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8.6c. Schizophrenia (Schizophrenia on PhilPapers)

See also:
Amador, Xavier F. & David, Anthony S. (2004). Insight and psychosis: awareness of illness in schizophrenia and related disorders. Oxford University Press, USA.   (Cited by 62 | Google | More links | Edit)
Andreasen, N. (2000). Is schizophrenia a disorder of memory or consciousness? In Endel Tulving (ed.), Memory, Consciousness, and the Brain: The Tallinn Conference. Psychology Press/Taylor & Francis.   (Cited by 1 | Google | Edit)
Area, R.; Garcia-Caballero, A.; Gómez, I.; Somoza, M. J.; Garcia-Lado, I.; Recimil, M. J. & Vila, L. (2003). Conscious compensations for thought insertion. Psychopathology 36 (3):129-131.   (Google | More links | Edit)
Bacon, E.; Danion, J. M.; Kauffmann-Muller, F. & Bruant, A. (2001). Consciousness in schizophrenia: A metacognitive approach to semantic memory. Consciousness and Cognition 10 (4):473-484.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links | Edit)
Abstract: Recent studies have shown that schizophrenia may be a disease affecting the states of consciousness. The present study is aimed at investigating metamemory, i.e., the knowledge about one's own memory capabilities, in patients with schizophrenia. The accuracy of the Confidence level (CL) in the correctness of the answers provided during a recall phase, and the predictability of the Feeling of Knowing (FOK) when recall fails were measured using a task consisting of general information questions and assessing semantic memory. Nineteen outpatients were paired with 19 control subjects with respect to age, sex, and education. Results showed that patients with schizophrenia exhibited an impaired semantic memory. CL ratings as well as CL and FOK accuracy were not significantly different in the schizophrenic and the control groups. However, FOK ratings were significantly reduced for the patient group, and discordant FOK judgments were also observed more frequently. Such results suggest that FOK judgments are impaired in patients with schizophrenia, which confirms that schizophrenia is an illness characterized by an impaired conscious awareness of one's own knowledge
Barr, W. B. (1998). Neurobehavioral Disorders of Awareness and Their Relevance to Schizophrenia. In Xavier F. Amador & Anthony S. David (eds.), Insight and Psychosis: Awareness of Illness in Schizophrenia and Related Disorders. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 11 | Google | Edit)
Baumann, Sean E. (2005). The schizophrenias as disorders of self consciousness. South African Psychiatry Review 8 (3):95-99.   (Google | More links | Edit)
Behrendt, R. P. & Young, C. (2004). Hallucinations in schizophrenia, sensory impairment, and brain disease: A unifying model. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (6):771-787.   (Cited by 30 | Google | More links | Edit)
Abstract: Based on recent insight into the thalamocortical system and its role in perception and conscious experience, a unified pathophysiological framework for hallucinations in neurological and psychiatric conditions is proposed, which integrates previously unrelated neurobiological and psychological findings. Gamma-frequency rhythms of discharge activity from thalamic and cortical neurons are facilitated by cholinergic arousal and resonate in networks of thalamocortical circuits, thereby transiently forming assemblies of coherent gamma oscillations under constraints of afferent sensory input and prefrontal attentional mechanisms. If perception is based on synchronisation of intrinsic gamma activity in the thalamocortical system, then sensory input to specific thalamic nuclei may merely play a constraining role. Hallucinations can be regarded as underconstrained perceptions that arise when the impact of sensory input on activation of thalamocortical circuits and synchronisation of thalamocortical gamma activity is reduced. In conditions that are accompanied by hallucinations, factors such as cortical hyperexcitability, cortical attentional mechanisms, hyperarousal, increased noise in specific thalamic nuclei, and random sensory input to specific thalamic nuclei may, to a varying degree, contribute to underconstrained activation of thalamocortical circuits. The reticular thalamic nucleus plays an important role in suppressing random activity of relay cells in specific thalamic nuclei, and its dysfunction may be implicated in the biological vulnerability to hallucinations in schizophrenia. Combined with general activation during cholinergic arousal, this leads to excessive disinhibition in specific thalamic nuclei, which may allow cortical attentional mechanisms to recruit thalamic relay cells into resonant assemblies of gamma oscillations, regardless of their actual sensory input, thereby producing an underconstrained perceptual experience. Key Words: Charles Bonnet syndrome; gamma oscillations; hallucinations; late paraphrenia; Lewy body dementia; perception; schizophrenia; thalamocortical system
