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8.5. First-Person Approaches in the Science of Consciousness (First-Person Approaches in the Science of Consciousness on PhilPapers)

Millikan, Ruth G. (2001). The myth of mental indexicals. In Andrew Brook & Richard Devidi (eds.), Self-Reference Amd Self-Awareness, Advances in Consciousness Research Volume 11. John Benjamins.   (Google)
Travis, Frederick T. & Pearson, C. (2000). Pure consciousness: Distinct phenomenological and physiological correlates of "consciousness itself". International Journal of Neuroscience 100 (1):77-89.   (Cited by 27 | Google | More links)
Wilber, Ken & Walsh, Roger (2000). An integral approach to consciousness research: A proposal for integrating first, second, and third person approaches to consciousness. In Max Velmans (ed.), Investigating Phenomenal Consciousness: New Methodologies and Maps. John Benjamins.   (Google)

8.5a Introspection and Introspectionism

Adams, William Y. (online). Introspectionism reconsidered.   (Google)
Armstrong, David M. (1963). Is introspective knowledge incorrigible? Philosophical Review 62 (October):417-32.   (Cited by 17 | Google | More links)
Arnold, Denis G. (1997). Introspection and its objects. Journal of Philosophical Research 22 (April):87-94.   (Google)
Aune, Bruce (1963). Feelings, moods, and introspection. Mind 72 (April):187-208.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Aydede, Murat & Guzeldere, Guven (2004). Cognitive architecture, concepts, and introspection: An information-theoretic solution to the problem of phenomenal consciousness. [Journal (on-Line/Unpaginated)] (in Press) 39 (2):197--255.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This essay is a sustained attempt to bring new light to some of the perennial problems in philosophy of mind surrounding phenomenal consciousness and introspection through developing an account of sensory and phenomenal concepts. Building on the information-theoretic framework of Dretske (1981), we present an informational psychosemantics as it applies to what we call sensory concepts, concepts that apply, roughly, to so-called secondary qualities of objects. We show that these concepts have a special informational character and semantic structure that closely tie them to the brain states realizing conscious qualitative experiences. We then develop an account of introspection which exploits this special nature of sensory concepts. The result is a new class of concepts, which, following recent terminology, we call phenomenal concepts: these concepts refer to phenomenal experience itself and are the vehicles used in introspection. On our account, the connection between sensory and phenomenal concepts is very tight: it consists in different semantic uses of the same cognitive structures underlying the sensory concepts, such as the concept of red. Contrary to widespread opinion, we show that information theory contains all the resources to satisfy internalist intuitions about phenomenal consciousness, while not offending externalist ones. A consequence of this account is that it explains and predicts the so-called conceivability arguments against physicalism on the basis of the special nature of sensory and phenomenal concepts. Thus we not only show why physicalism is not threatened by such arguments, but also demonstrate its strength in virtue of its ability to predict and explain away such arguments in a principled way. However, we take the main contribution of this work to be what it provides in addition to a response to those conceivability arguments, namely, a substantive account of the interface between sensory and conceptual systems and the mechanisms of introspection as based on the special nature of the information flow between them
Aydede, Murat & Guven, Guzeldere (ms). Concepts, introspection, and phenomenal consciousness: An information-theoretical approach.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This essay is a sustained information-theoretic attempt to bring new light on some of the perennial problems in the philosophy of mind surrounding phenomenal consciousness and introspection. Following Dretske (1981), we present and develop an informational psychosemantics as it applies to what we call sensory concepts, concepts that apply, roughly, to so-called secondary qualities of objects. We show that these concepts have a special informational character and semantic structure that closely tie them to the brain states realizing conscious qualitative experiences. We then develop an account of introspection which exploits this special nature of sensory concepts. The result is a new class of concepts, which, following recent terminology, we call phenomenal concepts: these concepts refer to phenomenal experience itself and are the vehicles used in introspection. On our account, the connection between sensory and phenomenal concepts is very tight: it consists in different semantic uses of the same cognitive structures underlying the sensory concepts, like RED. Contrary to widespread opinion, we show that information theory contains all the resources to satisfy internalist intuitions about phenomenal consciousness, while not offending externalist ones. A consequence of this account is that it explains and predicts the so-called conceivability arguments against physicalism on the basis of the special nature of sensory and phenomenal concepts. Thus we not only show why physicalism is not threatened by such arguments, but also demonstrate its strength in virtue of its ability to predict and explain away such arguments in a principled way. However, we take the main contribution of this work to be what it provides in addition to a response to those conceivability arguments, namely, a substantive account of the interface between sensory and conceptual systems and the mechanisms of introspection as based on the special nature of the information flow between them
Aydede, Murat & Price, Donald D. (2005). Introspection and unrevisability: Reply to commentaries. In Murat Aydede (ed.), Pain: New Essays on Its Nature and the Methodology of Its Study. Cambridge MA: Bradford Book/MIT Press.   (Google)
Aydede, Murat (2003). Is introspection inferential? In Brie Gertler (ed.), Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge. Ashgate.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Suppose there is a red ball against a uniformly gray background moving toward my left. I am seeing the moving red ball. I am having a visual experience that carries the information (among other things) that [the ball] is red.1 Now supposing that I have the concepts RED and SEEING, and all my other cognitive (including introspective) mechanisms are intact and working normally, the job is to say exactly how I do come to know that I am seeing [the ball] as red. How do I come to know, as I shall sometimes put it, that I am seeing red?
Aydede, Murat (2001). Naturalism, introspection, and direct realism about pain. Consciousness and Emotion 2 (1):29-73.   (Cited by 13 | Google)
Abstract: This paper examines pain states (and other intransitive bodily sensations) from the perspective of the problems they pose for pure informational/representational approaches to naturalizing qualia. I start with a comprehensive critical and quasi-historical discussion of so-called Perceptual Theories of Pain (e.g., Armstrong, Pitcher), as these were the natural predecessors of the more modern direct realist views. I describe the theoretical backdrop (indirect realism, sense-data theories) against which the perceptual theories were developed. The conclusion drawn is that pure representationalism about pain in the tradition of direct realist perceptual theories (e.g., Dretske, Tye) leaves out something crucial about the phenomenology of pain experiences, namely, their affective character. I touch upon the role that introspection plays in such representationalist views, and indicate how it contributes to the source of their trouble vis-à-vis bodily sensations. The paper ends by briefly commenting on the relation between the affective/evaluative component of pain and the hedonic valence of emotions
Aydede, Murat & Price, D. (2005). The experimental use of introspection in the scientific study of pain and its integration with third-person methodologies: The experiential-phenomenological approach. In Murat Aydede (ed.), Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study. MIT Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Understanding the nature of pain depends, at least partly, on recognizing its subjectivity (thus, its first-person epistemology). This in turn requires using a first-person experiential method in addition to third-person experimental approaches to study it. This paper is an attempt to spell out what the former approach is and how it can be integrated with the latter. We start our discussion by examining some foundational issues raised by the use of introspection. We argue that such a first-person method in the scientific study of pain (as in the study of any experience) is in fact indispensable by demonstrating that it has in fact been consistently used in conjunction with conventional third-person methodologies, and this for good reasons. We show that, contrary to what appears to be a widespread opinion, there is absolutely no reason to think that the use of such a first-person approach is scientifically and methodologically suspect. We distinguish between two uses of introspective methods in scientific experiments: one draws on the subjects’ introspective reports where any investigator has equal and objective access. The other is where the investigator becomes a subject of his own study and draws on the introspection of his own experiences. We give examples using and/or approximating both strategies that include studies of second pain summation and its relationship to neural activities, and brain imaging- psychophysical studies wherein sensory and affective qualities of pain are correlated with cerebral cortical activity. We explain what we call the experiential or phenomenological approach that has its origins in the work of Price and Barrell (1980). This approach capitalizes on the scientific prospects and benefits of using the introspection of the investigator. We distinguish between its vertical and horizontal applications. Finally, we conclude that integrating such an approach to standard third-person methodologies can only help us in having a fuller understanding of pain and of conscious experience in general..
Bain, Alexander (1893). The respective spheres and mutual helps of introspection and psychophysical experiment in psychology. Mind 2 (5):42-53.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Banerjee, Hiranmoy (2003). Introspectible consciousness: What philosophers can do about it. In Perspectives on Consciousness. New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal.   (Google)
Baynes, K. & Gazzaniga, Michael S. (2000). Consciousness, introspection, and the split-brain: The two minds/one body problem. In Michael S. Gazzaniga (ed.), The New Cognitive Neurosciences: 2nd Edition. MIT Press.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Beaton, Michael (2009). Qualia and Introspection. Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (5):88-110.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The claim that behaviourally undetectable inverted spectra are possible has been endorsed by many physicalists. I explain why this starting point rules out standard forms of scientific explanation for qualia. The modern ‘phenomenal concept strategy’ is an updated way of defending problematic intuitions like these, but I show that it cannot help to recover standard scientific explanation. I argue that Chalmers is right: we should accept the falsity of physicalism if we accept this problematic starting point. I further argue that accepting this starting point amounts to at least implicitly endorsing certain theoretical claims about the nature of introspection. I therefore suggest that we allow ourselves to be guided, in our quest to understand qualia, by whatever independently plausible theories of introspection we have. I propose that we adopt a more moderate definition of qualia, as those introspectible properties which cannot be fully specified simply by specifying the non-controversially introspectible ‘propositional attitude’ mental states (including seeing x, experiencing x, and so on, where x is a specification of a potentially public state of affairs). Qualia thus defined may well fit plausible, naturalisable accounts of introspection. If so, such accounts have the potential to explain, rather than explain away, the problematic intuitions discussed earlier; an approach that should allow integration of our understanding of qualia with the rest of science.
Blumenthal, Arthur L. (2001). A wundt Primer: The operating characteristics of consciousness. In Robert W. Rieber & David K. Robinson (eds.), Wilhelm Wundt in History: The Making of a Scientific Psychology. Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers.   (Google)
Bode, Boyd H. (1913). The method of introspection. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 10 (4):85-91.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Bonnay, Denis & Égré, Paul (2009). Inexact knowledge with introspection. Journal of Philosophical Logic 38 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: Standard Kripke models are inadequate to model situations of inexact knowledge with introspection, since positive and negative introspection force the relation of epistemic indiscernibility to be transitive and euclidean. Correlatively, Williamson’s margin for error semantics for inexact knowledge invalidates axioms 4 and 5. We present a new semantics for modal logic which is shown to be complete for K45, without constraining the accessibility relation to be transitive or euclidean. The semantics corresponds to a system of modular knowledge, in which iterated modalities and simple modalities are not on a par. We show how the semantics helps to solve Williamson’s luminosity paradox, and argue that it corresponds to an integrated model of perceptual and introspective knowledge that is psychologically more plausible than the one defended by Williamson. We formulate a generalized version of the semantics, called token semantics, in which modalities are iteration-sensitive up to degree n and insensitive beyond n. The multi-agent version of the semantics yields a resource-sensitive logic with implications for the representation of common knowledge in situations of bounded rationality
Brentano, Franz Clemens (1874). Psychology From an Empirical Standpoint. Routledge.   (Google)
Brueckner, Anthony L. (2001). Problems for a recent account of introspective knowledge. Facta Philosophica.   (Google)
Byrne, Alex (2005). Introspection. Philosophical Topics 33:79--104.   (Google)
Byrne, Alex (2005). Introspection. Philosophical Topics 33 (1):79-104.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: I know various contingent truths about my environment by perception. For example, by looking, I know that there is a computer before me; by hearing, I know that someone is talking in the corridor; by tasting, I know that the coffee has no sugar. I know these things because I have some built-in mechanisms specialized for detecting the state of my environment. One of these mechanisms, for instance, is presently transducing electromagnetic radiation (in a narrow band of wavelengths) coming from the computer and the desk on which it sits. How that mechanism works is a complicated story—to put it mildly—and of course much remains unknown. But we can at least produce more-or- less plausible sketches of how the mechanism can start from retinal irradiation, and go on to deliver knowledge of my surroundings. Moreover, in the sort of world we inhabit, specialized detection mechanisms that are causally affected by the things they detect have no serious competition—seeing the computer by seeing an idea of the computer in the divine mind, for example, is not a feasible alternative
Caruso, Gregg (2008). Consciousness and Free Will: A Critique of the Argument from Introspection. Southwest Philosophy Review 24 (1):219-231.   (Google)
Abstract: One of the main libertarian arguments in support of free will is the argument from introspection. This argument places a great deal of faith in our conscious feeling of freedom and our introspective abilities. People often infer their own freedom from their introspective phenomenology of freedom. It is here argued that from the fact that I feel myself free, it does not necessarily follow that I am free. I maintain that it is our mistaken belief in the transparency and infallibility of consciousness that gives the introspective argument whatever power it possesses. Once we see that consciousness is neither transparent nor infallible, the argument from introspection loses all of its force. I argue that since we do not have direct, infallible access to our own minds, to rely on introspection to infer our own freedom would be a mistake.
Carloye, Jack C. (1991). Consciousness and introspective knowledge. Methodology and Science 8:8-22.   (Google)
Carruthers, Peter (ms). Cartesian epistemology.   (Google)
Abstract: This paper argues that a Cartesian belief in the self-transparency of minds might actually be an innate aspect of our mind-reading faculty. But it acknowledges that some crucial evidence needed to establish this claim hasn’t been looked for or collected. What we require is evidence that a belief in the self-transparency of mind is universal to the human species. The paper closes with a call to anthropologists (and perhaps also developmental psychologists), who are in a position to collect such evidence, encouraging them to do so
Carruthers, Peter (2010). Introspection: Divided and partly eliminated. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (1):76-111.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper will argue that there is no such thing as introspective access to judgments and decisions. It won’t challenge the existence of introspective access to perceptual and imagistic states, nor to emotional feelings and bodily sensations. On the contrary, the model presented in Section 2 presumes such access. Hence introspection is here divided into two categories: introspection of propositional attitude events, on the one hand, and introspection of broadly perceptual events, on the other. I shall assume that the latter exists while arguing that the former doesn’t (or not in the case of judgments and decisions, at least). Section 1 makes some preliminary points and distinctions, and outlines the scope of the argument. Section 2 presents and motivates the general model of introspection that predicts a divided result. Section 3 provides independent evidence for the conclusion that judgments and decisions aren’t introspectable. Section 4 then replies to a number of objections to the argument, the most important of which is made from the perspective of so-called “dual systems theories” of belief formation and decision making. The upshot is a limited form of eliminativism about introspection, in respect of at least two core categories of propositional attitude
Carruthers, Peter (2010). Introspection: Divided and partly eliminated. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (1):76-111.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper will argue that there is no such thing as introspective access to judgments and decisions. It won’t challenge the existence of introspective access to perceptual and imagistic states, nor to emotional feelings and bodily sensations. On the contrary, the model presented in Section 2 presumes such access. Hence introspection is here divided into two categories: introspection of propositional attitude events, on the one hand, and introspection of broadly perceptual events, on the other. I shall assume that the latter exists while arguing that the former doesn’t (or not in the case of judgments and decisions, at least). Section 1 makes some preliminary points and distinctions, and outlines the scope of the argument. Section 2 presents and motivates the general model of introspection that predicts a divided result. Section 3 provides independent evidence for the conclusion that judgments and decisions aren’t introspectable. Section 4 then replies to a number of objections to the argument, the most important of which is made from the perspective of so-called “dual systems theories” of belief formation and decision making. The upshot is a limited form of eliminativism about introspection, in respect of at least two core categories of propositional attitude
Cassam, Quassim (1995). Introspection and bodily self-ascription. In Jose Luis Bermudez, Anthony J. Marcel & Naomi M. Eilan (eds.), The Body and the Self. MIT Press.   (Cited by 10 | Google)
Cassam, Quassim (2004). Introspection, perception, and epistemic privilege. The Monist 87 (2):255-274.   (Google)
Churchland, Paul M. (1985). Reduction, qualia and the direct introspection of brain states. Journal of Philosophy 82 (January):8-28.   (Cited by 110 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Clifton, Andrew (ms). The introspection game - or, does the tin man have a heart?   (Google)
Abstract: Eliminative functionalism is the view that mental attributes, of humans and other machines, consist ultimately in behavioural abilities or dispositions. Hence, ‘Strong AI’: if a machine consistently acts as if it were fully conscious, then conscious it is. From these assumptions, optimistic futurists have derived a variety of remarkable visions of our ‘post-human’ future; from widely-recognised ‘robot rights’ to ‘mind uploading’, immortality, ‘apotheosis’ and beyond. It is argued here, however, that eliminative functionalism is false; for at least on our present knowledge, the subjectively qualitative characteristics of conscious experience are neither deducible from, nor logically required to generate, the performance of any sort of overtly ‘intelligent’, or indeed, characteristically human behaviour. Thus, a machine could easily be designed to report awareness of phenomenal qualities, without necessarily possessing them; and Alan Turing’s ‘Imitation Game’ test for artificial thinking is unable to determine whether or not a machine is sentient. An alternative test is proposed, in which the machine is asked phenomenological questions under conditions designed to detect any form of cheating—whilst also, potentially revealing evidence for the occurrence of genuine qualitative experience
Cohen, Jonathan & Nichols, Shaun (2010). Colours, colour relationalism and the deliverances of introspection. Analysis 70 (2).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: I frame no hypotheses; for whatever is not deduced from the phenomena is to be called an hypothesis; and hypotheses, whether metaphysical or physical, whether of occult qualities or mechanical, have no place in experimental philosophy
Costall, Alan (2006). 'Introspectionism' and the mythical origins of scientific psychology. Consciousness and Cognition 15 (4):634-654.   (Google)
Crane, Tim (2002). Introspection, intentionality, and the transparency of experience. Philosophical Topics 28:49-67.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Dainton, Barry F. (2004). Unity and introspectibility: Reply to Gilmore. Psyche 10 (1).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Gilmore concentrates on two arguments which I took to undermine the claim that introspectibility is necessary for co-consciousness: the
Dennett, Daniel C. (1968). The nature of images and the introspective trap. In Content and Consciousness. Routledge and Kegan Paul.   (Cited by 53 | Google)
Dilworth, John B. (2006). Perception, introspection, and functional consonance. Theoria 72 (4):299-318.   (Google)
Abstract: What is the relation between a perceptual experience of an object X as being red, and one's belief, if any, as to the nature of that experience? A traditional Cartesian view would be that, if indeed object X does seem to be red to oneself, then one's resulting introspective belief about it could only be a _conforming _belief, i.e., a belief that X perceptually seems to be _red _to oneself--rather than, for instance, a belief that X perceptually seems to be green to oneself instead. On such a Cartesian view, our introspective certainly about our own thoughts extends also to our perceptual experiences as to how things seem to be to us, so that our resulting introspective beliefs about our phenomenal states also count as knowledge of them
Dorsch, Fabian, Experience and introspection.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: One central fact about hallucinations is that they may be subjectively indistinguishable from perceptions. Indeed, it has been argued by M. G. F. Martin and others that the hallucinatory experiences concerned cannot — and need not — be characterised in any more positive general terms. This epistemic conception of hallucinations has been advocated as the best choice for proponents of experiential (or ‘na¨ıve realist’) disjunctivism — the view that perceptions and hallucinations differ essentially in their introspectible subjective characters. In this chapater, I aim to formulate and defend an intentional alternative to experiential disjunctivism called experiential intentionalism. This view does not only enjoy some advantages over its rival, but also can hold on to the epistemic conception of perception-like hallucinations. First of all, I try to spell out in a bit more detail in which sense hallucinations may be subjectively indistinguishable from perceptions, and why this leads us to erroneously judge them to be perceptions (cf. sections I–III and VIII). Then, I raise three challenges each for experiential disjunctivism and its orthodox intentionalist counterparts (cf. sections IV and V), notably in respect of the need to explicate why a perception-like hallucination still makes the same judgements reasonable from the subject’s perspective as the corresponding perceptions. And, finally, I propose my alternative both to experiential disjunctivism and to orthodox intentionalism. Experiential intentionalism takes perceptions and perception-like hallucinations to share a common character partly to be spelled out in intentional — and, hence, normative — terms (cf. sections VI and VII). The central thought is that the hallucinations concerned are intentionally — and erroneously — presented to us as perceptual relations to the world. I aim to show that the resulting view can meet all six challenges (cf. sections VI–VIII). I end..
