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8.5c. Phenomenology and Consciousness (Phenomenology and Consciousness on PhilPapers)

See also:
Thompson, Evan; Lutz, A. & Cosmelli, D. (2005). Neurophenomenology: An introduction for neurophilosophers. In Andrew Brook & Kathleen Akins (eds.), Cognition and the Brain: The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 41 | Google)
Arvidson, P. Sven (1992). On the origin of organization in consciousness. Journal of the British Society of Phenomenology 23 (1):53-65.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Arvidson, P. Sven (2000). Transformations in consciousness: Continuity, the self and marginal consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (3):3-26.   (Cited by 18 | Google)
Baars, Bernard J. (1993). Putting the focus on the fringe: Three empirical cases. Journal of Consciousness Studies 2:126-36.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Barnes, Hazel E. (2006). Consciousness and digestion: Sartre and Neuroscience. Sartre Studies International 11 (1-2):117-132.   (Google)
Barresi, John (2004). Intentionality, consciousness and intentional relations: From constitutive phenomenology to cognitive science. In L. Embree (ed.), Gurwitsch's Relevance for Cognitive Science. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.   (Google)
Abstract: In this chapter I look closely at the intentionality of consciousness from a naturalistic perspective. I begin with a consideration of Gurwitsch's suggestive ideas about the role of acts of consciousness in constituting both the objects and the subjects of consciousness. I turn next to a discussion of how these ideas relate to my own empirical approach to intentional relations seen from a developmental perspective. This is followed by a discussion of some recent ideas in philosophical cognitive science on the intentionality of consciousness, both with respect to the objects and the subjects of consciousness. I show that these recent trends tend to naturalize intentionality and consciousness in directions compatible with the descriptive aspects of Gurwitsch's constitutive phenomenology
Bayne, Timothy J. (2004). Closing the gap: Some questions for neurophenomenology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3 (4):349-64.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   In his 1996 paper Neurophenomenology: A methodological remedy for the hard problem, Francisco Varela called for a union of Husserlian phenomenology and cognitive science. Varela''s call hasn''t gone unanswered, and recent years have seen the development of a small but growing literature intent on exploring the interface between phenomenology and cognitive science. But despite these developments, there is still some obscurity about what exactly neurophenomenology is. What are neurophenomenologists trying to do, and how are they trying to do it? To what extent is neurophenomenology a distinctive and unified research programme? In this paper I attempt to shed some light on these questions
Bergmann, Frithjof (1982). Sartre on the nature of consciousness. American Philosophical Quarterly 19 (April):153-162.   (Google)
Braddock, Glenn (2001). Beyond reflection in naturalized phenomenology. Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (11):3-16.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Brown, Steven Ravett (1999). Beyond the fringe: James, Gurwitsch, and the conscious horizon. Journal Of Mind And Behavior 20 (2):211-227.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: All our conscious experiences, linguistic and nonlinguistic, are bound up with and dependent on a background that is vague, unexpressed, and sometimes unconscious. The combination of William JamesÕs concept of "fringes" coupled with Aaron GurwitschÕs analysis of the field of consciousness provides a general structure in which to embed phenomenal descriptions, enabling fringe phenomena to be understood, in part, relative to other experiences. I will argue, drawing on examples from Drew LederÕs book, The Absent Body, that specific and detailed phenomena can and should be interrelated through JamesÕs and GurwitschÕs analyses. I am proposing first that phenomenological descriptions in general could benefit from explicit consideration of the context of the phenomena within the totality of the field of consciousness, and second, that establishing that context requires a general structural model of that field, similar to that provided by Gurwitsch
Brown, Steven (2008). Must phenomenology rest on paradox?: Implications of methodology-limited theories. Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (12):5-32.   (Google)
Abstract: Husserlian phenomenology depends upon a particular and limited set of related methodologies, which assume not merely abilities and results on the part of phenomenologists which have been severely criticized, but more profoundly, that mental contents are atomistic and independently manipulable. I will show not only that this assumption is mistaken and that questioning it undermines traditional phenomenological method, but that it leads to a paradox when turned upon itself which forces the rejection of a purely Husserlian phenomenology. More generally, any theory whose data is confined to the results of particular and limited methodologies is by that fact unable to investigate those methodologies, and is thus at best only able to function in a severely restricted realm
