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8.7e. Visual Imagery and Imagination (Visual Imagery and Imagination on PhilPapers)

See also:
Ahsen, A. (1991). A second report on AA-VVIQ: Role of vivid and unvivid images in consciousness research. Journal of Mental Imagery 15:1-31.   (Google)
Ahsen, A. (1991). Imagery and consciousness: Putting together poetic, mythic and social realities. Journal of Mental Imagery 15:63-97.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Ahsen, A. (1993). Imagery paradigm: Imaginative consciousness in the experimental and clinical setting. Journal of Mental Imagery 17 (1-2).   (Google)
Arnheim, Rudolf (1994). Consciousness: An island of images. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 14:121-27.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Arterberry, Martha E.; Craver-Lemley, Catherine & Reeves, Adam (2002). Visual imagery is not always like visual perception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (2):183-184.   (Google)
Abstract: The “Perky effect” is the interference of visual imagery with vision. Studies of this effect show that visual imagery has more than symbolic properties, but these properties differ both spatially (including “pictorially”) and temporally from those of vision. We therefore reject both the literal picture-in-the-head view and the entirely symbolic view
Ahsen, A. (2005). A second report on AA-VVIQ: Role of vivid and unvivid images in consciousness research. Journal of Mental Imagery 29 (3-4).   (Google)
Bichowsky, F. R. (1926). The mechanism of consciousness: Images. American Journal of Psychology 37:557-564.   (Google)
Casey, Edward S. (1971). Imagination: Imagining and the image. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 31 (June):475-490.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Frick, R. W. (1987). A dissociation of conscious visual imagery and visual short-term memory. Neuropsychologia 25:707-12.   (Google)
Gendler, Tamar Szabó (2006). Imaginative contagion. Metaphilosophy 37 (2):183-203.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The aim of this article is to expand the diet of examples considered in philosophical discussions of imagination and pretense, and to offer some preliminary observations about what we might learn about the nature of imagination as a result. The article presents a number of cases involving imaginative contagion: cases where merely imagining or pretending that P has effects that we would expect only perceiving or believing that P to have. Examples are offered that involve visual imagery, motor imagery, fictional emotions, and social priming. It is suggested that imaginative contagion is a more prevalent phenomenon than has typically been recognized
Gregory, Dominic (2010). Pictures, pictorial contents and vision. British Journal of Aesthetics 50 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: Certain simple thoughts about pictures suggest that the contents of pictures are closely bound to vision. But how far can the striking features of depiction be accounted for merely in terms of the especially visual contents which belong to pictures, without considering, for example, any issues concerning the nature of the visual experiences with which pictures provide us? This article addresses that question by providing an account of the distinctively visual contents belonging to pictures, and by using that account to explain many notable general facts about depiction. Some implications of the resulting framework for the main stream of current theorizing about pictorial representation are also discussed.
Grossberg, Stephen (2002). Neural substrates of visual percepts, imagery, and hallucinations. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (2):194-195.   (Google)
Abstract: Recent neural models clarify many properties of mental imagery as part of the process whereby bottom-up visual information is influenced by top-down expectations, and how these expectations control visual attention. Volitional signals can transform modulatory top-down signals into supra-threshold imagery. Visual hallucinations can occur when the normal control of these volitional signals is lost
Grush, Rick (1998). Perception, imagery, and the sensorimotor loop. In F. Esken & F.-D. Heckman (eds.), A Consciousness Reader. Schoeningh Verlag.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Hampson, P. J. & Morris, P. E. (1990). Imagery, consciousness, and cognitive control: The boss model reviewed. In P. J. Hampson, D. F. Marks & Janet Richardson (eds.), Imagery: Current Developments. Routledge.   (Google)
Hebb, D. O. (1968). Concerning imagery. Psychological Review 75:466-77.   (Cited by 61 | Google)
Horne, P. V. (1993). The nature of imagery. Consciousness and Cognition 2:58-82.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Ishai, Alumit & Sagi, D. (1998). Visual imagery and visual perception: The role of memory and conscious awareness. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness II. MIT Press.   (Google)
Kunzendorf, Robert G.; Justice, M. & Capone, D. (1997). Conscious images as "centrally excited sensations": A developmental study of imaginal influences on the ERG. Journal of Mental Imagery 21:155-66.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Kunzendorf, Robert G. (1990). The causal efficacy of consciousness in general, imagery in particular: A materialist perspective. In Robert G. Kunzendorf (ed.), Mental Imagery. Plenum Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Lehmann, Daniel; Henggler, B.; Koukkan, M. & Michel, M. (1993). Source localization of brain electric field frequency bands during conscious, spontaneous visual imagery and abstract thought. Cognitive Brain Research 1:203-20.   (Google)
