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8.7d. Change/Inattentional Blindness (Change/Inattentional Blindness on PhilPapers)

See also:
Anderson, Joseph & Anderson, Barbara (1993). The myth of persistence of vision revisited. Journal of Film and Video 45:3--12.   (Google)
Angelone, Bonnie L.; Levin, Daniel T. & Simons, Daniel J. (2003). The relationship between change detection and recognition of centrally attended objects in motion pictures. Perception 32 (8):947-962.   (Cited by 13 | Google | More links)
Beck, Diane; Rees, Geraint; Frith, Christopher D. & Lavie, Nilli (2001). Change blindness and change awareness. Nature Neuroscience 4.   (Google)
Beck, Melissa R.; Levin, Daniel T. & Angelone, Bonnie L. (2007). Change blindness blindness: Beliefs about the roles of intention and scene complexity in change detection. Consciousness and Cognition 16 (1):31-51.   (Google | More links)
Beck, Melissa R.; Levin, Daniel T. & Angelone, Bonnie L. (2007). Metacognitive errors in change detection: Lab and life converge. Consciousness and Cognition 16 (1):58-62.   (Google | More links)
Beck, Diane; Rees, Geraint; Frith, Christopher D. & Lavie, Nilli (2001). Neural correlates of change detection and change blindness. Nature Neuroscience 4 (6):645-650.   (Cited by 178 | Google | More links)
Blackmore, Susan J.; Brelstaff, Gavin; Nelson, Katherine & Troscianko, Tom (1995). Is the richness of our visual world an illusion? Transsaccadic memory for complex scenes. Perception 24:1075-81.   (Cited by 165 | Google | More links)
Blackmore, Susan J. (2002). The grand illusion: Why consciousness exists only when you look for it. New Scientist 174 (2348):26-29.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Like most people, I used to think of my conscious life as like a stream of experiences, passing through my mind, one after another. But now I’m starting to wonder, is consciousness really like this? Could this apparently innocent assumption be the reason we find consciousness so baffling?
Braun, Jochen (2001). Inattentional blindness: It's great but not necessarily about attention. Psyche 7 (6).   (Google)
Bridgeman, Bruce; Hendry, David & Stark, L. (1975). Failure to detect displacements of the visual world during saccadic eye movements. Vision Research 15:719-22.   (Google)
Changeux, Jean-Pierre & Dehaene, Stanislas (2005). Ongoing spontaneous activity controls access to consciousness: A neuronal model for inattentional blindness. PLoS Biology 3 (5):e141.   (Google)
Abstract: 1 INSERM-CEA Unit 562, Cognitive Neuroimaging, Service Hospitalier Fre´de´ric Joliot, Orsay, France, 2 CNRS URA2182 Re´cepteurs and Cognition, Institut Pasteur, Paris, France
Clark, Andy (2002). Is seeing all it seems? Journal of Consciousness Studies 9:181-202.   (Cited by 32 | Google)
Cleeremans, Axel, Change blindness to gradual changes in facial expressions.   (Google)
Abstract: Change blindness—our inability to detect changes in a stimulus—occurs even when the change takes place gradually, without disruption (Simons et al., 2000). Such gradual changes are more difficult to detect than changes that involve a disruption. In this experiment, we extend previous findings to the domain of facial expressions of emotions occurring in the context of a realistic scene. Even with changes occurring in central, highly relevant stimuli such as faces, gradual changes still produced high levels of change blindness: Detection rates were three times lower for gradual changes than for displays involving disruption, with only 15% of the observers perceiving the gradual change within a single trial. However, despite this high rate of change blindness, changes on faces were significantly better detected than color changes occurring on non facial objects in the same scene
Cohen, Jonathan (2002). The grand grand illusion illusion. Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (5-6):141-157.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Davis, Deborah; Loftus, Elizabeth F.; Vanous, Samuel & Cucciare, Michael, Unconscious transference' can be an instance of 'change blindness.   (Google)
Abstract:      Three experiments investigated the role of 'change blindness' in mistaken eyewitness identifications of innocent bystanders to a simulated crime. Two innocent people appeared briefly in a filmed scene in a supermarket. The 'continuous innocent' (CI) walked down the liquor aisle and passed behind a stack of boxes, where upon the perpetrator emerged and stole a bottle of liquor, thereby resulting in an action sequence promoting the illusion of continuity between perpetrator and innocent. The 'discontinuous innocent' (DI) was shown immediately afterward in the produce aisle. Results revealed that: (1) more than half of participants failed to notice the change between the CI and the perpetrator, (2) among those who failed to notice the change, more misidentified the 'CI' than the 'DI', a pattern that did not hold for those who did notice the change. Participants were less likely to notice the change when they were distracted while watching the video
