanism through which various anesthetic agents produce unconsciousness. Functional-brain-imaging data obtained from 11 volunteers during general anesthesia showed specific suppression of regional thalamic and midbrain reticular formation activity across two different commonly used volatile agents. These findings are discussed in relation to findings from sleep neurophysiology and the implications of this work for consciousness research. It is hypothesized that the essential common neurophysiologic mechanism underlying anesthetic-induced unconsciousness is, as with sleep-induced unconsciousness, a hyperpolarization block of thalamocortical neurons. A model of anesthetic-induced unconsciousness is introduced to explain how the plethora of effects anesthetics have on cellular functioning ultimately all converge on a single neuroanatomic/neurophysiologic system, thus providing for a unitary physiologic theory of narcosis related to consciousness
Arhem, P. (1996). Vertical information flow in the brain: On neuronal micro events and consciousness. Biosystems 38:191-98.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Ascoli, Giorgio A. (2000). The complex link between neuroanatomy and consciousness. Complexity 6 (1):20-26.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Baars, Bernard J. (2003). How brain reveals mind: Neural studies support the fundamental role of conscious experience. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (9-10):100-114.   (Cited by 14 | Google)
Baars, Bernard J. (1998). The Neural Basis of Conscious Experience. In A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Bachmann, Talis (2004). Inaptitude of the signal detection theory, useful vexation from the microgenetic view, and inevitability of neurobiological signatures in understanding perceptual (un)awareness. Consciousness and Cognition 13 (1):101-106.   (Google)
Balog, Katalin (2007). Comments on Ned Block's target article “Consciousness, accessibility, and the mesh between psychology and neuroscience”. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (4):499-500.   (Google)
Abstract: Block argues that relevant data in psychology and neuroscience shows that access consciousness is not constitutively necessary for phenomenality. However, a phenomenal state can be access conscious in two radically different ways. Its content can be access conscious, or its phenomenality can be access conscious. I’ll argue that while Block’s thesis is right when it is formulated in terms of the first notion of access consciousness, there is an alternative hypothesis about the relationship between phenomenality and access in terms of the second notion that is not touched by Block’s argument.
Ballard, Clive & Piggott, Margaret (2002). Neuroleptics. In Elaine Perry, Heather Ashton & Allan Young (eds.), Neurochemistry of Consciousness: Neurotransmitters in Mind. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Barr, W. B. (1998). Neurobehavioral Disorders of Awareness and Their Relevance to Schizophrenia. In Xavier F. Amador & Anthony S. David (eds.), Insight and Psychosis: Awareness of Illness in Schizophrenia and Related Disorders. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 11 | Google)
Beck, Heinrich (1976). Neuropsychological servosystems, consciousness, and the problem of embodiment. Behavioral Science 21:139-60.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Behrendt, Ralf-Peter (2004). A neuroanatomical model of passivity phenomena. Consciousness and Cognition 13 (3):579-609.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Beitman, Bernard D. & Nair, Jyotsna (2004). Self-Awareness Deficits in Psychiatric Patients: Neurobiology, Assessment, and Treatment. W.W.Norton.   (Google)
Bernhaut, M.; Gellhorn, E. & Rasmussen, A. T. (1953). Experimental contributions to the problem of consciousness. Journal of Neurophysiology 16:21-35.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Bogen, Joseph E. (2001). An experimental disconnection approach to a function of consciousness. International Journal of Neuroscience 111 (3):135-136.   (Google)
Bondi, Massimo & Bondi, Manuele (1998). The role of synaptic junctions in the identification of human consciousness. Rivista Di Biologia-Biology Forum 91 (2):329-334.   (Google)
Borrett, Donald; Kelly, Sean D. & Kwan, Hon (2000). Phenomenology, dynamical neural networks and brain function. Philosophical Psychology 13 (2):213-228.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Current cognitive science models of perception and action assume that the objects that we move toward and perceive are represented as determinate in our experience of them. A proper phenomenology of perception and action, however, shows that we experience objects indeterminately when we are perceiving them or moving toward them. This indeterminacy, as it relates to simple movement and perception, is captured in the proposed phenomenologically based recurrent network models of brain function. These models provide a possible foundation from which predicative structures may arise as an emergent phenomenon without the positing of a representing subject. These models go some way in addressing the dual constraints of phenomenological accuracy and neurophysiological plausibility that ought to guide all projects devoted to discovering the physical basis of human experience
Burgess, Adrian (2007). On the contribution of neurophysiology to hypnosis research: Current state and future directions. In Graham A. Jamieson (ed.), Hypnosis and Conscious States: The Cognitive Neuroscience Perspective. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Calvin, William H. (1996). The Cerebral Code. MIT Press.   (Cited by 91 | Google | More links)
Calvin, William H. (1990). The Cerebral Symphony: Seashore Reflections on the Structure of Consciousness. Bantam.   (Cited by 61 | Google | More links)
Cole, Jonathan (2005). Imagination after neurological losses of movement and sensation: The experience of spinal cord injury. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (2).   (Google)
Abstract:   To what extent is imagination dependent on embodied experience? In attempting to answer such questions I consider the experiences of those who have to come to terms with altered neurological function, namely those with spinal cord injury at the neck. These people have each lost all sensation and movement below the neck. How might these new ways of living affect their imagination?