Mandler, George (1984). Consciousness, imagery, and emotion -- with special reference to autonomic imagery. Journal of Mental Imagery 8:87-94.   (Google)
Marks, D. F. (1977). Imagery and consciousness: A theoretical review from an individual differences perspective. Journal of Mental Imagery 1:275-90.   (Cited by 9 | Google)
Marks, D. F. (1983). Imagery and consciousness: A theoretical review. In Anees A. Sheikh (ed.), Imagery: Current Theory, Research, and Application. Wiley.   (Cited by 9 | Google)
Marks, D. F. (1990). On the relationship between imagery, body, and mind. In P. J. Hampson, D. F. Marks & Janet Richardson (eds.), Imagery: Current Developments. Routledge.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Mavromatis, A. (1987). On shared states of consciousness and objective imagery. Journal of Mental Imagery 11:125-30.   (Google)
Morris, P. E. & Hampson, P. J. (1983). Imagery and Consciousness. Academic Press.   (Cited by 29 | Google)
Newton, Natika (1982). Experience and imagery. Southern Journal of Philosophy 21:475-87.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
O'Connor, Kieron P. & Aardema, Frederick (2005). The imagination: Cognitive, pre-cognitive, and meta-cognitive aspects. Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2):233-256.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Richardson, Alan W. (2000). Individual differences in visual imagination imagery. In Robert G. Kunzendorf & B. Alan Wallace (eds.), Individual Differences in Conscious Experience. John Benjamins.   (Google)
Schirra, Jörg R. J. (1993). A contribution to reference semantics of spatial prepositions: The visualization problem and its solution in vitra. In Cornelia Zelinsky-Wibbelt (ed.), [Book Chapter]. Mouton de Gruyter.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The cognitive function of mental images with respect to the referential aspect of language is examined and used in the listener model ANTLIMA of the natural language system SOCCER. An operational realization of the reference relation used to recognize instances of spatial concepts in the results of a vision system and also to visualize locative expressions is presented and compared to A. Herskovits' analysis of the semantics of spatial prepositions
Schirra, Jörg R. J., Connecting visual and verbal space: Preliminary considerations concerning the concept 'mental image'.   (Google)
Abstract: AI research concerning the connection between seeing and speaking mainly employs what is called reference semantics. Within this framework, the notion of `mental image' is often used while explaining how somebody not situated in the same perceptual context is able to anchor his understanding of an utterance describing the scene visually perceived by the speaker. We give a foundation for considering mental images as propositions with respect to a certain field of concepts: these fields have to provide a syntactically dense set of concepts distinguishing locations. The use of such propositions in the reference semantic explanations of understanding utterances about visually perceived scenes is motivated by applying Kant's idea of the introduction of new types of objects: we conceive spatial relations as relations only applicable to sortal objects, i.e., individuated objects which are synthetically introduced on a syntactically dense field providing their potential locations. The concept `mental image' which results from these preliminary studies is applied to two current projects in AI, one dealing with the semantics of particular spatial prepositions, and the other more generally concerned with the logic of the connection between visual and verbal space
Schirra, Jörg R. J. & Sachs-Hombach, Klaus (ms). Homo pictor and the Linguistic Turn: Revisiting Hans Jonas' Picture Anthropology.   (Google)
Sheehan, P. W. & Lewis, S. E. (1974). Subjects' reports of confusion in consciousness and the arousal of imagery. Perceptual and Motor Skills 38:731-34.   (Google)
Singer, Jerome L. (2006). Consciousness, thinking modalities, and imagination: Theory and research. In Jerome L. Singer (ed.), Imagery in Psychotherapy. American Psychological Associaton.   (Google)
Slezak, Peter P. (2002). The imagery debate: Déjà-vu all over again? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (2):209-210.   (Google)
Abstract: The imagery debate re-enacts controversies persisting since Descartes. The controversy remains important less for what we can learn about visual imagery than about cognitive science itself. In the tradition of Arnauld, Reid, Bartlett, Austin and Ryle, Pylyshyn's critique exposes notorious mistakes being unwittingly rehearsed not only regarding imagery but also in several independent domains of research in modern cognitive science
Thirion, Bertrand; Duchesnay, Edouard; Hubbard, Edward M.; Dubois, Jessica; Poline, Jean-Baptiste; Lebihan, Denis & Dehaene, Stanislas (2006). Inverse retinotopy: Inferring the visual content of images from brain activation patterns. Neuroimage 33 (4):1104-1116.   (Google | More links)
Thomas, Nigel (ms). A note on "schema" and "image schema".   (Google)
Abstract: The term schema (plural: schemata, or sometimes schemas) is widely used in cognitive psychology and the cognitive sciences generally to designate "psychological constructs that are postulated to account for the molar forms of human generic knowledge" (Brewer, 1999). The vagueness of this definition is no accident (and no sort of failing on Brewer's part). In fact schema is used in such very different ways by different cognitive theorists that the term has become quite notorious for its ambiguity (Miller, Polson, & Kintsch, 1984 p. 6). However, a concept of..
