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8.6. Science of Consciousness, Miscellaneous (Science of Consciousness, Miscellaneous on PhilPapers)

Baruss, Imants (2008). Beliefs about consciousness and reality: Clarification of the confusion concerning consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (s 10-11):277-292.   (Google)
Abstract: There is considerable confusion surrounding the notion of consciousness. This confusion can be partially resolved by clarifying the referents of the word 'consciousness'. Doing so, however, reveals a more insidious problem, namely, the role played by personal beliefs in understanding consciousness. In particular, as revealed by a comprehensive survey, such beliefs range along a material- transcendent dimension, with the choice of notions of consciousness corresponding to materialist, conservatively transcendent, or extraordinarily transcendent positions. Further empirical research has revealed that those with more transcendent beliefs tend to have a more rational and curious approach to the world than those with more materialist beliefs. And, indeed, transcendent beliefs are also associated with greater intelligence. Although the possibility of a developmental sequence from materialist to transcendent beliefs is suggested, given the nature of fundamental beliefs, it does not appear that reconciliation between them is possible. Thus, although the confusion surrounding the study of consciousness can be clarified, the situation giving rise to the confusion cannot be eliminated

8.6a Consciousness and Language

Arbib, Michael A. (2001). Co-evolution of human consciousness and language. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 929:195-220.   (Cited by 18 | Google | More links)
Arbib, Michael A. (1972). Consciousness: The secondary role of language. Journal of Philosophy 64 (5):579-591.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Bailey, W. (1986). Consciousness and action/motion theories of communication. Western Journal of Speech Communication 50:74-86.   (Google)
Bever, Thomas G. & Townsend, David J. (2001). Some sentences on our consciousness of sentences. In Emmanuel Dupoux (ed.), Language, Brain, and Cognitive Development: Essays in Honor of Jacques Mehler. MIT Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Blachowicz, James A. (1997). The dialogue of the soul with itself. Journal of Consciousness Studies 4 (4-5):485-508.   (Cited by 10 | Google)
Bridgeman, Bruce (1992). On the evolution of consciousness and language. Psycoloquy 3 (15).   (Cited by 26 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Psychology can be based on plans, internally held images of achievement that organize the stimulus-response links of traditional psychology. The hierarchical structure of plans must be produced, held, assigned priorities, and monitored. Consciousness is the operation of the plan-executing mechanism, enabling behavior to be driven by plans rather than immediate environmental contingencies. The mechanism unpacks a single internally held idea into a series of actions. New in this paper is the proposal that language uses this mechanism for communication, unpacking an idea into a series of articulatory acts. Language comprehension uses the plan-monitoring mechanism to pack a series of linguistic events into an idea. Recursive processing results from monitoring one's own speech. Neurophysiologically, the planning mechanism is identified with higher-order motor control
Brook, Andrew (1996). Jackendoff and consciousness. Pragmatics and Cognition 4 (1):81-92.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Carruthers, Peter (1996). The involvement of language in conscious thinking. In Language, Thought, and Consciousness. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Chafe, Wallace L. (1994). Discourse, Consciousness, and Time: The Flow and Displacement of Conscious Experience in Speaking and Writing. University of Chicago Press.   (Cited by 620 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This work offers a comprehensive picture of the dynamic natures of language and consciousness that will interest linguists, psychologists, literary scholars,...
Chapman, S. B. & Ulatowska, H. K. (1997). Discourse in dementia: Considerations of consciousness. In Maxim I. Stamenov (ed.), Language Structure, Discourse, and the Access to Consciousness. John Benjamins.   (Google)
Chafe, Wallace L. (1996). How consciousness shapes language. Pragmatics and Cognition 4 (1):35-54.   (Google)
Chafe, Wallace L. (2007). Language and consciousness. In Philip David Zelazo, Morris Moscovitch & Evan Thompson (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness. Cambridge.   (Cited by 121 | Google | More links)
Chafe, Wallace L. (1980). The deployment of consciousness in the construction of narrative. In Wallace L. Chafe (ed.), The Pear Stories: Cognitive, Cultural, and Linguistic Aspects of Narrative Production. Ablex.   (Google)
Clowes, Robert (2007). A self-regulation model of inner speech and its role in the organisation of human conscious experience. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (7):59-71.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper argues for the importance of inner speech in a proper understanding of the structure of human conscious experience. It reviews one recent attempt to build a model of inner speech based on a grammaticization model (Steels, 2003) and compares it with a self-regulation model here proposed. This latter model is located within the broader literature on the role of language in cognition and the inner voice in consciousness. I argue that this role is not limited to checking the grammatical correctness of prospective utterances before they are spoken. Rather, it is a more broadly activity-structuring role, regulating and shaping the ongoing shape of human activity in the world. Through linking inner speech to the control of attention, I argue that the study of the functional role of inner speech should be a central area of analysis in our attempt to understand the development and qualitative character of human consciousness and that modelling can play a central role in that understanding
de Beaugrande, R. (1997). The "conscious and unconscious mind" in the theoretical discourse of modern linguistics. In Maxim I. Stamenov (ed.), Language Structure, Discourse, and the Access to Consciousness. John Benjamins.   (Google)
Ellis, Ralph D. (1996). Ray Jackendoff's phenomenology of language as a refutation of the 'appendage' theory of consciousness. Pragmatics and Cognition 4 (1):125-137.   (Google)
Fireman, Gary D.; McVay, T. E. & Flanagan, Owen J. (eds.) (2003). Narrative and Consciousness: Literature, Psychology and the Brain. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Abstract: We define our conscious experience by constructing narratives about ourselves and the people with whom we interact. Narrative pervades our lives--conscious experience is not merely linked to the number and variety of personal stories we construct with each other within a cultural frame, but is subsumed by them. The claim, however, that narrative constructions are essential to conscious experience is not useful or informative unless we can also begin to provide a distinct, organized, and empirically consistent explanation for narrative in relation to consciousness. Understanding the role of narrative in determining individual and collective consciousness has been elusive from within traditional academic frameworks. This volume argues that addressing so broad and complex a problem requires an examination from outside our insular disciplinary framework. Such an open examination would be informed by the inquiries and approaches of multiple disciplines. Recognition of the different approaches toexamining personal stories will allow for the coordination of how narrative seems (its phenomenology), with what mental labor it does (its psychology), and how it is realized (its neurobiology). Only by overcoming the boundaries erected by multiple theoretical and discursive traditions can we begin to comprehend the nature and function of narrative in consciousness. Narrative and Consciousness brings together essays by exceptional scholars and scientists in the disciplines of literary theory, psychology, and neuroscience to examine how stories are constructed, how stories structure lived experience, and how stories are rooted in material reality (the human body). The specific topics addressed include narrative in the development of conscious awareness; autobiographical narrative, fiction and the construction of self; trauma and narrative disruptions; narrative, memory and identity; and the physiological and neural substrate of narrative. It is the editors' hope that the multidisciplinary nature of this collection will challenge the reader to move beyond disciplinary confines and toward a coherent interdisciplinary dialogue