Danion, Jean-Marie; Cuervo, Christine; Piolino, Pascale; Huron, Caroline; Riutort, Marielle; Peretti, Charles S. & Eustache, Francis (2005). Conscious recollection in autobiographical memory: An investigation in schizophrenia. Consciousness and Cognition 14 (3):535-547.   (Cited by 3 | Google | Edit)
Danion, Jean-Marie & Huron, Caroline (2007). Can we study subjective experiences objectively? First-person perspective approaches and impaired subjective states of awareness in schizophrenia? In Philip David Zelazo, Morris Moscovitch & Evan Thompson (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness. Cambridge.   (Google | Edit)
Danion, Jean-Marie; Huron, Caroline; Rizzo, Lydia & Vidailhet, Pierre (2004). Emotion, memory, and conscious awareness in schizophrenia. In Daniel Reisberg & Paula Hertel (eds.), Memory and Emotion. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google | Edit)
Del Cul, Antoine; Dehaene, Stanislas & Leboyer, Marion (2006). Preserved subliminal processing and impaired conscious access in schizophrenia. Archives of General Psychiatry 63 (12):1313-1323.   (Google | Edit)
Depraz, Natalie (2003). Putting the epoche into practice: Schizophrenic experience as illustrating the phenomenological exploration of consciousness. In K. William M. Fulford, Katherine J. Morris, John Z. Sadler & Giovanni Stanghellini (eds.), Nature and Narrative: An Introduction to the New Philosophy of Psychiatry. Oxford University Press.   (Google | Edit)
Edelstyn, Nicola M. J.; Drakeford, Justine; Oyebode, Femi & Findlay, Chris (2003). Investigation of conscious recollection, false recognition and delusional misidentification in patients with schizophrenia. Psychopathology 36 (6):312-319.   (Google | Edit)
Evans, Cathryn E. Y.; Bowman, Caroline H. & Turnbull, Oliver H. (2005). Subjective awareness on the iowa gambling task: The key role of emotional experience in schizophrenia. Journal of Clinical and Experimental Neuropsychology 27 (6):656-664.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links | Edit)
Flashman, Laura A. (2004). Disorders of insight, self-awareness, and attribution in schizophrenia. In Bernard D. Beitman & Jyotsna Nair (eds.), Self-Awareness Deficits in Psychiatric Patients: Neurobiology, Assessment, and Treatment. W.W. Norton & Co.   (Google | Edit)
Flashman, Laura A. & Roth, Robert M. (2004). Neural correlates of unawareness of illness in psychosis. In Xavier F. Amador & Anthony S. David (eds.), Insight and Psychosis: Awareness of Illness in Schizophrenia and Related Disorders. Oxford University Press.   (Google | Edit)
Frith, Christopher D. (1979). Consciousness, information processing and schizophrenia. British Journal of Psychiatry 134:225-35.   (Cited by 108 | Google | More links | Edit)
Frith, Christopher D.; Blakemore, S. J. & Wolpert, D. (2000). Explaining the symptoms of schizophrenia: Abnormalities in the awareness of action. Brain Research Reviews 31 (2):357-363.   (Cited by 140 | Google | More links | Edit)
Fuchs, Thomas (2005). Corporealized and disembodied minds: A phenomenological view of the body in melancholia and schizophrenia. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 12 (2):95-107.   (Cited by 2 | Google | Edit)
Gallagher, Shaun (2004). Agency, ownership, and alien control in schizophrenia. In Dan Zahavi, T. Grunbaum & Josef Parnas (eds.), The Structure and Development of Self-Consciousness: Interdisciplinary Perspectives. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 1 | Google | Edit)
Gallup Jr, Gordon G.; Anderson, James R. & Platek, Steven M. (2003). Self-awareness, social intelligence and schizophrenia. In Tilo Kircher & Anthony David (eds.), The Self in Neuroscience and Psychiatry. Cambridge University Press.   (Google | Edit)
Gambini, O.; Barbieri, V. & Scarone, S. (2004). Theory of mind in schizophrenia: First person vs third person perspective. Consciousness and Cognition 13 (1):39-46.   (Cited by 4 | Google | Edit)
Grant, Donald C. (2002). Becoming conscious and schizophrenia. Neuro-Psychoanalysis 4 (1):199-207.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)
Haggard, Patrick; Martin, Flavie; Taylor-Clarke, Marisa; Jeannerod, Marc & Franck, Nicolas (2003). Awareness of action in schizophrenia. Neuroreport 14 (7):1081-1085.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links | Edit)
Herzog, Michael H. (2006). The relationship of visual masking and basic object recognition in healthy observers and patients with schizophrenia. In gmen, Haluk; Breitmeyer, Bruno G. (2006). The First Half Second: The Microgenesis and Temporal Dynamics of Unconscious and Conscious Visual Processes. (Pp. 259-274). Cambridge, MA, US: MIT Press. Xi, 410 Pp.   (Google | Edit)
Hoerl, Christoph (2001). Introduction: Understanding, explaining, and intersubjectivity in schizophrenia. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 8 (2-3):83-88.   (Google | Edit)
