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8.2b. Hypnosis and Consciousness (Hypnosis and Consciousness on PhilPapers)

See also:
Alexander, A.; Andrew, A.; Sakari, Kallio & Antti, Revonsuo (2007). Hypnosis induces a changed composition of brain oscillations in EEG: A case study. Contemporary Hypnosis 24 (1):3-18.   (Google)
Araoz, Daniel L. (2001). The unconscious in Ericksonian hypnotherapy. Australian Journal of Clinical Hypnotherapy and Hypnosis 22 (2):78-92.   (Google)
Baruss, Imants (2003). Hypnosis. In Imants Baruss (ed.), Alterations of Consciousness: An Empirical Analysis for Social Scientists. American Psychological Association.   (Google)
Bayne, Tim (2007). Hypnosis and the unity of consciousness. In Graham A. Jamieson (ed.), Hypnosis and Conscious States: The Cognitive Neuroscience Perspective. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Hypnosis appears to generate unusual—and sometimes even astonishing—changes in the contents of consciousness. Hypnotic subjects report perceiving things that are not there, they report not perceiving things that are there, and they report unusual alterations in the phenomenology of agency. In addition to apparent alterations in the contents of consciousness, hypnosis also appears to involve alterations in the structure of consciousness. According to many theorists—most notably Hilgard—hypnosis demonstrates that the unity of consciousness is an illusion (Hilgard 1977)
Beahrs, J. O. (1983). Co-consciousness: A common denominator in hypnosis, multiple personality, and normalcy. American Journal of Clinical Hypnosis 26:100-13.   (Cited by 10 | Google)
Beahrs, J. O. (1982). Unity and Multiplicity: Multilevel Consciousness of Self in Hypnosis, Psychiatric Disorder, and Mental Health. Brunner/Mazel.   (Cited by 37 | Google)
Benner, D. G. & Evans, C. Stephen (1984). Unity and multiplicity in hypnosis, commissurotomy, and multiple personality disorder. Journal of Mind and Behavior 5:423-431.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Binet, Alfred (1884). Visual hallucinations in hypnotism. Mind 9 (35):413-415.   (Google | More links)
Block, Ned (2002). Behaviorism revisited. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):977-978.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: O'Regan and Noe declare that the qualitative character of experience is constituted by the nature of the sensorimotor contingencies at play when we perceive. Sensorimotor contingencies are a highly restricted set of input-output relations. The restriction excludes contingencies that don’t essentially involve perceptual systems. Of course if the ‘sensory’ in ‘sensorimotor’ were to be understood mentalistically, the thesis would not be of much interest, so I assume that these contingencies are to be understood non-mentalistically. Contrary to their view, experience is a matter of what mediates between input and output, not input-output relations all by themselves. However, instead of mounting a head-on collision with their view, I think it will be more useful to consider a consequence of their view that admits of obvious counterexamples. The consequence consists of two claims: (1) any two systems that share that highly restricted set of input-output relations are therefor experientially the same and (2) conversely, any two systems that share experience must share these sensorimotor contingencies. Once stated, the view is so clearly wrong that my ascription of it to them might be challenged. At least it is a consequence of a major strand in their view. Perhaps this will be an opportunity for them to disassociate themselves from it. I will limit myself to (1)
Boly, Mélanie; Faymonville, Marie-Elisabeth; Vogt, Brent A.; Maquet, Pierre & Laureys, Steven (2007). Hypnotic regulation of consciousness and the pain neuromatrix. In Graham A. Jamieson (ed.), Hypnosis and Conscious States: The Cognitive Neuroscience Perspective. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Borch-Jacobsen, Mikkel (2005). Simulating the unconscious. Psychoanalysis and History 7 (1):5-20.   (Google)
Bryant, Richard A. & Mallard, David (2003). Seeing is believing: The reality of hypnotic hallucinations. Consciousness and Cognition 12 (2):219-230.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Burgess, Adrian (2007). On the contribution of neurophysiology to hypnosis research: Current state and future directions. In Graham A. Jamieson (ed.), Hypnosis and Conscious States: The Cognitive Neuroscience Perspective. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
C., M. & P., W. (2003). Hypnotic control of attention in the stroop task: A historical footnote. Consciousness and Cognition 12 (3):347-353.   (Google)
Abstract: have recently provided a compelling demonstration of enhanced attentional control under post-hypnotic suggestion. Using the classic color-word interference paradigm, in which the task is to ignore a word and to name the color in which it is printed (e.g., RED in green, say ''green''), they gave a post-hypnotic instruction to participants that they would be unable to read. This eliminated Stroop interference in high suggestibility participants but did not alter interference in low suggestibility participants. replicated this pattern and further demonstrated that it is not due to a visual strategy (such as blurring or looking at a different location). As a historical footnote, we describe a ''case study'' from 18 years ago in which we observed the same result using a hypnotic instruction to a single highly suggestible individual that he could not read. The elimination of Stroop interference has important implications for both the study of attention and the study of hypnosis
