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8.7f. Science of Visual Consciousness, Misc (Science of Visual Consciousness, Misc on PhilPapers)

See also:
Bachmann, Talis (1998). Fast dynamics of visibility of brief visual images: The perceptual-retouch viewpoint. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness II. MIT Press.   (Google)
Bach-y-Rita, Paul; Tyler, Mitchell & Kaczamarek, Kurt (2003). Seeing with the brain. International Journal Of Human-Computer Interaction 15 (2):285-295.   (Google)
Bachmann, Talis (1997). Visibility of brief images: The dual-process approach. Consciousness and Cognition 6:491-518.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Ballard, Dana (2002). Our perception of the world has to be an illusion. Journal of Consciousness Studies 9:54-71.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Baxt, N. (1982). On the time necessary for a visual impression to come into consciousness. Psychological Research 44:1-12.   (Google | More links)
Beeckmans, J. (2004). Chromatically rich phenomenal percepts. Philosophical Psychology 17 (1):27-44.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Visual percepts frequently appear chromatically rich, yet their paucity in reportable information has led to widely accepted minimalist models of vision. The discrepancy may be resolved by positing that the richness of natural scenes is reflected in phenomenal consciousness but not in detail in the phenomenal judgments upon which reports about qualia are based. Conceptual awareness (including phenomenal judgments) arises from neural mechanisms that categorize objects, and also from mechanisms that conceptually characterize textural properties of pre-categorically segmented regions in the visual field. Experimental evidence suggests that complex images instigate the generation of so-called ensemble phenomenal judgments. These involve concepts that categorize global attributes of segmented areas but carry no information pertaining to details. It is then argued that there are cogent reasons for believing that phenomenal percepts (i.e. qualia) arising from chromatically complex stimuli cohere in this ensemble sense with both the stimulus and with the resulting ensemble phenomenal judgments. Thus, spatially detailed retinal images are deemed to yield correspondingly detailed phenomenal experiences that are in turn conceptually apprehended via a relatively small number of ensemble phenomenal judgments. Lastly, it is suggested that the bridge locus for chromatically rich phenomenal experiences is most plausibly located early in the cortical visual pathway
Belopolsky, Artem V. (online). The role of awareness in the error-processing of involuntary eye movements.   (Google)
Blake, Randolph; Tadin, Duje; Sobel, Kenith V.; Raissian, Tony A. & Chong, Sang Chul (2006). Strength of early visual adaptation depends on visual awareness. PNAS Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 103 (12):4783-4788.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
Breitmeyer, Bruno G. & Ögmen, Haluk (2006). Visual Masking: Time Slices Through Conscious and Unconscious Vision (2nd Ed.). Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 15 | Google)
Abstract: This new edition uses the technique of visual masking to explore temporal aspects of conscious and unconscious processes down to a resolution in the...
Christie, John R. & Barresi, John (2002). Consciousness and information processing: A reply to durgin. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):372-374.   (Google)
Abstract: Durgin's (2002) commentary on our article provides us with an opportunity to look more closely at the relationship between information processing and consciousness. In our article we contrasted the information processing approach to interpreting our data, with our own 'scientific' approach to consciousness. However, we should point out that, on our view, information processing as a methodology is not by itself in conflict with the scientific study of consciousness - indeed, we have adopted this very methodology in our experiments, which we purport to use to investigate consciousness. Furthermore, Durgin's own review of the history of research on metacontrast (Lachter & Durgin, 1999) shows that some researchers investigating metacontrast also thought that they were in the business of evaluating the role of consciousness in accounting for their effects. Yet, there is no doubt that metacontrast research is a paradigm case of research generated from an information processing perspective. So, prima facie, investigating consciousness and using information processing methodology are compatible