Dennett, Daniel C. (2002). How could I be wrong? How wrong could I be? Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (5):13-16.   (Cited by 14 | Google | More links)
Abstract: One of the striking, even amusing, spectacles to be enjoyed at the many workshops and conferences on consciousness these days is the breathtaking overconfidence with which laypeople hold forth about the nature of consciousness Btheir own in particular, but everybody =s by extrapolation. Everybody =s an expert on consciousness, it seems, and it doesn =t take any knowledge of experimental findings to secure the home truths these people enunciate with such conviction
Dretske, Fred (2004). Change blindness. Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):1-18.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Dretske, Fred (2007). What change blindness teaches about consciousness. Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):215–220.   (Google | More links)
Dulany, Donelson E. (2001). Inattentional awareness. Psyche 7 (5).   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Ellis, Ralph D. (2001). Implications of inattentional blindness for "enactive" theories of consciousness. Brain and Mind 2 (3):297-322.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Mack and Rock show evidence that no consciousperception occurs without a prior attentiveact. Subjects already executing attention taskstend to neglect visible elements extraneous tothe attentional task, apparently lacking evenbetter-than-chance ``implicit perception,''except in certain cases where the unattendedstimulus is a meaningful word or has uniquepre-tuned salience similar to that ofmeaningful words. This is highly consistentwith ``enactive'' notions that consciousnessrequires selective attention via emotional subcortical and limbic motivationalactivation as it influences anterior attentionmechanisms. Occipital activation withoutconsciousness suggests that motivated search,enacted through the organism's subcorticalmotivational functions, is needed beforevisual stimulation engenders consciousness.This enactive view – that searching for,rather than receiving or processing input isthe basis of consciousness – was slow ingaining acceptance lacking empirical evidenceof this kind, combined with thestimulus-response assumption that brain eventssubserving perceptual consciousness must resultfrom transformation of perceptual input ratherthan from the organism's self-regulatedactivity as manifested through subcorticalactivity. Implicit perception occurring withword priming is ``paradoxical'' according to Mackand Rock, suggesting late selection forattention after extensive unconsciousprocessing, while most trials involvingnonverbal rather than verbal images mightsuggest earlier selection, sinceunattended objects are unseen, apparently evenimplicitly. This paper argues that anteriorand subcortical motivational mechanisms play animportant role in early selection; posteriormechanisms then unconsciously enhance signals;if data survive early gating andcorticothalamic enhancement, then still further anterior-limbic loops motivatedlyactivate ``image schemas'' resonating withposterior nonconscious processing; at thatpoint, consciousness occurs
Laloyaux, Cedric; Devue, Christel; Doyen, Stephane; David, Elodie & Cleeremans, Axel (online). Undetected changes in visible stimuli influence subsequent decisions.   (Google)
Abstract: Change blindness—our inability to detect changes in a stimulus—occurs even when the change takes place gradually, without any disruption (Simons et al., 2000). Such gradual changes are more difficult to detect than changes that involve a disruption. Using this method, David et al. (in press) recently showed substantial blindness to changes that involve facial expressions of emotion. In this experiment, we show that people who failed to detect any change in the displays were (1) nevertheless influenced by the changing information in subsequent recognition decisions about which facial expression they had seen, and (2) that their confidence in their decisions was lower after exposure to changing vs. static displays. The findings therefore support the notion that undetected changes that occur in highly salient stimuli may be causally efficacious and influence subsequent behaviour. Implications concerning the nature of the representations associated with undetected changes are discussed
