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8.7. Science of Visual Consciousness (Science of Visual Consciousness on PhilPapers)

See also:
Bruce, Vicki & Green, Patrick (1985). Visual Perception: Physiology, Psychology, and Ecology. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.   (Google)
Cutting, James E. (2003). Reconceiving perceptual space. In Heiko Hecht, Robert Schwartz & Margaret Atherton (eds.), Looking Into Pictures. The Mit Press.   (Google)

8.7a Neural Correlates of Visual Consciousness

Anderson, R. A. (1997). Neural mechanisms in visual motion perception in primates. Neuron 18:865-872.   (Google)
Babiloni, Claudio; Vecchio, Fabrizio; Bultrini, Alessandro; Romani, Gian Luca & Rossini, Paolo Maria (2006). Pre- and poststimulus alpha rhythms are related to conscious visual perception: A high-resolution EEC study. Cerebral Cortex 16 (12):1690-1700.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Babiloni, Claudio; Vecchio, Fabrizio; Miriello, Maurizio; Romani, Gian Luca & Rossini, Paolo Maria (2006). Visuo-spatial consciousness and parieto-occipital areas: A high-resolution EEG study. Cerebral Cortex 16 (1):37-46.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Bar, Moshe & Biederman, Irving (1999). Localizing the cortical region mediating visual awareness of object identity. Proceedings Of The National Academy Of Sciences Of The United States Of America 96 (4):1790-1793.   (Cited by 34 | Google | More links)
Beteleva, T. G. & Farber, D. A. (2002). Role of the frontal cortical areas in the analysis of visual stimuli at conscious and unconscious levels. Human Physiology 28 (5):511-519.   (Google | More links)
Blake, Randolph & Kim, Chai-Youn (2005). Psychophysical strategies for rendering the normally visible invisible. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9 (8):381-388.   (Google)
Abstract: What are the neural correlates of conscious visual awareness? Tackling this question requires contrasting neural correlates of stimulus processing culminating in visual awareness with neural correlates of stimulus processing unaccompanied by awareness. To contrast these two neural states, one must be able to erase an otherwise visible stimulus from awareness. This paper describes and critiques visual phenomena involving dissociation of physical stimulation and conscious awareness: degraded stimulation, visual masking, visual crowding, bistable figures, binocular rivalry, motion-induced blindness, inattentional blindness, change blindness and attentional blink. While no single strategy stands above the others, those producing changing visual awareness despite invariant physical stimulation are clearly preferable
Breitmeyer, Bruno G. & Stoerig, Petra (2006). Neural correlates and levels of conscious and unconscious vision. In Haluk Ögmen & Bruno G. Breitmeyer (eds.), The First Half Second: The Microgenesis and Temporal Dynamics of Unconscious and Conscious Visual Processes. MIT Press.   (Google)
Brouwer, Gijs J.; van Ee, Raymond & Schwarzbach, Jens (2005). Activation in visual cortex correlates with the awareness of stereoscopic depth. Journal of Neuroscience 25 (45):10403-10413.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Bullier, Jean (2001). Feedback connections and conscious vision. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 5 (9):369-370.   (Cited by 47 | Google | More links)
Carmel, D.; Lavie, N. & Rees, G. (2006). Conscious awareness of flicker in humans involves frontal and parietal cortex. Current Biology 16 (9):907-11.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Carlson, Thomas A.; Rauschenberger, Robert & Verstraten, Frans A. J. (2007). No representation without awareness in the lateral occipital cortex. Psychological Science 18 (4):298-302.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Changeux, Jean-Pierre & Dehaene, Stanislas (2005). Ongoing spontaneous activity controls access to consciousness: A neuronal model for inattentional blindness. PLoS Biology 3 (5):e141.   (Google)
Abstract: 1 INSERM-CEA Unit 562, Cognitive Neuroimaging, Service Hospitalier Fre´de´ric Joliot, Orsay, France, 2 CNRS URA2182 Re´cepteurs and Cognition, Institut Pasteur, Paris, France
Clavagnier, Simon; Falchier, Arnaud & Kennedy, Henry (2004). Long-distance feedback projections to area v1: Implications for multisensory integration, spatial awareness, and visual consciousness. Cognitive, Affective and Behavioral Neuroscience. Special Issue 4 (2):117-126.   (Google)
Cowey, Alan (1996). Visual awareness: Still at sea with seeing? Current Biology 6:45-47.   (Cited by 36 | Google | More links)
Crick, Francis & Koch, Christof (1995). Are we aware of neural activity in primary visual cortex? Nature 375:121-23.   (Cited by 486 | Google | More links)
Crick, Francis & Koch, Christof (1995). Cortical areas in visual awareness. Nature 377:294-5.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Cussins, Adrian (2002). Experience, thought and activity. In Y. Gunther (ed.), Essays on Nonconceptual Content. MIT Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Tim Crane University College London 1. Introduction P.F. Strawson argued that ‘mature sensible experience (in general) presents itself as … an immediate consciousness of the existence of things outside us’ (1979: 97). He began his defence of this very natural idea by asking how someone might typically give a description of their current visual experience, and offered this example of such a description: ‘I see the red light of the setting sun filtering through the black and thickly clustered branches of the elms; I see the dappled deer grazing in groups on the vivid green grass…’ (1979: 97). In other words, in describing experience, we tend to describe the objects of experience – the things which we experience – and the ways they are when we are experiencing them
Duncan, Seth & Barrett, Lisa Feldman (2007). The role of the amygdala in visual awareness. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 11 (5):190-192.   (Google | More links)
Eriksson, Johan; Larsson, Anne; Åhlström, Katrine Riklund & Nyberg, Lars (2007). Similar frontal and distinct posterior cortical regions mediate visual and auditory perceptual awareness. Cerebral Cortex 17 (4):760-765.   (Google | More links)
Eriksson, J.; Larsson, A.; Alstrom, K. & Nyberg, Lars (2004). Visual consciousness: Dissociating the neural correlates of perceptual transitions from sustained perception with fMRI. Consciousness and Cognition 13 (1):61-72.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Farah, Martha J. (2000). The Cognitive Neuroscience of Vision. Blackwell Publishers.   (Cited by 129 | Google)
Abstract: The Cognitive Neuroscience of Vision begins by introducing the reader to the anatomy of the eye and visual cortex and then proceeds to discuss image and...
Farah, Martha J.; O'Reilly, R. C. & Vecera, Shaun P. (1997). The neural correlates of perceptual awareness: Evidence from Covert recognition in prosopagnosia. In Jonathan D. Cohen & Jonathan W. Schooler (eds.), Scientific Approaches to Consciousness. Lawrence Erlbaum.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Feinstein, J.; Stein, M.; Castillo, G. & Paulus, M. (2004). From sensory processes to conscious perception. Consciousness and Cognition 13 (2):323-335.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
ffytche, Dominic H. & Pins, Delphine (2003). Are neural correlates of visual consciousness retinotopic? Neuroreport 14 (16):2011-2014.   (Google)
Ffytche, D. H. (2000). Imaging conscious vision. In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Neural Correlates of Consciousness. MIT Press.   (Google)
ffytche, Dominic H. (2002). Neural codes for conscious vision. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 6 (12):493-495.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Gray, Charles M. & di Prisco, Gonzalo V. (1997). Stimulus-dependent neuronal oscillations and local synchonization in striate cortex of the alert cat. Journal of Neuroscience 17 (9).   (Google)
Grosbras, Marie-Hélène & Paus, Tomáš (2003). Transcranial magnetic stimulation of the human frontal eye field facilitates visual awareness. European Journal of Neuroscience 18 (11):3121-3126.   (Cited by 25 | Google | More links)
Hubel, D. H. (1998). Recordings from the striate cortex in awaje behaving animals. In H. Jasper, L. Descarries, V. Castellucci & S. Rossignol (eds.), Consciousness: At the Frontiers of Neuroscience. Lippincott-Raven.   (Google)
Ingram, J. (2002). Consciousness: Just more of the same in the visual brain? Trends in Cognitive Sciences 6 (10):412-412.   (Google | More links)
Kastner, Sabine & Ungerleider, Leslie G. (2000). Mechanisms of visual attention in the human cortex. Annual Review Of Neuroscience 23:315-341.   (Cited by 455 | Google | More links)
Kirschfeld, K. (1999). Afterimages: A tool for defining the neural correlate of visual consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 8 (4):462-483.   (Cited by 27 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Our visual system not only mediates information about the visual environment but is capable of generating pictures of nonexistent worlds: afterimages, illusions, phosphenes, etc. We are ''aware'' of these pictures just as we are aware of the images of natural, physical objects. This raises the question: is the neural correlate of consciousness (NCC) of such images the same as that of images of physical objects? Images of natural objects have some properties in common with afterimages (e.g., stability of verticality) but there are also obvious differences (e.g., images maintain size constancy, whereas afterimages follow Emmert's Law: when seen while screens at different distances are observed, an afterimage looks larger, the greater the distance of the screen). The differences can be explained by differences in the retinal extent of images and afterimages, which favors the view that both have the same NCC. It seems reasonable to assume that before neural activity can produce awareness, all the computations necessary for a veridical representation of, e.g., an object, must be completed within the neural substrate and that information characteristic of a particular object must be available within the NCC. Given these assumptions, it can be shown that no retinotopic (in a strict sense) cortical areas can serve as the NCC, although some type of topographic representation is necessary. It seems also to be unlikely that neurons classified as cardinal cells alone can serve as NCC
Kjaer, T. W.; Nowak, M.; Kjaer, K. W.; Lou, A. R. & Lou, H. C. (2001). Precuneus-prefrontal activity during awareness of visual verbal stimuli. Consciousness and Cognition 10 (3):356-365.   (Cited by 16 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Awareness is a personal experience, which is only accessible to the rest of world through interpretation. We set out to identify a neural correlate of visual awareness, using brief subliminal and supraliminal verbal stimuli while measuring cerebral blood flow distribution with H215O PET. Awareness of visual verbal stimuli differentially activated medial parietal association cortex (precuneus), which is a polymodal sensory cortex, and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, which is thought to be primarily executive. Our results suggest participation of these higher order perceptual and executive cortical structures in visual verbal awareness
Koch, Christof (1998). The neuroanatomy of visual consciousness. In H. Jasper, L. Descarries, V. Castellucci & S. Rossignol (eds.), Consciousness: At the Frontiers of Neuroscience. Lippincott-Raven.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Koch, Christof (1996). Toward the neuronal substrate of visual consciousness. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness. MIT Press.   (Google)
Koch, Christof & Braun, Jochen (1996). Toward the neuronal correlate of visual awareness. Current Opinion in Neurobiology 6:158-64.   (Google)
Koch, Christof (1995). Visual awareness and the thalamic intralaminar nuclei. Consciousness and Cognition 4:163-66.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Koivisto, Mika & Revonsuo, Antti (2007). Electrophysiological correlates of visual consciousness and selective attention. Neuroreport 18 (8):753-756.   (Google | More links)
Kosslyn, Stephen M. (2001). Visual consciousness. In Peter G. Grossenbacher (ed.), Finding Consciousness in the Brain: A Neurocognitive Approach. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Kreiman, G.; Fried, I. & Koch, Christof (2002). Single-neuron correlates of subjective vision in the human medial temporal lobe. Proceedings of the National Academy of Science USA 99:8378-8383.   (Cited by 39 | Google | More links)
Lamme, Victor A. F. (2001). Neural mechanisms of visual awareness: A linking proposition. Brain and Mind 1 (3):385-406.   (Cited by 63 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Recent developments in psychology and neuroscience suggest away to link the mental phenomenon of visual awareness with specific neural processes. Here, it is argued that the feed-forward activation of cells in any area of the brain is not sufficient to generate awareness, but that recurrent processing, mediated by horizontal and feedback connections is necessary. In linking awareness with its neural mechanisms it is furthermore important to dissociate phenomenal awareness from visual attention or decision processes
Lamme, Victor A. F.; Super, H. Landman; R. Roelfsema, P. R. & Spekreijse, H. (2000). The role of primary visual cortex (v1) in visual awareness. Vision Research 40 (10):1507-21.   (Cited by 100 | Google | More links)
Lamme, Victor A. F. (2006). Zap! Magnetic tricks on conscious and unconscious vision. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 10 (5):193-195.   (Google | More links)
Leopold, David A. (1997). Brain Mechanisms of Visual Awareness: Using Perceptual Ambiguity to Investigate the Neural Basis of Image Segmentation and Grouping. Dissertation, Baylor College of Medicine   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Leopold, David A. (2003). Motion perception: Read my LIP. Nature Neuroscience 6 (6):548-549.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Logothetis, N. Leopold & A., Sheinberg (2003). Neural mechanisms of perceptual organization. In Naoyuki Osaka (ed.), Neural Basis of Consciousness. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Logothetis, Nikos K. (1998). Single units and conscious vision. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London Series B-Biological Sciences 353:1801-1818.   (Cited by 157 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Logothetis, N.K.: Single units and conscious vision. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London Series B-Biological Sciences 353, 1801-1818 (1998) Abstract
Luck, Stephen; Chelazzi, Leonardo; Hillyard, Steven & Desimone, Robert (1997). Neural mechanisms of spatial selective attention in areas v1, v2, and v4 of macaque visual cortex. Journal Of Neurophysiology 77 (1):24-42.   (Cited by 528 | Google | More links)
Luck, Steven J. & Ford, Michelle (1998). On the role of selective attention in visual perception. Proceedings Of The National Academy Of Sciences Of The United States Of America 95 (3):825-830.   (Cited by 46 | Google | More links)