Fludernik, M. & Sell, R. D. (1995). The fictions of language and the languages of fiction: The linguistic representation of speech and consciousness. Journal of Pragmatics 24.   (Cited by 96 | Google | More links)
Glicksohn, Joseph (2001). Metaphor and consciousness: The path less taken. Journal of Mind and Behavior 22 (4):343-364.   (Google)
Gross, Steven (2009). Review of Ray Jackendoff, Language, Consciousness, Culture. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 20095 (5).   (Google | More links)
Hofstadter, Albert (1969). On the consciousness and language of art. Philosophy East and West 19 (1):3-15.   (Google | More links)
Johnston, P. K. (1997). Battle within: Shakespeare's brain and the nature of human consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 4 (4):365-73.   (Google)
Langacker, Ronald W. (1997). Consciousness, construal, and subjectivity. In Maxim I. Stamenov (ed.), Language Structure, Discourse, and the Access to Consciousness. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Lecours, A. R. (1998). Language contrivance on consciousness (and vice versa). In H. Jasper, L. Descarries, V. Castellucci & S. Rossignol (eds.), Consciousness: At the Frontiers of Neuroscience. Lippincott-Raven.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Leontiev, A. N. (2005). Lecture 13. language and consciousness. Journal of Russian and East European Psychology 43 (5):5-13.   (Google)
Lichtenberg, Joseph (2002). Values, consciousness, and language. Psychoanalytic Inquiry 22 (5):841-856.   (Google | More links)
Macphail, E. (2000). The search for a mental rubicon. In C. Heyes & Ludwig Huber (eds.), The Evolution of Cognition. MIT Press.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Marsh, James L. (1978). Consciousness and expression. Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 9:105-109.   (Google)
Markey, J. F. (1925). The place of language habits in a behavioristic explanation of consciousness. Psychological Review 32:384-401.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Nelson, Katherine (2003). Narrative and the emergence of a consciousness of self. In Gary D. Fireman, T. E. McVay & Owen J. Flanagan (eds.), Narrative and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Pronko, N. H. (1987). Language with or without consciousness. In G. Greenberg & E. Tobach (eds.), Cognition, Language and Consciousness: Integrative Levels. Lawrence Erlbaum.   (Google)
Ricciardelli, L. A. (1993). Two components of metalinguistic awareness: Control of linguistic processing and analysis of linguistic knowledge. Applied Psycholinguistics 14:349-367.   (Cited by 11 | Google)
Schooler, Jonathan W. & Fiore, S. M. (1997). Consciousness and the limits of language: You can't always say what you think or think what you say. In Jonathan D. Cohen & Jonathan W. Schooler (eds.), Scientific Approaches to Consciousness. Lawrence Erlbaum.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Searle, John R. (2002). Consciousness and Language. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 43 | Google | More links)
Abstract: One of the most important and influential philosophers of the last 30 years, John Searle has been concerned throughout his career with a single overarching question: how can we have a unified and theoretically satisfactory account of ourselves and of our relations to other people and to the natural world? In other words, how can we reconcile our common-sense conception of ourselves as conscious, free, mindful, rational agents in a world that we believe comprises brute, unconscious, mindless, meaningless, mute physical particles in fields of force? The essays in this collection are all related to the broad overarching issue that unites the diverse strands of Searle's work. Gathering in an accessible manner essays available only in relatively obscure books and journals, this collection will be of particular value to professionals and upper-level students in philosophy as well as to Searle's more extended audience in such fields as psychology and linguistics
Sekhar, A. C. (1948). Language and consciousness. Indian Journal of Psychology 23:79-84.   (Google)
Sinha, Vimalendu N. (1987). Symbolic language not a pre-requisite for self-awareness. Psycho-Lingua 17:115-121.   (Google)
Smith, Thomas R. (2004). Narrative and consciousness: Review article. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (5-6):146-155.   (Google)
Stamenov, Maxim I. (1997). Grammar, meaning, and consciousness: What sentence structure can tell us about the structure of consciousness. In Maxim I. Stamenov (ed.), Language Structure, Discourse, and the Access to Consciousness. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Stamenov, Maxim I. (2003). Language and self-consciousness: Modes of self-presentation in language structure. In Tilo Kircher & Anthony S. David (eds.), The Self in Neuroscience and Psychiatry. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 10 | Google)
Stamenov, Maxim I. (2001). Language structure and the structure of consciousness: Can one find a 'common denominator' between them? In Paavo Pylkkanen & Tere Vaden (eds.), Dimensions of Conscious Experience. John Benjamins.   (Google)
Stamenov, Maxim I. (ed.) (1997). Language Structure, Discourse, and the Access to Consciousness. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Subitzky, E. (2003). I am a conscious essay. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (12):64-66.   (Google)

8.6b Parapsychology and Consciousness

Atkinson, Anthony P.; Baker, I. S.; Blackmore, Susan J.; Braud, William; Burns, Jean E.; Carpenter, R. H. S.; Clarke, Christopher J. S.; Ellis, Ralph D.; Fontana, David; French, Christopher C.; Radin, D.; Schlitz, M.; Schmidt, Stefan & Velmans, Max (2005). Open Peer commentary on 'the sense of being stared at' parts 1 &. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (6):50-116.   (Google)
Augustine, Keith (2007). Does paranormal perception occur in near-death experiences? Journal of Near Death Studies 25 (4):203-236.   (Google)
Abstract: While most near-death researchers have disregarded reports of near-death experiences (NDEs) with hallucinatory features, many have sought cases of veridical paranormal perception during NDEs. But despite more than a quarter century of near-death studies, no compelling evidence that NDErs can obtain information from remote locations during their NDEs has been forthcoming. This paper, Part I of a critique of survivalist interpretations of NDEs, reviews the quality of the evidence for veridical observations during NDEs, and finds the case for veridical paranormal perception during NDEs wanting.
Augustine, Keith (2007). Near-death experiences with hallucinatory features. Journal of Near Death Studies 26 (1):3-31.   (Google)
Abstract: Though little systematic attention has been given to near-death experiences (NDEs) with clear or suggestive hallucinatory features, reports of such experiences strongly imply that NDEs are not glimpses of an afterlife. This paper, Part II of a critique of survivalist interpretations of NDEs, surveys NDEs incorporating out-of-body discrepancies, bodily sensations, encounters with living persons and fictional characters, random or insignificant memories, returns from a point of no return, hallucinatory imagery, and unfulfilled predictions. Though attempts to accommodate hallucinatory NDEs within a survivalist framework are possible, they signal a failure to take the empirical evidence against a survivalist interpretation of NDEs seriously.
Augustine, Keith (2007). Psychophysiological and cultural correlates undermining a survivalist interpretation of near-death experiences. Journal of Near Death Studies 26 (2):89-125.   (Google)
Abstract: This paper, Part III of a critique of survivalist interpretations of near-death experiences (NDEs), considers psychophysiological and cultural correlates of NDEs suggesting that such experiences are solely products of individuals' minds rather than windows into a transcendental realm. While current psychophysiological models do not fully explain out-of-body experiences (OBEs) and NDEs, several psychophysiological correlates offer promising clues about the mechanisms implicated in their production. These correlates do not definitively identify their precise causes, but strongly imply that such experiences represent internally generated fantasies rather than genuine perceptions of a transcendental environment. Additionally, stark differences in the phenomenology of NDEs from different cultures have been uncovered. Though nonWestern samples are too limited to draw anything more than tentative conclusions, the available data suggest that prototypical Western NDE motifs derive from a cultural source, consistent with the hypothesis that NDE content reflects social conditioning and personal expectation rather than the perception of an external reality.
