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8.5d. Eastern Approaches to Consciousness (Eastern Approaches to Consciousness on PhilPapers)

See also:
Śaṅkarācārya, (1962). Ātmabodhaḥ: Self-Knowledge. Madras, Sri Ramakrishna Math.   (Google)
Śaṅkarācārya, (1996). Upadeśa Sāhasri: Thousand Guidelines to Self-Knowledge. Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan.   (Google)
Austin, James H. (1998). Zen and the Brain: Toward an Understanding of Meditation and Consciousness. MIT Press.   (Cited by 111 | Google | More links)
Barendregt, Henk (online). Buddhist phenomenology.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Barendregt, Henk (forthcoming). The abidhamma model of consciousness and its consequences. In M.G.T. Kwee, K.J. Gergen & F. Koshikawa (eds.), Buddhist Psychology: Practice, Research & Theory. Taos Institute Publishing, Taos, New Mexico.   (Google)
Chennakesavan, Sarasvati (1954). Mind and consciousness - a comparison of indian and western views. Philosophical Quarterly (India) 26 (January):247-252.   (Google)
Coseru, Christian (2009). Naturalism and Intentionality: A Buddhist Epistemological Approach. Asian Philosophy 19 (3):239-264.   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper I propose a naturalist account of the Buddhist epistemological discussion of sva- samvitti (“self-awareness,” “self-cognition”) following similar attempts in the domains of phe- nomenology and analytic epistemology. I examine the extent to which recent work in naturalized epistemology and phenomenology, particularly in the areas of perception and inten- tionality could be profitably used in unpacking the implications of the Buddhist epistemological project. I am also concerned with naturalism more generally, and the ways in which spe- cific models such as that of embodied cognition, can benefit from some of the valuable insights of Buddhist epistemology.
Dreyfus, Georges & Thompson, Evan (2007). Indian theories of mind. In P.D. Zelazo, Morris Moscovitch & Evan Thompson (eds.), Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness. Cambridge.   (Google)
Fontana, David (2007). Mystical experience. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell.   (Google)
Garfield, Jay L. (2006). The conventional status of reflexive awareness: What's at stake in a tibetan debate? Philosophy East and West 56 (2):201-228.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: ‘Ju Mipham Rinpoche, (1846-1912) an important figure in the _Ris med_, or non- sectarian movement influential in Tibet in the late 19th and early 20th Centuries, was an unusual scholar in that he was a prominent _Nying ma_ scholar and _rDzog_ _chen_ practitioner with a solid dGe lugs education. He took dGe lugs scholars like Tsong khapa and his followers seriously, appreciated their arguments and positions, but also sometimes took issue with them directly. In his commentary to Candrak¥rti’s _Madhyamakåvatåra, _Mi pham argues that Tsong khapa is wrong to take Candrak¥rti’s rejection of the reflexive character of consciousness to be a rejection of the _conventional _existence of reflexive awareness. Instead, he argues, Candrak¥rti only intends to reject the reflexivity of awareness _ultimately_, and, indeed, Mipham argues, it is simply _obvious _that conventionally, consciousness is reflexive
Joseph, Audrey (1980). Karman, self-knowledge and I-Ching divination. Philosophy East and West 30 (1):65-75.   (Google | More links)
Kurak, Michael (2001). Buddhism and brain science. Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (11):17-26.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Lee, Jung Young (1974). Death and Beyond in the Eastern Perspective. [New York,Gordon and Breach.   (Google)
MacKenzie, Matthew D. (2007). The illumination of consciousness: Approaches to self-awareness in the indian and western traditions. Philosophy East and West 57 (1):40-62.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: : Philosophers in the Indian and Western traditions have developed and defended a range of sophisticated accounts of self-awareness. Here, four of these accounts are examined, and the arguments for them are assessed. Theories of self-awareness developed in the two traditions under consideration fall into two broad categories: reflectionist or other-illumination theories and reflexivist or self-illumination theories. Having assessed the main arguments for these theories, it is argued here that while neither reflectionist nor reflexivist theories are adequate as traditionally formulated and defended, the approaches examined here give important insights for the development of amore adequate contemporary account of self-awareness