Lumer, Erik & Rees, Geraint (1999). Covariation of activity in visual and prefrontal cortex associated with subjective visual perception. Proceedings Of The National Academy Of Sciences Of The United States Of America 96 (4):1669-1673.   (Cited by 116 | Google | More links)
Macknik, Stephen L. & Haglund, Michael M. (1999). Optical images of visible and invisible percepts in the primary visual cortex of primates. Proceedings Of The National Academy Of Sciences Of The United States Of America 96 (26):15208-15210.   (Cited by 20 | Google | More links)
Ma, Wei Ji; Hamker, Fred & Koch, Christof (2006). Neural mechanisms underlying temporal aspects of conscious visual perception. In Haluk Ögmen & Bruno G. Breitmeyer (eds.), The First Half Second: The Microgenesis and Temporal Dynamics of Unconscious and Conscious Visual Processes. MIT Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Milner, A. David (1995). Cerebral correlates of visual awareness. Neuropsychologia 33:1117-30.   (Cited by 68 | Google | More links)
Naccache, Lionel (2004). The cerebral substrate of visual consciousness: A neurological approach. Revue Neurologique 160:395-400.   (Google)
Naccache, Lionel (2006). Visual phenomenal consciousness: A neurological guided tour. In Steven Laureys (ed.), Boundaries of Consciousness. Elsevier.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Nguyen, Peter V. (2001). Tracking the cortical signals that mediate visual awareness. Trends in Neurosciences 24 (7):371-372.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Ojanen, Ville; Revonsuo, Antti & Sams, Mikko (2003). Visual awareness of low-contrast stimuli is reflected in event-related brain potentials. Psychophysiology 40 (2):192-197.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Osaka, Naoyuki (2002). Neural Correlates of Visual Working Memory for Motion. In Kunio Yasue, Marj Jibu & Tarcisio Della Senta (eds.), No Matter, Never Mind: Proceedings of Toward a Science of Consciousness: Fundamental Approaches (Tokyo '99). John Benjamins.   (Google)
Pascual-Leone, Alvaro & Walsh, Vincent (2001). Fast backprojections from the motion to the primary visual area necessary for visual awareness. Science 292 (5516):510-512.   (Cited by 203 | Google | More links)
Pins, Delphine & Ffytche, D. H. (2003). The neural correlates of conscious vision. Cerebral Cortex 13 (5):461-74.   (Google)
Pollen, Daniel A. (2003). Explicit neural representations, recursive neural networks and conscious visual perception. Cerebral Cortex 13 (8):807-814.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Prinz, Jesse J. (2000). A neurofunctional theory of visual consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):243-59.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper develops an empirically motivated theory of visual consciousness. It begins by outlining neuropsychological support for Jackendoff's (1987) hypothesis that visual consciousness involves mental representations at an intermediate level of processing. It then supplements that hypothesis with the further requirement that attention, which can come under the direction of high level representations, is also necessary for consciousness. The resulting theory is shown to have a number of philosophical consequences. If correct, higher-order thought accounts, the multiple drafts account, and the widely held belief that sensation precedes perception will all be found wanting. The theory will also be used to illustrate and defend a methodology that fills the gulf between functionalists who ignore the brain and neural reductionists who repudiate functionalism
Rees, Geraint; Kreiman, G. & Koch, Christof (2002). Neural correlates of consciousness in humans. Nature Reviews Neuroscience 3 (4):261-270.   (Cited by 136 | Google | More links)
Rees, Geraint (2001). Neuroimaging of visual awareness in patients and normal subjects. Current Opinion in Neurobiology 11 (2):150-156.   (Cited by 96 | Google | More links)
Ribary, U. (2006). Dynamics of thalamo-cortical network oscillations and human perception. In Steven Laureys (ed.), Boundaries of Consciousness. Elsevier.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Ro, Tony; Breitmeyer, Bruno; Burton, Philip; Singhal, Neel S. & Lane, David (2003). Feedback contributions to visual awareness in human occipital cortex. Current Biology 13 (12):1038-1041.   (Cited by 18 | Google | More links)
Rolls, Edmund T. (2006). Consciousness absent and present: A neurophysiological exploration of masking. In Haluk Ögmen & Bruno G. Breitmeyer (eds.), The First Half Second: The Microgenesis and Temporal Dynamics of Unconscious and Conscious Visual Processes. MIT Press.   (Google)
Ro, Tony (2006). The cognitive neuroscience of unconscious and conscious vision. In Haluk Ögmen & Bruno G. Breitmeyer (eds.), The First Half Second: The Microgenesis and Temporal Dynamics of Unconscious and Conscious Visual Processes. MIT Press.   (Google)
Schall, Jeffrey D. (2000). Investigating neural correlates of consciousness with ambiguous stimuli. Neuro-Psychoanalysis 2 (1):32-35.   (Google | More links)
Sewards, Terence V. & Sewards, Mark A. (2000). Visual awareness due to neuronal activities in subcortical structures: A proposal. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (1):86-116.   (Cited by 13 | Google | More links)
Abstract: It has been shown that visual awareness in the blind hemifield of hemianopic cats that have undergone unilateral ablations of visual cortex can be restored by sectioning the commissure of the superior colliculus or by destroying a portion of the substantia nigra contralateral to the cortical lesion (the Sprague effect). We propose that the visual awareness that is recovered is due to synchronized oscillatory activities in the superior colliculus ipsilateral to the cortical lesion. These oscillatory activities are normally partially suppressed by the inhibitory, GABAergic contralateral nigrotectal projection, and the destruction of the substantia nigra, or the sectioning of the collicular commissure, disinhibits the collicular neurons, causing an increase in the extent of oscillatory activity and/or synchronization between activities at different sites. This increase in the oscillatory and synchronized character is sufficient for the activities to give rise to visual awareness. We argue that in rodents and lower vertebrates, normal visual awareness is partly due to synchronized oscillatory activities in the optic tectum and partly due to similar activities in visual cortex. It is only in carnivores and primates that visual awareness is wholly due to cortical activities. Based on von Baerian recapitulation theory, we propose that, even in humans, there is a period in early infancy when visual awareness is partially due to activities in the superior colliculus, but that this awareness gradually disappears as the nigrotectal projection matures
Sheinberg, D. L. & Logothetis, Nikos K. (1997). The role of temporal cortical areas in perceptual organization. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA 94:3408-3413.   (Cited by 236 | Google | More links)
Silvanto, Juha (2008). A re-evaluation of blindsight and the role of striate cortex (V1) in visual awareness. Neuropsychologia.   (Google)
Abstract: Some patients with a lesion to the striate cortex (V1), when assessed through forced-choice paradigms, are able to detect stimuli presented in the blind field, despite reporting a complete lack of visual experience. This phenomenon, known as blindsight, strongly implicates V1 in visual awareness. However, the view that V1 is indispensable for conscious visual perception is challenged by a recent finding that the blindsight subject GY can be aware of visual qualia in his blind field, implying that V1may not be critical under all circumstances. This apparent contradiction raises the following question: if V1 is not always necessary for phenomenal awareness, why do V1 lesions have such a detrimental effect on conscious perception? It is suggested here that this contradiction can be resolved by considering the impact of V1 lesions on the functioning of the whole visual cortex.
Silvanto, Juha; Lavie, Nilli & Walsh, Vincent (2005). Double dissociation of v1 and V5/MT activity in visual awareness. Cerebral Cortex 15 (11):1736-1741.   (Cited by 17 | Google | More links)
Silvanto, Juha; Cowey, Alan; Lavie, Nilli & Walsh, Vincent (2005). Striate cortex (v1) activity Gates awareness of motion. Nature Neuroscience 8 (2):143-144.   (Cited by 26 | Google | More links)
Skoyles, John R. (1997). Another variety of vision. Trends in Neurosciences 20 (1):22-23.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Stoerig links blindsight to lesions between the primary visual cortex and the extravisual cortex. A parallel 'blindsight' occurs when input from the primary visual cortex is blocked during eye movements, convergence and blinks. At such moments (i) conscious vision based upon retinal input is blocked, (ii), however, like in blind sight retinal input can be used in motor tasks. The main difference to blindsight is that we are not only blind but cannot even with deliberate attention bring this blindness into awareness. We are doubly unaware: unaware of being blind and unaware that in spite of this that what we can see is created by the posterior parietal cortex substituting output (for that temporarily not coming from the primary visual cortex) for higher areas of the cerebral cortex
Srinivasan, Ramesh; Russell, D. P.; Edelman, Gerald M. & Tononi, Giulio Srinivasan (1999). Increased synchronization of neuromagnetic responses during conscious perception. Journal of Neuroscience 19 (13):5435-5448.   (Cited by 150 | Google | More links)
Srinivasan, Ramesh & Petrovic, Sanja (2006). Meg phase follows conscious perception during binocular rivalry induced by visual stream segregation. Cerebral Cortex 16 (5):597-608.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Stoerig, Petra (2001). The neuroanatomy of phenomenal vision: A psychological perspective. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 929:176-94.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Stoerig, Petra & Cowey, Alan (1995). Visual perception and phenomenal consciousness. Behavioural Brain Research 71:147-156.   (Cited by 19 | Google | More links)
Thompson, K. G. & Schall, Jeffrey D. (2000). Antecedents and correlates of visual detectoin and awareness in macaque prefrontal cortex. Vision Research 40 (10):1523-38.   (Google)
Tononi, Giulio Srinivasan; R, Russell & D. P., Edelman (1998). Investigating neural correlates of conscious perception by frequency-tagged neuromagnetic responses. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA 95:3198-3203.   (Cited by 83 | Google | More links)
Tong, Frank (2003). Primary visual cortex and visual awareness. Nature Reviews Neuroscience 4 (3):219-229.   (Cited by 64 | Google | More links)
Vanni, S.; Revonsuo, Antti; Saarinen, J. & Hari, R. (1996). Visual awareness of objects correlates with activity of right occipital cortex. Neuroreport 8:183-186.   (Cited by 75 | Google | More links)
Whatham, Andrew R.; Vuilleumier, Patrik; Landis, Theodor & Safran, Avinoam B. (2003). Visual consciousness in health and disease. Neurologic Clinics 21 (3):647-686.   (Google)
Wilenius, Maria E. & Revonsuo, Antti T. (2007). Timing of the earliest ERP correlate of visual awareness. Psychophysiology 44 (5):703-710.   (Google)
Zeki, Semir (2001). Localization and globalization in conscious vision. Annual Review of Neuroscience 24:57-86.   (Google)
Zeki, Semir & Bartels, Andreas (1999). Toward a theory of visual consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 8 (2):225-59.   (Cited by 66 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The visual brain consists of several parallel, functionally specialized processing systems, each having several stages (nodes) which terminate their tasks at different times; consequently, simultaneously presented attributes are perceived at the same time if processed at the same node and at different times if processed by different nodes. Clinical evidence shows that these processing systems can act fairly autonomously. Damage restricted to one system compromises specifically the perception of the attribute that that system is specialized for; damage to a given node of a processing system that leaves earlier nodes intact results in a degraded perceptual capacity for the relevant attribute, which is directly related to the physiological capacities of the cells left intact by the damage. By contrast, a system that is spared when all others are damaged can function more or less normally. Moreover, internally created visual percepts-illusions, afterimages, imagery, and hallucinations-activate specifically the nodes specialized for the attribute perceived. Finally, anatomical evidence shows that there is no final integrator station in the brain, one which receives input from all visual areas; instead, each node has multiple outputs and no node is recipient only. Taken together, the above evidence leads us to propose that each node of a processing-perceptual system creates its own microconsciousness. We propose that, if any binding occurs to give us our integrated image of the visual world, it must be a binding between microconsciousnesses generated at different nodes. Since any two microconsciousnesses generated at any two nodes can be bound together, perceptual integration is not hierarchical, but parallel and postconscious. By contrast, the neural machinery conferring properties on those cells whose activity has a conscious correlate is hierarchical, and we refer to it as generative binding, to distinguish it from the binding that might occur between the microconsciousnesses
Zeman, Adam Z. J. (2004). Theories of visual awareness. Progress in Brain Research 144:321-29.   (Cited by 3 | Google)

8.7b Binocular Rivalry

Barrett, William (1986). Death of the Soul: From Descartes to the Computer. Anchor Press.   (Google)
Blake, R. R. (2001). A Primer on binocular rivalry, including current controversies. Brain and Mind 2 (1):5-38.   (Cited by 37 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Among psychologists and vision scientists,binocular rivalry has enjoyed sustainedinterest for decades dating back to the 19thcentury. In recent years, however, rivalry''saudience has expanded to includeneuroscientists who envision rivalry as a tool for exploring the neural concomitants ofconscious visual awareness and perceptualorganization. For rivalry''s potential to berealized, workers using this tool need toknow details of this fascinating phenomenon,and providing those details is the purpose ofthis article. After placing rivalry in ahistorical context, I summarize major findingsconcerning the spatial characteristics and thetemporal dynamics of rivalry, discuss two majortheoretical accounts of rivalry ( eye vs stimulus rivalry) and speculate on possibleneural concomitants of binocular rivalry
Boore, W. H. (1973). First Light. London,Search Press.   (Google)
Breese, B. B. (1909). Can binocular rivalry be suppressed by practise? Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 6 (25):686-687.   (Google | More links)
Chander, Jagdish & B., K. (1983). Eternal Drama of Souls, Matter, and God. Prajapati Brama Kumaris Ishwariya Vishwa-Vidyalaya.   (Google)
Abstract: pt. 1. [without special title] -- pt. 2. The eternal world drama.