Clark, Austen (2001). Some logical features of feature integration. In Werner Backhaus (ed.), Neuronal Coding of Perceptual Systems. World Scientific.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: One of the biggest challenges in understanding perception is to understand how the nervous system manages to integrate the multiple codes it uses to represent features in multiple sensory modalities. From different cortical areas, which might separately register the sight of something red and the touch of something smooth, one effortlessly generates the perception of one thing that is both red and smooth. This process has been variously called "feature integration", "binding", or "synthesis". Citing some current models and some historical precursors, this paper makes some simple observations about the logic of feature integration. I suggest that "feature conjunction" is not strictly speaking conjunction at all, but rather joint predication; and that the critical task in "binding" is not simply grouping scattered representations together, or providing them a common label, but rather identifying those that have a common subject matter-those that are
Cogan, A. I. (1995). Vision comes to mind. Perception 24:811-26.   (Cited by 48 | Google | More links)
Davies, Todd R.; Hoffman, Donald D. & Rodriguez, Agustin M. G. (2002). Visual worlds: Construction or reconstruction? Journal of Consciousness Studies 9:72-87.   (Google)
Dennett, Daniel C. (1992). Filling in versus finding out: A ubiquitous confusion in cognitive science. In H. Pick, P. Van den Broek & D. Knill (eds.), [Book Chapter]. American Psychological Association.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: One of the things you learn if you read books and articles in (or about) cognitive science is that the brain does a lot of "filling in"--not filling in, but "filling in"--in scare quotes. My claim today will be that this way of talking is not a safe bit of shorthand, or an innocent bit of temporizing, but a source of deep confusion and error. The phenomena described in terms of "filling in" are real, surprising, and theoretically important, but it is a mistake to conceive of them as instances of something being filled in, for that vivid phrase always suggests too much--sometimes a little too much, but often a lot too much. Here are some examples (my boldface throughout)
di Lollo, V.; Enns, James T. & Rensink, R. (2000). Competition for consciousness among visual events: The psychophysics of reentrant visual processes. Journal Of Experimental Psychology-General 129 (4):481-507.   (Google)
Durgin, Frank H. (2002). An ostrich on a rock: Commentary on Christie and Barresi (2002). Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):366-371.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Durgin, Frank H. (1995). On the filling in of the visual blind spot: Some rules of thumb. Perception 24:827-40.   (Cited by 62 | Google | More links)
Durgin, Frank H. (2002). The tinkerbell effect: Motion, perception and illusion. Journal of Consciousness Studies 9:88-101.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Eagleman, David M. & Sejnowski, Terrence J. (2000). Motion integration and postdiction in visual awareness. Science 287 (5460):2036-2038.   (Cited by 128 | Google | More links)
Enns, J. T.; Rensink, R. A. & Di Lollo, V. (2000). Competition for consciousness among visual events: The psychophysics of reentrant visual processes. Journal of Experimental Psychology 129 (4):481-507.   (Google)
Abstract: Advances in neuroanatomy and neurophysiology have called attention to reentrant signalling as the predominant form of communication between brain areas. We propose that explicit use be made of reentrant processing in theories of perception. To show that this can be done effectively in one domain, we report on a series of psychophysical experiments involving a new form of masking, which defies explanation by current feed-forward theories. This masking occurs when a brief display of target plus mask is continued with the mask alone. We report evidence of two masking processes: an early process affected by physical factors such as adapting luminance and contour proximity, and a later process affected by attentional factors such as set size, target pop-out, and spatial pre-cuing. We call this later process masking by
Ferber, Susanne & Emrich, Stephen M. (2007). Maintaining the ties that bind: The role of an intermediate visual memory store in the persistence of awareness. Cognitive Neuropsychology 24 (2):187-210.   (Google)
Francis, Gregory & Hermens, Frouke (2002). Comment on Competition for Consciousness Among Visual Events: The Psychophysics of Reentrant Visual Processes (di lollo, Enns & Rensink, 2000). Journal of Experimental Psychology 131 (4):590-593.   (Google)
Ögmen, Haluk & Breitmeyer, Bruno G. (2006). The First Half Second: The Microgenesis and Temporal Dynamics of Unconscious and Conscious Visual Processes. MIT Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Hofstoetter, C.; Koch, Christof & Kiper, D. C. (2004). Motion-induced blindness does not affect the formation of negative afterimages. Consciousness and Cognition 13 (4):691-708.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Huang, Liqiang; Treisman, Anne & Pashler, Harold (2007). Characterizing the limits of human visual awareness. Science 317 (5839):823-825.   (Google)