Fernandez-Duque, Diego & Thornton, Ian (2000). Change detection without awareness: Do explicit reports underestimate the representation of change in the visual system? Visual Cognition 7 (1):323-344.   (Cited by 81 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Evidence from many different paradigms (e.g. change blindness, inattentional blindness, transsaccadic integration) indicate that observers are often very poor at reporting changes to their visual environment. Such evidence has been used to suggest that the spatio-temporal coherence needed to represent change can only occur in the presence of focused attention. In four experiments we use modified change blindness tasks to demonstrate (a) that sensitivity to change does occur in the absence of awareness, and (b) this sensitivity does not rely on the redeploy- ment of attention. We discuss these results in relation to theories of scene percep- tion, and propose a reinterpretatio n of the role of attention in representing change
Fernandez-Duque, Diego & Thornton, Ian (2003). Explicit mechanisms do not account for implicit localization and identification of change: An empirical reply to Mitroff et al (2000). Journal of Experimental Psychology 29 (5).   (Google)
Abstract: Several recent findings support the notion that changes in the environment can be implicitly represented by the visual system. S. R. Mitroff, D. J. Simons, and S. L. Franconeri (2002) challenged this view and proposed alternative interpretations based on explicit strategies. Across 4 experiments, the current study finds no empirical support for such alternative proposals. Experiment 1 shows that subjects do not rely on unchanged items when locating an unaware change. Experiments 2 and 3 show that unaware changes affect performance even when they occur at an unpredictable location. Experiment 4 shows that the unaware congruency effect does not depend simply on the pattern of the final display. The authors point to converging evidence from other methodologies and highlight several weaknesses in Mitroff et al.’s theoretical arguments. It is concluded here that implicit representation of change provides the most parsimonious explanation for both past and present findings
Fernandez-Duque, Diego; Grossi, Giordana; Thornton, Ian & Neville, Helen (2003). Representation of change: Separate electrophysiological markers of attention, awareness, and implicit processing. Journal Of Cognitive Neuroscience 15 (4):491-507.   (Cited by 18 | Google | More links)
Abstract: & Awareness of change within a visual scene only occurs in subjects were aware of, replicated those attentional effects, but the presence of focused attention. When two versions of a
Grimes, John A. (1996). On the failure to detect changes in scenes across saccades. In Kathleen Akins (ed.), Perception. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 202 | Google)
Hatfield, Gary (2004). Seeing 'subscript Dretske'. Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):19-35.   (Google)
Janzen, Greg (2008). Intentionalism and change blindness. Philosophia 36 (3).   (Google)
Abstract:  According to reductive intentionalism, the phenomenal character of a conscious experience is constituted by the experience's intentional (or representational) content. In this article I attempt to show that a phenomenon in visual perception called change blindness poses a problem for this doctrine. Specifically, I argue that phenomenal character is not sensitive, as it should be if reductive intentionalism is correct, to fine-grained variations in content. The standard anti-intentionalist strategy is to adduce putative cases in which phenomenal character varies despite sameness of content. This paper explores an alternative antiintentionalist tack, arguing, by way of a specific example involving change blindness, that content can vary despite sameness of phenomenal character
Koivisto, Mika & Revonsuo, Antti (2003). An ERP study of change detection, change blindness, and visual awareness. Psychophysiology 40 (3):423-429.   (Cited by 20 | Google | More links)
Levin, Daniel T. (2002). Change blindness blindness as visual metacognition. Journal of Consciousness Studies 9:111-30.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Levin, Daniel T.; Momen, Nausheen; Drivdahl, Sarah B. & Simons, Daniel J. (2000). Change blindness blindness: The metacognitive error of overestimating change-detection ability. Visual Cognition 7 (1):397-412.   (Cited by 91 | Google | More links)
Levin, Daniel T.; Drivdahl, Sarah B.; Momen, Nausheen & Beck, Melissa R. (2002). False predictions about the detectability of visual changes: The role of beliefs about attention, memory, and the continuity of attended objects in causing change blindness blindness. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (4):507-527.   (Google)