Cosmelli, Diego J. & Thompson, Evan (online). Mountains and valleys: Binocular rivalry and the flow of experience.   (Google)
Abstract: Binocular rivalry provides a useful situation for studying the relation between the temporal flow of conscious experience and the temporal dynamics of neural activity. After proposing a phenomenological framework for understanding temporal aspects of consciousness, we review experimental research on multistable perception and binocular rivalry, singling out various methodological, theoretical, and empirical aspects of this research relevant to studying the flow of experience. We then review an experimental study from our group explicitly concerned with relating the temporal dynamics of rivalrous experience to the temporal dynamics of cortical activity. Drawing attention to the importance of dealing with ongoing activity and its inherent changing nature at both phenomenological and neurodynamical levels, we argue that the notions of recurrence and variability are pertinent to understanding rivalry in particular and the flow of experience in general
Crabbe, M. James C. (ed.) (1999). From Soul to Self. Routledge.   (Google)
Abstract: From Soul to Self takes us on a fascinating journey through philosophy, theology, religious studies and physiological sciences. The contributors explore the relationship between a variety of ideas that have arisen in philosophy, religion and science, each idea seeking to explain why we think we are somehow unique and distinct
Darling, David J. (1995). After Life: In Search of Cosmic Consciousness. Fourth Estate.   (Google)
Doesburg, Sam M.; Kitajo, Keiichi & Ward, Lawrence M. (2005). Increased gamma-band synchrony precedes switching of conscious perceptual objects in binocular rivalry. Neuroreport 16 (11):1139-1142.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Elbert, Jerome W. (2000). Are Souls Real? Prometheus Books.   (Google)
Engel, Andreas K.; Fries, P.; Konig, P. Kreiter; Brecht, M. & Singer, Wolf (1999). Temporal binding, binocular rivalry, and consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 8 (2):128-51.   (Cited by 130 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Cognitive functions like perception, memory, language, or consciousness are based on highly parallel and distributed information processing by the brain. One of the major unresolved questions is how information can be integrated and how coherent representational states can be established in the distributed neuronal systems subserving these functions. It has been suggested that this so-called ''binding problem'' may be solved in the temporal domain. The hypothesis is that synchronization of neuronal discharges can serve for the integration of distributed neurons into cell assemblies and that this process may underlie the selection of perceptually and behaviorally relevant information. As we intend to show here, this temporal binding hypothesis has implications for the search of the neural correlate of consciousness. We review experimental results, mainly obtained in the visual system, which support the notion of temporal binding. In particular, we discuss recent experiments on the neural mechanisms of binocular rivalry which suggest that appropriate synchronization among cortical neurons may be one of the necessary conditions for the buildup of perceptual states and awareness of sensory stimuli
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Haynes, John-Dylan & Rees, Geraint (2005). Predicting the stream of consciousness from activity in human visual cortex. Current Biology 15 (14):1301-7.   (Cited by 20 | Google | More links)
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Kanai, Ryota; Moradi, Farshad; Shimojo, Shinsuke & Verstraten, Frans A. J. (2005). Perceptual alternation induced by visual transients. Perception 34 (7):803-822.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Abstract: When our visual system is confronted with ambiguous stimuli, the perceptual interpretation spontaneously alternates between the competing incompatible interpretations. The timing of such perceptual alternations is highly stochastic and the underlying neural mechanisms are poorly understood. Here, we show that perceptual alternations can be triggered by a transient stimulus presented nearby. The induction was tested for four types of bistable stimuli: structure-from-motion, binocular rivalry, Necker cube, and ambiguous apparent motion. While underlying mechanisms may vary among them, a transient flash induced time-locked perceptual alternations in all cases. The effect showed a dependency on the adaptation to the dominant percept prior to the presentation of a flash. These perceptual alternations show many similarities to perceptual disappearances induced by transient stimuli (Kanai & Kamitani, 2003, Moradi & Shimojo, 2004). Mechanisms linking these two transient induced phenomena are discussed
Katz, Bruce (2008). Fixing functionalism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (3):87-118.   (Google)
Abstract: Functionalism, which views consciousness as the product of the processing of stimuli by the brain, is perhaps the dominant view among researchers in the cognitive sciences and associated fields. However, as a workable scientific model of consciousness, it has been marred by a singular lack of tangible success, except at the broadest levels of explanation. This paper argues that this is not an accident, and that in its standard construal it is simply too unwieldy to assume the burden of full-fledged theory. In its place, a reduced functionalism is introduced by applying the principle of parsimony successively to the elements of standard functionalism until only a minimal framework remains. This simpler account states that consciousness is a function of instantaneous causal relations between processing elements rather the putative algorithm such relations are instantiating. It is then argued as a corollary that the only such relations that matter are those in which reciprocal influences are at play. Thus, purely afferent and efferent causal relations are pruned from consideration. The theory resulting from the addition of this corollary is shown to have good correspondence with a number of recent neurophysiologically-motivated approaches to consciousness, including those that stress the importance of reentry, those that view synchrony as a key independent variable, and those that highlight the importance of the accessibility of conscious contents to multiple processing modules. In addition, the theory is shown to be consistent with recent results in the literature on masking, and those in the literature on binocular rivalry. The paper concludes by arguing that the theoretical and empirical difficulties inherent in consciousness research imply that the principle of parsimony must occupy a more central role in consciousness research than it would in ordinary scientific discourse
Kenny, Anthony (1973). The Anatomy of the Soul. [Oxford]Basil Blackwell.   (Google)
Abstract: Mental health in Plato's Republic.--The practical syllogism and incontinence.--Aristotle on happiness.--Intellect and imagination in Aquinas.--Descartes on the will.--Cartesian privacy.--Appendix: The history of intention in ethics.--Bibliography (p. [147])
K. Moutoussis, ; G. A. Keliris, ; Z. Kourtzi, & N. K. Logothetis, (2005). A binocular rivalry study of motion perception in the human brain. Vision Research 45 (17):2231-43.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The relationship between brain activity and conscious visual experience is central to our understanding of the neural mechanisms underlying perception. Binocular rivalry, where monocular stimuli compete for perceptual dominance, has been previously used to dissociate the constant stimulus from the varying percept. We report here fMRI results from humans experiencing binocular rivalry under a dichoptic stimulation paradigm that consisted of two drifting random dot patterns with different motion coherence. Each pattern had also a different color, which both enhanced rivalry and was used for reporting which of the two patterns was visible at each time. As the perception of the subjects alternated between coherent motion and motion noise, we examined the effect that these alternations had on the strength of the MR signal throughout the brain. Our results demonstrate that motion perception is able to modulate the activity of several of the visual areas which are known to be involved in motion processing. More specifically, in addition to area V5 which showed the strongest modulation, a higher activity during the perception of motion than during the perception of noise was also clearly observed in areas V3A and LOC, and less so in area V3. In previous studies, these areas had been selectively activated by motion stimuli but whether their activity reflects motion perception or not remained unclear; here we show that they are involved in motion perception as well. The present findings therefore suggest a lack of a clear distinction between ?processing? versus ?perceptual? areas in the brain, but rather that the areas involved in the processing of a specific visual attribute are also part of the neuronal network that is collectively responsible for its perceptual representation
Kobayashi, T. & Kato, K. (2002). Reactivity of human cortical oscillations reflecting conscious perception in binocular rivalry. In Kunio Yasue, Marj Jibu & Tarcisio Della Senta (eds.), No Matter, Never Mind. John Benjamins.   (Google)
Kornhaber, Arthur (1988). Spirit: Mind, Body, and the Will to Existence. Warner Books.   (Google)
Kovacs, Ilona; Papathomas, Thomas; Yang, Ming & Feher, Akos (1997). When the brain changes its mind: Interocular grouping during binocular rivalry. Investigative Ophthalmology and Visual Science 38 (4):2249-2249.   (Cited by 95 | Google | More links)
Kurthen, M. Moskopp (1999). Conscious behavior explained. Consciousness and Cognition 8 (2):155-158.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Current neurobiological research on temporal binding in binocular rivalry settings contributes to a better understanding of the neural correlate of perceptual consciousness. This research can easily be integrated into a theory of conscious behavior, but if it is meant to promote a naturalistic theory of perceptual consciousness itself, it is confronted with the notorious explanatory gap argument according to which any statement of psychophysical correlations (and their interpretation) leaves the phenomenal character of, e.g., states of perceptual consciousness open. It is argued that research on temporal binding plays no role in a naturalistic theory of consciousness if the gap argument can be solved on internal philosophical grounds or if it turns out to be unsolvable at the time being. But there may be a way to dissolve or deconstruct it, and the accessibility of this way may well depend on scientific progress, including neurobiological research on the neural correlate of perceptual consciousness
Landwehr, Joe (2007). Tracking the Soul: With an Astrology of Consciousness. Ancient Tower Press.   (Google)
Leopold, David A. & Logothetis, Nikos K. (1996). Activity changes in early visual cortex reflect monkeys' percepts during binocular rivalry. Nature 379 (6565):549-553.   (Cited by 396 | Google | More links)
Leopold, David A. & Logothetis, Nikos K. (1999). Multistable phenomena: Changing views in perception. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 3 (7):254-264.   (Cited by 196 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Traditional explanations of multistable visual phenomena (e.g. ambiguous figures, perceptual rivalry) suggest that the basis for spontaneous reversals in perception lies in antagonistic connectivity within the visual system. In this review, we suggest an alternative, albeit speculative, explanation for visual multistability – that spontaneous alternations reflect responses to active, programmed events initiated by brain areas that integrate sensory and non-sensory information to coordinate a diversity of behaviors. Much evidence suggests that perceptual reversals are themselves more closely related to the expression of a behavior than to passive sensory responses: (1) they are initiated spontaneously, often voluntarily, and are influenced by subjective variables such as attention and mood; (2) the alternation process is greatly facilitated with practice and compromised by lesions in non-visual cortical areas; (3) the alternation process has temporal dynamics similar to those of spontaneously initiated behaviors; (4) functional imaging reveals that brain areas associated with a variety of cognitive behaviors are specifically activated when vision becomes unstable. In this scheme, reorganizations of activity throughout the visual cortex, concurrent with perceptual reversals, are initiated by higher, largely non-sensory brain centers. Such direct intervention in the processing of the sensory input by brain structures associated with planning and motor programming might serve an important role in perceptual organization, particularly in aspects related to selective attention
Leopold, David A.; Maier, Alexander & Logothetis, Nikos K. (2003). Measuring subjective visual perception in the nonhuman primate. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (9-10):115-130.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Leslie, John (2007). Immortality Defended. Blackwell Pub..   (Google)
Abstract: Might we be parts of a divine mind? Could anything like an afterlife make sense? Starting with a Platonic answer to why the world exists, Immortality Defended suggests we could well be immortal in all of three separate ways. Tackles the fundamental questions posed by our very existence, among them ‘why does the cosmos exist?’, ‘is there a divine mind or God?’ and ‘in what sense might we have afterlives?’ Defends a belief in immortality, without the need for a religious affiliation or rejection of modern science Explores the ideas of ‘Einsteinian immortality’, the divine afterlife, and the theory of an infinite and divine mind Draws from the work of a wide-range of philosophers, from ancient Greece to the present day, and incorporates up-to-date scientific findings Written in a thought-provoking and engaging manner, accessible to anyone intrigued by the wonder of our being
Lewis, Hywel David (1978). Persons and Life After Death: Essays. Barnes & Noble.   (Google)
Abstract: Realism and metaphysics.--Ultimates and a way of looking.--Religion and the paranormal.--Quinton, A., Lewis, H. D., Williams, B. Life after death.--Lewis, H. D., Flew, A. Survival.--Shoemaker, S., Lewis, H. D. Immortality and dualism.--The belief in life after death.--The person of Christ.
Logothetis, Nikos K. (1999). Binocular rivalry: A window onto consciousness. Scientific American.   (Google)
Logothetis, Nikos K. & Schall, Jeffrey D. (1989). Neuronal correlates of subjective visual perception. Science 245:761-63.   (Cited by 222 | Google | More links)
Logothetis, Nikos K. & Leopold, David A. (1998). Single-neuron activity and visual perception. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness II. MIT Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Logothetis, Nikos K.; Leopold, David A. & Sheinberg, D. L. (1996). What is rivalling during binocular rivalry? Nature 30 (6575):621-624.   (Cited by 211 | Google | More links)
Lumer, E. D. (2000). Binocular rivalry and human visual awareness. In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Neural Correlates of Consciousness. MIT Press.   (Cited by 44 | Google)
Lumer, E. D.; Friston, K. J. & Rees, Geraint (1998). Neural correlates of perceptual rivalry in the human brain. Science 280 (5371):1930-1934.   (Cited by 271 | Google | More links)
Macknik, Stephen L. & Martinez-Conde, Susana (2004). Dichoptic visual masking reveals that early binocular neurons exhibit weak interocular suppression: Implications for binocular vision and visual awareness. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 16 (6):1049-1059.   (Google)
McGraw, John J. (2004). Brain & Belief: An Exploration of the Human Soul. Aegis Press.   (Google)
McTaggart, John McTaggart Ellis (1916). Human Immortality and Pre-Existence. Kraus Reprint.   (Google)
Miller, S. M. (2001). Binocular rivalry and the cerebral hemispheres, with a note on the correlates and constitution of visual consciousness. Brain and Mind 2 (1):119-49.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In addressing thescientific study of consciousness, Crick and Koch state, It is probable that at any moment some active neuronal processes in your head correlate with consciousness, while others do not: what is the difference between them? (1998, p. 97). Evidence from electrophysiological and brain-imaging studies of binocular rivalry supports the premise of this statement and answers to some extent, the question posed. I discuss these recent developments and outline the rationale and experimental evidence for the interhemispheric switch hypothesis of perceptual rivalry. According to this model, the perceptual alternations of rivalry reflect hemispheric alternations, suggesting that visual consciousness of rivalling stimuli may be unihemispheric at any one time (Miller et al., 2000). However, in this paper, I suggest that interhemispheric switching could involve alternating unihemispheric attentional selection of neuronal processes for access to visual consciousness. On this view, visual consciousness during rivalry could be bi hemispheric because the processes constitutive of attentional selection may be distinct from those constitutive of visual consciousness. This is a special case of the important distinction between the neuronal correlates and constitution of visual consciousness
Murphy, Nancey C. (2006). Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies? Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Are humans composed of a body and a nonmaterial mind or soul, or are we purely physical beings? Opinion is sharply divided over this issue. In this clear and concise book, Nancey Murphy argues for a physicalist account, but one that does not diminish traditional views of humans as rational, moral, and capable of relating to God. This position is motivated not only by developments in science and philosophy, but also by biblical studies and Christian theology. The reader is invited to appreciate the ways in which organisms are more than the sum of their parts. That higher human capacities such as morality, free will, and religious awareness emerge from our neurobiological complexity and develop through our relation to others, to our cultural inheritance, and, most importantly, to God. Murphy addresses the questions of human uniqueness, religious experience, and personal identity before and after bodily resurrection
Newman, J. B. & Grace, A. A. (1999). Binding across time: The selective gating of frontal and hippocampal systems modulating working memory and attentional states. Consciousness and Cognition 8 (2):196-212.   (Cited by 41 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Temporal binding via 40-Hz synchronization of neuronal discharges in sensory cortices has been hypothesized to be a necessary condition for the rapid selection of perceptually relevant information for further processing in working memory. Binocular rivalry experiments have shown that late stage visual processing associated with the recognition of a stimulus object is highly correlated with discharge rates in inferotemporal cortex. The hippocampus is the primary recipient of inferotemporal outputs and is known to be the substrate for the consolidation of working memories to long-term, episodic memories. The prefrontal cortex, on the other hand, is widely thought to mediate working memory processes, per se. This article reviews accumulated evidence for the role of a subcortical matrix in linking frontal and hippocampal systems to select and ''stream'' conscious episodes across time (hundreds of milliseconds to several seconds). ''Streaming'' is hypothesized to be mediated by the selective gating of reentrant flows of information between these cortical systems and the subcortical matrix. The physiological mechanism proposed for this temporally extended form of binding is synchronous oscillations in the slower EEG spectrum (< 8 Hz)
O'Shea, Robert P. & Corballis, Paul M. (2001). Binocular rivalry between complex stimuli in split-brain observers. Brain and Mind 2 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: We investigated binocular rivalry in the twocerebral hemispheres of callosotomized(split-brain) observers. We found that rivalryoccurs for complex stimuli in split-brainobservers, and that it is similar in the twohemispheres. This poses difficulties for twotheories of rivalry: (1) that rivalry occursbecause of switching of activity between thetwo hemispheres, and (2) that rivalry iscontrolled by a structure in the rightfrontoparietal cortex. Instead, similar rivalryfrom the two hemispheres is consistent with atheory that its mechanism is low in the visualsystem, at which each hemisphere conducts asimilar analysis of its half of visual space
Osmond, Rosalie (2003). Imagining the Soul: A History. Sutton Pub. Ltd..   (Google)
Abstract: Is there a ghost in the machine? Are we born trailing clouds of glory? Is there a part of us that will survive death? Is the soul reborn in different bodily forms? These and similar questions have occupied humankind since the dawn of consciousness. Rosalie Osmond's book explores the way the soul has been represented in different cultures and at different times, from ancient Egypt and Greece, through medieval Europe and into the 21st century. Basing her approach on historical sources, she reveals the many different ways in which the soul has been imagined and the range of human needs and aspirations these imaginings have addressed
Pearson, Joel & Clifford, Colin W. G. (2004). Determinants of visual awareness following interruptions during rivalry. Journal of Vision 4 (3):196-202.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Seidel, George J. (2000). Toward a Hermeneutics of Spirit. Bucknell University Press.   (Google)