Thomas, Nigel J. T. (ms). Are There People Who Do Not Experience Imagery? (And why does it matter?).   (Google)
Abstract: To the best of my knowledge, with the exception of Galton's original work (1880, 1883), Sommer's brief case study (1978), and Faw's (1997, 2009) articles, this is the only really substantial discussion of the phenomenon of non-brain-damaged "non-imagers" available anywhere.
Thomas, Nigel J. T. (online). Imagination. Dictionary of Philosophy of Mind.   (Google)
Abstract: A brief historical and conceptual account of the concept of imagination
Thomas, Nigel J. T. (1997). Imagery and the coherence of imagination: A critique of white. Journal of Philosophical Research 22 (April):95-127.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Abstract: This article defends tradition and common sense against a widespread and rarely questioned contemporary philosophical orthodoxy that underpins the entrenched and exorbitant "lingualism" of so much 20th century thought, and leads the way to extreme doctrines like cognitive relativism and eliminative materialism. It also plugs what might otherwise have seemed to be a significant hole in the argument of my Are Theories of Imagery Theories of Imagination? (which I regard as my main positive contribution so far to the understanding of the mind). For a relatively brief overview of the situation in cognitive theory and consciousness studies, as I see it, see A Stimulus to the Imagination. Click here to view the full article: Imagery and the Coherence of Imagination: a Critique of White. Earlier drafts of this article, one entitled "The White Images of Imagery and Imagination: A Critique and an Alternative", were formerly available on the net. Please make any citations to the published version. - N.J.T.T
Thomas, Nigel J. T. (online). Mental imagery. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Cited by 14 | Google)
Thomas, Nigel J. T. (2005). Mental Imagery, Philosophical Issues About. In Lynn Nadel (ed.), Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science, Volume 2, pp. 1147-1153.   (Google)
Abstract: An introduction to the science and philosophy of mental imagery.
Thomas, Nigel J. T. (online). New support for the perceptual activity theory of mental imagery.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: Since the publication of my "Are Theories of Imagery Theories of Imagination? An _Active Perception_ Approach to Conscious Mental Content," (Thomas, 1999 - henceforth abbreviated as ATOITOI on this page), a good deal of published material has appeared or has come to my attention that either provides additional support for the Perceptual Activity Theory PA theory) of mental imagery presented in ATOITOI, or that throws further doubt on the rival (picture and description) theories that are criticized there. Other relevant evidence was not mentioned in ATOITOI because I lacked the space for a proper explanation of its relevance. I hope eventually to write and publish a new account of
PA
theory, that will make use of much of this material. In the meantime this page provides citations (and, where possible, links) to the "new" support, and discussion sections that briefly explain the relevance of the cited material. Quite apart from presenting new lines of supporting evidence and argument, I hope this page will help to clarify many aspects of
Thorndike, Edward L. (1907). On the function of visual images. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 4 (12):324-327.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Thomas, Nigel J. T. (2003). The false dichotomy of imagery. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (2):211-211.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Pylyshyn's critique is powerful. Pictorial theories of imagery fail. On the other hand, the symbolic description theory he manifestly still favors also fails, lacking the semantic foundation necessary to ground imagery's intentionality and consciousness. But, contrary to popular belief, these two theory types do not exhaust available options. Recent work on embodied, active perception supports the alternative perceptual activity theory of imagery
Thomas, Nigel J. T. (2009). Visual Imagery and Consciousness. In William P. Banks (ed.), Encyclopedia of Consciousness.   (Google)
Abstract: Defining Imagery: Experience or Representation?
Historical Development of Ideas about Imagery
Subjective Individual Differences in Imagery Experience
Theories of Imagery, and their Implications for Consciousness
Picture theory
Description theory
Enactive theory
Zeimbekis, John, Thought experiments and mental simulations.   (Google)
Abstract: Thought experiments have a mysterious way of informing us about the world, apparently without examining it, yet with a great degree of certainty. It is tempting to try to explain this capacity by making use of the idea that in thought experiments, the mind somehow simulates the processes about which it reaches conclusions. Here, I test this idea. I argue that when they predict the outcomes of hypothetical physical situations, thought experiments cannot simulate physical processes. They use mental models, which should not be confused with process-driven simulations. A convincing case can be made that thought experiments about hypothetical mental processes are mental simulations. Concerning moral thought experiments, I argue that construing them as simulations of mental processes favours certain moral theories over others. The scope of mental simulation in thought experiments is primarily limited by the constraint of relevant similarity on source and target processes: on one hand, this constraint disqualifies thought from simulating external natural processes; on the other hand, it is a source of epistemic bias in moral thought experiments. In view of these results, I conclude that thought experiments and mental simulations cannot be assimilated as means of acquiring knowledge.