Cheyne, J. A.; Rueffer, S. D. & Newby-Clark, I. R. (1999). Hypnagogic and hypnopompic hallucinations during sleep paralysis: Neurological and cultural construction of the night-Mare. Consciousness and Cognition 8 (3):319-337.   (Google)
Abstract: Hypnagogic and hypnopompic experiences (HHEs) accompanying sleep paralysis (SP) are often cited as sources of accounts of supernatural nocturnal assaults and paranormal experiences. Descriptions of such experiences are remarkably consistent across time and cultures and consistent also with known mechanisms of REM states. A three-factor structural model of HHEs based on their relations both to cultural narratives and REM neurophysiology is developed and tested with several large samples. One factor, labeled Intruder, consisting of sensed presence, fear, and auditory and visual hallucinations, is conjectured to originate in a hypervigilant state initiated in the midbrain. Another factor, Incubus, comprising pressure on the chest, breathing difficulties, and pain, is attributed to effects of hyperpolarization of motoneurons on perceptions of respiration. These two factors have in common an implied alien ''other'' consistent with occult narratives identified in numerous contemporary and historical cultures. A third factor, labeled Unusual Bodily Experiences, consisting of floating/flying sensations, out-of-body experiences, and feelings of bliss, is related to physically impossible experiences generated by conflicts of endogenous and exogenous activation related to body position, orientation, and movement. Implications of this last factor for understanding of orientational primacy in self-consciousness are considered. Central features of the model developed here are consistent with recent work on hallucinations associated with hypnosis and schizophrenia
Cleeremans, Axel & Myin, Erik (1999). A short review of Consciousness in Action by Susan Hurley. Revue Internationale de Philosophie 3:455-458.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Consider Susan Hurley's depiction of mainstream views of the mind: "The mind is a kind of sandwich, and cognition is the filling" (p. 401). This particular sandwich (with perception as the bottom loaf and action as the top loaf) tastes foul to Hurley, who devotes most of "Consciousness in Action" to a systematic and sometimes extraordinarily detailed critique of what has otherwise been dubbed "classical" models of the mind. This critique then provides the basis for her alternative proposal, in which perception, action and environment are deeply intertwined
David, Alvin; Moore, Mark & Rusu, Dan (2002). Unconscious information processing, hypnotic amnesia, and the misattribution of arousal: Schachter and Singer's theory revised. Journal of Cognitive and Behavioral Psychotherapies 2 (1):23-33.   (Google)
De Pascalis, Vilfredo (2007). Phase-ordered gamma oscillations and the modulation of hypnotic experience. In Graham A. Jamieson (ed.), Hypnosis and Conscious States: The Cognitive Neuroscience Perspective. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Dienes, Zoltán & Perner, Josef (2007). Executive control without conscious awareness: The cold control theory of hypnosis. In Graham A. Jamieson (ed.), Hypnosis and Conscious States: The Cognitive Neuroscience Perspective. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Double, Richard (1989). Puppeteers, hypnotists, and neurosurgeons. Philosophical Studies 56 (June):163-73.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Egner, Tobias & Raz, Amir (2007). Cognitive control processes and hypnosis. In Graham A. Jamieson (ed.), Hypnosis and Conscious States: The Cognitive Neuroscience Perspective. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Fingelkurts, Andrew A.; Fingelkurts, Alexander A.; Kallio, Sakari & Revonsuo, Antti (2007). Cortex functional connectivity as a neurophysiological correlate of hypnosis: An EEG case study. Neuropsychologia 45 (7):14521462.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Cortex functional connectivity associated with hypnosis was investigated in a single highly hypnotizable subject in a normal baseline condition

and under neutral hypnosis during two sessions separated by a year. After the hypnotic induction, but without further suggestions as compared to

the baseline condition, all studied parameters of local and remote functional connectivity were significantly changed. The significant differences

between hypnosis and the baseline condition were observable (to different extent) in five studied independent frequency bands (delta, theta, alpha,

beta, and gamma). The results were consistent and stable after 1 year. Based on these findings we conclude that alteration in functional connectivity of the brain may be regarded as a neuronal correlate of hypnosis (at least in very highly hypnotizable subjects) in which separate cognitive modules and subsystems may be temporarily incapable of communicating with each other normally.
