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8.2. States of Consciousness (States of Consciousness on PhilPapers)

Backman, S. B.; Fiset, P. & Plourde, G. (2004). Cholinergic mechanisms mediating anesthetic induced altered states of consciousness. Progress in Brain Research 145:197-206.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Dennis, Geoffrey W. (2008). The use of water as a medium for altered states of consciousness in early jewish mysticism: A cross-disciplinary analysis. Anthropology of Consciousness 19 (1):84-106.   (Google)
Abstract: This article combines the disciplines of textual/linguistic analysis, anthropology, and perceptual psychology to examine selected ancient Jewish mystical texts that claim to describe the praxis for ascents into heaven and encounters with angelic spirits in order to reconstruct the psychosocial context of these literary works. Specifically, the article examines Hekhalot or "Divine Palaces" texts that deal with hydromancy, giving attention to their mythic–symbolic assumptions, their described preparatory and triggering rituals, and their accounts of the ASC (altered states of consciousness) visions resulting from these rituals that are experienced by the practitioners. The article suggests that these accounts correlate with ASC practices identified in the literature and additionally suggests that although the mystical texts are written to resemble biblical accounts of revelatory experiences, the texts under consideration are more than works of fabulous imagination; they are literary artifacts of an actual ecstatic ASC praxis among the Jews of Late Antiquity
Hanegraaff, Wouter J. (2008). Altered states of knowledge: The attainment of gnōsis in the hermetica. International Journal of the Platonic Tradition 2 (2):128-163.   (Google)
Abstract: Research into the so-called “philosophical” Hermetica has long been dominated by the foundational scholarship of André-Jean Festugière, who strongly emphasized their Greek and philosophical elements. Since the late 1970s, this perspective has given way to a new and more complex one, due to the work of another French scholar, Jean-Pierre Mahé, who could profit from the discovery of new textual sources, and called much more attention to the Egyptian and religious dimensions of the hermetic writings. This article addresses the question of how, on these foundations, we should evaluate and understand the frequent hermetic references to profound but wholly ineffable revelatory and salvational insights received during “ecstatic” states. Festugière dismissed them as “literary fictions”, whereas Mahé took them much more seriously as possibly reflecting ritual practices that took place in hermetic communities. Based upon close reading of three central texts (CH I, CH XIII, NH VI6), and challenging existing translations and interpretations, this article argues that the authors of the hermetic corpus assumed a sequential hierarchy of “levels of knowledge”, in which the highest and most profound knowledge (gnōsis) is attained only during ecstatic or “altered” states of consciousness that transcend rationality. While the hermetic teachings have often been described as unsystematic, inconsistent, incoherent or confused, in fact they are grounded in a precise and carefully formulated doctrine of how the hermetic initiate may move from the domain of mere rational discourse to the attainment of several “trans-rational” stages of direct experiential knowledge, and thereby from the limited and temporal domain of material reality to the unlimited and eternal one of Mind
Krippner, Stanley & George, L. (1986). Psi phenomena as related to altered states of consciousness. In Benjamin B. Wolman & M. Ullman (eds.), Handbook of States of Consciousness. Van Nostrand Reinhold.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Palmer, John (1998). Parapsychology, anomaly, and altered states of consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (2):302-303.   (Google)
Revonsuo, Antti; Kallio, Sakari & Sikka, Pilleriin (2009). What is an altered state of consciousness? Philosophical Psychology 22 (2):187 – 204.   (Google)
Abstract: “Altered State of Consciousness” (ASC) has been defined as a changed overall pattern of conscious experience, or as the subjective feeling and explicit recognition that one's own subjective experience has changed. We argue that these traditional definitions fail to draw a clear line between altered and normal states of consciousness (NSC). We outline a new definition of ASC and argue that the proper way to understand the concept of ASC is to regard it as a representational notion: the alteration that has happened is not an alteration of consciousness (or subjective experience) per se, but an alteration in the informational or representational relationships between consciousness and the world. An altered state of consciousness is defined as a state in which the neurocognitive background mechanisms of consciousness have an increased tendency to produce misrepresentations such as hallucinations, delusions, and memory distortions. Paradigm examples of such generally misrepresentational, temporary, and reversible states are dreaming, psychotic episodes, psychedelic drug experiences, some epileptic seizures, and hypnosis in highly hypnotizable subjects. The representational definition of ASC should be applied in the theoretical and empirical studies of ASCs to unify and clarify the conceptual basis of ASC research
Roussel, Jean-Robert & Bachelor, Alexandra (2000). Altered state and phenomenology of consciousness in schizophrenia. Imagination, Cognition and Personality 20 (2):141-159.   (Google)
Sidky, H. (2009). A shaman's cure: The relationship between altered states of consciousness and shamanic healing. Anthropology of Consciousness 20 (2):171-197.   (Google)
Abstract: This study, which is based upon ethnographic data collected between 1999 and 2008 in Nepal, examines the connection between the shaman's altered states of consciousness (ASC; i.e., what goes on inside the healer's mind/brain) and therapeutic changes that take place in the patient's mind/body. Unlike other studies that primarily emphasize the shaman's internal psychological state, this article attempts to explain the role of the healer's ASC and elucidate how desired therapeutic changes depend upon patient–healer interactions. This question is explored in the context of a healing ritual highlighting various aspects of the cosmology of Nepalese shamans
Talbot, L. R. & Whitaker, H. A. (1994). Brain-injured persons in an altered state of consciousness: Measures and intervention strategies. Brain Injury 8:689-99.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)