Cole, Jonathan; Depraz, Natalie & Gallagher, Shaun (online). Unity and disunity in bodily awareness: Phenomenology and neuroscience.   (Google)
Cosmelli, Diego J.; Lachaux, Jean-Philippe & Thompson, Evan (2007). Neurodynamics of consciousness. In P.D. Zelazo, Morris Moscovitch & Evan Thompson (eds.), Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness. Cambridge.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: cal basis of consciousness. We continue by discussing the relation between spatiotem- One of the outstanding problems in the cog- poral patterns of brain activity and con- nitive sciences is to understand how ongo- sciousness, with particular attention to pro- ing conscious experience is related to the cesses in the gamma frequency band. We workings of the brain and nervous system. then adopt a critical perspective and high-
Cowey, Alan (1997). Current awareness: Spotlight on consciousness. Developmental Medicine and Child Neurology 39:54-62.   (Google)
Cowey, Alan & Stoerig, Petra (1991). The neurobiology of blindsight. Trends in Neurosciences 14:140-5.   (Cited by 150 | Google)
Creutzfeld, O. D. (1979). Neurophysiological mechanisms and consciousness. In Brain and Mind. (Ciba Foundation Symposium 69).   (Google)
Crick, Francis (1994). The Astonishing Hypothesis: The Scientific Search for the Soul. Scribners.   (Cited by 1055 | Google | More links)
Crick, Francis & Koch, Christof (1992). The problem of consciousness. Scientific American 267 (3):152-60.   (Cited by 78 | Google | More links)
Cytowic, Richard (1995). Synesthesia: Phenomenology and neuropsychology. Psyche 2 (10).   (Cited by 79 | Google | More links)
Dehaene, Stanislas; Kerszberg, Michel & Changeux, Jean-Pierre (2001). A neuronal model of a global workspace in effortful cognitive tasks. Pnas 95 (24):14529-14534.   (Cited by 140 | Google | More links)
Dehaene, Stanislas (ed.) (2002). The Cognitive Neuroscience of Consciousness. MIT Press.   (Cited by 17 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This book investigates the philosophical, empirical, and theoretical bases on which a cognitive neuroscience of consciousness can be founded.