Sengpiel, Frank; Bonhoeffer, Tobias; Freeman, Tobe C. B. & Blakemore, Colin (2001). On the relationship between interocular suppression in the primary visual cortex and binocular rivalry. Brain and Mind 2 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: Both classical psychophysical work and recentfunctional imaging studies have suggested acritical role for the primary visual cortex(V1) in resolving the perceptual ambiguitiesexperienced during binocular rivalry. Here weexamine, by means of single-cell recordings andoptical imaging of intrinsic signals, thespatial characteristics of suppression elicitedby rival stimuli in cat V1. We find that the interocular suppression field of V1 neuronsis centred on the same position in space and isslightly larger (by a factor of 1.3) than theminimum response field, measured through thesame eye. Suppression is always strongest at asingle position corresponding very closely tothe centre of the classical receptive field,and reduces responses through the other eye byup to 90% but typically around 40%. Thespatial pattern of interocular suppression, asrevealed by optical imaging, closely matchesthe cortical representation of the stimulus,which is being suppressed, both in terms of itsorientation and the eye of origin. Theseresults indicate that interocular suppressionis directly related to the functionalarchitecture of V1; it is probably caused bydirect inhibitory interactions betweenneighbouring cortical columns of oppositeocular dominance
Sewards, Terence V. & Sewards, Mark A. (2001). On the correlation between synchronized oscillatory activities and consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 10 (4):485-495.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Recent experiments have shown that the amplitudes of cortical gamma band oscillatory activities that occur during anesthesia are often greater than amplitudes of similar activities that occur without anesthesia. This result is apparently at odds with the hypothesis that synchronized oscillatory activities constitute the neural correlate of consciousness. We argue that while synchronization and oscillatory patterning are necessary conditions for consciousness, they are not sufficient. Based on the results of a binocular rivalry study of Fries et al. (1997), we propose that the degrees of oscillatory strength and synchronization of neuronal activities determine the degree of awareness those activities produce. On the other hand, the overal firing rates of neurons in cortical sensory areas are not correlated with the degree of awareness the activities of those neurons produce. The results of the experiment of Fries et al. (1997) appear to conflict with the results of another binocular rivalry experiment, in which monkeys were trained to pull a lever in order to report which stimulus object was being perceived (Leopold & Logothetis, 1996). In the latter experiment, it was demonstrated that the firing rates of neurons in striate cortex did not change during perceptual alterations, while 90% of neurons in inferior and superior temporal cortices changed their firing rate when the perceived image changed. This result led to the conclusion that activities in temporal cortex are correlated with visual awareness, but those in striate cortex are not. We argue that activities in temporal cortex contribute little, if anything, to perceptual awareness, and that their primary function is computational. Thus the correlation between the firing rates of neurons in these areas and the responses of the monkeys is due to the recognition of a particular stimulus object, which in turn is due to the computations made there
Smythies, J. (1999). Consciousness: Some basic issues- a neurophilosophical perspective. Consciousness and Cognition 8 (2):164-172.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper concentrates on the basic properties of ''consciousness'' that temporal coding is postulated to relate to. A description of phenomenal consciousness based on what introspection tells us about its contents is offered. This includes a consideration of the effect of various brain lesions that result in cortical blindness, apperceptive and associative agnosia, and blindsight, together with an account of the manner in which sight is regained after cortical injuries. I then discuss two therories of perception-Direct Realism and the Representative Theory. This includes a discussion of the concept of the body-image, phantom limbs, the alleged projection of sensations, the ontological status of phenomenal space, the homunculus argument, the validity of topographic coding, the difference between the stimulus field and the visual field, and two theories of brain-mind relationship-the Identity Theory and the Bohr-Heisenberg theory of brain-mind complementarity. Finally I suggest that the binocular rivalry obtained in the case of the stroboscopic patterns that result from intermittent photic stimulation of one eye, when used in animal expeiments with unit recording, offers a good experimental method of investigating the binding problem
Srinivasan, Ramesh & Petrovic, Sanja (2006). Meg phase follows conscious perception during binocular rivalry induced by visual stream segregation. Cerebral Cortex 16 (5):597-608.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Stapp, Henry P., Quantum mechanics of presentiment in binocular rivalry.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This is a brief account of a theory of presentiment/retrocausation in the context of a proposed binocular rivalry experiment. According to orthodox (classical or quantum mechanical) physics there can be no retrocausal effects. In order to accommodate such effects one must go beyond/outside orthodox theories. The simplest way to modify QM in a way that would permit such effects is to accept the hypothesis of Eccles (1987) that mental involvement (mental effort or emotion) can alter the orthodox statistical weighting factors associated with the observed outcomes of our experimental probing actions
Tara, (1970). The Evolution of the Soul. Milwaukee, Wis.,Universal Creative Research Institute.   (Google)
Taya, Fumihiko & Mogi, Ken (2005). Spatio-temporal dynamics of the visual system revealed in binocular rivalry. Neuroscience Letters 381 (1-2):63-68.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: From the evolutionary viewpoint, animals need to monitor the surrounding environment and capture salient features, such as motion, for survival. The visual system is highly developed for monitoring a wide area of visual field and capturing such salient features. In humans and primates, there is a wide binocular field, suggesting a necessity of integrating the images from the two eyes. Binocular rivalry [R. Blake, A neural theory of binocular rivalry, Psychol. Rev. 96 (1989) 145–167; R. Blake, N.K. Logothetis, Visual competition, Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 3 (2002) 13–21], where incompatible inputs from the two eyes compete to emerge in the subject’s visual percept, has been shown to exhibit highly adaptive behavior [I. Kovacs, T.V. Parathomas, M. Yang, A. Feher, When the brain changes its mind: interocular grouping during binocular rivalry. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 93 (1996) 15508–15511; N.K. Logothetis, Single units and conscious vision, Philos. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B. Biol. Sci. 353 (1998) 1801–1818]. Here we investigated the spatio-temporal dynamics of the ocular dominance pattern in binocular rivalry under conditions where conflicting salient features were presented in a temporally varying manner. We found a striking example of the detailed structure of the dominance wave propagation, by using a spatio-temporal sampling method. The data show in detail the ability of the visual system to dynamically adapt to the changing stimuli in the context of the massively parallel visual field. We show by model prediction that the globally coherent dominance change in the presence of multiple stimuli can be explained by a mechanism based on local saliency comparison. © 2005 Elsevier Ireland Ltd. All rights reserved
Thomsen, Dr Knud (ms). Is quantum mechanics needed to explain consciousness ?   (Google)
Abstract: In this short comment to a recent contribution by E. Manousakis [1] it is argued that the reported agreement between the measured time evolution of conscious states during binocular rivalry and predictions derived from quantum mechanical formalisms does not require any direct effect of QM. The recursive consumption analysis process in the Ouroboros Model can yield the same behavior
Tong, Frank; Nakayama, K.; Vaughan, J. T. & Kanwisher, Nancy (1998). Binocular rivalry and visual awareness in human extrastriate cortex. Neuron 21:753-59.   (Cited by 298 | Google | More links)
Tong, Frank (2001). Competing theories of binocular rivalry: A possible resolution. Brain and Mind 2 (1):55-83.   (Cited by 27 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The neural basis of binocular rivalry has beenthe subject of vigorous debate. Do discrepantmonocular patterns rival for awareness becauseof neural competition among patternrepresentations or monocular channels? In thisarticle, I briefly review psychophysical andneurophysiological evidence pertaining to boththeories and discuss important new neuroimagingdata which reveal that rivalry is fullyresolved in monocular visual cortex. These newfindings strongly suggest that interocularcompetition mediates binocular rivalry and thatV1 plays an important role in the selection ofconscious visual information. They furthersuggest that rivalry is not a unitaryphenomenon. Interocular competition may fullyaccount for binocular rivalry whereas aseparate mechanism involving patterncompetition likely accounts for monocular andstimulus rivalry
Tsuchiya, Naotsugu & Koch, Christof (2005). Continuous flash suppression reduces negative afterimages. Nature Neuroscience 8 (8):1096-1101.   (Cited by 19 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Illusions that produce perceptual suppression despite constant retinal input are used to manipulate visual consciousness. Here we report on a powerful variant of existing techniques, Continuous Flash Suppression. Distinct images flashed successively around 10 Hz into one eye reliably suppress an image presented to the other eye. Compared to binocular rivalry, the duration of perceptual suppression increased more than 10-fold. Using this tool we show that the strength of the negative afterimage of an adaptor was reduced by half when it was perceptually suppressed by input from the other eye. The more likely the adaptor was completely suppressed, the larger the reduction of the afterimage intensity. Paradoxically, trial-to-trial visibility of the adaptor did not correlate with the degree of suppression. Our results imply that formation of afterimages involves neuronal structures that access input from both eyes, but that do not correspond directly to the neuronal correlates of perceptual awareness

8.7c Visual Pathways

Baylis, Gordon C.; Gore, Christopher L.; Rodriguez, P. Dennis & Shisler, Rebecca J. (2001). Visual extinction and awareness: The importance of binding dorsal and ventral pathways. Visual Cognition. Special Issue 8 (3):359-379.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Bridgeman, Bruce & Huemer, V. (1998). A spatially oriented decision does not induce consciousness in a motor task. Consciousness and Cognition 7 (3):454-464.   (Cited by 86 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Visual information follows at least two branches in the human nervous system, following a common input stage: a cognitive ''what'' branch governs perception and experience, while a sensorimotor ''how'' branch handles visually guided behavior though its outputs are unconscious. The sensorimotor system is probed with an isomorphic task, requiring a 1:1 relationship between target position and motor response. The cognitive system, in contrast, is probed with a forced qualitative decision, expressed verbally, about the location of a target. Normally, the cognitive system is influenced by context-induced illusions of visual direction, while the sensorimotor system is not. Here, we inquire whether the process of making a spatially based decision is critical in forcing subjects to use the information in the cognitive system for spatial tasks. Subjects hear a tone that determines whether they jab an ''X'' or an ''O'' with the forefinger. Despite making a decision about which target to contact, the jab is not influenced by the position of a surrounding frame, indicating that choice can be handled within the context-insensitive sensorimotor system
Bridgeman, Bruce (2000). Interactions between vision for perception and vision for behavior. In Yves Rossetti & Antti Revonsuo (eds.), Beyond Dissociation: Interaction Between Dissociated Implicit and Explicit Processing. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 14 | Google)
Bridgeman, Bruce (2002). The grand illusion and Petit illusions: Interactions of perception and sensory coding. Journal of Consciousness Studies 9:29-34.   (Google)
Carey, D. P.; Dijkerman, H. Chris & Milner, A. David (1998). Perception and action in depth. Consciousness and Cognition 7 (3):438-453.   (Cited by 46 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Little is known about distance processing in patients with posterior brain damage. Although many investigators have claimed that distance estimates are normal or abnormal in some of these patients, many of these observations were made informally and the examiners often asked for relative, and not absolute, distance estimates. The present investigation served two purposes. First, we wanted to contrast the use of distance information in peripersonal space for perceptual report as opposed to visuomotor control in our visual form agnosic patient, DF. Second, we wanted to see to what extent her abilities to process distance cues were dependent on binocular vision, in light of Milner et al.'s (1991) observations of preserved stereopsis in DF, and Dijkerman et al.'s (1996) and Marotta et al.'s (1997) observations that her visual guidance of grasping may be particularly dependent on binocular vision of the target. We hypothesized that DF's visuomotor responses would show normal sensitivity to target distance, while her perceptual estimates would not. In the first experiment, we required DF and two age- and sex-matched control subjects to reach out and grasp black cubes placed at varying distances, or to estimate the distance of the cubes from the hand starting position without making a reaching movement. In the second experiment, we required DF and two age-matched control subjects to point as rapidly and accurately as possible to small LED targets which differed in spatial location, under binocular and monocular conditions. The results showed that, relative to the control subjects, DF's grasping movements produced normal peak velocity-distance scaling-when she reached for blocks which varied in depth or pointed to LED targets which were presented at different distances in depth. In contrast, in the cube experiment, her verbal estimates of object distance were poorly scaled, although they improved slightly under the binocular conditions. The results are discussed in terms of current theories of processing streams in extrastriate visual cortex and the distinction between categorical and coordinate spatial processing
de Schotten, Michel T.; Urbanski, Marika; Duffau, Hugues; Volle, Emmanuelle; Lévy, Richard; Dubois, Bruno & Bartolomeo, Paolo (2005). Direct evidence for a parietal-frontal pathway subserving spatial awareness in humans. Science 309 (5744):2226-2228.   (Cited by 31 | Google | More links)
Dijkerman, H. Chris; Milner, A. David & Carey, D. P. (1998). Grasping spatial relationships: Failure to demonstrate allocentric visual coding in a patient with visual form agnosia. Consciousness and Cognition 7 (3):424-437.   (Cited by 43 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The cortical visual mechanisms involved in processing spatial relationships remain subject to debate. According to one current view, the ''dorsal stream'' of visual areas, emanating from primary visual cortex and culminating in the posterior parietal cortex, mediates this aspect of visual processing. More recently, others have argued that while the dorsal stream provides egocentric coding of visual location for motor control, the separate ''ventral'' stream is needed for allocentric spatial coding. We have assessed the visual form agnosic patient DF, whose lesion mainly affects the ventral stream, on a prehension task requiring allocentric spatial coding. She was presented with transparent circular disks. Each disk had circular holes cut in it. DF was asked to reach out and grasp the disk by placing her fingers through the holes. The disks either had three holes (for forefinger, middle finger, and thumb) or two holes (for forefinger and thumb). The distance between the forefinger and thumb holes, and the orientation of the line formed by them, were independently varied. DF was quite unable to adjust her grip aperture or her hand orientation in the three-hole task. Although she was able to orient her hand appropriately for the two-hole disks, she still remained unable to adjust her grip aperture to the distance between the holes. These findings are consistent with the idea that allocentric processing of spatial information requires a functioning ventral stream, even when the information is being used to guide a motor response
Fecteau, Jillian H.; Chua, Romeo; Franks, Ian & Enns, James T. (2001). Visual awareness and the on-line modification of action. Canadian Journal of Experimental Psychology 55 (2):104-110.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Giaschi, Deborah; Jan, James E.; Bjornson, Bruce; Young, Simon Au; Tata, Matthew; Lyons, Christopher J.; Good, William V. & Wong, Peter K. H. (2003). Conscious visual abilities in a patient with early bilateral occipital damage. Developmental Medicine and Child Neurology 45 (11):772-781.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Goodale, Melvyn A. (2007). Duplex vision: Separate cortical pathways for conscious perception and the control of action. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell.   (Google)
Goodale, Melvyn A.; Cant, Jonathan S. & Króliczak, Grzegorz (2006). Grasping the past and present: When does visuomotor priming occur? In Ögmen, Haluk; Breitmeyer, Bruno G. (2006). The First Half Second: The Microgenesis and Temporal Dynamics of Unconscious and Conscious Visual Processes. (Pp. 51-71). Cambridge, MA, US: MIT Press. Xi, 410 Pp.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Goodale, Melvyn A. (2004). Perceiving the world and grasping it: Dissociations between conscious and unconscious visual processing. In Michael S. Gazzaniga (ed.), The Cognitive Neurosciences. MIT Press.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Goodale, Melvyn A. & Murphy, K. (2000). Space in the brain: Different neural substrates for allocentric and egocentric frames of reference. In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Neural Correlates of Consciousness. MIT Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Goodale, Melvyn A. & Milner, A. David (2004). Sight Unseen: An Exploration of Conscious and Unconscious Vision. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 53 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Vision, more than any other sense, dominates our mental life. Our visual experience is just so rich, so detailed, that we can hardly distinguish that experience from the world itself. Even when we just think about the world and don't look at it directly, we can't help but 'imagine' what it looks like. We think of 'seeing' as being a conscious activity--we direct our eyes, we choose what we look at, we register what we are seeing. The series of events described in this book radically altered this attitude towards vision. This book describes one of the most extraordinary neurological cases of recent years--one that profoundly changed scientific views on consciousness. It is the story of Dee Fletcher--a woman recently blinded--who became the subject of a series of scientific studies. As events unfolded, Milner and Goodale found that Dee wasn't in fact blind--she just didn't know that she could see. Taking us on a journey into the unconscious brain, the two scientists who made this incredible discovery tell the amazing story of their work, and the surprising conclusion they were forced to reach. Written to be accessible to students and popular science readers, this book is a fascinating illustration of the power of the 'unconscious' mind
Goodale, Melvyn A. & Milner, A. David (1992). Separate visual pathways for perception and action. Trends in Neurosciences 15:20-25.   (Cited by 1299 | Google | More links)
Humphreys, Glyn W.; Troscianko, Tom; Riddoch, M. J. & Boucart, M. (1992). Covert processing in different visual recognition systems. In A. David Milner & M. D. Rugg (eds.), The Neuropsychology of Consciousness. Academic Press.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Humphrey, G. K. & Goodale, Melvyn A. (1998). Probing unconscious visual processing with the Mccollough effect. Consciousness and Cognition 7 (3):494-519.   (Cited by 36 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The McCollough effect, an orientation-contingent color aftereffect, has been known for over 30 years and, like other aftereffects, has been taken as a means of probing the brain's operations psychophysically. In this paper, we review psychophysical, neuropsychological, and neuroimaging studies of the McCollough effect. Much of the evidence suggests that the McCollough effect depends on neural mechanisms that are located early in the cortical visual pathways, probably in V1. We also review evidence showing that the aftereffect can be induced without conscious perception of the induction patterns. Based on these two lines of evidence, it is argued that our conscious visual experience of the world arises in the cortical visual system beyond V1
Jiang, Huai; Stein, Barry E. & McHaffie, John G. (2003). Opposing basal ganglia processes shape midbrain visuomotor activity bilaterally. Nature 423:982-986.   (Cited by 24 | Google | More links)
Milner, A. David & Dijkerman, H. Chris (2001). Direct and indirect visuals routes to action. In Beatrice De Gelder, Edward H. F. De Haan & Charles A. Heywood (eds.), Out of Mind: Varieties of Unconscious Processes. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Milner, A. David (1998). Streams and consciousness: Visual awareness and the brain. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 2:25-30.   (Cited by 33 | Google)
Milner, A. David & Goodale, Melvyn A. (1995). The Visual Brain in Action. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Although the mechanics of how the eye works are well understood, debate still exists as to how the complex machinery of the brain interprets neural impulses...