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Frankish, Keith (2009). How we know our conscious minds: Introspective access to conscious thoughts. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):145-146.   (Google)
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Abstract: Alas, things are not quite so simple. As James implies, the term ‘introspection’ literally means ‘looking within’, but of course we do not visually inspect the interiors of our crania. What unites proponents of introspection is the claim that we can recognize our own mental states through some sort of attention—a non-visual ‘looking’—whose immediate objects are thoughts or sensations within oneself, in a non-spatial sense of ‘within’. (The term ‘introspection’ is occasionally given an ecumenical gloss, to refer to any method of knowing one’s own mental states, and not just self-directed attention. But the more restrictive use is standard, and provides the topic of the current entry.) As we will see, some contemporary philosophers and psychologists doubt that any such introspective process underlies self-knowledge
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Gilmore, Cody S. (2003). The introspectibility thesis. Psyche 9 (5).   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: According to what Barry Dainton calls the 'Strong Introspectibility thesis', it is a necessary truth that mental states S and S* are co-conscious (experienced together) if and only if they are 'jointly introspectible', i.e., if and only if it is possible for there to be some single state of introspective awareness that represents both S and S*. Dainton offers two arguments for the conclusion that joint introspectibility is unnecessary for co-consciousness. In these comments I attempt to show, first, that Dainton's arguments fail, and, second, that joint introspectibility is actually insufficient for co-consciousness. (As to whether it is also unnecessary, I take no stance.)
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Grundmann, Thomas (2009). Introspective self-knowledge and reasoning: An externalist guide. Erkenntnis 71 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: According to the received view, externalist grounds or reasons need not be introspectively accessible. Roughly speaking, from an externalist point of view, a belief will be epistemically justified, iff it is based upon facts that make its truth objectively highly likely. This condition can be satisfied, even if the epistemic agent does not have actual or potential awareness of the justifying facts. No inner perspective on the belief-forming mechanism and its truth-ratio is needed for a belief to be justified. In my view, this is not the whole story. While I agree that introspective access to our reasons is a defining feature of justification for the access internalist, not the externalist, I will argue that even for the latter, some kind of introspective access is an epistemic desideratum. Yet, even given that I am right, the desirable might not be achievable for us. Recent psychological research suggests that we do not dispose of reliable introspection into the sources of our own beliefs. This seems to undermine the claim that we can introspectively know about the reasons upon which our beliefs are based. In this paper I will therefore additionally show why these results do not threaten the kind of introspective access desirable from an externalist point of view
Guo, Jiahong (2009). The incorporation of Moorean type information by introspective agents. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 4 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: The main task is to discuss the issue in belief dynamics in which philosophical beliefs and rational introspective agents incorporate Moorean type new information. First, a brief survey is conducted on Moore’s Paradox, and one of its solutions is introduced with the help of Update Semantics. Then, we present a Dynamic Doxastic Logic (DDL) which revises the belief of introspective agents put forward by Lindström & Rabinowicz. Next, we attempt to incorporate Moorean type new information within the DEL (DDL) framework, as advised by van Benthem, Segerberg et al. Though we maintain the principle of “the primacy of new information” from the literature on traditional belief revision theory, several unsuccessful ways are also presented. We then conclude that some special kind of success (weak success) can still be found in those revision processes although absolute success does not hold. At last, the relevant problem of “learnability” is re-considered through weak success
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Abstract: In Scientific Evidence: Philosophical Theories & Applications, ed. by Peter Achinstein (Baltimore: Johns Hopkine University Press, 2005), 259–86. Key words: introspection, psychology of perception, Wundt, Gestalt Psychology
Haybron, Daniel M. (2007). Do we know how happy we are? On some limits of affective introspection and recall. Noûs 41 (3):394–428.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Hebb, D. O. (1954). The problem of consciousness and introspection. In J. F. Delafresnaye (ed.), Brain Mechanisms and Consciousness. Blackwell.   (Cited by 9 | Google)
Hermerén, Göran (1993). Emotive properties: The role of abstraction, introspection and projection. Theoria 59 (1-3):80-112.   (Google)
Herrick, C. Judson (1915). Introspection as a biological method. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 12 (20):543-551.   (Google | More links)
Hill, Christopher S. (1988). Introspective awareness of sensations. Topoi 7 (March):11-24.   (Google | More links)
Hill, Christopher S. (1991). Introspection and the skeptic. In Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism. Cambridge University Press.   (Annotation | Google)
Hofmann, Frank (2009). Introspective self-knowledge of experience and evidence. Erkenntnis 71 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: The paper attempts to give an account of the introspective self-knowledge of our own experiences which is in line with representationalism about phenomenal consciousness and the transparency of experience. A two-step model is presented. First, a demonstrative thought of the form ‚I am experiencing this’ is formed which refers to what one experiences, by means of attention. Plausibly, this thought is knowledge, since safe. Second, a non-demonstrative thought of the form ‚I am experiencing a pain’ occurs. This second self-ascription is justified inferentially, on the basis of the first, demonstrative thought. Thus, an account of introspective experiential self-knowledge can be developed which is richer and more adequate to the phenomena than pure reliabilism and Dretske’s displaced perception model. There is really such a thing as introspection, but no inner sense
Hofmann, Frank (online). The epistemological role of consciousness for introspective self-knowledge.   (Google)
Abstract: Recently, some philosophers have claimed that consciousness has an important epistemological role to play in the introspective self-ascription of one’s own mental states. This is the thesis of the epistemological role of consciousness for introspective self-knowledge. I will criticize BonJour’s account of the role of consciousness for introspection. He does not provide any reason for believing that conscious states are epistemically better off than non-conscious states. Then I will sketch a representationalist account of how the thesis could be true. Conscious states are available to the subject in a very special way in which non-conscious states are not available. This is the first part of the explanation. The crucial further element in the representationalist account is what I would like to call the ‘introspective mode of mind’. A mind can operate in certain ways or modes – modes of mind. Introspection normally takes place in the introspective mode of mind, judgments about one’s environment in the mode of ‘taking one’s appearances at face value’. And there probably are other modes of mind. The introspective mode of mind is characterized by the special way or framework in which cognitive capacities are employed
Hogan, Melinda & Martin, R. (2001). Introspective misidentification: An I for an I. In Andrew Brook & R. DeVidi (eds.), Self-Reference and Self-Awareness. John Benjamins.   (Google)
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Howell, Robert J. & Fantl, Jeremy (2003). Sensations, swatches, and speckled hens. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84:371-383.   (Google)
Imam, Akhtar (1966). Is the substantial self known by introspection. Pakistan Philosophical Congress 13 (May):92-99.   (Google)
Jack, Anthony I. & Roepstorff, Andreas (2002). Introspection and cognitive brain mapping: From stimulus-response to script-report. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 6:333-339.   (Cited by 48 | Google | More links)
Jack, Anthony I. & Shallice, T. (2001). Introspective physicalism as an approach to the science of consciousness. Cognition 79 (1):161-196.   (Cited by 82 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Most ?theories of consciousness? are based on vague speculations about the properties of conscious experience. We aim to provide a more solid basis for a science of consciousness. We argue that a theory of consciousness should provide an account of the very processes that allow us to acquire and use information about our own mental states ? the processes underlying introspection. This can be achieved through the construction of information processing models that can account for ?Type-C? processes. Type-C processes can be specified experimentally by identifying paradigms in which awareness of the stimulus is necessary for an intentional action. The Shallice (1988b) framework is put forward as providing an initial account of Type-C processes, which can relate perceptual consciousness to consciously performed actions. Further, we suggest that this framework may be refined through the investigation of the functions of prefrontal cortex. The formulation of our approach requires us to consider fundamental conceptual and methodological issues associated with consciousness. The most significant of these issues concerns the scientific use of introspective evidence. We outline and justify a conservative methodological approach to the use of introspective evidence, with attention to the difficulties historically associated with its use in psychology
Jack, Anthony I. (ed.) (2004). Trusting the Subject? The Use of Introspective Evidence in Cognitive Science Volume. Thorverton UK: Imprint Academic.   (Google)
James, William (1884). On some omissions of introspective psychology. Mind 9 (33):1-26.   (Cited by 25 | Google | More links)
Johansson, Petter; Hall, Lars; Sikstrom, Sverker & Olsson, Andreas (2005). Failure to detect mismatches between intention and outcome in a simple decision task. Science 310:116-119.   (Cited by 17 | Google | More links)
Johansson, Petter; Hall, Lars; Sikström, Sverker; Tärning, Betty & Lind, Andreas (2006). How something can be said about telling more than we can know: On choice blindness and introspection. Consciousness and Cognition 15 (4):673-692.   (Google)
Judson Herrick, C. (1915). Introspection as a biological method. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 12 (20):543-551.   (Google | More links)
Kelly, J. S. (1989). On neutralizing introspection: The data of sensuous awareness. Southern Journal of Philosophy 27:29-53.   (Google)
Kind, Amy (online). Introspection. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Google)
Kirk, Robert E. (1971). Armstrong's analogue of introspection. Philosophical Quarterly 21 (April):158-62.   (Google | More links)
Kneale, William C. (1950). Experience and introspection. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 50:I.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Kornblith, Hilary (1989). Introspection and misdirection. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 67 (4):410 – 422.   (Google)
Kroker, K. (2003). The progress of introspection in America, 1896-1938. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 34 (1):77-108.   (Google)
Abstract: Most histories of psychology weave a story around the rise of objective methods of investigation and the decline of subjective introspection. This paper sidesteps such disciplinary stories by describing self-scrutiny as a practice that moved through a variety of cultural, social and technological contexts in early twentieth-century America. Edmund Jacobson's technique of 'progressive relaxation' is offered as a case in point. Jacobson, a Chicago clinician, developed this cure for nervousness out of his earlier research under E. B. Titchener, an experimental psychologist at Cornell University. Like Titchener's method of 'experimental introspection', progressive relaxation was a laboratory-based activity designed to transform the practitioner's sensibilities through the fastidious repetition of simple tasks. But while experimental psychologists ultimately rejected introspection as the core of their disciplinary project, the American public embraced progressive relaxation as a practical technique for mastering the new conditions of modernity
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Laird, John (1919). Introspection. Mind 28 (112):385-406.   (Google | More links)
Laird, John (1917). Introspection and intuition. Philosophical Review 26 (5):496-513.   (Google | More links)
Langland-Hassan, Peter (2009). Metacognition without introspection. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):151-152.   (Google)
Larkin, William S. (ms). A broad perceptual model of privileged introspective judgments.   (Google)
Larkin, William S. (ms). Concepts and introspection: An externalist defense of inner sense.   (Google)
Lehrer, Keith (1960). Can we know that we have free will by introspection? Journal of Philosophy 57 (March):145-156.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Levin, Michael E. (1985). Introspection. Behaviorism 13:125-136.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Lindström, Sten & Rabinowicz, Wlodek (online). Belief change for introspective agents. Spinning Ideas, Electronic Essays Dedicated to Peter Gärdenfors on His Fiftieth Birthday.   (Google)
Lindström, Sten & Rabinowicz, Wlodek (1999). DDL unlimited: Dynamic doxastic logic for introspective agents. Erkenntnis 50 (2-3).   (Google)
Livermore, Robert L. (1982). Introspection versus the identity theory: An unnecessary conflict. Noûs 16 (September):387-398.   (Google | More links)
Lurz, Robert W. (2009). Feigning introspective blindness for thought. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):153-154.   (Google)
Lycan, William G. (2002). Dretske's ways of introspecting. In Brie Gertler (ed.), Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge. Ashgate.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: ‘[I]ntrospection’ is just a convenient word to describe our way of knowing what is going on in our own mind, and anyone convinced that we know—at least sometimes—what is going on in our own mind and therefore, that we have a mind and, therefore, that we are not zombies, must believe that introspection is the answer we are looking for. I, too, believe in introspection
Lyons, William E. (1985). The behaviourists' struggle with introspection. International Philosophical Quarterly 25 (June):139-156.   (Google)
Lyons, William E. (1986). The Disappearance of Introspection. MIT Press.   (Cited by 81 | Google | More links)
Lyons, William E. (1988). The development of introspection. Philosophical Perspectives 2:31-64.   (Google)
Macdonald, Cynthia (2007). Introspection and authoritative self-knowledge. Erkenntnis 67 (2).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In this paper I outline and defend an introspectionist account of authoritative self-knowledge for a certain class of cases, ones in which a subject is both thinking and thinking about a current, conscious thought. My account is distinctive in a number of ways, one of which is that it is compatible with the truth of externalism
Machery, Edouard (2005). You don't know how you think: Introspection and language of thought. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (3):469-485.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: recent cognitive theories into two antagonistic groups. Sententialists claim that we think in some language, while advocates of non-linguistic views of cognition deny this claim. The Introspective Argument for Sententialism is one of the most appealing arguments for sententialism. In substance, it claims that the introspective fact of inner speech provides strong evidence that our thoughts are linguistic. This article challenges this argument. I claim that the Introspective Argument for Sententialism confuses the content of our thoughts with their vehicles: while sententialism is a thesis about the vehicles of our thoughts, inner speech sentences are the content of auditory or articulatory images. The rebuttal of the introspective argument for sententialism is shown to have a general significance in cognitive science: introspection does not tell us how we think. The problem The introspective argument for sententialism The argument for the blindness of introspection thesis Objections and replies Conclusion
Mandik, Pete (2006). The introspectibility of brain states as such. In Brian Keeley (ed.), Paul Churchland. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Is the Introspection Thesis true? It certainly isn’t obvious. Introspection is the faculty by which each of us has access to his or her own mental states. Even if we were to suppose that mental states are identical to brain states, it doesn’t follow immediately from this supposition that we can introspect our mental states as brain states. This point is analogous to the following. It doesn’t follow immediately from the mere fact that some distant object is identical to a horse that we can perceive it as a horse. Further, it isn’t obvious that any amount of education would suffice to make some distant speck on the horizon seem like a horse. It may very well be the case that no matter how well we know that some distant speck is a horse; as long as we are sufficiently distant from it we will only be able to see it as a speck. Analogously then, it may very well be the case that no matter how well we know that our mental states are brain states, we will only be able to introspect them as irreducibly mental
Marcel, Anthony J. (2003). Introspective report - trust, self-knowledge and science. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (9-10):167-186.   (Google)
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Morin, Alain & Everett, James (1991). Self-awareness and introspective private speech in 6-year-old children. Psychological Reports 68:1299-1306.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Myers, Gerald E. (1986). Introspection and self-knowledge. American Philosophical Quarterly 23 (April):199-207.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Nahmias, Eddy A. (2002). Verbal reports on the contents of consciousness: Reconsidering introspectionist methodology. Psyche 8 (21).   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Abstract: Doctors must now take a fifth vital sign from their patients: pain reports. I use this as a case study to discuss how different schools of psychology (introspectionism, behaviorism, cognitive psychology) have treated verbal reports about the contents of consciousness. After examining these differences, I suggest that, with new methods of mapping data about neurobiological states with behavioral data and with verbal reports about conscious experience, we should reconsider some of the introspectionists' goals and methods. I discuss examples from cognitive psychology, including pain researchers' attempts to develop self-reports of pain so that they can be, like other vital signs, reliable indicators of internal states.
Nakamura, Yutaka & Chapman, R. (2002). Measuring pain: An introspective look at introspection. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (4):582-592.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Newton, Natika (1986). Churchland on direct introspection of brain states. Analysis 46 (March):97-102.   (Cited by 2 | Annotation | Google)
Newton, Natika (1988). Introspection and perception. Topoi 7 (March):25-30.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   Sydney Shoemaker argues that introspection, unlike perception, provides no identification information about the self, and that knowledge of one''s mental states should be conceived as arising in a direct and unmediated fashion from one''s being in those states. I argue that while one does not identify aself as the subject of one''s states, one does frequently identify and misidentify thestates, in ways analogous to the identification of objects in perception, and that in discourse about one''s mental states the self plays the role of external reality in discourse about physical objects. Discourse about any sort of entity or property can be viewed as involving a domain or frame of reference which constrains what can be said about the entities; this view is related to Johnson-Laird''s theory of mental models. On my approach evidence, including sensory evidence, may be involved in decisions about one''s mental states. I conclude that while Shoemaker may well be right about different roles for sense impressions in introspection and perception, the exact differences and their significance remain to be established
Newton, Natika (1999). Introspection and the secret agent. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (4):629-629.   (Google)
Abstract: The notion of introspection is unparsimonious and unnecessary to explain the experiential grounding of our mentalistic concepts. Instead, we can look at subtle proprioceptive experiences, such as the experience of agency in planning motor acts, which may be explained in part by the phenomenon of collateral discharge or efference copy. Proprioceptive sensations experienced during perceptual and motor activity may account for everything that has traditionally been attributed to a special mental activity called “introspection.”