8.2a Consciousness, Sleep, and Dreaming

Antrobus, John S. (2000). How does the dreaming brain explain the dreaming mind? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):904-907.   (Google)
Abstract: Recent work on functional brain architecture during dreaming provides invaluable clues for an understanding of dreaming, but identifying active brain regions during dreaming, together with their waking cognitive and cognitive functions, informs a model that accounts for only the grossest characteristics of dreaming. Improved dreaming models require cross discipline apprehension of what it is we want dreaming models to “explain.” [Hobson et al.; Neilsen; Revonsuo; Solms]
Arden, J. B. (1996). Consciousness, Dreams, and Self: A Transdisciplinary Approach. Psychosocial Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Baruss, Imants (2003). Dreams. In Imants Baruss (ed.), Alterations of Consciousness: An Empirical Analysis for Social Scientists. American Psychological Association.   (Google)
Baruss, Imants (2003). Sleep. In Imants Baruss (ed.), Alterations of Consciousness: An Empirical Analysis for Social Scientists. American Psychological Association.   (Google)
Bassetti, Claudio (2001). Disturbances of consciousness and sleep-wake functions. In Julien Bogousslavsky & Louis R. Caplan (eds.), Stroke Syndromes. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Bentley, E. (2000). Awareness: Biorhythms, Sleep and Dreaming. Routledge.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Blackmore, Susan J. (1991). Lucid dreaming: Awake in your sleep? Skeptical Inquirer 15:362-370.   (Google)
Abstract: What could it mean to be conscious in your dreams? For most of us, dreaming is something quite separate from normal life. When we wake up from being chased by a ferocious tiger, or seduced by a devastatingly good-looking Nobel Prize winner we realize with relief or disappointment that "it was only a dream."
Bosinelli, M. (1995). Mind and consciousness during sleep. Behavioural Brain Research 69:195-201.   (Cited by 27 | Google)
Brereton, Derek P. (2000). Dreaming, adaptation, and consciousness: The social mapping hypothesis. Ethos 28 (3):377-409.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Brewer, Bill (2001). Precis of perception and reason, and response to commentator (michael ayers). Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.   (Google)
Abstract: What is the role of conscious perceptual experience in the acquisition of empirical knowledge? My central claim is that a proper account of the way in which perceptual experiences contribute to our understanding of the most basic beliefs about particular things in the mind-independent world around us reveals how such experiences provide peculiarly fundamental reasons for such beliefs. There are, I claim, epistemic requirements upon the very possibility of empirical belief. The crucial epistemological role of experiences lies in their essential contribution to the subject’s understanding of certain perceptual demonstrative contents, simply grasping which provides him with a reason to endorse them in belief. Part I of my book argues that this must be so; Part II explains in detail how it is so
Broughton, R. J. (1982). Human consciousness and sleep/waking rhythms: A review and some neuropsychological considerations. Journal of Clinical Neuropsychology 4:193-218.   (Cited by 29 | Google)
Cicogna, P. & Bosinelli, M. (2001). Consciousness during dreams. Consciousness and Cognition 10 (1):26-41.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Two aspects of consciousness are first considered: consciousness as awareness (phenomenological meaning) and consciousness as strategic control (functional meaning). As to awareness, three types can be distinguished: first, awareness as the phenomenal experiences of objects and events; second, awareness as meta-awareness, i.e., the awareness of mental life itself; third, awareness as self-awareness, i.e., the awareness of being oneself. While phenomenal experience and self-awareness are usually present during dreaming (even if many modifications are possible), meta-awareness is usually absent (apart from some particular experiences of self-reflectiveness) with the major exception of lucid dreaming. Consciousness as strategic control may also be present in dreams. The functioning of consciousness is then analyzed, following a cognitive model of dream production. In such a model, the dream is supposed to be the product of the interaction of three components: (a) the bottom-up activation of mnemonic elements coming from LTM systems, (b) interpretative and elaborative top-down processes, and (c) monitoring of phenomenal experience. A feedback circulation is activated among the components, where the top-down interpretative organization and the conscious monitoring of the oneiric scene elicitates other mnemonic contents, according to the requirements of the dream plot. This dream productive activity is submitted to unconscious and conscious processes
Combs, Allan & Krippner, Stanley (1998). Dream sleep and waking reality: A dynamical view. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness II. MIT Press.   (Google)
Drewitt, J. A. J. (1911). On the distinction between waking and dreaming. Mind 20 (77):67-73.   (Google | More links)
Flanagan, Owen J. (1997). Prospects for a unified theory of consciousness or, what dreams are made of. In Jonathan D. Cohen & Jonathan W. Schooler (eds.), Scientific Approaches to Consciousness. Lawrence Erlbaum.   (Cited by 9 | Google)
Foulkes, D. (1990). Dreaming and consciousness. European Journal of Cognitive Psychology 2:39-55.   (Cited by 15 | Google)
Gackenbach, J. & LaBerge, S. (1988). Conscious Mind, Sleeping Brain: Perspectives on Lucid Dreaming. Plenum Press.   (Cited by 15 | Google)
Green, Christopher D. & McGreery, C. (1994). Lucid Dreaming: The Paradox of Consciousness During Sleep. Routledge.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Abstract: Throughout, there are many case histories to illustrate the text.
Hearne, K. M. (1992). Prolucid dreaming, lucid dreams, and consciousness. Journal of Mental Imagery 16:119-123.   (Google)
Hobson, Allan (2004). A model for madness? Dream consciousness: Our understanding of the neurobiology of sleep offers insight into abnormalities in the waking brain. Nature 430 (6995):21.   (Google)
Hobson, J. Allan; Pace-Schott, Edward F. & Stickgold, Robert (2000). Consciousness: Its vicissitudes in waking and sleep. In Michael S. Gazzaniga (ed.), The New Cognitive Neurosciences: 2nd Edition. MIT Press.   (Cited by 33 | Google)
Hobson, J. Allan; Pace-Schott, Edward F. & Stickgold, Robert (2000). Dreaming and the brain: Toward a cognitive neuroscience of conscious states. Behavioral And Brain Sciences 23 (6):793-842; 904-1018; 1083-1121.   (Cited by 214 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Sleep researchers in different disciplines disagree about how fully dreaming can be explained in terms of brain physiology. Debate has focused on whether REM sleep dreaming is qualitatively different from nonREM (NREM) sleep and waking. A review of psychophysiological studies shows clear quantitative differences between REM and NREM mentation and between REM and waking mentation. Recent neuroimaging and neurophysiological studies also differentiate REM, NREM, and waking in features with phenomenological implications. Both evidence and theory suggest that there are isomorphisms between the phenomenology and the physiology of dreams. We present a three-dimensional model with specific examples from normally and abnormally changing conscious states. Key Words: consciousness; dreaming; neuroimaging; neuromodulation; NREM; phenomenology; qualia; REM; sleep
Hobson, J. Allan; Pace-Schott, Edward F. & Stickgold, Robert (2003). Dreaming and the brain: Toward a cognitive neuroscience of conscious states. In Edward F. Pace-Schott, Mark Solms, Mark Blagrove & Stevan Harnad (eds.), Sleep and Dreaming: Scientific Advances and Reconsiderations. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 216 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Sleep researchers in different disciplines disagree about how fully dreaming can be explained in terms of brain physiology. Debate has focused on whether REM sleep dreaming is qualitatively different from nonREM (NREM) sleep and waking. A review of psychophysiological studies shows clear quantitative differences between REM and NREM mentation and between REM and waking mentation. Recent neuroimaging and neurophysiological studies also differentiate REM, NREM, and waking in features with phenomenological implications. Both evidence and theory suggest that there are isomorphisms between the phenomenology and the physiology of dreams. We present a three-dimensional model with specific examples from normally and abnormally changing conscious states. Key Words: consciousness; dreaming; neuroimaging; neuromodulation; NREM; phenomenology; qualia; REM; sleep