Beloff, John (1980). Could there be a physical explanation for psi? Journal of the Society for Psychical Research 50:263-272.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Beloff, John (1989). Dualism: A parapsychological perspective. In J. Smythies & John Beloff (eds.), The Case for Dualism. Virginia University Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Beloff, John (1976). Mind-body interactionism in light of the parapsychological evidence. Theoria to Theory 10 (May):125-37.   (Google)
Beloff, John (1990). Parapsychology and radical dualism. In The Relentless Question. McFarland & Company.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Beloff, John (1987). Parapsychology and the mind-body problem. Inquiry 30 (September):215-25.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Beloff, John (1973). The subliminal and the extrasensory. Parapsychology Review 4:23-27.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Bem, D. J. & Honorton, C. (1994). Does psi exist? Replicable evidence for an anomalous process of information transfer. Psychological Bulletin 115:4-18.   (Cited by 144 | Google)
Betty, L. Stafford (2004). Mind, paranormal experience, and the inadequacy of materialism. International Philosophical Quarterly 44 (3):373-392.   (Google)
Bierman, Dick (2003). Does consciousness collapse the wave-packet? Mind and Matter 1 (1):45-57.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The 'subjective reduction' interpretation of measurement in quantum physics proposes that the collapse of the wave-packet, associated with measurement, is due to the consciousness of human observers. A refined conceptual replication of an earlier experiment, designed and carried out to test this interpretation in the 1970s, is reported. Two improvements are introduced. First, the delay between pre-observation and final observation of the same quantum event is increased from a few microseconds in the original experiment to one second in this replication. Second, rather than using the final observers' verbal response as the dependent variable, his early brain responses as measured by EEG are used. These early responses cover a period during which an observer is not yet conscious of an observed event. Our results support the 'subjective reduction' hypothesis insofar as significant differences in the brain responses of the final observer are found, depending on whether or not the pre-observer has been looking at the quantum event . Alternative 'normal' explanations are discussed and rejected. It is concluded that the present results do justify further research along these lines
Bierman, Dick (1998). Do psi phenomena suggest radical dualism? In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness II. MIT Press.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Bierman, Dick (2001). On the nature of anamalous phenomena: Another reality between the world of subjective consciousness and the objective world of physics? In P. Van Loocke (ed.), The Physical Nature of Consciousness. John Benjamins.   (Google)
Blackmore, Susan (1992). Psychic experiences: Psychic illusions. Skeptical Inquirer 16:367-376.   (Cited by 9 | Google)
Abstract: Why do so many people believe in psychic phenomena? Because they have psychic experiences. And why do they have psychic experiences? Because such experiences are an inevitable consequence of the way we think. I suggest that, like visual illusions, they are the price we pay for a generally very effective relationship with a massively complex world
Blackmore, Susan J. (1991). Psi in science. Journal of the Society for Psychical Research 57:404-11.   (Google)
Blackmore, Susan J. (2001). What can the paranormal teach us about consciousness ? Skeptical Inquirer 25 (2):22-27.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Abstract: Consciousness is a hot topic. Relegated to the fringes of science for most of the twentieth century, the question of consciousness only crept back to legitimacy with the collapse of behaviourism in the 1960s and 1970s, and only recently became an acceptable term for psychologists to use. Now many neuroscientists talk enthusiastically about the nature of consciousness, there are societies and regular conferences, and some say that consciousness is the greatest challenge for twenty-first century science. Although confusion abounds, there is at least some agreement that at the heart of the problem lies the question of subjectivity - or what it’s like for _me_. As philosopher Thomas Nagel (1974) put it when he asked his famous question "What is it like to be a bat?" - if there is something it is like _for the bat_ then we can say that the bat is conscious. This is what we mean by consciousness - consciousness is private and subjective and this is why it is so difficult to understand
Blackmore, Susan J. (1998). Why psi tells us nothing about consciousness. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness II. MIT Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Also published in 1998 in S.R.Hameroff, A.W.Kaszniak and .C.Scott (Eds) _Toward a Science of_ _Consciousness II._ MIT Press. 701-707. Note that there were problems with the editing of this volume and there are some misprints. This version is correct
Braude, Stephen E. (1979). ESP and Psychokineses: A Philosophical Examination. Temple University Press.   (Google)
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Burns, Jean E. (1993). Time, consciousness, and psi. In B. Kane, J. Millay & D. H. Brown (eds.), Silver Threads: 25 Years of Parapsychology Research. Praeger.   (Google)
Burns, Jean E. (2003). What is beyond the edge of the known world? Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (6-7):7-28.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Clarke, Christopher J. S. (2005). The sense of being stared at: Its relevance to the physics of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (6):78-82.   (Google)
Dean, Geoffrey O. & Kelly, Ivan W. (2003). Is astrology relevant to consciousness and psi? Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (6):175-198.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Dilley, Frank B. (1989). Mind-brain interaction and psi. Southern Journal of Philosophy 26:469-80.   (Google)
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Ehm, Werner (2005). Meta-analysis O mind-matter experiments: A statistical modeling perspective. Mind and Matter 3 (1):85-132.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Are there relationships between consciousness and the material world? Empirical evidence for such a connection was reported in several meta-analyses of mind-matter experiments designed to address this question. In this paper we consider such meta-analyses from a statistical modeling perspective, emphasizing strategies to validate the models and the associated statistical procedures. In particular, we explicitly model increased data variability and selection mechanisms, which permits us to estimate 'selection profiles ' and to reassess the experimental effect in view of potential other effects. An application to the data pool considered in the influential meta-analysis of Radin and Nelson (1989) yields indications for the presence of random and selection effects Adjustment for possible selection is found to render the,without such an adjustment significant, experimental effect non-significant. Somewhat different conclusions apply to a subset of the data deserving separate consideration. The actual origin of the data features that are described as experimental, random, or selection effects within the proposed model cannot be clarified y our approach and remains open
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Abstract: Most people have had the experience of turning round feeling that someone is looking at them from behind, and finding that this is the case. Most people have also had the converse experience. They can sometimes make people turn around by staring at them. In surveys in Europe and North America, between 70% and 97% of the people questioned said they had had personal experiences of these kinds (Braud et al., 1990; Sheldrake, 1994; Cottrell et al., 1996)
Smythies, J. M. (1960). Three classical theories of mind. Journal of the Society for Psychical Research 40:385-397.   (Google)
Sprigge, Timothy L. S. (2003). What might parapsychology contribute to our view of the world. Think 5.   (Google)
Stokes, Douglas M. (ms). Consciousness and the Physical World.   (Google)
Stokes, Douglas M. (1993). Mind, matter, and death: Cognitive neuroscience and the problem of survival. Journal of the American Society for Psychical Research 87:41-84.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Stokes, Douglas M. (1982). On the relationship between mind and brain. Parapsychology Review 13:22-27.   (Google)
Stokes, Douglas M. (1997). The Nature of Mind: Parapsychology and the Role of Consciousness in the Physical World. McFarland and Co.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Stokes, Douglas M. (2002). The persistence of consciousness: Guest editorial. Journal of the American Society for Psychical Research 96 (1):5-14.   (Google)
Storm, Lance & Thalbourne, Michael A. (2006). The Survival of Human Consciousness: Essays on the Possibility of Life After Death. McFarland.   (Google)
Tart, Charles T. (online). Consciousness: A psychological, transpersonal, and parapsychological approach.   (Google)
Tiller, W.; Kohane, M. & Dibble, W. (2000). Can an aspect of consciousness be imprinted into an electronic device? Integrative Physiological and Behavioral Science 35 (2):142-163.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Tong, Frank (2003). Out-of-body experiences: From penfield to present. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (3):104-106.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Towell, Tony (2001). Unconscious awareness. In Ron Roberts & David Groome (eds.), Parapsychology: The Science of Unusual Experience. Arnold.   (Google)
Varvoglis, M. (1996). Nonlocality on a human scale: Psi and consciousness research. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness. MIT Press.   (Google)
Wade, Jenny (1998). Physically transcendent awareness: A comparison of the phenomenology of consciousness before birth and after death. Journal of Near-Death Studies 16:249-275.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Walker, E. H. (1984). A review of criticisms of the quantum-mechanical theory of psi phenomena. Journal of Parapsychology 48:277-32.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Walker, E. H. (1975). Foundations of Paraphysical and Parapsychological Phenomena. In L. Oteri (ed.), Quantum Physics and Parapsychology. Parapsychology Foundation.   (Cited by 26 | Google)
