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8.8. Consciousness and Psychology (Consciousness and Psychology on PhilPapers)

Alkire, M. T.; Haier, R. J. & James, H. F. (1998). Toward the neurobiology of consciousness: Using brain imaging and anesthesia to investigate the anatomy of consciousness. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness II. MIT Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Perruchet, Pierre & Vinter, Annie (2003). Linking learning and consciousness: The self-organizing consciousness (SOC) model. In Axel Cleeremans (ed.), The Unity of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)

8.8a Cognitive Models of Consciousness

Aleksander, Igor & Morton, Helen (2007). Depictive architectures for synthetic phenomenology. In Antonio Chella & Riccardo Manzotti (eds.), Artificial Consciousness. Imprint Academic.   (Google)
Aleksander, Igor L. (2007). Why axiomatic models of being conscious? Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (7):15-27.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper looks closely at previously enunciated axioms that specifically include phenomenology as the sense of a self in a perceptual world. This, we suggest, is an appropriate way of doing science on a first-person phenomenon. The axioms break consciousness down into five key components: presence, imagination, attention, volition and emotions. The paper examines anew the mechanism of each and how they interact to give a single sensation. An abstract architecture, the Kernel Architecture, is introduced as a starting point for building computational models. The thrust of the paper is to relate the axioms to the kernel architecture and indicate that this opens a way of discussing some first-person issues: tests for consciousness, animal consciousness and Higher Order Thought
Baars, Bernard J. (1988). A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 953 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Conscious experience is one of the most difficult and thorny problems in psychological science. Its study has been neglected for many years, either because it was thought to be too difficult, or because the relevant evidence was thought to be poor. Bernard Baars suggests a way to specify empirical constraints on a theory of consciousness by contrasting well-established conscious phenomena - such as stimulus representations known to be attended, perceptual, and informative - with closely comparable unconscious ones - such as stimulus representations known to be preperceptual, unattended, or habituated. Adducing data to show that consciousness is associated with a kind of global workplace in the nervous system, and that several brain structures are known to behave in accordance with his theory, Baars helps to clarify many difficult problems
Baars, Bernard J.; Ramsoy, Thomas Zoega & Laureys, Steven (2003). Brain, conscious experience, and the observing self. Trends in Neurosciences 26 (12):671-5.   (Cited by 58 | Google | More links)
Baars, Bernard J.; Fehling, M. R.; LaPolla, M. & McGovern, Katharine A. (1997). Consciousness creates access: Conscious goal images recruit unconscious action routines, but goal competition serves to "liberate" such routines, causing predictable slips. In Jonathan D. Cohen & Jonathan W. Schooler (eds.), Scientific Approaches to Consciousness. Lawrence Erlbaum.   (Google)
Baars, Bernard J. (1983). Conscious contents provide the nervous system with coherent, global information. In Richard J. Davidson, Gary E. Schwartz & D. H. Shapiro (eds.), Consciousness and Self-Regulation. Plenum.   (Cited by 31 | Google)
Baars, Bernard J. & McGovern, Katharine A. (1996). Cognitive views of consciousness: What are the facts? How can we explain them? In Max Velmans (ed.), The Science of Consciousness. Routledge.   (Cited by 16 | Google | More links)
Abstract: At this instant you, the reader, are conscious of some aspects of the act of reading --- the color and texture of THIS PAGE, and perhaps the inner sound of THESE WORDS. But you are probably not aware of the touch of your chair at this instant; nor of a certain background taste in your mouth, nor that monotonous background noise, the soft sound of music, or the complex syntactic processes needed to understand THIS PHRASE; nor are you now aware of your feelings about a friend, the fleeting events of several seconds ago, or the multiple meanings of ambiguous words, as in THIS CASE. Even though you are not currently conscious of them, there is good of evidence that such unconscious events are actively processed in your brain, every moment you are awake. When we try to understand conscious experience we aim to explain the differences between these two conditions: between the events in your nervous system that you can report, act upon, distinguish, and acknowledge as your own, and a great multitude of sophisticated and intelligent processes which are unconscious, and do not allow these operations
Baars, Bernard J. (2006). Global workspace theory of consciousness: Toward a cognitive neuroscience of human experience? In Steven Laureys (ed.), Boundaries of Consciousness. Elsevier.   (Cited by 13 | Google)
