MindPapers: 8.6b. Hypnosis and Consciousness

Alexander, A.; Andrew, A.; Sakari, Kallio & Antti, Revonsuo (2007). Hypnosis induces a changed composition of brain oscillations in EEG: A case study. Contemporary Hypnosis 24 (1):3-18. (Google | Edit)

Araoz, Daniel L. (2001). The unconscious in Ericksonian hypnotherapy. Australian Journal of Clinical Hypnotherapy and Hypnosis 22 (2):78-92. (Google | Edit)

Baruss, Imants (2003). Hypnosis. In Imants Baruss (ed.), Alterations of Consciousness: An Empirical Analysis for Social Scientists. American Psychological Association. (Google | Edit)

Bayne, Tim (2007). Hypnosis and the unity of consciousness. In Graham A. Jamieson (ed.), Hypnosis and Conscious States: The Cognitive Neuroscience Perspective. Oxford University Press. (Google | Edit)

Block, Ned (2002). Behaviorism revisited. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24:977-978. (Cited by 2 | Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: O'Regan and Noe declare that the qualitative character of experience is constituted by the nature of the sensorimotor contingencies at play when we perceive. Sensorimotor contingencies are a highly restricted set of input-output relations. The restriction excludes contingencies that donât essentially involve perceptual systems. Of course if the âsensoryâ in âsensorimotorâ were to be understood mentalistically, the thesis would not be of much interest, so I assume that these contingencies are to be understood non-mentalistically. Contrary to their view, experience is a matter of what mediates between input and output, not input-output relations all by themselves. However, instead of mounting a head-on collision with their view, I think it will be more useful to consider a consequence of their view that admits of obvious counterexamples. The consequence consists of two claims: (1) any two systems that share that highly restricted set of input-output relations are therefor experientially the same and (2) conversely, any two systems that share experience must share these sensorimotor contingencies. Once stated, the view is so clearly wrong that my ascription of it to them might be challenged. At least it is a consequence of a major strand in their view. Perhaps this will be an opportunity for them to disassociate themselves from it. I will limit myself to (1)

Boly, Mélanie; Faymonville, Marie-Elisabeth; Vogt, Brent A.; Maquet, Pierre & Laureys, Steven (2007). Hypnotic regulation of consciousness and the pain neuromatrix. In Graham A. Jamieson (ed.), Hypnosis and Conscious States: The Cognitive Neuroscience Perspective. Oxford University Press. (Google | Edit)

Borch-Jacobsen, Mikkel (2005). Simulating the unconscious. Psychoanalysis and History 7 (1):5-20. (Google | Edit)

Bryant, Richard A. & Mallard, David (2003). Seeing is believing: The reality of hypnotic hallucinations. Consciousness and Cognition 12 (2):219-230. (Cited by 6 | Google | Edit)

Burgess, Adrian (2007). On the contribution of neurophysiology to hypnosis research: Current state and future directions. In Graham A. Jamieson (ed.), Hypnosis and Conscious States: The Cognitive Neuroscience Perspective. Oxford University Press. (Google | Edit)

Cleeremans, Axel & Myin, Erik (1999). A short review of Consciousness in Action by Susan Hurley. Revue Internationale de Philosophie 3:455-458. (Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: Consider Susan Hurley's depiction of mainstream views of the mind: "The mind is a kind of sandwich, and cognition is the filling" (p. 401). This particular sandwich (with perception as the bottom loaf and action as the top loaf) tastes foul to Hurley, who devotes most of "Consciousness in Action" to a systematic and sometimes extraordinarily detailed critique of what has otherwise been dubbed "classical" models of the mind. This critique then provides the basis for her alternative proposal, in which perception, action and environment are deeply intertwined

David, Alvin; Moore, Mark & Rusu, Dan (2002). Unconscious information processing, hypnotic amnesia, and the misattribution of arousal: Schachter and Singer's theory revised. Journal of Cognitive and Behavioral Psychotherapies 2 (1):23-33. (Google | Edit)