Walach, Harald & Schmidt, Stefan (2005). Repairing Plato's life boat with ockham's razor: The important function of research in anomalies for consciousness studies. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (2):52-70.   (Google)
Abstract: Scientific progress is achieved not only by continuous accumulation of knowledge but also by paradigm shifts. These shifts are often necessitated by anomalous findings that cannot be incorporated in accepted models. Two important methodological principles regulate this process and complement each other: Ockham's Razor as the principle of parsimony and Plato's Life Boat as the principle of the necessity to 'save the appearances' and thus incorporate conflicting phenomenological data into theories. We review empirical data which are in conflict with some presuppositions of accepted mainstream science: Clinical and experimental effects of prayer and healing intention, data from telepathy, psychokinesis experiments and precognition, and anecdotal reports of macro-psychokinesis. Taken together, the now well documented possibility of these events suggests that such phenomena are anomalies that challenge some widely held beliefs in mainstream science. On the other hand, scientists often fear that by accepting the reality of these phenomena they also have to subscribe to world-models invoking ontological dualism or idealism. We suggest accepting the phenomena as real, but without questionable ontologies commonly associated with them. We outline how this might work
Wilson, Stuart (2002). Psi, perception without awareness and false recognition. Journal of Parapsychology 66 (3):271-289.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Woodworth, H. (1942). Report of investigations into an obscure function of the subconscious mind. Journal of the American Society for Psychical Research 36:185-230.   (Google)

8.6c Science of Consciousness, Foundations

Baars, Bernard J. (1994). A thoroughly empirical approach to consciousness. Psyche 1 (6).   (Cited by 33 | Google | More links)
Baruss, Imants & Moore, R. J. (1992). Measurement of beliefs about consciousness and reality. Psychological Reports 71:59-64.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Battista, J. R. (1978). The science of consciousness. In K. S. Pope & Jerome L. Singer (eds.), The Stream of Consciousness: Scientific Investigation Into the Flow of Experience. Plenum.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Bitbol, Michel (2002). Science as if situation mattered. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1 (2):181-224.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   When he formulated the program of neurophenomenology, Francisco Varela suggested a balanced methodological dissolution of the hard problem of consciousness. I show that his dissolution is a paradigm which imposes itself onto seemingly opposite views, including materialist approaches. I also point out that Varela's revolutionary epistemological ideas are gaining wider acceptance as a side effect of a recent controversy between hermeneutists and eliminativists. Finally, I emphasize a structural parallel between the science of consciousness and the distinctive features of quantum mechanics. This parallel, together with the former convergences, point towards the common origin of the main puzzles of both quantum mechanics and the philosophy of mind: neglect of the constitutive blindspot of objective knowledge
Block, Ned (2001). Paradox and cross purposes in recent work on consciousness. Cognition 79 (1):197-219.   (Cited by 51 | Google | More links)
Burns, Jean E. (forthcoming). The nature of free will and other independent processing by consciousness. In R. L. Amoroso (ed.), The Complementarity of Mind and Body: Fulfilling the Dream of Descartes, Einstein and Eccles.   (Google)
Chalmers, David J. (1998). The problems of consciousness. In H. Jasper, L. Descarries, V. Castellucci & S. Rossignol (eds.), Consciousness: At the Frontiers of Neuroscience. Lippincott-Raven.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper is an edited transcription of a talk at the 1997 Montreal symposium on "Consciousness at the Frontiers of Neuroscience". There's not much here that isn't said elsewhere, e.g. in "Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness" and "How Can We Construct a Science of Consciousness?"]]
Dennett, Daniel C. (2001). Are we explaining consciousness yet? Cognition 79 (1):221-37.   (Cited by 72 | Google | More links)
Depraz, Natalie & Cosmelli, Diego J. (2003). Empathy and openness: Practices of intersubjectivity at the core of the science of consciousness. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 29.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Flanagan, Owen J. (1995). Consciousness and the natural method. Neuropsychologia 33:1103-15.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Frith, Christopher D. (2003). The scientific study of consciousness. In Maria A. Ron & Trevor W. Robbins (eds.), Disorders of Brain and Mind 2. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Gell-Mann, M. (2001). Consciousness, reduction, and emergence: Some remarks. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 929:41-49.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Goldman, A. (2000). Can science know when you're conscious? Epistemological Foundations of Consciousness Research. Journal Of Consciousness Studies 7:3-22.   (Cited by 18 | Google | More links)
Greenfield, Susan A. (2002). Mind, brain and consciousness. British Journal of Psychiatry 181 (2):91-93.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Grinker, R. R. (1953). Problems of consciousness: A review, an analysis, and a proposition. In H. A. Abramson (ed.), Problems of Consciousness: Transactions of the Fourth Conference. Josiah Macy Foundation.   (Google)
Harman, Willis W. (1987). Consciousness as causal reality: Towards a complementary science. In The Real And The Imaginary. New York: Paragon House.   (Google)
Hut, Piet (1999). Exploring actuality through experiment and experience. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & David J. Chalmers (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness III. MIT Press.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Jahn, Robert G. & Dunne, Brenda J. (1997). Science of the subjective. Journal of Scientific Exploration 11 (2):201-224.   (Cited by 22 | Google | More links)
Jewkes, Sonya & Barušs, Imants (2000). Personality correlates of beliefs about consciousness and reality. Advanced Development 9:91-103.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Jordan, J. Scott & McBride, Dawn M. (2007). Stable instabilities in the study of consciousness: A potentially integrative prologue? Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (1):viii-xii.   (Google | More links)
Jordan, J. Scott & McBride, Dawn M. (2007). The Concepts of Consciousness: Integrating an Emerging Science. Imprint Academic.   (Google)
Josephson, Brian & Rubik, Beverly (1992). The challenge of consciousness research. Frontier Perspectives 3 (1):15-19.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Maasen, Sabine (2007). Selves in turmoil. In J. Scott Jordan & Dawn M. McBride (eds.), The Concepts of Consciousness: Integrating an Emerging Science. Imprint Academic.   (Google)
Mandler, George (2005). The consciousness continuum: From "qualia" to "free will". Psychological Research/Psychologische Forschung. Vol 69 (5-6):330-337.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Menant, Christophe, Evolution as connecting first-person and third-person perspectives of consciousness (2008).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: First-person and third-person perspectives are different items of human consciousness. Feeling the taste of a fruit or being consciously part of a group eating fruits call for different perspectives of consciousness. The latter is about objective reality (third-person data). The former is about subjective experience (first-person data) and cannot be described entirely by objective reality. We propose to look at how these two perspectives could be rooted in an evolutionary origin of human consciousness, and somehow be connected. Our starting point is a scenario describing how evolution could have transformed a non self-conscious auto-representation into a conscious self-representation (Menant 2006). The scenario is based on the performance of inter-subjectivity existing among non human primates (Gardenfors 2006). A key item of the scenario is the identification of the auto-representation of a subject with the representations that the subject has of her conspecifics, the latter feeding the former with the meaning: “existing in the environment”. So during evolution, pre-human primates were brought to perceive their auto-representation as existing in the environment. Such process could have generated the initial elements of a conscious self-representation. We take this scenario as providing a possible rooting of human consciousness in evolution. We develop here a part of this scenario by expliciting the inward and outward components of the non self-conscious auto-representation. Inward components are about proprioception and interoception (thirst, pain, …). Outward components cover the sensory information relative to the perception of the body (seen feet, … ) and of its effects on the environment. We consider that the initial elements of a conscious self-representation have been applied to both inward and outward components of the auto-representation. We propose that the application to inward components made possible some first-person information, and that the application to outward components brought up third-person information. Relations between the two perspectives are highlighted. Such approach can root first-person and third-person perspectives in the same slot of human evolution. We conclude by a summary of the above and introduce a possible application of this approach to the concepts of bodily self and of pre-reflexive self-consciousness (Legrand, 2006)
Merker, Bjorn H. (ms). The common denominator of conscious states: Implications for the biology of consciousness.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In order to distinguish the conscious state itself from its aspects and contents we need an answer to the question "if there is something it is like to be conscious, what is it?" A succinct answer to this question is provided in the form of a common denominator of all conscious states. This characterization of the conscious state has implications for the systematic study of consciousness through its bearing on a number of concrete issues connected with the nature of consciousness and its relation to the biology of brains and their evolution. These are discussed with a view to delineating the characteristics of consciousness, suggesting the primary functional role of consciousness in the total economy of brain functions, and exploring the tractability of the problem of consciousness from the standpoint of ordinary science. 1997