Milner, David & Goodale, Melvyn A. (1998). The visual brain in action (precis). Psyche 4 (12).   (Google)
Overgaard, Morten; Nielsen, Jorgen Feldbaek & Fuglsang-Frederiksen, Anders (2004). A TMS study of the ventral projections from v1 with implications for the finding of neural correlates of consciousness. Brain and Cognition 54 (1):58-64.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Poppel, Ernst; Held, R. & Frost, D. (1973). Residual function after brain wounds involving the central visual pathways in man. Nature 243:295-96.   (Google)
Silveira, Luiz Carlos L. (2004). Parallel visual pathways from the retina to the visual cortex – how do they fit? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (1):50-51.   (Google)
Abstract: Which roles are played by subcortical pathways in models of cortical streams for visual processing? Through their thalamic relays, magnocellular (M) and parvocellular (P) projecting ganglion cells send complementary signals to V1, where their outputs are combined in several different ways. The synergic role of M and P cells in vision can be understood by estimating cell response entropy in all domains of interest
Thier, Peter; Haarmeier, Thomas; Chakraborty, Subhojit; Lindner, Axel & Tikhonov, Alexander (2002). Cortical substrates of visuospatial awareness outside the classical dorsal stream of visual processing. In Hans-Otto Karnath, David Milner & Giuseppe Vallar (eds.), The Cognitive and Neural Bases of Spatial Neglect. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Thomas, Nigel J. T. (online). New support for the perceptual activity theory of mental imagery.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: Since the publication of my "Are Theories of Imagery Theories of Imagination? An _Active Perception_ Approach to Conscious Mental Content," (Thomas, 1999 - henceforth abbreviated as ATOITOI on this page), a good deal of published material has appeared or has come to my attention that either provides additional support for the Perceptual Activity Theory PA theory) of mental imagery presented in ATOITOI, or that throws further doubt on the rival (picture and description) theories that are criticized there. Other relevant evidence was not mentioned in ATOITOI because I lacked the space for a proper explanation of its relevance. I hope eventually to write and publish a new account of
PA
theory, that will make use of much of this material. In the meantime this page provides citations (and, where possible, links) to the "new" support, and discussion sections that briefly explain the relevance of the cited material. Quite apart from presenting new lines of supporting evidence and argument, I hope this page will help to clarify many aspects of

8.7d Change/Inattentional Blindness

Anderson, Joseph & Anderson, Barbara (1993). The myth of persistence of vision revisited. Journal of Film and Video 45:3--12.   (Google)
Angelone, Bonnie L.; Levin, Daniel T. & Simons, Daniel J. (2003). The relationship between change detection and recognition of centrally attended objects in motion pictures. Perception 32 (8):947-962.   (Cited by 13 | Google | More links)
Beck, Diane; Rees, Geraint; Frith, Christopher D. & Lavie, Nilli (2001). Change blindness and change awareness. Nature Neuroscience 4.   (Google)
Beck, Melissa R.; Levin, Daniel T. & Angelone, Bonnie L. (2007). Change blindness blindness: Beliefs about the roles of intention and scene complexity in change detection. Consciousness and Cognition 16 (1):31-51.   (Google | More links)
Beck, Melissa R.; Levin, Daniel T. & Angelone, Bonnie L. (2007). Metacognitive errors in change detection: Lab and life converge. Consciousness and Cognition 16 (1):58-62.   (Google | More links)
Beck, Diane; Rees, Geraint; Frith, Christopher D. & Lavie, Nilli (2001). Neural correlates of change detection and change blindness. Nature Neuroscience 4 (6):645-650.   (Cited by 178 | Google | More links)
Blackmore, Susan J.; Brelstaff, Gavin; Nelson, Katherine & Troscianko, Tom (1995). Is the richness of our visual world an illusion? Transsaccadic memory for complex scenes. Perception 24:1075-81.   (Cited by 165 | Google | More links)
Blackmore, Susan J. (2002). The grand illusion: Why consciousness exists only when you look for it. New Scientist 174 (2348):26-29.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Like most people, I used to think of my conscious life as like a stream of experiences, passing through my mind, one after another. But now I’m starting to wonder, is consciousness really like this? Could this apparently innocent assumption be the reason we find consciousness so baffling?
Braun, Jochen (2001). Inattentional blindness: It's great but not necessarily about attention. Psyche 7 (6).   (Google)
Bridgeman, Bruce; Hendry, David & Stark, L. (1975). Failure to detect displacements of the visual world during saccadic eye movements. Vision Research 15:719-22.   (Google)
Changeux, Jean-Pierre & Dehaene, Stanislas (2005). Ongoing spontaneous activity controls access to consciousness: A neuronal model for inattentional blindness. PLoS Biology 3 (5):e141.   (Google)
Abstract: 1 INSERM-CEA Unit 562, Cognitive Neuroimaging, Service Hospitalier Fre´de´ric Joliot, Orsay, France, 2 CNRS URA2182 Re´cepteurs and Cognition, Institut Pasteur, Paris, France
Clark, Andy (2002). Is seeing all it seems? Journal of Consciousness Studies 9:181-202.   (Cited by 32 | Google)
Cleeremans, Axel, Change blindness to gradual changes in facial expressions.   (Google)
Abstract: Change blindness—our inability to detect changes in a stimulus—occurs even when the change takes place gradually, without disruption (Simons et al., 2000). Such gradual changes are more difficult to detect than changes that involve a disruption. In this experiment, we extend previous findings to the domain of facial expressions of emotions occurring in the context of a realistic scene. Even with changes occurring in central, highly relevant stimuli such as faces, gradual changes still produced high levels of change blindness: Detection rates were three times lower for gradual changes than for displays involving disruption, with only 15% of the observers perceiving the gradual change within a single trial. However, despite this high rate of change blindness, changes on faces were significantly better detected than color changes occurring on non facial objects in the same scene
Cohen, Jonathan (2002). The grand grand illusion illusion. Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (5-6):141-157.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Davis, Deborah; Loftus, Elizabeth F.; Vanous, Samuel & Cucciare, Michael, Unconscious transference' can be an instance of 'change blindness.   (Google)
Abstract:      Three experiments investigated the role of 'change blindness' in mistaken eyewitness identifications of innocent bystanders to a simulated crime. Two innocent people appeared briefly in a filmed scene in a supermarket. The 'continuous innocent' (CI) walked down the liquor aisle and passed behind a stack of boxes, where upon the perpetrator emerged and stole a bottle of liquor, thereby resulting in an action sequence promoting the illusion of continuity between perpetrator and innocent. The 'discontinuous innocent' (DI) was shown immediately afterward in the produce aisle. Results revealed that: (1) more than half of participants failed to notice the change between the CI and the perpetrator, (2) among those who failed to notice the change, more misidentified the 'CI' than the 'DI', a pattern that did not hold for those who did notice the change. Participants were less likely to notice the change when they were distracted while watching the video
Dennett, Daniel C. (2002). How could I be wrong? How wrong could I be? Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (5):13-16.   (Cited by 14 | Google | More links)
Abstract: One of the striking, even amusing, spectacles to be enjoyed at the many workshops and conferences on consciousness these days is the breathtaking overconfidence with which laypeople hold forth about the nature of consciousness Btheir own in particular, but everybody =s by extrapolation. Everybody =s an expert on consciousness, it seems, and it doesn =t take any knowledge of experimental findings to secure the home truths these people enunciate with such conviction
Dretske, Fred (2004). Change blindness. Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):1-18.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Dretske, Fred (2007). What change blindness teaches about consciousness. Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):215–220.   (Google | More links)
Dulany, Donelson E. (2001). Inattentional awareness. Psyche 7 (5).   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Ellis, Ralph D. (2001). Implications of inattentional blindness for "enactive" theories of consciousness. Brain and Mind 2 (3):297-322.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Mack and Rock show evidence that no consciousperception occurs without a prior attentiveact. Subjects already executing attention taskstend to neglect visible elements extraneous tothe attentional task, apparently lacking evenbetter-than-chance ``implicit perception,''except in certain cases where the unattendedstimulus is a meaningful word or has uniquepre-tuned salience similar to that ofmeaningful words. This is highly consistentwith ``enactive'' notions that consciousnessrequires selective attention via emotional subcortical and limbic motivationalactivation as it influences anterior attentionmechanisms. Occipital activation withoutconsciousness suggests that motivated search,enacted through the organism's subcorticalmotivational functions, is needed beforevisual stimulation engenders consciousness.This enactive view – that searching for,rather than receiving or processing input isthe basis of consciousness – was slow ingaining acceptance lacking empirical evidenceof this kind, combined with thestimulus-response assumption that brain eventssubserving perceptual consciousness must resultfrom transformation of perceptual input ratherthan from the organism's self-regulatedactivity as manifested through subcorticalactivity. Implicit perception occurring withword priming is ``paradoxical'' according to Mackand Rock, suggesting late selection forattention after extensive unconsciousprocessing, while most trials involvingnonverbal rather than verbal images mightsuggest earlier selection, sinceunattended objects are unseen, apparently evenimplicitly. This paper argues that anteriorand subcortical motivational mechanisms play animportant role in early selection; posteriormechanisms then unconsciously enhance signals;if data survive early gating andcorticothalamic enhancement, then still further anterior-limbic loops motivatedlyactivate ``image schemas'' resonating withposterior nonconscious processing; at thatpoint, consciousness occurs
Laloyaux, Cedric; Devue, Christel; Doyen, Stephane; David, Elodie & Cleeremans, Axel (online). Undetected changes in visible stimuli influence subsequent decisions.   (Google)
Abstract: Change blindness—our inability to detect changes in a stimulus—occurs even when the change takes place gradually, without any disruption (Simons et al., 2000). Such gradual changes are more difficult to detect than changes that involve a disruption. Using this method, David et al. (in press) recently showed substantial blindness to changes that involve facial expressions of emotion. In this experiment, we show that people who failed to detect any change in the displays were (1) nevertheless influenced by the changing information in subsequent recognition decisions about which facial expression they had seen, and (2) that their confidence in their decisions was lower after exposure to changing vs. static displays. The findings therefore support the notion that undetected changes that occur in highly salient stimuli may be causally efficacious and influence subsequent behaviour. Implications concerning the nature of the representations associated with undetected changes are discussed
Fernandez-Duque, Diego & Thornton, Ian (2000). Change detection without awareness: Do explicit reports underestimate the representation of change in the visual system? Visual Cognition 7 (1):323-344.   (Cited by 81 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Evidence from many different paradigms (e.g. change blindness, inattentional blindness, transsaccadic integration) indicate that observers are often very poor at reporting changes to their visual environment. Such evidence has been used to suggest that the spatio-temporal coherence needed to represent change can only occur in the presence of focused attention. In four experiments we use modified change blindness tasks to demonstrate (a) that sensitivity to change does occur in the absence of awareness, and (b) this sensitivity does not rely on the redeploy- ment of attention. We discuss these results in relation to theories of scene percep- tion, and propose a reinterpretatio n of the role of attention in representing change
Fernandez-Duque, Diego & Thornton, Ian (2003). Explicit mechanisms do not account for implicit localization and identification of change: An empirical reply to Mitroff et al (2000). Journal of Experimental Psychology 29 (5).   (Google)
Abstract: Several recent findings support the notion that changes in the environment can be implicitly represented by the visual system. S. R. Mitroff, D. J. Simons, and S. L. Franconeri (2002) challenged this view and proposed alternative interpretations based on explicit strategies. Across 4 experiments, the current study finds no empirical support for such alternative proposals. Experiment 1 shows that subjects do not rely on unchanged items when locating an unaware change. Experiments 2 and 3 show that unaware changes affect performance even when they occur at an unpredictable location. Experiment 4 shows that the unaware congruency effect does not depend simply on the pattern of the final display. The authors point to converging evidence from other methodologies and highlight several weaknesses in Mitroff et al.’s theoretical arguments. It is concluded here that implicit representation of change provides the most parsimonious explanation for both past and present findings
Fernandez-Duque, Diego; Grossi, Giordana; Thornton, Ian & Neville, Helen (2003). Representation of change: Separate electrophysiological markers of attention, awareness, and implicit processing. Journal Of Cognitive Neuroscience 15 (4):491-507.   (Cited by 18 | Google | More links)
Abstract: & Awareness of change within a visual scene only occurs in subjects were aware of, replicated those attentional effects, but the presence of focused attention. When two versions of a
Grimes, John A. (1996). On the failure to detect changes in scenes across saccades. In Kathleen Akins (ed.), Perception. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 202 | Google)
Hatfield, Gary (2004). Seeing 'subscript Dretske'. Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):19-35.   (Google)
Janzen, Greg (2008). Intentionalism and change blindness. Philosophia 36 (3).   (Google)