Delacour, J. (1995). An introduction to the biology of consciousness. Neuropsychologia 33:1061-1074.   (Cited by 28 | Google | More links)
Delafresnaye, J. F. (ed.) (1954). Brain Mechanisms and Consciousness. Blackwell.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Delacour, J. (1997). Neurobiology of consciousness: An overview. Behavioural Brain Research 85:127-141.   (Cited by 22 | Google | More links)
Depraz, Natalie (2002). Confronting death before death: Between imminence and unpredictability. Francisco Varela's neurophenomenology of radical embodiment. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1 (2).   (Google)
Depraz, Natalie (2008). The Rainbow of emotions: At the crossroads of neurobiology and phenomenology. Continental Philosophy Review 41 (2).   (Google)
Abstract:  This contribution seeks to explicitly articulate two directions of a continuous phenomenal field: (1) the genesis of intersubjectivity in its bodily basis (both organic and phylogenetic); and (2) the re-investment of the organic basis (both bodily and cellular) as a self-transcendence. We hope to recast the debate about the explanatory gap by suggesting a new way to approach the mind-body and Leib/Körper problems: with a heart-centered model instead of a brain-centered model. By asking how the physiological dynamics of heart and breath can become constitutive of a subjective (qua intersubjective) point of view, we give an account of the specific circular and systemic dynamic that we call “the rainbow of emotions.” This dynamic, we argue, is composed of both structural and experiential components and better evidences the seamless, non-dual articulation between the organic and the experiential
Desmedt, J. E. Tomberg (1995). Consciousness. Electroencephalography and Clinical Neurophysiology, Supplement 44:227-34.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Donnelly, G. F. (1982). Consciousness: The brain and self-regulation modalities. Topics in Clinical Nursing 3:13-20.   (Google | More links)
Donchin, E.; McCarthy, G.; Kutas, M. & Ritter, W. (1983). Event-related brain potentials in the study of consciousness. In Richard J. Davidson, Sophie Schwartz & D. H. Shapiro (eds.), Consciousness and Self-Regulation. Plenum Press.   (Cited by 14 | Google)
Donald, Matthew (1995). The neurobiology of human consciousness: An evolutionary approach. Neuropsychologia 33:1087-1102.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Doty, R. W. (1975). Consciousness from neurons. Acta Neurobiologiae Experimentalis 35:791-804.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Eccles, John C. (ed.) (1966). Brain and Conscious Experience. Springer.   (Cited by 24 | Google)
Eccles, John C. (1974). Cerebral activity and consciousness. In F. Ayala & T. Dobzhansky (eds.), Studies in the Philosophy of Biology. University of California Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Eccles, John C. (1987). The effect of silent thinking on the cerebral cortex. In B. Gulyas (ed.), The Brain-Mind Problem: Philosophical and Neurophysiological Approaches. Leuven University Press.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Ellis, Ralph D. (2006). Phenomenology-friendly neuroscience: The return to Merleau-ponty as psychologist. Human Studies 29 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: This paper reports on the Kuhnian revolution now occurring in neuropsychology that is finally supportive of and friendly to phenomenology – the “enactive” approach to the mind-body relation, grounded in the notion of self-organization, which is consistent with Husserl and Merleau-Ponty on virtually every point. According to the enactive approach, human minds understand the world by virtue of the ways our bodies can act relative to it, or the ways we can imagine acting. This requires that action be distinguished from passivity, that the mental be approached from a first person perspective, and that the cognitive capacities of the brain be grounded in the emotional and motivational processes that guide action and anticipate action affordances. It avoids the old intractable problems inherent in the computationalist approaches of twentieth century atomism and radical empiricism, and again allows phenomenology to bridge to neuropsychology in the way Merleau-Ponty was already doing over half a century ago
Elpidorou, Andreas (2010). Alva noë: Out of our heads: Why you are not your brain, and other lessons from the biology of consciousness. Minds and Machines 20 (1).   (Google)
Faw, Bill (2004). Cognitive neuroscience of consciousness: A review article. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (2):69-72.   (Google)
Faw, Bill (2000). My amygdala-orbitofrontal-circuit made me do it. Consciousness and Emotion 1 (1):167-179.   (Google)
Abstract: I have suggested that the prefrontal cortex constitutes an ?executive committee? with five streams coming from posterior cortex and subcortical areas to five pre-frontal executive regions, each of which chairs at least one on-going ?sub-committee? and vies with the other executives for taking over central control of conscious attention and willed action. It is through the dynamic interaction of this executive committee that unified conscious experiences and a sense of continuous self-identity are created. There is growing evidence that the amygdala-orbitofrontal brain circuit, in particular, is crucial to impulse control, ?knowledge of good and evil,? personality, personhood, and even ?how X-me made Y-me do something.? There are striking examples of the ways that orbitofrontal and anterior cingulate ?committee members? can stage an insurrection against the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex executive chair
Fessard, A. E. (1952). Mechanisms of nervous integration and conscious experience. In J. F. Delafresnaye (ed.), Brain Mechanisms and Consciousness. Blackwell.   (Cited by 9 | Google)
Fingelkurts, Andrew A. & Fingerlkurts, Alexander A. (2001). Operational architectonics of the human brain biopotential field: Toward solving the mind-brain problem. Brain and Mind 2 (3):261-296.   (Cited by 38 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The understanding of the interrelationship between brain and mind remains far from clear. It is well established that the brain's capacity to integrate information from numerous sources forms the basis for cognitive abilities. However, the core unresolved question is how information about the "objective" physical entities of the external world can be integrated, and how unifiedand coherent mental states (or Gestalts) can be established in the internal entities of distributed neuronal systems. The present paper offers a unified methodological and conceptual basis for a possible mechanism of how the transient synchronization of brain operations may construct the unified and relatively stable neural states, which underlie mental states. It was shown that the sequence of metastable spatial EEG mosaics does exist and probably reflects the rapid stabilization periods of the interrelation of large neuron systems. At the EEG level this is reflected in the stabilization of quasi-stationary segments on corresponding channels. Within the introduced framework, physical brain processes and psychological processes are considered as two basic aspects of a single whole informational brain state. The relations between operational process of the brain, mental states and consciousness are discussed.