Nichols, Shaun & Fiala, Brian, Confabulation, confidence, and introspection.   (Google)
Abstract: Carruthers’ arguments depend on a tenuous interpretation of cases from the confabulation literature. Specifically, Carruthers maintains that cases of confabulation are “subjectively indistinguishable” from cases of alleged introspection. However, in typical cases of confabulation, the self-attributions are characterized by low confidence, in contrast to cases of alleged introspection
Nichols, Shaun (2000). The mind's "I" and the theory of mind's "I": Introspection and two concepts of self. Philosophical Topics 28:171-99.   (Google)
Abstract: Introspection plays a crucial role in Modern philosophy in two different ways. From the beginnings of Modern philosophy, introspection has been used a tool for philosophical exploration in a variety of thought experiments. But Modern philosophers (e.g., Locke and Hume) also tried to characterize the nature of introspection as a psychological phenomenon. In contemporary philosophy, introspection is still frequently used in thought experiments. And in the analytic tradition, philosophers have tried to characterize conceptually necessary features of introspection.2 But over the last several decades, philosophers have devoted relatively little attention to the cognitive characteristics of introspection. This has begun to change, impelled largely by a fascinating body of work on how children and autistic individuals understand the mind.3 In a pair of recent papers, Stephen Stich and I have drawn on this empirical work to develop an account of introspection or self-awareness.4 In this paper, I will elaborate and defend this cognitive theory of introspection further and argue that if the account is right, it may have important ramifications for psychological and philosophical debates over the self
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Ogden, R. M. (1913). Content versus "kundgabe" in introspection. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 10 (15):403-411.   (Google | More links)
Overgaard, Morten & Sorenson, T. A. (2004). Introspection distinct from first-order experiences. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Overgaard, Morten (2006). Introspection in science. Consciousness and Cognition 15 (4):629-633.   (Google)
Overgaard, Morten; Koivisto, Mika; Sorensen, Thomas Alrik; Vangkilde, Signe & Revonsuo, Antti (2006). The electrophysiology of introspection. Consciousness and Cognition 15 (4):662-672.   (Google)
Pereboom, Derk (1994). Bats, brain scientists, and the limitations of introspection. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (2):315-29.   (Google | More links)
Pereboom, Derk (web). Consciousness and introspective inaccuracy. In L. M. Jorgensen & S. Newlands (eds.), Appearance, Reality, and the Good: Themes From the Philosophy of Robert M. Adams. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Perner, Josef; Kloo, Daniela & Stöttinger, Elisabeth (forthcoming). Introspection & remembering. Synthese.   (Google)
Abstract: We argue that episodic remembering, understood as the ability to re-experience past events, requires a particular kind of introspective ability and understanding. It requires the understanding that first person experiences can represent actual events. In this respect it differs from the understanding required by the traditional false belief test for children, where a third person attribution (to others or self) of a behavior governing representation is sufficient. The understanding of first person experiences as representations is also required for problem solving with images. In support of this argument we review developmental evidence that children’s episodic remembering is independent of and emerges after mastery of the false belief task but emerges together with the use of imagery for solving visual rotation tasks
Pestana, Mark Stephen (2005). (A laconic exposition of) a method by which the internal compositional features of qualitative experience can be made evident to subjective awareness. Philosophical Psychology 18 (6):767-783.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In this paper I explicate a technique which can be used to make subtle relational features of experience more evident to awareness. Results of this method could be employed to diffuse one intuition that drives the common critique of functionalist-information theoretic accounts of mind that "qualia" cannot be exhaustively characterized in information theoretic-functional terms. An intuition that commonly grounds this critique is that the qualitative aspects of experience do not entirely appear in consciousness as informational-functional structures. The first section of the paper is a schematic overview of nature of the qualitative and the problem that qualia are taken to create for information theoretic-functionalist theories of mind. §2 contains a précis of the concept of different levels of functional scale in mental activity that was developed by Armstrong and the Churchlands and that is needed to interpret (possible) results of the proposed experiment. In §3, I outline a method whereby analogies would be generated between purely relational forms, structures, configurations, etc. and purely qualitative aspects of experience. These analogies would be created by subjects through forced choice selection of presented images of structures that "most resembled" a pure quality. Repeated choices would then be shaped by a genetic program into the structural configuration that "most resembled" the pure quality. The final section of the paper explores how consistent, reliable results from the experiment would make information-theoretic functionalism more intuitively plausible in spite of the "fact" that the qualitative aspects of experience do not immediately appear as entirely relational/structural
Petty, Richard E. & Briñol, Pablo (2009). Introspection and interpretation: Dichotomy or continuum? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):157-158.   (Google)
Piccinini, Gualtiero (2003). Data from introspective reports: Upgrading from common sense to science. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (9-10):141-156.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Introspective reports are used as sources of information about other minds, in both everyday life and science. Many scientists and philosophers consider this practice unjustified, while others have made the untestable assumption that introspection is a truthful method of private observation. I argue that neither skepticism nor faith concerning introspective reports are warranted. As an alternative, I consider our everyday, commonsensical reliance on each other’s introspective reports. When we hear people talk about their minds, we neither refuse to learn from nor blindly accept what they say. Sometimes we accept what we are told, other times we reject it, and still other times we take the report, revise it in light of what we believe, then accept the modified version. Whatever we do, we have (implicit) reasons for it. In developing a sound methodology for the scientific use of introspective reports, we can take our commonsense treatment of introspective reports and make it more explicit and rigorous. We can discover what to infer from introspective reports in a way similar to how we do it every day, but with extra knowledge, methodological care, and precision. Sorting out the use of introspective reports as sources of data is going to be a painstaking, piecemeal task, but it promises to enhance our science of the mind and brain.
Piccinini, Gualtiero (2001). Mind gauging: Introspection as a public epistemic resource. PhilSci Archive.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Introspection used to be excluded from science because it isn?t public--for any question about mental states, only the person whose states are in question can answer by introspecting. However, we often use introspective reports to gauge each other?s minds, and contemporary psychologists generate data from them. I argue that some uses of introspection are as public as any scientific method
Pillsbury, Walter B. (1904). A suggestion toward a reinterpretation of introspection. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 1 (9):225-228.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Pilkington, G. W. & Glasgow, W. D. (1967). Towards a rehabilitation of introspection as a method in psychology. Journal of Existentialism 7:329-350.   (Google)
Pratt, Carroll C. (1924). The present status of introspective technique. Journal of Philosophy 21 (9):225-231.   (Google | More links)
Price, Donald D. & Aydede, Murat (2005). The experimental use of introspection in the scientific study of pain. In Murat Aydede (ed.), New Essays on the Nature of Pain and the Methodology of its Study. MIT Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Understanding the nature of pain depends, at least partly, on recognizing its subjectivity (thus, its first-person epistemology). This in turn requires using a first-person experiential method in addition to third-person experimental approaches to study it. This paper is an attempt to spell out what the former approach is and how it can be integrated with the latter. We start our discussion by examining some foundational issues raised by the use of introspection. We argue that such a first-person method in the scientific study of pain (as in the study of any experience) is in fact indispensable by demonstrating that it has in fact been consistently used in conjunction with conventional third-person methodologies, and this for good reasons. We show that, contrary to what appears to be a widespread opinion, there is absolutely no reason to think that the use of such a first-person approach is scientifically and methodologically suspect. We distinguish between two uses of introspective methods in scientific experiments: one draws on the subjects’ introspective reports where any investigator has equal and objective access. The other is where the investigator becomes a subject of his own study and draws on the introspection of his own experiences. We give examples using and/or approximating both strategies that include studies of second pain summation and its relationship to neural activities, and brain imaging- psychophysical studies wherein sensory and affective qualities of pain are correlated with cerebral cortical activity. We explain what we call the experiential or phenomenological approach that has its origins in the work of Price and Barrell (1980). This approach capitalizes on the scientific prospects and benefits of using the introspection of the investigator. We distinguish between its vertical and horizontal applications. Finally, we conclude that integrating such an approach to standard third-person methodologies can only help us in having a fuller understanding of pain and of conscious experience in general..
Price, Donald D. & Aydede, Murat (2005). The experimental use of introspection in the scientific study of pain and its integration with third-person methodologies: The experiential-phenomenological approach. In Murat Aydede (ed.), Pain: New Essays on Its Nature and the Methodology of Its Study. Cambridge MA: Bradford Book/MIT Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Abstract: Understanding the nature of pain depends, at least partly, on recognizing its subjectivity (thus, its first-person epistemology). This in turn requires using a first-person experiential method in addition to third-person experimental approaches to study it. This paper is an attempt to spell out what the former approach is and how it can be integrated with the latter. We start our discussion by examining some foundational issues raised by the use of introspection. We argue that such a first-person method in the scientific study of pain (as in the study of any experience) is in fact indispensable by demonstrating that it has in fact been consistently used in conjunction with conventional third-person methodologies, and this for good reasons. We show that, contrary to what appears to be a widespread opinion, there is absolutely no reason to think that the use of such a first-person approach is scientifically and methodologically suspect. We distinguish between two uses of introspective methods in scientific experiments: one draws on the subjects’ introspective reports where any investigator has equal and objective access. The other is where the investigator becomes a subject of his own study and draws on the introspection of his own experiences. We give examples using and/or approximating both strategies that include studies of second pain summation and its relationship to neural activities, and brain imaging- psychophysical studies wherein sensory and affective qualities of pain are correlated with cerebral cortical activity. We explain what we call the experiential or phenomenological approach that has its origins in the work of Price and Barrell (1980). This approach capitalizes on the scientific prospects and benefits of using the introspection of the investigator. We distinguish between its vertical and horizontal applications. Finally, we conclude that integrating such an approach to standard third-person methodologies can only help us in having a fuller understanding of pain and of conscious experience in general..
Prinz, Jesse J. (2004). The fractionation of introspection. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (7-8):40-57.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
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Rakover, Sam (1993). Empirical criteria for task susceptibility to introspective awareness and awareness effects. Philosophical Psychology 6 (4):451 – 467.   (Google)
Abstract: A proposed empirical criterion for task susceptibility to introspective awareness distinguishes cognitive processes of which one cannot be aware from those of which one can be aware. The empirical criterion for task susceptibility to awareness effects proposes that there are tasks which cannot be affected by awareness of the rules constituting the tasks. These criteria were applied to research programmes in rule-learning in which past studies in the area of learning without awareness were included as well as current research in implicit learning. The principal question addressed in these studies is whether or not rule-learning can occur without awareness. An historical review showed that rule-learning occurred in tasks which were both susceptible and insusceptible to introspective awareness and to awareness effects. Accordingly, it has been proposed that rather than attempt to decide theoretically and empirically between the opposing hypotheses—that of “cognitive learning” on the one hand, which assumes that awareness is a necessary condition for rule-learning, and that of “automatic learning” on the other, which assumes direct, automatic and unconscious processes—efforts should rather be directed toward developing a theoretical approach which is based on both conscious and unconscious processes. However, an approach of this kind encounters severe problems, such as the generation of contradictory predictions, which result from the employment of several incongruent and irreconcilable models of explanation. The criteria for task susceptibility offer a way out of these difficulties
Rakover, Sam S. (1983). Hypothesizing from introspections: A model for the role of mental entities in psychological explanation. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 13 (2):211–230.   (Google | More links)
Ramsøy, Thomas Zoega & Overgaard, Morten (2004). Introspection and subliminal perception. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3 (1):1-23.   (Google)
Abstract:   Subliminal perception (SP) is today considered a well-supported theory stating that perception can occur without conscious awareness and have a significant impact on later behaviour and thought. In this article, we first present and discuss different approaches to the study of SP. In doing this, we claim that most approaches are based on a dichotomic measure of awareness. Drawing upon recent advances and discussions in the study of introspection and phenomenological psychology, we argue for both the possibility and necessity of using an elaborated measure of subjective states. In the second part of the article, we present findings where these considerations are implemented in an empirical study. The results and implications are discussed in detail, both with reference to SP, and in relation to the more general problem of using elaborate introspective reports as data in relation to studies of cognition
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Robbins, Philip (2004). Knowing me, knowing you: Theory of mind and the machinery of introspection. In Anthony I. Jack & Andreas Roepstorff (eds.), Trusting the Subject? The Use of Introspective Evidence in Cognitive Science Volume 2. Thorverton UK: Imprint Academic.   (Google | More links)
Robbins, Philip (2006). The ins and outs of introspection. Philosophy Compass 1 (6):617–630.   (Google | More links)
Robbins, Philip (2008). Teaching & learning guide for: The ins and outs of introspection. Philosophy Compass 3 (5):1100-1102.   (Google)
Abstract: Philosophical interest in introspection has a long and storied history, but only recently – with the 'scientific turn' in philosophy of mind – have philosophers sought to ground their accounts of introspection in psychological data. In particular, there is growing awareness of how evidence from clinical and developmental psychology might be brought to bear on long-standing debates about the architecture of introspection, especially in the form of apparent dissociations between introspection and third-person mental-state attribution. It is less often noticed that this evidence needs to be interpreted with due sensitivity to distinctions between different types of introspection, for example, introspection of propositional attitudes (beliefs, desires) vs. introspection of phenomenally conscious states (pains, emotional feelings). As contemporary debates about the machinery of introspection – and debates about mindreading in general – move forward, these distinctions are likely to figure more prominently. Author Recommends: Peter Carruthers, 'Simulation and Self-Knowledge: A Defense of Theory-Theory', in Theories of Theories of Mind, eds. P. Carruthers and P. K. Smith (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 22–38. Defends a sophisticated form of the theory-theory of introspection, according to which we come to know at least some of our mental states (e.g., propositional attitudes) by reasoning from an innate folk-psychological theory. Fred Dretske, 'Introspection', in Naturalizing the Mind (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995), 39–63. Introduces and defends the idea of introspection as 'displaced perception'. Alvin Goldman, 'Self-Attribution', in Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Mindreading (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 223–57. Defends a version of the 'inner sense' view of introspection in which mental state types are classified via their neural properties, and mental contents are classified via 'redeployment'. Alison Gopnik, 'How We Read Our Own Minds: The Illusion of First-Person Knowledge of Intentionality', Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1993): 1–14. A noted psychologist defends a version of the theory-theory of introspection, citing evidence of developmental symmetries between first-person and third-person mental-state attribution. Robert Gordon, 'Simulation without Introspection or Inference from Me to You', in Mental Simulation: Evaluations and Applications, eds. T. Stone and M. Davies (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), 53–67. Develops the idea of ascent routines – the rough analog of 'displaced perception' for the introspection of propositional attitudes. Uta Frith and Francesca Happé, 'Theory of Mind and Self-Consciousness: What Is It Like to Be Autistic?'Mind and Language 14 (1999): 1–14. Appeals to evidence from autism to motivate the idea that first-person and third-person mental-state attribution have a common basis. Shaun Nichols and Stephen Stich, 'Reading One's Own Mind', in Mindreading: An Integrated Account of Pretence, Self-awareness, and Understanding other Minds (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 150–99. Presents a comprehensive critique of leading theories of introspection (especially the theory-theory), then introduces and defends the authors' preferred alternative, the 'monitoring mechanism' account. Jesse Prinz, 'The Fractionation of Introspection', Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (2004): 40–57. Develops the idea that introspection admits of several varieties. Philip Robbins, 'Knowing Me, Knowing You: Theory of Mind and the Machinery of Introspection', Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (2004): 129–43. Defends a hybrid view of introspection for propositional attitudes, according to which both theoretic inference and monitoring play a role. Sample Syllabus: Week 1: Theory-theory Alison Gopnik, 'How We Read Our Own Minds: The Illusion of First-Person Knowledge of Intentionality', Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1993): 1–14. Peter Carruthers, 'Simulation and Self-Knowledge: A Defense of Theory-Theory', in Theories of Theories of Mind, eds. P. Carruthers and P. K. Smith (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 22–38. Week 2: Displaced perception and semantic ascent Fred Dretske, 'Introspection', in Naturalizing the Mind (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995), 39–63. Robert Gordon, 'Simulation without Introspection or Inference from Me to You', in Mental Simulation: Evaluations and Applications, eds. T. Stone and M. Davies (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), 53–67. Week 3: Monitoring theory Shaun Nichols and Stephen Stich, 'Reading One's Own Mind', in Mindreading: An Integrated Account of Pretence, Self-awareness, and Understanding Other Minds (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 150–99. Week 4: Hybrid approaches Alvin Goldman, 'Self-Attribution', in Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Mindreading (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 223–57. Philip Robbins, 'Knowing Me, Knowing You: Theory of Mind and the Machinery of Introspection', Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (2004): 129–43. Focus Questions:1. What distinguishes 'inside access' from 'outside access' views of introspection?2. To what extent is the theory-theoretic approach to introspection wedded to the idea that first-person and third-person mindreading are mechanistically symmetric capacities?3. What reasons are there for distinguishing between different types of introspection, and why might those taxonomic distinctions matter for theory construction in this area?4. In what sense, if any, are personality traits introspectible?5. Debates about third-person mindreading have revolved around the relative merits of theory-theory and simulation theory, whereas debates about introspection have taken a slightly different focus. For example, no one has defended a simulation-theoretic account of introspection. Why might that be?