Hobson, J. Allan & Pace-Schott, Edward F. (2002). The cognitive neuroscience of sleep: Neuronal systems, consciousness and learning. Nature Reviews Neuroscience 3:679-93.   (Cited by 171 | Google | More links)
Stickgold, R. & Hobson, J. Allan (1995). The conscious state paradigm: A neurocognitive approach to waking, sleeping, and dreaming. In Michael S. Gazzaniga (ed.), The Cognitive Neurosciences. MIT Press.   (Cited by 13 | Google)
Hobson, J. Allan (1998). The conscious state paradigm: A neuropsychological analysis of waking, sleeping, and dreaming. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness II. MIT Press.   (Google)
Hobson, J. Allan (2003). The Dream Drugstore: Chemically Altered States of Consciousness. MIT Press.   (Cited by 20 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In this book J. Allan Hobson offers a new understanding of altered states of consciousness based on knowledge of how our brain chemistry is balanced when we are...
Johnstone Jr, Henry W. (1973). Toward a philosophy of sleep. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 34 (September):73-81.   (Google)
Jones, B. E. (1998). The neural basis of consciousness across the sleep-waking cycle. In H. Jasper, L. Descarries, V. Castellucci & S. Rossignol (eds.), Consciousness: At the Frontiers of Neuroscience. Lippincott-Raven.   (Cited by 25 | Google)
Kahan, Tracey L. & LaBerge, S. (1996). Cognition and metacognition in dreaming and waking: Comparisons of first and third-person ratings. Dreaming 6:235-249.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Kahan, Tracey L. (2001). Consciousness in dreaming: A metacognitive approach. In Kelly Bulkeley (ed.), Dreams: A Reader on Religious, Cultural, and Psychological Dimensions of Dreaming. Palgrave.   (Google)
Kahn, David; Pace-Schott, Edward F. & Hobson, J. Allan (1997). Consciousness in waking and dreaming: The roles of neuronal oscillation and neuromodulation in determining similarities and differences. Neuroscience 78:13-38.   (Google)
Kahan, Tracey L. & LaBerge, S. (1994). Lucid dreaming as metacognition: Implications for cognitive science. Consciousness and Cognition 3:246-64.   (Cited by 13 | Google)
Kahn, David & Hobson, J. Allan (2003). State dependence of character perception: Implausibility differences in dreaming and waking consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (3):57-68.   (Google)
Khan, D.; Krippner, Stanley & Combs, Allan (2000). Dreaming and the self-organizing brain. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7:4-11.   (Google)
King, C. Daly (1947). Dream and the problem of consciousness. Journal of General Psychology 37:15-24.   (Google)
Kleitman, N. (1957). Sleep, wakefulness, and consciousness. Psychological Bulletin 54:354-359.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Kozmová, Miloslava & Wolman, Richard N. (2006). Self-awareness in dreaming. Dreaming 16 (3):196-214.   (Google)
Krippner, Stanley & Combs, Allan (2000). Self-organization in the dreaming brain. Journal of Mind and Behavior 21 (4):399-412.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
LaBerge, S. (1998). Dreaming and consciousness. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness II. MIT Press.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
LaBerge, S. (1985). Lucid Dreaming. J.   (Cited by 98 | Google | More links)
LaBerge, S.; Levitan, L. & Dement, W. C. (1986). Lucid dreaming: Physiological correlates of consciousness during Rem sleep. Journal of Mind and Behavior 7:251-258.   (Cited by 12 | Google)
LaBerge, S. (1990). Lucid dreaming: Psychophysiological studies of consciousness during Rem sleep. In R. Bootsen, John F. Kihlstrom & Daniel L. Schacter (eds.), Sleep and Cognition. American Psychological Association Press.   (Cited by 86 | Google | More links)
LaBerge, S. & DeGracia, D. (2000). Varieties of lucid dreaming experience. In Robert G. Kunzendorf & B. Alan Wallace (eds.), Individual Differences in Conscious Experience. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Lindsley, D. B. (1960). Attention, consciousness, sleep, and wakefulness. In H. W. Magoun & V. Hall (eds.), Handbook of Physiology. Section I: Neurophysiology. American Physiological Society.   (Cited by 44 | Google)
Mahowald, Mark W. (2004). Commentary on Sleep and Dream Suppression Following a Lateral Medullary Infarct: A First Person Account by J. Allan Hobson. Consciousness and Cognition 13 (1):134-137.   (Google | More links)
Makeig, S.; Jung, T. & Sejnowski, Terrence J. (2000). Awareness during drowsiness: Dynamics and electrophysiological correlates. Canadian Journal of Experimental Psychology 54 (4):266-273.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Maquet, Pierre; Ruby, P.; Maudoux, A.; Albouy, G.; Sterpenich, V.; Dan-Vu, T.; Desseilles, M.; Boly, Melanie; Perrin, Fabien; Peigneux, Philippe & Laureys, Steven (2006). Human cognition during Rem sleep and the activity profile within frontal and parietal cortices. A reappraisal of functional neuroimaging data. In Steven Laureys (ed.), Boundaries of Consciousness. Elsevier.   (Google)
Monnier, M. (1952). Experimental work on sleep and other variations of consciousness. In H. A. Abramson (ed.), Problems of Consciousness: Transactions of the Third Conference. Josiah Macy Foundation.   (Google)
Moorcroft, W. & Breitenstein, J. (2000). Awareness of time during sleep. Annals of Medicine 32 (4):236-238.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Munglani, R. & Jones, J. G. (1992). Sleep and general anesthesia as altered states of consciousness. Journal of Psychopharmacology 6:399-409.   (Google)
Pare, D. & Llinas, R. (1995). Conscious and pre-conscious processes as seen from the standpoint of sleep-waking cycle neurophysiology. Neuropsychologia 33:1155-1168.   (Cited by 44 | Google | More links)
Revonsuo, Antti (1995). Consciousness, dreams and virtual realities. Philosophical Psychology 8 (1):35-58.   (Cited by 87 | Google)
Abstract: In this paper I develop the thesis that dreams are essential to an understanding of waking consciousness. In the first part I argue in opposition to the philosophers Malcolm and Dennett that empirical evidence now shows dreams to be real conscious experiences. In the second part, three questions concerning consciousness research are addressed. (1) How do we isolate the system to be explained (consciousness) from other systems? (2) How do we describe the system thus isolated? (3) How do we reveal the mechanisms on which this system is based? I suggest that empirical dream research combined with other empirical approaches can help us to sketch answers to all of these questions. I argue that the subjective form of dreams reveals the subjective, macro-level form of consciousness in general and that both dreams and the everyday phenomenal world may be thought of as constructed “virtual realities”. A major task for empirical consciousness research is to find out the mechanisms which bind this experienced world into a coherent whole
Rowland, Eleanor H. (1909). A case of visual sensations during sleep. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 6 (13):353-357.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Rusalova, M. N. (2006). Frequency-amplitude characteristics of the EEG at different levels of consciousness. Neuroscience and Behavioral Physiology 36 (4):351-358.   (Google | More links)
Simon, C. W. & Emmons, W. (1956). Consciousness, and sleep. Science 124:1066-1069.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Solms, Mark (2002). Dreaming: Cholinergic and dopaminergic hypotheses. In Elaine Perry, Heather Ashton & Allan Young (eds.), Neurochemistry of Consciousness: Neurotransmitters in Mind. Advances in Consciousness Research. John Benjamins.   (Google)
Stoyva, J. & Kamiya, J. (1968). Electrophysiological studies of dreaming as the prototype of a new strategy in the study of consciousness. Psychological Review 75:192-205.   (Cited by 15 | Google)
Tulku, Tarab (2000). Lucid dreaming: Exerting the creativity of the unconscious. In Gay Watson, Stephen Batchelor & Guy Claxton (eds.), The Psychology of Awakening: Buddhism, Science, and Our Day-to-Day Lives. Samuel Weiser.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Valli, Katja & Revonsuo, Antti (2006). Recurrent dreams: Recurring threat simulations? Consciousness and Cognition 15 (2):464-469.   (Google)
Windt, Jennifer Michelle & Metzinger, Thomas (2007). The philosophy of dreaming and self-consciousness: What happens to the experiential subject during the dream state? In Deirdre Barrett & Patrick McNamara (eds.), The New Science of Dreaming Vol 3: Cultural and Theoretical Perspectives. Praeger Publishers/Greenwood Publishing Group.   (Google)
Zadra, Antonio; Desjardins, Sophie & Marcotte, Éric (2006). Evolutionary function of dreams: A test of the threat simulation theory in recurrent dreams. Consciousness and Cognition 15 (2):450-463.   (Google)

