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8.4. Consciousness and Biology (Consciousness and Biology on PhilPapers)

8.4a Evolution of Consciousness

Allen, Colin (1992). Mental content and evolutionary explanation. Biology and Philosophy 7 (1):1-12.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   Cognitive ethology is the comparative study of animal cognition from an evolutionary perspective. As a sub-discipline of biology it shares interest in questions concerning the immediate causes and development of behavior. As a part of ethology it is also concerned with questions about the function and evolution of behavior. I examine some recent work in cognitive ethology, and I argue that the notions of mental content and representation are important to enable researchers to answer questions and state generalizations about the function and volution of behavior
Arbib, Michael A. (2001). Co-evolution of human consciousness and language. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 929:195-220.   (Cited by 18 | Google | More links)
Arhem, P.; Liljenstrom, H. & Lindahl, B. Ingemar B. (2002). Evolution of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 9:81-84.   (Google)
Arhem, P. & Liljenstrom, H. (1997). On the coevolution of consciousness and cognition. Journal of Theoretical Biology 187:601-12.   (Google)
Baldwin, James Mark (1896). Consciousness and evolution. American Naturalist.   (Cited by 14 | Google | More links)
Barlow, H. B. (1980). Nature's joke: A conjecture on the biological role of consciousness. In Brian Josephson & V. Ramach (eds.), Consciousness and the Physical World. Pergamon Press.   (Google)
Barlow, H. B. (1987). The biological role of consciousness. In Colin Blakemore & Susan A. Greenfield (eds.), Mindwaves. Blackwell.   (Cited by 14 | Google)
Benton, Luke (ms). On the nature of a healthy mind.   (Google)
Bernstein, Jerome S. (2005). Living in the Borderland: The Evolution of Consciousness and the Challenge of Healing Trauma. Brunner-Routledge.   (Google)
Abstract: Living in the Borderland addresses the evolution of Western consciousness and describes the emergence of the 'Borderland,' a spectrum of reality that is beyond the rational yet is palpable to an increasing number of individuals. Building on Jungian theory, Jerome Bernstein argues that a greater openness to transrational reality experienced by Borderland personalities allows new possibilities for understanding and healing confounding clinical and developmental enigmas. In three sections, this book charts the evolution of Western consciousness, examines the psychological and clinical implications and looks at how the new Borderland consciousness bridges the mind-body divide. It challenges the standard clinical model, which views normality as an absence of pathology and equates normality with the rational, and abnormality with the transrational. Jerome Bernstein describes how psychotherapy itself often contributes to the alienation of many Borderland personalities by misdiagnosing the difference between the pathological and the sacred and uses case studies to illustrate the potential such misdiagnoses have for causing serious psychic and emotional damage to the patient. This challenge to the orthodoxies and complacencies of Western medicine's concept of pathology will interest Jungian Analysts, Psychoanalysts, Psychotherapists and Psychiatrists
Bering, Jesse M. & Shackelford, Todd K. (2004). The causal role of consciousness: A conceptual addendum to human evolutionary psychology. Review of General Psychology 8 (4):227-248.   (Cited by 36 | Google | More links)
Bering, Jesse M. & Bjorklund, Dave (2007). The serpent's gift: Evolutionary psychology and consciousness. In Philip David Zelazo, Morris Moscovitch & Evan Thompson (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness. Cambridge.   (Google)
Bridgeman, Bruce (1992). On the evolution of consciousness and language. Psycoloquy 3 (15).   (Cited by 26 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Psychology can be based on plans, internally held images of achievement that organize the stimulus-response links of traditional psychology. The hierarchical structure of plans must be produced, held, assigned priorities, and monitored. Consciousness is the operation of the plan-executing mechanism, enabling behavior to be driven by plans rather than immediate environmental contingencies. The mechanism unpacks a single internally held idea into a series of actions. New in this paper is the proposal that language uses this mechanism for communication, unpacking an idea into a series of articulatory acts. Language comprehension uses the plan-monitoring mechanism to pack a series of linguistic events into an idea. Recursive processing results from monitoring one's own speech. Neurophysiologically, the planning mechanism is identified with higher-order motor control
Bringsjord, Selmer & Noel, Ron (2002). Why did evolution engineer consciousness? In James H. Fetzer (ed.), Consciousness Evolving. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Cairns-Smith, A. G. (1996). Evolving the Mind: On the Nature of Matter and the Origin of Consciousness. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 35 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Evolving the Mind has two main themes: how ideas about the mind evolved in science; and how the mind itself evolved in nature. The mind came into physical science when it was realised, first, that it is the activity of a physical object, a brain, which makes a mind; and secondly, that our theories of nature are largely mental constructions, artificial extensions of an inner model of the world which we inherited from our distant ancestors. From both of these perspectives, consciousness is the great enigma. If consciousness evolved, however, it is in some sense a material thing whatever else may be said of it. Physics, chemistry, molecular biology, brain function and evolutionary biology - almost the whole of science - is involved, and there can be no expert in all these fields. So the style of the book is simple, almost conversational. The excitement is that we seem to be close to a scientific theory of consciousness
Calvin, William H. (1991). The Ascent of Mind: Ice Age Climates and the Evolution of Intelligence. Bantam Books.   (Cited by 29 | Google)
Calvin, William (ms). The evolution of consciousness.   (Google)
Abstract: I will actually talk mostly about evolutionary processes in the brain as we think about what to say next; I'll be happy to answer questions later, however, about how this system we call consciousness itself evolved on the usual evolutionary time scale of the ice ages
Carruthers, Peter (2000). The evolution of consciousness. In Peter Carruthers & A. Chamberlain (eds.), Evolution and the Human Mind. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Abstract: How might consciousness have evolved? Unfortunately for the prospects of providing a convincing answer to this question, there is no agreed account of what consciousness is. So any attempt at an answer will have to fragment along a number of different lines of enquiry. More fortunately, perhaps, there is general agreement that a number of distinct notions of consciousness need to be distinguished from one another; and there is also broad agreement as to which of these is particularly problematic - namely phenomenal consciousness, or the kind of conscious mental state which it is like something to have, which has a distinctive subjective feel or phenomenology (henceforward referred to as p-consciousness). I shall survey the prospects for an evolutionary explanation of p-consciousness, on a variety of competing accounts of its nature. My goal is to use evolutionary considerations to adjudicate between some of those accounts
Clark, S. (2002). Nothing without mind. In James H. Fetzer (ed.), Consciousness Evolving. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Coan, R. W. (1989). Alternative views on the evolution of consciousness. Journal of Human Psychology 29:167-99.   (Google)
Combs, Allan (1996). The Radiance of Being: Complexity, Chaos, and the Evolution of Consciousness. Paragon House.   (Google)
Corballis, Michael C. (2007). The evolution of consciousness. In Philip David Zelazo, Morris Moscovitch & Evan Thompson (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness. Cambridge.   (Google)
Cotterill, Rodney M. J. (2000). Did consciousness evolve from self-paced probing of the environment, and not from reflexes? Brain and Mind 1 (2):283-298.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: It is suggested that the anatomical structures whichmediate consciousness evolved as decisiveembellishments to a (non-conscious) design strategypresent even in the simplest monocellular organisms.Consciousness is thus not the pinnacle of ahierarchy whose base is the primitive reflex, becausereflexes require a nervous system, which the monocelldoes not possess. By postulating that consciousness isintimately connected to self-paced probing of theenvironment, also prominent in prokaryotic behavior,one can make mammalian neuroanatomy amenable todramatically simple rationalization
Cotterill, Rodney M. J. (2001). Evolution, cognition and consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (2):3-17.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Crook, J. H. (1980). The Evolution of Human Consciousness. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 88 | Google)
Csikszentmihalyi, Mihaly (2004). Materialism and the evolution of consciousness. In Tim Kasser & Allen D. Kanner (eds.), Psychology and Consumer Culture: The Struggle for a Good Life in a Materialistic World. American Psychological Association.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Dennett, Daniel C. (1986). Julian Jaynes' software archaeology. Canadian Psychology 27:149-54.   (Google)
Dennett, Daniel C. (1988). The Evolution of Consciousness. In J. Brockman (ed.), The Reality Club, Vol. III. Prentice-Hall.   (Cited by 7 | Annotation | Google)
Dewart, L. (1989). Evolution and Consciousness: The Role of Speech in the Origin and Development of Human Nature. University of Toronto Press.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Donald, Merlin (2001). A Mind So Rare: The Evolution of Human Consciousness. W.W. Norton.   (Cited by 144 | Google | More links)
Donald, Matthew (1995). The neurobiology of human consciousness: An evolutionary approach. Neuropsychologia 33:1087-1102.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Earley, Joseph E. (2002). The social evolution of consciousness. Journal of Humanistic Psychology 42 (1):107-132.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Eccles, John C. (1992). Evolution of consciousness. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA 89:7320-24.   (Cited by 73 | Google | More links)
Eccles, John C. (1990). Evolution of the Brain: Creation of the Self. New York: Routledge.   (Cited by 115 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Sir John Eccles, a distinguished scientist and Nobel Prize winner who has devoted his scientific life to the study of the mammalian brain, tells the story of...
Edelman, David B. (2007). Consciousness without corticocentrism: Beating an evolutionary path. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (1):91-92.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Merker's approach allows the formulation of an evolutionary view of consciousness that abandons a dependence on structural homology – in this case, the presence of a cerebral cortex – in favor of functional concordance. In contrast to Merker, though, I maintain that the emergence of complex, dynamic interactions, such as those which occur between thalamus and cortex, was central to the appearance of consciousness. (Published Online May 1 2007)
Fetzer, James H. (ed.) (2002). Consciousness Evolving. John Benjamins.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Includes bibliographical references and indexes.
