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8.4c. Animal Self-Consciousness (Animal Self-Consciousness on PhilPapers)

See also:
Bard, Kim A.; Todd, Brenda K.; Bernier, Chris; Love, Jennifer & Leavens, David A. (2006). Self-awareness in human and chimpanzee infants: What is measured and what is meant by the mark and mirror test? Infancy 9 (2):191-219.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Browne, Derek (2004). Do dolphins know their own minds? Biology and Philosophy 19 (4):633-53.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   Knowledge of one's own states of mind is one of the varieties of self-knowledge. Do any nonhuman animals have the capacity for this variety of self-knowledge? The question is open to empirical inquiry, which is most often conducted with primate subjects. Research with a bottlenose dolphin gives some evidence for the capacity in a nonprimate taxon. I describe the research and evaluate the metacognitive interpretation of the dolphin's behaviour. The research exhibits some of the difficulties attached to the task of eliciting behaviour that both attracts a higher-order interpretation while also resisting deflationary, lower-order interpretations. Lloyd Morgan's Canon, which prohibits inflationary interpretations of animal behaviour, has influenced many animal psychologists. There is one defensible version of the Canon, the version that warns specifically against unnecessary intentional ascent. The Canon on this interpretation seems at first to tell against a metacognitive interpretation of the data collected in the dolphin study. However, the model of metacognition that is in play in the dolphin studies is a functional model, one that does not implicate intentional ascent. I explore some interpretations of the dolphin's behaviour as metacognitive, in this sense. While this species of metacognitive interpretation breaks the connection with the more familiar theory of mind research using animal subjects, the interpretation also points in an interesting way towards issues concerning consciousness in dolphins
Byrne, R. W. & Whiten, Andrew (1988). Machiavellian Intelligence: Social Expertise and the Evolution of Intellect in Monkeys, Apes, and Humans. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 905 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This book presents an alternative to conventional ideas about the evolution of the human intellect.
Carruthers, Peter (2007). Meta-cognition in animals: A skeptical look. Mind and Language 22 (1):58–89.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper examines the recent literature on meta-cognitive processes in non-human animals, arguing that in each case the data admit of a simpler, purely first-order, explanation. The topics discussed include the alleged monitoring of states of certainty and uncertainty, the capacity to know whether or not one has perceived something, and the capacity to know whether or not the information needed to solve some problem is stored in memory. The first-order explanations advanced all assume that beliefs and desires come in various different _strengths_, or _degrees_
Davis, Lawrence H. (1989). Self-consciousness in chimps and pigeons. Philosophical Psychology 2 (3):249-59.   (Google)
Abstract: Chimpanzee behaviour with mirrors makes it plausible that they can recognise themselves as themselves in mirrors, and so have a 'self-concept'. I defend this claim, and argue that roughly similar behaviour in pigeons, as reported, does not in fact make it equally plausible that they also have this mental capacity. But for all that it is genuine, chimpanzee self-consciousness may differ significantly from ours. I describe one possibility I believe consistent with the data, even if not very plausible: that the chimpanzee is aware of itself only as a material being, and not as a subject of any psychological states. As I try to make clear, this possibility exists even if the chimpanzee has psychological states, and is aware of some of them
Epstein, Robert; Lanza, R. P. & Skinner, B. F. (1981). "Self-awareness" in the pigeon. Science 212 (4495):695-96.   (Cited by 14 | Google | More links)
Gallup, G. G. (1970). Chimpanzees: Self-recognition. Science 167:86-87.   (Cited by 246 | Google | More links)
Gallup, G. G. (1987). Self-awareness. In G. Mitchell (ed.), Comparative Primate Biology, Volume 2. Liss.   (Cited by 13 | Google)
Gallup, G. G. (1982). Self-awareness and the emergence of mind in primates. American Journal of Primatology 2:237-48.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Gallup, G. G. (1979). Self-recognition in chimpanzees and man: A developmental and comparative perspective. In M. Lewis & M. Rosenblum (eds.), Genesis of Behavior, Volume 2. Plenum Press.   (Cited by 10 | Google)
Gallup, G. G. (1977). Self-recognition in primates: A comparative approach to the bidirectionalproperties of consciousness. American Psychologist 32:329-38.   (Cited by 73 | Google)
Gallup, G. G. (1994). Self-recognition: Research strategies and experimental design. In S. T. Parker, R. Mitchell & M. L. Boccia (eds.), Self-Awareness in Animals and Humans: Developmental Perspectives. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Gallup, G. G. (1991). Toward a comparative psychology of self-awareness: Species limitations and cognitive consequences. In G. Goethals & J. Strauss (eds.), The Self: An Interdisciplinary Perspective. Springer-Verlag.   (Cited by 16 | Google)
Gallup, G. G. (1975). Toward an operational definition of self-awareness. In R. Tuttle (ed.), Socioecology and the Psychology of Primates. Mouton.   (Google)
Hart, Daniel & Karmel, M. P. (1996). Self-awareness and self-knowledge in humans, apes, and monkeys. In A. Russon, Kim A. Bard & S. Parkers (eds.), Reaching Into Thought: The Minds of the Great Apes. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 13 | Google)
Heyes, Cecilia M. (1994). Reflections on self-recognition in primates. Animal Behaviour 47:909-19.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Hyatt, C. W. & Hopkins, W. (1994). Self-awareness in bonobos and chimpanzees: A comparative perspective. In S. T. Parker, R. Mitchell & M. L. Boccia (eds.), Self-Awareness in Animals and Humans: Developmental Perspectives. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 17 | Google)
Kempf, Edward J. (1916). Did consciousness of self play a part in the behavior of this monkey? Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 13 (15):410-412.   (Google | More links)