Baars, Bernard J. (1997). In the Theater of Consciousness: The Workspace of the Mind. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The study of conscious experience has seen remarkable strides in the last ten years, reflecting important technological breakthroughs and the enormous efforts of researchers in disciplines as varied as neuroscience, cognitive science, and philosophy. Although still embroiled in debate, scientists are now beginning to find common ground in their understanding of consciousness, which may pave the way for a unified explanation of how and why we experience and understand the world around us. Written by eminent psychologist Bernard J. Baars, Inside the Theater of Consciousness: The Workspace of the Mind brings us to the frontlines of this exciting discipline, offering the general reader a fascinating overview of how top scientists currently understand the processes underlying conscious experience. Combining psychology with brain science, Baars brilliantly brings his subject to life with a metaphor that has been used to understand consciousness since the time of Aristotle--the mind as theater. Here consciousness is seen as a "stage" on which our sensations, perceptions, thoughts, and feelings play to a vast, silent audience (the immensely complicated inner-workings of the brain's unconscious processes). Behind the scenes, silent context operators shape conscious experience; they include implicit expectations, self systems, and scene setters. Using this framework, Baars presents compelling evidence that human consciousness rides on top of biologically ancient mechanisms. In humans it manifests itself in inner speech, imagery, perception, and voluntary control of thought and action. Topics like hypnosis, absorbed states of mind, adaptation to trauma, and the human propensity to project expectations on uncertainty, all fit into the expanded theater metaphor. As Baars explores our present understanding of the mind, he takes us to the top laboratories around the world, where we witness some of the field's most exciting breakthroughs and discoveries. (For instance, Baars recounts one extraordinary sequence of experiments, in which state-of-the-art PET scans--reproduced here in full color--capture in fascinating, graphic detail how brain activity changes as people learn how to play the computer game Tetris.) And throughout the book, Baars has sprinkled numerous and often highly amusing on-the-spot demonstrations that illuminate the ideas under discussion. Understanding consciousness is perhaps the most difficult puzzle facing the sciences today. In the Theater of Consciousness offers an invaluable introduction to the field, brilliantly weaving together the various theories that have emerged as scientists continue their quest to uncover the profound mysteries of the mind--and of human nature itself
Baars, Bernard J. (1997). In the theatre of consciousness: Global workspace theory, a rigorous scientific theory of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 4 (4):292-309.   (Cited by 21 | Google)
Baars, Bernard J. (1998). Metaphors of consciousness and attention in the brain. Trends in Neurosciences 21:58-62.   (Cited by 31 | Google | More links)
Baars, Bernard J. (2002). The conscious access hypothesis: Origins and recent evidence. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 6 (1):47-52.   (Cited by 88 | Google | More links)
Baars, Bernard J. (2007). The global workspace theory of consciousness. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell.   (Cited by 13 | Google)
Barresi, John & Christie, John R. (2002). Consciousness and information processing: A reply to durgin. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):372-374.   (Google)
Abstract: Durgin's (2002) commentary on our article provides us with an opportunity to look more closely at the relationship between information processing and consciousness. In our article we contrasted the information processing approach to interpreting our data, with our own 'scientific' approach to consciousness. However, we should point out that, on our view, information processing as a methodology is not by itself in conflict with the scientific study of consciousness - indeed, we have adopted this very methodology in our experiments, which we purport to use to investigate consciousness. Furthermore, Durgin's own review of the history of research on metacontrast (Lachter & Durgin, 1999) shows that some researchers investigating metacontrast also thought that they were in the business of evaluating the role of consciousness in accounting for their effects. Yet, there is no doubt that metacontrast research is a paradigm case of research generated from an information processing perspective. So, prima facie, investigating consciousness and using information processing methodology are compatible
Bechtel, William P. (1995). Consciousness: Perspectives from symbolic and connectionist AI. Neuropsychologia.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Browne, C.; Evans, Robert W.; Sales, N. & Aleksander, Igor L. (1997). Consciousness and neural cognizers: A review of some recent approaches. Neural Networks 10:1303-1316.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Brown, R. A. (1997). Consciousness in a self-learning, memory-controlled, compound machine. Neural Networks 10:1333-85.   (Google | More links)