Floeano, D. (2002). Ago ergo sum. In James H. Fetzer (ed.), Consciousness Evolving. John Benjamins.   (Google)
Gandhi, Kishor (ed.) (1984). Literature and the Evolution of Consciousness. Allied.   (Google)
Gandhi, Kishor (ed.) (1983). The Evolution of Consciousness. Paragon House.   (Google)
Garson, James W. (2002). Evolution, consciousness, and the language of thought. In James H. Fetzer (ed.), Consciousness Evolving. John Benjamins.   (Google)
Germine, Mark (2008). The holographic principle of mind and the evolution of consciousness. World Futures 64 (3):151 – 178.   (Google)
Abstract: The Holographic Principle holds that the information in any region of space and time exists on the surface of that region. Layers of the holographic, universal “now” go from the inception of the universe to the present. Universal Consciousness is the timeless source of actuality and mentality. Information is experience, and the expansion of the “now” leads to higher and higher orders of experience in the Universe, with various levels of consciousness emerging from experience. The brain consists of a nested hierarchy of surfaces that range from the most elementary field through the neuron, neural group, and the whole brain. Evidence from the evolution and structure of the brain shows that optimal surface areas in a variety of structures are conserved with respect to underlying surfaces. Microgenesis, the becoming of the mental state through a process of recapitulation of development and evolution, is in full accord with the Holographic Principle. Evidence from a wide variety of contexts indicates the capacity on the mind for total recall of past life events and for access to universal information, indicating connection with the holographic surfaces of prior “nows” and with the Universal holographic boundary. In summation, the Holographic Principle can help us explain the unity and mechanisms of perception, experience, memory, and consciousness
Glynn, I. M. (1993). The evolution of consciousness: William James' unresolved problem. Biological Reviews of the Cambridge Philosophical Society 68:599-616.   (Google)
Grace, C. & Moreland, James P. (2002). Intelligent design psychology and evolutionary psychology on consciousness: Turning water into wine. Journal of Psychology and Theology 30 (1):51-67.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Grossenbacher, Peter G. (2001). Multisensory coordination and the evolution of consciousness. In Peter G. Grossenbacher (ed.), Finding Consciousness in the Brain: A Neurocognitive Approach. John Benjamins.   (Google)
Hameroff, Stuart R. (1998). Did consciousness cause the cambrian evolutionary explosion? In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness II. MIT Press.   (Cited by 9 | Google)
Abstract: When and where did consciousness emerge in the course of evolution? Did it happen as recently as the past million years, for example concomitant with language or tool making in humans or primates? Or did consciousness arrive somewhat earlier, with the advent of mammalian neocortex 200 million years ago (Eccles, 1992)? At the other extreme, is primitive consciousness a property of even simple unicellular organisms of several billion years ago (e.g. as suggested by Margulis and Sagan, 1995)? Or did consciousness appear at some intermediate point, and if so, where and why? Whenever it first occurred, did consciousness alter the course of evolution?
Harvey, Irene E. (2002). Evolving robot consciousness: The easy problems and the rest. In James H. Fetzer (ed.), Consciousness Evolving. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Hart, Tobin (2001). From Information to Transformation: Education for the Evolution of Consciousness. P. Lang.   (Google)
Harnad, Stevan (2002). Turing indistinguishability and the blind watchmaker. In James H. Fetzer (ed.), Consciousness Evolving. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 30 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Many special problems crop up when evolutionary theory turns, quite naturally, to the question of the adaptive value and causal role of consciousness in human and nonhuman organisms. One problem is that -- unless we are to be dualists, treating it as an independent nonphysical force -- consciousness could not have had an independent adaptive function of its own, over and above whatever behavioral and physiological functions it "supervenes" on, because evolution is completely blind to the difference between a conscious organism and a functionally equivalent (Turing Indistinguishable) nonconscious "Zombie" organism: In other words, the Blind Watchmaker, a functionalist if ever there was one, is no more a mind reader than we are. Hence Turing-Indistinguishability = Darwin-Indistinguishability. It by no means follows from this, however, that human behavior is therefore to be explained only by the push-pull dynamics of Zombie determinism, as dictated by calculations of "inclusive fitness" and "evolutionarily stable strategies." We are conscious, and, more important, that consciousness is piggy-backing somehow on the vast complex of unobservable internal activity -- call it "cognition" -- that is really responsible for generating all of our behavioral capacities. Hence, except in the palpable presence of the irrational (e.g., our sexual urges) where distal Darwinian factors still have some proximal sway, it is as sensible to seek a Darwinian rather than a cognitive explanation for most of our current behavior as it is to seek a cosmological rather than an engineering explanation of an automobile's behavior. Let evolutionary theory explain what shaped our cognitive capacity (Steklis & Harnad 1976; Harnad 1996, but let cognitive theory explain our resulting behavior
Herrick, C. Judson (1945). The natural history of experience. Philosophy of Science 12 (April):57-71.   (Google | More links)
Hopkins, James (2000). Evolution, Consciousness, and the Internality of the Mind. In Peter Carruthers & A. Chamberlain (eds.), Evolution and the Human Mind. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Abstract: The problem of consciousness seems to arise from experience itself. As we shall consider in more detail below, we are strongly disposed to contrast conscious experience with the physical states or events by which we take it to be realized. This contrast gives rise to dualism and other problems of mind and body. In this chapter I argue that these problems can usefully be considered in the perspective of evolution
Horst, Steven (2002). Evolutionary explanation and consciousness. Journal of Psychology and Theology 30 (1):41-50.   (Google)
Humphrey, N. (1992). A History of the Mind: Evolution and the Birth of Consciousness. Simon and Schuster.   (Cited by 195 | Google)
Abstract: This book is a tour-de-force on how human consciousness may have evolved. From the "phantom pain" experienced by people who have lost their limbs to the uncanny faculty of "blindsight," Humphrey argues that raw sensations are central to all conscious states and that consciousness must have evolved, just like all other mental faculties, over time from our ancestorsodily responses to pain and pleasure. '
Humphrey, Nicholas (ms). Consciousness: A just-so story.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Humphrey, Nicholas (2006). Consciousness: The Achilles heel of darwinism? Thank God, not quite. In John Brockman (ed.), Intelligent Thought: Science Versus the Intelligent Design Movement. Vintage.   (Google)
Abstract: William Paley in his famous statement in 1800 of the Argument from Design, imagined that he found a watch lying on a heath and set to wondering how it came to be there. “The inference is inevitable, that the watch must have had a maker: that there must have existed, at some time, and at some place or other, an artificer or artificers who formed it for the purpose which
Irwin, Ronald R. (2000). Meditation and the evolution of consciousness: Theoretical and practical solutions to midlife angst. In Melvin E. Miller & Alan N. West (eds.), Spirituality, Ethics, and Relationship in Adulthood: Clinical and Theoretical Explorations. Psychosocial Press.   (Google)
Jantsch, Erich (ed.) (1976). Evolution And Consciousness: Human Systems In Transition. Reading Ma: Addison-Wesley.   (Cited by 36 | Google)
Jaynes, Julian (1976). The Origins of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind. Houghton Mifflin.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Jonker, A. (1987). The origin of the human mind: A speculation on the emergence of language and human consciousness. Acta Biotheoretica 36 (3):129-77.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The study of human evolution has attracted scientists of various disciplines, judging by the attendance of the conferences devoted to it, and by the publications concerned. In the course of years I became amazed about the seeming absence of a synthesis of the available information. This article presents an attempt to combine some results of the various publications.The study of human evolution has become particularly focussed on the emergence of language and human consciousness with respect to the social behaviour and mental capacities of our closest relatives: the apes. Social relations imply communication, and mentation underlies the ability to communicate. The more it becomes apparent that the social behaviour of the apes resembles that of man in many respects, the greater the danger that typically, and perhaps even uniquely, human traits are ascribed to anthropoids. Anthropomorphic descriptions of animal behaviour tend to prevent a clear view on animal mentality
Kinsbourne, Marcel (2005). A continuum of self-consciousness that emerges in phylogeny and ontogeny. In Herbert S. Terrace & Janet Metcalfe (eds.), The Missing Link in Cognition: Origins of Self-Reflective Consciousness. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
King, Joseph E.; Rumbaugh, Duane M. & Savage-Rumbaugh, E. S. (1998). Evolution of intelligence, language, and other emergent processes for consciousness: A comparative perspective. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness II. MIT Press.   (Google)
Kretz, Robert K. (2000). The evolution of self-awareness: Advances in neurological understandings since Julian Jaynes' "bicameral mind". Dissertation Abstracts International 60.   (Google)
Ladd, George Trumbull (1896). Consciousness and evolution. Psychological Review 3:296-300.   (Google)
Lindahl, B. Ingemar B. (1997). Consciousness and biological evolution. Journal of Theoretical Biology 187:613-29.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Lindahl, B. Ingemar B. (2001). Consciousness, behavioural patterns and the direction of biological evolution: Implications for the mind-brain problem. In Paavo Pylkkanen & Tere Vaden (eds.), Dimensions of Conscious Experience. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Loocke, P. (2001). The philosophy of consciousness, 'deep' teleology and objective selection. In P. Van Loocke (ed.), The Physical Nature of Consciousness. John Benjamins.   (Google)
Macphail, E. M. (1998). The Evolution of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Are non-human animals conscious? When do babies begin to feel pain? What function is served by consciousness? What evidence could resolve these issues? In The Evolution of Consciousness, psychologist Euan Macphail tackles these questions and more by exploring such topics as: animal cognition; unconscious learning and perception in humans; infantile amnesia; theory of mind in primates; and the nature of pleasure and pain. Experimental results are placed in theoretical context by tracing the development of concepts of consciousness in animals and humans. Written in an accessible style, this book will be of interest to students and professionals in psychology, philosophy, and linguistics, as well as all those interested in the nature of consciousness
Macpherson, Fiona (2002). The power of natural selection. Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (8):30-35.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Some naturalistic theories of consciousness give an essential role to teleology.1 This teleology is said to arise due to natural selection. Thus it is claimed that only certain states, namely, those that have been selected for by evolutionary pro- cesses because they contribute to (or once contributed to) an organism’s fitness, are conscious states. These theories look as if they are assigning a creative role to natural selection. If a state is conscious only if it has been selected for, then selec- tion appears to be able to create a new feature of states, namely, their conscious nature. Yet, intuitively, natural selection cannot create anything. Natural selec- tion chooses certain features that already exist and makes them more (or less) prevalent in a population, but it cannot bring features into existence itself. Natu- ral selection can select for conscious states, but it cannot create them. This con- clusion has recently been argued for by Steven Horst (1999). If it is right, then teleological theories of conscious states should be rejected. A state cannot become a conscious experience in virtue of having been selected for by evolu- tionary process
Marshall, Henry Rutgers (1896). Consciousness and biological evolution. (I.). Mind 5 (19).   (Google)
Marshall, Henry Rutgers (1896). Consciousness and biological evolution. (II.). Mind 5 (20).   (Google)
Margulis, L. (2001). The conscious cell. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 929:55-70.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Martinot, Steve (1992). The contingency of consciousness. Auslegung 18 (1):39-67.   (Google)
Menant, Christophe, Evolution as connecting first-person and third-person perspectives of consciousness (2008).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: First-person and third-person perspectives are different items of human consciousness. Feeling the taste of a fruit or being consciously part of a group eating fruits call for different perspectives of consciousness. The latter is about objective reality (third-person data). The former is about subjective experience (first-person data) and cannot be described entirely by objective reality. We propose to look at how these two perspectives could be rooted in an evolutionary origin of human consciousness, and somehow be connected. Our starting point is a scenario describing how evolution could have transformed a non self-conscious auto-representation into a conscious self-representation (Menant 2006). The scenario is based on the performance of inter-subjectivity existing among non human primates (Gardenfors 2006). A key item of the scenario is the identification of the auto-representation of a subject with the representations that the subject has of her conspecifics, the latter feeding the former with the meaning: “existing in the environment”. So during evolution, pre-human primates were brought to perceive their auto-representation as existing in the environment. Such process could have generated the initial elements of a conscious self-representation. We take this scenario as providing a possible rooting of human consciousness in evolution. We develop here a part of this scenario by expliciting the inward and outward components of the non self-conscious auto-representation. Inward components are about proprioception and interoception (thirst, pain, …). Outward components cover the sensory information relative to the perception of the body (seen feet, … ) and of its effects on the environment. We consider that the initial elements of a conscious self-representation have been applied to both inward and outward components of the auto-representation. We propose that the application to inward components made possible some first-person information, and that the application to outward components brought up third-person information. Relations between the two perspectives are highlighted. Such approach can root first-person and third-person perspectives in the same slot of human evolution. We conclude by a summary of the above and introduce a possible application of this approach to the concepts of bodily self and of pre-reflexive self-consciousness (Legrand, 2006)