Levin, Daniel T.; Simons, Daniel J.; Angelone, Bonnie L. & Chabris, Christopher (2002). Memory for centrally attended changing objects in an incidental real-world change detection paradigm. British Journal Of Psychology 93:289-302.   (Cited by 65 | Google | More links)
Levin, Daniel T. & Varakin, D. Alexander (2004). No pause for a brief disruption: Failures of visual awareness during ongoing events. Consciousness and Cognition 13 (2):363-372.   (Google | More links)
Mack, Arien & Rock, Irvin (1998). Inattentional Blindness. MIT Press.   (Cited by 739 | Google | More links)
Mack, Arien & Rock, Irvin (2003). Inattentional blindness: An overview. Current Directions in Psychological Science 12 (5):180-184.   (Cited by 673 | Google | More links)
Mack, Arien (2002). Is the visual world a grand illusion? A response. Journal of Consciousness Studies 9:102-10.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
McConkie, G. W. & Zola, D. (1979). Is visual information integrated across successive fixations in reading? Perception and Psychophysics 25:221-24.   (Cited by 125 | Google)
Mitroff, Stephen R. & Simons, Daniel J. (2000). Changes are not localized before they are explicitly detected. Investigative Ophthalmology and Visual Science 41 (4).   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Mitroff, Steve; Simons, Daniel J. & Levin, Daniel T. (2004). Nothing compares 2 views: Change blindness results from failures to compare retained information. Perception and Psychophysics 66 (8):1268-1281.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Mitroff, Stephen R.; Simons, Daniel J. & Franconeri, Steven (2002). The siren song of implicit change detection. Journal Of Experimental Psychology-Human Perception And Performance 28 (4):798-815.   (Cited by 28 | Google | More links)
Moore, Cathleen (2001). Inattentional blindness: Perception or memory and what does it matter? Psyche 7 (2).   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Most, Steve; Simons, Daniel J.; Scholl, Brian J. & Chabris, Christopher (2000). Sustained inattentional blindness: The role of location in the detection of unexpected dynamic events. Psyche 6 (14).   (Cited by 18 | Google)
Most, Steve; Scholl, Brian J.; Clifford, E. & Simons, Daniel J. (2005). What you see is what you set: Sustained inattentional blindness and the capture of awareness. Psychological Review 112 (1):217-242.   (Cited by 40 | Google | More links)
Niedeggen, Michael; Wichmann, Petra & Stoerig, Petra (2001). Change blindness and time to consciousness. European Journal of Neuroscience 14 (10):1719-1726.   (Cited by 17 | Google | More links)
Noë, Alva; Pessoa, Luis & Thompson, Evan (2000). Beyond the grand illusion: What change blindness really teaches us about vision. Visual Cognition 7 (1-3):93-106.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Experiments on scene perception and change blindness suggest that the visual system does not construct detailed internal models of a scene. These experiments therefore call into doubt the traditional view that vision is a process in which detailed representations of the environment must be constructed. The non-existence of such detailed representations, however, does not entail that we do not perceive the detailed environment. The “grand illusion hypothesis” that our visual world is an illusion rests on (1) a problematic “reconstructionist” conception of vision, and (2) a misconception about the character of perceptual experience
Noë, Alva (2001). Experience and the active mind. Synthese 61 (1):41-60.   (Google)
Noë, Alva (2007). Inattentional blindness, change blindness and consciousness. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell.   (Google)
Noë, Alva (2002). Is the visual world a grand illusion? Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (5-6):1-12.   (Google)
Noë, Alva & O'Regan, Kevin J. (2000). Perception, attention, and the grand illusion. Psyche 6 (15).   (Google)
Abstract: This paper looks at two puzzles raised by the phenomenon of inattentional blindness. First, how can we see at all if, in order to see, we must first perceptually attend to that which we see? Second, if attention is required for perception, why does it seem to us as if we are perceptually aware of the whole detailed visual field when it is quite clear that we do not attend to all that detail? We offer a general framework for thinking about perception and perceptual consciousness that addresses these questions and we propose, in addition, an informal account of the relation between attention and consciousness. On this view, perceptual awareness is a species of attention