Roessler, Johannes (1999). Perception, introspection and attention. European Journal of Philosophy 7 (1):47-64.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Rosenthal, David M. (1998). Introspection. In Robert A. Wilson & Frank F. Keil (eds.), MIT Encyclopedia of the Cognitive Sciences (MITECS). MIT Press.   (Google)
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Abstract: Taking exception to Gilbert Ryle's influentially ironical remark about introspection, that it would be like peering into a 'windowless chamber illuminated by a very peculiar sort of light, and one to which only he [the one attempting the introspecting] has access', this essay claims that introspective awareness of one's actions and motivations in their chronological sequence is not empty but highly informative, not trivial but inseparable from any significant life, and not hopeless but entirely feasible. It is argued that informative and significant introspective awareness is a practice which ought to be as unbroken as possible, not fetched into consciousness or dismissed therefrom at whim in discrete quanta. Philosophers of mind for whom self-awareness is a surd will, however, naturally be inclined to attend to it reluctantly, thus without the requisite persistence, and without understanding it to be a skilled practice. This essay offers a preliminary map of the territory of introspection, which it defines under the heading of 'inner space and inner time.' It shows what sorts of conceptual clarifications are to be gained by the introspective practice it recommends, what responsibilities grasped, and what missteps avoided
Sawyer, Sarah (1999). Am externalist account of introspectve knowledge. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 4 (4):358-78.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The Content Sceptic argues that a subject could not have introspective knowledge of a thought whose content is individuated widely. This claim is incorrect, relying on the tacit assumption that introspective knowledge differs significantly from other species of knowledge. The paper proposes a reliabilist model for understanding introspective knowledge according to which introspective knowledge is simply another species of knowledge, and according to which claims to introspective knowledge are not, as suggested by the Content Sceptic, defeated by the mere possibility of error. This way of understanding introspective knowledge affords a robust theory of privileged access consistent with semantic externalism
Schwitzgebel, Eric (2005). Difference tone training: A demonstration adapted from Titchener's experimental psychology. Psyche 11 (6).   (Google)
Schooler, Jonathan W. (2002). Establishing a legitimate relationship with introspection: Response to jack and roepstorff. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 6:371-372.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Schooler, Jonathan W. (2004). Experience, meta-consciousness, and the paradox of introspection. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (7):17-39.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Schwitzgebel, Eric (online). Introspection. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Google)
Schwitzgebel, Eric (2004). Introspective training apprehensively defended: Reflections on Titchener's lab manual. In Anthony I. Jack (ed.), Journal of Consciousness Studies. Thorverton UK: Imprint Academic.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Schwitzgebel, Eric (2004). Introspective training: Reflections on Titchener's lab manual. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (7):58-76.   (Google | More links)
Schwitzgebel, Eric (2008). The unreliability of naive introspection. Philosophical Review 117 (2).   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: We are prone to gross error, even in favorable circumstances of extended reflection, about our own ongoing conscious experience, our current phenomenology. Even in this apparently privileged domain, our self-knowledge is faulty and untrustworthy. We are not simply fallible at the margins but broadly inept. Examples highlighted in this essay include: emotional experience (for example, is it entirely bodily; does joy have a common, distinctive phenomenological core?), peripheral vision (how broad and stable is the region of visual clarity?), and the phenomenology of thought (does it have a distinctive phenomenology, beyond just imagery and feelings?). Cartesian skeptical scenarios undermine knowledge of ongoing conscious experience as well as knowledge of the outside world. Infallible judgments about ongoing mental states are simply banal cases of self-fulfillment. Philosophical foundationalism supposing that we infer an external world from secure knowledge of our own consciousness is almost exactly backward
Schwitzgebel, Eric (2008). The unreliability of naive introspection. Philosophical Review 117 (2).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: We are prone to gross error, even in favorable circumstances of extended reflection, about our own ongoing conscious experience, our current phenomenology. Even in this apparently privileged domain, our self-knowledge is faulty and untrustworthy. We are not simply fallible at the margins but broadly inept. Examples highlighted in this essay include: emotional experience (for example, is it entirely bodily; does joy have a common, distinctive phenomenological core?), peripheral vision (how broad and stable is the region of visual clarity?), and the phenomenology of thought (does it have a distinctive phenomenology, beyond just imagery and feelings?). Cartesian skeptical scenarios undermine knowledge of ongoing conscious experience as well as knowledge of the outside world. Infallible judgments about ongoing mental states are simply banal cases of self-fulfillment. Philosophical foundationalism supposing that we infer an external world from secure knowledge of our own consciousness is almost exactly backward
Seager, William E. (2002). Emotional introspection. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (4):666-687.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Seager, William E. (2000). Introspection and the elementary acts of mind. Dialogue 39 (1):53-76.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
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Shoemaker, Sydney (1984). Churchland on reduction, qualia, and introspection. Philosophy of Science Association 1984.   (Cited by 2 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Shoemaker, Sydney (2001). Introspection and phenomenal character. Philosophical Topics 28 (2):247--73.   (Cited by 30 | Google | More links)
Abstract: […] One view I hold about the nature of phenomenal character, which is also a view about the relation between phenomenal character and the introspective belief about it, is that phenomenal character is “self intimating.” This means that it is of the essence of a state’s having a certain phenomenal character that this issues in the subject’s being introspectively aware of that character, or does so if the subject reflects. Part of my aim is to give an account which makes it intelligible that this should be so. A more substantive view I hold about phenomenal character is that a perceptual state’s having a certain phenomenal character is a matter of its having a certain sort of representational content. This much I hold in common with a number of recent writers, including Gil Harman, Michael Tye, Bill Lycan, and Fred Dretske. But representationalism about phenomenal character often goes with the rejection of “qualia,” and with the rejection of the possibility of spectrum inversion and other sorts of “qualia invesion.” My version of representationalism embraces what other versions reject. It assigns an essential role to qualia, and accepts the possibility of qualia inversion. A central aim of the present paper is to present a version of this view which is free of the defects I now see in my earlier versions of it
Shoemaker, Sydney (1986). Introspection and the self. Midwest Studies in Philosophy.   (Cited by 35 | Google)
Shusterman, Richard (2005). William James, somatic introspection, and care of the self. Philosophical Forum 36 (4):419–440.   (Google | More links)
Singer Jr, Edgar A. (1925). Concerning introspection: A reply. Journal of Philosophy 22 (26):711-716.   (Google)
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Abstract: I do not think that the world or the sciences would ever have suggested to me any philosophical problems. What has suggested philosophical problems to me is things which other philosophers have said about the world or the sciences. (G.E. Moore, 1942, p. 14)
Smith, Renée (2005). The transparency of qualia and the nature of introspection. Philosophical Writings 29:21-44.   (Google)
Smythies, John (1999). Consciousness and introspection: How we get to know the inner world. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (6):971-972.   (Google)
Abstract: We can in fact obtain scientific information about the contents of consciousness by the methods of introspectionist psychology. An example comes from the author's work on the stroboscopic patterns and from the way psychedelic drugs alter color perception
Smythies, J. R. (1993). The impact of contemporary neuroscience and introspection psychology on the philosophy of perception. In Edmond Leo Wright (ed.), New Representationalisms: Essays in the Philosophy of Perception. Brookfield: Avebury.   (Google)
Snyder, Douglas M. & Fast, K. (2004). Valid comparisons of suprathreshold sensations. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11.   (Google)
Sorensen, Roy A. (2009). Hearing silence: The perception and introspection of absences. In Matthew Nudds & Casey O'Callaghan (eds.), Sounds and Perception. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: in Sounds and Perception: New Philosophical Essays, ed. by Matthew Nudds and Casey O’Callaghan (Oxford University Press, forthcoming in 2008)
Spener, Maja H. (2003). Gilding and Staining the Mind: Introspection and the Metaphysics of Visual Phenomenology. Dissertation, King's College, University of London   (Google)
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Steiner, Rudolf (1999). The Philosophy of Freedom (the Philosophy of Spiritual Activity): The Basis for a Modern World Conception: Some Results of Introspective Observation Following the Methods of Natural Science. R. Steiner Press.   (Google)
Sully, James (1881). Illusions of introspection. Mind 6 (21):1-18.   (Google | More links)
ten Hoor, Marten (1932). A critical analysis of the concept of introspection. Journal of Philosophy 29 (12):322-331.   (Google | More links)
Thomas, Nigel J. T. (1989). Experience and theory as determinants of attitudes toward mental representation: The case of Knight Dunlap and the vanishing images of J.b. Watson. [Journal (Paginated)].   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Galton and subsequent investigators find wide divergences in people's subjective reports of mental imagery. Such individual differences might be taken to explain the peculiarly irreconcilable disputes over the nature and cognitive significance of imagery which have periodically broken out among psychologists and philosophers. However, to so explain these disputes is itself to take a substantive and questionable position on the cognitive role of imagery. This article distinguishes three separable issues over which people can be "for" or "against" mental images. Conflation of these issues can lead to theoretical differences being mistaken for experiential differences, even by theorists themselves. This is applied to the case of John B. Watson, who inaugurated a half-century of neglect of image psychology. Watson originally claimed to have vivid imagery; by 1913 he was denying the existence of images. This strange reversal, which made his behaviorism possible, is explicable as a "creative misconstrual" of Dunlap's "motor" theory of imagination
Thomasson, Amie L. (2003). Introspection and phenomenological method. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (3):239-54.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   It is argued that the work of Husserl offers a model for self-knowledge that avoids the disadvantages of standard introspectionist accounts and of a Sellarsian view of the relation between our perceptual judgements and derived judgements about appearances. Self-knowledge is based on externally directed knowledge of the world that is then subjected to a cognitive transformation analogous to the move from a statement to the activity of stating. Appearance talk is (contra Sellars) not an epistemically non-committal form of speech, but talk to which we are fully committed. However, it is a commitment to a certain kind of claim about our experiences, viewed as cognitive phenomena, after a process of transformation. Such reductive and hypostatizing transformations can exhibit the intentional structure of consciousness. Phenomenology thus gives a form of knowledge about our mental states that is first personal but not introspective knowledge in any philosophically problematic sense. The account offered is also, in key respects, dissimilar to Sellars's outer directed view of the origin of self-knowledge
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Abstract: Higher-order theories and neo-Brentanian theories of consciousness both consider conscious states to be states of which we have some sort of
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Abstract: in Sounds and Perception: New Philosophical Essays, ed. by Matthew Nudds and Casey O’Callaghan (Oxford University Press, forthcoming in 2008)
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Abstract: We model the forgetting of propositional variables in a modal logical context where agents become ignorant and are aware of each others’ or their own resulting ignorance. The resulting logic is sound and complete. It can be compared to variable-forgetting as abstraction from information, wherein agents become unaware of certain variables: by employing elementary results for bisimulation, it follows that beliefs not involving the forgotten atom(s) remain true
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Wozniak, Robert H. (ed.) (1884). Theoretical Roots of Early Behaviourism: Functionalism, the Critique of Introspection, and the Nature and Evolution of Consciousness. Routledge/Thoemmes Press.   (Google)
Abstract: While John B. Watson articulated the intellectual commitments of behaviorism with clarity and force, wove them into a coherent perspective, gave the perspective a name, and made it a cause, these commitments had adherents before him. To document the origins of behaviorism, this series collects the articles that set the terms of the behaviorist debate, includes the most important pre-Watsonian contributions to objectivism, and reprints the first full text of the new behaviorism. Contents: Functionalism, the Critque of Introspection, and the Nature and Evolution of Consciousness: Theoretical Roots of Early Behaviourism: An Anthology [1842-1914] Robert H. Wozniak (Ed) 360 pp Studies of Animal and Infant Behaviour. the Experimental and Comparative Roots of Early Behaviourism: An Anthology [1840-1911] Robert H. Wozniak (Ed) 412 pp An Introuduction to Comparative Psychology [1894 edition] Conway Lloyd Morgan 628 pp Comparative Physiology of the Brain and Comparative Psychology [1900] Jacques Loeb 342 pp Fundamental Laws of Human Behaviour. Lectures on the foundtions of Any Mental or Social Science [1911] Max F. Meyer 264 pp Behaviour. An Introduction to Comparative Psychology [1914 edition] John B. Watson 482 pp
Zemach, Eddy M. (1990). Churchland, introspection, and dualism. Philosophia 20 (December):3-13.   (Google | More links)
Zimmerman, Aaron Z. (ms). Infallible introspection.   (Google)
Zinck, Alexandra; Lodahl, Sanne & Frith, Chris D. (2009). Making a case for introspection. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):163-164.   (Google)
Zizzo, Daniel John (2004). Introspection and intuition in the decision sciences. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (2):274-275.   (Google)
Abstract: Self-experimentation is uncommon in the decision sciences, but mental experiments are common; for example, intuition and introspection are often used by theoretical economists as justifications for their models. While introspection can be useful for the generation of ideas, it can also be overused and become a comfortable illusion for the theorist and an obstacle for science

8.5b Verbal Reports and Heterophenomenology

Adair, John G. & Spinner, Barry (1981). Subjects' access to cognitive processes: Demand characteristics and verbal report. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 11 (1):31–52.   (Google | More links)
Adams, William A. (2006). Transpersonal heterophenomenology? Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (4):89-93.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: Anthony Freeman's article on transpersonal psychology cited Jorge Ferrer's criticism that while the field claims to be non-dualistic or 'post-Cartesian' (no subject -object or mind-body split), it is nevertheless hopelessly dualistic. . .Freeman proposes a way of salvation for transpersonal psychology by invoking Daniel Dennettapos;s concept of heterophenomenology, which is a third-person investigation of someone elseapos;s first-person experience (as reported). . .Freeman's proposal is a fine demonstration of lateral thinking, calling upon atheist Dennett in support of transpersonal and religious inquiry. Unfortunately, it is a solution analogous to searching for lost keys under the lamppost where the light is better
Albahari, Miri (2002). Can heterophenomenology ground a complete science of consciousness? Noetica.   (Google)
Beenfeldt, Christian (2008). A philosophical critique of heterophenomenology. Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (8):5-34.   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper Dennett's method of heterophenomenology is discussed. After a brief explanation of the method, three arguments in support of it are considered in turn. First, the argument from the possibility of error and self-delusion of the subject is found to ignore the panoply of intermediate position that one can take with regard to the epistemic status of first-personal knowledge. The argument is also criticized for employing an epistemic double-standard. Second, the argument from the neutrality of heterophenomenology is found to be defeated by the fact that, contrary to Dennett's claims, third-person, functionalist and instrumentalist assumptions substantially underpin and inform the method. Similarities between heterophenomenology and the Turing Test are furthermore explored, and it is shown that a weaker version of the neutrality claim also fails. Third, the argument from the appeal to the standard practice of science is shown to substantially rest on an equivocation on the term 'heterophenomenology' and is therefore rejected. Finally, it is suggested that the use of introspective reports is not inherently at odds with sound scientific procedures
Benoit, P. J. & Benoit, W. L. (1986). Consciousness: The mindlessness/mindfulness and verbal report controversies. Western Journal of Speech Communication 50:41-63.   (Google)
Bremer, Manuel (2006). Animal consciousness, anthromorphism and heterophenomenology. Philosophisches Jahrbuch 113 (2):397-410.   (Google)
Cytowic, Richard (2003). The clinician's paradox: Believing those you must not trust. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10.   (Google)
Dennett, Daniel C. (2007). Heterophenomenology reconsidered. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2).   (Google | More links)
Dennett, Daniel C. (1982). How to study human consciousness empirically, or, nothing comes to mind. Synthese 53 (2):159-80.   (Cited by 16 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Dennett, Daniel C. (2003). Who's on first? Heterophenomenology explained. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (9):19-30.   (Google)
Dienes, Zoltán (2004). Assumptions of subjective measures of unconscious mental states: Higher order thoughts and bias. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (9):25-45.   (Cited by 14 | Google)
Dokic, Jérôme & Pacherie, Elisabeth (2007). Too much ado about belief. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Three commitments guide Dennett’s approach to the study of consciousness. First, an ontological commitment to materialist monism. Second, a methodological commitment to what he calls ‘heterophenomenology.’ Third, a ‘doxological’ commitment that can be expressed as the view that there is no room for a distinction between a subject’s beliefs about how things seem to her and what things actually seem to her, or, to put it otherwise, as the view that there is no room for a reality/appearance distinction for consciousness. We investigate how Dennett’s third doxological commitment relates to his first two commitments and whether its acceptance should be seen as a mere logical consequence of acceptance of the first two. We will argue that this is not the case, that Dennett’s doxological commitment is in need of independent motivation, and that this independent motivation is not forthcoming
Dreyfus, Hubert L. & Kelly, Sean D. (2007). Heterophenomenology: Heavy-handed Sleight-of-hand. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2):45-55.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: We argue that heterophenomenology both over- and under-populates the intentional realm. For example, when one is involved in coping, one’s mind does not contain beliefs. Since the heterophenomenologist interprets all intentional commitment as belief, he necessarily overgenerates the belief contents of the mind. Since beliefs cannot capture the normative aspect of coping and perceiving, any method, such as heterophenomenology, that allows for only beliefs is guaranteed not only to overgenerate beliefs but also to undergenerate other kinds of intentional phenomena
Ericsson, K. A. (2003). Valid and non-reactive verbalization of thoughts during performance of tasks - towards a solution to the central problems of introspection as a source of scientific data. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (9-10):1-18.   (Google)
Falk, Arthur E. (1975). Learning to report one's introspections. Philosophy of Science 42 (September):223-241.   (Google | More links)
Goldman, A. (2004). Epistemology and the evidential status of introspective reports I. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (7-8):1-16.   (Google | More links)
Hartelius, G. (2006). All that glisters is not gold - heterophenomenology and transpersonal theory. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (6):63-77.   (Google)
Abstract: Anthony Freeman (2006) proposes that Dennett's heterophenomenology (HP) be fully integrated into transpersonal studies as a solution to the 'subtle Cartesianism' that Jorge Ferrer (2002) detects within the field. Methods virtually indistinguishable from HP are already in use within transpersonal research, so the issue of comparison lies deeper. On close analysis, Ferrer's approach cannot be situated within Dennett's (2003) data levels at all, for participatory transpersonalism conceives a profoundly different relationship between conscious subject and the world: a relational matrix of interacting subjects participating in the co- creation of the cosmos. HP, while valuable, is not adequate for a comprehensive study of consciousness. Its shortcomings can be illustrated by imagining an analogical discipline in the natural sciences: heterobotany. Limiting transpersonal inquiry to HP would represent a step backwards in the ongoing process of pioneering effective methods of consciousness research
Hurlburt, R. & Heavey, C. L. (2004). To beep or not to beep: Obtaining accurate reports about awareness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (7):113-128.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Marcel, Anthony J. (2003). Introspective report - trust, self-knowledge and science. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (9-10):167-186.   (Google)
Marbach, Eduard (2007). No heterophenomenology without autophenomenology: Variations on a theme of mine. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The paper assumes that the very source for an appropriate concept formation and categorization of the phenomena of consciousness is provided by pre-reflectively living through one’s own experiences (of perceiving, remembering, imagining, picturing, judging, etc.) and reflecting upon them. It tries to argue that without reflective auto-phenomenological theorizing about such phenomena, there is no prospect for a scientific study of consciousness doing fully justice to the phenomena themselves. To substantiate the point, a detailed reflective and descriptive analysis of re-presentational experiences is presented, an essential property of which is their containing in themselves components that can only be individuated on the basis of reflection by the experiencing subject him- or herself. For heterophenomenology to account for them, autophenomenology is therefore presupposed
Marbach, Eduard (1994). Troubles with heterophenomenology. In Roberto Casati, B. Smith & Stephen L. White (eds.), Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences. Holder-Pichler-Tempsky.   (Cited by 47 | Google)
Mcclure, John (1983). Telling more than they can know: The positivist account of verbal reports and mental processes. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 13 (1):111–128.   (Google | More links)
Nahmias, Eddy A. (2002). Verbal reports on the contents of consciousness: Reconsidering introspectionist methodology. Psyche 8 (21).   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Abstract: Doctors must now take a fifth vital sign from their patients: pain reports. I use this as a case study to discuss how different schools of psychology (introspectionism, behaviorism, cognitive psychology) have treated verbal reports about the contents of consciousness. After examining these differences, I suggest that, with new methods of mapping data about neurobiological states with behavioral data and with verbal reports about conscious experience, we should reconsider some of the introspectionists' goals and methods. I discuss examples from cognitive psychology, including pain researchers' attempts to develop self-reports of pain so that they can be, like other vital signs, reliable indicators of internal states.