De Pascalis, Vilfredo (2007). Phase-ordered gamma oscillations and the modulation of hypnotic experience. In Graham A. Jamieson (ed.), Hypnosis and Conscious States: The Cognitive Neuroscience Perspective. Oxford University Press. (Google | Edit)

Dienes, Zoltán & Perner, Josef (2007). Executive control without conscious awareness: The cold control theory of hypnosis. In Graham A. Jamieson (ed.), Hypnosis and Conscious States: The Cognitive Neuroscience Perspective. Oxford University Press. (Google | Edit)

Egner, Tobias & Raz, Amir (2007). Cognitive control processes and hypnosis. In Graham A. Jamieson (ed.), Hypnosis and Conscious States: The Cognitive Neuroscience Perspective. Oxford University Press. (Google | Edit)

Fingelkurts, ; Andrew, A.; Alexander, A.; Sakari, Kallio & Antti, Revonsuo (2007). Cortex functional connectivity as a neurophysiological correlate of hypnosis: An EEG case study. Neuropsychologia 45 (7):1452-1462. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)

Gallagher, Shaun (2005). Review of Alva noë's Action in Perception. Times Literary Supplement. (Google | Edit)

Abstract: In Action in Perception, Alva Noë provides a persuasive account of the “enactive” approach to perception, according to which perception is not simply based on the processing of sensory information, or on the construction of internal representations, but is fundamentally shaped by the motor possibilities of the perceiving body. As John Dewey put it in 1896, in his essay, “The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology”

Gruzelier, John (2005). Altered states of consciousness and hypnosis in the twenty-first century: Comment. Contemporary Hypnosis 22 (1):1-7. (Google | Edit)

Hilgard, Ernest R. (1979). Consciousness and control: Lessons from hypnosis. Australian Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis 7:103-15. (Google | Edit)

Hurley, Susan L. (2007). Neural dominance, neural deference, and sensorimotor dynamics. In M. Velmans (ed.), Encyclopedia of Consciousness. Blackwell. (Google | Edit)

Abstract: Why is neural activity in a particular area expressed as experience of red rather than green, or as visual experience rather than auditory? Indeed, why does it have any conscious expression at all? These familiar questions indicate the explanatory gap between neural activity and ‘what it’s like’-- qualities of conscious experience. The comparative explanatory gaps, intermodal and intramodal, can be separated from the absolute explanatory gap and associated zombie issues--why does neural activity have any conscious expression at all?. Here I focus on comparative gaps: why is neural activity in a given area expressed as this type of experience rather than that type of experience?

Jamieson, Graham A., Hypnosis and conscious states: The cognitive neuroscience perspective. (Google | Edit)

Jamieson, Graham A. & Hasegawa, Harutomo (2007). New paradigms of hypnosis research. In Graham A. Jamieson (ed.), Hypnosis and Conscious States: The Cognitive Neuroscience Perspective. Oxford University Press. (Google | Edit)

Jamieson, Graham A. (2007). Previews and prospects for the cognitive neuroscience of hypnosis and conscious states. In Graham A. Jamieson (ed.), Hypnosis and Conscious States: The Cognitive Neuroscience Perspective. Oxford University Press. (Google | Edit)

Kallio, Sakari & Revonsuo, Antti (2003). Hypnotic phenomena and altered states of consciousness: A multilevel framework of description and explanation. Contemporary Hypnosis 20 (3):111-164. (Cited by 18 | Google | More links | Edit)

Kihlstrom, John F. (2007). Consciousness in hypnosis. In Philip David Zelazo, Morris Moscovitch & Evan Thompson (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness. Cambridge. (Google | Edit)

Kihlstrom, John F. (2005). Is hypnosis an altered state of consciousness or what?: Comment. Contemporary Hypnosis 22 (1):34-38. (Google | Edit)

Kunzendorf, Robert G.; Beltz, S. M. & Tymowicz, G. (1992). Self-awareness in autistic subjects and deeply hypnotized subjects: Dissociation of self-concept versus self-consciousness. Imagination, Cognition and Personality 11:129-41. (Google | Edit)