Brown, Steven Ravett (2004). Structural Phenomenology: An Empirically-Based Model of Consciousness. Dissertation, University of Oregon   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In this dissertation I develop a structural model of phenomenal consciousness that integrates contemporary experimental and theoretical work in philosophy and cognitive science. I argue that phenomenology must be “naturalized” and that it should be acknowledged as a major component of empirical research. I use this model to describe important phenomenal structures, and I then employ it to provide a detailed explication of tip-of-tongue phenomena. The primary aim of “structural phenomenology” is the creation of a general framework within which descriptions of experiences may be organized. The work of Husserl, Gurwitsch, the Gestalt psychologists, and many contemporary philosophers and cognitive scientists reveals several basic parameters underlying subjectivity. Chapter I argues that Husserlian methodology possesses problems both of praxis and of internal logic, and that its phenomenological descriptions cannot have the certainty he claimed. Consequently, an adequate phenomenology must incorporate empirical studies. This conclusion enables explicit transitions between empirical investigations and phenomenological insights. Chapter II introduces the theoretical framework underlying my model. I identify four parameters applicable to all experiences: 1) the degree of volitional emphasis with which something is experienced, i.e., the intensity of our focus on it, 2) the degree of non-volitional emphasis, i.e., the degree to which it is salient, 3) a variant of intentionality I term “directionality”, and 4) the property of recursion. Experiences are embedded within a complex set of relationships that unify and direct a layered phenomenal structure. I support these claims with evidence discovered over the past two centuries of research. Chapter III applies my model to the tip-of-tongue (TOT) state, in which difficulty remembering is accompanied by a sense of active searching. I show that a phenomenological description of the TOT experience is dependent on cognitive data, and that a phenomenological analysis is necessary to properly interpret these data. By showing how structural phenomenology offers a perspective from which to elucidate the results of experimental studies, I hope to clarify and establish the explicit role of introspection in empiricism, and of empiricism in phenomenology
Cairns, Dorion (2002). Phenomenology and present-day psychology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1 (1):69-77.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Carruthers, Peter (ms). Cartesian epistemology.   (Google)
Abstract: This paper argues that a Cartesian belief in the self-transparency of minds might actually be an innate aspect of our mind-reading faculty. But it acknowledges that some crucial evidence needed to establish this claim hasn’t been looked for or collected. What we require is evidence that a belief in the self-transparency of mind is universal to the human species. The paper closes with a call to anthropologists (and perhaps also developmental psychologists), who are in a position to collect such evidence, encouraging them to do so
Carman, Taylor (2005). On the inescapability of phenomenology. In David Woodruff Smith & Amie L. Thomasson (eds.), Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Chokr, N. N. (1992). Mind, consciousness, and cognition: Phenomenology vs cognitive science. Husserl Studies 9 (3):179-97.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Clegg, Joshua W. (2006). Phenomenology as foundational to the naturalized consciousness. Culture and Psychology 12 (3):340-351.   (Google)
Crowell, Steven G. (2002). Is there a phenomenological research program? Synthese 131 (3):419-444.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Deikman, Arthur (1996). 'I' = awareness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3:350-56.   (Cited by 12 | Google)
Depraz, Natalie; Varela, F. & Vermersch, Pierre (2003). On Becoming Aware: A Pragmatics of Experiencing. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 50 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Searches for the sources and means for a disciplined practical approach to exploring human experience.
Depraz, Natalie; Varela, Francisco & Vermersch, Pierre (2003). The basic cycle. In Natalie Depraz, Francisco J. Varela & Pierre Vermersch (eds.), On Becoming Aware: A Pragmatics of Experiencing. John Benjamins.   (Google)
Depraz, Natalie; Varela, F. & Vermersch, Pierre (2000). The gesture of awareness: An account of its structural dynamics. In Max Velmans (ed.), Investigating Phenomenal Consciousness: New Methodologies and Maps. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 27 | Google)
Depraz, N. (2003). The philosophic challenge. In Natalie Depraz, Francisco J. Varela & Pierre Vermersch (eds.), On Becoming Aware: A Pragmatics of Experiencing. Advances in Consciousness Research.   (Google)
de Quincey, Christian (2000). Intersubjectivity: Exploring consciousness from the second-person perspective. Journal of Transpersonal Psychology 32 (2):135-155.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Dreyfus, Hubert L. (ms). A phenomenology of skill acquisition as the basis for a Merleau-Pontian nonrepresentational cognitive science.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Dreyfus, Hubert L. (2001). Phenomenological description versus rational reconstruction. Revue Internationale de Philosophie 55 (216):181-196.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Dreyfus, Hubert L. (1999). The primacy of phenomenology over logical analysis: A critique of Searle. Philosophical Topics 27 (2).   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Drummond, John J. (2007). Phenomenology: Neither auto- nor hetero- be. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Dennett’s contrast between auto- and hetero-phenomenology is badly drawn, primarily because Dennett identifies phenomenologists as introspective psychologists. The contrast I draw between phenomenology and hetero-phenomenology is not in terms of the difference between a first-person, introspective perspective and a third-person perspective but rather in terms of the difference between two third-person accounts – a descriptive phenomenology and an explanatory psychology – both of which take the first-person perspective into account