Menant, Christophe (ms). Evolution and mirror neurons. An introduction to the nature of self-consciousness (2005).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Self-consciousness is a product of evolution. Few people today disagree with the evolutionary history of humans. But the nature of self-consciousness is still to be explained, and the story of evolution has rarely been used as a framework for studies on consciousness during the 20th century. This last point may be due to the fact that modern study of consciousness came up at a time where dominant philosophical movements were not in favor of evolutionist theories (Cunningham 1996). Research on consciousness based on Phenomenology or on Analytic Philosophy has been mostly taking the characteristics of humans as starting points. Relatively little has been done with bottom-up approaches, using performances of animals as a simpler starting point to understand the generation of consciousness through evolution. But this status may be changing, thanks to new tools coming from recent discoveries in neurology. The discovery of mirror neurons about ten years ago (Gallese et al. 1996, Rizzolatti et al. 1996) has allowed the built up of new conceptual tools for the understanding of intersubjectivity within humans and non human primates (Gallese 2001, Hurley 2005). Studies in these fields are still in progress, with discussions on the level of applicability of this natural intersubjectivity to non human primates (Decety and Chaminade 2003). We think that these subject/conspecific mental relations made possible by mirror neurons can open new paths for the understanding of the nature of self-consciousness via an evolutionist bottom-up approach. We propose here a scenario for the build up of self-consciousness through evolution by a specific analysis of two steps of evolution: first step from simple living elements to non human primates comparable to chimpanzees, and second step from these non human primates to humans. We identify these two steps as representing the evolution from basic animal awareness to body self-awareness, and from body self-awareness to self-consciousness. (we consider that today non human primates are comparable to what were pre-human primates). We position body self-awareness as corresponding to the performance of mirror self recognition as identified with chimpanzees and orangutans (Gallup). We propose to detail and understand the content of this body self-awareness through a specific evolutionist build up process using the performances of mirror neurons and group life. We address the evolutionary step from body self-awareness to self-consciousness by complementing the recently proposed approach where self-consciousness is presented as a by-product of body self-awareness amplification via a positive feedback loop resulting of anxiety limitation (Menant 2004). The scenario introduced here for the build up of self-consciousness through evolution leaves open the question about the nature of phenomenal-consciousness (Block 2002). We plan to address this question later on with the help of the scenario made available here
Menant, Christophe, Evolution of representations and intersubjectivity as sources of the self. An introduction to the nature of self-consciousness (2006).   (Google)
Abstract: It is agreed by most people that self-consciousness is the result of an evolutionary process, and that representations may have played an important role in that process. We would like to propose here that some evolutionary stages can highlight links existing between representations and the notion of self, opening a possible path to the nature of self-consciousness. Our starting point is to focus on representations as usage oriented items for the subject that carries them. These representations are about elements of the environment including conspecifics, and can also represent parts of the subject without refering to a notion of self (we introduce the notion of "auto-representation" that does not carry the notion of self-representation). Next step uses the performance of intersubjectivity (mirror neurons level in evolution) where a subject has the capability to mentally simulate the observed action of a conspecific (Gallese 2001). We propose that this intersubjectivity allows the subject to identify his auto-representation with the representations of his conspecifics, and so to consider his auto-representation as existing in the environment. We show how this evolutionary stage can introduce a notion of self-representation for a subject, opening a road to self-conciousness and to self. This evolutionary approach to the self via self- representation is close to the current theory of the self linked to representations and simulations (Metzinger 2003). We use a scenario about how evolution has brought the performance of self-representation to self-consciousness. We develop a process describing how the anxiety increase resulting from identification with endangered or suffering conspecifics may have called for the development of tools to limit this anxiety (empathy, imitation, language), and how these tools have accelerated the evolutionary process through a positive feedback on intersubjectivity (Menant 2004, 2005). We finish by summarizing the points addressed, and propose some possible continuations
Menant, Christophe (ms). Evolution of representations. From basic life to self-representation and self-consciousness (2006).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The notion of representation is at the foundation of cognitive sciences and is used in theories of mind and consciousness. Other notions like ‘embodiment’, 'intentionality‘, 'guidance theory' or ‘biosemantics’ have been associated to the notion of representation to introduce its functional aspect. We would like to propose here that a conception of 'usage related' representation eases its positioning in an evolutionary context, and opens new areas of investigation toward self-representation and self-consciousness. The subject is presented in five parts:Following an overall presentation, the first part introduces a usage related representation as being an information managed by a system submitted to a constraint that has to be satisfied. We consider that such a system can generate a meaningful information by comparing its constraint to a received information (Menant 2003). We define a representation as being made of the received information and of the meaningful information. Such approach allows groundings in and out for the representation relatively to the system. The second part introduces the two types of representations we want to focus on for living organisms: representations of conspecifics and auto-representation, the latter being defined without using a notion of self-representation. Both types of representations have existed for our pre-human ancestors which can be compared to today great apes.In the third part, we use the performance of intersubjectivity as identified in group life with the presence of mirror neurons in the organisms. Mirror neurons have been discovered in the 90‘s (Rizzolatti & al.1996, Gallese & al.1996). The level of intersubjectivity that can be attributed to non human primates as related to mirror neurons is currently a subject of debate (Decety 2003). We consider that a limited intersubjectivity between pre-human primates made possible a merger of both types of representations. The fourth part proposes that such a merger of representations feeds the auto-representation with the meanings associated to the representations of conspecifics, namely the meanings associated to an entity perceived as existing in the environment. We propose that auto-representation carrying these new meanings makes up the first elements of self-representation. Intersubjectivity has allowed auto-representation to evolve into self-representation, avoiding the homunculus risk. The fifth part is a continuation to other presentations (Menant 2004, 2005) about possible evolution of self-representation into self-consciousness. We propose that identification with suffering or endangered conspecifics has increased anxiety, and that the tools used to limit this anxiety (development of empathy, imitation, language and group life) have provided a positive feedback on intersubjectivity and created an evolutionary engine for the organism. Other outcomes have also been possible. Such approach roots consciousness in emotions. The evolutionary scenario proposed here does not introduce explicitly the question of phenomenal consciousness (Block 1995). This question is to be addressed later with the help of this scenario.The conclusion lists the points introduced here with their possible continuations
Menant, Christophe, Proposal for an approach to artificial consciousness based on self-consciousness.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Current research on artificial consciousness is focused on phenomenal consciousness and on functional consciousness. We propose to shift the focus to self-consciousness in order to open new areas of investigation. We use an existing scenario where self-consciousness is considered as the result of an evolution of representations. Application of the scenario to the possible build up of a conscious robot also introduces questions relative to emotions in robots. Areas of investigation are proposed as a continuation of this approach
Menant, Christophe (ms). Performances of self-awareness used to explain the evolutionary advantages of consciousness (2004).   (Google)
Abstract: The question about evolution of consciousness has been addressed so far as possible selectional advantage related to consciousness ("What evolutionary advantages, if any, being conscious might confer on an organism ? "). But evidencing an adaptative explanation of consciousness has proven to be very difficult. Reason for that being the complexity of consciousness. We take here a different approach on subject by looking at possible selectional advantages related to the performance of Self Awareness that appeared during evolution millions of years before consciousness as we know it for humans. The interest of such an approach is that the analysis of selectional advantage is done at an evolution step sigificantly simpler that the step of Human Consciousness. We analyse how evolutionary advantages have resulted from this specific Self Awareness step. This is done by taking into consideration the possibility for a subject to identify with a conspecific at this level of evolution. We use the results made available by Mirror Neuron researchs where intersubjectivity and some level of identification with conspecifics have been evidenced for non human primates. Selectional advantages related to Self Awareness are analysed two ways: - Reformulating the performances of imitation and of development of language. - Showing that Self Awareness within group life can naturaly produce an important increase in fear/anxiety for a subject, and that the means implemented by the subject to overcome this fear/anxiety can act as significant evolution advantages opening the road to Human Consciousness. Such approach brings new elements supporting the view that consciousness is grounded in emotions. It also proposes some more evolutionist explanations to the widely dicussed subject of Empathy (S. Preston & F. de Waal) in terms of specific behaviour implemented to limit fear/anxiety increase. This approach also provides some explanation for limited anxiety within dolphins and introduces a basis for a possible phylogenesis of emotions
Merker, Bjorn H. (2005). The liabilities of mobility: A selection pressure for the transition to consciousness in animal evolution. Consciousness and Cognition 14 (1):89-114.   (Cited by 21 | Google)
Nichols, Shaun & Grantham, Todd A. (2000). Adaptive complexity and phenomenal consciousness. Philosophy Of Science 67 (4):648-670.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Ong, Walter J. (1977). Interfaces of the Word: Studies in the Evolution of Consciousness and Culture. Cornell University Press.   (Google)
Ornstein, Robert E. (1991). The Evolution of Consciousness: Of Darwin, Freud, and Cranial Fire: The Origins of the Way We Think. Prentice-Hall.   (Cited by 50 | Google)
Pachalska, Maria (2006). The psychology of art and the evolution of the conscious brain. Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease 194 (8):632-634.   (Google | More links)
Pally, Regina (2005). Non-conscious prediction and a role for consciousness in correcting prediction errors. Cortex. Special Issue 41 (5):643-662.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Panksepp, Jaak (2002). On the animalian values of the human spirit: The foundational role of affect in psychotherapy and the evolution of consciousness. European Journal of Psychotherapy, Counselling and Health 5 (3):225-245.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Paul, Diana Y. (1984). Philosophy of Mind in Sixth-Century China: Paramārtha's "Evolution of Consciousness". Stanford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Of the many translators who carried the Buddhist doctrine to China, Paramartha, a missionary-monk who arrived in China in AD 546, ranks as the translator par excellence of the sixth century. Introducing philosophical ideas that would subsequently excite the Chinese imagination to develop the great schools of Sui and T'ang Buddhism, Paramartha's translations are almost exclusively of Yogacara Buddhist texts on the nature of the mind and consciousness. This first study of Paramartha in a Western language focuses on the Chuan shih lun (Evolution of Consciousness), a text that reveals the outline of Paramartha's Yogacara thought. The study begins with a discussion of Paramartha's life, the historical and political context of the time in India and south China, and the roles of his main disciples in disseminating his work. It then describes Paramartha's treatment of Yogacarin views on language and the process of cognition, both central to this system of thought. The final chapter analyzes the history and content of the Chuan shih lun, and the book concludes with a new translation of the text, with extensive annotations
Pharoah, Mark (ms). Looking to systems theory for a reductive explanation of phenomenal experience and evolutionary foundations for H.O.T.   (Google)
Abstract: This paper details an evolving dynamic systems hierarchy and explores its relationship with conceptual, evolutionary, physiological, and behavioural characteristics that include phenomenal experience. In doing this, the paper demonstrates an example of a type-C physicalist's reductive explanation of phenomenal experience that is coherent with stipulated philosophical criteria and theories. By providing a reductive explanation of phenomenal experience, the paper provides insights toward explaining many unique human characteristics. These include, creativity, the origins of language as distinct from animal communication, the evolution of morality, and the dynamics behind bias and prejudice. Furthermore, the reductive explanation provides foundations for artificial consciousness applications.