Noë, Alva (2005). What does change blindness teach us about consciousness? Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9 (5):218.   (Google)
O'Regan, Kevin J.; Rensink, Ronald A. & Clark, James J. (1999). Change blindness as a result of mudsplashes. Nature 398 (6722):34-34.   (Cited by 175 | Google | More links)
O'Regan, J. Kevin; Deubel, H.; Clark, James J. & Rensink, R. (2000). Picture changes during blinks: Looking without seeing and seeing without looking. Visual Cognition 7:191-211.   (Cited by 170 | Google | More links)
Pashler, Harold (1988). Familiarity and visual change detection. Perception and Psychophysics 41:191-201.   (Cited by 155 | Google | More links)
Pourtois, Gilles; De Pretto, Michael; Hauert, Claude-Alain & Vuilleumier, Patrik (2006). Time course of brain activity during change blindness and change awareness: Performance is predicted by neural events before change onset. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 18 (12):2108-2129.   (Google)
Raffman, Diana (ms). Nontransitivity, Indiscriminability, and Looking the Same.   (Google)
Rees, Geraint; Russell, C.; Frith, Christopher D. & Driver, Julia (1999). Inattentional blindness versus inattentional amnesia for fixated but ignored words. Science 286 (5449):2504-7.   (Cited by 102 | Google | More links)
Rensink, Ronald (ms). Change blindness.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Large changes that occur in clear view of an observer can become difficult to notice if made during an eye movement, blink, or other such disturbance. This change blindness is consistent with the proposal that focused visual attention is necessary to see change, with a change becoming difficult to notice whenever conditions prevent attention from being automatically drawn to it
Rensink, Ronald A. (2005). Change blindness: Implications for the nature of visual attention. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9 (1):16-20.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Rensink, Ronald A. (2002). Change detection. [Journal (Paginated)] 53:245-277.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Five aspects of visual change detection are reviewed. The first concerns the concept of _change_ itself, in particular the ways it differs from the related notions of _motion_ and _difference_. The second involves the various methodological approaches that have been developed to study change detection; it is shown that under a variety of conditions observers are often unable to see large changes directly in front of them. Next, it is argued that this "change blindness" indicates that focused attention is needed to detect change, and that this can help map out the nature of visual attention. The fourth aspect concerns how these results affect our understanding of visual perception—for example, the proposal that a sparse, dynamic representation underlies much of our visual experience. Finally, a brief discussion is presented concerning the limits to our current understanding of change detection
Rensink, Ronald A.; O'Regan, Kevin J. & Clark, James J. (2000). On failures to detect changes in scenes across brief interruptions. Visual Cognition 7 (1-3):127-145.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: When brief blank fields are placed between alternating displays of an original and a modified scene, a striking failure of perception is induced: the changes become extremely difficult to notice, even when they are large, presented repeatedly, and the observer expects them to occur (Rensink, O'Regan, & Clark, 1997). To determine the mechanisms behind this induced "change blindness", four experiments examine its dependence on initial preview and on the nature of the interruptions used. Results support the proposal that representations at the early stages of visual processing are highly volatile, and that focused attention is needed to stabilize them sufficiently to support the perception of change
Rensink, Ronald A. (2000). Seeing, sensing, and scrutinizing. Vision Research:469-1487.   (Cited by 203 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Large changes in a scene often become difficult to notice if made during an eye movement, image flicker, movie cut, or other such disturbance. It is argued here that this _change blindness_ can serve as a useful tool to explore various aspects of vision. This argument centers around the proposal that focused attention is needed for the explicit perception of change. Given this, the study of change perception can provide a useful way to determine the nature of visual attention, and to cast new light on the way that it is?and is not?involved in visual perception. To illustrate the power of this approach, this paper surveys its use in exploring three different aspects of vision. The first