Kircher, T. T. J. & Thienel, R. (2006). Functional brain imaging of symptoms and cognition in schizophrenia. In Steven Laureys (ed.), Boundaries of Consciousness. Elsevier.   (Cited by 8 | Google | Edit)
Kircher, T. T. J. & Leube, D. (2003). Self-consciousness, self-agency, and schizophrenia. Consciousness and Cognition 12 (4):656-669.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links | Edit)
Abstract: Empirical approaches on topics such as consciousness, self-awareness, or introspective perspective, need a conceptual framework so that the emerging, still unconnected findings can be integrated and put into perspective. We introduce a model of self-consciousness derived from phenomenology, philosophy, the cognitive, and neurosciences. We will then give an overview of research data on one particular aspect of our model, self-agency, trying to link findings from cognitive psychology and neuroscience. Finally, we will expand on pathological aspects of self-agency, and in particular on psychosis in schizophrenia. We show, that a deficient self-monitoring system underlies, in part, hallucinations and formal thought (language) disorder in schizophrenia. We argue, that self-consciousness is a valid construct and can be studied with the instruments of cognitive and neuroscience
Light, G. & Braff, D. (2000). Do self-reports of perceptual anomalies reflect gating deficits in schizophrenia patients? Biological Psychiatry 47:463-467.   (Cited by 50 | Google | More links | Edit)
Medalia, Alice & Lim, Rosa W. (2004). Self-awareness of cognitive functioning in schizophrenia. Schizophrenia Research 71 (2):331-338.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links | Edit)
Parnas, Josef & Sass, Louis A. (2001). Self, solipsism, and schizophrenic delusions. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 8 (2-3):101-120.   (Cited by 16 | Google | More links | Edit)
Reynolds, Gavin P. (2002). Schizophrenia. In Elaine Perry, Heather Ashton & Allan Young (eds.), Neurochemistry of Consciousness: Neurotransmitters in Mind. John Benjamins.   (Google | Edit)
Roussel, Jean-Robert & Bachelor, Alexandra (2000). Altered state and phenomenology of consciousness in schizophrenia. Imagination, Cognition and Personality 20 (2):141-159.   (Google | Edit)
Sass, Louis A. (2004). Affectivity in schizophrenia: A phenomenological view. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (10-11):127-147.   (Cited by 1 | Google | Edit)
Sass, Louis A. & Parnas, Josef (2001). Phenomenology of self-disturbances in schizophrenia: Some research findings and directions. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 8 (4):347-356.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links | Edit)
Sass, Louis A. & Parnas, Josef (2003). Schizophrenia, consciousness, and the self. Schizophrenia Bulletin 29 (3):427-444.   (Cited by 28 | Google | More links | Edit)
Sass, Louis A. (2000). Schizophrenia, self-experience, and the so-called "negative symptoms": Reflections on hyperreflexivity. In Dan Zahavi (ed.), Exploring the Self: Philosophical and Psychopathological Perspectives on Self-Experience. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 28 | Google | Edit)
Schwartz, Michael A.; Wiggins, Osborne P.; Naudin, Jean & Spitzer, Manfred (2005). Rebuilding reality: A phenomenology of aspects of chronic schizophrenia. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (1).   (Google | More links | Edit)
Abstract: Schizophrenia, like other pathological conditions of mental life, has not been systematically included in the general study of consciousness. By focusing on aspects of chronic schizophrenia, we attempt to remedy this omission. Basic components of Husserl’s phenomenology (intentionality, synthesis, constitution, epoche, and unbuilding) are explicated and then employed in an account of chronic schizophrenia. In schizophrenic experience, basic constituents of reality are lost and the subject must try to explicitly re-constitute them. “Automatic mental life” is weakened such that much of the world that is normally taken-for-granted cannot continue to be so. The subject must actively re-lay the ontological foundations of reality
Sonntag, Philippe; Gokalsing, Erick; Olivier, Carinne; Robert, Philippe; Burglen, Franck; Kauffmann-Muller, Françoise; Huron, Caroline; Salame, Pierre & Danion, Jean-Marie (2003). Impaired strategic regulation of contents of conscious awareness in schizophrenia. Consciousness and Cognition 12 (2):190-200.   (Cited by 4 | Google | Edit)
Tononi, Giulio Srinivasan & Edelman, Gerald M. (2000). Schizophrenia and the mechanisms of conscious integration. Brain Research Reviews 31 (2):391-400.   (Cited by 97 | Google | More links | Edit)
Villagrán, José M. (2003). Consciousness disorders in schizophrenia: A forgotten land for psychopathology. International Journal of Psychology and Psychological Therapy 3 (2):209-234.   (Google | Edit)
Zahavi, Dan (2001). Schizophrenia and self-awareness. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology. Special Issue 8 (4):339-341.   (Google | More links | Edit)