Polger, Thomas W. & Flanagan, Owen J. (2002). Consciousness, adaptation and epiphenomenalism. In James H. Fetzer (ed.), Consciousness Evolving. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Polger, Thomas W. & Flanagan, Owen J. (online). Explaining the evolution of consciousness: The other hard problem.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Recently some philosophers interested in consciousness have begun to turn their attention to the question of what evolutionary advantages, if any, being conscious might confer on an organism. The issue has been pressed in recent dicussions involving David Chalmers, Todd Moody, Owen Flanagan and Thomas Polger, Daniel Dennett, and others. The purpose of this essay is to consider some of the problems that face anyone who wants to give an evolutionary explanation of consciousness. We begin by framing the problem in the context of some current debates. Then we
Poletti, Frank (2002). Plato's vowels: How the alphabet influenced the evolution of consciousness. World Futures 58 (1):101 – 116.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Beginning with Ken Wilber's framework for the evolution of human consciousness, this essay investigates the critical threshold crossed around the year 500 B.C.E., when human consciousness in the Western world transformed from a predominantly oral and tribal framework to a largely written and abstract one. This transformation has been called the birth of the mental-ego-the birth of an autonomous, willful, and uniquely individual consciousness. Yet, in the Western world this birth was inextricably influenced by a completely novel literary invention-the Greek version of the alphabet. Living at the precise moment when this new invention was rapidly proliferating throughout ancient Greece, the Western world's most famous philosopher, Plato, posited his ontology of human disconnection from the sensory world. For Plato, the "real world" is the abstract world of transcendent Ideas, of which our sensory, human world is only a pale reflection. The following essay asks, then: is it just a mere coincidence that the world's most abstract literacy tool (the Greek alphabet) and the world's most abstract and disembodied philosophy (Plato's theory of Ideas) just happened to flourish in ancient Greece at exactly the same time in history?
Polger, Thomas W. (2007). Rethinking the evolution of consciousness. In Susan Schneider & Max Velmans (eds.), Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Suppose that consciousness is a natural feature of biological organisms, and that it is a capacity or property or process that resides in a single organ. In that case there is a straightforward question about the consciousness organ, namely: How did the consciousness organ come to be formed and why is its presence maintained in those organisms that have it? Of course answering this question might be rather difficult, particularly if the consciousness organ is made of soft tissue that leaves at best indirect fossil records, or if it has been fixed in the populations for such a long time that there are few available examples of organisms that lack the consciousness organ on which to conduct comparative experiments. No doubt there are other confounding practical obstacles as well. But these are just the complications that face biologists and natural historians on a regular basis, and they do not reflect any special problems about the study of consciousness. This is just to say that if consciousness is a natural feature of biological organisms then its origins and history can be studied in the same manner as other features of the biological world. It’s a hard business, but biologists are pretty good at it
Povinelli, Daniel J. (1987). Monkeys, apes, mirrors, minds: The evolution of self-awareness in primates. Human Evolution 2:493-507.   (Cited by 9 | Google)
Pribram, Karl H.; Jerison, H. J.; McGuiness, D. & Eccles, John C. (1982). The evolution of consciousness: A symposium. In John C. Eccles (ed.), Mind and Brain. Paragon House.   (Google)
Puccetti, Roland (1974). Physicalism and the evolution of consciousness. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 1:171-83.   (Google)
Puccetti, Roland (1981). The ascent of consciousness. In Pragmatism And Purpose: Essays Presented To Thomas A Goudge. Toronto: University Of Toronto Press.   (Google)
Read, Herbert (1954). Art and the evolution of consciousness. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 13 (2):143-155.   (Google | More links)
Reber, Arthur S. (1992). An evolutionary context for the cognitive unconscious. Philosophical Psychology 5 (1):33-51.   (Cited by 22 | Google)
Abstract: This paper is an attempt to put the work of the past several decades on the problems of implicit learning and unconscious cognition into an evolutionary context. Implicit learning is an inductive process whereby knowledge of a complex environment is acquired and used largely independently of awareness of either the process of acquisition or the nature of that which has been learned. Characterized this way, implicit learning theory can be viewed as an attempt to come to grips with the classic epistemological issues of knowledge acquisition, representation and use. The argument is made that the process, despite its seeming cognitive sophistication, is of considerable evolutionary antiquity and that it antedates awareness and the capacity for conscious control of mentation. Various classic heuristics from evolutionary biology are used to substantiate this claim and several specific entailments of this line of argument are outlined
Reber, Arthur S. & Allen, Robert F. (2000). Individual differences in implicit learning: Implications for the evolution of consciousness. In Robert G. Kunzendorf & B. Alan Wallace (eds.), Individual Differences in Conscious Experience. John Benjamin.   (Cited by 9 | Google)
Reber, Arthur S. (1992). The cognitive unconscious: An evolutionary perspective. Consciousness and Cognition 1:93-133.   (Cited by 42 | Google)
Rogers, L. J. (1995). Evolution and development of brain asymmetry, and its relevance to language, tool use and consciousness. International Journal of Comparative Psychology 8:1-15.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Rossano, Matt J. (2003). Expertise and the evolution of consciousness. Cognition 89 (3):207-236.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Roth, Gerhard (2000). The evolution and ontogeny of consciousness. In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Neural Correlates of Consciousness. MIT Press.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Rutgers Marshall, Henry (1896). Consciousness and biological evolution. Mind 5 (20):523-538.   (Google | More links)
Sloman, Aaron (ms). The evolution of what?   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: There is now a huge amount of interest in consciousness among scientists as well as philosophers, yet there is so much confusion and ambiguity in the claims and counter-claims that it is hard to tell whether any progress is being made. This ``position paper'' suggests that we can make progress by temporarily putting to one side questions about what consciousness is or which animals or machines have it or how it evolved. Instead we should focus on questions about the sorts of architectures that are possible for behaving systems and ask what sorts of capabilities, states and processes, might be supported by different sorts of architectures. We can then ask which organisms and machines have which sorts of architectures. This combines the standpoint of philosopher, biologist and engineer. If we can find a general theory of the variety of possible architectures (a characterisation of ``design space'') and the variety of environments, tasks and roles to which such architectures are well suited (a characterisation of ``niche space'') we may be able to use such a theory as a basis for formulating new more precisely defined concepts with which to articulate less ambiguous questions about the space of possible minds. For instance our initially ill-defined concept (``consciousness'') might split into a collection of more precisely defined concepts which can be used to ask unambiguous questions with definite answers. As a first step this paper explores a collection of conjectures regarding architectures and their evolution. In particular we explore architectures involving a combination of coexisting architectural levels including: (a) reactive mechanisms which evolved very early, (b) deliberative mechanisms which evolved later in response to pressures on information processing resources and (c) meta-management mechanisms that can explicitly inspect evaluate and modify some of the contents of various internal information structures. It is conjectured that in response to the needs of these layers, perceptual and action subsystems also developed layers, and also that an ``alarm'' system which initially existed only within the reactive layer may have become increasingly sophisticated and extensive as its inputs and outputs were linked to the newer layers. Processes involving the meta-management layer in the architecture could explain the origin of the notion of ``qualia''. Processes involving the ``alarm'' mechanism and mechanisms concerned with resource limits in the second and third layers gives us an explanation of three main forms of emotion, helping to account for some of the ambiguities which have bedevilled the study of emotion. Further theoretical and practical benefits may come from further work based on this design-based approach to consciousness. A deeper longer term implication is the possibility of a new science investigating laws governing possible trajectories in design space and niche space, as these form parts of high order feedback loops in the biosphere
Solso, Robert L. (2003). The Psychology of Art and the Evolution of the Conscious Brain. MIT Press.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Stapp, Henry P. (1998). The evolution of consciousness. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness II. MIT Press.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract: It is argued that the principles of classical physics are inimical to the development of a satisfactory science of consciousness The problem is that insofar as the classical principles are valid consciousness can have no e ect on the behavior and hence on the survival prospects of the organisms in which it inheres Thus within the classical framework it is not possible to explain in natural terms the development of consciousness to the high level form found in human beings In quantum theory on the other hand consciousness can be dynamically e cacious quantum the ory does allows consciousness to in uence behavior and thence to evolve in accordance with the principles of natural selection However this evo lutionary requirement places important constraints upon the details of the formulation of the quantum dynamical principles..
