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8.6c. Science of Consciousness, Foundations (Science of Consciousness, Foundations on PhilPapers)

See also:
Baars, Bernard J. (1994). A thoroughly empirical approach to consciousness. Psyche 1 (6).   (Cited by 33 | Google | More links)
Baruss, Imants & Moore, R. J. (1992). Measurement of beliefs about consciousness and reality. Psychological Reports 71:59-64.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Battista, J. R. (1978). The science of consciousness. In K. S. Pope & Jerome L. Singer (eds.), The Stream of Consciousness: Scientific Investigation Into the Flow of Experience. Plenum.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Bitbol, Michel (2002). Science as if situation mattered. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1 (2):181-224.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   When he formulated the program of neurophenomenology, Francisco Varela suggested a balanced methodological dissolution of the hard problem of consciousness. I show that his dissolution is a paradigm which imposes itself onto seemingly opposite views, including materialist approaches. I also point out that Varela's revolutionary epistemological ideas are gaining wider acceptance as a side effect of a recent controversy between hermeneutists and eliminativists. Finally, I emphasize a structural parallel between the science of consciousness and the distinctive features of quantum mechanics. This parallel, together with the former convergences, point towards the common origin of the main puzzles of both quantum mechanics and the philosophy of mind: neglect of the constitutive blindspot of objective knowledge
Block, Ned (2001). Paradox and cross purposes in recent work on consciousness. Cognition 79 (1):197-219.   (Cited by 51 | Google | More links)
Burns, Jean E. (forthcoming). The nature of free will and other independent processing by consciousness. In R. L. Amoroso (ed.), The Complementarity of Mind and Body: Fulfilling the Dream of Descartes, Einstein and Eccles.   (Google)
Chalmers, David J. (1998). The problems of consciousness. In H. Jasper, L. Descarries, V. Castellucci & S. Rossignol (eds.), Consciousness: At the Frontiers of Neuroscience. Lippincott-Raven.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper is an edited transcription of a talk at the 1997 Montreal symposium on "Consciousness at the Frontiers of Neuroscience". There's not much here that isn't said elsewhere, e.g. in "Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness" and "How Can We Construct a Science of Consciousness?"]]
Dennett, Daniel C. (2001). Are we explaining consciousness yet? Cognition 79 (1):221-37.   (Cited by 72 | Google | More links)
Depraz, Natalie & Cosmelli, Diego J. (2003). Empathy and openness: Practices of intersubjectivity at the core of the science of consciousness. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 29.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Flanagan, Owen J. (1995). Consciousness and the natural method. Neuropsychologia 33:1103-15.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Frith, Christopher D. (2003). The scientific study of consciousness. In Maria A. Ron & Trevor W. Robbins (eds.), Disorders of Brain and Mind 2. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Gell-Mann, M. (2001). Consciousness, reduction, and emergence: Some remarks. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 929:41-49.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Goldman, A. (2000). Can science know when you're conscious? Epistemological Foundations of Consciousness Research. Journal Of Consciousness Studies 7:3-22.   (Cited by 18 | Google | More links)
Greenfield, Susan A. (2002). Mind, brain and consciousness. British Journal of Psychiatry 181 (2):91-93.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Grinker, R. R. (1953). Problems of consciousness: A review, an analysis, and a proposition. In H. A. Abramson (ed.), Problems of Consciousness: Transactions of the Fourth Conference. Josiah Macy Foundation.   (Google)
Harman, Willis W. (1987). Consciousness as causal reality: Towards a complementary science. In The Real And The Imaginary. New York: Paragon House.   (Google)
Hut, Piet (1999). Exploring actuality through experiment and experience. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & David J. Chalmers (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness III. MIT Press.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Jahn, Robert G. & Dunne, Brenda J. (1997). Science of the subjective. Journal of Scientific Exploration 11 (2):201-224.   (Cited by 22 | Google | More links)
Jewkes, Sonya & Barušs, Imants (2000). Personality correlates of beliefs about consciousness and reality. Advanced Development 9:91-103.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Jordan, J. Scott & McBride, Dawn M. (2007). Stable instabilities in the study of consciousness: A potentially integrative prologue? Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (1):viii-xii.   (Google | More links)
Jordan, J. Scott & McBride, Dawn M. (2007). The Concepts of Consciousness: Integrating an Emerging Science. Imprint Academic.   (Google)