Midgley, David (2006). Intersubjectivity and collective consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (5):99-109.   (Google)
Abstract: This paper explores some connections between the philosophically central topic of intersubjectivity highlighted in John Ziman's article and the notion of collective consciousness, which has received very little formal attention in mainstream philosophy. The deconstruction of the Cartesian model of isolated spheres of consciousness which the intersubjective viewpoint brings about is supported by considerations from Kant's critical account of transcendental psychology. The phenomenon of empathy, an essential component in the achievement of intersubjective consensus, is related to the possibility of shared experiences, i.e. of two or more individuals participating in the same conscious experience. The use of mental concept-words applied to collectives of persons is interpreted as more than a mere metaphor; this interpretation is supported by comparison with complex collective behaviours in other social species. It is necessary to say that this paper very much represents work in progress-- other commitments have prevented the author from supporting many of the points made with references or further analysis at this stage, and it is hoped merely that this exploratory essay will provide useful ideas for further research
Miller, D. (2000). Designing a bridge for consciousness: Are criteria for a unification of approaches feasible? Advances in Mind-Body Medicine 16 (2):82-89.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Needleman, Jacob (1993). Inner empiricism as a way to a science of consciousness. Noetic Sciences Review.   (Google)
Núñez, Rafael E. (1997). Eating soup with chopsticks: Dogmas, difficulties and alternatives in the study of conscious experience. Journal of Consciousness Studies 4 (2):143-166.   (Google)
Ó Nualláin, Séan (2006). Inner and outer empiricism in consciousness research. New Ideas in Psychology 24 (1):30-40.   (Google)
Nunez, R. (1997). Eating soup with chopsticks: Dogmas, difficulties, and alternatives in the study of conscious experience. Journal of Consciousness Studies 4:143-66.   (Google)
Overgaard, Morten (2004). Confounding factors in contrastive analysis. Synthese 141 (2):217-31.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   Several authors within psychology, neuroscience and philosophy take for granted that standard empirical research techniques are applicable when studying consciousness. In this article, it is discussed whether one of the key methods in cognitive neuroscience – the contrastive analysis – suffers from any serious confounding when applied to the field of consciousness studies; that is to say, if there are any systematic difficulties when studying consciousness with this method that make the results untrustworthy. Through an analysis of theoretical arguments in favour of using contrastive analysis, combined with analyses of empirical findings, I conclude by arguing for three factors that currently are confounding of research using contrastive analysis. These are (1) unconscious processes, (2) introspective reports, and (3) attention
Papineau, David (2003). Could there be a science of consciousness? Philosophical Issues 13 (1):205-20.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Pickering, John (2000). Methods are a message. In Max Velmans (ed.), Investigating Phenomenal Consciousness: New Methodologies and Maps. John Benjamins.   (Google)
Rakover, Sam S. (2002). Scientific rules of the game and the mind/body: A critique based on the theory of measurement. Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (11):52-57.   (Google)
Revonsuo, Antti (2000). Inner Presence: Consciousness As a Biological Phenomenon. MIT Press.   (Cited by 18 | Google | More links)
Scott, A. C. (2000). Modern science and the mind. In Max Velmans (ed.), Investigating Phenomenal Consciousness: New Methodologies and Maps. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Scott, A. C. (1998). Reductionism revisited. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness II. MIT Press.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Searle, John R. (1998). How to study consciousness scientifically. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness II. MIT Press.   (Cited by 58 | Google | More links)
Simon, Herbert A. (1997). Scientific approaches to the question of consciousness. In Jonathan D. Cohen & Jonathan W. Schooler (eds.), Scientific Approaches to Consciousness. Lawrence Erlbaum.   (Google)
Stevens, S. S. (1966). Quantifying the sensory experience. In Paul K. Feyerabend & Grover Maxwell (eds.), Mind, Matter, and Method: Essays in Philosophy and Science in Honor of Herbert Feigl. University of Minnesota Press.   (Google)
Sullivan, Philip R. (2006). Are current philosophical theories of consciousness useful to neuroscientists? Behavior and Philosophy 34:59-70.   (Google)
Thomas, Nigel (1999). Are theories of imagery theories of imagination? Cognitive Science 23:207--45.   (Google)
Abstract: Can theories of mental imagery, conscious mental contents, developed within cognitive science throw light on the obscure (but culturally very significant) concept of imagination? Three extant views of mental imagery are considered: quasi-pictorial, description, and perceptual activity theories. The first two face serious theoretical and empirical difficulties. The third is (for historically contingent reasons) little known, theoretically underdeveloped, and empirically untried, but has real explanatory potential. It rejects the "traditional" symbolic computational view of mental contents, but is compatible with recent situated cognition and active vision approaches in robotics. This theory is developed and elucidated. Three related key aspects of imagination (non-discursiveness, creativity, and seeing as) raise difficulties for the other theories. Perceptual activity theory presents imagery as non-discursive and relates it closely to seeing as. It is thus well placed to be the basis for a general theory of imagination and its role in creative thought.
Vandervert, Larry R. (2006). Kuttner and Rosenblum failed to "objectify" consciousness. Journal of Mind and Behavior 27 (2):167-176.   (Google)
Velmans, Max (2007). An epistemology for the study of consciousness. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell.   (Google)
Abstract: This is a prepublication version of the final chapter from the Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. In it I re-examine the basic conditions required for a study of conscious experiences in the light of progress made in recent years in the field of consciousness studies. I argue that neither dualist nor reductionist assumptions about subjectivity versus objectivity and the privacy of experience versus the public nature of scientific observations allow an adequate understanding of how studies of consciousness actually proceed. The chapter examines the sense in which the experimenter is also a subject, the sense in which all experienced phenomena are private and subjective, the different senses in which a phenomenon can nevertheless be public and observations of it objective, and the conditions for intra-subjective and intersubjective repeatability. The chapter goes on to re-examine the empirical method and how methods used in psychology differ from those used in physics. I argue that a reflexive understanding of these relationships supports a form of “critical phenomenology” that fits consciousness studies smoothly into science
Velmans, Max (1999). Intersubjective science. [Journal (Paginated)] 6 (2-3):299-306.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The study of consciousness in modern science is hampered by deeply ingrained, dualist presuppositions about the nature of consciousness. In particular, conscious experiences are thought to be private and subjective, contrasting with physical phenomena which are public and objective. In the present article, I argue that all observed phenomena are, in a sense, private to a given observer, although there are some events to which there is public access. Phenomena can be objective in the sense of intersubjective, investigators can be objective in the sense of truthful or dispassionate, and procedures can be objective in being well-specified, but observed phenomena cannot be objective in the sense of being observer-free. Phenomena are only repeatable in the sense that they are judged by a community of observers to be tokens of the same type. Stripped of its dualist trappings the empirical method becomes if you carry out these procedures you will observe or experience these results - which applies as much to a science of consciousness as it does to physics
Velmans, Max (1996). Introduction to the science of consciousness. In Max Velmans (ed.), The Science of Consciousness. Routledge.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Velmans, Max (2000). Understanding Consciousness. Routledge.   (Cited by 78 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The mysteries of consciousness have gripped the human imagination for over 2,500 years. At the dawn of the new millennium, Understanding Consciousness provides new solutions to some of the deepest puzzles surrounding its nature and function. Drawing on recent scientific discoveries, Max Velmans challenges conventional reductionist thought, providing an understanding of how consciousness relates to the brain and physical world that is neither dualist, nor reductionist. Understanding Consciousness will be of great interest to psychologists, philosophers, neuroscientists and other professionals concerned with mind/body relationships, and all who care deeply about this subject
Walsh, Roger (2000). The search for an integral theory of consciousness. Advances in Mind-Body Medicine 16 (2):95-97.   (Google | More links)
Wallace, B. Alan (2000). The Taboo of Subjectivity: Toward a New Science of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 33 | Google)
Abstract: This book takes a bold new look at ways of exploring the nature, origins, and potentials of consciousness within the context of science and religion.