Edie, James M. (1970). William James and phenomenology. Review of Metaphysics 23 (March):481-526.   (Cited by 25 | Google)
Ellis, Ralph D. (1986). An Ontology of Consciousness. Kluwer.   (Cited by 46 | Google)
Ellis, Ralph D. (1983). Phenomenological psychology and the empirical observation of consciousness. International Philosophical Quarterly 23 (June):191-204.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Embree, Lester (2006). Direct and indirect consciousness. Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 37 (1):1-8.   (Google)
Fisette, Denis (2003). Descriptive phenomenology and the problem of consciousness. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 29.   (Google)
Gallagher, Shaun (1997). Mutual enlightenment: Recent phenomenology in cognitive science. Journal of Consciousness Studies 4 (3):195-214.   (Cited by 40 | Google | More links)
Gallagher, Shaun (2003). Phenomenology and experimental design: Toward a phenomenologically enlightened experimental science. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (9-10):85-99.   (Cited by 14 | Google)
Gallagher, Shaun (online). Phenomenological and experimental research on embodied experience.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Abstract: In recent years there has been some hard-won but still limited agreement that phenomenology may be of central importance to the cognitive sciences. This realization comes in the wake of dismissive gestures made by philosophers of mind like Dennett (1991), who mistakenly associates phenomenological method with the worst forms of introspection. For very different reasons, resistance can also be found on the phenomenological side of this issue. There are many thinkers well versed in the Husserlian tradition who do not even want to consider the usefulness of phenomenology for enlightening the sciences of the mind. For them cognitive science is simply too computational or too reductionistic to be seriously considered as capable of explaining experience or consciousness. [1] This is surprising in light of the fact that a highly respected phenomenologist like Merleau-Ponty was integrating phenomenological analyses with considerations drawn from the empirical sciences of psychology and neurology long before cognitive science was constructed as a framework to include just those aspects of psychology and neurology that focus on cognitive experience. Merleau-Ponty aside, philosophers on both sides of this issue have only gradually come to acknowledge the possibility that phenomenology may be directly relevant for a scientific understanding of cognition. Sometimes the empirical scientists themselves have arrived at this conclusion even before, and in spite of the philosophers. Francisco Varela's work on neurophenomenology provides an important example (Varela, 1996). Even the hardest of hard scientists have made peace offerings to phenomenology. Recently, for example, the neuroscientist Jean-Pierre Changeux declares that his purpose "is not to go to war against phenomenology; to the contrary, [he wants] to see what constructive contribution it can make to our knowledge of the psyche, acting in concert with the neurosciences" (Changeux and Ricoeur, 2000, p. 85)
Gallagher, Shaun (2003). Phenomenology and neurophenomenology: An interview with Shaun Gallagher. Aluze 2:92-102.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Gallagher, Shaun (2007). Phenomenological approaches to consciousness. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Gallagher, Shaun & Varela, F. (2003). Redrawing the map and resetting the time: Phenomenology and the cognitive sciences. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 29.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Galin, David (1996). The structure of subjective experience: Sharpen the concepts and terminology. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness. MIT Press.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Gurwitsch, Aron (1966). Studies in Phenomenology and Psychology. Northwestern University Press.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Gurwitsch, Aron (1964). The Field of Consciousness. Duquesne University Press.   (Cited by 208 | Google)
Gurwitsch, Aron (1955). The phenomenological and the psychological approach to consciousness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 15 (March):303-319.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Hanna, Robert & Thompson, Evan (2003). Neurophenomenology and the spontaneity of consciousness. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 29.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Huemer, Wolfgang (2004). The Constitution of Consciousness. Routledge.   (Google)
Husserl, Edmund G. (1981). Pure phenomenology, its method, and its field of investigation. In Peter McCormick & Frederick A. Elliston (eds.), Husserl: Shorter Works. University of Notre Dame Press.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Husserl, Edmund G. (1937). The way into phenomenological transcendental philosophy from psychology. In The Crisis of European Sciences.   (Google)
Ihde, Don (1977). Experimental Phenomenology. Putnam.   (Cited by 87 | Google | More links)