Josephson, Brian & Rubik, Beverly (1992). The challenge of consciousness research. Frontier Perspectives 3 (1):15-19.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Maasen, Sabine (2007). Selves in turmoil. In J. Scott Jordan & Dawn M. McBride (eds.), The Concepts of Consciousness: Integrating an Emerging Science. Imprint Academic.   (Google)
Mandler, George (2005). The consciousness continuum: From "qualia" to "free will". Psychological Research/Psychologische Forschung. Vol 69 (5-6):330-337.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Menant, Christophe, Evolution as connecting first-person and third-person perspectives of consciousness (2008).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: First-person and third-person perspectives are different items of human consciousness. Feeling the taste of a fruit or being consciously part of a group eating fruits call for different perspectives of consciousness. The latter is about objective reality (third-person data). The former is about subjective experience (first-person data) and cannot be described entirely by objective reality. We propose to look at how these two perspectives could be rooted in an evolutionary origin of human consciousness, and somehow be connected. Our starting point is a scenario describing how evolution could have transformed a non self-conscious auto-representation into a conscious self-representation (Menant 2006). The scenario is based on the performance of inter-subjectivity existing among non human primates (Gardenfors 2006). A key item of the scenario is the identification of the auto-representation of a subject with the representations that the subject has of her conspecifics, the latter feeding the former with the meaning: “existing in the environment”. So during evolution, pre-human primates were brought to perceive their auto-representation as existing in the environment. Such process could have generated the initial elements of a conscious self-representation. We take this scenario as providing a possible rooting of human consciousness in evolution. We develop here a part of this scenario by expliciting the inward and outward components of the non self-conscious auto-representation. Inward components are about proprioception and interoception (thirst, pain, …). Outward components cover the sensory information relative to the perception of the body (seen feet, … ) and of its effects on the environment. We consider that the initial elements of a conscious self-representation have been applied to both inward and outward components of the auto-representation. We propose that the application to inward components made possible some first-person information, and that the application to outward components brought up third-person information. Relations between the two perspectives are highlighted. Such approach can root first-person and third-person perspectives in the same slot of human evolution. We conclude by a summary of the above and introduce a possible application of this approach to the concepts of bodily self and of pre-reflexive self-consciousness (Legrand, 2006)
Merker, Bjorn H. (ms). The common denominator of conscious states: Implications for the biology of consciousness.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In order to distinguish the conscious state itself from its aspects and contents we need an answer to the question "if there is something it is like to be conscious, what is it?" A succinct answer to this question is provided in the form of a common denominator of all conscious states. This characterization of the conscious state has implications for the systematic study of consciousness through its bearing on a number of concrete issues connected with the nature of consciousness and its relation to the biology of brains and their evolution. These are discussed with a view to delineating the characteristics of consciousness, suggesting the primary functional role of consciousness in the total economy of brain functions, and exploring the tractability of the problem of consciousness from the standpoint of ordinary science. 1997
Midgley, David (2006). Intersubjectivity and collective consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (5):99-109.   (Google)
Abstract: This paper explores some connections between the philosophically central topic of intersubjectivity highlighted in John Ziman's article and the notion of collective consciousness, which has received very little formal attention in mainstream philosophy. The deconstruction of the Cartesian model of isolated spheres of consciousness which the intersubjective viewpoint brings about is supported by considerations from Kant's critical account of transcendental psychology. The phenomenon of empathy, an essential component in the achievement of intersubjective consensus, is related to the possibility of shared experiences, i.e. of two or more individuals participating in the same conscious experience. The use of mental concept-words applied to collectives of persons is interpreted as more than a mere metaphor; this interpretation is supported by comparison with complex collective behaviours in other social species. It is necessary to say that this paper very much represents work in progress-- other commitments have prevented the author from supporting many of the points made with references or further analysis at this stage, and it is hoped merely that this exploratory essay will provide useful ideas for further research