Williams, Donald C. (1934). Scientific method and the existence of consciousness. Psychological Review 41:461-79.   (Google)
Zeman, Adam Z. J. (2006). What do we mean by "conscious" and "aware?". Neuropsychological Rehabilitation 16 (4):356-376.   (Google | More links)

8.6d Science of Consciousness, Misc

Abramson, H. A. (ed.) (1950). Problems of Consciousness: Transactions of the First Conference. Josiah Macy Foundation.   (Google)
Abramson, H. A. (ed.) (1951). Problems of Consciousness: Transactions of the Second Conference. Josiah Macy Foundation.   (Google)
Abramson, H. A. (ed.) (1952). Problems of Consciousness: Transactions of the Third Conference. Josiah Macy Foundation.   (Google)
Abramson, H. A. (ed.) (1953). Problems of Consciousness: Transactions of the Fourth Conference. Josiah Macy Foundation.   (Google)
Abramson, H. A. (ed.) (1954). Problems of Consciousness: Transactions of the Fifth Conference. Josiah Macy Foundation.   (Google)
Ackers, S. (2001). Consciousness, art and media: Reflections on mediated experience. In Paavo Pylkkanen & Tere Vaden (eds.), Dimensions of Conscious Experience. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Aleksander, Igor L. (2005). The World in My Mind, My Mind in the World. Thorverton UK: Imprint Academic.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Atkinson, Anthony P.; Thomas, Michael S. C. & Cleeremans, Axel (2000). Consciousness: Mapping the theoretical landscape. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 4 (10):372-382.   (Cited by 29 | Google | More links)
Abstract: What makes us conscious? Many theories that attempt to answer this question have appeared recently in the context of widespread interest about consciousness in the cognitive neurosciences. Most of these proposals are formulated in terms of the information processing conducted by the brain. In this overview, we survey and contrast these models. We first delineate several notions of consciousness, addressing what it is that the various models are attempting to explain. Next, we describe a conceptual landscape that addresses how the theories attempt to explain consciousness. We then situate each of several representative models in this landscape and indicate which aspect of consciousness they try to explain. We conclude that the search for the neural correlates of consciousness should be usefully complemented by a search for the computational correlates of consciousness
Baars, Bernard J. & Newman, J. B. (eds.) (2001). Essential Sources in the Scientific Study of Consciousness. MIT Press.   (Cited by 59 | Google | More links)
Bachmann, Talis (2000). Microgenetic Approach to the Conscious Mind. Amsterdam: J Benjamins.   (Google | More links)
Bartsch, Renate (2002). Consciousness Emerging: The Dynamics of Perception, Imagination, Action, Memory, Thought, and Language. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Bielecki, A.; Kokoszka, Andrzej & Holas, P. (2000). Dynamic systems theory approach to consciousness. International Journal of Neuroscience 104 (1):29-47.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Blackmore, Susan J. (2003). Consciousness: An Introduction. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 38 | Google)
Abstract: Is there a theory that explains the essence of consciousness? Or is consciousness itself just an illusion? The "last great mystery of science," consciousness was excluded from serious research for most of the last century but is now a rapidly expanding area of study for students of psychology, philosophy, and neuroscience. Recently the topic has also captured growing popular interest. This groundbreaking book is the first volume to bring together all the major theories of consciousness studies--from those rooted in traditional Western philosophy to those coming out of neuroscience, quantum theory, and Eastern philosophy. Broadly interdisciplinary, Consciousness: An Introduction is divided into nine sections that examine such topics as how subjective experiences arise from objective brain processes, the basic neuroscience and neuropathology of consciousness, altered states of consciousness, mystical experiences and dreams, and the effects of drugs and meditation. It also discusses the nature of self, the possibility of artificial consciousness in robots, and the question of whether or not animals are conscious. Enhanced by numerous illustrations and profiles of important researchers, the book also includes self-assessment questions, further reading suggestions, and practical exercises that help bring the subject to life
Blackmore, Susan J. (2005). Consciousness: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Blackmore, Susan J. (2003). Consciousness in meme machines. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (4):19-30.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Blackmore, Susan J. (2005). Conversations on Consciousness. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Blakemore, Colin & Greenfield, Susan A. (1987). Mindwaves: Thoughts on Intelligence, Identity, and Consciousness. Blackwell.   (Cited by 21 | Google)
Blackmore, Susan J. (2001). State of the art: Consciousness. Psychologist 14 (10):522-525.   (Google)
Blackmore, Susan J. (2001). The psychology of consciousness. The Psychologist 14:522-525.   (Google)
Bock, G. R. & Marsh, James L. (eds.) (1993). Experimental and Theoretical Studies of Consciousness. (Ciba Foundation Symposium 174).   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Briggs, J. (2001). Where's the poetry? Consciousness as the flight of three blackbirds. In Paavo Pylkkanen & Tere Vaden (eds.), Dimensions of Conscious Experience. John Benjamins.   (Google)
Carruthers, Glenn (forthcoming). A problem for Wegner and colleagues' model of the sense of agency. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences.   (Google)
Abstract: The sense of agency, that is the sense that one is the agent of one’s bodily actions, is one component of our self-consciousness. Recently, Wegner and colleagues have developed a model of the causal history of this sense. Their model takes it that the sense of agency is elicited for an action when one infers that one or other of one’s mental states caused that action. In their terms, the sense of agency is elicited by the inference to apparent mental state causation. Here, I argue that this model is inconsistent with data from developmental psychology that suggests children can identify the agent behind an action without being capable of understanding the relationship between their intentions and actions. Furthermore, I argue that this model is inconsistent with the preserved sense of agency in autism. In general, the problem is that there are cases where subjects can experience themselves as the agent behind their actions despite lacking the resources to make the inference to apparent mental state causation
Carruthers, Glenn (2009). Commentary on Synofzik, Vosgerau and Newen. Consciousness and Cognition 18:515 - 520.   (Google)
Abstract: Synofzik, Vosgerau, and Newen (2008) offer a powerful explanation of the sense of agency. To argue for their model they attempt to show that one of the standard models (the comparator model) fails to explain the sense of agency and that their model offers a more general account than is aimed at by the standard model. Here I offer comment on both parts of this argument. I offer an alternative reading of some of the data they use to argue against the comparator model. I argue that contrary to Synofzik, Vosgerau and Newen’s reading the case of G.L. supports rather than contradicts the comparator model. Next I suggest how the comparator model can differentiate failures of action attribution in patients suffering parietal lobe lesions and delusions of alien control. I also argue that the apparently unexpected phenomenon of ‘‘hyperassociation” is predicted by the comparator model. Finally I suggest that as it stands Synofzik, Vosgerau and Newen’s model is not well specified enough to explain deficits in the sense of agency associated with delusions of thought insertion. Thus they have not met their second argumentative burden of showing how their model is more general than the comparator model.
Carter, R. (2002). Exploring Consciousness. University of California Press.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The book also discusses how traditional approaches--philosophical, scientific, and experiential--might be brought together to create a more complete...
Cazenave, Michel (ed.) (1984). Science And Consciousness: Two Views Of The Universe. Ny: Pergamon Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Chapman, C. R. & Nakamura, Yutaka (1999). A passion of the soul: An introduction to pain for consciousness researchers. Consciousness and Cognition 8 (4):391-422.   (Cited by 28 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Pain is an important focus for consciousness research because it is an avenue for exploring somatic awareness, emotion, and the genesis of subjectivity. In principle, pain is awareness of tissue trauma, but pain can occur in the absence of identifiable injury, and sometimes substantive tissue injury produces no pain. The purpose of this paper is to help bridge pain research and consciousness studies. It reviews the basic sensory neurophysiology associated with tissue injury, including transduction, transmission, modulation, and central representation. In addition, it highlights the central mechanisms for the emotional aspects of pain, demonstrating the physiological link between tissue trauma and mechanisms of emotional arousal. Finally, we discuss several current issues in the field of pain research that bear on central issues in consciousness studies, such as sickness and sense of self
Chalmers, David J. (1994). Review of Journal of Consciousness Studies. Times Literary Supplement.   (Google)
Abstract: How does conscious experience emerge from a physical basis? At a first glance, this is the question about the mind that most needs answering. So it is curious that those who study the mind professionally have often avoided the question entirely. In psychology, the cognitive revolution did not make consciousness respectable: most cognitive psychologists have stuck to subjects such as learning, memory, and perception instead. Neuroscientists have been known to speculate on the topic, but usually only late at night, after a few drinks. Even philosophers have been curiously diffident. Some have been exercised by the fact that there is a problem, others have been concerned to deny the problem entirely, but the focus of inquiry has remained elsewhere. As in all these fields, serious theories of consciousness have been hard to come by
Chaudhuri, Haridas (1970). The integral view of consciousness. International Philosophical Quarterly 10 (June):204-219.   (Google)
Cohen, Jonathan D. & Schooler, Jonathan W. (eds.) (1997). Scientific Approaches to Consciousness. Lawrence Erlbaum.   (Cited by 41 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This volume takes the first step toward building the necessary local bridges.