Stewart, John E. (ms). The future evolution of consciousness.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: ABSTRACT. What potential exists for improvements in the functioning of consciousness? The paper addresses this issue using global workspace theory. According to this model, the prime function of consciousness is to develop novel adaptive responses. Consciousness does this by putting together new combinations of knowledge, skills and other disparate resources that are recruited from throughout the brain. The paper's search for potential improvements in the functioning of consciousness draws on studies of the shift during human development from the use of implicit knowledge to the use of explicit (declarative) knowledge. These studies show that the ability of consciousness to adapt a particular domain improves significantly as the transition to the use of declarative knowledge occurs in that domain. However, this potential for consciousness to enhance adaptability has not yet been realised to any extent in relation to consciousness itself. The paper assesses the potential for adaptability to be improved by the conscious adaptation of key processes that constitute consciousness. A number of sources (including the practices of religious and contemplative traditions) are drawn on to investigate how this potential might be realised
Stewart, John E. (2007). The future evolution of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (8):58-92.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: What is the potential for improvements in the functioning of consciousness? The paper addresses this issue using global workspace theory. According to this model, the prime function of consciousness is to develop novel adaptive responses. Consciousness does this by putting together new combinations of knowledge, skills and other disparate resources that are recruited from throughout the brain. The paper's search for potential improvements in consciousness is aided by studies of a developmental transition that enhances functioning in whichever domain it occurs. This transition involves a shift from the use of procedural (implicit) knowledge to declarative (explicit) knowledge. However, the potential of the transition to enhance functioning has not yet been realised to any extent in relation to consciousness itself. The paper assesses the potential for consciousness to use declarative knowledge to improve its own functioning and to thereby enhance human adaptability. A number of sources (including the practices of religious and contemplative traditions) are drawn on to investigate how this potential might be realised
Sugerman, Shirley (ed.) (1976). Evolution of Consciousness: Studies in Polarity. Barfield Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Owen Barfield: a conversation with Shirley Sugerman -- To Owen Barfield -- Cecil Harwood: Owen Barfield -- Norman O. Brown: on interpretation -- Howard Nemerov: exceptions and rules -- Studies in polarity -- David Bohm: imagination, fancy, insight, and reason in the process of thought -- R.H. Barfield: darwinism -- Richard A. Hocks: "novelty" in polarity to "the most admitted truths" : tradition and the individual talent in S.T. Coleridge and T.S. Eliot -- Robert O. Preyer: the burden of culture and the dialectic of literature -- R.K. Meiners: on modern poetry, poetic consciousness, and the madness of poets -- Paul Piehler: Milton's iconoclasm -- Colin Hardie: two descents into the underworld -- Lionel Adey: enjoyment, contemplation, and hierarchy in Hamlet -- G.B. Tennyson: etymology and meaning -- R.J. Reilly: a note on Barfield, romanticism, and time -- Shirley Sugerman: an "essay" on Coleridge on imagination -- Clyde S. Kilby: the ugly and the evil -- Mary Caroline Richards: the vessel and the fire -- The works of Owen Barfield -- G.B. Tennyson: a bibliography of the works of Owen Barfield.
Thompson, William Irwin (1998). Coming Into Being: Artifacts and Texts in the Evolution of Consciousness. St. Martin's Griffin.   (Google)
Abstract: In his best-selling The Time Falling Bodies Take to Light , William Irwin Thompson intrigued readers with his thoughts on mythology and sexuality. In his newest book, Coming Into Being: Artifacts and Texts in the Evolution of Consciousness , he takes the reader on a journey through the evolution of consciousness from the preverbal communications of early stone carvings, to the writings of Marcel Proust, around the monumental wrappings of Christo and up to the rebirth of interest in the Taoist philosophy of Lao Tzu. Owing as much to the rhythmic constructions of jazz as to established methods of scholarship, Thompson plays a riff on biology and culture seeing the birth of the mind in Proust’s Madeleine, the displacement of humanity in Christo’s wrapping of the Reichstag and, in Lao Tzu’s Tao Te Ching , the path forward to a new planetary culture. In Coming Into Being , William Irwin Thompson presents a fascinating vision of our past, our present, and our future that no one will want to miss
Towers, Bernard (1979). Consciousness and the brain: Evolutionary aspects. In Brain and Mind. (Ciba Foundation Symposium 69).   (Google)
Vandervert, Larry R. (1995). Chaos theory and the evolution of consciousness and mind: A thermodynamic/holographic resolution to the mind-body problem. New Ideas in Psychology 13:107-27.   (Cited by 42 | Google)
Vazire, Simine & Robins, Richard W. (2004). Beyond the justification hypothesis: A broader theory of the evolution of self-consciousness. Journal of Clinical Psychology. Special Issue 1 (12):1271-1273.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Velmans, Max (2010). The evolution of consciousness. In Michel Weber & Anderson Weekes (eds.), Process Approaches to Consciousness in Psychology, Neuroscience, and Philosophy of Mind. State University of New York Press.   (Google)
Wallace, Rodrick & Wallace, Robert G. (ms). Darwin's Rainbow: Evolutionary radiation and the spectrum of consciousness.   (Google)
Abstract: Evolution is littered with paraphyletic convergences: many roads lead to functional Romes. We propose here another example - an equivalence class structure factoring the broad realm of possible realizations of the Baars Global Workspace consciousness model. The construction suggests many different physiological systems can support rapidly shifting, sometimes highly tunable, temporary assemblages of interacting unconscious cognitive modules. The discovery implies various animal taxa exhibiting behaviors we broadly recognize as conscious are, in fact, simply expressing different forms of the same underlying phenomenon. Mathematically, we find much slower, and even multiple simultaneous, versions of the basic structure can operate over very long timescales, a kind of paraconsciousness often ascribed to group phenomena. The variety of possibilities, a veritable rainbow, suggests minds today may be only a small surviving fraction of ancient evolutionary radiations - bush phylogenies of consciousness and paraconsciousness. Under this scenario, the resulting diversity was subsequently pruned by selection and chance extinction. Though few traces of the radiation may be found in the direct fossil record, exaptations and vestiges are scattered across the living mind. Humans, for instance, display an uncommonly profound synergism between individual consciousness and their embedding cultural heritages, enabling efficient Lamarkian adaptation
Weiss, Donald D. (1970). Modern materialism and the evolution of self-consciousness. Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 1:38-44.   (Google)
Johnson Jr, William C. (1979). Literature, film, and the evolution of consciousness. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 38 (1):29-38.   (Google | More links)
Wozniak, Robert H. (ed.) (1884). Theoretical Roots of Early Behaviourism: Functionalism, the Critique of Introspection, and the Nature and Evolution of Consciousness. Routledge/Thoemmes Press.   (Google)
Abstract: While John B. Watson articulated the intellectual commitments of behaviorism with clarity and force, wove them into a coherent perspective, gave the perspective a name, and made it a cause, these commitments had adherents before him. To document the origins of behaviorism, this series collects the articles that set the terms of the behaviorist debate, includes the most important pre-Watsonian contributions to objectivism, and reprints the first full text of the new behaviorism. Contents: Functionalism, the Critque of Introspection, and the Nature and Evolution of Consciousness: Theoretical Roots of Early Behaviourism: An Anthology [1842-1914] Robert H. Wozniak (Ed) 360 pp Studies of Animal and Infant Behaviour. the Experimental and Comparative Roots of Early Behaviourism: An Anthology [1840-1911] Robert H. Wozniak (Ed) 412 pp An Introuduction to Comparative Psychology [1894 edition] Conway Lloyd Morgan 628 pp Comparative Physiology of the Brain and Comparative Psychology [1900] Jacques Loeb 342 pp Fundamental Laws of Human Behaviour. Lectures on the foundtions of Any Mental or Social Science [1911] Max F. Meyer 264 pp Behaviour. An Introduction to Comparative Psychology [1914 edition] John B. Watson 482 pp

8.4b Animal Consciousness

Allen, Colin (online). Animal consciousness. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Google)
Allen, Colin & Bekoff, Mark (2007). Animal consciousness. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell.   (Google)
Allen, Colin (2004). Animal pain. Noûs 38 (4):617-43.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Which nonhuman animals experience conscious pain?1 This question is central to the debate about animal welfare, as well as being of basic interest to scientists and philosophers of mind. Nociception—the capacity to sense noxious stimuli—is one of the most primitive sensory capacities. Neurons functionally specialized for nociception have been described in invertebrates such as the leech Hirudo medicinalis and the marine snail Aplysia californica (Walters 1996). Is all nociception accompanied by conscious pain, even in relatively primitive animals such as Aplysia, or is it the case, as some philosophers continue to maintain, that conscious experiences are the exclu- sive province of human beings? What philosophical and scientific resources are presently available for assessing claims lying between these extremes?
Allen-Hermanson, Sean (2010). Blindsight in Monkeys: Lost and (perhaps) found. Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (1-2).   (Google)
Abstract: Stoerig and Cowey’s work is widely regarded as showing that monkeys with lesions in the primary visual cortex have blindsight. However, Mole and Kelly persuasively argue that the experimental results are compatible with an alternative hypothesis positing only a deficit in attention and perceptual working memory. I describe a revised procedure which can distinguish these hypotheses, and offer reasons for thinking that the blindsight hypothesis provides a superior explanation. The study of blindsight might contribute towards a general investigation into animal consciousness, though there is a problem when it comes to showing how a non-verbal animal can indicate whether or not it is perceiving consciously. Perhaps whether there is something that it is like to be a given animal depends on whether it exhibits the cognitive profile of conscious vision as opposed to non-conscious “natural blindsight.”
Allen, Colin (2005). Deciphering animal pain. In Murat Aydede (ed.), Pain: New Essays on Its Nature and the Methodology of Its Study. Cambridge MA: Bradford Book/MIT Press.   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper we1 assess the potential for research on nonhuman animals to address questions about the phenomenology of painful experiences. Nociception, the basic capacity for sensing noxious stimuli, is widespread in the animal kingdom. Even rel- atively primitive animals such as leeches and sea slugs possess nociceptors, neurons that are functionally specialized for sensing noxious stimuli (Walters 1996). Vertebrate spinal cords play a sophisticated role in processing and modulating nociceptive signals, providing direct control of some motor responses to noxious stimuli, and a basic capacity for Pavlovian and instrumental conditioning (Grau et al. 1990; Grau 2002). Higher brain systems provide additional layers of association, top-down control, and cognition. In humans, at least, these higher brain systems also give rise to the conscious experiences that are characteristic of pain. What can be said about the experiences of other animals who possess nervous systems that are similar but not identical to humans?