Miller, D. (2000). Designing a bridge for consciousness: Are criteria for a unification of approaches feasible? Advances in Mind-Body Medicine 16 (2):82-89.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Needleman, Jacob (1993). Inner empiricism as a way to a science of consciousness. Noetic Sciences Review.   (Google)
Núñez, Rafael E. (1997). Eating soup with chopsticks: Dogmas, difficulties and alternatives in the study of conscious experience. Journal of Consciousness Studies 4 (2):143-166.   (Google)
Ó Nualláin, Séan (2006). Inner and outer empiricism in consciousness research. New Ideas in Psychology 24 (1):30-40.   (Google)
Nunez, R. (1997). Eating soup with chopsticks: Dogmas, difficulties, and alternatives in the study of conscious experience. Journal of Consciousness Studies 4:143-66.   (Google)
Overgaard, Morten (2004). Confounding factors in contrastive analysis. Synthese 141 (2):217-31.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   Several authors within psychology, neuroscience and philosophy take for granted that standard empirical research techniques are applicable when studying consciousness. In this article, it is discussed whether one of the key methods in cognitive neuroscience – the contrastive analysis – suffers from any serious confounding when applied to the field of consciousness studies; that is to say, if there are any systematic difficulties when studying consciousness with this method that make the results untrustworthy. Through an analysis of theoretical arguments in favour of using contrastive analysis, combined with analyses of empirical findings, I conclude by arguing for three factors that currently are confounding of research using contrastive analysis. These are (1) unconscious processes, (2) introspective reports, and (3) attention
Papineau, David (2003). Could there be a science of consciousness? Philosophical Issues 13 (1):205-20.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Pickering, John (2000). Methods are a message. In Max Velmans (ed.), Investigating Phenomenal Consciousness: New Methodologies and Maps. John Benjamins.   (Google)
Rakover, Sam S. (2002). Scientific rules of the game and the mind/body: A critique based on the theory of measurement. Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (11):52-57.   (Google)
Revonsuo, Antti (2000). Inner Presence: Consciousness As a Biological Phenomenon. MIT Press.   (Cited by 18 | Google | More links)
Scott, A. C. (2000). Modern science and the mind. In Max Velmans (ed.), Investigating Phenomenal Consciousness: New Methodologies and Maps. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Scott, A. C. (1998). Reductionism revisited. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness II. MIT Press.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Searle, John R. (1998). How to study consciousness scientifically. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness II. MIT Press.   (Cited by 58 | Google | More links)
Simon, Herbert A. (1997). Scientific approaches to the question of consciousness. In Jonathan D. Cohen & Jonathan W. Schooler (eds.), Scientific Approaches to Consciousness. Lawrence Erlbaum.   (Google)
Stevens, S. S. (1966). Quantifying the sensory experience. In Paul K. Feyerabend & Grover Maxwell (eds.), Mind, Matter, and Method: Essays in Philosophy and Science in Honor of Herbert Feigl. University of Minnesota Press.   (Google)
Sullivan, Philip R. (2006). Are current philosophical theories of consciousness useful to neuroscientists? Behavior and Philosophy 34:59-70.   (Google)
Thomas, Nigel (1999). Are theories of imagery theories of imagination? Cognitive Science 23:207--45.   (Google)
Abstract: Can theories of mental imagery, conscious mental contents, developed within cognitive science throw light on the obscure (but culturally very significant) concept of imagination? Three extant views of mental imagery are considered: quasi-pictorial, description, and perceptual activity theories. The first two face serious theoretical and empirical difficulties. The third is (for historically contingent reasons) little known, theoretically underdeveloped, and empirically untried, but has real explanatory potential. It rejects the "traditional" symbolic computational view of mental contents, but is compatible with recent situated cognition and active vision approaches in robotics. This theory is developed and elucidated. Three related key aspects of imagination (non-discursiveness, creativity, and seeing as) raise difficulties for the other theories. Perceptual activity theory presents imagery as non-discursive and relates it closely to seeing as. It is thus well placed to be the basis for a general theory of imagination and its role in creative thought.