Focquaert, Farah; Braeckman, Johan & Platek, Steven M. (2008). An evolutionary cognitive neuroscience perspective on human self-awareness and theory of mind. Philosophical Psychology 21 (1):47 – 68.   (Google)
Abstract: The evolutionary claim that the function of self-awareness lies, at least in part, in the benefits of theory of mind (TOM) regained attention in light of current findings in cognitive neuroscience, including mirror neuron research. Although certain non-human primates most likely possess mirror self-recognition skills, we claim that they lack the introspective abilities that are crucial for human-like TOM. Primate research on TOM skills such as emotional recognition, seeing versus knowing and ignorance versus knowing are discussed. Based upon current findings in cognitive neuroscience, we provide evidence in favor of an introspection-based simulation theory account of human mindreading
Frith, Christopher D. (1992). Consciousness, information processing, and the brain. Journal of Psychopharmacology 6:436-40.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Gaillard, Jean-Michel (2000). Neurobiological correlates of the unlocking of the unconscious. International Journal of Intensive Short-Term Dynamic Psychotherapy 14 (4):89-107.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Gallup, Gordon G. & Platek, Steven M. (2001). Cognitive empathy presupposes self-awareness: Evidence from phylogeny, ontogeny, neuropsychology, and mental illness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (1):36-37.   (Google)
Abstract: We argue that cognitive empathy and other instances of mental state attribution are a byproduct of self-awareness. Evidence is brought to bear on this proposition from comparative psychology, early child development, neuropsychology, and abnormal behavior
Gallese, Vittorio (2005). Embodied simulation: From neurons to phenomenal experience. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (1):23-48.   (Cited by 34 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The same neural structures involved in the unconscious modeling of our acting body in space also contribute to our awareness of the lived body and of the objects that the world contains. Neuroscientific research also shows that there are neural mechanisms mediating between the multi-level personal experience we entertain of our lived body, and the implicit certainties we simultaneously hold about others. Such personal and body-related experiential knowledge enables us to understand the actions performed by others, and to directly decode the emotions and sensations they experience. A common functional mechanism is at the basis of both body awareness and basic forms of social understanding: embodied simulation. It will be shown that the present proposal is consistent with some of the perspectives offered by phenomenology
Gallagher, Shaun (2003). Phenomenology and neurophenomenology: An interview with Shaun Gallagher. Aluze 2:92-102.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Gastaut, H. (1954). The brain stem and cerebral electrogenesis in relation to consciousness. In J. F. Delafresnaye (ed.), Brain Mechanisms and Consciousness. Blackwell.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Gazzaniga, Michael S. (1988). Brain modularity: Toward a philosophy of conscious experience. In Anthony J. Marcel & E. Bisiach (eds.), Consciousness in Contemporary Science. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 27 | Google)
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Abstract: Psychology is dead. The self is a fiction invented by the brain. Brain plasticity isn?t all it?s cracked up to be. Our conscious learning is an observation post factum, a recollection of something already accomplished by the brain. We don?t learn to speak; speech is generated when the brain is ready to say something. False memories are more prevalent than one might think, and they aren?t all that bad. We think we?re in charge of our lives, but actually we are not. On top of all this, the common belief that reading to a young child will make her brain more attuned to reading is simply untrue
Georgiev, Danko, Interneuronal macroscopic quantum coherence in the brain cortex! The role of the intrasynaptic adhesive proteins beta-neurexin and neuroligin-.   (Google)