Allen-Hermanson, Sean (2008). Insects and the problem of simple minds: Are bees natural zombies? Journal of Philosophy 105 (8).   (Google | More links)
Allen, Keith (2009). Inter-species variation in colour perception. Philosophical Studies 142 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: Inter-species variation in colour perception poses a serious problem for the view that colours are mind-independent properties. Given that colour perception varies so drastically across species, which species perceives colours as they really are? In this paper, I argue that all do. Specifically, I argue that members of different species perceive properties that are determinates of different, mutually compatible, determinables. This is an instance of a general selectionist strategy for dealing with cases of perceptual variation. According to selectionist views, objects simultaneously instantiate a plurality of colours, all of them genuinely mind-independent, and subjects select from amongst this plurality which colours they perceive. I contrast selectionist views with relationalist views that deny the mind-independence of colour, and consider some general objections to this strategy
Allen, Garland E. (1987). Materialism and reductionism in the study of animal consciousness. In G. Greenberg & E. Tobach (eds.), Cognition, Language, and Consciousness: Integrative Levels. Lawrence Erlbaum.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Allen, Colin (1997). The discovery of animal consciousness: An optimistic assessment. Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 10 (3).   (Google)
Appleton, Tim (1976). Consciousness in animals. Zygon 11 (December):337-345.   (Google | More links)
Baars, Bernard J. (2005). Subjective experience is probably not limited to humans: The evidence from neurobiology and behavior. Consciousness and Cognition 14 (1):7-21.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Baars, Bernard J. (2001). There are no known differences in brain mechanisms of consciousness between humans and other mammals. Animal Welfare Supplement 10:31- 40.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Bateson, P. P. G. & Klopfer, P. H. (1991). Perspectives in Ethology, Volume 9: Human Understanding and Animal Awareness. Plenum Press.   (Google)
Bechtel, William (1992). Studying the thinking of non-human animals. Biology and Philosophy 7 (2).   (Google | More links)
Bekoff, Marc (2006). Animal passions and beastly virtues: Cognitive ethology as the unifying science for understanding the subjective, emotional, empathic, and moral lives of animals. Zygon 41 (1):71-104.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Bekoff, Marc (2003). Considering animals--not higher primates. Zygon 38 (2):229-245.   (Google | More links)
Bekoff, Marc (1992). Scientific ideology, animal consciousness, and animal protection: A principled plea for unabashed common sense. New Ideas in Psychology 10:79-94.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Bermond, B. (2001). A neuropsychological and evolutionary approach to animal consciousness and animal suffering. Animal Welfare Supplement 10:47- 62.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Beshkar, Majid (2008). Animal consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (3):5-33.   (Google)
Abstract: There are several types of behavioural evidence in favour of the notion that many animal species experience at least some simple levels of consciousness. Other than behavioural evidence, there are a number of anatomical and physiological criteria that help resolve the problem of animal consciousness, particularly when addressing the problem in lower vertebrates and invertebrates. In this paper, I review a number of such behavioural and brain- based evidence in the case of mammals, birds, and some invertebrate species. Cumulative evidence strongly suggests that consciousness, of one form or another, is present in mammals and birds. Although supportive evidence is less strong in the case of invertebrates, it is more likely than not that they also experience some simple levels of consciousness
Bradshaw, R. H. (1998). Consciousness in nonhuman animals: Adopting the precautionary principle. Journal of Consciousness Studies 5 (1):108-14.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Bremer, Manuel (2006). Animal consciousness, anthromorphism and heterophenomenology. Philosophisches Jahrbuch 113 (2):397-410.   (Google)
Bremer, Manuel, Animal consciousness as a test case of cognitive science.   (Google)
Abstract: In our dealings with animals at least most of us see them as conscious beings. On the other hand the employment of human categories to animals seems to be problematic. Reflecting on the details of human beliefs, for example, casts serious doubt on whether the cat is able to believe anything at all. These theses try to reflect on methodological issues when investigating animal minds. Developing a theory of animal mentality seems to be a test case of the interdisciplinary research programme in cognitive science. From the philosopher`s perspective the most pressing problem is how to talk about animal minds. Can we just employ the vocabulary of human psychology? If not, exploring animal minds contains the non-trivial task of introducing a terminology that allows to see the distinctness of animal minds and to see its connection to the human case. The treatment of some topic in cognitive science has to reach a reflective equilibrium between our intuitions, a phenomenological approach, philosophical conceptual analysis, various empirical approaches and model building. Reflective equilibrium means in this context that we have to reach a coherent model which incorporates as much of our intuitions concerning animal consciousness and integrates at the same time the findings of the different co-operating sciences. There can be various trade-offs in case of conflict between, say, philosophical definitions of mental terms as to be applied to animals, neurophysiology, our reflected intuitions and ethological model building based on a computational theory of animal minds. The paper gives an example of reflective equilibrium in discussing the case for awareness in vertebrates. It considers the role of evolutionary reasoning. The main focus lays on two examples of comparing our human notions (chosen here are “having concepts” and “belief”) with corresponding abilities in animals, and how an appropriate conceptual apparatus dealing with the abilities of animals could be introduced
Burghardt, Gordon M. (1985). Animal awareness: Current perceptions and historical perspective. American Psychologist 40:905-919.   (Cited by 28 | Google)
Carruthers, Peter (1998). Animal subjectivity. Psyche.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Carruthers, Peter (1989). Brute experience. Journal of Philosophy 86 (May):258-269.   (Cited by 44 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Carruthers, Peter (2005). Consciousness might matter very much - reply. Philosophical Psychology 18 (1):113-122.   (Google)
Carruthers, Peter (2004). On being simple minded. American Philosophical Quarterly 41 (3):205-220.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Carruthers, Peter (2005). Reply to Shriver and Allen. Philosophical Psychology 18 (1):113-122.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Shriver and Allen (this volume, this journal; hereafter S&A) make three unconnected criticisms of my views concerning phenomenal consciousness and the question of animal consciousness. First, they claim that my dispositional higher-order thought theory of consciousness has much greater significance for ethics than I recognize. Second, they claim that, in the course of attempting to motivate that theory, I have presented inadequate criticisms of first-order theories (according to which phenomenal consciousness may well be rampant in the animal world). And third, they claim that my argument that the question of animal consciousness might not matter a great deal for comparative psychology may prove too much, showing that such consciousness is genuinely epiphenomenal in ourselves, and undermining some of my own evolutionary arguments in support of higher-order theories. I shall focus mostly on the second and third criticisms. But I begin with a few remarks about the first
Carruthers, Peter (1999). Sympathy and subjectivity. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (4):465-82.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Carruthers, Peter (2004). Suffering without subjectivity. Philosophical Studies 121 (2):99-125.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   This paper argues that it is possible for suffering to occur in the absence of phenomenal consciousness – in the absence of a certain sort of experiential subjectivity, that is. (Phenomenal consciousness is the property that some mental states possess, when it is like something to undergo them, or when they have subjective feels, or possess qualia.) So even if theories of phenomenal consciousness that would withhold such consciousness from most species of non-human animal are correct, this neednt mean that those animals dont suffer, and arent appropriate objects of sympathy and concern
Carruthers, Peter (2005). Why the question of animal consciousness might not matter very much. Philosophical Psychology 18 (1):83-102.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: According to higher-order thought accounts of phenomenal consciousness it is unlikely that many non-human animals undergo phenomenally conscious experiences. Many people believe that this result would have deep and far-reaching consequences. More specifically, they believe that the absence of phenomenal consciousness from the rest of the animal kingdom must mark a radical and theoretically significant divide between ourselves and other animals, with important implications for comparative psychology. I shall argue that this belief is mistaken. Since phenomenal consciousness might be almost epiphenomenal in its functioning within human cognition, its absence in animals may signify only relatively trivial differences in cognitive architecture. Our temptation to think otherwise arises partly as a side-effect of imaginative identification with animal experiences, and partly from mistaken beliefs concerning the aspects of common-sense psychology that carry the main explanatory burden, whether applied to humans or to non-human animals
Chandroo, K. P.; Yue, S. & Moccia, R. D. (2004). An evaluation of current perspectives on consciousness and pain in fishes. Fish and Fisheries 5:281-95.   (Cited by 13 | Google | More links)
Cheney, Dorothy L. & Seyfarth, Robert M. (1990). How Monkeys See the World: Inside the Mind of Another Species. University of Chicago Press.   (Cited by 1064 | Google | More links)
Abstract: "This reviewer had to be restrained from stopping people in the street to urge them to read it: They would learn something of the way science is done,...
Collins, Arthur W. (1998). Beastly experience. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2):375-380.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Crook, J. H. (1983). On attributing consciousness to animals. Nature 303:11-14.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Dawkins, Marian S. (1993). Through Our Eyes Only: The Search for Animal Consciousness. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 97 | Google)
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Dennett, Daniel C. (1995). Animal consciousness: What matters and why? Social Research 62:691-710.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Abstract: But perhaps we really don't want to know the answers to these questions. We should not despise the desire to be kept in ignorance--aren't there many facts about yourself and your loved ones that you would wisely choose not to know? Speaking for myself, I am sure that I would go to some lengths to prevent myself from learning all the secrets of those around me--whom they found disgusting, whom they secretly adored, what crimes and follies they had committed, or thought I had committed! Learning all these facts would destroy my composure, cripple my attitude towards those around me. Perhaps learning too much about our animal cousins would have a similarly poisonous effect on our relations with them. But if so, then let's make a frank declaration to that effect and drop the topic, instead of pursuing any further the pathetic course many are now embarked upon
Dol, M.; Kasanmoentalib, Soemini; Lijmbach, Susanne; Rivas, E. & van den Bos, Ruud (2002). Animal Consciousness and Animal Ethics. Van Gorcum and Co.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
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Edelman, D. B.; Baars, Bernard J. & Seth, Anil K. (2005). Identifying hallmarks of consciousness in non-mammalian species. Consciousness and Cognition 14 (1):169-87.   (Cited by 23 | Google | More links)
Gallup, G. G. (1985). Do minds exist in species other than our own? Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews 9:631-41.   (Cited by 27 | Google)
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Griffin, Donald R. (1985). Animal consciousness. Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews 9:615-22.   (Cited by 9 | Google)
Griffin, Donald R. (1992). Animal Minds. University of Chicago Press.   (Cited by 332 | Google | More links)
Abstract: University of Chicago Press, 2001 Review by Adriano Palma, Ph.D. on Aug 1st 2001 Volume: 5, Number: 31
Griffin, Donald R. (2001). Animal Minds: Beyond Cognition to Consciousness. University of Chicago Press.   (Cited by 332 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Finally, in four chapters greatly expanded for this edition, Griffin considers the latest scientific research on animal consciousness, pro and con, and...