Jopling, David A. (1996). Sub-phenomenology. Human Studies 19 (2):153-73.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper argues that cognitive psychology's practice of explaining mental processes in terms which avoid invoking phenomenology, and the person-level self-conception with which it is associated in common sense psychology, leads to a hybrid Cartesian dualism. Because phenomenology is considered to be fundamentally irrelevant in any scientific explanation of the mind, the person-level is regarded as scientifically invisible: it is a ghost-like housing for sub-personal computational cognition. The problem of explaining how the sub-personal and sub-phenomenological machinery of mind is related to person-level experience is as troublesome for cognitive psychology as the problem Descartes faced in explaining how the ghost (the non-corporeal mind) is related to the machine (the material body).This paper outlines the historical roots of cognitive dualism, showing how it has come to recapitulate a number of puzzling conceptual dichotomies that have hindered scientific and philosophical psychology since Kantian constructivism. It then defends the view that cognitive psychology's commitment to the sub-personal explanatory level leads to exaggerated deflationary claims about the explanatory significance of phenomenology, and the personlevel framework. It is argued that phenomenological description must function as a constraint upon, and guide for, theory formation in cognitive psychology (as illustrated in the work of the cognitive neuro-psychologist A.R. Luria). Phenomenology must be brought into a kind of reflective equilibrium with the cognitive and neuro-sciences
Kelly, Sean D. (2002). Husserl and phenomenology. In Robert C. Solomon & D. Sherman (eds.), Blackwell Guide to Continental Philosophy. Blackwell.   (Google)
Kern, I. & Marbach, Eduard (2001). Understanding the representational mind: A prerequisite for intersubjectivity proper. Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (5-7):69-82.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Klaassen, Pim; Rietveld, Erik & Topal, Julien (2010). Inviting complementary perspectives on situated normativity in everyday life. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (1):53-73.   (Google)
Abstract: In everyday life, situations in which we act adequately yet entirely without deliberation are ubiquitous. We use the term “situated normativity” for the normative aspect of embodied cognition in skillful action. Wittgenstein’s notion of “directed discontent” refers to a context-sensitive reaction of appreciation in skillful action. Extending this notion from the domain of expertise to that of adequate everyday action, we examine phenomenologically the question of what happens when skilled individuals act correctly with instinctive ease. This question invites exploratory contributions from a variety of perspectives complementary to the philosophical/ phenomenological one, including cognitive neuroscience, neurodynamics and psychology. Along such lines we try to make the normative aspect of adequate immediate action better accessible to empirical research. After introducing the idea that “valence” is a forerunner of directed discontent, we propose to make progress on this by first pursuing a more restricted exploratory question, namely, ‘what happens in the first few hundred milliseconds of the development of directed discontent?’
Koestenbaum, Peter (1962). The sense of subjectivity. Review of Existential Psychology 2:47-65.   (Google)
Kriegel, Uriah (2007). The phenomenologically manifest. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2):115-136.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Disputes about what is phenomenologically manifest in conscious experience have a way of leading to deadlocks with remarkable immediacy. Disputants reach the foot-stomping stage of the dialectic more or less right after declaring their discordant views. It is this fact, I believe, that leads some to heterophenomenology and the like attempts to found Consciousness Studies on purely third-person grounds. In this paper, I explore the other possible reaction to this fact, namely, the articulation of methods for addressing phenomenological disputes. I suggest two viable methods, of complementary value, which I call “the method of contrast” and “the method of knowability.”
Lind, Richard W. (1986). Does the unconscious undermine phenomenology? Inquiry 29 (September):325-344.   (Google)
Lind, Richard W. (1996). Micro-phenomenology: Toward a hypothetico-inductive science of experience. International Philosophical Quarterly 36 (4):429-42.   (Google)
Lohmar, Dieter (2006). Mirror neurons and the phenomenology of intersubjectivity. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 5 (1):5-16.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The neurological discovery of mirror neurons is of eminent importance for the phenomenological theory of intersubjectivity. G. Rizzolatti and V. Gallese found in experiments with primates that a set of neurons in the premotor cortex represents the visually registered movements of another animal. The activity of these mirror neurons presents exactly the same pattern of activity as appears in the movement of one's own body. These findings may be extended to other cognitive and emotive functions in humans. I show how these neurological findings might be “translated” phenomenologically into our own experienced sensations, feelings and volitions
Lutz, Antoine & Thompson, Evan (2003). Neurophenomenology. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (9-10):31-52.   (Cited by 55 | Google | More links)
Abstract: _sciousness called ‘neurophenomenology’ (Varela 1996) and illustrates it with a_ _recent pilot study (Lutz et al., 2002). At a theoretical level, neurophenomenology_ _pursues an embodied and large-scale dynamical approach to the_ _neurophysiology of consciousness (Varela 1995; Thompson and Varela 2001;_ _Varela and Thompson 2003). At a methodological level, the neurophenomeno-_ _logical strategy is to make rigorous and extensive use of first-person data about_ _subjective experience as a heuristic to describe and quantify the large-scale_ _neurodynamics of consciousness (Lutz 2002). The paper foocuses on_ _neurophenomenology in relation to three challenging methodological issues_ _about incorporating first-person data into cognitive neuroscience: (i) first-person_ _reports can be biased or inaccurate; (ii) the process of generating first-person_ _reports about an experience can modify that experience; and (iii) there is an ‘ex-_ _planatory gap’ in our understanding of how to relate first-person, phenomeno-_ _logical data to third-person, biobehavioural data._