8.2b Hypnosis and Consciousness

Alexander, A.; Andrew, A.; Sakari, Kallio & Antti, Revonsuo (2007). Hypnosis induces a changed composition of brain oscillations in EEG: A case study. Contemporary Hypnosis 24 (1):3-18.   (Google)
Araoz, Daniel L. (2001). The unconscious in Ericksonian hypnotherapy. Australian Journal of Clinical Hypnotherapy and Hypnosis 22 (2):78-92.   (Google)
Baruss, Imants (2003). Hypnosis. In Imants Baruss (ed.), Alterations of Consciousness: An Empirical Analysis for Social Scientists. American Psychological Association.   (Google)
Bayne, Tim (2007). Hypnosis and the unity of consciousness. In Graham A. Jamieson (ed.), Hypnosis and Conscious States: The Cognitive Neuroscience Perspective. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Hypnosis appears to generate unusual—and sometimes even astonishing—changes in the contents of consciousness. Hypnotic subjects report perceiving things that are not there, they report not perceiving things that are there, and they report unusual alterations in the phenomenology of agency. In addition to apparent alterations in the contents of consciousness, hypnosis also appears to involve alterations in the structure of consciousness. According to many theorists—most notably Hilgard—hypnosis demonstrates that the unity of consciousness is an illusion (Hilgard 1977)
Beahrs, J. O. (1983). Co-consciousness: A common denominator in hypnosis, multiple personality, and normalcy. American Journal of Clinical Hypnosis 26:100-13.   (Cited by 10 | Google)
Beahrs, J. O. (1982). Unity and Multiplicity: Multilevel Consciousness of Self in Hypnosis, Psychiatric Disorder, and Mental Health. Brunner/Mazel.   (Cited by 37 | Google)
Benner, D. G. & Evans, C. Stephen (1984). Unity and multiplicity in hypnosis, commissurotomy, and multiple personality disorder. Journal of Mind and Behavior 5:423-431.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Binet, Alfred (1884). Visual hallucinations in hypnotism. Mind 9 (35):413-415.   (Google | More links)
Block, Ned (2002). Behaviorism revisited. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):977-978.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: O'Regan and Noe declare that the qualitative character of experience is constituted by the nature of the sensorimotor contingencies at play when we perceive. Sensorimotor contingencies are a highly restricted set of input-output relations. The restriction excludes contingencies that don’t essentially involve perceptual systems. Of course if the ‘sensory’ in ‘sensorimotor’ were to be understood mentalistically, the thesis would not be of much interest, so I assume that these contingencies are to be understood non-mentalistically. Contrary to their view, experience is a matter of what mediates between input and output, not input-output relations all by themselves. However, instead of mounting a head-on collision with their view, I think it will be more useful to consider a consequence of their view that admits of obvious counterexamples. The consequence consists of two claims: (1) any two systems that share that highly restricted set of input-output relations are therefor experientially the same and (2) conversely, any two systems that share experience must share these sensorimotor contingencies. Once stated, the view is so clearly wrong that my ascription of it to them might be challenged. At least it is a consequence of a major strand in their view. Perhaps this will be an opportunity for them to disassociate themselves from it. I will limit myself to (1)
Boly, Mélanie; Faymonville, Marie-Elisabeth; Vogt, Brent A.; Maquet, Pierre & Laureys, Steven (2007). Hypnotic regulation of consciousness and the pain neuromatrix. In Graham A. Jamieson (ed.), Hypnosis and Conscious States: The Cognitive Neuroscience Perspective. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Borch-Jacobsen, Mikkel (2005). Simulating the unconscious. Psychoanalysis and History 7 (1):5-20.   (Google)
Bryant, Richard A. & Mallard, David (2003). Seeing is believing: The reality of hypnotic hallucinations. Consciousness and Cognition 12 (2):219-230.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Burgess, Adrian (2007). On the contribution of neurophysiology to hypnosis research: Current state and future directions. In Graham A. Jamieson (ed.), Hypnosis and Conscious States: The Cognitive Neuroscience Perspective. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
C., M. & P., W. (2003). Hypnotic control of attention in the stroop task: A historical footnote. Consciousness and Cognition 12 (3):347-353.   (Google)
Abstract: have recently provided a compelling demonstration of enhanced attentional control under post-hypnotic suggestion. Using the classic color-word interference paradigm, in which the task is to ignore a word and to name the color in which it is printed (e.g., RED in green, say ''green''), they gave a post-hypnotic instruction to participants that they would be unable to read. This eliminated Stroop interference in high suggestibility participants but did not alter interference in low suggestibility participants. replicated this pattern and further demonstrated that it is not due to a visual strategy (such as blurring or looking at a different location). As a historical footnote, we describe a ''case study'' from 18 years ago in which we observed the same result using a hypnotic instruction to a single highly suggestible individual that he could not read. The elimination of Stroop interference has important implications for both the study of attention and the study of hypnosis
Cheyne, J. A.; Rueffer, S. D. & Newby-Clark, I. R. (1999). Hypnagogic and hypnopompic hallucinations during sleep paralysis: Neurological and cultural construction of the night-Mare. Consciousness and Cognition 8 (3):319-337.   (Google)
Abstract: Hypnagogic and hypnopompic experiences (HHEs) accompanying sleep paralysis (SP) are often cited as sources of accounts of supernatural nocturnal assaults and paranormal experiences. Descriptions of such experiences are remarkably consistent across time and cultures and consistent also with known mechanisms of REM states. A three-factor structural model of HHEs based on their relations both to cultural narratives and REM neurophysiology is developed and tested with several large samples. One factor, labeled Intruder, consisting of sensed presence, fear, and auditory and visual hallucinations, is conjectured to originate in a hypervigilant state initiated in the midbrain. Another factor, Incubus, comprising pressure on the chest, breathing difficulties, and pain, is attributed to effects of hyperpolarization of motoneurons on perceptions of respiration. These two factors have in common an implied alien ''other'' consistent with occult narratives identified in numerous contemporary and historical cultures. A third factor, labeled Unusual Bodily Experiences, consisting of floating/flying sensations, out-of-body experiences, and feelings of bliss, is related to physically impossible experiences generated by conflicts of endogenous and exogenous activation related to body position, orientation, and movement. Implications of this last factor for understanding of orientational primacy in self-consciousness are considered. Central features of the model developed here are consistent with recent work on hallucinations associated with hypnosis and schizophrenia
Cleeremans, Axel & Myin, Erik (1999). A short review of Consciousness in Action by Susan Hurley. Revue Internationale de Philosophie 3:455-458.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Consider Susan Hurley's depiction of mainstream views of the mind: "The mind is a kind of sandwich, and cognition is the filling" (p. 401). This particular sandwich (with perception as the bottom loaf and action as the top loaf) tastes foul to Hurley, who devotes most of "Consciousness in Action" to a systematic and sometimes extraordinarily detailed critique of what has otherwise been dubbed "classical" models of the mind. This critique then provides the basis for her alternative proposal, in which perception, action and environment are deeply intertwined
David, Alvin; Moore, Mark & Rusu, Dan (2002). Unconscious information processing, hypnotic amnesia, and the misattribution of arousal: Schachter and Singer's theory revised. Journal of Cognitive and Behavioral Psychotherapies 2 (1):23-33.   (Google)
De Pascalis, Vilfredo (2007). Phase-ordered gamma oscillations and the modulation of hypnotic experience. In Graham A. Jamieson (ed.), Hypnosis and Conscious States: The Cognitive Neuroscience Perspective. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Dienes, Zoltán & Perner, Josef (2007). Executive control without conscious awareness: The cold control theory of hypnosis. In Graham A. Jamieson (ed.), Hypnosis and Conscious States: The Cognitive Neuroscience Perspective. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Double, Richard (1989). Puppeteers, hypnotists, and neurosurgeons. Philosophical Studies 56 (June):163-73.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Egner, Tobias & Raz, Amir (2007). Cognitive control processes and hypnosis. In Graham A. Jamieson (ed.), Hypnosis and Conscious States: The Cognitive Neuroscience Perspective. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Fingelkurts, Andrew A.; Fingelkurts, Alexander A.; Kallio, Sakari & Revonsuo, Antti (2007). Cortex functional connectivity as a neurophysiological correlate of hypnosis: An EEG case study. Neuropsychologia 45 (7):14521462.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Cortex functional connectivity associated with hypnosis was investigated in a single highly hypnotizable subject in a normal baseline condition

and under neutral hypnosis during two sessions separated by a year. After the hypnotic induction, but without further suggestions as compared to

the baseline condition, all studied parameters of local and remote functional connectivity were significantly changed. The significant differences

between hypnosis and the baseline condition were observable (to different extent) in five studied independent frequency bands (delta, theta, alpha,