Combs, Allan & Krippner, Stanley (2007). Structures of consciousness and creativity: Opening the doors of perception. In Ruth Richards (ed.), Everyday Creativity and New Views of Human Nature: Psychological, Social, and Spiritual Perspectives. American Psychological Association.   (Google)
Cornwell, J. (ed.) (1998). Consciousness and Human Identity. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Cotterill, Rodney M. J. (2000). Enchanted Looms: Conscious Networks in Brains and Computers. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 67 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The title of this book was inspired by a passage in Charles Sherrington's Man on his Nature.
Cotterill, Rodney M. J. (2000). On brain and mind. Brain and Mind 1 (2):237-244.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: An easily-accessible introduction is provided for theauthor''s book Enchanted Looms , which is reviewedelsewhere in this volume by Jesse Prinz and by MarcelKinsbourne, and also for the article Didconsciousness evolve from self-paced probing of theenvironment, and not from reflexes? , which alsoappears in this volume and which summarises theauthor''s more recent thoughts on consciousness
Coward, L. Andrew & Sun, Ron (2001). A Universe of Consciousness: How Matter Becomes Imagination. Basic Books.   (Google)
Dulany, Donelson (2008). How well are we moving toward a most productive science of consciousness? Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (12):75-98.   (Google)
Abstract: Commentary on the Toward a Science of Consciousness Conference, Tucson 2008
Dulany, Donelson E. (2003). Strategies for putting consciousness in its place. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (1):33-43.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Edelman, Gerald M. & Tononi, Giulio (2000). A Universe of Consciousness: How Matter Becomes Imagination. Basic Books.   (Cited by 701 | Google | More links)
Edelman, Gerald M. (2004). Wider Than the Sky: The Phenomenal Gift of Consciousness. Yale University Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Epstein, Russell (2004). Consciousness, art, and the brain: Lessons from Marcel Proust. Consciousness and Cognition 13 (2):213-40.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Faw, Bill (2006). 'Are we studying consciousness yet?': Toward a science of consciousness--tucson conference, April 4-8, 2006. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (4):94-112.   (Google)
Faw, Bill (2006). Are we studying consciousness yet? Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (4):94-112.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Conference Report for Toward a Science of Consciousness Tucson Conference, April 4- 8, 2006
Faw, Bill (2003). Models and mechanisms of consciousness: Report on ASSC-7 in memphis: May 30-June 2, 2003. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (8):79-89.   (Google)
Faw, Bill (2005). What we know and what we don't about consciousness science. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (7):74-86.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: A Review of ASSC-9 at Cal-Tech, June 24-27, 2005
Ferrari, Michel & Pinard, Adrien (2006). Death and resurrection of a disciplined science of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (12):75-96.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The Latin conscius does not translate anything like mind or consciousness. Only in the mid-nineteenth century do we find the first attempts to study consciousness as its own discipline. Wundt, James, and Freud disagreed about how to approach the science of consciousness, although agreeing that psychology was a 'science of consciousness' that takes lived biological experience as its object. The behaviorists vetoed this idea. By the 1950s, for cognitive science, mind (conscious and unconscious) was considered analogous to computer software. Recently, the science of consciousness has returned as Consciousness Studies, a new interdisciplinary synthesis of neuroscience, psychology, philosophy, and cultural anthropology. But what is new in this renaissance of the science of consciousness? New first, second and third person approaches all propose to take consciousness itself as a variable. This approach is as controversial as the nineteenth-century science of consciousness--controversy perhaps inherent to any science of consciousness
Ferrari, Melanie; Pinard, Adrien & Runions, K. (2001). Piaget's framework for a scientific study of consciousness. Human Development 44 (4):195-213.   (Google)
Frith, Christopher D. & Rees, Geraint (2007). A brief history of the scientific approach to the study of consciousness. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell.   (Google)
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Gray, Jeffrey A. (2004). Consciousness: Creeping Up on the Hard Problem. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 24 | Google | More links)
Greenspan, Ralph J. & Baars, Bernard J. (2005). Consciousness eclipsed: Jacques Loeb, Ivan P. Pavlov, and the rise of reductionistic biology after 1900. Consciousness and Cognition 14 (1):219-230.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
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Abstract: This volume, a part of the Foundations of Philosophy in India series, is an examination of the myriad conceptions of consciousness in classical Indian philosophy
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Abstract: Toward a Science of Consciousnessmarks the first major gathering -- a landmark event -- devoted entirely to unlocking the mysteries of consciousness.
Hardcastle, Valerie Gray (2001). Consciousness: Chili of the brain. Consciousness and Cognition 10 (3):418-420.   (Google)
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Humphrey, Nicholas (2006). Seeing Red: A Study in Consciousness. Belknap Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: The purpose of this book is to build towards an explanation of just what the matter is.
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Abstract: One day someone will write a book that explains consciousness. The book will put forward a theory that closes the “explanatory gap” between conscious experience and brain activity, by showing how a brain state could in principle amount to a state of consciousness. But it will do more. It will demonstrate just why this particular brain state has to be this particular experience. As Dan Lloyd puts it in his philosophical novel, Radiant Cool: “What we need is a transparent theory. One that, once you get it, you see that anything built like this will have this particular conscious experience.”1
Ione, Amy (2000). An inquiry into Paul cezanne: The role of the artist in studies of perception and consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (8):57-74.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Ito, M.; Miyashita, Y. & Rolls, Edmund T. (eds.) (1997). Cognition, Computation, and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: This book illustrates these three approaches, with chapters provided by some of the most important and provocative figures in the field.