Nisbett, Richard E. & Wilson, Timothy D. (1977). Telling more than we can know: Verbal reports on mental processes. Psychological Review 84:231-59.   (Cited by 2376 | Google | More links)
Overgaard, Morten (2001). The role of phenomenological reports in experiments on consciousness. Psycoloquy 12 (29):1-10.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Petitmengin, Claire (2006). Describing one's subjective experience in the second person: An interview method for the science of consciousness. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 5 (3-4).   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: This article presents an interview method which enables us to bring a person, who may not even have been trained, to become aware of his or her subjective experience, and describe it with great precision. It is focused on the difficulties of becoming aware of one’s subjective experience and describing it, and on the processes used by this interview technique to overcome each of these difficulties. The article ends with a discussion of the criteria governing the validity of the descriptions obtained, and then with a brief review of the functions of these descriptions
Piccinini, Gualtiero (2003). Data from introspective reports: Upgrading from common sense to science. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (9-10):141-156.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Introspective reports are used as sources of information about other minds, in both everyday life and science. Many scientists and philosophers consider this practice unjustified, while others have made the untestable assumption that introspection is a truthful method of private observation. I argue that neither skepticism nor faith concerning introspective reports are warranted. As an alternative, I consider our everyday, commonsensical reliance on each other’s introspective reports. When we hear people talk about their minds, we neither refuse to learn from nor blindly accept what they say. Sometimes we accept what we are told, other times we reject it, and still other times we take the report, revise it in light of what we believe, then accept the modified version. Whatever we do, we have (implicit) reasons for it. In developing a sound methodology for the scientific use of introspective reports, we can take our commonsense treatment of introspective reports and make it more explicit and rigorous. We can discover what to infer from introspective reports in a way similar to how we do it every day, but with extra knowledge, methodological care, and precision. Sorting out the use of introspective reports as sources of data is going to be a painstaking, piecemeal task, but it promises to enhance our science of the mind and brain.
Piccinini, Gualtiero (forthcoming). How to improve on heterophenomenology: The self-measurement methodology of first-person data. Journal of Consciousness Studies.   (Google)
Abstract: Heterophenomenology is a third-person methodology proposed by Daniel Dennett for using first-person reports as scientific evidence. I argue that heterophenomenology can be improved by making six changes: (i) setting aside consciousness, (ii) including other sources of first-person data besides first-person reports, (iii) abandoning agnosticism as to the truth value of the reports in favor of the most plausible assumptions we can make about what can be learned from the data, (iv) interpreting first-person reports (and other first-person behaviors) directly in terms of target mental states rather than in terms of beliefs about them, (v) dropping any residual commitment to incorrigibility of first-person reports, and (vi) recognizing that thirdperson methodology does have positive effects on scientific practices. When these changes are made, heterophenomenology turns into the self-measurement methodology of firstperson data that I have defended in previous papers.
Praetorius, Nini (2004). Intersubjectivity of cognition and language: Principled reasons why the subject may be Trusted. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3 (2):195-214.   (Google | More links)
Abstract:   The paper aims to show that scepticism concerning the status of first-person reports of mental states and their use as evidence in scientific cognitive research is unfounded. Rather, principled arguments suggest that the conditions for the intersubjectivity of cognition and description of publicly observable things apply equally for our cognition and description of our mental or internal states. It is argued that on these conditions relies the possibility of developing well-defined scientific criteria for distinguishing between first-person and third-person cognition and description. The paper concludes by outlining the consequences for cognitive research and for functional theories of mind
Radner, Daisie M. (1994). Heterophenomenology: Learning about the birds and the bees. Journal of Philosophy 91 (8):389-403.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Rich, Marvina C. (1979). Verbal reports on mental processes: Issues of accuracy and awareness. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 9 (1):29–37.   (Google | More links)
Roepstorff, Andreas (2003). Why trust the subject? Journal of Consciousness Studies 10.   (Google)
Roy, Jean-Michel (2007). Heterophenomenology and phenomenological skepticism. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2).   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper is an attempt to clarify and assess Dennett’s opinion about the relevance of the phenomenological tradition to contemporary cognitive science, focussing on the very idea of a phenomenological investigation. Dennett can be credited with four major claims on this topic: (1) Two kinds of phenomenological investigations must be carefully distinguished: autophenomenology and heterophenomenology; (2) autophenomenology is wrong, because it fails to overcome what might be called the problem of phenomenological scepticism; (3) the phenomenological tradition mainly derived from Husserl is based on an autophenomenological conception of phenomenology, and, consequently, can be of no help to contemporary cognitive science; (4) however, heterophenomenology is indispensable for obtaining an adequate theory of consciousness. In response to Dennett’s analysis, the paper develops two main counterclaims: (1) Although the traditional conception of phenomenology does indeed fit Dennett’s notion of autophenomenology, his sceptical arguments fail to rule out at least the possibility of a modified version of this traditional conception, such as the one defended in Roy et al. (Naturalizing Phenomenology, 1999); (2) the distinction between autophenomenology and heterophenomenology is at any rate misconceived, because, upon closer analysis, heterophenomenology proves to include the essential characteristics of autophenomenology
Soldati, Gianfranco (2007). Subjectivity in heterophenomenology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: I distinguish between naïve phenomenology and really existing phenomenology, a distinction that is too often ignored. As a consequence, the weaknesses inherent in naïve phenomenology are mistakenly attributed to phenomenology. I argue that the critics of naïve phenomenology have unwittingly adopted a number of precisely those weaknesses they wish to point out. More precisely, I shall argue that Dennett’s criticism of the naïve or auto-phenomenological conception of subjectivity fails to provide a better understanding of the intended phenomenon
Sytsma, Justin, Does heterophenomenology concede too much? Experiments on the folk theory of consciousness.   (Google)
Abstract: It is fairly common in the modern debates over qualia to find assumptions being made about the views of non-philosophers. It is often assumed that the concept is part of the folk theory of consciousness. In fact, even prominent skeptics about qualia will admit that their views run counter to common sense. I illustrate this by considering the work of Daniel Dennett, focusing on his standard articulation of the debate concerning his heterophenomenological method. While Dennett is often accused of not going far enough (excluding qualia from the catalog of what needs to be explained by a science of consciousness), I argue that he goes too far in accepting that folk psychological utterances should be interpreted in terms of beliefs about qualia. I support this contention by calling on the results of six empirical studies testing Dennett’s theory of the folk theory of consciousness
Thompson, David L. (2000). Phenomenology and heterophenomenology: Husserl and Dennett on reality and science. In Andrew Brook, Don Ross & David L. Thompson (eds.), Dennett's Philosophy: A Comprehensive Assessment. MIT Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Velmans, Max (2007). Heterophenomenology vs. critical phenomenology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2).   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Dennett’s heterophenomenology and the critical phenomenology that I outline may be thought of as competing accounts of a cautious approach to phenomenal description and method. One can be critical or cautious about how well or how reliably a subject can communicate his or her subjective experience in experimental settings, without for a moment doubting their existence or claiming them to be something completely different to how they seem. Given this, Dennett’s heterophenomenology with its accompanying “qualia denial” looks like nothing more than an attempt to shore up his counterintuitive, eliminativist philosophy of mind
Velmans, Max (ms). Heterophenomenogy versus critical phenomenology: A dialogue with Dan Dennett.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: ABSTRACT. The following is an email interchange that took place between Dan Dennett and myself in the period 14th to 28th June, 2001. The discussion tries to clarify some essential features of the "heterophenomenology" developed in his book Consciousness Explained (1996), and how this differs from a form of "critical phenomenology" implicit in my own book Understanding Consciousness (2000), and developed in my edited Investigating Phenomenal Consciousness: new methodologies and maps (2000). The departure point for the discussion is a paper posted on Dan's website that summarises a related debate between Dan, David Chalmers and Alvin Goldman (Dennett, 2001). To make the discussion easier to follow, the multiple embeddings have been removed (restoring the sequence in which the comments were written). I have also corrected a few typos and grammatical errors. However, the text of the emails remains exactly the same. In Round 1, I suggest that scientific investigations of consciousness are better described as a form of "critical phenomenology" that accepts conscious experiences to be real rather than as a "heterophenomenology" which remains neutral about or denies their existence. Dan replies that I have misunderstood his position - he doesn't deny that conscious experiences exist. Conscious experiences just don't have the first-person phenomenal properties that they are commonly thought to have and, in his view, science remains neutral about the nature of such properties. In Round 2, I agree with Dan that science initially remains neutral about how to understand the nature of conscious experiences. Nevertheless, the phenomenology of consciousness provides the data that scientists are trying to understand. A better understanding of data does not, in general, make the data disappear. I also ask, "if you remove the phenomena from phenomenal consciousness, in what sense is whatever remains "consciousness"? And, if one removes all the phenomenal content from what one takes consciousness to be, doesn't this amount to a denial of the existence of "consciousness" in any ordinary sense of this term? Dan's reply likens beliefs in phenomenal properties to the belief in evil spirits causing disease. He has no doubts that diseases such as whooping cough and tuberculosis are real, but this doesn't require him to believe in evil spirits. And, what's left, once one removes phenomenal properties, is what a zombie and a so-called conscious person have in common: a given set of functional properties that enable them to carry out the tasks we normally think of as conscious. In Round 3, I summarise our similarities and differences. We agree that first-person reports are not incorrigible and that third-person information may throw light on how to interpret them. We also agree that first-person reports are reports of "something", although we disagree about the nature of that something. I suggest that Dan is sceptical about first-person reports rather than heterophenomenologically "neutral" (e.g. when he likens belief in phenomenal properties to belief in evil spirits). While we agree that science is likely to deepen our understanding of consciousness, I repeat that, unlike the replacement of old theories by better theories, a deeper understanding of phenomena does not in general replace the phenomena themselves. Rather than third-person data replacing first-person reports, the former are required to make sense of the latter, making their relationship complementary and mutually irreducible. In fact, there are many cases where science takes the reality of first-person phenomenology seriously, for example in the extensive literature on pain and its alleviation. If this can't be squeezed into an exclusively third-person view of science, then we will just have to adjust our view of science - something that a "critical phenomenology" achieves at little cost. At the time of this editing, Dan has not replied. . Reference. Dennett, D. (2001) The fantasy of first-person science. http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/pubpage.htm
Velmans, Prof Max (ms). Heterophenomenology versus critical phenomenology.   (Google)
Abstract: Following an on-line dialogue with Dennett (Velmans, 2001) this paper examines the similarities and differences between heterophenomenology (HP) and critical phenomenology (CP), two competing accounts of the way that conscious phenomenology should be, and normally is incorporated into psychology and related sciences. Dennett’s heterophenomenology includes subjective reports of conscious experiences, but according to Dennett, first person conscious phenomenena in the form of “qualia” such as hardness, redness, itchiness etc. have no real existence. Consequently, subjective reports about such qualia should be understood as prescientific attempts to make sense of brain functioning that can be entirely understood in third person terms. I trace the history of this position in behaviourism (Watson, Skinner and Ryle) and early forms of physicalism and functionalism (Armstrong), and summarise some of the difficulties of this view. Critical phenomenology also includes a conventional, third person, scientific investigation of brain and behaviour that includes subjects’ reports of what they experience. CP is also cautious about the accuracy or completeness of subjective reports. However, unlike HP, CP does not assume that subjects are necessarily deluded about their experiences or doubt that these experiences can have real qualities that can, in principle, be described. Such experienced qualities cannot be exhaustively reduced to third-person accounts of brain and behaviour. CP is also reflexive, in it assumes experimenters to have first-person experiences that they can describe much as their subjects do. And crucially, experimenter’s third-person reports of others are based, in the first instance, on their own first-person experiences. CP is commonplace in psychological science, and given that it conforms both to scientific practice and common sense, I argue that there is little to recommend HP other than an attempt to shore up a counterintuitive, reductive philosophy of mind
White, Patricia D. (1980). Limitations on verbal reports of internal events: A refutation of Nisbett and Wilson and of Bem. Psychological Review 87:105-12.   (Google)

8.5c Phenomenology and Consciousness

Thompson, Evan; Lutz, A. & Cosmelli, D. (2005). Neurophenomenology: An introduction for neurophilosophers. In Andrew Brook & Kathleen Akins (eds.), Cognition and the Brain: The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 41 | Google)
Arvidson, P. Sven (1992). On the origin of organization in consciousness. Journal of the British Society of Phenomenology 23 (1):53-65.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Arvidson, P. Sven (2000). Transformations in consciousness: Continuity, the self and marginal consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (3):3-26.   (Cited by 18 | Google)
Baars, Bernard J. (1993). Putting the focus on the fringe: Three empirical cases. Journal of Consciousness Studies 2:126-36.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Barnes, Hazel E. (2006). Consciousness and digestion: Sartre and Neuroscience. Sartre Studies International 11 (1-2):117-132.   (Google)
Barresi, John (2004). Intentionality, consciousness and intentional relations: From constitutive phenomenology to cognitive science. In L. Embree (ed.), Gurwitsch's Relevance for Cognitive Science. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.   (Google)
Abstract: In this chapter I look closely at the intentionality of consciousness from a naturalistic perspective. I begin with a consideration of Gurwitsch's suggestive ideas about the role of acts of consciousness in constituting both the objects and the subjects of consciousness. I turn next to a discussion of how these ideas relate to my own empirical approach to intentional relations seen from a developmental perspective. This is followed by a discussion of some recent ideas in philosophical cognitive science on the intentionality of consciousness, both with respect to the objects and the subjects of consciousness. I show that these recent trends tend to naturalize intentionality and consciousness in directions compatible with the descriptive aspects of Gurwitsch's constitutive phenomenology
Bayne, Timothy J. (2004). Closing the gap: Some questions for neurophenomenology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3 (4):349-64.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   In his 1996 paper Neurophenomenology: A methodological remedy for the hard problem, Francisco Varela called for a union of Husserlian phenomenology and cognitive science. Varela''s call hasn''t gone unanswered, and recent years have seen the development of a small but growing literature intent on exploring the interface between phenomenology and cognitive science. But despite these developments, there is still some obscurity about what exactly neurophenomenology is. What are neurophenomenologists trying to do, and how are they trying to do it? To what extent is neurophenomenology a distinctive and unified research programme? In this paper I attempt to shed some light on these questions
Bergmann, Frithjof (1982). Sartre on the nature of consciousness. American Philosophical Quarterly 19 (April):153-162.   (Google)
Braddock, Glenn (2001). Beyond reflection in naturalized phenomenology. Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (11):3-16.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Brown, Steven Ravett (1999). Beyond the fringe: James, Gurwitsch, and the conscious horizon. Journal Of Mind And Behavior 20 (2):211-227.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: All our conscious experiences, linguistic and nonlinguistic, are bound up with and dependent on a background that is vague, unexpressed, and sometimes unconscious. The combination of William JamesÕs concept of "fringes" coupled with Aaron GurwitschÕs analysis of the field of consciousness provides a general structure in which to embed phenomenal descriptions, enabling fringe phenomena to be understood, in part, relative to other experiences. I will argue, drawing on examples from Drew LederÕs book, The Absent Body, that specific and detailed phenomena can and should be interrelated through JamesÕs and GurwitschÕs analyses. I am proposing first that phenomenological descriptions in general could benefit from explicit consideration of the context of the phenomena within the totality of the field of consciousness, and second, that establishing that context requires a general structural model of that field, similar to that provided by Gurwitsch
Brown, Steven (2008). Must phenomenology rest on paradox?: Implications of methodology-limited theories. Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (12):5-32.   (Google)
Abstract: Husserlian phenomenology depends upon a particular and limited set of related methodologies, which assume not merely abilities and results on the part of phenomenologists which have been severely criticized, but more profoundly, that mental contents are atomistic and independently manipulable. I will show not only that this assumption is mistaken and that questioning it undermines traditional phenomenological method, but that it leads to a paradox when turned upon itself which forces the rejection of a purely Husserlian phenomenology. More generally, any theory whose data is confined to the results of particular and limited methodologies is by that fact unable to investigate those methodologies, and is thus at best only able to function in a severely restricted realm
Brown, Steven Ravett (2004). Structural Phenomenology: An Empirically-Based Model of Consciousness. Dissertation, University of Oregon   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In this dissertation I develop a structural model of phenomenal consciousness that integrates contemporary experimental and theoretical work in philosophy and cognitive science. I argue that phenomenology must be “naturalized” and that it should be acknowledged as a major component of empirical research. I use this model to describe important phenomenal structures, and I then employ it to provide a detailed explication of tip-of-tongue phenomena. The primary aim of “structural phenomenology” is the creation of a general framework within which descriptions of experiences may be organized. The work of Husserl, Gurwitsch, the Gestalt psychologists, and many contemporary philosophers and cognitive scientists reveals several basic parameters underlying subjectivity. Chapter I argues that Husserlian methodology possesses problems both of praxis and of internal logic, and that its phenomenological descriptions cannot have the certainty he claimed. Consequently, an adequate phenomenology must incorporate empirical studies. This conclusion enables explicit transitions between empirical investigations and phenomenological insights. Chapter II introduces the theoretical framework underlying my model. I identify four parameters applicable to all experiences: 1) the degree of volitional emphasis with which something is experienced, i.e., the intensity of our focus on it, 2) the degree of non-volitional emphasis, i.e., the degree to which it is salient, 3) a variant of intentionality I term “directionality”, and 4) the property of recursion. Experiences are embedded within a complex set of relationships that unify and direct a layered phenomenal structure. I support these claims with evidence discovered over the past two centuries of research. Chapter III applies my model to the tip-of-tongue (TOT) state, in which difficulty remembering is accompanied by a sense of active searching. I show that a phenomenological description of the TOT experience is dependent on cognitive data, and that a phenomenological analysis is necessary to properly interpret these data. By showing how structural phenomenology offers a perspective from which to elucidate the results of experimental studies, I hope to clarify and establish the explicit role of introspection in empiricism, and of empiricism in phenomenology
Cairns, Dorion (2002). Phenomenology and present-day psychology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1 (1):69-77.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Carruthers, Peter (ms). Cartesian epistemology.   (Google)
Abstract: This paper argues that a Cartesian belief in the self-transparency of minds might actually be an innate aspect of our mind-reading faculty. But it acknowledges that some crucial evidence needed to establish this claim hasn’t been looked for or collected. What we require is evidence that a belief in the self-transparency of mind is universal to the human species. The paper closes with a call to anthropologists (and perhaps also developmental psychologists), who are in a position to collect such evidence, encouraging them to do so
Carman, Taylor (2005). On the inescapability of phenomenology. In David Woodruff Smith & Amie L. Thomasson (eds.), Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Chokr, N. N. (1992). Mind, consciousness, and cognition: Phenomenology vs cognitive science. Husserl Studies 9 (3):179-97.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Clegg, Joshua W. (2006). Phenomenology as foundational to the naturalized consciousness. Culture and Psychology 12 (3):340-351.   (Google)
Crowell, Steven G. (2002). Is there a phenomenological research program? Synthese 131 (3):419-444.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Deikman, Arthur (1996). 'I' = awareness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3:350-56.   (Cited by 12 | Google)
Depraz, Natalie; Varela, F. & Vermersch, Pierre (2003). On Becoming Aware: A Pragmatics of Experiencing. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 50 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Searches for the sources and means for a disciplined practical approach to exploring human experience.