Marten, K. & Psarakos, S. (1994). Evidence for self-awareness in the bottlenose Dolphin. In S. T. Parker, R. Mitchell & M. L. Boccia (eds.), Self-Awareness in Animals and Humans: Developmental Perspectives. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Marten, K. & Psarakos, S. (1992). Using self-view television to distinguish between self-examination and social behavior in the bottlenose Dolphin. Consciousness and Cognition 4:205-24.   (Cited by 20 | Google)
Miles, H. L. (1994). Me chantek: The development of self-awareness in a signing orangutan. In S. T. Parker, R. Mitchell & M. L. Boccia (eds.), Self-Awareness in Animals and Humans: Developmental Perspectives. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 24 | Google)
Moynihan, M. H. (1997). Self-awareness, with specific references to coleoid cephalopods. In R. Mitchell, Nicholas S. Thompson & H. L. Miles (eds.), Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals. SUNY Press.   (Google)
Parker, S. T. (1991). A developmental approach to the origins of self-recognition in great apes. Human Evolution 6:435-49.   (Cited by 9 | Google)
Parker, S. T.; Mitchell, R. M. & Boccia, M. L. (1994). Self-Awareness in Animals and Humans: Developmental Perspectives. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 100 | Google)
Patterson, F. G. P. & Cohn, Robert G. (1994). Self-recognition and self-awareness in lowland gorillas. In S. T. Parker, R. Mitchell & M. L. Boccia (eds.), Self-Awareness in Animals and Humans: Developmental Perspectives. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 38 | Google)
Peterson, Gregory R. (2003). Being conscious of Marc Bekoff: Thinking of animal self-consciousness. Zygon 38 (2):247-256.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Povinelli, Daniel J. (1998). Are animals self-aware? Maybe not. Scientific American.   (Google)
Povinelli, Daniel J. (1987). Monkeys, apes, mirrors, minds: The evolution of self-awareness in primates. Human Evolution 2:493-507.   (Cited by 9 | Google)
Schilhab, T. S. S. (2004). What mirror self-recognition in nonhumans can tell us about aspects of self. Biology and Philosophy 19 (1):111-126.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   Research on mirror self-recognition where animals are observed for mirror-guided self-directed behaviour has predominated the empirical approach to self-awareness in nonhuman primates. The ability to direct behaviour to previously unseen parts of the body such as the inside of the mouth, or grooming the eye by aid of mirrors has been interpreted as recognition of self and evidence of a self-concept. Three decades of research has revealed that contrary to monkeys, most great apes (humans, common chimpanzees, pygmy chimpanzees and orangutans but not the gorilla) have convincingly displayed the capacity to recognize self by mirrors. The putative discontinuity in phylogeny of the ability suggests the existence of a so-called cognitive gap between great apes and the rest of the animal kingdom. However, methodological and theoretical inconsistencies regarding the empirical approach prevail. For instance, the observation of self-directed behaviour might not be as straightforward as it seems. In addition, the interpretation of mirror self-recognition as an index of self-awareness is challenged by alternative explanations, raising doubt about some assumptions behind mirror self-recognition. To evaluate the significance of the test in discussions of the concept of self this paper presents and analyses some major arguments raised on the mirror task
Shettleworth, Sara J. & Sutton, Jennifer E. (2006). Do animals know what they know? In Susan L. Hurley & Matthew Nudds (eds.), Rational Animals? Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Smith, J.; Shields, W. & Washburn, D. (2003). The comparative psychology of uncertainty monitoring and metacognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (3):317-339.   (Cited by 42 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Researchers have begun to explore animals' capacities for uncertainty monitoring and metacognition. This exploration could extend the study of animal self-awareness and establish the relationship of self-awareness to other-awareness. It could sharpen descriptions of metacognition in the human literature and suggest the earliest roots of metacognition in human development. We summarize research on uncertainty monitoring by humans, monkeys, and a dolphin within perceptual and metamemory tasks. We extend phylogenetically the search for metacognitive capacities by considering studies that have tested less cognitively sophisticated species. By using the same uncertainty-monitoring paradigms across species, it should be possible to map the phylogenetic distribution of metacognition and illuminate the emergence of mind. We provide a unifying formal description of animals' performances and examine the optimality of their decisional strategies. Finally, we interpret animals' and humans' nearly identical performances psychologically. Low-level, stimulus-based accounts cannot explain the phenomena. The results suggest granting animals a higher-level decision-making process that involves criterion setting using controlled cognitive processes. This conclusion raises the difficult question of animal consciousness. The results show that animals have functional features of or parallels to human conscious cognition. Remaining questions are whether animals also have the phenomenal features that are the feeling/knowing states of human conscious cognition, and whether the present paradigms can be extended to demonstrate that they do. Thus, the comparative study of metacognition potentially grounds the systematic study of animal consciousness. Key Words: cognition; comparative cognition; consciousness; memory monitoring; metacognition; metamemory; self-awareness; uncertainty; uncertainty monitoring
Suarez, S. D. & Gallup, G. G. (1981). Self-recognition in chimpanzee and orangutans, but not gorillas. Journal of Human Evolution 10:175-88.   (Google)
Swartz, K. B. & Evans, Suzette M. (1991). Not all chimpanzees show self-recognition. Primates 32:483-96.   (Google)
Terrace, Herbert S. & Metcalfe, Janet (2005). The Missing Link in Cognition: Origins of Self-Reflective Consciousness. Oxford University Press.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: These and other related concerns are crucial in this volume's lively debate over the nature of the missing cognitive link, and whether gorillas, chimps, or...