Fingelkurts, Alexander A.; Fingelkurts, Andrew A.; Kallio, Sakari & Revonsuo, Antti (2007). HYPNOSIS INDUCES A CHANGED COMPOSITION OF BRAIN OSCILLATIONS IN EEG: A CASE STUDY. Contemporary Hypnosis 24 (1):3-18.   (Google)
Abstract: Cognitive functions associated with the frontal lobes of the brain may be specifi cally involved in hypnosis. Thus, the frontal area of the brain has recently been of great interest when searching for neural changes associated with hypnosis. We tested the hypothesis that EEG during pure hypnosis would differ from the normal non-hypnotic EEG especially above the frontal area of the brain. The composition of brain oscillations was examined in a broad frequency band (130 Hz) in the electroencephalogram (EEG) of a single virtuoso subject. Data was collected in two independent data collection periods separated by one year. The hypnotic and non-hypnotic conditions were repeated multiple times during each data acquisition session. We found that pure hypnosis induced reorganization in the composition of brain oscillations especially in prefrontal and right occipital EEG channels. Additionally, hypnosis was characterized by consistent rightside-dominance asymmetry. In the prefrontal EEG channels the composition of brain oscillations included spectral patterns during hypnosis that were completely different from those observed during non-hypnosis. Furthermore, the EEG spectral patterns observed overall during the hypnotic condition did not return to the pre-hypnotic baseline EEG immediately when hypnosis was terminated. This suggests that for the brain, the return to a normal neurophysiological baseline condition after hypnosis is a time-consuming process. The present results suggest that pure hypnosis is characterized by an increase in alertness and heightened attention, refl ected as cognitive and neuronal activation. Taken together, the present data provide support for the hypothesis that in a very highly hypnotizable person (a hypnotic virtuoso) hypnosis as such may be accompanied by a changed pattern of neural activity in the brain.
Gallagher, Shaun (2005). Review of Alva noë's Action in Perception. Times Literary Supplement.   (Google)
Abstract: In Action in Perception, Alva Noë provides a persuasive account of the “enactive” approach to perception, according to which perception is not simply based on the processing of sensory information, or on the construction of internal representations, but is fundamentally shaped by the motor possibilities of the perceiving body. As John Dewey put it in 1896, in his essay, “The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology”
Gruzelier, John (2005). Altered states of consciousness and hypnosis in the twenty-first century: Comment. Contemporary Hypnosis 22 (1):1-7.   (Google | More links)
Gurney, Edmund (1887). Further problems of hypnotism (I.). Mind 12 (46):212-232.   (Google | More links)
Gurney, Edmund (1887). Further problems of hypnotism (II.). Mind 12 (47):397-422.   (Google | More links)
Gurney, Edmund (1884). The problems of hypnotism. Mind 9 (36):477-508.   (Google | More links)
Gurney, Edmund (1884). The stages of hypnotism. Mind 9 (33):110-121.   (Google | More links)
Hall, G. Stanley (1883). Reaction-time and attention in the hypnotic state. Mind 8 (30):170-182.   (Google | More links)
Hall, G. Stanley (1881). Recent researches on hypnotism. Mind 6 (21):98-104.   (Google | More links)
Hilgard, Ernest R. (1979). Consciousness and control: Lessons from hypnosis. Australian Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis 7:103-15.   (Google)
Hurley, Susan L. (2007). Neural dominance, neural deference, and sensorimotor dynamics. In M. Velmans (ed.), Encyclopedia of Consciousness. Blackwell.   (Google)
Abstract: Why is neural activity in a particular area expressed as experience of red rather than green, or as visual experience rather than auditory? Indeed, why does it have any conscious expression at all? These familiar questions indicate the explanatory gap between neural activity and ‘what it’s like’-- qualities of conscious experience. The comparative explanatory gaps, intermodal and intramodal, can be separated from the absolute explanatory gap and associated zombie issues--why does neural activity have any conscious expression at all?. Here I focus on comparative gaps: why is neural activity in a given area expressed as this type of experience rather than that type of experience?