Depraz, Natalie; Varela, Francisco & Vermersch, Pierre (2003). The basic cycle. In Natalie Depraz, Francisco J. Varela & Pierre Vermersch (eds.), On Becoming Aware: A Pragmatics of Experiencing. John Benjamins.   (Google)
Depraz, Natalie; Varela, F. & Vermersch, Pierre (2000). The gesture of awareness: An account of its structural dynamics. In Max Velmans (ed.), Investigating Phenomenal Consciousness: New Methodologies and Maps. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 27 | Google)
Depraz, N. (2003). The philosophic challenge. In Natalie Depraz, Francisco J. Varela & Pierre Vermersch (eds.), On Becoming Aware: A Pragmatics of Experiencing. Advances in Consciousness Research.   (Google)
de Quincey, Christian (2000). Intersubjectivity: Exploring consciousness from the second-person perspective. Journal of Transpersonal Psychology 32 (2):135-155.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Dreyfus, Hubert L. (ms). A phenomenology of skill acquisition as the basis for a Merleau-Pontian nonrepresentational cognitive science.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Dreyfus, Hubert L. (2001). Phenomenological description versus rational reconstruction. Revue Internationale de Philosophie 55 (216):181-196.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Dreyfus, Hubert L. (1999). The primacy of phenomenology over logical analysis: A critique of Searle. Philosophical Topics 27 (2).   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Drummond, John J. (2007). Phenomenology: Neither auto- nor hetero- be. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Dennett’s contrast between auto- and hetero-phenomenology is badly drawn, primarily because Dennett identifies phenomenologists as introspective psychologists. The contrast I draw between phenomenology and hetero-phenomenology is not in terms of the difference between a first-person, introspective perspective and a third-person perspective but rather in terms of the difference between two third-person accounts – a descriptive phenomenology and an explanatory psychology – both of which take the first-person perspective into account
Edie, James M. (1970). William James and phenomenology. Review of Metaphysics 23 (March):481-526.   (Cited by 25 | Google)
Ellis, Ralph D. (1986). An Ontology of Consciousness. Kluwer.   (Cited by 46 | Google)
Ellis, Ralph D. (1983). Phenomenological psychology and the empirical observation of consciousness. International Philosophical Quarterly 23 (June):191-204.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Embree, Lester (2006). Direct and indirect consciousness. Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 37 (1):1-8.   (Google)
Fisette, Denis (2003). Descriptive phenomenology and the problem of consciousness. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 29.   (Google)
Gallagher, Shaun (1997). Mutual enlightenment: Recent phenomenology in cognitive science. Journal of Consciousness Studies 4 (3):195-214.   (Cited by 40 | Google | More links)
Gallagher, Shaun (2003). Phenomenology and experimental design: Toward a phenomenologically enlightened experimental science. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (9-10):85-99.   (Cited by 14 | Google)
Gallagher, Shaun (online). Phenomenological and experimental research on embodied experience.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Abstract: In recent years there has been some hard-won but still limited agreement that phenomenology may be of central importance to the cognitive sciences. This realization comes in the wake of dismissive gestures made by philosophers of mind like Dennett (1991), who mistakenly associates phenomenological method with the worst forms of introspection. For very different reasons, resistance can also be found on the phenomenological side of this issue. There are many thinkers well versed in the Husserlian tradition who do not even want to consider the usefulness of phenomenology for enlightening the sciences of the mind. For them cognitive science is simply too computational or too reductionistic to be seriously considered as capable of explaining experience or consciousness. [1] This is surprising in light of the fact that a highly respected phenomenologist like Merleau-Ponty was integrating phenomenological analyses with considerations drawn from the empirical sciences of psychology and neurology long before cognitive science was constructed as a framework to include just those aspects of psychology and neurology that focus on cognitive experience. Merleau-Ponty aside, philosophers on both sides of this issue have only gradually come to acknowledge the possibility that phenomenology may be directly relevant for a scientific understanding of cognition. Sometimes the empirical scientists themselves have arrived at this conclusion even before, and in spite of the philosophers. Francisco Varela's work on neurophenomenology provides an important example (Varela, 1996). Even the hardest of hard scientists have made peace offerings to phenomenology. Recently, for example, the neuroscientist Jean-Pierre Changeux declares that his purpose "is not to go to war against phenomenology; to the contrary, [he wants] to see what constructive contribution it can make to our knowledge of the psyche, acting in concert with the neurosciences" (Changeux and Ricoeur, 2000, p. 85)
Gallagher, Shaun (2003). Phenomenology and neurophenomenology: An interview with Shaun Gallagher. Aluze 2:92-102.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Gallagher, Shaun (2007). Phenomenological approaches to consciousness. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Gallagher, Shaun & Varela, F. (2003). Redrawing the map and resetting the time: Phenomenology and the cognitive sciences. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 29.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Galin, David (1996). The structure of subjective experience: Sharpen the concepts and terminology. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness. MIT Press.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Gurwitsch, Aron (1966). Studies in Phenomenology and Psychology. Northwestern University Press.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Gurwitsch, Aron (1964). The Field of Consciousness. Duquesne University Press.   (Cited by 208 | Google)
Gurwitsch, Aron (1955). The phenomenological and the psychological approach to consciousness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 15 (March):303-319.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Hanna, Robert & Thompson, Evan (2003). Neurophenomenology and the spontaneity of consciousness. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 29.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Huemer, Wolfgang (2004). The Constitution of Consciousness. Routledge.   (Google)
Husserl, Edmund G. (1981). Pure phenomenology, its method, and its field of investigation. In Peter McCormick & Frederick A. Elliston (eds.), Husserl: Shorter Works. University of Notre Dame Press.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Husserl, Edmund G. (1937). The way into phenomenological transcendental philosophy from psychology. In The Crisis of European Sciences.   (Google)
Ihde, Don (1977). Experimental Phenomenology. Putnam.   (Cited by 87 | Google | More links)
Jopling, David A. (1996). Sub-phenomenology. Human Studies 19 (2):153-73.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper argues that cognitive psychology's practice of explaining mental processes in terms which avoid invoking phenomenology, and the person-level self-conception with which it is associated in common sense psychology, leads to a hybrid Cartesian dualism. Because phenomenology is considered to be fundamentally irrelevant in any scientific explanation of the mind, the person-level is regarded as scientifically invisible: it is a ghost-like housing for sub-personal computational cognition. The problem of explaining how the sub-personal and sub-phenomenological machinery of mind is related to person-level experience is as troublesome for cognitive psychology as the problem Descartes faced in explaining how the ghost (the non-corporeal mind) is related to the machine (the material body).This paper outlines the historical roots of cognitive dualism, showing how it has come to recapitulate a number of puzzling conceptual dichotomies that have hindered scientific and philosophical psychology since Kantian constructivism. It then defends the view that cognitive psychology's commitment to the sub-personal explanatory level leads to exaggerated deflationary claims about the explanatory significance of phenomenology, and the personlevel framework. It is argued that phenomenological description must function as a constraint upon, and guide for, theory formation in cognitive psychology (as illustrated in the work of the cognitive neuro-psychologist A.R. Luria). Phenomenology must be brought into a kind of reflective equilibrium with the cognitive and neuro-sciences
Kelly, Sean D. (2002). Husserl and phenomenology. In Robert C. Solomon & D. Sherman (eds.), Blackwell Guide to Continental Philosophy. Blackwell.   (Google)
Kern, I. & Marbach, Eduard (2001). Understanding the representational mind: A prerequisite for intersubjectivity proper. Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (5-7):69-82.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Klaassen, Pim; Rietveld, Erik & Topal, Julien (2010). Inviting complementary perspectives on situated normativity in everyday life. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (1):53-73.   (Google)
Abstract: In everyday life, situations in which we act adequately yet entirely without deliberation are ubiquitous. We use the term “situated normativity” for the normative aspect of embodied cognition in skillful action. Wittgenstein’s notion of “directed discontent” refers to a context-sensitive reaction of appreciation in skillful action. Extending this notion from the domain of expertise to that of adequate everyday action, we examine phenomenologically the question of what happens when skilled individuals act correctly with instinctive ease. This question invites exploratory contributions from a variety of perspectives complementary to the philosophical/ phenomenological one, including cognitive neuroscience, neurodynamics and psychology. Along such lines we try to make the normative aspect of adequate immediate action better accessible to empirical research. After introducing the idea that “valence” is a forerunner of directed discontent, we propose to make progress on this by first pursuing a more restricted exploratory question, namely, ‘what happens in the first few hundred milliseconds of the development of directed discontent?’
Koestenbaum, Peter (1962). The sense of subjectivity. Review of Existential Psychology 2:47-65.   (Google)
Kriegel, Uriah (2007). The phenomenologically manifest. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2):115-136.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Disputes about what is phenomenologically manifest in conscious experience have a way of leading to deadlocks with remarkable immediacy. Disputants reach the foot-stomping stage of the dialectic more or less right after declaring their discordant views. It is this fact, I believe, that leads some to heterophenomenology and the like attempts to found Consciousness Studies on purely third-person grounds. In this paper, I explore the other possible reaction to this fact, namely, the articulation of methods for addressing phenomenological disputes. I suggest two viable methods, of complementary value, which I call “the method of contrast” and “the method of knowability.”
Lind, Richard W. (1986). Does the unconscious undermine phenomenology? Inquiry 29 (September):325-344.   (Google)
Lind, Richard W. (1996). Micro-phenomenology: Toward a hypothetico-inductive science of experience. International Philosophical Quarterly 36 (4):429-42.   (Google)
Lohmar, Dieter (2006). Mirror neurons and the phenomenology of intersubjectivity. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 5 (1):5-16.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The neurological discovery of mirror neurons is of eminent importance for the phenomenological theory of intersubjectivity. G. Rizzolatti and V. Gallese found in experiments with primates that a set of neurons in the premotor cortex represents the visually registered movements of another animal. The activity of these mirror neurons presents exactly the same pattern of activity as appears in the movement of one's own body. These findings may be extended to other cognitive and emotive functions in humans. I show how these neurological findings might be “translated” phenomenologically into our own experienced sensations, feelings and volitions
Lutz, Antoine & Thompson, Evan (2003). Neurophenomenology. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (9-10):31-52.   (Cited by 55 | Google | More links)
Abstract: _sciousness called ‘neurophenomenology’ (Varela 1996) and illustrates it with a_ _recent pilot study (Lutz et al., 2002). At a theoretical level, neurophenomenology_ _pursues an embodied and large-scale dynamical approach to the_ _neurophysiology of consciousness (Varela 1995; Thompson and Varela 2001;_ _Varela and Thompson 2003). At a methodological level, the neurophenomeno-_ _logical strategy is to make rigorous and extensive use of first-person data about_ _subjective experience as a heuristic to describe and quantify the large-scale_ _neurodynamics of consciousness (Lutz 2002). The paper foocuses on_ _neurophenomenology in relation to three challenging methodological issues_ _about incorporating first-person data into cognitive neuroscience: (i) first-person_ _reports can be biased or inaccurate; (ii) the process of generating first-person_ _reports about an experience can modify that experience; and (iii) there is an ‘ex-_ _planatory gap’ in our understanding of how to relate first-person, phenomeno-_ _logical data to third-person, biobehavioural data._
Lutz, Antoine & Thompson, Evan (2003). Neurophenomenology - integrating subjective experience and brain dynamics in the neuroscience of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (9-10):31-52.   (Cited by 54 | Google)
Lutz, Antoine (2002). Toward a neurophenomenology as an account of generative passages: A first empirical case study. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1 (2):133-67.   (Cited by 63 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   This paper analyzes an explicit instantiation of the program of neurophenomenology in a neuroscientific protocol. Neurophenomenology takes seriously the importance of linking the scientific study of consciousness to the careful examination of experience with a specific first-person methodology. My first claim is that such strategy is a fruitful heuristic because it produces new data and illuminates their relation to subjective experience. My second claim is that the approach could open the door to a natural account of the structure of human experience as it is mobilized in itself in such methodology. In this view, generative passages define the type of circulation which explicitly roots the active and disciplined insight the subject has about his/her experience in a biological emergent process
MacDonald, Paul S. (2001). Current approaches to phenomenology. Inquiry 44 (1):101-124.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
MacLennan, Bruce J. (1995). The investigation of consciousness through phenomenology and neuroscience. In Joseph E. King & Karl H. Pribram (eds.), Proceedings Scale in Conscious Experience: Third Appalachian Conference on Behavioral Neurodynamics.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The principal problem of consciousness is how brain processes cause subjective awareness. Since this problem involves subjectivity, ordinary scientific methods, applicable only to objective phenomena, cannot be used. Instead, by parallel application of phenomenological and scientific methods, we may establish a correspondence between the subjective and the objective. This correspondence is effected by the construction of a theoretical entity, essentially an elementary unit of consciousness, the intensity of which corresponds to electrochemical activity in a synapse. Dendritic networks correspond to causal dependencies between these subjective units. Therefore, the structure of conscious experience is derived from synaptic connectivity. This parallel phenomenal/neural analysis provides a framework for the investigation of a number of problems, including sensory inversions, the unity of consciousness, and the nature of nonhuman consciousness
Mangan, Bruce (2007). Cognition, fringe consciousness, and the legacy of William James. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell.   (Google)
Mangan, Bruce (1993). Taking phenomenology seriously: The "fringe" and its implication for cognitive research. Consciousness and Cognition 2:89-108.   (Cited by 72 | Google)
Martin, Wayne M. (2005). Bubbles and skulls: The phenomenological structure of self-consciousness in dutch still-life painting. In M. Wrathal & Hubert L. Dreyfus (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Phenomenology and Existentialism. Blackwell.   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper I investigate the representation of self-consciousness in the still life tradition in the Netherlands around the time of Descartes’ residence there. I treat the paintings of this tradition as both a phenomenological resource and as a phenomenological undertaking in their own right. I begin with an introductory overview of the still life tradition, with particular attention to semiotic structures characteristic of the vanitas still life. I then focus my analysis on the representation of self-consciousness in this tradition, identifying both a Cartesian mode of representation of self-consciousness but also a counter trend
Marbach, Eduard (1993). Mental Representation and Consciousness: Toward a Phenomenological Theory of Representation and Reference. Kluwer.   (Cited by 22 | Google)
Abstract: The book makes a direct contribution to the connection between phenomenology and cognitive science.
Marbach, Eduard (2000). The place for an ego in current research. In Dan Zahavi (ed.), Exploring the Self: Philosophical and Psychopathological Perspectives on Self-Experience. John Benjamins.   (Google)
Marbach, Eduard (1996). Understanding the representational mind: A phenomenological perspective. Human Studies 19 (2):137-52.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper reflects on the relationship between Husserlian phenomenology and scientific psychology. It tries to show how phenomenological results have relevance and validity for present-day cognitive developmental psychology by arguing that consciousness matters in the study of the representational mind. The paper presents some methodological remarks concerning empirical or applied phenomenology; it describes the conception of an exploratory developmental study with 3 to 9-year-old children viewing a complex pictorial display; it then illustrates how a phenomenological interpretation of the data works; in conclusion, it sketches a view of realism about conscious experiences which is taken to be inherent in the phenomenological perspective of understanding the representational mind
Mathiesen, Kay (2005). Collective consciousness. In David Woodruff Smith & Amie L. Thomasson (eds.), Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press.   (Google)
McIntyre, Ronald & Smith, David Woodruff (1989). Theory of intentionality. In William R. McKenna & J. N. Mohanty (eds.), Husserl's Phenomenology: A Textbook. University Press of America.   (Google)
Abstract: §1. Intentionality; §2. Husserl's Phenomenological Conception of Intentionality; §3. The Distinction between Content and Object; §4. Husserl's Theory of Content: Noesis and Noema; §5. Noema and Object; §6. The Sensory Content of Perception; §7. The Internal Structure of Noematic Sinne; §8. Noema and Horizon; §9. Horizon and Background Beliefs
Mensch, James R. (2000). An objective phenomenology: Husserl sees colors. Journal of Philosophical Research 25 (January):231-260.   (Google)
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice (1967). The Structure of Behavior. Beacon Press.   (Cited by 247 | Google)
Nelson, Paul A. (1998). Consciousness as reflexive shadow: An operational psychophenomenological model. Imagination, Cognition and Personality 17:215-228.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Noë, Alva (2007). The critique of pure phenomenology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2).   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The topic of this paper is phenomenology. How should we think of phenomenology – the discipline or activity of investigating experience itself – if phenomenology is to be a genuine source of knowledge? This is related to the question whether phenomenology can make a contribution to the empirical study of human or animal experience. My own view is that it can. But only if we make a fresh start in understanding what phenomenology is and can be
Overgaard, Morten (2004). On the naturalizing of phenomenology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3 (4):365-79.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   In the attempt to construct a scientific approach to consciousness, it has been proposed that transcendental phenomenology or phenomenological psychology be introduced into the framework of cognitive neuroscience. In this article, the consequences of such an approach in terms of basic assumptions, methods for the collection of data, and evaluation of the collected data are discussed. Especially, the proposed notions of mutual constraint and the second perso are discussed. It is concluded that even though naturalising of phenomenology might not prove impossible, the projec has not yet found a coherent basic ground
Parnas, Josef & Zahavi, Dan (1998). Phenomenal consciousness and self-awareness: A phenomenological critique of representational theory. Journal of Consciousness Studies 5 (5-6):687-705.   (Google)
Pekala, Ronald J. & Wenger C. F., Levine R. L. (1985). Individual differences in phenomenological experience: States of consciousness as a function of absorption. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 48:125-32.   (Cited by 12 | Google)
Pekala, Ronald J. & Levine, R. L. (1982). Mapping consciousness: Development of an empirical-phenomenological approach. Imagination, Cognition and Personality 1:29-47.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Petit, Jean-Luc (1999). Constitution by movement: Husserl in light of recent neurobiological findings. In Naturalizing Phenomenology. Stanford: Stanford University Press.   (Cited by 12 | Google)
Reber, Rolf; Wurtz, P. & Zimmermann, Thomas E. (2004). Exploring "fringe" consciousness: The subjective experience of perceptual fluency and its objective bases. Consciousness and Cognition 13 (1):47-60.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Reiser, Oliver L. (1927). A phenomenological interpretation of physico-chemical configurations and conscious structures. Journal of Philosophy 24 (14):373-385.   (Google | More links)
Reiser, Oliver L. (1927). A phenomenological interpretation of physicochemical configurations and conscious structures: Part II. Journal of Philosophy 24 (15):404-415.   (Google | More links)
Rietveld, Erik (2008). Situated normativity: The normative aspect of embodied cognition in unreflective action. Mind 117 (468):973-1001.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In everyday life we often act adequately, yet without deliberation. For instance, we immediately obtain and maintain an appropriate distance from others in an elevator. The notion of normativity implied here is a very basic one, namely distinguishing adequate from inadequate, correct from incorrect, or better from worse in the context of a particular situation. In the first part of this paper I investigate such ‘situated normativity’ by focusing on unreflective expert action. More particularly, I use Wittgenstein’s examples of craftsmen (tailors and architects) absorbed in action to introduce situated normativity. Situated normativity can be understood as the normative aspect of embodied cognition in unreflective skillful action. I develop Wittgenstein’s insight that a peculiar type of affective behaviour, ‘directed discontent’, is essential for getting things right without reflection. Directed discontent is a reaction of appreciation in action and is introduced as a paradigmatic expression of situated normativity. In the second part I discuss Wittgenstein’s ideas on the normativity of what he calls ‘blind’ rule-following and the ‘bedrock’ of immediate action. What matters for understanding the normativity of (even ‘blind’) rule-following, is not that one has the capacity for linguistic articulation or reflection but that one is reliably participating in a communal custom. In the third part I further investigate the complex relationships between unreflective skillful action, perception, emotion, and normativity. Part of this entails an account of the link between normativity at the level of the expert’s socio-cultural practice and the individual’s situated and lived normativity.