Burks, Arthur W. (1986). An architectural theory of functional consciousness. In Nicholas Rescher (ed.), Current Issues in Teleology. University Press of America.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Cabanac, M. (1996). On the origin of consciousness, a postulate, and its corollary. Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews 20:33-40.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Calvin, William H. (1998). Competing for consciousness: A Darwinian mechanism at an appropriate level of explanation. Journal of Consciousness Studies 5 (4):389-404.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Treating consciousness as awareness or attention greatly underestimates it, ignoring the temporary levels of organization associated with higher intellectual function (syntax, planning, logic, music). The tasks that require consciousness tend to be the ones that demand a lot of resources. Routine tasks can be handled on the back burner but dealing with ambiguity, groping around offline, generating creative choices, and performing precision movements may temporarily require substantial allocations of neocortex. Here I will attempt to clarify the appropriate levels of explanation (ranging from quantum aspects to association cortex dynamics) and then propose a specific mechanism (consciousness as the current winner of Darwinian copying competitions in cerebral cortex) that seems capable of encompassing the higher intellectual function aspects of consciousness as well as some of the attentional aspects. It includes features such as a coding space appropriate for analogies and a supervisory Darwinian process that can bias the operation of other Darwinian processes
Cam, Philip (1989). Notes toward a faculty theory of cognitive consciousness. In Peter Slezak (ed.), Computers, Brains and Minds. Kluwer.   (Google)
Carr, T. H. (1979). Consciousness in models of human information processing: Primary memory, executive control, and input regulation. In G. Underwood & R. Stevens (eds.), Aspects of Consciousness, Volume 1. Academic Press.   (Cited by 9 | Google)
Cardaci, Maurizio; D'Amico, Antonella & Caci, Barbara (2007). The social cognitive theory: A new framework for implementing artificial consciousness. In Antonio Chella & Riccardo Manzotti (eds.), Artificial Consciousness. Imprint Academic.   (Google)
Chang, Fu (online). A theory of consciousness.   (Google | More links)
Claxton, Guy (1996). Structure, strategy and self in the fabrication of conscious experience. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (2):98-111.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Cook, N. D. (1999). Simulating consciousness in a bilateral neural network: ''Nuclear'' and ''fringe'' awareness. Consciousness and Cognition 8 (1):62-93.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Abstract: A technique for the bilateral activation of neural nets that leads to a functional asymmetry of two simulated ''cerebral hemispheres'' is described. The simulation is designed to perform object recognition, while exhibiting characteristics typical of human consciousness-specifically, the unitary nature of conscious attention, together with a dual awareness corresponding to the ''nucleus'' and ''fringe'' described by William James (1890). Sensory neural nets self-organize on the basis of five sensory features. The system is then taught arbitrary symbolic labels for a small number of similar stimuli. Finally, the trained network is exposed to nonverbal stimuli for object recognition, leading to Gaussian activation of the ''sensory'' maps-with a peak at the location most closely related to the features of the external stimulus. ''Verbal'' maps are activated most strongly at the labeled location that lies closest to the peak on homologous sensory maps. On the verbal maps activation is characterized by both excitatory and inhibitory Gaussians (a Mexican hat), the parameters of which are determined by the relative locations of the verbal labels. Mutual homotopic inhibition across the ''corpus callosum'' then produces functional cerebral asymmetries, i.e., complementary activation of homologous ''association'' and ''frontal'' maps within a common focus of attention-a nucleus in the left hemisphere and a fringe in the right hemisphere. An object is recognized as corresponding to a known label when the total activation of both hemispheres (nucleus plus fringe) is strongest for that label. The functional dualities of the cerebral hemispheres are discussed in light of the nucleus/fringe asymmetry
Cotterill, Rodney M. J. (1997). Navigation, consciousness and the body/mind "problem". Psyke and Logos 18:337-341.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Cotterill, Rodney M. J. (1997). On the mechanism of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 4 (3):231-48.   (Cited by 15 | Google)
Cotterill, Rodney M. J. (1996). Prediction and internal feedback in conscious perception. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3:245-66.   (Google)