concerns the general nature of _seeing_. To explain why change blindness can be easily induced in experiments but apparently not in everyday life, it is proposed that perception involves a _virtual representation_, where object representations do not accumulate, but are formed as needed. An architecture containing both attentional and nonattentional streams is proposed as a way to implement this scheme. The second aspect concerns the ability of observers to detect change even when they have no visual experience of it. This _sensing_ is found to take on at least two forms: detection without visual experience (but still with conscious awareness), and detection without any awareness at all. It is proposed that these are both due to the operation of a nonattentional visual stream. The final aspect considered is the nature of visual attention itself?the mechanisms involved when _scrutinizing_ items. Experiments using controlled stimuli show the existence of various limits on visual search for change. It is shown that these limits provide a powerful means to map out the attentional mechanisms involved
Rensink, Ronald A. (2000). The dynamic representation of scenes. Visual Cognition.   (Cited by 227 | Google | More links)
Abstract: One of the more powerful impressions created by vision is that of a coherent, richly-detailed world where everything is present simultaneously. Indeed, this impression is so compelling that we tend to ascribe these properties not only to the external world, but to our internal representations as well. But results from several recent experiments argue against this latter ascription. For example, changes in images of real-world scenes often go unnoticed when made during a saccade, flicker, blink, or movie cut. This "change blindness" provides strong evidence against the idea that our brains contain a picture-like representation of the scene that is everywhere detailed and coherent
Rensink, Ronald A.; O'Regan, J. Kevin & Clark, James J. (1997). To see or not to see: The need for attention to perceive changes in scenes. Psychological Science 8:368-373.   (Cited by 659 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Methods. We employed a "flicker" technique, in which an original and a modified image (each of duration 240 ms) continually alternated, with a blank field (duration 80 ms) between each display. Images were all of real-world scenes. One of three kinds of change (appearance/disappearance, color, or translation) was made to an object or region in each scene. Changes were large and easily seen under normal conditions. Subjects viewed the flicker display, and pressed a key when they noticed the change
Rensink, Ronald A. (2004). Visual sensing without seeing. Psychological Science 15:27-32.   (Google)
Abstract: It has often been assumed that when we use vision to become aware of an object or event in our surroundings, this must be accompanied by a corresponding visual experience (i.e., _seeing_). It is shown here that this assumption is incorrect. When observers view a sequence of displays alternating between an image of a scene and the same image changed in some way, they often feel (or
Rensink, Ronald A. (2000). When good observers go bad: Change blindness, inattentional blindness, and visual experience. [Journal (on-Line/Unpaginated)] 6 (9).   (Cited by 19 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Several studies (e.g., Becklen & Cervone, 1983; Mack & Rock, 1998; Neisser & Becklen, 1975) have found that observers attending to a particular object or event often fail to report the presence of unexpected items. This has been interpreted as inattentional blindness (IB), a failure to see unattended items (Mack & Rock, 1998). Meanwhile, other studies (e.g., Pashler, 1988; Phillips, 1974; Rensink et al., 1997; Simons, 1996) have found that observers often fail to report the presence of large changes in a display when these changes occur simultaneously with a transient such as an eye movement or flash of the display. This has been interpreted as change blindness (CB), a failure to see unattended changes (Rensink et al., 1997). In both cases there is a striking failure to report an object or event that would be quite visible under other circumstances. And in both cases there is a widespread (although not universal) belief that the underlying cause has to do with the absence of attention. The question then arises as to how these effects might be related. Is CB the same thing as IB? If not, what is the relation between them? And given that these phenomena deal with failures of subjective perception, what can they teach us about the nature of our visual experience? In particular, what can they teach us about the role played by visual attention?