Lutz, Antoine & Thompson, Evan (2003). Neurophenomenology - integrating subjective experience and brain dynamics in the neuroscience of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (9-10):31-52.   (Cited by 54 | Google)
Lutz, Antoine (2002). Toward a neurophenomenology as an account of generative passages: A first empirical case study. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1 (2):133-67.   (Cited by 63 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   This paper analyzes an explicit instantiation of the program of neurophenomenology in a neuroscientific protocol. Neurophenomenology takes seriously the importance of linking the scientific study of consciousness to the careful examination of experience with a specific first-person methodology. My first claim is that such strategy is a fruitful heuristic because it produces new data and illuminates their relation to subjective experience. My second claim is that the approach could open the door to a natural account of the structure of human experience as it is mobilized in itself in such methodology. In this view, generative passages define the type of circulation which explicitly roots the active and disciplined insight the subject has about his/her experience in a biological emergent process
MacDonald, Paul S. (2001). Current approaches to phenomenology. Inquiry 44 (1):101-124.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
MacLennan, Bruce J. (1995). The investigation of consciousness through phenomenology and neuroscience. In Joseph E. King & Karl H. Pribram (eds.), Proceedings Scale in Conscious Experience: Third Appalachian Conference on Behavioral Neurodynamics.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The principal problem of consciousness is how brain processes cause subjective awareness. Since this problem involves subjectivity, ordinary scientific methods, applicable only to objective phenomena, cannot be used. Instead, by parallel application of phenomenological and scientific methods, we may establish a correspondence between the subjective and the objective. This correspondence is effected by the construction of a theoretical entity, essentially an elementary unit of consciousness, the intensity of which corresponds to electrochemical activity in a synapse. Dendritic networks correspond to causal dependencies between these subjective units. Therefore, the structure of conscious experience is derived from synaptic connectivity. This parallel phenomenal/neural analysis provides a framework for the investigation of a number of problems, including sensory inversions, the unity of consciousness, and the nature of nonhuman consciousness
Mangan, Bruce (2007). Cognition, fringe consciousness, and the legacy of William James. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell.   (Google)
Mangan, Bruce (1993). Taking phenomenology seriously: The "fringe" and its implication for cognitive research. Consciousness and Cognition 2:89-108.   (Cited by 72 | Google)
Martin, Wayne M. (2005). Bubbles and skulls: The phenomenological structure of self-consciousness in dutch still-life painting. In M. Wrathal & Hubert L. Dreyfus (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Phenomenology and Existentialism. Blackwell.   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper I investigate the representation of self-consciousness in the still life tradition in the Netherlands around the time of Descartes’ residence there. I treat the paintings of this tradition as both a phenomenological resource and as a phenomenological undertaking in their own right. I begin with an introductory overview of the still life tradition, with particular attention to semiotic structures characteristic of the vanitas still life. I then focus my analysis on the representation of self-consciousness in this tradition, identifying both a Cartesian mode of representation of self-consciousness but also a counter trend
Marbach, Eduard (1993). Mental Representation and Consciousness: Toward a Phenomenological Theory of Representation and Reference. Kluwer.   (Cited by 22 | Google)
Abstract: The book makes a direct contribution to the connection between phenomenology and cognitive science.
Marbach, Eduard (2000). The place for an ego in current research. In Dan Zahavi (ed.), Exploring the Self: Philosophical and Psychopathological Perspectives on Self-Experience. John Benjamins.   (Google)
Marbach, Eduard (1996). Understanding the representational mind: A phenomenological perspective. Human Studies 19 (2):137-52.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper reflects on the relationship between Husserlian phenomenology and scientific psychology. It tries to show how phenomenological results have relevance and validity for present-day cognitive developmental psychology by arguing that consciousness matters in the study of the representational mind. The paper presents some methodological remarks concerning empirical or applied phenomenology; it describes the conception of an exploratory developmental study with 3 to 9-year-old children viewing a complex pictorial display; it then illustrates how a phenomenological interpretation of the data works; in conclusion, it sketches a view of realism about conscious experiences which is taken to be inherent in the phenomenological perspective of understanding the representational mind
Mathiesen, Kay (2005). Collective consciousness. In David Woodruff Smith & Amie L. Thomasson (eds.), Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press.   (Google)