Coward, L. Andrew & Sun, Ron (2004). Criteria for an effective theory of consciousness and some preliminary attempts. Consciousness and Cognition 13 (2):268-301.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In the physical sciences a rigorous theory is a hierarchy of descriptions in which causal relationships between many general types of entity at a phenomenological level can be derived from causal relationships between smaller numbers of simpler entities at more detailed levels. The hierarchy of descriptions resembles the modular hierarchy created in electronic systems in order to be able to modify a complex functionality without excessive side effects. Such a hierarchy would make it possible to establish a rigorous scientific theory of consciousness. The causal relationships implicit in definitions of access consciousness and phe- nomenal consciousness are made explicit, and the corresponding causal relationships at the more detailed levels of perception, memory, and skill learning described. Extension of these causal relationships to physiological and neural levels is discussed. The general capability of a range of current consciousness models to support a modular hierarchy which could generate these causal relationships is reviewed, and the specific capabilities of two models with good general capabilities are compared in some detail. Ó 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved
Coward, L. Andrew & Sun, Ron (2002). Explaining consciousness at multiple levels. In Serge P. Shohov (ed.), Advances in Psychology Research. Nova Science Publishers.   (Google)
Díaz, José-Luis (1997). A patterned process approach to brain, consciousness, and behavior. Philosophical Psychology 10 (2):179-195.   (Google)
Abstract: The architecture of brain, consciousness, and behavioral processes is shown to be formally similar in that all three may be conceived and depicted as Petri net patterned processes structured by a series of elements occurring or becoming active in stochastic succession, in parallel, with different rhythms of temporal iteration, and with a distinct qualitative manifestation in the spatiotemporal domain. A patterned process theory is derived from the isomorphic features of the models and contrasted with connectionist, dynamic system notions. This empirically derived formulation is considered to be optimally compatible with the dual aspect theory in that the foundation of the diverse aspects would be a highly structured and dynamic process, the psychophysical neutral “ground” of mind and matter posed (but not properly determined) by dual aspect and neutral monist theories. It is methodologically sound to approach each one of these processes with specific tools and to establish concurrences in real time between them at the organismic level of analysis. Such intra-level and inter-perspective correlations could eventually constitute psychophysical bridge-laws. A mature psychology of consciousness is necessary to situate and verify the bridges required by a genuine mind-body science
Dehaene, Stanislas; Kerszberg, Michel & Changeux, Jean-Pierre (2001). A neuronal model of a global workspace in effortful cognitive tasks. Pnas 95 (24):14529-14534.   (Cited by 140 | Google | More links)
Dennett, D. C. & Westbury, C. F. (1999). Stability is not intrinsic. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):153-154.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: A pure vehicle theory of the contents of consciousness is not possible. While it is true that hard-wired tacit representations are insufficient as content-vehicles, not all tacit representations are hard-wired. The definition of stability offered for patterns of neural activation is not well-motivated, and too simplistic. We disagree in particular with the assumption that stability within a network is purely intrinsic to that network. Many complex forms of stability within a network are apparent only when interpreted by something external to that network. The requirement for interpretation introduces a necessary functional element into the theory of the contents of consciousness, suggesting that a pure vehicle theory of those contents will not succeed
Dorrell, Philip (ms). Computation vs. feelings and the production/judgment model.   (Google)
Abstract: Functional versus Subjective Consciousness The Example of Pain Dieting and Free Will The Production/Judgement Model Judgement is not Reward Feelings are Judgements Low-Bandwidth Channels Candidate Neural Control Channels Timing of Intention and Action Conclusion References Abstract
d'Ydewalle, Géry (2000). The case against a single consciousness center: Much ado about nothing? European Psychologist 5 (1):12-13.   (Google)
Franklin, Stan (online). Action selection and language generation in "conscious" software agents.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Franklin, Stan & Graesser, Art (1999). A software agent model of consciousness. Consciousness And Cognition 8 (3):285-301.   (Cited by 31 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Baars (1988, 1997) has proposed a psychological theory of consciousness, called global workspace theory. The present study describes a software agent implementation of that theory, called ''Conscious'' Mattie (CMattie). CMattie operates in a clerical domain from within a UNIX operating system, sending messages and interpreting messages in natural language that organize seminars at a university. CMattie fleshes out global workspace theory with a detailed computational model that integrates contemporary architectures in cognitive science and artificial intelligence. Baars (1997) lists the psychological ''facts that any complete theory of consciousness must explain'' in his appendix to In the Theater of Consciousness; global workspace theory was designed to explain these ''facts.'' The present article discusses how the design of CMattie accounts for these facts and thereby the extent to which it implements global workspace theory