Scholl, Brian J. (2000). Attenuated change blindness for exogenously attended items in a flicker paradigm. Visual Cognition 7:377-396.   (Cited by 53 | Google | More links)
Scholl, Brian J. & Simons, Daniel J. (2001). Change blindness, Gibson, and the sensorimotor theory of vision. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):1004-1006.   (Google)
Abstract: We suggest that the sensorimotor “theory” of vision is really an unstructured collection of separate ideas, and that much of the evidence cited in its favor at best supports only a subset of these ideas. As an example, we note that work on change blindness does not “vindicate” (or even speak to) much of the sensorimotor framework. Moreover, the ideas themselves are not always internally consistent. Finally, the proposed framework draws on ideas initially espoused by James Gibson, but does little to differentiate itself from those earlier views. For even part of this framework to become testable, it must specify which sources of evidence can support or contradict each of the component hypotheses
Scott-Brown, K.; Baker, M. J. & Orbach, H. (2000). Comparison blindness. Visual Cognition 7:253-267.   (Cited by 61 | Google | More links)
Shapiro, Kenneth J. (2000). Change blindness: Theory or paradigm? Visual Cognition 7:83-91.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Shore, D. & Klein, Raymond M. (2000). The effects of scene inversion on change blindness. Journal of General Psychology 127:27-43.   (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
Siewert, Charles (2002). Is visual experience rich or poor? Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (5-6):131-40.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Silverman, Michael E. & Mack, Arien (2006). Change blindness and priming: When it does and does not occur. Consciousness and Cognition 15 (2):409-422.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Simons, Daniel J. (2000). Attentional capture and inattentional blindness. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 4 (4):147-155.   (Cited by 92 | Google | More links)
Simons, Daniel J. (2000). Current approaches to change blindness. Visual Cognition 7:1-15.   (Cited by 179 | Google | More links)
Simons, Daniel J. & Levin, Daniel T. (1997). Change blindness. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 1:241-82.   (Cited by 608 | Google | More links)
Simons, Daniel J.; Franconeri, Steven & Reimer, Rebecca (2000). Change blindness in the absence of a visual disruption. Perception 29 (10):1143-1154.   (Cited by 88 | Google | More links)
Simons, Daniel J. & Rensink, Ronald A. (2005). Change blindness, representations, and consciousness: Reply to Noe. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9 (5):219.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Simons, Daniel J.; Chabris, Christopher & Schnur, Tatiana (2002). Evidence for preserved representations in change blindness. Consciousness And Cognition 11 (1):78-97.   (Cited by 36 | Google | More links)
Abstract: People often fail to detect large changes to scenes, provided that the changes occur during a visual disruption. This phenomenon, known as ''change blindness,'' occurs both in the laboratory and in real-world situations in which changes occur unexpectedly. The pervasiveness of the inability to detect changes is consistent with the theoretical notion that we internally represent relatively little information from our visual world from one glance at a scene to the next. However, evidence for change blindness does not necessarily imply the absence of such a representation-people could also miss changes if they fail to compare an existing representation of the pre-change scene to the post-change scene. In three experiments, we show that people often do have a representation of some aspects of the pre-change scene even when they fail to report the change. And, in fact, they appear to ''discover'' this memory and can explicitly report details of a changed object in response to probing questions. The results of these real-world change detection studies are discussed in the context of broader claims about change blindness
Simons, Daniel J. & Chabris, Christopher (1999). Gorillas in our midst: Sustained inattentional blindness for dynamic events. Perception 28 (9):1059-1074.   (Cited by 289 | Google | More links)
Simons, Daniel J.; Mitroff, Steve & Franconeri, Steve (2003). Scene perception: What we can learn from visual integration and change detection. In Michael L. Peterson & G. Rhodes (eds.), Perception of Faces, Objects, and Scenes: Analytic and Holistic Processes (335-355). Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Smilek, Daniel; Eastwood, John D.; Reynolds, Michael G. & Kingstone, Alan (2007). Metacognitive errors in change detection: Missing the gap between lab and life. Consciousness and Cognition 16 (1):52-57.   (Google | More links)
Thornton, Ian & Fernandez-Duque, Diego (2000). An implicit measure of undetected change. Spatial Vision 14 (1):21-44.   (Cited by 24 | Google | More links)