Rietveld, Erik (2008). The Skillful Body as a Concernful System of Possible Actions: Phenomena and Neurodynamics. Theory & Psychology 18 (3):341-361.   (Google)
Abstract: For Merleau-Ponty,consciousness in skillful coping is a matter of prereflective ‘I can’ and not explicit ‘I think that.’ The body unifies many domain-specific capacities. There exists a direct link between the perceived possibilities for action in the situation (‘affordances’) and the organism’s capacities. From Merleau-Ponty’s descriptions it is clear that in a flow of skillful actions, the leading ‘I can’ may change from moment to moment without explicit deliberation. How these transitions occur, however, is less clear. Given that Merleau-Ponty suggested that a better understanding of the self-organization of brain and behavior is important, I will re-read his descriptions of skillful coping in the light of recent ideas on neurodynamics. Affective processes play a crucial role in evaluating the motivational significance of objects and contribute to the individual’s prereflective responsiveness to relevant affordances.
Searle, John R. (2000). Limits of phenomenology. In Mark A. Wrathall & Jeff E. Malpas (eds.), Heidegger Coping and Cognitive Science. MIT Press.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Siewert, Charles (2007). In favor of (plain) phenomenology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2).   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Plain phenomenology explains theoretically salient mental or psychological distinctions with an appeal to their first-person applications. But it does not assume (as does heterophenomenology) that warrant for such first-person judgment is derived from an explanatory theory constructed from the third-person perspective. Discussions in historical phenomenology can be treated as plain phenomenology. This is illustrated by a critical consideration of Brentano’s account of consciousness, drawing on some ideas in early Husserl. Dennett’s advocacy of heterophenomenology on the grounds of its supposed “neutrality” does not show it is preferable to plain phenomenology. In fact the latter is more neutral in ways we ought to want, and permits a desirable (and desirably critical) use of first-person reflection that finds no place in the former
Smith, David Woodruff & Thomasson, Amie L. (2003). Introduction. In David Woodruff Smith & Amie L. Thomasson (eds.), Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Smith, Joel (2005). Merleau-ponty and the phenomenological reduction. Inquiry 48 (6):553-571.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: _reduction in favour of his existentialist account of être au monde. I show that whilst Merleau-Ponty _ _rejected, what he saw as, the transcendental idealist context in which Husserl presents the _ _reduction, he nevertheless accepts the heart of it, the epoché, as a methodological principle. _ _Contrary to a number of Merleau-Ponty scholars, être au monde is perfectly compatible with the _ _epoché and Merleau-Ponty endorses both. I also argue that it is a mistake to think that Merleau-_ _Ponty’s liberal use of the results of empirical psychology signify a rejection of the epoché. A proper _ _understanding of his views on the relation between phenomenology and psychology shows that, at _ _least in Merleau-Ponty’s eyes, the methods of phenomenology and the empirical sciences are _ _largely similar. I conclude that we have every reason to think that Merleau-Ponty accepted _ _Husserl’s demand that the phenomenologist place the world in brackets._
Smith, David Woodruff (2000). Ontological phenomenology. In The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Volume 7: Modern Philosophy. Charlottesville: Philosophy Doc Ctr.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Smith, David Woodruff (ed.) (2005). Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Philosophical work on the mind flowed in two streams through the 20th century: phenomenology and analytic philosophy. This volume aims to bring them together again, by demonstrating how work in phenomenology may lead to significant progress on problems central to current analytic research, and how analytical philosophy of mind may shed light on phenomenological concerns. Leading figures from both traditions contribute specially written essays on such central topics as consciousness, intentionality, perception, action, self-knowledge, temporal awareness, and mental content. Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind demonstrates that these different approaches to the mind should not stand in opposition to each other, but can be mutually illuminating
Smith, David Woodruff (2004). Return to consciousness. In David Woodruff Smith (ed.), Mind World: Essays in Phenomenology and Ontology. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Stevens, R. (2000). Phenomenological approaches to the study of conscious awareness. In Max Velmans (ed.), Investigating Phenomenal Consciousness: New Methodologies and Maps. John Benjamins.   (Google)
Thompson, Evan (2001). Empathy and consciousness. Journal Of Consciousness Studies 8 (5-7):1-32.   (Cited by 54 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This article makes five main points. (1) Individual human consciousness is formed in the dynamic interrelation of self and other, and therefore is inherently intersubjective. (2) The concrete encounter of self and other fundamentally involves empathy, under- stood as a unique and irreducible kind of intentionality. (3) Empathy is the precondi- tion (the condition of possibility) of the science of consciousness. (4) Human empathy
Thompson, Evan (2004). Life and mind: From autopoiesis to neurophenomenology. A tribute to francisco Varela. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3 (4):381-398.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   This talk, delivered at De l''autopoièse à la neurophénoménologie: un hommage à Francisco Varela; from autopoiesis to neurophenomenology: a tribute to Francisco Varela, June 18–20, at the Sorbonne in Paris, explicates several links between Varela''s neurophenomenology and his biological concept of autopoiesis
Thompson, Evan (forthcoming). Neurophenomenology and contemplative experience. In Philip Clayton (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Science and Religion. Oup.   (Google)
Abstract: Scientific investigation of the mind, known since the nineteen-seventies as ‘cognitive science’, is an interdisciplinary field of research comprising psychology, neuroscience, linguistics, computer science, artificial intelligence, and philosophy of mind. The presence of philosophy in this list is telling. Cognitive science, although institutionally well established, is not a theoretically settled field, unlike molecular biology or high-energy physics. Rather, it includes a variety of competing research programmes - the computational theory of mind (also known as classical cognitive science), connectionism, and dynamical and embodied approaches - whose underlying conceptions of mentality and its relation to biology, on the one hand, and to culture, on the other, are often strikingly different (see Clark, 2001, for a useful overview)
Thompson, Evan & Zahavi, Dan (2007). Phenomenology. In P.D. Zelazo, Morris Moscovitch & Evan Thompson (eds.), Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness. Cambridge.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Current scientific research on consciousness aims to understand how consciousness arises from the workings of the brain and body, as well as the relations between conscious experience and cognitive processing. Clearly, to make progress in these areas, researchers cannot avoid a range of conceptual issues about the nature and structure of consciousness, such as the following: What is the relation between intentionality and consciousness? What is the relation between self-awareness and consciousness? What is the temporal structure of conscious experience? What is it like to imagine or visualize something, and how is this type of experience different from perception? How is bodily experience related to self-consciousness? Such issues have been addressed in detail in the philosophical tradition of phenomenology, inaugurated by Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) and developed by numerous other philosophers throughout the 20th century. This chapter provides an introduction to this tradition and its way of approaching issues about consciousness. We first discuss some features of phenomenological methodology and then present some of the most important, influential, and enduring phenomenological proposals about various aspects of consciousness. These aspects include intentionality, self-awareness and the first-person perspective, time-consciousness, embodiment, and intersubjectivity. We also highlight a few ways of linking phenomenology and cognitive
Thompson, Evan (2004). The Problem of Consciousness: New Essays in Phenomenological Philosophy of Mind. Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
van Gelder, Tim (1999). Wooden iron? Husserlian phenomenology meets cognitive science. In Jean Petitot, Franscisco J. Varela, Barnard Pacoud & Jean-Michel Roy (eds.), Naturalizing Phenomenology. Stanford University Press.   (Cited by 20 | Google)
Varela, F. (2001). Intimate distances: Fragments for a phenomenology of organ transplantation. Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (5-7):259-271.   (Cited by 20 | Google)
Varela, F. (1995). Neurophenomenology: A methodological remedy for the hard problem. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (4):330-49.   (Cited by 248 | Annotation | Google)
Vernon, R. Fox (2005). Peering into the foundations of inquiry: An ontology of conscious experience along Husserlian lines. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 25 (2):280-300.   (Google)
Wait, Eldon C. (2002). Reconciling descriptions of consciousness from within and from without. In Analecta Husserliana: The Yearbook of Phenomenological Research Vol LXXVII. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Pub.   (Google)
Yoshimi, Jeffrey (2007). Mathematizing phenomenology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (3).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Husserl is well known for his critique of the “mathematizing tendencies” of modern science, and is particularly emphatic that mathematics and phenomenology are distinct and in some sense incompatible. But Husserl himself uses mathematical methods in phenomenology. In the first half of the paper I give a detailed analysis of this tension, showing how those Husserlian doctrines which seem to speak against application of mathematics to phenomenology do not in fact do so. In the second half of the paper I focus on a particular example of Husserl’s “mathematized phenomenology”: his use of concepts from what is today called dynamical systems theory
Zahavi, Dan (2001). Beyond empathy: Phenomenological approaches to intersubjectivity. Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (5-7):151-167.   (Cited by 26 | Google)
Zahavi, Dan (2002). First-person thoughts and embodied self-awareness: Some reflections on the relation between recent analytic philosophy and cognitive science. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1 (1):7-26.   (Google)
Abstract:   The article examines some of the main theses about self-awareness developed in recent analytic philosophy of mind (especially the work of Bermúdez), and points to a number of striking overlaps between these accounts and the ones to be found in phenomenology. Given the real risk of unintended repetitions, it is argued that it would be counterproductive for philosophy of mind to ignore already existing resources, and that both analytical philosophy and phenomenology would profit from a more open exchange
Zahavi, Dan (2007). Killing the straw man: Dennett and phenomenology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Can phenomenology contribute to the burgeoning science of consciousness? Dennett’s reply would probably be that it very much depends upon the type of phenomenology in question. In my paper I discuss the relation between Dennett’s heterophenomenology and the type of classical philosophical phenomenology that one can find in Husserl, Scheler and Merleau-Ponty. I will in particular be looking at Dennett’s criticism of classical phenomenology. How vulnerable is it to Dennett’s criticism, and how much of a challenge does his own alternative constitute? I will argue that there are some rather marked differences between these two approaches to consciousness, but as I also hope to make clear, Dennett’s own account of where the differences are located is off target and ultimately based on a somewhat flawed conception of what classical phenomenology amounts to
Zahavi, Dan (2004). Phenomenology and the project of naturalization. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3 (4):331-47.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   In recent years, more and more people have started talking about the necessity of reconciling phenomenology with the project of naturalization. Is it possible to bridge the gap between phenomenological analyses and naturalistic models of consciousness? Is it possible to naturalize phenomenology? Given the transcendental philosophically motivated anti-naturalism found in many phenomenologists such a naturalization proposal might seem doomed from the very start, but in this paper I will examine and evaluate some possible alternatives
Zahavi, Dan (2008). The mind without, the world within. Synthese 160 (3).   (Google | More links)
Zahavi, Dan (2002). The three concepts of consciousness in the logische untersuchungen. Husserl Studies 18 (1):51-64.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)

8.5d Eastern Approaches to Consciousness

Śaṅkarācārya, (1962). Ātmabodhaḥ: Self-Knowledge. Madras, Sri Ramakrishna Math.   (Google)
Śaṅkarācārya, (1996). Upadeśa Sāhasri: Thousand Guidelines to Self-Knowledge. Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan.   (Google)
Austin, James H. (1998). Zen and the Brain: Toward an Understanding of Meditation and Consciousness. MIT Press.   (Cited by 111 | Google | More links)
Barendregt, Henk (online). Buddhist phenomenology.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Barendregt, Henk (forthcoming). The abidhamma model of consciousness and its consequences. In M.G.T. Kwee, K.J. Gergen & F. Koshikawa (eds.), Buddhist Psychology: Practice, Research & Theory. Taos Institute Publishing, Taos, New Mexico.   (Google)
Chennakesavan, Sarasvati (1954). Mind and consciousness - a comparison of indian and western views. Philosophical Quarterly (India) 26 (January):247-252.   (Google)
Coseru, Christian (2009). Naturalism and Intentionality: A Buddhist Epistemological Approach. Asian Philosophy 19 (3):239-264.   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper I propose a naturalist account of the Buddhist epistemological discussion of sva- samvitti (“self-awareness,” “self-cognition”) following similar attempts in the domains of phe- nomenology and analytic epistemology. I examine the extent to which recent work in naturalized epistemology and phenomenology, particularly in the areas of perception and inten- tionality could be profitably used in unpacking the implications of the Buddhist epistemological project. I am also concerned with naturalism more generally, and the ways in which spe- cific models such as that of embodied cognition, can benefit from some of the valuable insights of Buddhist epistemology.
Dreyfus, Georges & Thompson, Evan (2007). Indian theories of mind. In P.D. Zelazo, Morris Moscovitch & Evan Thompson (eds.), Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness. Cambridge.   (Google)
Fontana, David (2007). Mystical experience. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell.   (Google)
Garfield, Jay L. (2006). The conventional status of reflexive awareness: What's at stake in a tibetan debate? Philosophy East and West 56 (2):201-228.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: ‘Ju Mipham Rinpoche, (1846-1912) an important figure in the _Ris med_, or non- sectarian movement influential in Tibet in the late 19th and early 20th Centuries, was an unusual scholar in that he was a prominent _Nying ma_ scholar and _rDzog_ _chen_ practitioner with a solid dGe lugs education. He took dGe lugs scholars like Tsong khapa and his followers seriously, appreciated their arguments and positions, but also sometimes took issue with them directly. In his commentary to Candrak¥rti’s _Madhyamakåvatåra, _Mi pham argues that Tsong khapa is wrong to take Candrak¥rti’s rejection of the reflexive character of consciousness to be a rejection of the _conventional _existence of reflexive awareness. Instead, he argues, Candrak¥rti only intends to reject the reflexivity of awareness _ultimately_, and, indeed, Mipham argues, it is simply _obvious _that conventionally, consciousness is reflexive
Joseph, Audrey (1980). Karman, self-knowledge and I-Ching divination. Philosophy East and West 30 (1):65-75.   (Google | More links)
Kurak, Michael (2001). Buddhism and brain science. Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (11):17-26.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Lee, Jung Young (1974). Death and Beyond in the Eastern Perspective. [New York,Gordon and Breach.   (Google)
MacKenzie, Matthew D. (2007). The illumination of consciousness: Approaches to self-awareness in the indian and western traditions. Philosophy East and West 57 (1):40-62.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: : Philosophers in the Indian and Western traditions have developed and defended a range of sophisticated accounts of self-awareness. Here, four of these accounts are examined, and the arguments for them are assessed. Theories of self-awareness developed in the two traditions under consideration fall into two broad categories: reflectionist or other-illumination theories and reflexivist or self-illumination theories. Having assessed the main arguments for these theories, it is argued here that while neither reflectionist nor reflexivist theories are adequate as traditionally formulated and defended, the approaches examined here give important insights for the development of amore adequate contemporary account of self-awareness
Menon, Sangeetha (2001). Towards a sankarite approach to consciousness studies: A discussion in the context of recent interdisciplinary scientific perspectives. Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research 18 (1):95-111.   (Google)
Puligandla, Ramakrishna (1999). The message of the mandukya upanisad: A phenomenological analysis of mind and consciousness. Indian Philosophical Quarterly 26 (2):221-231.   (Google)
Ram-Prasad, C. (2001). Saving the self: Classical hindu theories on consciousness and contemporary physicalism. Philosophy East and West 51 (3):378-392.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Rao, K. Ramakrishna (2002). Bridging eastern and western perspectives on consciousness: Comment. Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (11):63-68.   (Google)
Rao, K. Ramakrishna (2001). Consciousness studies: A survey of perspectives and research. In Janak Pandey (ed.), Psychology in India Revisited: Developments in the Discipline, Vol. 2: Personality and Health Psychology. Sage Publications India.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Rao, K. Ramakrishna (2005). Perception, cognition, and consciousness in classical hindu psychology. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (3):3-30.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Perception is sensory awareness. Cognition is reflective awareness. Consciousness is awareness-as-such. In Indian psychology, as represented by Samkhya-Yoga and Advaita Vedanta systems, consciousness and mind are fundamentally different. Reality is the composite of being (sat), knowing (cit) and feeling (ananda). Consciousness is the knowledge side of the universe. It is the ground condition of all awareness. Consciousness is not a part or aspect of the mind. Mind is physical and consciousness is not. Consciousness does not interact with the mind, the brain or any other physical objects or processes. Nor does it have any causative role in mental activity. Hence the existence of consciousness does not interfere or upset the apparently closed physical system. Mind in this view is the interfacing instrumentality that faces consciousness on one side and the brain and the rest of the physical world on the other. Mind is closely connected with the different systems of the brain. In normal perceptions, the mind takes the forms of objects via the channels of the sensory system and the processes in the brain. The forms themselves are non-conscious representations of the world of objects. The mental forms (vrittis) become conscious experiences in the light of the purusha. The vritti in sensory form is perception and with the reflection of the purusha it becomes cognition. All conscious perceptions are therefore cognitions
Rao, K. Ramakrishna (1998). Two faces of consciousness: A look at eastern and western perspectives. Journal of Consciousness Studies 5:309-27.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Reeves, Robert (1989). Abhidhamma as practical method. Southwest Philosophical Studies 57:57-64.   (Google)
Saksena, Shri Krishna (1944). Nature Of Consciousness In Hindu Philosophy. Delhi,: Mitilal Banarsidass.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Saṅkarācārya, (1964). Self-Knowledge (Ātma-Bodha) of Śrí Śaṅkarācārya. Madras, Akhila Bharata Sankara Seva Samiti.   (Google)
Schweizer, Paul (1993). Mind/consciousness dualism in sankhya-yoga philosophy. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (4):845-859.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Shear, Jonathan (2007). Eastern methods for investigating mind and consciousness. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell.   (Google)
Shear, Jonathan (1981). Maharshi, Plato and the tm-sidhi program on innate structures of consciousness. Metaphilosophy 12 (January):72-84.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Upadhyaya, K. N. (1991). Śa dot ndot nkara on reason, scriptural authority and self-knowledge. Journal of Indian Philosophy 19 (2).   (Google)
Wallace, B. Alan (2001). Intersubjectivity in indo-tibetan buddhism. In Evan Thompson (ed.), Between Ourselves: Second-Person Issues in the Study of Consciousness. Imprint Academic.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Wilber, Ken (2000). Waves, streams, states and self: Further considerations for an integral theory of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (11-12):145-176.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Woodhouse, Mark B. (1978). Consciousness and Brahman-atman. The Monist 61 (January):109-124.   (Cited by 1 | Google)

8.5e First-Person Approaches in the Science of Consciousness, Misc

Alston, William P. (1972). Can psychology do without private data? Behaviorism 1:71-102.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Baker, Lynne Rudder, Science and the first-person.   (Google)
Abstract: I want to raise a question for which I have no definitive answer. The question is how to understand first-personal phenomena—phenomena that that can be discerned only from a first-personal point of view. The question stems from reflection on two claims: First, the claim of scientific naturalism that all phenomena can be described and explained by science; and second, the claim of science that everything within its purview is intersubjectively accessible, and hence that all science is constructed exclusively form the third-personal point of view. Using these two claims as premises, we can construct a simple valid argument, which I’ll label ‘The Master Argument:’
Chalmers, David J. (1999). First-person methods in the science of consciousness. Consciousness Bulletin.   (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
Abstract: As I see it, the science of consciousness is all about relating _third-person data_ - about brain processes, behavior, environmental interaction, and the like - to _first-person data_ about conscious experience. I take it for granted that there are first-person data. It's a manifest fact about our minds that there is something it is like to be us - that we have subjective experiences - and that these subjective experiences are quite different at different times. Our direct knowledge of subjective experiences stems from our first-person access to them. And subjective experiences are arguably the central data that we want a science of consciousness to explain
Chalmers, David J. (2004). How can we construct a science of consciousness? In Michael S. Gazzaniga (ed.), The Cognitive Neurosciences III. MIT Press.   (Cited by 19 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In recent years there has been an explosion of scientific work on consciousness in cognitive neuroscience, psychology, and other fields. It has become possible to think that we are moving toward a genuine scientific understanding of conscious experience. But what is the science of consciousness all about, and what form should such a science take? This chapter gives an overview of the agenda
Christensen, Tamlin C. (2004). Experience-Sampling Procedures: Are They Probes to Autonoetic Awareness? Dissertation, Boston College   (Google | More links)
Conrad, D. (1996). Consciousness, privacy, and information. Biosystems 38:207-10.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Dennett, Daniel C. (ms). The fantasy of first-person science.   (Cited by 10 | Google)
Abstract: A week ago, I heard James Conant give a talk at Tufts, entitled “Two Varieties of Skepticism” in which he distinguished two oft-confounded questions:
Descartes: How is it possible for me to tell whether a thought of mine is true or false, perception or dream?