Lynn, Steven Jay; Kirsch, Irving; Knox, Josh; Fassler, Oliver & Lilienfeld, Scott O. (2007). Hypnosis and neuroscience: Implications for the altered state debate. In Graham A. Jamieson (ed.), Hypnosis and Conscious States: The Cognitive Neuroscience Perspective. Oxford University Press. (Google | Edit)

Marone, Fulvio (2002). Suggestions from the unconscious: Freud, hypnosis, and the mind-body problem. In Gertrudis Van de Vijver & Filip Geerardyn (eds.), The Pre-Psychoanalytic Writings of Sigmund Freud. Karnac Books. (Google | Edit)

Naish, Peter (2005). Detecting hypnotically altered states of consciousness: Comment. Contemporary Hypnosis 22 (1):24-30. (Cited by 1 | Google | Edit)

Naish, Peter L. N. (2007). Time distortion, and the nature of hypnosis and consciousness. In Graham A. Jamieson (ed.), Hypnosis and Conscious States: The Cognitive Neuroscience Perspective. Oxford University Press. (Google | Edit)

Oakley, David A. (1999). Hypnosis and consciousness: A structural model. Contemporary Hypnosis 16:215-223. (Cited by 16 | Google | Edit)

Ott, Ulrich (2007). States of absorption: In search of neurobiological foundations. In Graham A. Jamieson (ed.), Hypnosis and Conscious States: The Cognitive Neuroscience Perspective. Oxford University Press. (Google | Edit)

Pekala, Ronald J. & Kumar, V. K. (2007). An empirical-phenomenological approach to quantifying consciousness and states of consciousness: With particular reference to understanding the nature of hypnosis. In Graham A. Jamieson (ed.), Hypnosis and Conscious States: The Cognitive Neuroscience Perspective. Oxford University Press. (Google | Edit)

Pekala, Ronald J. & Kumar, V. K. (2000). Individual differences in patterns of hypnotic experience across low and high hypnotically susceptible individuals. In Robert G. Kunzendorf & Benjamin Wallace (eds.), Individual Differences in Conscious Experience. John Benjamins. (Google | Edit)

Pekala, Ronald J. & Kumar, V. K. (2000). Individual differences in patterns of hypnotic experience across low and high hypnotically susceptible individuals. In (r. Kunzendorf & B. Wallace, eds) individual differences in conscious experience. John Benjamins. (Google | Edit)

Pekala, Ronald J. & Kumar, V. K. (1989). Phenomenological patterns of consciousness during hypnosis: Relevance to cognition and individual differences. Australian Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis 17:1-20. (Cited by 2 | Google | Edit)

Rainville, Pierre; Hofbauer, Rrrobert K.; Bushnell, M. Catherine; Duncan, Gary H. & Price, Donald D. (2002). Hypnosis modulates activity in brain structures involved in the regulation of consciousness. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 14 (6):887-901. (Cited by 73 | Google | More links | Edit)

Rainville, Pierre & Price, Donald D. (2003). Hypnosis phenomenology and the neurobiology of consciousness. International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis 51 (2):105-29. (Cited by 16 | Google | More links | Edit)

Rossi, Ernest L. & Rossi, Kathryn L. (2006). The neuroscience of observing consciousness & mirror neurons in therapeutic hypnosis. American Journal of Clinical Hypnosis 48 (4):263-278. (Cited by 2 | Google | Edit)

Spiegel, David (2005). Multileveling the playing field: Altering our state of consciousness to understand hypnosis: Comment. Contemporary Hypnosis 22 (1):31-33. (Google | Edit)

Spivak, L.; V. Puzenko, S. Medvedev & Polyakov, Y. (1990). Neurophysiological correlates of the altered state of consciousness during hypnosis. Human Physiology 16:405-410. (Cited by 1 | Google | Edit)

Woody, Erik & Szechtman, Henry (2007). To see feelingly: Emotion, motivation, and hypnosis. In Graham A. Jamieson (ed.), Hypnosis and Conscious States: The Cognitive Neuroscience Perspective. Oxford University Press. (Google | Edit)

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