Griffin, Donald R. & Speck, G. B. (2004). New evidence of animal consciousness. Animal Cognition 7 (1):5-18.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Griffin, Donald R. (1981). The Question of Animal Awareness: Evolutionary Continuity of Mental Experience. William Kaufmann.   (Cited by 186 | Google)
Griffin, Donald R. (1995). Windows on animal minds. Consciousness and Cognition 4:194-204.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Hampton, Robert R. & Hampstead, Benjamin M. (2006). Spontaneous behavior of a rhesus monkey (Macaca Mulatta) during memory tests suggests memory awareness. Behavioural Processes 72 (2):184-189.   (Google | More links)
Hanna, Robert (ms). What is it like to be a bat in pain? Kinds of animal minds and the moral comparison principle.   (Google)
Heinrich, Bernd (2002). Raven consciousness. In Marc Bekoff, Colin Allen & Gordon M. Burghardt (eds.), The Cognitive Animal: Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives on Animal Cognition. MIT Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Helton, William S. (2005). Animal expertise, conscious or not. Animal Cognition 8 (2):67-74.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Heyes, Cecilia (2008). Beast machines? Questions of animal consciousness. In Lawrence Weiskrantz & Martin Davies (eds.), Frontiers of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Heyes, Cecilia M. (1987). Cognisance of consciousness in the study of animal knowledge. In Werner Callebaut & R. Pinxten (eds.), Evolutionary Epistemology: A Multiparadigm Program. Reidel.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Heyes, Nicholas Shea Æ Cecilia, Metamemory as evidence of animal consciousness: The type that does the trick.   (Google)
Abstract: The question of whether non-human animals are conscious is of fundamental importance. There are already good reasons to think that many are, based on evolutionary continuity and other considerations. However, the hypothesis is notoriously resistant to direct empirical test. Numerous studies have shown behaviour in animals analogous to consciously-produced human behaviour. Fewer probe whether the same mechanisms are in use. One promising line of evidence about consciousness in other animals derives from experiments on metamemory. A study by Hampton (Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 98(9):5359–5362, 2001) suggests that at least one rhesus macaque can use metamemory to predict whether it would itself succeed on a delayed matching-to-sample task. Since it is not plausible that mere meta-representation requires consciousness, Hampton’s study invites an important question: what kind of metamemory is good evidence for consciousness? This paper argues that if it were found that an animal had a memory trace which allowed it to use information about a past perceptual stimulus to inform a range of different behaviours, that would indeed be good evidence that the animal was conscious. That functional characterisation can be tested by investigating whether successful performance on one metamemory task transfers to a range of new tasks. The paper goes on to argue that thinking about animal consciousness in this way helps in formulating a more precise functional characterisation of the mechanisms of conscious awareness
Hughes, Henry S. (2001). Sensory Exotica: A World Beyond Human Experience. MIT Press.   (Cited by 21 | Google)
Jolly, A. (1991). Conscious chimpanzees? A review of recent literature. In C. A. Ristau (ed.), Cognitive Ethology. Lawrence Erlbaum.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Jolley, N. (1995). Sensation, intentionality, and animal consciousness. Ratio 8 (2):128-42.   (Google | More links)
Kasanmoentalib, Soemini & Visser, Matthew B. H. (1997). Perspectives on animal consciousness. Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 10 (3).   (Google)
Kirkwood, J. K. & Hubrecht, R. (2001). Animal consciousness, cognition and welfare. Animal Welfare Supplement 10.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Kretz, Lisa (2004). Peter Carruthers and brute experience: Descartes revisited. Essays in Philosophy 5 (2):1-13.   (Google)
Kuczaj, S.; Tranel, K.; Trone, M. & Hill, H. Hamner (2001). Are animals capable of deception or empathy? Implications for animal consciousness and animal welfare. Animal Welfare. Special Issue 10:161- 173.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Kuczaj, S.; Tranel, K.; Trone, M. & Hill, H. Hamner (2001). Are animals capable of deception or empathy? Implications for Animal Consciousness and Animal Welfare. Animal Welfare Supplement 10.   (Google)
Latto, R. (1986). The question of animal consciousness. Psychological Record 36:309-14.   (Google)
Lehman, Hugh (1998). Marcel dol, Soemini Kasanmoentalib, Susanne lijmbch, Esteban Rivas, Ruud Van den Bos, animal consciousness and animal ethics: Perspectives from the netherlands. Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 11 (1).   (Google)
Linzey, Andrew (2004). 'The powers that be': Mechanisms that prevent us recognising animal sentience. Essays in Philosophy 5 (2):1-15.   (Google)
Lurz, Robert W. (1999). Animal consciousness. Journal of Philosophical Research 24 (January):149-168.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Macer, Darryl (1997). Animal consciousness and ethics in asia and the Pacific. Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 10 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: The interactions between humans, animals and the environment have shaped human values and ethics, not only the genes that we are made of. The animal rights movement challenges human beings to reconsider interactions between humans and other animals, and maybe connected to the environmental movement that begs us to recognize the fact that there are symbiotic relationships between humans and all other organisms. The first part of this paper looks at types of bioethics, the implications of autonomy and the value of being alive. Then the level of consciousness of these relationships are explored in survey results from Asia and the Pacific, especially in the 1993 International Bioethics Survey conducted in Australia, Hong Kong, India, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, The Philippines, Russia, Singapore and Thailand. Very few mentioned animal consciousness in the survey, but there were more biocentric comments in Australia and Japan; and more comments with the idea of harmony including humans in Thailand. Comparisons between questions and surveys will also be made, in an attempt to describe what people imagine animal consciousness to be, and whether this relates to human ethics of the relationships
Main, Alexander (1876). The automatic theory of animal activity. Mind 1 (3):431-434.   (Google | More links)
Mendl, M. & Paul, E. S. (2004). Consciousness, emotion and animal welfare: Insights from cognitive science. Animal Welfare 13:17- 25.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Nadler, Steven (1991). Daisie Radner and Michael Radner: Animal consciousness. Environmental Ethics 13 (2):187-191.   (Google)
Ng, Yew-Kwang (1995). Towards welfare biology: Evolutionary economics of animal consciousness and suffering. Biology and Philosophy 10 (3).   (Google)
Abstract:   Welfare biology is the study of living things and their environment with respect to their welfare (defined as net happiness, or enjoyment minus suffering). Despite difficulties of ascertaining and measuring welfare and relevancy to normative issues, welfare biology is a positive science. Evolutionary economics and population dynamics are used to help answer basic questions in welfare biology: Which species are affective sentients capable of welfare? Do they enjoy positive or negative welfare? Can their welfare be dramatically increased? Under plausible axioms, all conscious species are plastic and all plastic species are conscious (and, with a stronger axiom, capable of welfare). More complex niches favour the evolution of more rational species. Evolutionary economics also supports the common-sense view that individual sentients failing to survive to mate suffer negative welfare. A kind of God-made (or evolution-created) fairness between species is also unexpectedly found. The contrast between growth maximization (as may be favoured by natural selection), average welfare, and total welfare maximization is discussed. It is shown that welfare could be increased without even sacrificing numbers (at equilibrium). Since the long-term reduction in animal suffering depends on scientific advances, strict restrictions on animal experimentation may be counter-productive to animal welfare
Oakley, David A. (1985). Animal awareness, consciousness, and self-image. In David A. Oakley (ed.), Brain and Mind. Methuen.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Panksepp, Jaak (2005). Toward a science of ultimate concern. Consciousness and Cognition 14 (1):22-29.   (Google)
Radner, Daisie M. & Radner, Michael (1996). Animal Consciousness. Prometheus Books.   (Cited by 19 | Google)
Reiss, D. (1998). Cognition and communication in dolphins: A question of consciousness. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness II. MIT Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Ristau, C. A. (1983). Language, cognition, and awareness in animals? Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 406:170-86.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Roberts, Hugh M. (1968). Consciousness in animals and automata. Psychological Reports 22:1226-28.   (Google)
Robinson, William S. (1997). Some nonhuman animals can have pains in a morally relevant sense. Biology and Philosophy 12 (1):51-71.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In a series of works, Peter Carruthers has argued for the denial of the title proposition. Here, I defend that proposition by offering direct support drawn from relevant sciences and by undercutting Carruthers argument. In doing the latter, I distinguish an intrinsic theory of consciousness from Carruthers relational theory of consciousness. This relational theory has two readings, one of which makes essential appeal to evolutionary theory. I argue that neither reading offers a successful view
Rollin, Bernard E. (1986). Animal consciousness and scientific change. New Ideas in Psychology 4:141-52.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Rollin, Bernard E. (1989). The Unheeded Cry: Animal Consciousness, Animal Pain, and Science. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 93 | Google)
Rose, J. D. (2002). The neurobehavioral nature of fishes and the question of awareness and pain. Reviews in Fisheries Science 10:1-38.   (Cited by 61 | Google | More links)
Rothschild, M. (1993). Thinking about animal consciousness. Journal of Natural History 27:509-12.   (Google | More links)
Rushen, J. P. (1985). The scientific status of animal consciousness. Applied Animal Behaviour Science 13:387-390.   (Google)
Rutgers Marshall, Henry (1904). Of simpler and more complex consciousnesses. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 1 (14):365-372.   (Google | More links)
Savage-Rumbaugh, E. S. & Rumbaugh, Duane M. (1998). Perspectives on consciousness, language, and other emergent processes in apes and humans. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness II. MIT Press.   (Google)
Schönfeld, Martin (2006). Animal consciousness: Paradigm change in the life sciences. Perspectives on Science 14 (3).   (Google)
Seth, Anil K.; Baars, Bernard J. & Edelman, D. B. (2005). Criteria for consciousness in humans and other mammals. Consciousness and Cognition 14 (1):119-39.   (Cited by 23 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The standard behavioral index for human consciousness is the ability to report events with accuracy. While this method is routinely used for scientific and medical applications in humans, it is not easy to generalize to other species. Brain evidence may lend itself more easily to comparative testing. Human consciousness involves widespread, relatively fast low-amplitude interactions in the thalamocortical core of the brain, driven by current tasks and conditions. These features have also been found in other mammals, which suggests that consciousness is a major biological adaptation in mammals. We suggest more than a dozen additional properties of human consciousness that may be used to test comparative predictions. Such homologies are necessarily more remote in non-mammals, which do not share the thalamocortical complex. However, as we learn more we may be able to make “deeper” predictions that apply to some birds, reptiles, large-brained invertebrates, and perhaps other species
Shea, Nicholas & Heyes, Cecilia (2010). Metamemory as evidence of animal consciousness: The type that does the trick. Biology and Philosophy 25 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: The question of whether non-human animals are conscious is of fundamental importance. There are already good reasons to think that many are, based on evolutionary continuity and other considerations. However, the hypothesis is notoriously resistant to direct empirical test. Numerous studies have shown behaviour in animals analogous to consciously-produced human behaviour. Fewer probe whether the same mechanisms are in use. One promising line of evidence about consciousness in other animals derives from experiments on metamemory. A study by Hampton (Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 98(9):5359–5362, 2001 ) suggests that at least one rhesus macaque can use metamemory to predict whether it would itself succeed on a delayed matching-to-sample task. Since it is not plausible that mere meta-representation requires consciousness, Hampton’s study invites an important question: what kind of metamemory is good evidence for consciousness? This paper argues that if it were found that an animal had a memory trace which allowed it to use information about a past perceptual stimulus to inform a range of different behaviours, that would indeed be good evidence that the animal was conscious. That functional characterisation can be tested by investigating whether successful performance on one metamemory task transfers to a range of new tasks. The paper goes on to argue that thinking about animal consciousness in this way helps in formulating a more precise functional characterisation of the mechanisms of conscious awareness