beta, and gamma). The results were consistent and stable after 1 year. Based on these findings we conclude that alteration in functional connectivity of the brain may be regarded as a neuronal correlate of hypnosis (at least in very highly hypnotizable subjects) in which separate cognitive modules and subsystems may be temporarily incapable of communicating with each other normally.
Fingelkurts, Alexander A.; Fingelkurts, Andrew A.; Kallio, Sakari & Revonsuo, Antti (2007). HYPNOSIS INDUCES A CHANGED COMPOSITION OF BRAIN OSCILLATIONS IN EEG: A CASE STUDY. Contemporary Hypnosis 24 (1):3-18.   (Google)
Abstract: Cognitive functions associated with the frontal lobes of the brain may be specifi cally involved in hypnosis. Thus, the frontal area of the brain has recently been of great interest when searching for neural changes associated with hypnosis. We tested the hypothesis that EEG during pure hypnosis would differ from the normal non-hypnotic EEG especially above the frontal area of the brain. The composition of brain oscillations was examined in a broad frequency band (130 Hz) in the electroencephalogram (EEG) of a single virtuoso subject. Data was collected in two independent data collection periods separated by one year. The hypnotic and non-hypnotic conditions were repeated multiple times during each data acquisition session. We found that pure hypnosis induced reorganization in the composition of brain oscillations especially in prefrontal and right occipital EEG channels. Additionally, hypnosis was characterized by consistent rightside-dominance asymmetry. In the prefrontal EEG channels the composition of brain oscillations included spectral patterns during hypnosis that were completely different from those observed during non-hypnosis. Furthermore, the EEG spectral patterns observed overall during the hypnotic condition did not return to the pre-hypnotic baseline EEG immediately when hypnosis was terminated. This suggests that for the brain, the return to a normal neurophysiological baseline condition after hypnosis is a time-consuming process. The present results suggest that pure hypnosis is characterized by an increase in alertness and heightened attention, refl ected as cognitive and neuronal activation. Taken together, the present data provide support for the hypothesis that in a very highly hypnotizable person (a hypnotic virtuoso) hypnosis as such may be accompanied by a changed pattern of neural activity in the brain.
Gallagher, Shaun (2005). Review of Alva noë's Action in Perception. Times Literary Supplement.   (Google)
Abstract: In Action in Perception, Alva Noë provides a persuasive account of the “enactive” approach to perception, according to which perception is not simply based on the processing of sensory information, or on the construction of internal representations, but is fundamentally shaped by the motor possibilities of the perceiving body. As John Dewey put it in 1896, in his essay, “The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology”
Gruzelier, John (2005). Altered states of consciousness and hypnosis in the twenty-first century: Comment. Contemporary Hypnosis 22 (1):1-7.   (Google | More links)
Gurney, Edmund (1887). Further problems of hypnotism (I.). Mind 12 (46):212-232.   (Google | More links)
Gurney, Edmund (1887). Further problems of hypnotism (II.). Mind 12 (47):397-422.   (Google | More links)
Gurney, Edmund (1884). The problems of hypnotism. Mind 9 (36):477-508.   (Google | More links)
Gurney, Edmund (1884). The stages of hypnotism. Mind 9 (33):110-121.   (Google | More links)
Hall, G. Stanley (1883). Reaction-time and attention in the hypnotic state. Mind 8 (30):170-182.   (Google | More links)
Hall, G. Stanley (1881). Recent researches on hypnotism. Mind 6 (21):98-104.   (Google | More links)
Hilgard, Ernest R. (1979). Consciousness and control: Lessons from hypnosis. Australian Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis 7:103-15.   (Google)
Hurley, Susan L. (2007). Neural dominance, neural deference, and sensorimotor dynamics. In M. Velmans (ed.), Encyclopedia of Consciousness. Blackwell.   (Google)
Abstract: Why is neural activity in a particular area expressed as experience of red rather than green, or as visual experience rather than auditory? Indeed, why does it have any conscious expression at all? These familiar questions indicate the explanatory gap between neural activity and ‘what it’s like’-- qualities of conscious experience. The comparative explanatory gaps, intermodal and intramodal, can be separated from the absolute explanatory gap and associated zombie issues--why does neural activity have any conscious expression at all?. Here I focus on comparative gaps: why is neural activity in a given area expressed as this type of experience rather than that type of experience?
Jamieson, Graham A., Hypnosis and conscious states: The cognitive neuroscience perspective.   (Google)
Jamieson, Graham A. & Hasegawa, Harutomo (2007). New paradigms of hypnosis research. In Graham A. Jamieson (ed.), Hypnosis and Conscious States: The Cognitive Neuroscience Perspective. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Jamieson, Graham A. (2007). Previews and prospects for the cognitive neuroscience of hypnosis and conscious states. In Graham A. Jamieson (ed.), Hypnosis and Conscious States: The Cognitive Neuroscience Perspective. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Jones, Simon R.; Fernyhough, Charles & Larøi, Frank (2010). A phenomenological survey of auditory verbal hallucinations in the hypnagogic and hypnopompic states. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: The phenomenology of auditory verbal hallucinations (AVHs) occurring in hypnagogic and hypnopompic (H&H) states has received little attention. In a sample of healthy participants ( N = 325), 108 participants reported H&H AVHs and answered subsequent questions on their phenomenology. AVHs in the H&H state were found (1) to be more likely to only feature the occasional clear word than to be clear, (2) to be more likely to be one-off voices than to be recurrent voices, (3) to be more likely to be voices of people known to the individual than unknown persons, (4) to be more likely to talk directly to the person rather than not, and (5) to only rarely give commands, ask questions, or to result in an interactive conversation. Their phenomenology was similar to normative AVHs in wakefulness (as established by previous research) in that the voice-hearer was usually the target of the voice, and the voice was more likely to be of a recognized person. However, H&H AVHs differed from AVHs in wakefulness in that commands and questions were rare, and there was typically no dialogical engagement with the voice. We conclude by proposing that two distinct types of H&H AVHs may exist (which we term “dialogic” and “monologic”), based on an analysis of the phenomenology of the experience, and suggest avenues for future research
Kallio, Sakari & Revonsuo, Antti (2003). Hypnotic phenomena and altered states of consciousness: A multilevel framework of description and explanation. Contemporary Hypnosis 20 (3):111-164.   (Cited by 18 | Google | More links)
Kihlstrom, John F. (2007). Consciousness in hypnosis. In Philip David Zelazo, Morris Moscovitch & Evan Thompson (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness. Cambridge.   (Google)
Kihlstrom, John F. (2005). Is hypnosis an altered state of consciousness or what?: Comment. Contemporary Hypnosis 22 (1):34-38.   (Google | More links)
Kirsch, Irving & Lynn, Steven Jay (2004). Hypnosis and will. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (5):667-668.   (Google)
Abstract: Although we are sympathetic to his central thesis about the illusion of will, having previously advanced a similar proposal, Wegner's account of hypnosis is flawed. Hypnotic behavior derives from specific suggestions that are given, rather than from the induction, of trance, and it can be observed in 90% of the population. Thus, it is very pertinent to the illusion of will. However, Wegner exaggerates the loss of subjective will in hypnosis
Kirsch, Irving (1997). Hypnotic responding and self-deception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):118-119.   (Google)
Abstract: As understood by neodissociation and sociocognitive theorists, hypnotic responses are instances of self-deception. Neodissociation theory matches the strict definition of Sackeim and Gur (1978) and sociocognitive theory matches Mele's looser definition. Recent data indicate that many hypnotized individuals deceive themselves into holding conflicting beliefs without dissociating, but others convince themselves that the suggested state of affairs is true without simultaneously holding a contrary belief
Kunzendorf, Robert G.; Beltz, S. M. & Tymowicz, G. (1992). Self-awareness in autistic subjects and deeply hypnotized subjects: Dissociation of self-concept versus self-consciousness. Imagination, Cognition and Personality 11:129-41.   (Google)
Levy, Donald (1983). Post-hypnotic suggestion and the existence of unconscious mental activity. Analysis 43 (October):184-189.   (Google)
Lynn, Steven Jay; Kirsch, Irving; Knox, Josh; Fassler, Oliver & Lilienfeld, Scott O. (2007). Hypnosis and neuroscience: Implications for the altered state debate. In Graham A. Jamieson (ed.), Hypnosis and Conscious States: The Cognitive Neuroscience Perspective. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
MacLeod, C. M. & Sheehan, P. W. (2003). Hypnotic control of attention in the stroop task: A historical footnote. Consciousness and Cognition 12 (3):347-353.   (Google)
Abstract: have recently provided a compelling demonstration of enhanced attentional control under post-hypnotic suggestion. Using the classic color-word interference paradigm, in which the task is to ignore a word and to name the color in which it is printed (e.g., RED in green, say ''green''), they gave a post-hypnotic instruction to participants that they would be unable to read. This eliminated Stroop interference in high suggestibility participants but did not alter interference in low suggestibility participants. replicated this pattern and further demonstrated that it is not due to a visual strategy (such as blurring or looking at a different location). As a historical footnote, we describe a ''case study'' from 18 years ago in which we observed the same result using a hypnotic instruction to a single highly suggestible individual that he could not read. The elimination of Stroop interference has important implications for both the study of attention and the study of hypnosis
Marone, Fulvio (2002). Suggestions from the unconscious: Freud, hypnosis, and the mind-body problem. In Gertrudis Van de Vijver & Filip Geerardyn (eds.), The Pre-Psychoanalytic Writings of Sigmund Freud. Karnac Books.   (Google)
Margolis, Joseph & Margolis, Clorinda G. (1979). The theory of hypnosis and the concept of persons. Behaviorism 7:97-111.   (Google)
Myers, Frederic W. H. (1887). On a case of alleged hypnotic hyperacuity of vision. Mind 12 (45):154-156.   (Google | More links)
Myers, Frederic W. H. (1893). Professor wundt on hypnotism and suggestion. Mind 2 (5):95-101.   (Google | More links)
Naish, Peter (2005). Detecting hypnotically altered states of consciousness: Comment. Contemporary Hypnosis 22 (1):24-30.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Naish, Peter L. N. (2007). Time distortion, and the nature of hypnosis and consciousness. In Graham A. Jamieson (ed.), Hypnosis and Conscious States: The Cognitive Neuroscience Perspective. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Oakley, David A. (1999). Hypnosis and consciousness: A structural model. Contemporary Hypnosis 16:215-223.   (Cited by 16 | Google | More links)
Ott, Ulrich (2007). States of absorption: In search of neurobiological foundations. In Graham A. Jamieson (ed.), Hypnosis and Conscious States: The Cognitive Neuroscience Perspective. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Pekala, Ronald J. & Kumar, V. K. (2007). An empirical-phenomenological approach to quantifying consciousness and states of consciousness: With particular reference to understanding the nature of hypnosis. In Graham A. Jamieson (ed.), Hypnosis and Conscious States: The Cognitive Neuroscience Perspective. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Pekala, Ronald J. & Kumar, V. K. (2000). Individual differences in patterns of hypnotic experience across low and high hypnotically susceptible individuals. In Robert G. Kunzendorf & Benjamin Wallace (eds.), Individual Differences in Conscious Experience. John Benjamins.   (Google)
Pekala, Ronald J. & Kumar, V. K. (2000). Individual differences in patterns of hypnotic experience across low and high hypnotically susceptible individuals. In (r. Kunzendorf & B. Wallace, eds) individual differences in conscious experience. John Benjamins.   (Google)
Pekala, Ronald J. & Kumar, V. K. (1989). Phenomenological patterns of consciousness during hypnosis: Relevance to cognition and individual differences. Australian Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis 17:1-20.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Pockett, Susan (2004). Hypnosis and the death of "subjective backwards referral". Consciousness and Cognition 13:621-25.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Rainville, Pierre; Hofbauer, Rrrobert K.; Bushnell, M. Catherine; Duncan, Gary H. & Price, Donald D. (2002). Hypnosis modulates activity in brain structures involved in the regulation of consciousness. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 14 (6):887-901.   (Cited by 73 | Google | More links)
Rainville, Pierre & Price, Donald D. (2003). Hypnosis phenomenology and the neurobiology of consciousness. International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis 51 (2):105-29.   (Cited by 16 | Google | More links)
Rossi, Ernest L. & Rossi, Kathryn L. (2006). The neuroscience of observing consciousness & mirror neurons in therapeutic hypnosis. American Journal of Clinical Hypnosis 48 (4):263-278.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Schultz, Johannes; Sebanz, Natalie & Frith, Chris (2004). Conscious will in the absence of ghosts, hypnotists, and other people. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (5):674-675.   (Google)
Abstract: We suggest that certain experiences reported by patients with schizophrenia show that priority, consistency, and exclusivity are not sufficient for the experience of willing an action. Furthermore, we argue that even if priority, consistency, and exclusivity cause the experience of being the author of an action, this does not mean that conscious will is an illusion
Spiegel, David (2005). Multileveling the playing field: Altering our state of consciousness to understand hypnosis: Comment. Contemporary Hypnosis 22 (1):31-33.   (Google)
Spivak, L.; V. Puzenko, S. Medvedev & Polyakov, Y. (1990). Neurophysiological correlates of the altered state of consciousness during hypnosis. Human Physiology 16:405-410.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
T., W. (1888). Prof. Delboeuf on the curative effects of hypnotism. Mind 13 (49):148-152.   (Google | More links)
Woody, Erik & Szechtman, Henry (2007). To see feelingly: Emotion, motivation, and hypnosis. In Graham A. Jamieson (ed.), Hypnosis and Conscious States: The Cognitive Neuroscience Perspective. Oxford University Press.   (Google)