Jamieson, Graham A., Hypnosis and conscious states: The cognitive neuroscience perspective.   (Google)
Jamieson, Graham A. & Hasegawa, Harutomo (2007). New paradigms of hypnosis research. In Graham A. Jamieson (ed.), Hypnosis and Conscious States: The Cognitive Neuroscience Perspective. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Jamieson, Graham A. (2007). Previews and prospects for the cognitive neuroscience of hypnosis and conscious states. In Graham A. Jamieson (ed.), Hypnosis and Conscious States: The Cognitive Neuroscience Perspective. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Jones, Simon R.; Fernyhough, Charles & Larøi, Frank (2010). A phenomenological survey of auditory verbal hallucinations in the hypnagogic and hypnopompic states. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: The phenomenology of auditory verbal hallucinations (AVHs) occurring in hypnagogic and hypnopompic (H&H) states has received little attention. In a sample of healthy participants ( N = 325), 108 participants reported H&H AVHs and answered subsequent questions on their phenomenology. AVHs in the H&H state were found (1) to be more likely to only feature the occasional clear word than to be clear, (2) to be more likely to be one-off voices than to be recurrent voices, (3) to be more likely to be voices of people known to the individual than unknown persons, (4) to be more likely to talk directly to the person rather than not, and (5) to only rarely give commands, ask questions, or to result in an interactive conversation. Their phenomenology was similar to normative AVHs in wakefulness (as established by previous research) in that the voice-hearer was usually the target of the voice, and the voice was more likely to be of a recognized person. However, H&H AVHs differed from AVHs in wakefulness in that commands and questions were rare, and there was typically no dialogical engagement with the voice. We conclude by proposing that two distinct types of H&H AVHs may exist (which we term “dialogic” and “monologic”), based on an analysis of the phenomenology of the experience, and suggest avenues for future research
Kallio, Sakari & Revonsuo, Antti (2003). Hypnotic phenomena and altered states of consciousness: A multilevel framework of description and explanation. Contemporary Hypnosis 20 (3):111-164.   (Cited by 18 | Google | More links)
Kihlstrom, John F. (2007). Consciousness in hypnosis. In Philip David Zelazo, Morris Moscovitch & Evan Thompson (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness. Cambridge.   (Google)
Kihlstrom, John F. (2005). Is hypnosis an altered state of consciousness or what?: Comment. Contemporary Hypnosis 22 (1):34-38.   (Google | More links)
Kirsch, Irving & Lynn, Steven Jay (2004). Hypnosis and will. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (5):667-668.   (Google)
Abstract: Although we are sympathetic to his central thesis about the illusion of will, having previously advanced a similar proposal, Wegner's account of hypnosis is flawed. Hypnotic behavior derives from specific suggestions that are given, rather than from the induction, of trance, and it can be observed in 90% of the population. Thus, it is very pertinent to the illusion of will. However, Wegner exaggerates the loss of subjective will in hypnosis
Kirsch, Irving (1997). Hypnotic responding and self-deception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):118-119.   (Google)
Abstract: As understood by neodissociation and sociocognitive theorists, hypnotic responses are instances of self-deception. Neodissociation theory matches the strict definition of Sackeim and Gur (1978) and sociocognitive theory matches Mele's looser definition. Recent data indicate that many hypnotized individuals deceive themselves into holding conflicting beliefs without dissociating, but others convince themselves that the suggested state of affairs is true without simultaneously holding a contrary belief
Kunzendorf, Robert G.; Beltz, S. M. & Tymowicz, G. (1992). Self-awareness in autistic subjects and deeply hypnotized subjects: Dissociation of self-concept versus self-consciousness. Imagination, Cognition and Personality 11:129-41.   (Google)
Levy, Donald (1983). Post-hypnotic suggestion and the existence of unconscious mental activity. Analysis 43 (October):184-189.   (Google)