Franklin, Stan (ms). Conscious software: A computational view of mind.   (Cited by 16 | Google | More links)
Fuentes, Luis J. (2000). Dissociating components in conscious experience. European Psychologist 5 (1):13-15.   (Google)
Gregory, Richard L. (1984). Is consciousness sensational inferences? Perception 13:641-6.   (Google)
Gupta, G. C. (2005). Mathematics and consciousness. Psychological Studies 50 (2):255-258.   (Google)
Hardcastle, Valerie Gray (1995). A critique of information processing theories of consciousness. Minds and Machines 5 (1):89-107.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   Information processing theories in psychology give rise to executive theories of consciousness. Roughly speaking, these theories maintain that consciousness is a centralized processor that we use when processing novel or complex stimuli. The computational assumptions driving the executive theories are closely tied to the computer metaphor. However, those who take the metaphor serious — as I believe psychologists who advocate the executive theories do — end up accepting too particular a notion of a computing device. In this essay, I examine the arguments from theoretical computational considerations that cognitive psychologists use to support their general approach in order to show that they make unwarranted assumptions about the processing attributes of consciousness. I then go on to examine the assumptions behind executive theories which grow out of the computer metaphor of cognitive psychology and conclude that we may not be the sort of computational machine cognitive psychology assumes and that cognitive psychology''s approach in itself does not buy us anything in developing theories of consciousness. Hence, the state space in which we may locate consciousness is vast, even within an information processing framework
Harnad, Stevan (1982). Consciousness: An afterthought. Cognition and Brain Theory 5:29-47.   (Cited by 53 | Google | More links)
Abstract: There are many possible approaches to the mind/brain problem. One of the most prominent, and perhaps the most practical, is to ignore it
Harth, E. (1996). Self-referent mechanisms as the neuronal basis of consciousness. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness. MIT Press.   (Google)
Harth, E. (1993). The Creative Loop: How the Brain Makes a Mind. Addison Wesley.   (Cited by 72 | Google)
Harth, E. (1995). The sketchpad model: A theory of consciousness, perception, and imagery. Consciousness and Cognition 4:346-68.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Ieshima, Takeshi & Tokosumi, Akifumi (2002). Modularity and hierarchy: A theory of consciousness based on the fractal neural network. In Kunio Yasue, Marj Jibu & Tarcisio Della Senta (eds.), No Matter, Never Mind: Proceedings of Toward a Science of Consciousness: Fundamental Approaches (Tokyo '99). John Benjamins.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Jackendoff, Ray S. (1987). Consciousness and the Computational Mind. MIT Press.   (Cited by 612 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Johnson-Laird, Philip N. (1983). A computational analysis of consciousness. Cognition and Brain Theory 6:499-508.   (Cited by 30 | Google)
John, E. Roy (1976). A model of consciousness. In Gary E. Schwartz & D. H. Shapiro (eds.), Consciousness and Self-Regulation. Plenum Press.   (Cited by 16 | Google)
Joseph, Michael H. & Joseph, Samuel R. H. (2001). The contents of consciousness: From C to shining c++. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (1):188-189.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: We suggest that consciousness (C) should be addressed as a multilevel concept. We can provisionally identify at least three, rather than two, levels: Gray's system should relate at least to the lowest of these three levels. Although it is unlikely to be possible to develop a behavioural test for C, it is possible to speculate as to the evolutionary advantages offered by C and how C evolved through succeeding levels. Disturbances in the relationships between the levels of C could underlie mental illness, especially schizophrenia
Kawato, M. (1997). Bidirectional theory approach to consciousness. In M. Ito, Y. Miyashita & Edmund T. Rolls (eds.), Cognition, Computation, and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 9 | Google)
Khromov, Andrei G. (2001). Logical self-reference as a model for conscious experience. Journal of Mathematical Psychology 45 (5):720-731.   (Google | More links)