8.2c Meditation and Consciousness

Aftanas, L. I. & Golosheikin, S. A. (2003). Changes in cortical activity in altered states of consciousness: The study of meditation by high-resolution EEG. Human Physiology 29 (2):143-151.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Atkinson, R. P. & Earl, H. (1996). Enhanced vigilance in guided meditation: Implications of altered consciousness. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness. MIT Press.   (Google)
Austin, James H. (1998). Zen and the Brain: Toward an Understanding of Meditation and Consciousness. MIT Press.   (Cited by 111 | Google | More links)
Barušs, Imants (2003). Transcendence. In Imants Baruss (ed.), Alterations of Consciousness: An Empirical Analysis for Social Scientists. American Psychological Association.   (Google)
Fasching, Wolfgang (2008). Consciousness, self-consciousness, and meditation. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (4).   (Google)
Abstract: Many spiritual traditions employ certain mental techniques (meditation) which consist in inhibiting mental activity whilst nonetheless remaining fully conscious, which is supposed to lead to a realisation of one’s own true nature prior to habitual self-substantialisation. In this paper I propose that this practice can be understood as a special means of becoming aware of consciousness itself as such. To explain this claim I conduct some phenomenologically oriented considerations about the nature of consciousness qua presence and the problem of self-presence of this presence
Fontana, David (2007). Meditation. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell.   (Google)
Forman, R. (1998). What does mysticism have to teach us about consciousness? In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness. MIT Press.   (Cited by 22 | Google)
Goleman, Daniel (1976). Meditation and consciousness: An asian approach to mental health. American Journal of Psychotherapy 30:41-54.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Griffiths, Paul J. (1986). On Being Mindless: Buddhist Meditation And The Mind-Body Problem. La Salle: Open Court.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Hanna, Fred J. (2000). Dissoving the center: Streamlining the mind and dismantling the self. In Tobin Hart, Peter L. Nelson & Kaisa Puhakka (eds.), Transpersonal Knowing: Exploring the Horizon of Consciousness. State University of New York Press.   (Google)
Humphrey, N. (2000). One self: A meditation on the unity of consciousness. [Journal (Paginated)] 67 (4):1059-1066.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: What unites the many selves that constitute the human mind? How is the self-binding problem solved? I argue that separate selves come to belong together as one Self as a result of their dynamic participation in creating a single life, rather as the members of an orchestra come to belong together as a result of their jointly creating a single work of music
Humphrey, Nicholas (ms). One self: A meditation on the unity of consciousness. Social research, 67, no. 4, 32-39, 2000.   (Google)
Abstract: I am looking at my baby son, as he thrashes around in his crib, two arms flailing, hands grasping randomly, legs kicking the air, head and eyes turning this way and that, a smile followed by a grimace crossing his face. . . And I’m wondering: what is it like to be him? What is he feeling now? What kind of experience is he having of himself?
Irwin, Ronald R. (2000). Meditation and the evolution of consciousness: Theoretical and practical solutions to midlife angst. In Melvin E. Miller & Alan N. West (eds.), Spirituality, Ethics, and Relationship in Adulthood: Clinical and Theoretical Explorations. Psychosocial Press.   (Google)
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Korman, Robert K. C. (1986). Pure consciousness events and mysticism. Sophia 25 (April):49-58.   (Google)
Lutz, Antoine; Dunne, John D. & Davidson, Richard J. (2007). Meditation and the neuroscience of consciousness. In P.D. Zelazo, Morris Moscovitch & Evan Thompson (eds.), Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness. Cambridge.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: in Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness edited by Zelazo P., Moscovitch M. and Thompson E. (2007)
MacKenna, Christopher (2004). Conscious change and changing consciousness: Some thoughts on the psychology of meditation. British Journal of Psychotherapy 21 (1):103-118.   (Google)
Menon, Sangeetha (2008). Transpersonal Psychology of the Bhagavad Gita: Consciousness, Meditation, Work and Love. In K. Ramakrishna Rao (ed.), Handbook of Indian Psychology. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Novak, P. (1996). Buddhist meditation and consciousness of time. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (3):267-77.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Pascual-Leone, Juan (2000). Mental attention, conscious, and the progressive emergence of wisdom. Journal of Adult Development. Special Issue 1949 (4):241-254.   (Google)
Pendleton, Gene (1996). Of pure consciousness experiences: A reply to Forman. Sophia 35 (2):63-66.   (Google)
Saltoon, Diana (1979). The Common Book of Consciousness: Relieve Stress and Take Charge of Your Environment Through Diet, Exercise, and Meditation. Chronicle Books.   (Google)
Shapiro, D. H. (1982). Meditation as an altered state of consciousness: Contributions of western behavioral science. Journal of Transpersonal Psychology 15:61-81.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Shear, Jonathan & Jevning, Ron (1999). Pure consciousness: Scientific exploration of meditation techniques. Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (2-3):189-209.   (Cited by 18 | Google | More links)
Shear, Jonathan (1983). The experience of pure consciousness: A new perspective for theories of self. Metaphilosophy 14 (January):53-62.   (Google | More links)
Srinivasan, N. & Baijal, S. (2007). Concentrative meditation enhances pre-attentive processing: A MMN study. Neuroreport 18 (16):1709-1712.   (Google | More links)
Travis, Frederick T. & Wallace, R. K. (1999). Autonomic and EEG patterns during eyes-closed rest and transcendental meditation (TM) practice: The basis for a neural model of TM practice. Consciousness and Cognition 8 (3):302-318.   (Google)
Abstract: In this single-blind within-subject study, autonomic and EEG variables were compared during 10-min, order-balanced eyes-closed rest and Transcendental Meditation (TM) sessions. TM sessions were distinguished by (1) lower breath rates, (2) lower skin conductance levels, (3) higher respiratory sinus arrhythmia levels, and (4) higher alpha anterior-posterior and frontal EEG coherence. Alpha power was not significantly different between conditions. These results were seen in the first minute and were maintained throughout the 10-min sessions. TM practice appears to (1) lead to a state fundamentally different than eyes-closed rest; (2) result in a cascade of events in the central and autonomic nervous systems, leading to a rapid change in state (within a minute) that was maintained throughout the TM session; and (3) be best distinguished from other conditions through autonomic and EEG alpha coherence patterns rather than alpha power. Two neural networks that may mediate these effects are suggested. The rapid shift in physiological functioning within the first minute might be mediated by a ''neural switch'' in prefrontal areas inhibiting activity in specific and nonspecific thalamocortical circuits. The resulting ''restfully alert'' state might be sustained by a basal ganglia-corticothalamic threshold regulation mechanism automatically maintaining lower levels of cortical excitability
Travis, Frederick T. & Pearson, C. (2000). Pure consciousness: Distinct phenomenological and physiological correlates of "consciousness itself". International Journal of Neuroscience 100 (1):77-89.   (Cited by 27 | Google | More links)
Dunne, John D.; Lutz, Antione & Davidson, Richard (2007). Meditation and the neuroscience of consciousness: An introduction. In Morris Moscovitch, Philip Zelazo & Evan Thompson (eds.), Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness.   (Google)
Venkatesh, S.; Raju, T. R.; Shivani, Y.; Tompkins, G. & Meti, B. L. (1997). A study of structure of phenomenology of consciousness in meditative and non-meditative states. Indian Journal of Physiology and Pharmacology 41:149-53.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
West, M. (1983). Meditation and self-awareness: Physiological and phenomenological approaches. In G. Underwood (ed.), Aspects of Consciousness, Volume 3: Awareness and Self-Awareness. Academic Press.   (Google)