Abstract: There are many blank areas in understanding the brain dynamics and especially how it gives rise to consciousness. Quantum mechanics is believed to be capable of explaining the enigma of conscious experience, however till now there is not good enough model considering both the data from clinical neurology and having some explanatory power! In this paper is presented a novel model in defence of macroscopic quantum events within and between neural cells. The beta-neurexin-neuroligin-1 link is claimed to be not just the core of the central neural synapse, instead it is a device mediating entanglement between the cytoskeletons of the cortical neurons. Thus a macroscopic quantum state can extend throughout large brain cortical areas and the subsequent collapse of the wavefunction could affect simultaneously the subneuronal events in millions of neurons. The beta-neurexin-neuroligin-1 complex also controls the process of exocytosis and provides an interesting and simple mechanism for retrograde signalling during learning-dependent changes in synaptic connectivity
Globus, Gordon G.; Maxwell, Grover & Savodnik, I. (eds.) (1975). Consciousness and the Brain. Plenum Press.   (Google)
Gray, Charles M. & di Prisco, Gonzalo V. (1997). Stimulus-dependent neuronal oscillations and local synchonization in striate cortex of the alert cat. Journal of Neuroscience 17 (9).   (Google)
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Hameroff, Stuart R. (ms). The brain is both neurocomputer and quantum computer.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: _Figure 1. Dendrites and cell bodies of schematic neurons connected by dendritic-dendritic gap junctions form a laterally connected input_ _layer (“dendritic web”) within a neurocomputational architecture. Dendritic web dynamics are temporally coupled to gamma synchrony_ _EEG, and correspond with integration phases of “integrate and fire” cycles. Axonal firings provide input to, and output from, integration_ _phases (only one input, and three output axons are shown). Cell bodies/soma contain nuclei shown as black circles; microtubule networks_ _pervade the cytoplasm. According to the Orch OR theory, gamma EEG-synchronized integration phases include quantum computations in_ _microtubule networks which culminate with conscious moments. Insert closeup shows a gap junction through which microtubule quantum_ _states entangle among different neurons, enabling macroscopic quantum states in dendritic webs extending throughout cortex and other_ _brain regions._
Heilman, K. M. (2000). Emotional experience: A neurological model. In Richard D. R. Lane, L. Nadel, G. L. Ahern, J. Allen & Alfred W. Kaszniak (eds.), Cognitive Neuroscience of Emotion. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 18 | Google)
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Karo, Roland & Friedenthal, Meelis (2008). Kenōsis, anamnēsis, and our place in history: A neurophenomenological account. Zygon 43 (4):823-836.   (Google)
Abstract: We assess St. Paul's account of kenōsis in Philippians 2:5–8 from a neurophenomenological horizon. We argue that kenōsis is not primarily a unique event but belongs to a class of experiences that could be called kenotic and are, at least in principle, to some degree accessible to all human beings. These experiences can be well analyzed, making use of both a phenomenological approach and the cognitive neuroscience of altered states of consciousness. We argue that kenotic experiences are ecstatic, in that they involve—both phenomenologically and neurologically—one's "stepping out of" his/her self and history. This seemingly impossible task of stepping out has led to the understanding of kenōsis as a unique event. We conclude that kenotic experiences are continuous with common, everyday experiences of the self's intimate communion with everything that exists. This means that kenotic Christology does not necessarily have to rest solely on the scriptures but can also be arrived at by way of the worldly experiences of actual, living persons
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Kotchoubey, Boris; Kübler, Andrea; Strehl, Ute; Flor, Herta & Birbaumer, Niels (2002). Can humans perceive their brain states? Consciousness and Cognition 11 (1):98-113.   (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Although the brain enables us to perceive the external world and our body, it remains unknown whether brain processes themselves can be perceived. Brain tissue does not have receptors for its own activity. However, the ability of humans to acquire self-control of brain processes indicates that the perception of these processes may also be achieved by learning. In this study patients learned to control low-frequency components of their EEG: the so-called slow cortical potentials (SCPs). In particular ''probe'' sessions, the patients estimated the quality of the SCP shift they had produced in the preceding trial. The correspondence between the recorded SCP amplitudes and the subjective estimates increased with training. The ability to perceive the SCPs was related to the ability to control them; this perception was not mediated by peripheral variables such as changes in muscle tonus and cannot be reduced to simple vigilance monitoring. These data provide evidence that humans can learn to perceive the neural activity of their brain. Alternative interpretations are discussed