Abstract: b>—Several paradigms (e.g. change blindness, inattentional blindness, transsaccadic integra- tion) indicate that observers are often very poor at reporting changes to their visual environment. Such evidence has been used to suggest that the spatio-temporal coherence needed to represent change can only occur in the presence of focused attention. However, those studies almost always rely on explicit reports. It remains a possibility that the visual system can implicitly detect change, but that in the absence of focused attention, the change does not reach awareness and consequently is not reported. To test this possibility, we used a simple change detection paradigm coupled with a speeded orien- tation discrimination task. Even when observers reported being unaware of a change in an item’s orientation, its nal orientation effectively biased their response in the orientation discrimination task. Both in aware and unaware trials, errors were most frequent when the changed item and the probe had incongruent orientations. These results demonstrate that the _nature _of the change can be represented in the absence of awareness
Thornton, Ian & Fernandez-Duque, Diego (2002). Converging evidence for the detection of change without awareness. Progress in Brain Research.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
Triesch, Jochen; Ballard, Dana; Hayhoe, Mary & Sullivan, Brian (2003). What you see is what you need. Journal Of Vision 3 (1):86-94.   (Cited by 36 | Google | More links)
Turatto, Massimo; Sandrini, Marco & Miniussi, Carlo (2004). The role of the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex in visual change awareness. Neuroreport 15 (16):2549-2552.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Wallace, Rodrick (ms). Culture and generalized inattentional blindness.   (Google)
Abstract: A recent mathematical treatment of Baars' Global Workspace consciousness model, much in the spirit of Dretske's communication theory analysis of high level mental function, is used to study the effects of embedding cultural heritage on a generalized form of inattentional blindness. Culture should express itself quite distinctly in this basic psychophysical phenomenon, acting across a variety of sensory and other modalities, because the limited syntactic and grammatical 'bandpass' of the topological rate distortion manifold characterizing conscious attention is itself strongly sculpted by the constraints of cultural context
Wallace, Rodrick (ms). Generalized inattentional blindness from a global workspace perspective.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Abstract: We apply Baars' Global Workspace model of consciousness to inattentional blindness, using the groupoid network method of Stewart et al. to explore modular structures defined by information measures associated with cognitive process. Internal cross-talk breaks the fundamental groupoid symmetry, and, if sufficiently strong, creates, in a highly punctuated manner, a linked, shifting, giant component which instantiates the global workspace of consciousness. Embedding, exterior, information sources act as an external field which breaks the groupoid symmetry in a somewhat different manner, definng the slowly-acting contexts of Baars' theory and providing topological constraints on the manifestations of consciousness. This analysis significantly extends recent mathematical treatments of the global workspace, and identifies a shifting, topologically-determined syntactical and grammatical 'bottleneck' as a tunable rate distortion manifold which constrains what sensory or other signals can be brought to conscious attention, typically in a punctuated manner. Sensations outside the limits of that filter's syntactic 'bandpass' have lower probability of detection, regardless of their structure, accounting for generalized forms of inattentional blindness
Wilken, Patrick & Ma, Wei Ji (2004). A detection theory account of change detection. Journal of Vision 4 (12):1120-1135.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Previous studies have suggested that visual short-term memory (VSTM) has a storage limit of approximately four items. However, the type of high-threshold (HT) model used to derive this estimate is based on a number of assumptions that have been criticized in other experimental paradigms (e.g., visual search). Here we report findings from nine experiments in which VSTM for color, spatial frequency, and orientation was modeled using a signal detection theory (SDT) approach. In Experiments 1-6, two arrays composed of multiple stimulus elements were presented for 100 ms with a 1500 ms ISI. Observers were asked to report in a yes/no fashion whether there was any difference between the first and second arrays, and to rate their confidence in their response on a 1-4 scale. In Experiments 1-3, only one stimulus element difference could occur (_T_ = 1) while set size was varied. In Experiments 4-6, set size was fixed while the number of stimuli that might change was varied (_T_ = 1, 2, 3, and 4). Three general models were tested against the receiver operating characteristics generated by the six experiments. In addition to the HT model, two SDT models were tried: one assuming summation of signals prior to a decision, the other using a max rule. In Experiments 7-9, observers were asked to directly report the relevant feature attribute of a stimulus presented 1500 ms previously, from an array of varying set size. Overall, the results suggest that observers encode stimuli independently and in parallel, and that performance is limited by internal noise, which is a function of set size
Wolfe, Jeremy (1999). Inattentional amnesia. Journal of Mental Imagery 29 (3-4):71-94.   (Cited by 120 | Google | More links)