Abstract:  According to reductive intentionalism, the phenomenal character of a conscious experience is constituted by the experience's intentional (or representational) content. In this article I attempt to show that a phenomenon in visual perception called change blindness poses a problem for this doctrine. Specifically, I argue that phenomenal character is not sensitive, as it should be if reductive intentionalism is correct, to fine-grained variations in content. The standard anti-intentionalist strategy is to adduce putative cases in which phenomenal character varies despite sameness of content. This paper explores an alternative antiintentionalist tack, arguing, by way of a specific example involving change blindness, that content can vary despite sameness of phenomenal character
Koivisto, Mika & Revonsuo, Antti (2003). An ERP study of change detection, change blindness, and visual awareness. Psychophysiology 40 (3):423-429.   (Cited by 20 | Google | More links)
Levin, Daniel T. (2002). Change blindness blindness as visual metacognition. Journal of Consciousness Studies 9:111-30.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Levin, Daniel T.; Momen, Nausheen; Drivdahl, Sarah B. & Simons, Daniel J. (2000). Change blindness blindness: The metacognitive error of overestimating change-detection ability. Visual Cognition 7 (1):397-412.   (Cited by 91 | Google | More links)
Levin, Daniel T.; Drivdahl, Sarah B.; Momen, Nausheen & Beck, Melissa R. (2002). False predictions about the detectability of visual changes: The role of beliefs about attention, memory, and the continuity of attended objects in causing change blindness blindness. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (4):507-527.   (Google)
Levin, Daniel T.; Simons, Daniel J.; Angelone, Bonnie L. & Chabris, Christopher (2002). Memory for centrally attended changing objects in an incidental real-world change detection paradigm. British Journal Of Psychology 93:289-302.   (Cited by 65 | Google | More links)
Levin, Daniel T. & Varakin, D. Alexander (2004). No pause for a brief disruption: Failures of visual awareness during ongoing events. Consciousness and Cognition 13 (2):363-372.   (Google | More links)
Mack, Arien & Rock, Irvin (1998). Inattentional Blindness. MIT Press.   (Cited by 739 | Google | More links)
Mack, Arien & Rock, Irvin (2003). Inattentional blindness: An overview. Current Directions in Psychological Science 12 (5):180-184.   (Cited by 673 | Google | More links)
Mack, Arien (2002). Is the visual world a grand illusion? A response. Journal of Consciousness Studies 9:102-10.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
McConkie, G. W. & Zola, D. (1979). Is visual information integrated across successive fixations in reading? Perception and Psychophysics 25:221-24.   (Cited by 125 | Google)
Mitroff, Stephen R. & Simons, Daniel J. (2000). Changes are not localized before they are explicitly detected. Investigative Ophthalmology and Visual Science 41 (4).   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Mitroff, Steve; Simons, Daniel J. & Levin, Daniel T. (2004). Nothing compares 2 views: Change blindness results from failures to compare retained information. Perception and Psychophysics 66 (8):1268-1281.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Mitroff, Stephen R.; Simons, Daniel J. & Franconeri, Steven (2002). The siren song of implicit change detection. Journal Of Experimental Psychology-Human Perception And Performance 28 (4):798-815.   (Cited by 28 | Google | More links)
Moore, Cathleen (2001). Inattentional blindness: Perception or memory and what does it matter? Psyche 7 (2).   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Most, Steve; Simons, Daniel J.; Scholl, Brian J. & Chabris, Christopher (2000). Sustained inattentional blindness: The role of location in the detection of unexpected dynamic events. Psyche 6 (14).   (Cited by 18 | Google)
Most, Steve; Scholl, Brian J.; Clifford, E. & Simons, Daniel J. (2005). What you see is what you set: Sustained inattentional blindness and the capture of awareness. Psychological Review 112 (1):217-242.   (Cited by 40 | Google | More links)
Niedeggen, Michael; Wichmann, Petra & Stoerig, Petra (2001). Change blindness and time to consciousness. European Journal of Neuroscience 14 (10):1719-1726.   (Cited by 17 | Google | More links)
Noë, Alva; Pessoa, Luis & Thompson, Evan (2000). Beyond the grand illusion: What change blindness really teaches us about vision. Visual Cognition 7 (1-3):93-106.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Experiments on scene perception and change blindness suggest that the visual system does not construct detailed internal models of a scene. These experiments therefore call into doubt the traditional view that vision is a process in which detailed representations of the environment must be constructed. The non-existence of such detailed representations, however, does not entail that we do not perceive the detailed environment. The “grand illusion hypothesis” that our visual world is an illusion rests on (1) a problematic “reconstructionist” conception of vision, and (2) a misconception about the character of perceptual experience
Noë, Alva (2001). Experience and the active mind. Synthese 61 (1):41-60.   (Google)
Noë, Alva (2007). Inattentional blindness, change blindness and consciousness. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell.   (Google)
Noë, Alva (2002). Is the visual world a grand illusion? Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (5-6):1-12.   (Google)
Noë, Alva & O'Regan, Kevin J. (2000). Perception, attention, and the grand illusion. Psyche 6 (15).   (Google)
Abstract: This paper looks at two puzzles raised by the phenomenon of inattentional blindness. First, how can we see at all if, in order to see, we must first perceptually attend to that which we see? Second, if attention is required for perception, why does it seem to us as if we are perceptually aware of the whole detailed visual field when it is quite clear that we do not attend to all that detail? We offer a general framework for thinking about perception and perceptual consciousness that addresses these questions and we propose, in addition, an informal account of the relation between attention and consciousness. On this view, perceptual awareness is a species of attention
Noë, Alva (2005). What does change blindness teach us about consciousness? Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9 (5):218.   (Google)
O'Regan, Kevin J.; Rensink, Ronald A. & Clark, James J. (1999). Change blindness as a result of mudsplashes. Nature 398 (6722):34-34.   (Cited by 175 | Google | More links)
O'Regan, J. Kevin; Deubel, H.; Clark, James J. & Rensink, R. (2000). Picture changes during blinks: Looking without seeing and seeing without looking. Visual Cognition 7:191-211.   (Cited by 170 | Google | More links)
Pashler, Harold (1988). Familiarity and visual change detection. Perception and Psychophysics 41:191-201.   (Cited by 155 | Google | More links)
Pourtois, Gilles; De Pretto, Michael; Hauert, Claude-Alain & Vuilleumier, Patrik (2006). Time course of brain activity during change blindness and change awareness: Performance is predicted by neural events before change onset. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 18 (12):2108-2129.   (Google)
Raffman, Diana (ms). Nontransitivity, Indiscriminability, and Looking the Same.   (Google)
Rees, Geraint; Russell, C.; Frith, Christopher D. & Driver, Julia (1999). Inattentional blindness versus inattentional amnesia for fixated but ignored words. Science 286 (5449):2504-7.   (Cited by 102 | Google | More links)
Rensink, Ronald (ms). Change blindness.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Large changes that occur in clear view of an observer can become difficult to notice if made during an eye movement, blink, or other such disturbance. This change blindness is consistent with the proposal that focused visual attention is necessary to see change, with a change becoming difficult to notice whenever conditions prevent attention from being automatically drawn to it
Rensink, Ronald A. (2005). Change blindness: Implications for the nature of visual attention. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9 (1):16-20.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Rensink, Ronald A. (2002). Change detection. [Journal (Paginated)] 53:245-277.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Five aspects of visual change detection are reviewed. The first concerns the concept of _change_ itself, in particular the ways it differs from the related notions of _motion_ and _difference_. The second involves the various methodological approaches that have been developed to study change detection; it is shown that under a variety of conditions observers are often unable to see large changes directly in front of them. Next, it is argued that this "change blindness" indicates that focused attention is needed to detect change, and that this can help map out the nature of visual attention. The fourth aspect concerns how these results affect our understanding of visual perception—for example, the proposal that a sparse, dynamic representation underlies much of our visual experience. Finally, a brief discussion is presented concerning the limits to our current understanding of change detection
Rensink, Ronald A.; O'Regan, Kevin J. & Clark, James J. (2000). On failures to detect changes in scenes across brief interruptions. Visual Cognition 7 (1-3):127-145.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: When brief blank fields are placed between alternating displays of an original and a modified scene, a striking failure of perception is induced: the changes become extremely difficult to notice, even when they are large, presented repeatedly, and the observer expects them to occur (Rensink, O'Regan, & Clark, 1997). To determine the mechanisms behind this induced "change blindness", four experiments examine its dependence on initial preview and on the nature of the interruptions used. Results support the proposal that representations at the early stages of visual processing are highly volatile, and that focused attention is needed to stabilize them sufficiently to support the perception of change
Rensink, Ronald A. (2000). Seeing, sensing, and scrutinizing. Vision Research:469-1487.   (Cited by 203 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Large changes in a scene often become difficult to notice if made during an eye movement, image flicker, movie cut, or other such disturbance. It is argued here that this _change blindness_ can serve as a useful tool to explore various aspects of vision. This argument centers around the proposal that focused attention is needed for the explicit perception of change. Given this, the study of change perception can provide a useful way to determine the nature of visual attention, and to cast new light on the way that it is?and is not?involved in visual perception. To illustrate the power of this approach, this paper surveys its use in exploring three different aspects of vision. The first concerns the general nature of _seeing_. To explain why change blindness can be easily induced in experiments but apparently not in everyday life, it is proposed that perception involves a _virtual representation_, where object representations do not accumulate, but are formed as needed. An architecture containing both attentional and nonattentional streams is proposed as a way to implement this scheme. The second aspect concerns the ability of observers to detect change even when they have no visual experience of it. This _sensing_ is found to take on at least two forms: detection without visual experience (but still with conscious awareness), and detection without any awareness at all. It is proposed that these are both due to the operation of a nonattentional visual stream. The final aspect considered is the nature of visual attention itself?the mechanisms involved when _scrutinizing_ items. Experiments using controlled stimuli show the existence of various limits on visual search for change. It is shown that these limits provide a powerful means to map out the attentional mechanisms involved
Rensink, Ronald A. (2000). The dynamic representation of scenes. Visual Cognition.   (Cited by 227 | Google | More links)
Abstract: One of the more powerful impressions created by vision is that of a coherent, richly-detailed world where everything is present simultaneously. Indeed, this impression is so compelling that we tend to ascribe these properties not only to the external world, but to our internal representations as well. But results from several recent experiments argue against this latter ascription. For example, changes in images of real-world scenes often go unnoticed when made during a saccade, flicker, blink, or movie cut. This "change blindness" provides strong evidence against the idea that our brains contain a picture-like representation of the scene that is everywhere detailed and coherent
Rensink, Ronald A.; O'Regan, J. Kevin & Clark, James J. (1997). To see or not to see: The need for attention to perceive changes in scenes. Psychological Science 8:368-373.   (Cited by 659 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Methods. We employed a "flicker" technique, in which an original and a modified image (each of duration 240 ms) continually alternated, with a blank field (duration 80 ms) between each display. Images were all of real-world scenes. One of three kinds of change (appearance/disappearance, color, or translation) was made to an object or region in each scene. Changes were large and easily seen under normal conditions. Subjects viewed the flicker display, and pressed a key when they noticed the change
Rensink, Ronald A. (2004). Visual sensing without seeing. Psychological Science 15:27-32.   (Google)
Abstract: It has often been assumed that when we use vision to become aware of an object or event in our surroundings, this must be accompanied by a corresponding visual experience (i.e., _seeing_). It is shown here that this assumption is incorrect. When observers view a sequence of displays alternating between an image of a scene and the same image changed in some way, they often feel (or
Rensink, Ronald A. (2000). When good observers go bad: Change blindness, inattentional blindness, and visual experience. [Journal (on-Line/Unpaginated)] 6 (9).   (Cited by 19 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Several studies (e.g., Becklen & Cervone, 1983; Mack & Rock, 1998; Neisser & Becklen, 1975) have found that observers attending to a particular object or event often fail to report the presence of unexpected items. This has been interpreted as inattentional blindness (IB), a failure to see unattended items (Mack & Rock, 1998). Meanwhile, other studies (e.g., Pashler, 1988; Phillips, 1974; Rensink et al., 1997; Simons, 1996) have found that observers often fail to report the presence of large changes in a display when these changes occur simultaneously with a transient such as an eye movement or flash of the display. This has been interpreted as change blindness (CB), a failure to see unattended changes (Rensink et al., 1997). In both cases there is a striking failure to report an object or event that would be quite visible under other circumstances. And in both cases there is a widespread (although not universal) belief that the underlying cause has to do with the absence of attention. The question then arises as to how these effects might be related. Is CB the same thing as IB? If not, what is the relation between them? And given that these phenomena deal with failures of subjective perception, what can they teach us about the nature of our visual experience? In particular, what can they teach us about the role played by visual attention?