McIntyre, Ronald & Smith, David Woodruff (1989). Theory of intentionality. In William R. McKenna & J. N. Mohanty (eds.), Husserl's Phenomenology: A Textbook. University Press of America.   (Google)
Abstract: §1. Intentionality; §2. Husserl's Phenomenological Conception of Intentionality; §3. The Distinction between Content and Object; §4. Husserl's Theory of Content: Noesis and Noema; §5. Noema and Object; §6. The Sensory Content of Perception; §7. The Internal Structure of Noematic Sinne; §8. Noema and Horizon; §9. Horizon and Background Beliefs
Mensch, James R. (2000). An objective phenomenology: Husserl sees colors. Journal of Philosophical Research 25 (January):231-260.   (Google)
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice (1967). The Structure of Behavior. Beacon Press.   (Cited by 247 | Google)
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Noë, Alva (2007). The critique of pure phenomenology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2).   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The topic of this paper is phenomenology. How should we think of phenomenology – the discipline or activity of investigating experience itself – if phenomenology is to be a genuine source of knowledge? This is related to the question whether phenomenology can make a contribution to the empirical study of human or animal experience. My own view is that it can. But only if we make a fresh start in understanding what phenomenology is and can be
Overgaard, Morten (2004). On the naturalizing of phenomenology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3 (4):365-79.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   In the attempt to construct a scientific approach to consciousness, it has been proposed that transcendental phenomenology or phenomenological psychology be introduced into the framework of cognitive neuroscience. In this article, the consequences of such an approach in terms of basic assumptions, methods for the collection of data, and evaluation of the collected data are discussed. Especially, the proposed notions of mutual constraint and the second perso are discussed. It is concluded that even though naturalising of phenomenology might not prove impossible, the projec has not yet found a coherent basic ground
Parnas, Josef & Zahavi, Dan (1998). Phenomenal consciousness and self-awareness: A phenomenological critique of representational theory. Journal of Consciousness Studies 5 (5-6):687-705.   (Google)
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Reiser, Oliver L. (1927). A phenomenological interpretation of physico-chemical configurations and conscious structures. Journal of Philosophy 24 (14):373-385.   (Google | More links)
Reiser, Oliver L. (1927). A phenomenological interpretation of physicochemical configurations and conscious structures: Part II. Journal of Philosophy 24 (15):404-415.   (Google | More links)
Rietveld, Erik (2008). Situated normativity: The normative aspect of embodied cognition in unreflective action. Mind 117 (468):973-1001.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In everyday life we often act adequately, yet without deliberation. For instance, we immediately obtain and maintain an appropriate distance from others in an elevator. The notion of normativity implied here is a very basic one, namely distinguishing adequate from inadequate, correct from incorrect, or better from worse in the context of a particular situation. In the first part of this paper I investigate such ‘situated normativity’ by focusing on unreflective expert action. More particularly, I use Wittgenstein’s examples of craftsmen (tailors and architects) absorbed in action to introduce situated normativity. Situated normativity can be understood as the normative aspect of embodied cognition in unreflective skillful action. I develop Wittgenstein’s insight that a peculiar type of affective behaviour, ‘directed discontent’, is essential for getting things right without reflection. Directed discontent is a reaction of appreciation in action and is introduced as a paradigmatic expression of situated normativity. In the second part I discuss Wittgenstein’s ideas on the normativity of what he calls ‘blind’ rule-following and the ‘bedrock’ of immediate action. What matters for understanding the normativity of (even ‘blind’) rule-following, is not that one has the capacity for linguistic articulation or reflection but that one is reliably participating in a communal custom. In the third part I further investigate the complex relationships between unreflective skillful action, perception, emotion, and normativity. Part of this entails an account of the link between normativity at the level of the expert’s socio-cultural practice and the individual’s situated and lived normativity.
Rietveld, Erik (2008). The Skillful Body as a Concernful System of Possible Actions: Phenomena and Neurodynamics. Theory & Psychology 18 (3):341-361.   (Google)
Abstract: For Merleau-Ponty,consciousness in skillful coping is a matter of prereflective ‘I can’ and not explicit ‘I think that.’ The body unifies many domain-specific capacities. There exists a direct link between the perceived possibilities for action in the situation (‘affordances’) and the organism’s capacities. From Merleau-Ponty’s descriptions it is clear that in a flow of skillful actions, the leading ‘I can’ may change from moment to moment without explicit deliberation. How these transitions occur, however, is less clear. Given that Merleau-Ponty suggested that a better understanding of the self-organization of brain and behavior is important, I will re-read his descriptions of skillful coping in the light of recent ideas on neurodynamics. Affective processes play a crucial role in evaluating the motivational significance of objects and contribute to the individual’s prereflective responsiveness to relevant affordances.