Irwin, D. E. (1991). Information integration across saccadic eye movements. Cognitive Psychology 23:420-56.   (Cited by 178 | Google | More links)
Lachter, J.; Durgin, Frank H. & Washington, T. (2000). Disappearing percepts: Evidence for retention failure in metacontrast masking. Visual Cognition 7:269-279.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Leopold, David A.; Wilke, Melanie; Maier, Alexander & Logothetis, Nikos K. (2002). Stable perception of visually ambiguous patterns. Nature Neuroscience 5 (6):605-609.   (Cited by 58 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Correspondence should be addressed to David A. Leopold david.leopold@tuebingen.mpg.deDuring the viewing of certain patterns, widely known as ambiguous or puzzle figures, perception lapses into a sequence of spontaneous alternations, switching every few seconds between two or more visual interpretations of the stimulus. Although their nature and origin remain topics of debate, these stochastic switches are generally thought to be the automatic and inevitable consequence of viewing a pattern without a unique solution. We report here that in humans such perceptual alternations can be slowed, and even brought to a standstill, if the visual stimulus is periodically removed from view. We also show, with a visual illusion, that this stabilizing effect hinges on perceptual disappearance rather than on actual removal of the stimulus. These findings indicate that uninterrupted subjective perception of an ambiguous pattern is required for the initiation of the brain-state changes underlying multistable vision.Visual perception involves coordination between sensory sampling of the world and active interpretation of the sensory data. Human perception of objects and scenes is normally stable and robust, but it falters when one is presented with patterns that are inherently ambiguous or contradictory. Under such conditions, vision lapses into a chain of continually alternating percepts, whereby a viable visual interpretation dominates for a few seconds and is then replaced by a rival interpretation. This multistable vision, or 'multistability', is thought to result from destabilization of fundamental visual mechanisms, and has offered valuable insights into how sensory patterns are actively organized and interpreted in the brain1, 2. Despite a great deal of recent research and interest in multistable perception, however, its neurophysiological underpinnings remain poorly understood. Physiological studies have suggested that disambiguation of ambiguous patterns
Leopold, David A. (2003). Visual perception: Shaping what we see. Current Biology 13 (1).   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Milner, A. D. (2008). Conscious and unconscious visual processing in the human brain. In Lawrence Weiskrantz & Martin Davies (eds.), Frontiers of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Mitroff, Stephen R.; Scholl, Brian J. & Wynn, Karen (2005). The relationship between object Files and conscious perception. Cognition 96 (1):67-92.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
Natsoulas, Thomas (1993). An introduction to reflective seeing. Journal of Mind and Behavior 14 (3):235-56.   (Google)
Natsoulas, Thomas (1994). An introduction to reflective seeing. Journal of Mind and Behavior 15 (3):351-74.   (Google)
Nijhawan, R. & Khurana, B. (2000). Conscious registration of continuous and discrete visual events. In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Neural Correlates of Consciousness. MIT Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
O'Regan, Kevin J. (1992). Solving the "real" mysteries of visual perception: The world as an outside memory. Canadian Journal of Psychology 46:461-88.   (Cited by 359 | Google | More links)
Palmer, Scott D. (2002). Visual awareness. In Daniel Levitin (ed.), Foundations of Cognitive Psychology: Core Readings. MIT Press.   (Google)
Palmer, Scott D. (1999). Vision Science: Photons to Phenomenology. MIT Press.   (Cited by 739 | Google | More links)
Pessoa, Luiz; Thompson, Evan & Noë, Alva (1998). Finding out about filling-in: A guide to perceptual completion for visual science and the philosophy of perception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (21):723–802.   (Cited by 195 | Google | More links)
Phillips, W. A. (1974). On the distinction between sensory storage and visual short-term memory. Perception and Psychophysics 16:283-90.   (Cited by 384 | Google)
Ramachandran, Vilayanur S. (1992). Filling in gaps in perception: Part I. Current Directions in Psychological Science 1:199-205.   (Google)