8.2d Drugs and Consciousness

Ballard, Clive & Piggott, Margaret (2002). Neuroleptics. In Elaine Perry, Heather Ashton & Allan Young (eds.), Neurochemistry of Consciousness: Neurotransmitters in Mind. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Baruss, Imants (2003). Psychedelics. In Imants Baruss (ed.), Alterations of Consciousness: An Empirical Analysis for Social Scientists. American Psychological Association.   (Google)
Bresnick, T. & Levin, R. (2006). Phenomenal qualities of ayahuasca ingestion and its relation to fringe consciousness and personality. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (9):5-24.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Ayahuasca, a hallucinogen with profound consciousness- altering properties, has been increasingly utilized in recent studies (e.g., Strassman, 2001; Shanon, 2002a,b). However, other than Shanon's recent work, there has been little attempt to examine the effects of ayahuasca on perceptual, affective and cognitive experience, its relation to fringe consciousness or to pertinent personality variables. Twenty-one volunteers attending a seminar on ayahuasca were administered personality measures and a semi-structured interview about phenomenal qualities of their experience. Ayahuasca ingestion was associated with profound alterations of temporal- spatial experiences including expansive space and slowed time. Ayahuasca use was also associated with positive emotional states, higher levels of fantasy proneness and psychological absorption and a greater openness to mystical experiences. Conversely, quickened time was associated with negative emotionality. The results are discussed within a multi-faceted model of fringe consciousness with a particular emphasis on Hunt's (1995) models of cross-modal translation as the basis for higher-order symbolic cognition and support James' (1890/1950) contention that fringe consciousness is essential to human cognition
Comer, Sandy M. & Zacny, James P. (2005). Subjective effects of opioids. In Mitch Earleywine (ed.), Mind-Altering Drugs. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Harman, Willis W. (1963). The issue of the consciousness-expanding drugs. Main Currents 20 (September-October):5-14.   (Google)
Hetem, L. A. B.; Danion, J. M.; Diemunsch, P. & Brandt, C. (2000). Effect of a subanesthetic dose of ketamine on memory and conscious awareness in healthy volunteers. Psychopharmacology 152 (3):283-288.   (Cited by 24 | Google | More links)
Houston, Jean (1965). Psycho-chemistry and the religious consciousness. International Philosophical Quarterly 5 (September):397-413.   (Google)
Keen, Ernest (2000). Chemicals for the mind: psychopharmacology and human consciousness. Greenwood Publishing Group.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Lyvers, Michael (2003). The neurochemistry of psychedelic experiences. Science and Consciousness Review 1.   (Google | More links)
Metzner, Ralph (2005). Psychedelic, psychoactive, and addictive drugs and states of consciousness. In Mitch Earleywine (ed.), Mind-Altering Drugs: The Science of Subjective Experience. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Pace-Schott, Edward F. & Allan Hobson, J. (2007). Altered states of consciousness: Drug induced states. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell.   (Google)
Spivak, Leonid Ivanovich (1991). Psychoactive Drug Research in the Soviet Scientific Tradition. Journal of Psychoactive Drugs 23 (3):271-281.   (Google)
Abstract: During the past 200 years, Soviet scientists have extensively investigated and evaluated the effects of psychoactive drugs in humans. An examination of the resultant literature provides insight into the four distinct periods that comprise this era of research.
Perry, Elaine (2002). Plants of the gods: Ethnic routes to altered consciousness. In Elaine Perry, Heather Ashton & Andrew W. Young (eds.), Neurochemistry of Consciousness. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 22 | Google)
Shanon, Benny (2004). Altered states and the study of consciousness: The case of ayahuasca. Journal of Mind and Behavior 24 (2):125-154.   (Google)
Shanon, Benny (2001). Altered temporality. Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (1):35-58.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Strassman, Rick (2005). Hallucinogens. In Mitch Earleywine (ed.), Mind-Altering Drugs. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Vollenweider, Franz X. & Geyer, Mark A. (2001). A systems model of altered consciousness: Integrating natural and drug-induced psychoses. Brain Research Bulletin. Special Issue 56 (5):495-507.   (Cited by 40 | Google | More links)
Walker, Diana J. & Zacny, James P. (2005). Subjective effects of nitrous oxide. In Mitch Earleywine (ed.), Mind-Altering Drugs. Oxford University Press.   (Google)