Lauro-Grotto, R.; Reich, S. & Virasoro, M. A. (1997). The computational role of conscious processing in a model of semantic memory. In M. Ito, Y. Miyashita & Edmund T. Rolls (eds.), Cognition, Computation, and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 12 | Google)
Lesley, Joan (2006). Awareness is relative: Dissociation as the organisation of meaning. Consciousness and Cognition 15 (3):593-604.   (Google)
Lloyd, Dan (1995). Consciousness: A connectionist manifesto. Minds and Machines 5 (2):161-85.   (Cited by 16 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   Connectionism and phenomenology can mutually inform and mutually constrain each other. In this manifesto I outline an approach to consciousness based on distinctions developed by connectionists. Two core identities are central to a connectionist theory of consciouness: conscious states of mind are identical to occurrent activation patterns of processing units; and the variable dispositional strengths on connections between units store latent and unconscious information. Within this broad framework, a connectionist model of consciousness succeeds according to the degree of correspondence between the content of human consciousness (the world as it is experienced) and the interpreted content of the network. Constitutive self-awareness and reflective self-awareness can be captured in a model through its ability to respond to self-reflexive information, identify self-referential categories, and process information in the absence of simultaneous input. The qualitative feel of sensation appears in a model as states of activation that are not fully discriminated by later processing. Connectionism also uniquely explains several specific features of experience. The most important of these is the superposition of information in consciousness — our ability to perceive more than meets the eye, and to apprehend complex categorical and temporal information in a single highly-cognized glance. This superposition in experience matches a superposition of representational content in distributed representations
Lloyd, Dan (1996). Consciousness, connectionism, and cognitive neuroscience: A meeting of the minds. Philosophical Psychology 9 (1):61-78.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Abstract: Accounting for phenomenal structure—the forms, aspects, and features of conscious experience—poses a deep challenge for the scientific study of consciousness, but rather than abandon hope I propose a way forward. Connectionism, I argue, offers a bi-directional analogy, with its oft-noted “neural inspiration” on the one hand, and its largely unnoticed capacity to illuminate our phenomenology on the other. Specifically, distributed representations in a recurrent network enable networks to superpose categorical, contextual, and temporal information on a specific input representation, much as our own experience does. Artificial neural networks also suggest analogues of four salient distinctions between sensory and nonsensoty consciousness. The paper concludes with speculative proposals for discharging the connectionist heuristics to leave a robust, detailed empirical theory of consciousness
Maia, Tiago V. & Cleeremans, Axel (2005). Consciousness: Converging insights from connectionist modeling and neuroscience. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9 (8):397-404.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Mathis, D. W. & Moxer, M. (1995). On the computational utility of consciousness. In G. Tesauro, D. Touretzky & T. Leen (eds.), Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 7. MIT Press.   (Cited by 13 | Google | More links)
McDermott, Josh (1995). Global workspace theory: Consciousness explained? Harvard Brain 2 (1).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The subject of consciousness, long shunned by mainstream psychology and the scientific community, has over the last two decades become a legitimate topic of scientific research. One of the most thorough attempts to formulate a theory of consciousness has come from Bernard Baars, a psychologist working at the Wright Institute. Baars proposes that consciousness is the result of a Global Workspace in the brain that distributes information to the huge number of parallel unconscious processors that form the rest of the brain. This paper critiques the central hypothesis of Baars' theory of consciousness
McGovern, Katherine & Baars, Bernard J. (2007). Cognitive theories of consciousness. In Philip David Zelazo, Morris Moscovitch & Evan Thompson (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness. Cambridge.   (Google)