Ramachandran, Vilayanur S. & Gregory, Richard L. (1991). Perceptual filling in of artificially induced scotomas in human vision. Nature 350:699-702.   (Cited by 189 | Google | More links)
Ramachandran, Vilayanur S. & Cobb, Steve (1995). Visual attention modulates metacontrast masking. Nature 373:66-68.   (Cited by 33 | Google | More links)
Reber, Rolf & Schwarz, Norbert (2001). The hot fringes of consciousness: Perceptual fluency and affect. Consciousness and Emotion 2 (2):223-231.   (Google)
Abstract: High figure-ground contrast usually results in more positive evaluations of visual stimuli. This may either reflect that high figure-ground contrast per se is a desirable attribute or that this attribute facilitates fluent processing. In the latter case, the influence of high figure-ground contrast should be most pronounced under short exposure times, that is, under conditions where the facilitative influence on perceptual fluency is most pronounced. Supporting this hypothesis, ratings of the prettiness of visual stimuli increased with figure-ground contrast under short exposure times (.3, 1, and 3 seconds, respectively). This positive influence of figure-ground contrast was eliminated under an exposure time of 10 seconds. We conclude that stimuli with high figure-ground contrast are more appealing because they are easier to process, not because high figure-ground contrast per se is a desirable attribute. We discuss this finding in the context of William James? notion that the fringe of consciousness includes vague contextual feelings at the periphery of the focus of attention and suggest that perceptual fluency is one of these feelings
Simons, Daniel J. & Rensink, Ron (2003). Induced failures of visual awareness. Journal of Vision 2 (3).   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Soto-Faraco, Salvador & Alsius, Agnès (2007). Conscious access to the unisensory components of a cross-modal illusion. Neuroreport 18 (4):347-350.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Sperling, George (1960). The information available in visual presentations. Psychological Monographs 74:1-29.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Treisman, Anne (2003). Consciousness and perceptual binding. In Axel Cleeremans (ed.), The Unity of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Treisman, Anne & Kanwisher, Nancy (1998). Perceiving visually presented objects: Recognition, awareness, and modularity. Current Opinion in Neurobiology 8:218-226.   (Cited by 62 | Google | More links)
Wallis, G. & Buelthoff, H. (2000). What's scene and not seen: Influences of movement and task upon what we see. Visual Cognition 7:175-190.   (Cited by 23 | Google | More links)
Wilken, Patrick (2001). Capacity Limits for the Detection and Identification of Charge: Implications for Models of Visual Short-Term Memory. Dissertation, The University of Melbourne   (Google)
Abstract: The issue of capacity limits in visual short-term memory (VSTM) has been an area of active research since the 19th Century (Cattell, 1886). A common metaphor suggests that VSTM is akin to a limited capacity urn, able to hold only three-to-six items (Cowan, 2001). The 11 experiments in this thesis explore implications of this metaphor. Experiments 1-4 suggest that items in VSTM are not stored as coherent objects, contrary to recent suggestions (Luck & Vogel, 1997; Vogel, Woodman, & Luck, 2001). Experiments 5-6 contrast two distinct experimental techniques used to probe the structure of information encoded in VSTM. The "single-shot" technique measures sensitivity to differences across two sequential arrays (Luck & Vogel, 1997); the "flicker" technique measures response times to the detection of change, across multiple successive presentations of two alternate displays (Rensink, O'Regan, & Clark, 1997). It is shown that observers' underlying sensitivity to change, and by implication the structure of information encoded, is the same for these two techniques. Experiments 7-9 examine the relationship between observers' performance for detection and identification of change between two successive visual arrays. It is demonstrated that this relationship fails to meet basic assumptions inherent in the urn metaphor. An alternate model is proposed, which suggests that the capacity limit in VSTM is not determined by the number of items stored, but by the amount of information able to be extracted from a visual display. In Experiments 10-11, this alternative model is used to examine the short-term storage of visual information. Overall, the findings of the thesis are inconsistent with a model in which limits in the detection and identification of change are the result of a single process, which operates on a limited number of coherent objects held in a high-level memory store.
Yantis, Steven (2005). How visual salience wins the battle for awareness. Nature Neuroscience 8 (8):975-977.   (Cited by 3 | Google)