Vandervert, Larry R. (2006). Kuttner and Rosenblum failed to "objectify" consciousness. Journal of Mind and Behavior 27 (2):167-176.   (Google)
Velmans, Max (2007). An epistemology for the study of consciousness. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell.   (Google)
Abstract: This is a prepublication version of the final chapter from the Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. In it I re-examine the basic conditions required for a study of conscious experiences in the light of progress made in recent years in the field of consciousness studies. I argue that neither dualist nor reductionist assumptions about subjectivity versus objectivity and the privacy of experience versus the public nature of scientific observations allow an adequate understanding of how studies of consciousness actually proceed. The chapter examines the sense in which the experimenter is also a subject, the sense in which all experienced phenomena are private and subjective, the different senses in which a phenomenon can nevertheless be public and observations of it objective, and the conditions for intra-subjective and intersubjective repeatability. The chapter goes on to re-examine the empirical method and how methods used in psychology differ from those used in physics. I argue that a reflexive understanding of these relationships supports a form of “critical phenomenology” that fits consciousness studies smoothly into science
Velmans, Max (1999). Intersubjective science. [Journal (Paginated)] 6 (2-3):299-306.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The study of consciousness in modern science is hampered by deeply ingrained, dualist presuppositions about the nature of consciousness. In particular, conscious experiences are thought to be private and subjective, contrasting with physical phenomena which are public and objective. In the present article, I argue that all observed phenomena are, in a sense, private to a given observer, although there are some events to which there is public access. Phenomena can be objective in the sense of intersubjective, investigators can be objective in the sense of truthful or dispassionate, and procedures can be objective in being well-specified, but observed phenomena cannot be objective in the sense of being observer-free. Phenomena are only repeatable in the sense that they are judged by a community of observers to be tokens of the same type. Stripped of its dualist trappings the empirical method becomes if you carry out these procedures you will observe or experience these results - which applies as much to a science of consciousness as it does to physics
Velmans, Max (1996). Introduction to the science of consciousness. In Max Velmans (ed.), The Science of Consciousness. Routledge.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Velmans, Max (2000). Understanding Consciousness. Routledge.   (Cited by 78 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The mysteries of consciousness have gripped the human imagination for over 2,500 years. At the dawn of the new millennium, Understanding Consciousness provides new solutions to some of the deepest puzzles surrounding its nature and function. Drawing on recent scientific discoveries, Max Velmans challenges conventional reductionist thought, providing an understanding of how consciousness relates to the brain and physical world that is neither dualist, nor reductionist. Understanding Consciousness will be of great interest to psychologists, philosophers, neuroscientists and other professionals concerned with mind/body relationships, and all who care deeply about this subject
Walsh, Roger (2000). The search for an integral theory of consciousness. Advances in Mind-Body Medicine 16 (2):95-97.   (Google | More links)
Wallace, B. Alan (2000). The Taboo of Subjectivity: Toward a New Science of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 33 | Google)
Abstract: This book takes a bold new look at ways of exploring the nature, origins, and potentials of consciousness within the context of science and religion.
Williams, Donald C. (1934). Scientific method and the existence of consciousness. Psychological Review 41:461-79.   (Google)
Zeman, Adam Z. J. (2006). What do we mean by "conscious" and "aware?". Neuropsychological Rehabilitation 16 (4):356-376.   (Google | More links)