McKee, George (online). The engine of awareness: Autonomous synchronous representations.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Objections to functional explanations of awareness assert that although functional systems may be adequate to explain behavior, including verbal behavior consisting of assertions of awareness by an individual, they cannot provide for the existence of phenomenal awareness. In this paper, a theory of awareness is proposed that counters this assertion by incorporating two advances: (1) a formal definition of representation, expressed in a functional notation: Newell's Representation Law, and 2) the introduction of real time into the analysis of awareness. This leads to the definition of phenomenal awareness as existing whenever an object contains an autonomously updated configuration satisfying the Representation Law with respect to some aspects of its environment. The relational aspect of the Representation Law permits the development of multiple levels of awareness, which provides for the existence of illusions and hallucinations, and permits the identification of a new measure, accuracy of awareness . The relational perspective also permits the incorporation of referential concepts into the framework. Qualia can then be identified with referentially opaque elements of awareness. The functional form of the Representation Law is linked to neurophysiology and the underlying phenomena of chemistry and physics by phenomena involving activity-dependent connectivity
Michie, Donald (1994). Consciousness as an engineering issue (parts 1 and 2). Journal of Consciousness Studies 1 (1):192-95.   (Google)
Michie, Donald (1995). Consciousness as an engineering issue, part. Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (1):52-66.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Morsella, Ezequiel (2005). The function of phenomenal states: Supramodular interaction theory. Psychological Review 112 (4):1000-1021.   (Google)
Moura, Ivan (2006). A model of agent consciousness and its implementation. Neurocomputing 69 (16-18):1984-1995.   (Google)
Negatu, Aregahegn S. & Franklin, Stan (2002). An action selection mechanism for "conscious" software agents. Cognitive Science Quarterly. Special Issue 2 (3):362-384.   (Cited by 15 | Google)
Norretranders, T. (1991). The User Illusion: Cutting Consciousness Down to Size. Viking Penguin.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Oatley, Keith (1981). Representing ourselves: Mental schemata, computational metaphors, and the nature of consciousness. In G. Underwood & R. Stevens (eds.), Aspects of Consciousness, Volume 2. Academic Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
O'Brien, Gerard & Opie, Jonathan (1999). A connectionist theory of phenomenal experience. [Journal (Paginated)] 22 (1):127-48.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: When cognitive scientists apply computational theory to the problem of phenomenal consciousness, as many of them have been doing recently, there are two fundamentally distinct approaches available. Either consciousness is to be explained in terms of the nature of the representational vehicles the brain deploys; or it is to be explained in terms of the computational processes defined over these vehicles. We call versions of these two approaches vehicle and process theories of consciousness, respectively. However, while there may be space for vehicle theories of consciousness in cognitive science, they are relatively rare. This is because of the influence exerted, on the one hand, by a large body of research which purports to show that the explicit representation of information in the brain and conscious experience are dissociable, and on the other, by the classical computational theory of mind – the theory that takes human cognition to be a species of symbol manipulation. But two recent developments in cognitive science combine to suggest that a reappraisal of this situation is in order. First, a number of theorists have recently been highly critical of the experimental methodologies employed in the dissociation studies – so critical, in fact, it’s no longer reasonable to assume that the dissociability of conscious experience and explicit representation has been adequately demonstrated. Second, classicism, as a theory of human cognition, is no longer as dominant in cognitive science as it once was. It now has a lively competitor in the form of connectionism; and connectionism, unlike classicism, does have the computational resources to support a robust vehicle theory of consciousness. In this paper we develop and defend this connectionist vehicle theory of consciousness. It takes the form of the following simple empirical hypothesis: phenomenal experience consists in the explicit representation of information in neurally realized PDP networks. This hypothesis leads us to re-assess some common wisdom about consciousness, but, we will argue, in fruitful and ultimately plausible ways
O'Brien, Gerard & Opie, Jonathan (2001). Connectionist vehicles, structural resemblance, and the phenomenal mind. Communication and Cognition (Special Issue) 34 (1-2):13-38.   (Google)
Abstract: We think the best prospect for a naturalistic explanation of phenomenal consciousness is to be found at the confluence of two influential ideas about the mind. The first is the _computational _ _theory of mind_: the theory that treats human cognitive processes as disciplined operations over neurally realised representing vehicles.1 The second is the _representationalist theory of _ _consciousness_: the theory that takes the phenomenal character of conscious experiences (the “what-it-is-likeness”) to be constituted by their representational content.2 Together these two theories suggest that phenomenal consciousness might be explicable in terms of the representational content of the neurally realised representing vehicles that are generated and manipulated in the course of cognition. The simplest and most elegant hypothesis that one might entertain in this regard is that conscious experiences are identical to (i.e., are one and the same as) the brain’s representing vehicles