Menon, Sangeetha (2001). Towards a sankarite approach to consciousness studies: A discussion in the context of recent interdisciplinary scientific perspectives. Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research 18 (1):95-111.   (Google)
Puligandla, Ramakrishna (1999). The message of the mandukya upanisad: A phenomenological analysis of mind and consciousness. Indian Philosophical Quarterly 26 (2):221-231.   (Google)
Ram-Prasad, C. (2001). Saving the self: Classical hindu theories on consciousness and contemporary physicalism. Philosophy East and West 51 (3):378-392.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Rao, K. Ramakrishna (2002). Bridging eastern and western perspectives on consciousness: Comment. Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (11):63-68.   (Google)
Rao, K. Ramakrishna (2001). Consciousness studies: A survey of perspectives and research. In Janak Pandey (ed.), Psychology in India Revisited: Developments in the Discipline, Vol. 2: Personality and Health Psychology. Sage Publications India.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Rao, K. Ramakrishna (2005). Perception, cognition, and consciousness in classical hindu psychology. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (3):3-30.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Perception is sensory awareness. Cognition is reflective awareness. Consciousness is awareness-as-such. In Indian psychology, as represented by Samkhya-Yoga and Advaita Vedanta systems, consciousness and mind are fundamentally different. Reality is the composite of being (sat), knowing (cit) and feeling (ananda). Consciousness is the knowledge side of the universe. It is the ground condition of all awareness. Consciousness is not a part or aspect of the mind. Mind is physical and consciousness is not. Consciousness does not interact with the mind, the brain or any other physical objects or processes. Nor does it have any causative role in mental activity. Hence the existence of consciousness does not interfere or upset the apparently closed physical system. Mind in this view is the interfacing instrumentality that faces consciousness on one side and the brain and the rest of the physical world on the other. Mind is closely connected with the different systems of the brain. In normal perceptions, the mind takes the forms of objects via the channels of the sensory system and the processes in the brain. The forms themselves are non-conscious representations of the world of objects. The mental forms (vrittis) become conscious experiences in the light of the purusha. The vritti in sensory form is perception and with the reflection of the purusha it becomes cognition. All conscious perceptions are therefore cognitions
Rao, K. Ramakrishna (1998). Two faces of consciousness: A look at eastern and western perspectives. Journal of Consciousness Studies 5:309-27.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Reeves, Robert (1989). Abhidhamma as practical method. Southwest Philosophical Studies 57:57-64.   (Google)
Saksena, Shri Krishna (1944). Nature Of Consciousness In Hindu Philosophy. Delhi,: Mitilal Banarsidass.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Saṅkarācārya, (1964). Self-Knowledge (Ātma-Bodha) of Śrí Śaṅkarācārya. Madras, Akhila Bharata Sankara Seva Samiti.   (Google)
Schweizer, Paul (1993). Mind/consciousness dualism in sankhya-yoga philosophy. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (4):845-859.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Shear, Jonathan (2007). Eastern methods for investigating mind and consciousness. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell.   (Google)
Shear, Jonathan (1981). Maharshi, Plato and the tm-sidhi program on innate structures of consciousness. Metaphilosophy 12 (January):72-84.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Upadhyaya, K. N. (1991). Śa dot ndot nkara on reason, scriptural authority and self-knowledge. Journal of Indian Philosophy 19 (2).   (Google)
Wallace, B. Alan (2001). Intersubjectivity in indo-tibetan buddhism. In Evan Thompson (ed.), Between Ourselves: Second-Person Issues in the Study of Consciousness. Imprint Academic.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Wilber, Ken (2000). Waves, streams, states and self: Further considerations for an integral theory of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (11-12):145-176.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Woodhouse, Mark B. (1978). Consciousness and Brahman-atman. The Monist 61 (January):109-124.   (Cited by 1 | Google)