Searle, John R. (2000). Limits of phenomenology. In Mark A. Wrathall & Jeff E. Malpas (eds.), Heidegger Coping and Cognitive Science. MIT Press.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Siewert, Charles (2007). In favor of (plain) phenomenology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2).   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Plain phenomenology explains theoretically salient mental or psychological distinctions with an appeal to their first-person applications. But it does not assume (as does heterophenomenology) that warrant for such first-person judgment is derived from an explanatory theory constructed from the third-person perspective. Discussions in historical phenomenology can be treated as plain phenomenology. This is illustrated by a critical consideration of Brentano’s account of consciousness, drawing on some ideas in early Husserl. Dennett’s advocacy of heterophenomenology on the grounds of its supposed “neutrality” does not show it is preferable to plain phenomenology. In fact the latter is more neutral in ways we ought to want, and permits a desirable (and desirably critical) use of first-person reflection that finds no place in the former
Smith, David Woodruff & Thomasson, Amie L. (2003). Introduction. In David Woodruff Smith & Amie L. Thomasson (eds.), Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Smith, Joel (2005). Merleau-ponty and the phenomenological reduction. Inquiry 48 (6):553-571.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: _reduction in favour of his existentialist account of être au monde. I show that whilst Merleau-Ponty _ _rejected, what he saw as, the transcendental idealist context in which Husserl presents the _ _reduction, he nevertheless accepts the heart of it, the epoché, as a methodological principle. _ _Contrary to a number of Merleau-Ponty scholars, être au monde is perfectly compatible with the _ _epoché and Merleau-Ponty endorses both. I also argue that it is a mistake to think that Merleau-_ _Ponty’s liberal use of the results of empirical psychology signify a rejection of the epoché. A proper _ _understanding of his views on the relation between phenomenology and psychology shows that, at _ _least in Merleau-Ponty’s eyes, the methods of phenomenology and the empirical sciences are _ _largely similar. I conclude that we have every reason to think that Merleau-Ponty accepted _ _Husserl’s demand that the phenomenologist place the world in brackets._
Smith, David Woodruff (2000). Ontological phenomenology. In The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Volume 7: Modern Philosophy. Charlottesville: Philosophy Doc Ctr.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Smith, David Woodruff (ed.) (2005). Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Philosophical work on the mind flowed in two streams through the 20th century: phenomenology and analytic philosophy. This volume aims to bring them together again, by demonstrating how work in phenomenology may lead to significant progress on problems central to current analytic research, and how analytical philosophy of mind may shed light on phenomenological concerns. Leading figures from both traditions contribute specially written essays on such central topics as consciousness, intentionality, perception, action, self-knowledge, temporal awareness, and mental content. Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind demonstrates that these different approaches to the mind should not stand in opposition to each other, but can be mutually illuminating
Smith, David Woodruff (2004). Return to consciousness. In David Woodruff Smith (ed.), Mind World: Essays in Phenomenology and Ontology. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Stevens, R. (2000). Phenomenological approaches to the study of conscious awareness. In Max Velmans (ed.), Investigating Phenomenal Consciousness: New Methodologies and Maps. John Benjamins.   (Google)
Thompson, Evan (2001). Empathy and consciousness. Journal Of Consciousness Studies 8 (5-7):1-32.   (Cited by 54 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This article makes five main points. (1) Individual human consciousness is formed in the dynamic interrelation of self and other, and therefore is inherently intersubjective. (2) The concrete encounter of self and other fundamentally involves empathy, under- stood as a unique and irreducible kind of intentionality. (3) Empathy is the precondi- tion (the condition of possibility) of the science of consciousness. (4) Human empathy
Thompson, Evan (2004). Life and mind: From autopoiesis to neurophenomenology. A tribute to francisco Varela. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3 (4):381-398.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   This talk, delivered at De l''autopoièse à la neurophénoménologie: un hommage à Francisco Varela; from autopoiesis to neurophenomenology: a tribute to Francisco Varela, June 18–20, at the Sorbonne in Paris, explicates several links between Varela''s neurophenomenology and his biological concept of autopoiesis
Thompson, Evan (forthcoming). Neurophenomenology and contemplative experience. In Philip Clayton (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Science and Religion. Oup.   (Google)
Abstract: Scientific investigation of the mind, known since the nineteen-seventies as ‘cognitive science’, is an interdisciplinary field of research comprising psychology, neuroscience, linguistics, computer science, artificial intelligence, and philosophy of mind. The presence of philosophy in this list is telling. Cognitive science, although institutionally well established, is not a theoretically settled field, unlike molecular biology or high-energy physics. Rather, it includes a variety of competing research programmes - the computational theory of mind (also known as classical cognitive science), connectionism, and dynamical and embodied approaches - whose underlying conceptions of mentality and its relation to biology, on the one hand, and to culture, on the other, are often strikingly different (see Clark, 2001, for a useful overview)