Scholl, Brian J. (2000). Attenuated change blindness for exogenously attended items in a flicker paradigm. Visual Cognition 7:377-396.   (Cited by 53 | Google | More links)
Scholl, Brian J. & Simons, Daniel J. (2001). Change blindness, Gibson, and the sensorimotor theory of vision. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):1004-1006.   (Google)
Abstract: We suggest that the sensorimotor “theory” of vision is really an unstructured collection of separate ideas, and that much of the evidence cited in its favor at best supports only a subset of these ideas. As an example, we note that work on change blindness does not “vindicate” (or even speak to) much of the sensorimotor framework. Moreover, the ideas themselves are not always internally consistent. Finally, the proposed framework draws on ideas initially espoused by James Gibson, but does little to differentiate itself from those earlier views. For even part of this framework to become testable, it must specify which sources of evidence can support or contradict each of the component hypotheses
Scott-Brown, K.; Baker, M. J. & Orbach, H. (2000). Comparison blindness. Visual Cognition 7:253-267.   (Cited by 61 | Google | More links)
Shapiro, Kenneth J. (2000). Change blindness: Theory or paradigm? Visual Cognition 7:83-91.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Shore, D. & Klein, Raymond M. (2000). The effects of scene inversion on change blindness. Journal of General Psychology 127:27-43.   (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
Siewert, Charles (2002). Is visual experience rich or poor? Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (5-6):131-40.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Silverman, Michael E. & Mack, Arien (2006). Change blindness and priming: When it does and does not occur. Consciousness and Cognition 15 (2):409-422.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Simons, Daniel J. (2000). Attentional capture and inattentional blindness. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 4 (4):147-155.   (Cited by 92 | Google | More links)
Simons, Daniel J. (2000). Current approaches to change blindness. Visual Cognition 7:1-15.   (Cited by 179 | Google | More links)
Simons, Daniel J. & Levin, Daniel T. (1997). Change blindness. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 1:241-82.   (Cited by 608 | Google | More links)
Simons, Daniel J.; Franconeri, Steven & Reimer, Rebecca (2000). Change blindness in the absence of a visual disruption. Perception 29 (10):1143-1154.   (Cited by 88 | Google | More links)
Simons, Daniel J. & Rensink, Ronald A. (2005). Change blindness, representations, and consciousness: Reply to Noe. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9 (5):219.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Simons, Daniel J.; Chabris, Christopher & Schnur, Tatiana (2002). Evidence for preserved representations in change blindness. Consciousness And Cognition 11 (1):78-97.   (Cited by 36 | Google | More links)
Abstract: People often fail to detect large changes to scenes, provided that the changes occur during a visual disruption. This phenomenon, known as ''change blindness,'' occurs both in the laboratory and in real-world situations in which changes occur unexpectedly. The pervasiveness of the inability to detect changes is consistent with the theoretical notion that we internally represent relatively little information from our visual world from one glance at a scene to the next. However, evidence for change blindness does not necessarily imply the absence of such a representation-people could also miss changes if they fail to compare an existing representation of the pre-change scene to the post-change scene. In three experiments, we show that people often do have a representation of some aspects of the pre-change scene even when they fail to report the change. And, in fact, they appear to ''discover'' this memory and can explicitly report details of a changed object in response to probing questions. The results of these real-world change detection studies are discussed in the context of broader claims about change blindness
Simons, Daniel J. & Chabris, Christopher (1999). Gorillas in our midst: Sustained inattentional blindness for dynamic events. Perception 28 (9):1059-1074.   (Cited by 289 | Google | More links)
Simons, Daniel J.; Mitroff, Steve & Franconeri, Steve (2003). Scene perception: What we can learn from visual integration and change detection. In Michael L. Peterson & G. Rhodes (eds.), Perception of Faces, Objects, and Scenes: Analytic and Holistic Processes (335-355). Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Smilek, Daniel; Eastwood, John D.; Reynolds, Michael G. & Kingstone, Alan (2007). Metacognitive errors in change detection: Missing the gap between lab and life. Consciousness and Cognition 16 (1):52-57.   (Google | More links)
Thornton, Ian & Fernandez-Duque, Diego (2000). An implicit measure of undetected change. Spatial Vision 14 (1):21-44.   (Cited by 24 | Google | More links)
Abstract: b>—Several paradigms (e.g. change blindness, inattentional blindness, transsaccadic integra- tion) indicate that observers are often very poor at reporting changes to their visual environment. Such evidence has been used to suggest that the spatio-temporal coherence needed to represent change can only occur in the presence of focused attention. However, those studies almost always rely on explicit reports. It remains a possibility that the visual system can implicitly detect change, but that in the absence of focused attention, the change does not reach awareness and consequently is not reported. To test this possibility, we used a simple change detection paradigm coupled with a speeded orien- tation discrimination task. Even when observers reported being unaware of a change in an item’s orientation, its nal orientation effectively biased their response in the orientation discrimination task. Both in aware and unaware trials, errors were most frequent when the changed item and the probe had incongruent orientations. These results demonstrate that the _nature _of the change can be represented in the absence of awareness
Thornton, Ian & Fernandez-Duque, Diego (2002). Converging evidence for the detection of change without awareness. Progress in Brain Research.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
Triesch, Jochen; Ballard, Dana; Hayhoe, Mary & Sullivan, Brian (2003). What you see is what you need. Journal Of Vision 3 (1):86-94.   (Cited by 36 | Google | More links)
Turatto, Massimo; Sandrini, Marco & Miniussi, Carlo (2004). The role of the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex in visual change awareness. Neuroreport 15 (16):2549-2552.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Wallace, Rodrick (ms). Culture and generalized inattentional blindness.   (Google)
Abstract: A recent mathematical treatment of Baars' Global Workspace consciousness model, much in the spirit of Dretske's communication theory analysis of high level mental function, is used to study the effects of embedding cultural heritage on a generalized form of inattentional blindness. Culture should express itself quite distinctly in this basic psychophysical phenomenon, acting across a variety of sensory and other modalities, because the limited syntactic and grammatical 'bandpass' of the topological rate distortion manifold characterizing conscious attention is itself strongly sculpted by the constraints of cultural context
Wallace, Rodrick (ms). Generalized inattentional blindness from a global workspace perspective.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Abstract: We apply Baars' Global Workspace model of consciousness to inattentional blindness, using the groupoid network method of Stewart et al. to explore modular structures defined by information measures associated with cognitive process. Internal cross-talk breaks the fundamental groupoid symmetry, and, if sufficiently strong, creates, in a highly punctuated manner, a linked, shifting, giant component which instantiates the global workspace of consciousness. Embedding, exterior, information sources act as an external field which breaks the groupoid symmetry in a somewhat different manner, definng the slowly-acting contexts of Baars' theory and providing topological constraints on the manifestations of consciousness. This analysis significantly extends recent mathematical treatments of the global workspace, and identifies a shifting, topologically-determined syntactical and grammatical 'bottleneck' as a tunable rate distortion manifold which constrains what sensory or other signals can be brought to conscious attention, typically in a punctuated manner. Sensations outside the limits of that filter's syntactic 'bandpass' have lower probability of detection, regardless of their structure, accounting for generalized forms of inattentional blindness
Wilken, Patrick & Ma, Wei Ji (2004). A detection theory account of change detection. Journal of Vision 4 (12):1120-1135.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Previous studies have suggested that visual short-term memory (VSTM) has a storage limit of approximately four items. However, the type of high-threshold (HT) model used to derive this estimate is based on a number of assumptions that have been criticized in other experimental paradigms (e.g., visual search). Here we report findings from nine experiments in which VSTM for color, spatial frequency, and orientation was modeled using a signal detection theory (SDT) approach. In Experiments 1-6, two arrays composed of multiple stimulus elements were presented for 100 ms with a 1500 ms ISI. Observers were asked to report in a yes/no fashion whether there was any difference between the first and second arrays, and to rate their confidence in their response on a 1-4 scale. In Experiments 1-3, only one stimulus element difference could occur (_T_ = 1) while set size was varied. In Experiments 4-6, set size was fixed while the number of stimuli that might change was varied (_T_ = 1, 2, 3, and 4). Three general models were tested against the receiver operating characteristics generated by the six experiments. In addition to the HT model, two SDT models were tried: one assuming summation of signals prior to a decision, the other using a max rule. In Experiments 7-9, observers were asked to directly report the relevant feature attribute of a stimulus presented 1500 ms previously, from an array of varying set size. Overall, the results suggest that observers encode stimuli independently and in parallel, and that performance is limited by internal noise, which is a function of set size
Wolfe, Jeremy (1999). Inattentional amnesia. Journal of Mental Imagery 29 (3-4):71-94.   (Cited by 120 | Google | More links)

8.7e Visual Imagery and Imagination

Ahsen, A. (1991). A second report on AA-VVIQ: Role of vivid and unvivid images in consciousness research. Journal of Mental Imagery 15:1-31.   (Google)
Ahsen, A. (1991). Imagery and consciousness: Putting together poetic, mythic and social realities. Journal of Mental Imagery 15:63-97.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Ahsen, A. (1993). Imagery paradigm: Imaginative consciousness in the experimental and clinical setting. Journal of Mental Imagery 17 (1-2).   (Google)
Arnheim, Rudolf (1994). Consciousness: An island of images. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 14:121-27.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Arterberry, Martha E.; Craver-Lemley, Catherine & Reeves, Adam (2002). Visual imagery is not always like visual perception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (2):183-184.   (Google)
Abstract: The “Perky effect” is the interference of visual imagery with vision. Studies of this effect show that visual imagery has more than symbolic properties, but these properties differ both spatially (including “pictorially”) and temporally from those of vision. We therefore reject both the literal picture-in-the-head view and the entirely symbolic view
Ahsen, A. (2005). A second report on AA-VVIQ: Role of vivid and unvivid images in consciousness research. Journal of Mental Imagery 29 (3-4).   (Google)
Bichowsky, F. R. (1926). The mechanism of consciousness: Images. American Journal of Psychology 37:557-564.   (Google)
Casey, Edward S. (1971). Imagination: Imagining and the image. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 31 (June):475-490.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Frick, R. W. (1987). A dissociation of conscious visual imagery and visual short-term memory. Neuropsychologia 25:707-12.   (Google)
Gendler, Tamar Szabó (2006). Imaginative contagion. Metaphilosophy 37 (2):183-203.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The aim of this article is to expand the diet of examples considered in philosophical discussions of imagination and pretense, and to offer some preliminary observations about what we might learn about the nature of imagination as a result. The article presents a number of cases involving imaginative contagion: cases where merely imagining or pretending that P has effects that we would expect only perceiving or believing that P to have. Examples are offered that involve visual imagery, motor imagery, fictional emotions, and social priming. It is suggested that imaginative contagion is a more prevalent phenomenon than has typically been recognized
Gregory, Dominic (2010). Pictures, pictorial contents and vision. British Journal of Aesthetics 50 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: Certain simple thoughts about pictures suggest that the contents of pictures are closely bound to vision. But how far can the striking features of depiction be accounted for merely in terms of the especially visual contents which belong to pictures, without considering, for example, any issues concerning the nature of the visual experiences with which pictures provide us? This article addresses that question by providing an account of the distinctively visual contents belonging to pictures, and by using that account to explain many notable general facts about depiction. Some implications of the resulting framework for the main stream of current theorizing about pictorial representation are also discussed.
Grossberg, Stephen (2002). Neural substrates of visual percepts, imagery, and hallucinations. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (2):194-195.   (Google)
Abstract: Recent neural models clarify many properties of mental imagery as part of the process whereby bottom-up visual information is influenced by top-down expectations, and how these expectations control visual attention. Volitional signals can transform modulatory top-down signals into supra-threshold imagery. Visual hallucinations can occur when the normal control of these volitional signals is lost
Grush, Rick (1998). Perception, imagery, and the sensorimotor loop. In F. Esken & F.-D. Heckman (eds.), A Consciousness Reader. Schoeningh Verlag.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Hampson, P. J. & Morris, P. E. (1990). Imagery, consciousness, and cognitive control: The boss model reviewed. In P. J. Hampson, D. F. Marks & Janet Richardson (eds.), Imagery: Current Developments. Routledge.   (Google)
Hebb, D. O. (1968). Concerning imagery. Psychological Review 75:466-77.   (Cited by 61 | Google)
Horne, P. V. (1993). The nature of imagery. Consciousness and Cognition 2:58-82.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Ishai, Alumit & Sagi, D. (1998). Visual imagery and visual perception: The role of memory and conscious awareness. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness II. MIT Press.   (Google)
Kunzendorf, Robert G.; Justice, M. & Capone, D. (1997). Conscious images as "centrally excited sensations": A developmental study of imaginal influences on the ERG. Journal of Mental Imagery 21:155-66.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Kunzendorf, Robert G. (1990). The causal efficacy of consciousness in general, imagery in particular: A materialist perspective. In Robert G. Kunzendorf (ed.), Mental Imagery. Plenum Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Lehmann, Daniel; Henggler, B.; Koukkan, M. & Michel, M. (1993). Source localization of brain electric field frequency bands during conscious, spontaneous visual imagery and abstract thought. Cognitive Brain Research 1:203-20.   (Google)
Mandler, George (1984). Consciousness, imagery, and emotion -- with special reference to autonomic imagery. Journal of Mental Imagery 8:87-94.   (Google)
Marks, D. F. (1977). Imagery and consciousness: A theoretical review from an individual differences perspective. Journal of Mental Imagery 1:275-90.   (Cited by 9 | Google)
Marks, D. F. (1983). Imagery and consciousness: A theoretical review. In Anees A. Sheikh (ed.), Imagery: Current Theory, Research, and Application. Wiley.   (Cited by 9 | Google)
Marks, D. F. (1990). On the relationship between imagery, body, and mind. In P. J. Hampson, D. F. Marks & Janet Richardson (eds.), Imagery: Current Developments. Routledge.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Mavromatis, A. (1987). On shared states of consciousness and objective imagery. Journal of Mental Imagery 11:125-30.   (Google)
Morris, P. E. & Hampson, P. J. (1983). Imagery and Consciousness. Academic Press.   (Cited by 29 | Google)
Newton, Natika (1982). Experience and imagery. Southern Journal of Philosophy 21:475-87.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
O'Connor, Kieron P. & Aardema, Frederick (2005). The imagination: Cognitive, pre-cognitive, and meta-cognitive aspects. Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2):233-256.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Richardson, Alan W. (2000). Individual differences in visual imagination imagery. In Robert G. Kunzendorf & B. Alan Wallace (eds.), Individual Differences in Conscious Experience. John Benjamins.   (Google)
Schirra, Jörg R. J. (1993). A contribution to reference semantics of spatial prepositions: The visualization problem and its solution in vitra. In Cornelia Zelinsky-Wibbelt (ed.), [Book Chapter]. Mouton de Gruyter.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The cognitive function of mental images with respect to the referential aspect of language is examined and used in the listener model ANTLIMA of the natural language system SOCCER. An operational realization of the reference relation used to recognize instances of spatial concepts in the results of a vision system and also to visualize locative expressions is presented and compared to A. Herskovits' analysis of the semantics of spatial prepositions
Schirra, Jörg R. J., Connecting visual and verbal space: Preliminary considerations concerning the concept 'mental image'.   (Google)
Abstract: AI research concerning the connection between seeing and speaking mainly employs what is called reference semantics. Within this framework, the notion of `mental image' is often used while explaining how somebody not situated in the same perceptual context is able to anchor his understanding of an utterance describing the scene visually perceived by the speaker. We give a foundation for considering mental images as propositions with respect to a certain field of concepts: these fields have to provide a syntactically dense set of concepts distinguishing locations. The use of such propositions in the reference semantic explanations of understanding utterances about visually perceived scenes is motivated by applying Kant's idea of the introduction of new types of objects: we conceive spatial relations as relations only applicable to sortal objects, i.e., individuated objects which are synthetically introduced on a syntactically dense field providing their potential locations. The concept `mental image' which results from these preliminary studies is applied to two current projects in AI, one dealing with the semantics of particular spatial prepositions, and the other more generally concerned with the logic of the connection between visual and verbal space
Schirra, Jörg R. J. & Sachs-Hombach, Klaus (ms). Homo pictor and the Linguistic Turn: Revisiting Hans Jonas' Picture Anthropology.   (Google)
Sheehan, P. W. & Lewis, S. E. (1974). Subjects' reports of confusion in consciousness and the arousal of imagery. Perceptual and Motor Skills 38:731-34.   (Google)
Singer, Jerome L. (2006). Consciousness, thinking modalities, and imagination: Theory and research. In Jerome L. Singer (ed.), Imagery in Psychotherapy. American Psychological Associaton.   (Google)
Slezak, Peter P. (2002). The imagery debate: Déjà-vu all over again? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (2):209-210.   (Google)
Abstract: The imagery debate re-enacts controversies persisting since Descartes. The controversy remains important less for what we can learn about visual imagery than about cognitive science itself. In the tradition of Arnauld, Reid, Bartlett, Austin and Ryle, Pylyshyn's critique exposes notorious mistakes being unwittingly rehearsed not only regarding imagery but also in several independent domains of research in modern cognitive science
Thirion, Bertrand; Duchesnay, Edouard; Hubbard, Edward M.; Dubois, Jessica; Poline, Jean-Baptiste; Lebihan, Denis & Dehaene, Stanislas (2006). Inverse retinotopy: Inferring the visual content of images from brain activation patterns. Neuroimage 33 (4):1104-1116.   (Google | More links)
Thomas, Nigel (ms). A note on "schema" and "image schema".   (Google)
Abstract: The term schema (plural: schemata, or sometimes schemas) is widely used in cognitive psychology and the cognitive sciences generally to designate "psychological constructs that are postulated to account for the molar forms of human generic knowledge" (Brewer, 1999). The vagueness of this definition is no accident (and no sort of failing on Brewer's part). In fact schema is used in such very different ways by different cognitive theorists that the term has become quite notorious for its ambiguity (Miller, Polson, & Kintsch, 1984 p. 6). However, a concept of..