Kant: How is it possible for something even to _be_ a thought (of mine)? What are the conditions for the possibility of experience (veridical or illusory) at all?
Fingelkurts, Alexander A. & Fingelkurts, Andrew A. (2009). Is Our Brain Hardwired to Produce God, or is Our Brain Hardwired to Perceive God? A Systematic Review on the Role of the Brain in Mediating Religious Experience. Cognitive Processing 10 (4):293-326.   (Google)
Abstract: To figure out whether the main empirical question “Is our brain hardwired to believe in and produce God, or is our brain hardwired to perceive and experience God?” is answered, this paper presents systematic critical review of the positions, arguments and controversies of each side of the neuroscientific-theological debate and puts forward an integral view where the human is seen as a psycho-somatic entity consisting of the multiple levels and dimensions of human existence (physical, biological, psychological, and spiritual reality), allowing consciousness/mind/spirit and brain/body/matter to be seen as different sides of the same phenomenon, neither reducible to each other. The emergence of a form of causation distinctive from physics where mental/conscious agency (a) is neither identical with nor reducible to brain processes and (b) does exert “downward” causal influence on brain plasticity and the various levels of brain functioning is discussed. This manuscript also discusses the role of cognitive processes in religious experience and outlines what can neuroscience offer for study of religious experience and what is the significance of this study for neuroscience, clinicians, theology and philosophy. A methodological shift from “explanation” to “description” of religious experience is suggested. This paper contributes to the ongoing discussion between theologians, cognitive psychologists and neuroscientists.
Ginsburg, Carl (2005). First-person experiments. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (2):22-42.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Abstract: The question asked in this paper is: How can we investigate our phenomenal experience in ways that are accurate, in principle repeatable, and produce experiences that help clarify what we understand about the processes of sensing, perceiving, moving, and being in the world? This sounds like an impossible task, given that introspection has so often in scientific circles been considered to be unreliable, and that first-person accounts are often coloured by mistaken ideas about what and how we are experiencing. The first-person experiments I suggest are different from experiments done in the psychology laboratory in that there is no narrowing down of the experiments to looking at a singular aspect of a question, and that they are to be carried out in most instances in a natural or specially structured environment without strict task controls or statistical experimental design. There is no intent to replace formal second- and third-person investigation, but to use a phenomenological approach to conjoin with hard research, and to suggest ways of awareness training that can enhance the skills of researchers. I take as a model an informal phenomenological approach for experimentation. I also suggest that it is possible through directing and broadening the attention process to turn consciousness towards what is non-conscious or unattended to in order to develop an improved sensory awareness and an ability to be open to experiencing without prejudging and without expectations. The idea is to go back to experience without first creating a theoretical stance from which to interpret what happens. I conclude with some other examples of this approach
Giorgi, Amedeo (2004). A way to overcome the methodological vicissitudes involved in researching subjectivity. Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 35 (1):1-25.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Goldman, A. (1997). Science, publicity, and consciousness. Philosophy of Science 64 (4):525-45.   (Cited by 20 | Google | More links)
Jack, Anthony I. & Shallice, T. (2001). Introspective physicalism as an approach to the science of consciousness. Cognition 79 (1):161-196.   (Cited by 82 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Most ?theories of consciousness? are based on vague speculations about the properties of conscious experience. We aim to provide a more solid basis for a science of consciousness. We argue that a theory of consciousness should provide an account of the very processes that allow us to acquire and use information about our own mental states ? the processes underlying introspection. This can be achieved through the construction of information processing models that can account for ?Type-C? processes. Type-C processes can be specified experimentally by identifying paradigms in which awareness of the stimulus is necessary for an intentional action. The Shallice (1988b) framework is put forward as providing an initial account of Type-C processes, which can relate perceptual consciousness to consciously performed actions. Further, we suggest that this framework may be refined through the investigation of the functions of prefrontal cortex. The formulation of our approach requires us to consider fundamental conceptual and methodological issues associated with consciousness. The most significant of these issues concerns the scientific use of introspective evidence. We outline and justify a conservative methodological approach to the use of introspective evidence, with attention to the difficulties historically associated with its use in psychology
Jack, Anthony I. (ed.) (2004). Trusting the Subject? The Use of Introspective Evidence in Cognitive Science Volume. Thorverton UK: Imprint Academic.   (Google)
Jack, Anthony I. & Roepstorff, Andreas (2003). Why trust the subject? Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (9-10).   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
Kirsh, Marvin Eli, Logic, nature and the town council.   (Google)
Abstract: Consider, in the study of the evolution of human beings, consciousness, and intelligence, the hypothesis that men are a special instance of the reflection of nature, and later in return to this notion, as unproven hypothesis, consider the dynamics of a town meeting when asking about intelligence, consciousness, the genes or evolution, when questioning to scientific rigor, the origin and nature of the logic that pervades existence. If reasoning is a special (or specially evolved) property exclusive to humans how might one account for it's lowered or appearing absent property in other species if each by necessity of the assumed hypothesis also reflect nature. Is there a separate nature for each species (excuse the pun) or is the nature of each species the same as a unique, one, nature (reflects) as a single unique entity
Kirsh, Marvin Eli, The hard problem of consciousness studies.   (Google)
Abstract:      The question addressed by the hard problem of philosophy (3), how cognitive representation is acquired from the physical properties of self and the external, is examined from a perspective originating with Boethius(14) that knowledge is dependant on the nature of the perceiver and discussed with respect to the philosophy of George Berkeley (1,2,7) concerning the existence of matter with respect to perception. An account of the trails of history, scientific method, with respect to the naming and delineation of the hard problem suggest that its topic of address is a factor of plural elements-perceived as singular, a monism, only an aspect of its universality is perceived. A surface aspect is what seduces scientifically and, as a result, a confusion involving excessive abstraction and perceptually absent empirical fact, is postulated to accompany a false morality-an inclination to conquer it from scientific method is attributed to a seduction by naturally existing perplexity that is intermingled with unknown physical elements, themselves rooted from the same singular perplexity such that an ensuing interrogation targeted at the physical world and unavoidingly overlapping with the strictly philosophical has taken place. An invisible paper thin but sharp and self denigrating third facet to the commonly known philosophical walls, within the perplexing and the logical incongruence's, an artifact of perception and modeling of nature, results in a combined scientific (physical) and philosophical (reflective) assailing of natural paradox in a pursuit to summit human sufferings that are suggested to be, at least in part, of an unnatural and physical origin. Included as a conceptual tool is a section that discusses all possible human behavior as intuitively contained by the set of all the possible paths of nature emerged up to present and continued to emerge
Kirsh, Marvin Eli, The universe framed with respect to paradox: Is memory physically all that exists?   (Google)
Abstract:      If all of the motive forces of the physical world, physically of the world, can be agreed upon to occur from the conceptual/ethereal as a confrontation of the logically entailed with its' antithesis, as the paradox, a scheme might be evolved to detail all phenomenon as occurrences that are the result of an elemental universal construction effected by the inversion, then one might account for the sciences, its' theory, the questions of nature, natural history, human history, rather than as explanation, as if seeking explanation for existence in the third person, but as an accounting that is closer conceptually to the innately perceived. If it is at the juncture of paradox where the pursuits of civilization seem to expand in a never ending seeking, perhaps one might reorient his frame to define in terms of paradox. Though this reorientation does not appear on the surface as potentially productive, does not resolve the paradox, one might assume it to be the only route available and, if not productive, one might also potentially assume that all efforts to extract a knowledge of nature are in vain in the sense that one might only arrive at paradox, originating itself from an active pursuit to bear fruit for continuance. At the surface of this inquiry is presentation of a valid criteria for the ubiquitous existence of paradox throughout all of nature, though more in line with presentation first of paradox and subsequently exposed as ubiquitous and employed for explanation. Since paradox arises from the willed/active application of the intellect to the external world there is no ground to assume that it is innate itself in a simpler setting of nature, the natural world and its' processes, in this presentation I will try to establish that paradox, defined as logically irreconcilable conflict, other than being solely the product of active perception, is, in an analogous corresponding form, ubiquitously companioned ,and tangential to direction, a partner to the inversion that pervades the universe. The inversion is given as a substrate for the faces of the paradox and the two combined as an elemental unit of nature. With regards to paradoxes of mind and matter, an ultimate conceptually/philosophically arrived paradox, a synthesis of the physical/biological/philosophical concepts with the empirical, DNA is given a role as the actual embodiment of all that can and does ensue in the universe - path and memory. In light of theory and current research results in the science of physics, DNA is elevated, with potential, scientific validity, to possess both a ubiquitous nature and unique existence confined to biological entities as 'a physical piece of physical path', a biological source of all memory, perception and cognition, a physically energetic absolute and fixed differential standard of path/emergence in physical form, contained physical emergence that serves to energetically emerge, and defining of all from a first perspective beholding to the possessor of life as a sole criteria for perspective and reference with which to scientifically organize experiences of nature
Lehar, Steven (2000). The dimensions of conscious experience: A quantitative phenomenology. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Psychology was originally formulated as the science of the _psyche_, i.e. the subjective side of the mind / brain barrier. However time and again it has been diverted from this objective in the supposed interest of scientific rigor. The Behaviorists proposed to transform psychology to a science of behavior, and today the Neuroreductionists propose to transform it to a science of neurophysiology. In the process they attempt to deny the very existence of conscious experience as valid object of scientific scrutiny. However the subjective conscious experience is a primary source of evidence for the nature of the representation in the brain. I propose a quantitative phenomenolgy to express the dimensions of conscious experience in information theoretic terms. This approach leads to interesting observations of the properties of phenomenal perspective, that clearly reveal the phenomenal world as an internal rather than external entity
Livingston, Paul M. (2002). Husserl and Schlick on the logical form of experience. Synthese 132 (3):239-272.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   Over a period of several decades spanning the origin of the Vienna Circle, Schlick repeatedly attacked Husserl''s phenomenological method for its reliance on the ability to intuitively grasp or see essences. Aside from its significance for phenomenologists, the attack illuminates significant and little-explored tensions in the history of analytic philosophy as well. For after coming under the influence of Wittgenstein, Schlick proposed to replace Husserl''s account of the epistemology of propositions describing the overall structure of experience with his own account based on the structure of language rather than on the intuition of essences. I discuss both philosophers'' accounts of the epistemology of propositions describing the structure of experience. For both philosophers, this epistemology was closely related to the general epistemology of logic; nevertheless, neither philosopher had a completely coherent account of it. Comparison of the two approaches shows that perennial and severe theoretical obstacles stand in the way of giving an epistemology of the structure of experience, a central requirement for both philosophers'' theories. Consideration of these obstacles sheds a new light on the reasons for the historically decisive split between the continental and the analytic traditions, as well as on the subsequent development of the analytic tradition away from the structural description of experience
Menant, Christophe, Evolution as connecting first-person and third-person perspectives of consciousness (2008).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: First-person and third-person perspectives are different items of human consciousness. Feeling the taste of a fruit or being consciously part of a group eating fruits call for different perspectives of consciousness. The latter is about objective reality (third-person data). The former is about subjective experience (first-person data) and cannot be described entirely by objective reality. We propose to look at how these two perspectives could be rooted in an evolutionary origin of human consciousness, and somehow be connected. Our starting point is a scenario describing how evolution could have transformed a non self-conscious auto-representation into a conscious self-representation (Menant 2006). The scenario is based on the performance of inter-subjectivity existing among non human primates (Gardenfors 2006). A key item of the scenario is the identification of the auto-representation of a subject with the representations that the subject has of her conspecifics, the latter feeding the former with the meaning: “existing in the environment”. So during evolution, pre-human primates were brought to perceive their auto-representation as existing in the environment. Such process could have generated the initial elements of a conscious self-representation. We take this scenario as providing a possible rooting of human consciousness in evolution. We develop here a part of this scenario by expliciting the inward and outward components of the non self-conscious auto-representation. Inward components are about proprioception and interoception (thirst, pain, …). Outward components cover the sensory information relative to the perception of the body (seen feet, … ) and of its effects on the environment. We consider that the initial elements of a conscious self-representation have been applied to both inward and outward components of the auto-representation. We propose that the application to inward components made possible some first-person information, and that the application to outward components brought up third-person information. Relations between the two perspectives are highlighted. Such approach can root first-person and third-person perspectives in the same slot of human evolution. We conclude by a summary of the above and introduce a possible application of this approach to the concepts of bodily self and of pre-reflexive self-consciousness (Legrand, 2006)
Noë, Alva (2000). Experience and experiment in art. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (8-9).   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Petranker, J. (2003). Inhabiting conscious experience: Engaged objectivity in the first-person study of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (12):3-23.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Piccinini, Gualtiero (2009). First-Person Data, Publicity and Self-Measurement. Philosophers' Imprint 9 (9):1-16.   (Google)
Abstract: First-person data have been both condemned and hailed because of their alleged privacy. Critics argue that science must be based on public evidence: since first-person data are private, they should be banned from science. Apologists reply that first-person data are necessary for understanding the mind: since first-person data are private, scientists must be allowed to use private evidence. I argue that both views rest on a false premise. In psychology and neuroscience, the subjects issuing first-person reports and other sources of first-person data play the epistemic role of a (self-) measuring instrument. Data from measuring instruments are public and can be validated by public methods. Therefore, first-person data are as public as other scientific data: their use in science is legitimate, in accordance with standard scientific methodology.
Punzo, Vincent A. & Miller, Emily (2002). Investigating conscious experience through the beeper project. Teaching of Psychology 29 (4):295-297.   (Google | More links)
Shear, Jonathan (1996). The hard problem: Closing the empirical gap. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (1):54-68.   (Cited by 13 | Annotation | Google)
Thompson, Evan (2001). Between Ourselves: Second-Person Issues in the Study of Consciousness. Imprint Academic.   (Cited by 21 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This book puts that right, and goes further by also including decriptions of animal "person-to-person" interactions.
Varela, F. (1998). A science of consciousness as if experience mattered. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness 1996. MIT Press.   (Cited by 10 | Google)
Varela, Francisco & Shear, Jonathan (1999). First-person methodologies: What, why, how? Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (2-3):1-14.   (Cited by 136 | Google | More links)
Varela, F. J. & Vermersch, Pierre (2003). The point of view of the researcher. In Natalie Depraz, Francisco J. Varela & Pierre Vermersch (eds.), On Becoming Aware: A Pragmatics of Experiencing. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Velmans, Max (1994). A reflexive science of consciousness. In Experimental and Theoretical Studies of Consciousness. (Ciba Foundation Symposium 174).   (Cited by 20 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Classical ways of viewing the relation of consciousness to the brain and physical world make it difficult to see how consciousness can be a subject of scientific study. In contrast to physical events, it seems to be private, subjective, and viewable only from a subject's first-person perspective. But much of psychology does investigate human experience, which suggests that classical ways of viewing these relations must be wrong. An alternative, Reflexive model is outlined along with it's consequences for methodology. Within this model the external phenomenal world is viewed as part-of consciousness, rather than apart-from it. Observed events are only "public" in the sense of "private experience shared." Scientific observations are only "objective" in the sense of "intersubjective." Observed phenomena are only "repeatable" in the sense that they are sufficiently similar to be taken for "tokens" of the same event "type." This closes the gap between physical and psychological phenomena. Indeed, events out-there in the world can often be regarded as either physical or psychological depending on the network of relationships under consideration