Thompson, Evan & Zahavi, Dan (2007). Phenomenology. In P.D. Zelazo, Morris Moscovitch & Evan Thompson (eds.), Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness. Cambridge.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Current scientific research on consciousness aims to understand how consciousness arises from the workings of the brain and body, as well as the relations between conscious experience and cognitive processing. Clearly, to make progress in these areas, researchers cannot avoid a range of conceptual issues about the nature and structure of consciousness, such as the following: What is the relation between intentionality and consciousness? What is the relation between self-awareness and consciousness? What is the temporal structure of conscious experience? What is it like to imagine or visualize something, and how is this type of experience different from perception? How is bodily experience related to self-consciousness? Such issues have been addressed in detail in the philosophical tradition of phenomenology, inaugurated by Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) and developed by numerous other philosophers throughout the 20th century. This chapter provides an introduction to this tradition and its way of approaching issues about consciousness. We first discuss some features of phenomenological methodology and then present some of the most important, influential, and enduring phenomenological proposals about various aspects of consciousness. These aspects include intentionality, self-awareness and the first-person perspective, time-consciousness, embodiment, and intersubjectivity. We also highlight a few ways of linking phenomenology and cognitive
Thompson, Evan (2004). The Problem of Consciousness: New Essays in Phenomenological Philosophy of Mind. Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
van Gelder, Tim (1999). Wooden iron? Husserlian phenomenology meets cognitive science. In Jean Petitot, Franscisco J. Varela, Barnard Pacoud & Jean-Michel Roy (eds.), Naturalizing Phenomenology. Stanford University Press.   (Cited by 20 | Google)
Varela, F. (2001). Intimate distances: Fragments for a phenomenology of organ transplantation. Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (5-7):259-271.   (Cited by 20 | Google)
Varela, F. (1995). Neurophenomenology: A methodological remedy for the hard problem. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (4):330-49.   (Cited by 248 | Annotation | Google)
Vernon, R. Fox (2005). Peering into the foundations of inquiry: An ontology of conscious experience along Husserlian lines. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 25 (2):280-300.   (Google)
Wait, Eldon C. (2002). Reconciling descriptions of consciousness from within and from without. In Analecta Husserliana: The Yearbook of Phenomenological Research Vol LXXVII. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Pub.   (Google)
Yoshimi, Jeffrey (2007). Mathematizing phenomenology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (3).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Husserl is well known for his critique of the “mathematizing tendencies” of modern science, and is particularly emphatic that mathematics and phenomenology are distinct and in some sense incompatible. But Husserl himself uses mathematical methods in phenomenology. In the first half of the paper I give a detailed analysis of this tension, showing how those Husserlian doctrines which seem to speak against application of mathematics to phenomenology do not in fact do so. In the second half of the paper I focus on a particular example of Husserl’s “mathematized phenomenology”: his use of concepts from what is today called dynamical systems theory
Zahavi, Dan (2001). Beyond empathy: Phenomenological approaches to intersubjectivity. Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (5-7):151-167.   (Cited by 26 | Google)
Zahavi, Dan (2002). First-person thoughts and embodied self-awareness: Some reflections on the relation between recent analytic philosophy and cognitive science. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1 (1):7-26.   (Google)
Abstract:   The article examines some of the main theses about self-awareness developed in recent analytic philosophy of mind (especially the work of Bermúdez), and points to a number of striking overlaps between these accounts and the ones to be found in phenomenology. Given the real risk of unintended repetitions, it is argued that it would be counterproductive for philosophy of mind to ignore already existing resources, and that both analytical philosophy and phenomenology would profit from a more open exchange
Zahavi, Dan (2007). Killing the straw man: Dennett and phenomenology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Can phenomenology contribute to the burgeoning science of consciousness? Dennett’s reply would probably be that it very much depends upon the type of phenomenology in question. In my paper I discuss the relation between Dennett’s heterophenomenology and the type of classical philosophical phenomenology that one can find in Husserl, Scheler and Merleau-Ponty. I will in particular be looking at Dennett’s criticism of classical phenomenology. How vulnerable is it to Dennett’s criticism, and how much of a challenge does his own alternative constitute? I will argue that there are some rather marked differences between these two approaches to consciousness, but as I also hope to make clear, Dennett’s own account of where the differences are located is off target and ultimately based on a somewhat flawed conception of what classical phenomenology amounts to
Zahavi, Dan (2004). Phenomenology and the project of naturalization. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3 (4):331-47.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   In recent years, more and more people have started talking about the necessity of reconciling phenomenology with the project of naturalization. Is it possible to bridge the gap between phenomenological analyses and naturalistic models of consciousness? Is it possible to naturalize phenomenology? Given the transcendental philosophically motivated anti-naturalism found in many phenomenologists such a naturalization proposal might seem doomed from the very start, but in this paper I will examine and evaluate some possible alternatives
Zahavi, Dan (2008). The mind without, the world within. Synthese 160 (3).   (Google | More links)
Zahavi, Dan (2002). The three concepts of consciousness in the logische untersuchungen. Husserl Studies 18 (1):51-64.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)