8.2e Other Altered States of Consciousness

Apter, Andrew (1992). Depersonalization, the experience of prosthesis, and our cosmic insignificance: The experimental phenomenology of an altered state. Philosophical Psychology 5 (3):257-285.   (Google)
Abstract: Psychogenic depersonalization is an altered mental state consisting of an unusual discontinuity in the phenomenological perception of personal being; the individual is engulfed by feelings of unreality, self-detachment and unfamiliarity in which the self is felt to lack subjective perspective and the intuitive feeling of personal embodiment. A new sub-feature of depersonalization is delineated. 'Prosthesis' consists in the thought that the thinker is a 'mere thing'. It is a subjectively realized sense of the specific and objective 'thingness' of the particular object thought about. I show that prosthesis is an important cognitive feature of depersonalization, and may be psychologically connected with the tendency of depersonalized individuals to report 'philosophical' types of thinking. Indeed, several philosophical issues concerning the identity of the self appear to have been enhanced by prosthesis experiences. Thus, far more efficient than William James's experimental attempts to uncover philosophical truths under the influence of nitrous oxide intoxication, prosthesis may be a safe and recommended experience for philosophers. The history of depersonalization theories is presented from Krishaber to Freud, and the main approaches to prosthesis criticized. Finally, a fresh approach to psychogenic depersonalization is outlined on the basis of certain cognitive similarities with visual agnosia. This paper may be understood as continuing the Jamesian tradition 'experimental abnormal psychology', that is, of examining extraordinary mental states with an eye to their philosophical implications
Ashton, Heather (2002). Delirium and hallucinations. In Elaine Perry, Heather Ashton & Allan Young (eds.), Neurochemistry of Consciousness: Neurotransmitters in Mind. John Benjamins.   (Google)
Barušs, Imants (2003). Death. In Imants Baruss (ed.), Alterations of Consciousness: An Empirical Analysis for Social Scientists. American Psychological Association.   (Google)
Barušs, Imants (2003). Introduction. In Imants Baruss (ed.), Alterations of Consciousness: An Empirical Analysis for Social Scientists. American Psychological Association.   (Google)
Baruss, Imants (2003). Trance. In Imants Baruss (ed.), Alterations of Consciousness: An Empirical Analysis for Social Scientists. American Psychological Association.   (Google)
Behrendt, R. P. (2003). Hallucinations: Synchronisation of thalamocortical ? oscillations underconstrained by sensory input. Consciousness and Cognition 12 (3):413-451.   (Cited by 42 | Google | More links)
Abstract: What we perceive is the product of an intrinsic process and not part of external physical reality. This notion is consistent with the philosophical position of transcendental idealism but also agrees with physiological findings on the thalamocortical system. -Frequency rhythms of discharge activity from thalamic and cortical neurons are facilitated by cholinergic arousal and resonate in thalamocortical networks, thereby transiently forming assemblies of coherent oscillations under constraints of sensory input and prefrontal attentional mechanisms. Perception and conscious experience may be based on such assemblies and sensory input to thalamic nuclei plays merely a constraining role in their formation. In schizophrenia, the ability of sensory input to modulate self-organisation of thalamocortical activity may be generally reduced. If during arousal thalamocortical self-organisation is underconstrained by sensory input, then attentional mechanisms alone may determine the content of perception and hallucinations may arise
Blanke, Olaf & Mohr, Christine (2005). Out-of-body experience, heautoscopy, and autoscopic hallucination of neurological origin. Implications for neurocognitive mechanisms of corporeal awareness and self consciousness. Brain Research Reviews 50 (1):184-199.   (Google)
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Dietrich, A. (2003). Functional neuroanatomy of altered states of consciousness: The transient hypofrontality hypothesis. Consciousness and Cognition 12 (2):231-256.   (Cited by 29 | Google)
Fingelkurts, Andrew A.; Fingelkurts, Alexander A.; Kallio, Sakari & Revonsuo, Antti (2007). Cortex functional connectivity as a neurophysiological correlate of hypnosis: An EEG case study. Neuropsychologia 45 (7):14521462.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Cortex functional connectivity associated with hypnosis was investigated in a single highly hypnotizable subject in a normal baseline condition

and under neutral hypnosis during two sessions separated by a year. After the hypnotic induction, but without further suggestions as compared to

the baseline condition, all studied parameters of local and remote functional connectivity were significantly changed. The significant differences

between hypnosis and the baseline condition were observable (to different extent) in five studied independent frequency bands (delta, theta, alpha,

beta, and gamma). The results were consistent and stable after 1 year. Based on these findings we conclude that alteration in functional connectivity of the brain may be regarded as a neuronal correlate of hypnosis (at least in very highly hypnotizable subjects) in which separate cognitive modules and subsystems may be temporarily incapable of communicating with each other normally.
Fingelkurts, Alexander A.; Fingelkurts, Andrew A.; Kallio, Sakari & Revonsuo, Antti (2007). HYPNOSIS INDUCES A CHANGED COMPOSITION OF BRAIN OSCILLATIONS IN EEG: A CASE STUDY. Contemporary Hypnosis 24 (1):3-18.   (Google)
Abstract: Cognitive functions associated with the frontal lobes of the brain may be specifi cally involved in hypnosis. Thus, the frontal area of the brain has recently been of great interest when searching for neural changes associated with hypnosis. We tested the hypothesis that EEG during pure hypnosis would differ from the normal non-hypnotic EEG especially above the frontal area of the brain. The composition of brain oscillations was examined in a broad frequency band (130 Hz) in the electroencephalogram (EEG) of a single virtuoso subject. Data was collected in two independent data collection periods separated by one year. The hypnotic and non-hypnotic conditions were repeated multiple times during each data acquisition session. We found that pure hypnosis induced reorganization in the composition of brain oscillations especially in prefrontal and right occipital EEG channels. Additionally, hypnosis was characterized by consistent rightside-dominance asymmetry. In the prefrontal EEG channels the composition of brain oscillations included spectral patterns during hypnosis that were completely different from those observed during non-hypnosis. Furthermore, the EEG spectral patterns observed overall during the hypnotic condition did not return to the pre-hypnotic baseline EEG immediately when hypnosis was terminated. This suggests that for the brain, the return to a normal neurophysiological baseline condition after hypnosis is a time-consuming process. The present results suggest that pure hypnosis is characterized by an increase in alertness and heightened attention, refl ected as cognitive and neuronal activation. Taken together, the present data provide support for the hypothesis that in a very highly hypnotizable person (a hypnotic virtuoso) hypnosis as such may be accompanied by a changed pattern of neural activity in the brain.
Forman, R. (ed.) (1990). The Problem of Pure Consciousness: Mysticism and Philosophy. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 57 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Are mystical experiences primarily formed by the mystic's cultural background and concepts, as modern day "constructivists" maintain, or do mystics in some way transcend language, belief, and culturally conditioned expectations? Do mystical experiences differ in the different religious traditions, as "pluralists" contend, or are they identical across cultures? Twelve contributors here attempt to answer these questions through close examination of a particular form of mystical experience, "Pure Consciousness"--the experience of being awake but devoid of intentional content for consciousness. The contributors analyze pure consciousness and other mystical experiences from historical Hindu, Buddhist, Christian, and Jewish sources, as well as from modern mystics. They demonstrate that pure consciousness poses serious conceptual problems for a contructivist understanding of mysticism. Revealing the inconsistencies and inadequacies of current models, they make significant strides towards developing new models for the phenomenon of mysticism, breaking new ground for our understanding of mysticism and of human experience in general
Gurstelle, E. B. & de Oliveira, J. L. (2004). Daytime parahypnagogia: A state of consciousness that occurs when we almost fall asleep. Medical Hypotheses 62:166-8.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Hogan, R. Edward & Kaiboriboon, Kitti (2003). The "dreamy state": John hughlings-jackson's ideas of epilepsy and consciousness. American Journal of Psychiatry 160 (10):1740-1747.   (Google)
Karam, Claire M. (2003). Rethinking Dissociation As an Altered State of Consciousness: An Exploration of Altered State Encounters in Imaginal Space and Beyond. Dissertation, Pacifica Graduate Institute   (Google)
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Koethe, Dagmar; Gerth, Christoph W.; Neatby, Miriam A.; Haensel, Anita; Thies, Martin; Schneider, Udo; Emrich, Hinderk M.; Klosterkötter, Joachim; Schultze-Lutter, Frauke & Leweke, F. Markus (2006). Disturbances of visual information processing in early states of psychosis and experimental delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol altered states of consciousness. Schizophrenia Research 88 (1-3):142-150.   (Google)
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8.2f States of Consciousness, Misc

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