Jarvilehto, Timo (2000). The theory of the organism-environment system: The problem of mental activity and consciousness. Integrative Physiological and Behavioral Science 35 (1):35-57.   (Cited by 20 | Google)
Jason Throop, C. & Laughlin, Charles (2007). Anthropology of consciousness. In Philip David Zelazo, Morris Moscovitch & Evan Thompson (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness. Cambridge.   (Google)
John, E. Roy (2001). A field theory of consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 10 (2):184-213.   (Cited by 93 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This article summarizes a variety of current as well as previous research in support of a new theory of consciousness. Evidence has been steadily accumulating that information about a stimulus complex is distributed to many neuronal populations dispersed throughout the brain and is represented by the departure from randomness of the temporal pattern of neural discharges within these large ensembles. Zero phase lag synchronization occurs between discharges of neurons in different brain regions and is enhanced by presentation of stimuli. This evidence further suggests that spatiotemporal patterns of coherence, which have been identified by spatial principal component analysis, may encode a multidimensional representation of a present or past event. How such distributed information is integrated into a holistic percept constitutes the binding problem. How a percept defined by a spatial distribution of nonrandomness can be subjectively experienced constitutes the problem of consciousness. Explanations based on a discrete connectionistic network cannot be reconciled with the relevant facts. Evidence is presented herein of invariant features of brain electrical activity found to change reversibly with loss and return of consciousness in a study of 176 patients anesthetized during surgical procedures. A review of relevant research areas, as well as the anesthesia data, leads to a postulation that consciousness is a property of quantumlike processes, within a brain field resonating within a core of structures, which may be the neural substrate of consciousness. This core includes regions of the prefrontal cortex, the frontal cortex, the pre- and paracentral cortex, thalamus, limbic system, and basal ganglia
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Abstract: Brain Mystique Light and Dark bridges the gap between neuroscience, brain evolution and consciousness by examining scientific models of how the brain becomes conscious. The book argues that the spiritual dimension of life is compatible with scientific naturalism. Not bound by conventional stereotypes, Charles Don Keyes safeguards the unity of brain/mind, synthesized from a wide range of sources, reinterprets the triune brain concept and self-reference models of consciousness
Koch, Christof (2004). The Quest for Consciousness. Roberts and Company.   (Cited by 142 | Google | More links)
Kunzendorf, Robert G. & Wallace, Benjamin (eds.) (2000). Individual Differences in Conscious Experience. Amsterdam: J Benjamins.   (Google | More links)
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Abstract: The World In Your Head: A Gestalt View of the Mechanism of Conscious Experience represents a bold assault on one of the greatest unsolved mysteries in science: the nature of consciousness and the human mind. Rather than examining the brain and nervous system to see what they tell us about the mind, this book begins with an examination of conscious experience to see what it can tell us about the brain. Through this analysis, the first and most obvious observation is that consciousness appears as a volumetric spatial void, containing colored objects and surfaces. This reveals that the representation in the brain takes the form of an explicit volumetric spatial model of external reality. Therefore, the world we see around us is not the real world itself, but merely a miniature virtual-reality replica of that world in an internal representation. In fact, the phenomena of dreams and hallucinations clearly demonstrate the capacity of the brain to construct complete virtual worlds even in the absence of sensory input. Perception is somewhat like a guided hallucination, based on sensory stimulation. This insight allows us to examine the world of visual experience not as scientists exploring the external world, but as perceptual scientists examining a rich and complex internal representation. This unique approach to investigating mental function has implications in a wide variety of related fields, including the nature of language and abstract thought, and motor control and behavior. It also has implications to the world of music, art, and dance, showing how the patterns of regularity and periodicity in space and time--apparent in those aesthetic domains--reflect the periodic basis set of the underlying harmonic resonance representation in the brain
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Abstract: The significance of consciousness in modern science is discussed by leading authorities from a variety of disciplines. Presenting a wide-ranging survey of current thinking on this important topic, the contributors address such issues as the status of different aspects of consciousness; the criteria for using the concept of consciousness and identifying instances of it; the basis of consciousness in functional brain organization; the relationship between different levels of theoretical discourse; and the functions of consciousness
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Pribram, Karl H. (2004). Consciousness reassessed. Mind and Matter 2 (1):7-35.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Many sophisticated essays and books have been written about the topic of consciousness. My own contributions date back some twenty-five years in an essay entitled 'Problems concerning the structure of consciousness' (Pribram 1976), and five years before that in delineating the difference between brain processes that are coordinate with awareness and those that are coordinate with habitual behavior (Pribram 1971a). I have been intrigued by what has been written since and take this occasion to reassess a few of the major issues that have arisen
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Abstract: The book is aimed at general readers with an interest in the mind and neuroscience, as well as a wide range of scientists whose work is related to the rapidly...
Searle, John R. (2000). Consciousness. Intellectica 31:85-110.   (Cited by 76 | Google | More links)
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Abstract: MIT Press, 1999 Review by Paul Bohan Broderick, Ph.D. on May 26th 2002 Volume: 6, Number: 21
Thomas, Nigel J. T. (1997). What does implicit cognition tell us about consciousness? Journal of Consciousness Studies.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: There was a brief inaugural session of the Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness during the Psychonomic Society Conference in Los Angeles in November 1995, but the first full conference of the Association was held this June in the very pleasant surroundings of the Claremont Colleges. Being at this conference was very different from being at Tucson II the previous year. This was a less ballyhooed, more intimate event, maybe less exciting, and less intellectually eclectic, but also perhaps more conducive to serious scientific exchange. Certainly the roster of speakers was replete with luminaries of the consciousness studies movement, and highly respected names from psychology, neuroscience, and philosophy: Christof Koch, Bernard Baars, Ned Block, Philip Merikle, Daniel Schacter, Larry Jacoby, Walter Freeman, Valerie Hardcastle, both Churchlands, Melvyn Goodale, Owen Flanagan . . . to unfairly pick out just a few
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Abstract: First religion explained how the mind emerged, language developed, and overall consciousness came into being. Many of these explanations were challenged during the "age of reason," grand metaphysical theories gradually displaced many of the religious perceptions of the world, only to be displaced by scientific advances at the start of the century. Now, Zoltan Torey, an Australian psychologist, freelance science writer, and science journalist for ABC Radio National in Australia, offers a new science-based theory of the human mind. Torey spent ten years using a process he calls reverse engineering, a process with a solid grounding in neuroscience, linguistics, and biological modelling to identify what we call the mind. He shows how it emerged, relates to language, generates consciousness, and yet remains hidden from insight. Sure to be controversial, The Crucible of Consciousness provides a unified description of the human mind, an antidote to the fragmented world and other simplistic belief-systems that occupy the cultural middleground
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Abstract: Of all the problems facing science none are more challenging yet fascinating than those posed by consciousness. In The Science of Consciousness leading researchers examine how consciousness is being investigated in the key areas of cognitive psychology, neuropsychology and clinical psychology. Within cognitive psychology, special focus is given to the function of consciousness, and to the relation of conscious processing to nonconscious processing in perception, learning, memory and information dissemination. Neuropsychology includes examination of the neural conditions for consciousness and the effects of brain damage. Finally, mind/body interactions in clinical and experimental settings are considered, including the somatic effects of imagery, biofeedback and placebo effects. Every chapter is written by an expert in the field. They each provide a clear overview of existing research along with an exciting new synthesis of consciousness studies. The The Science of Consciousness will be invaluable for students, researchers and clinicians interested in the developments and directions of this rapidly growing field
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Wilber, Ken (2000). Integral Psychology: Consciousness, Spirit, Psychology, Therapy. Shambhala.   (Cited by 235 | Google)
Abstract: The goal of an "integral psychology" is to honor and embrace every legitimate aspect of human consciousness under one roof. This book presents one of the first truly integrative models of consciousness, psychology, and therapy. Drawing on hundreds of sources--Eastern and Western, ancient and modern--Wilber creates a psychological model that includes waves of development, streams of development, states of consciousness, and the self, and follows the course of each from subconscious to self-conscious to superconscious. Included in the book are charts correlating over a hundred psychological and spiritual schools from around the world, including Kabbalah, Vedanta, Plotinus, Teresa of Ávila, Aurobindo, Theosophy, and modern theorists such as Jean Piaget, Erik Erikson, Jane Loevinger, Lawrence Kohlberg, Carol Gilligan, Erich Neumann, and Jean Gebser. Integral Psychology is Wilber's most ambitious psychological system to date, and it is already being called a landmark study in human development
Yates, John, Not Even Wrong - a view of current science of the mind.   (Google)
Abstract: Present progress in mind science is racing away in the direction of denying the existence of human freewill and animal and human sentience. This brief paper attempts to summarise a few brief reasons why areas of present work by prominent authors have departed from fact to the realms of folk psychology and summarises some of the ways in which present work can be put right. An experiment is described and carried out in an attempt to breach a little more of the present gap between experimental fact and the outmoded theory which others have tried to apply blindly.
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Abstract: The Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness is the first of its kind in the field, and its appearance marks a unique time in the history of intellectual inquiry on the topic. After decades during which consciousness was considered beyond the scope of legitimate scientific investigation, consciousness re-emerged as a popular focus of research towards the end of the last century, and it has remained so for nearly 20 years. There are now so many different lines of investigation on consciousness that the time has come when the field may finally benefit from a book that pulls them together and, by juxtaposing them, provides a comprehensive survey of this exciting field. An authoritative desk reference , which will also be suitable as an advanced textbook
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