Lynn, Steven Jay; Kirsch, Irving; Knox, Josh; Fassler, Oliver & Lilienfeld, Scott O. (2007). Hypnosis and neuroscience: Implications for the altered state debate. In Graham A. Jamieson (ed.), Hypnosis and Conscious States: The Cognitive Neuroscience Perspective. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
MacLeod, C. M. & Sheehan, P. W. (2003). Hypnotic control of attention in the stroop task: A historical footnote. Consciousness and Cognition 12 (3):347-353.   (Google)
Abstract: have recently provided a compelling demonstration of enhanced attentional control under post-hypnotic suggestion. Using the classic color-word interference paradigm, in which the task is to ignore a word and to name the color in which it is printed (e.g., RED in green, say ''green''), they gave a post-hypnotic instruction to participants that they would be unable to read. This eliminated Stroop interference in high suggestibility participants but did not alter interference in low suggestibility participants. replicated this pattern and further demonstrated that it is not due to a visual strategy (such as blurring or looking at a different location). As a historical footnote, we describe a ''case study'' from 18 years ago in which we observed the same result using a hypnotic instruction to a single highly suggestible individual that he could not read. The elimination of Stroop interference has important implications for both the study of attention and the study of hypnosis
Marone, Fulvio (2002). Suggestions from the unconscious: Freud, hypnosis, and the mind-body problem. In Gertrudis Van de Vijver & Filip Geerardyn (eds.), The Pre-Psychoanalytic Writings of Sigmund Freud. Karnac Books.   (Google)
Margolis, Joseph & Margolis, Clorinda G. (1979). The theory of hypnosis and the concept of persons. Behaviorism 7:97-111.   (Google)
Myers, Frederic W. H. (1887). On a case of alleged hypnotic hyperacuity of vision. Mind 12 (45):154-156.   (Google | More links)
Myers, Frederic W. H. (1893). Professor wundt on hypnotism and suggestion. Mind 2 (5):95-101.   (Google | More links)
Naish, Peter (2005). Detecting hypnotically altered states of consciousness: Comment. Contemporary Hypnosis 22 (1):24-30.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Naish, Peter L. N. (2007). Time distortion, and the nature of hypnosis and consciousness. In Graham A. Jamieson (ed.), Hypnosis and Conscious States: The Cognitive Neuroscience Perspective. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
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Ott, Ulrich (2007). States of absorption: In search of neurobiological foundations. In Graham A. Jamieson (ed.), Hypnosis and Conscious States: The Cognitive Neuroscience Perspective. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Pekala, Ronald J. & Kumar, V. K. (2007). An empirical-phenomenological approach to quantifying consciousness and states of consciousness: With particular reference to understanding the nature of hypnosis. In Graham A. Jamieson (ed.), Hypnosis and Conscious States: The Cognitive Neuroscience Perspective. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
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Rainville, Pierre & Price, Donald D. (2003). Hypnosis phenomenology and the neurobiology of consciousness. International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis 51 (2):105-29.   (Cited by 16 | Google | More links)
Rossi, Ernest L. & Rossi, Kathryn L. (2006). The neuroscience of observing consciousness & mirror neurons in therapeutic hypnosis. American Journal of Clinical Hypnosis 48 (4):263-278.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
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Abstract: We suggest that certain experiences reported by patients with schizophrenia show that priority, consistency, and exclusivity are not sufficient for the experience of willing an action. Furthermore, we argue that even if priority, consistency, and exclusivity cause the experience of being the author of an action, this does not mean that conscious will is an illusion
Spiegel, David (2005). Multileveling the playing field: Altering our state of consciousness to understand hypnosis: Comment. Contemporary Hypnosis 22 (1):31-33.   (Google)
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Woody, Erik & Szechtman, Henry (2007). To see feelingly: Emotion, motivation, and hypnosis. In Graham A. Jamieson (ed.), Hypnosis and Conscious States: The Cognitive Neuroscience Perspective. Oxford University Press.   (Google)