Shriver, Adam & Allen, Colin (2005). Consciousness might matter very much. Philosophical Psychology 18 (1):113-22.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Peter Carruthers argues that phenomenal consciousness might not matter very much either for the purpose of determining which nonhuman animals are appropriate objects of moral sympathy, or for the purpose of explaining for the similarities in behavior of humans and nonhumans. Carruthers bases these claims on his version of a dispositionalist higher-order thought (DHOT) theory of consciousness which allows that much of human behavior is the result of first-order beliefs that need not be conscious, and that prima facie judgments about the importance of consciousness are due to confabulation. We argue briefly against his claim that 'the moral landscape can remain unchanged' even if all or nearly all nonhuman animals are taken to be incapable of conscious experience. We then show how a first-order representational (FOR) theory of consciousness might be defended against Carruthers' criticisms. Finally, we argue that Carruthers' appeal to confabulation undercuts his own arguments for an evolutionary explanation for consciousness, posing a greater epiphenomenalist threat to his DHOT theory than he concedes
Shriver, Adam (2006). Minding mammals. Philosophical Psychology 19 (4):433-442.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Many traditional attempts to show that nonhuman animals are deserving of moral consideration have taken the form of an argument by analogy. However, arguments of this kind have had notable weaknesses and, in particular, have not been able to convince two kinds of skeptics. One of the most important weaknesses of these arguments is that they fail to provide theoretical justifications for why particular physiological similarities should be considered relevant. This paper examines recent empirical research on pain and, in particular, explores the implications of the dissociation between the sensory and the affective pain pathways. It is argued that these results show that the belief that nonhuman animals experience pain in a morally relevant way is reasonable, though not certain. It is further argued that the proposal to explore the relationship between consciousness and various forms of learning challenges the aforementioned skeptics to provide more physiological details for their claims that nonhuman mammals are probably not conscious
Singer, Peter (1990). Do animals feel pain? In Peter. Singer (ed.), Animal Liberation. Avon Books.   (Google | More links)
Spruijt, B. M. (2001). How the hierarchical organization of the brain and increasing cognitive abilities may result in consciousness. Animal Welfare Supplement 10:77- 87.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Taylor, John G. (2001). What do neuronal network models of the mind indicate about animal consciousness? Animal Welfare Supplement 10:63- 75.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Tye, Michael (1997). The problem of simple minds: Is there anything it's like to be a honeybee? Philosophical Studies 88 (3):289-317.   (Google)
van Rooijen, J. (1981). Are feelings adaptations? The basis of modern applied animal ethology. Applied Animal Ethoilogy 7:187-89.   (Google)
van den Bos, Ruud (2000). General organizational principles of the brain as key to the study of animal consciousness. Psyche 6 (5).   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Wallace, Rodrick (ms). New mathematical foundations for AI and alife: Are the necessary conditions for animal consciousness sufficient for the design of intelligent machines?   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Rodney Brooks' call for 'new mathematics' to revitalize the disciplines of artificial intelligence and artificial life can be answered by adaptation of what Adams has called 'the informational turn in philosophy', aided by the novel perspectives that program gives regarding empirical studies of animal cognition and consciousness. Going backward from the necessary conditions communication theory imposes on animal cognition and consciousness to sufficient conditions for machine design is, however, an extraordinarily difficult engineering task. The most likely use of the first generations of conscious machines will be to model the various forms of psychopathology, since we have little or no understanding of how consciousness is stabilized in humans or other animals
Watkins, Michael (1999). Do animals see colors? An anthropocentrist's guide to animals, the color blind, and far away places. Philosophical Studies 94 (3):189-209.   (Google)
Weiskrantz, Lawrence (2001). Commentary responses and conscious awareness in humans: The implications for awareness in non-human animals. Animal Welfare. Special Issue 10:41- 46.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Weiskrantz, Lawrence (1995). The problem of animal consciousness in relation to neuropsychology. Behavioral Brain Research 71:171-75.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Wemelsfelder, F. (2001). The inside and outside aspects of consciousness: Complementary approaches to the study of animal emotion. Animal Welfare Supplement 10:129- 139.   (Cited by 1 | Google)

8.4c Animal Self-Consciousness

Bard, Kim A.; Todd, Brenda K.; Bernier, Chris; Love, Jennifer & Leavens, David A. (2006). Self-awareness in human and chimpanzee infants: What is measured and what is meant by the mark and mirror test? Infancy 9 (2):191-219.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Browne, Derek (2004). Do dolphins know their own minds? Biology and Philosophy 19 (4):633-53.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   Knowledge of one's own states of mind is one of the varieties of self-knowledge. Do any nonhuman animals have the capacity for this variety of self-knowledge? The question is open to empirical inquiry, which is most often conducted with primate subjects. Research with a bottlenose dolphin gives some evidence for the capacity in a nonprimate taxon. I describe the research and evaluate the metacognitive interpretation of the dolphin's behaviour. The research exhibits some of the difficulties attached to the task of eliciting behaviour that both attracts a higher-order interpretation while also resisting deflationary, lower-order interpretations. Lloyd Morgan's Canon, which prohibits inflationary interpretations of animal behaviour, has influenced many animal psychologists. There is one defensible version of the Canon, the version that warns specifically against unnecessary intentional ascent. The Canon on this interpretation seems at first to tell against a metacognitive interpretation of the data collected in the dolphin study. However, the model of metacognition that is in play in the dolphin studies is a functional model, one that does not implicate intentional ascent. I explore some interpretations of the dolphin's behaviour as metacognitive, in this sense. While this species of metacognitive interpretation breaks the connection with the more familiar theory of mind research using animal subjects, the interpretation also points in an interesting way towards issues concerning consciousness in dolphins
Byrne, R. W. & Whiten, Andrew (1988). Machiavellian Intelligence: Social Expertise and the Evolution of Intellect in Monkeys, Apes, and Humans. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 905 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This book presents an alternative to conventional ideas about the evolution of the human intellect.
Carruthers, Peter (2007). Meta-cognition in animals: A skeptical look. Mind and Language 22 (1):58–89.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper examines the recent literature on meta-cognitive processes in non-human animals, arguing that in each case the data admit of a simpler, purely first-order, explanation. The topics discussed include the alleged monitoring of states of certainty and uncertainty, the capacity to know whether or not one has perceived something, and the capacity to know whether or not the information needed to solve some problem is stored in memory. The first-order explanations advanced all assume that beliefs and desires come in various different _strengths_, or _degrees_
Davis, Lawrence H. (1989). Self-consciousness in chimps and pigeons. Philosophical Psychology 2 (3):249-59.   (Google)
Abstract: Chimpanzee behaviour with mirrors makes it plausible that they can recognise themselves as themselves in mirrors, and so have a 'self-concept'. I defend this claim, and argue that roughly similar behaviour in pigeons, as reported, does not in fact make it equally plausible that they also have this mental capacity. But for all that it is genuine, chimpanzee self-consciousness may differ significantly from ours. I describe one possibility I believe consistent with the data, even if not very plausible: that the chimpanzee is aware of itself only as a material being, and not as a subject of any psychological states. As I try to make clear, this possibility exists even if the chimpanzee has psychological states, and is aware of some of them
Epstein, Robert; Lanza, R. P. & Skinner, B. F. (1981). "Self-awareness" in the pigeon. Science 212 (4495):695-96.   (Cited by 14 | Google | More links)
Gallup, G. G. (1970). Chimpanzees: Self-recognition. Science 167:86-87.   (Cited by 246 | Google | More links)
Gallup, G. G. (1987). Self-awareness. In G. Mitchell (ed.), Comparative Primate Biology, Volume 2. Liss.   (Cited by 13 | Google)
Gallup, G. G. (1982). Self-awareness and the emergence of mind in primates. American Journal of Primatology 2:237-48.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Gallup, G. G. (1979). Self-recognition in chimpanzees and man: A developmental and comparative perspective. In M. Lewis & M. Rosenblum (eds.), Genesis of Behavior, Volume 2. Plenum Press.   (Cited by 10 | Google)
Gallup, G. G. (1977). Self-recognition in primates: A comparative approach to the bidirectionalproperties of consciousness. American Psychologist 32:329-38.   (Cited by 73 | Google)
Gallup, G. G. (1994). Self-recognition: Research strategies and experimental design. In S. T. Parker, R. Mitchell & M. L. Boccia (eds.), Self-Awareness in Animals and Humans: Developmental Perspectives. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Gallup, G. G. (1991). Toward a comparative psychology of self-awareness: Species limitations and cognitive consequences. In G. Goethals & J. Strauss (eds.), The Self: An Interdisciplinary Perspective. Springer-Verlag.   (Cited by 16 | Google)
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Abstract:   Research on mirror self-recognition where animals are observed for mirror-guided self-directed behaviour has predominated the empirical approach to self-awareness in nonhuman primates. The ability to direct behaviour to previously unseen parts of the body such as the inside of the mouth, or grooming the eye by aid of mirrors has been interpreted as recognition of self and evidence of a self-concept. Three decades of research has revealed that contrary to monkeys, most great apes (humans, common chimpanzees, pygmy chimpanzees and orangutans but not the gorilla) have convincingly displayed the capacity to recognize self by mirrors. The putative discontinuity in phylogeny of the ability suggests the existence of a so-called cognitive gap between great apes and the rest of the animal kingdom. However, methodological and theoretical inconsistencies regarding the empirical approach prevail. For instance, the observation of self-directed behaviour might not be as straightforward as it seems. In addition, the interpretation of mirror self-recognition as an index of self-awareness is challenged by alternative explanations, raising doubt about some assumptions behind mirror self-recognition. To evaluate the significance of the test in discussions of the concept of self this paper presents and analyses some major arguments raised on the mirror task
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Smith, J.; Shields, W. & Washburn, D. (2003). The comparative psychology of uncertainty monitoring and metacognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (3):317-339.   (Cited by 42 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Researchers have begun to explore animals' capacities for uncertainty monitoring and metacognition. This exploration could extend the study of animal self-awareness and establish the relationship of self-awareness to other-awareness. It could sharpen descriptions of metacognition in the human literature and suggest the earliest roots of metacognition in human development. We summarize research on uncertainty monitoring by humans, monkeys, and a dolphin within perceptual and metamemory tasks. We extend phylogenetically the search for metacognitive capacities by considering studies that have tested less cognitively sophisticated species. By using the same uncertainty-monitoring paradigms across species, it should be possible to map the phylogenetic distribution of metacognition and illuminate the emergence of mind. We provide a unifying formal description of animals' performances and examine the optimality of their decisional strategies. Finally, we interpret animals' and humans' nearly identical performances psychologically. Low-level, stimulus-based accounts cannot explain the phenomena. The results suggest granting animals a higher-level decision-making process that involves criterion setting using controlled cognitive processes. This conclusion raises the difficult question of animal consciousness. The results show that animals have functional features of or parallels to human conscious cognition. Remaining questions are whether animals also have the phenomenal features that are the feeling/knowing states of human conscious cognition, and whether the present paradigms can be extended to demonstrate that they do. Thus, the comparative study of metacognition potentially grounds the systematic study of animal consciousness. Key Words: cognition; comparative cognition; consciousness; memory monitoring; metacognition; metamemory; self-awareness; uncertainty; uncertainty monitoring
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Abstract: These and other related concerns are crucial in this volume's lively debate over the nature of the missing cognitive link, and whether gorillas, chimps, or...

8.4d Consciousness and Biology, Misc

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