Thomas, Nigel J. T. (ms). Are There People Who Do Not Experience Imagery? (And why does it matter?).   (Google)
Abstract: To the best of my knowledge, with the exception of Galton's original work (1880, 1883), Sommer's brief case study (1978), and Faw's (1997, 2009) articles, this is the only really substantial discussion of the phenomenon of non-brain-damaged "non-imagers" available anywhere.
Thomas, Nigel J. T. (online). Imagination. Dictionary of Philosophy of Mind.   (Google)
Abstract: A brief historical and conceptual account of the concept of imagination
Thomas, Nigel J. T. (1997). Imagery and the coherence of imagination: A critique of white. Journal of Philosophical Research 22 (April):95-127.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Abstract: This article defends tradition and common sense against a widespread and rarely questioned contemporary philosophical orthodoxy that underpins the entrenched and exorbitant "lingualism" of so much 20th century thought, and leads the way to extreme doctrines like cognitive relativism and eliminative materialism. It also plugs what might otherwise have seemed to be a significant hole in the argument of my Are Theories of Imagery Theories of Imagination? (which I regard as my main positive contribution so far to the understanding of the mind). For a relatively brief overview of the situation in cognitive theory and consciousness studies, as I see it, see A Stimulus to the Imagination. Click here to view the full article: Imagery and the Coherence of Imagination: a Critique of White. Earlier drafts of this article, one entitled "The White Images of Imagery and Imagination: A Critique and an Alternative", were formerly available on the net. Please make any citations to the published version. - N.J.T.T
Thomas, Nigel J. T. (online). Mental imagery. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Cited by 14 | Google)
Thomas, Nigel J. T. (2005). Mental Imagery, Philosophical Issues About. In Lynn Nadel (ed.), Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science, Volume 2, pp. 1147-1153.   (Google)
Abstract: An introduction to the science and philosophy of mental imagery.
Thomas, Nigel J. T. (online). New support for the perceptual activity theory of mental imagery.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: Since the publication of my "Are Theories of Imagery Theories of Imagination? An _Active Perception_ Approach to Conscious Mental Content," (Thomas, 1999 - henceforth abbreviated as ATOITOI on this page), a good deal of published material has appeared or has come to my attention that either provides additional support for the Perceptual Activity Theory PA theory) of mental imagery presented in ATOITOI, or that throws further doubt on the rival (picture and description) theories that are criticized there. Other relevant evidence was not mentioned in ATOITOI because I lacked the space for a proper explanation of its relevance. I hope eventually to write and publish a new account of
PA
theory, that will make use of much of this material. In the meantime this page provides citations (and, where possible, links) to the "new" support, and discussion sections that briefly explain the relevance of the cited material. Quite apart from presenting new lines of supporting evidence and argument, I hope this page will help to clarify many aspects of
Thorndike, Edward L. (1907). On the function of visual images. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 4 (12):324-327.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Thomas, Nigel J. T. (2003). The false dichotomy of imagery. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (2):211-211.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Pylyshyn's critique is powerful. Pictorial theories of imagery fail. On the other hand, the symbolic description theory he manifestly still favors also fails, lacking the semantic foundation necessary to ground imagery's intentionality and consciousness. But, contrary to popular belief, these two theory types do not exhaust available options. Recent work on embodied, active perception supports the alternative perceptual activity theory of imagery
Thomas, Nigel J. T. (2009). Visual Imagery and Consciousness. In William P. Banks (ed.), Encyclopedia of Consciousness.   (Google)
Abstract: Defining Imagery: Experience or Representation?
Historical Development of Ideas about Imagery
Subjective Individual Differences in Imagery Experience
Theories of Imagery, and their Implications for Consciousness
Picture theory
Description theory
Enactive theory
Zeimbekis, John, Thought experiments and mental simulations.   (Google)
Abstract: Thought experiments have a mysterious way of informing us about the world, apparently without examining it, yet with a great degree of certainty. It is tempting to try to explain this capacity by making use of the idea that in thought experiments, the mind somehow simulates the processes about which it reaches conclusions. Here, I test this idea. I argue that when they predict the outcomes of hypothetical physical situations, thought experiments cannot simulate physical processes. They use mental models, which should not be confused with process-driven simulations. A convincing case can be made that thought experiments about hypothetical mental processes are mental simulations. Concerning moral thought experiments, I argue that construing them as simulations of mental processes favours certain moral theories over others. The scope of mental simulation in thought experiments is primarily limited by the constraint of relevant similarity on source and target processes: on one hand, this constraint disqualifies thought from simulating external natural processes; on the other hand, it is a source of epistemic bias in moral thought experiments. In view of these results, I conclude that thought experiments and mental simulations cannot be assimilated as means of acquiring knowledge.

8.7f Science of Visual Consciousness, Misc

Bachmann, Talis (1998). Fast dynamics of visibility of brief visual images: The perceptual-retouch viewpoint. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness II. MIT Press.   (Google)
Bach-y-Rita, Paul; Tyler, Mitchell & Kaczamarek, Kurt (2003). Seeing with the brain. International Journal Of Human-Computer Interaction 15 (2):285-295.   (Google)
Bachmann, Talis (1997). Visibility of brief images: The dual-process approach. Consciousness and Cognition 6:491-518.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Ballard, Dana (2002). Our perception of the world has to be an illusion. Journal of Consciousness Studies 9:54-71.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Baxt, N. (1982). On the time necessary for a visual impression to come into consciousness. Psychological Research 44:1-12.   (Google | More links)
Beeckmans, J. (2004). Chromatically rich phenomenal percepts. Philosophical Psychology 17 (1):27-44.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Visual percepts frequently appear chromatically rich, yet their paucity in reportable information has led to widely accepted minimalist models of vision. The discrepancy may be resolved by positing that the richness of natural scenes is reflected in phenomenal consciousness but not in detail in the phenomenal judgments upon which reports about qualia are based. Conceptual awareness (including phenomenal judgments) arises from neural mechanisms that categorize objects, and also from mechanisms that conceptually characterize textural properties of pre-categorically segmented regions in the visual field. Experimental evidence suggests that complex images instigate the generation of so-called ensemble phenomenal judgments. These involve concepts that categorize global attributes of segmented areas but carry no information pertaining to details. It is then argued that there are cogent reasons for believing that phenomenal percepts (i.e. qualia) arising from chromatically complex stimuli cohere in this ensemble sense with both the stimulus and with the resulting ensemble phenomenal judgments. Thus, spatially detailed retinal images are deemed to yield correspondingly detailed phenomenal experiences that are in turn conceptually apprehended via a relatively small number of ensemble phenomenal judgments. Lastly, it is suggested that the bridge locus for chromatically rich phenomenal experiences is most plausibly located early in the cortical visual pathway
Belopolsky, Artem V. (online). The role of awareness in the error-processing of involuntary eye movements.   (Google)
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Abstract: This new edition uses the technique of visual masking to explore temporal aspects of conscious and unconscious processes down to a resolution in the...
Christie, John R. & Barresi, John (2002). Consciousness and information processing: A reply to durgin. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):372-374.   (Google)
Abstract: Durgin's (2002) commentary on our article provides us with an opportunity to look more closely at the relationship between information processing and consciousness. In our article we contrasted the information processing approach to interpreting our data, with our own 'scientific' approach to consciousness. However, we should point out that, on our view, information processing as a methodology is not by itself in conflict with the scientific study of consciousness - indeed, we have adopted this very methodology in our experiments, which we purport to use to investigate consciousness. Furthermore, Durgin's own review of the history of research on metacontrast (Lachter & Durgin, 1999) shows that some researchers investigating metacontrast also thought that they were in the business of evaluating the role of consciousness in accounting for their effects. Yet, there is no doubt that metacontrast research is a paradigm case of research generated from an information processing perspective. So, prima facie, investigating consciousness and using information processing methodology are compatible
Clark, Austen (2001). Some logical features of feature integration. In Werner Backhaus (ed.), Neuronal Coding of Perceptual Systems. World Scientific.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: One of the biggest challenges in understanding perception is to understand how the nervous system manages to integrate the multiple codes it uses to represent features in multiple sensory modalities. From different cortical areas, which might separately register the sight of something red and the touch of something smooth, one effortlessly generates the perception of one thing that is both red and smooth. This process has been variously called "feature integration", "binding", or "synthesis". Citing some current models and some historical precursors, this paper makes some simple observations about the logic of feature integration. I suggest that "feature conjunction" is not strictly speaking conjunction at all, but rather joint predication; and that the critical task in "binding" is not simply grouping scattered representations together, or providing them a common label, but rather identifying those that have a common subject matter-those that are
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Abstract: One of the things you learn if you read books and articles in (or about) cognitive science is that the brain does a lot of "filling in"--not filling in, but "filling in"--in scare quotes. My claim today will be that this way of talking is not a safe bit of shorthand, or an innocent bit of temporizing, but a source of deep confusion and error. The phenomena described in terms of "filling in" are real, surprising, and theoretically important, but it is a mistake to conceive of them as instances of something being filled in, for that vivid phrase always suggests too much--sometimes a little too much, but often a lot too much. Here are some examples (my boldface throughout)
di Lollo, V.; Enns, James T. & Rensink, R. (2000). Competition for consciousness among visual events: The psychophysics of reentrant visual processes. Journal Of Experimental Psychology-General 129 (4):481-507.   (Google)
Durgin, Frank H. (2002). An ostrich on a rock: Commentary on Christie and Barresi (2002). Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):366-371.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Durgin, Frank H. (1995). On the filling in of the visual blind spot: Some rules of thumb. Perception 24:827-40.   (Cited by 62 | Google | More links)
Durgin, Frank H. (2002). The tinkerbell effect: Motion, perception and illusion. Journal of Consciousness Studies 9:88-101.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
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Enns, J. T.; Rensink, R. A. & Di Lollo, V. (2000). Competition for consciousness among visual events: The psychophysics of reentrant visual processes. Journal of Experimental Psychology 129 (4):481-507.   (Google)
Abstract: Advances in neuroanatomy and neurophysiology have called attention to reentrant signalling as the predominant form of communication between brain areas. We propose that explicit use be made of reentrant processing in theories of perception. To show that this can be done effectively in one domain, we report on a series of psychophysical experiments involving a new form of masking, which defies explanation by current feed-forward theories. This masking occurs when a brief display of target plus mask is continued with the mask alone. We report evidence of two masking processes: an early process affected by physical factors such as adapting luminance and contour proximity, and a later process affected by attentional factors such as set size, target pop-out, and spatial pre-cuing. We call this later process masking by
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Abstract: Correspondence should be addressed to David A. Leopold david.leopold@tuebingen.mpg.deDuring the viewing of certain patterns, widely known as ambiguous or puzzle figures, perception lapses into a sequence of spontaneous alternations, switching every few seconds between two or more visual interpretations of the stimulus. Although their nature and origin remain topics of debate, these stochastic switches are generally thought to be the automatic and inevitable consequence of viewing a pattern without a unique solution. We report here that in humans such perceptual alternations can be slowed, and even brought to a standstill, if the visual stimulus is periodically removed from view. We also show, with a visual illusion, that this stabilizing effect hinges on perceptual disappearance rather than on actual removal of the stimulus. These findings indicate that uninterrupted subjective perception of an ambiguous pattern is required for the initiation of the brain-state changes underlying multistable vision.Visual perception involves coordination between sensory sampling of the world and active interpretation of the sensory data. Human perception of objects and scenes is normally stable and robust, but it falters when one is presented with patterns that are inherently ambiguous or contradictory. Under such conditions, vision lapses into a chain of continually alternating percepts, whereby a viable visual interpretation dominates for a few seconds and is then replaced by a rival interpretation. This multistable vision, or 'multistability', is thought to result from destabilization of fundamental visual mechanisms, and has offered valuable insights into how sensory patterns are actively organized and interpreted in the brain1, 2. Despite a great deal of recent research and interest in multistable perception, however, its neurophysiological underpinnings remain poorly understood. Physiological studies have suggested that disambiguation of ambiguous patterns
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Reber, Rolf & Schwarz, Norbert (2001). The hot fringes of consciousness: Perceptual fluency and affect. Consciousness and Emotion 2 (2):223-231.   (Google)
Abstract: High figure-ground contrast usually results in more positive evaluations of visual stimuli. This may either reflect that high figure-ground contrast per se is a desirable attribute or that this attribute facilitates fluent processing. In the latter case, the influence of high figure-ground contrast should be most pronounced under short exposure times, that is, under conditions where the facilitative influence on perceptual fluency is most pronounced. Supporting this hypothesis, ratings of the prettiness of visual stimuli increased with figure-ground contrast under short exposure times (.3, 1, and 3 seconds, respectively). This positive influence of figure-ground contrast was eliminated under an exposure time of 10 seconds. We conclude that stimuli with high figure-ground contrast are more appealing because they are easier to process, not because high figure-ground contrast per se is a desirable attribute. We discuss this finding in the context of William James? notion that the fringe of consciousness includes vague contextual feelings at the periphery of the focus of attention and suggest that perceptual fluency is one of these feelings
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Wilken, Patrick (2001). Capacity Limits for the Detection and Identification of Charge: Implications for Models of Visual Short-Term Memory. Dissertation, The University of Melbourne   (Google)
Abstract: The issue of capacity limits in visual short-term memory (VSTM) has been an area of active research since the 19th Century (Cattell, 1886). A common metaphor suggests that VSTM is akin to a limited capacity urn, able to hold only three-to-six items (Cowan, 2001). The 11 experiments in this thesis explore implications of this metaphor. Experiments 1-4 suggest that items in VSTM are not stored as coherent objects, contrary to recent suggestions (Luck & Vogel, 1997; Vogel, Woodman, & Luck, 2001). Experiments 5-6 contrast two distinct experimental techniques used to probe the structure of information encoded in VSTM. The "single-shot" technique measures sensitivity to differences across two sequential arrays (Luck & Vogel, 1997); the "flicker" technique measures response times to the detection of change, across multiple successive presentations of two alternate displays (Rensink, O'Regan, & Clark, 1997). It is shown that observers' underlying sensitivity to change, and by implication the structure of information encoded, is the same for these two techniques. Experiments 7-9 examine the relationship between observers' performance for detection and identification of change between two successive visual arrays. It is demonstrated that this relationship fails to meet basic assumptions inherent in the urn metaphor. An alternate model is proposed, which suggests that the capacity limit in VSTM is not determined by the number of items stored, but by the amount of information able to be extracted from a visual display. In Experiments 10-11, this alternative model is used to examine the short-term storage of visual information. Overall, the findings of the thesis are inconsistent with a model in which limits in the detection and identification of change are the result of a single process, which operates on a limited number of coherent objects held in a high-level memory store.
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