Kretz, Robert K. (2000). The evolution of self-awareness: Advances in neurological understandings since Julian Jaynes' "bicameral mind". Dissertation Abstracts International 60.   (Google)
LaBerge, David (2006). Apical dendrite activity in cognition and consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 15 (2):235-257.   (Google)
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Libet, Benjamin W. (2003). Cerebral physiology of conscious experience: Experimental studies in human subjects. In Naoyuki Osaka (ed.), Neural Basis of Consciousness. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
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Abstract: A broad range of evidence regarding the functional organization of the vertebrate brain – spanning from comparative neurology to experimental psychology and neurophysiology to clinical data – is reviewed for its bearing on conceptions of the neural organization of consciousness. A novel principle relating target selection, action selection, and motivation to one another, as a means to optimize integration for action in real time, is introduced. With its help, the principal macrosystems of the vertebrate brain can be seen to form a centralized functional design in which an upper brain stem system organized for conscious function performs a penultimate step in action control. This upper brain stem system retained a key role throughout the evolutionary process by which an expanding forebrain – culminating in the cerebral cortex of mammals – came to serve as a medium for the elaboration of conscious contents. This highly conserved upper brainstem system, which extends from the roof of the midbrain to the basal diencephalon, integrates the massively parallel and distributed information capacity of the cerebral hemispheres into the limited-capacity, sequential mode of operation required for coherent behavior. It maintains special connective relations with cortical territories implicated in attentional and conscious functions, but is not rendered nonfunctional in the absence of cortical input. This helps explain the purposive, goal-directed behavior exhibited by mammals after experimental decortication, as well as the evidence that children born without a cortex are conscious. Taken together these circumstances suggest that brainstem mechanisms are integral to the constitution of the conscious state, and that an adequate account of neural mechanisms of conscious function cannot be confined to the thalamocortical complex alone. (Published Online May 1 2007) Key Words: action selection; anencephaly; central decision making; consciousness; control architectures; hydranencephaly; macrosystems; motivation; target selection; zona incerta
Miller, Arthur I. (2007). Unconscious thought, intuition, and visual imagery: A critique of "working memory, cerebellum, and creativity". Creativity Research Journal 19 (1):47-48.   (Google | More links)
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Mogi, Ken (online). Creativity and the neural basis of qualia.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In what computational aspect is the brain different from the computer? In what objective measures can the brain said to be “creative”? These are the fundamental questions that concerns the neural basis of human mental activity. Here we discuss several important aspects of the essential computational ingredients of human mind in order to understand the “creative” process going on in the brain. One of the key concepts is the nature of the source of "externality" that adds new ingredients to the system and its output. We argue that in addition to information input and stochasticity, we need to consider a third possibility, namely "dynamics-embedded externality". We discuss how the neural origin of the subjective sensory qualities (qualia) is related to this aspect of creativity. The invariance of qualia under a certain class of transformation, and the mapping of discrete,
Mogi, Ken (1997). Qualia and the brain. Nikkei Science.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: _The concept of qualia describes the unique properties that_ _accompany our senses. It is an essential concept when we try to_ _understand the principle that bridges the neural firings in our_ _brain and our perception. The idea of qualia is also of crucial_ _importance when we try to study the functions of the brain from_ _an objective point of view. Qualia must be part of the_ _mathematical formulation of information we use to understand_ _the function of the brain._
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