O'Brien, Gerard & Opie, Jonathan (1999). Putting content into a vehicle theory of consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):175-196.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The connectionist vehicle theory of phenomenal experience in the target article identifies consciousness with the brain’s explicit representation of information in the form of stable patterns of neural activity. Commentators raise concerns about both the conceptual and empirical adequacy of this proposal. On the former front they worry about our reliance on vehicles, on representation, on stable patterns of activity, and on our identity claim. On the latter front their concerns range from the general plausibility of a vehicle theory to our specific attempts to deal with the dissociation studies. We address these concerns, and then finish by considering whether the vehicle theory we have defended has a coherent story to tell about the active, unified subject to whom conscious experiences belong
Opie, Jonathan (2000). Consciousness in the loops. Review of Cotterill, Enchanted Looms: Conscious Networks in Brains and Computers. Metascience 9 (2):277-82.   (Google)
Abstract: Consciousness is a pretty sexy topic right now, as the plethora of recent books on the subject demonstrate. Everyone is having a go at it: philosophers, psychologists, neuroscientists and physicists, to mention just a few. And for every discipline or sub-discipline that pretends to some insight on the matter we find not only a different explanatory strategy, but a different take on the explanandum – there is widespread disagreement about _what_ a theory of consciousness should actually explain. However, one thing seems to be agreed by all concerned: consciousness, whatever it is, is deeply mysterious
Parsons, T. (1953). Consciousness and symbolic processes. In H. A. Abramson (ed.), Problems of Consciousness: Transactions of the Fourth Conference. Josiah Macy Foundation.   (Google)
Parsell, Mitch (2005). Review of P.o. Haikonen's The Cognitive Approach to Conscious Machines. Psyche 11 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: Haikonen (2003) is an attempt to explicate a platform for modelling consciousness. The book sets out the foundational concepts behind Haikonen’s work in the area and proposes a particular modelling environment. This is developed in three parts: part 1 offers a brief analysis of the state of play in cognitive modelling; part 2 an extended treatment of the phenomena to be explained; part 3 promises a synthesis of the two preceding discussions to provide the necessary background and detail for the proposed modelling environment. This final part covers a broad range of technical details from the nature of the representational-computational economy instantiated, to the control of motor output, to the means of implementing emotions in artefacts. Haikonen proposes an environment based on a distributed representational economy, instantiated in a neural network architecture and trained using associative learning regimes, but which also has symbolic processing abilities to handle the critical task of generating inner language
Peters, Frederic (2010). Consciousness as Recursive, Spatiotemporal Self Location. Psychological Research.   (Google)
Abstract: At the phenomenal level, consciousness can be described as a singular, unified field of recursive self-awareness, consistently coherent in a particualr way; that of a subject located both spatially and temporally in an egocentrically-extended domain, such that conscious self-awareness is explicitly characterized by I-ness, now-ness and here-ness. The psychological mechanism underwriting this spatiotemporal self-locatedness and its recursive processing style involves an evolutionary elaboration of the basic orientative reference frame which consistently structures ongoing spatiotemporal self-location computations as i-here-now. Cognition computes action-output in the midst of ongoing movement, and consequently requires a constant self-locating spatiotemporal reference frame as basis for these computations. Over time, constant evolutionary pressures for energy efficiency have encouraged both the proliferation of anticipative feedforward processing mechansims, and the elaboration, at the apex of the sensorimotor processing hierarchy, of self-activating, highly attenuated recursively-feedforward circuitry processing the basic orientational schema independent of external action output. As the primary reference frame of active waking cognition, this recursive i-here-now processing generates a zone of subjective self-awareness in terms of which it feels like something to be oneself here and now. This is consciousness.
Phaf, R. H. & Wolters, G. (1997). A constructivist and connectionist view on conscious and nonconscious processes. Philosophical Psychology 10 (3):287-307.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Recent experimental findings reveal dissociations of conscious and nonconscious performance in many fields of psychological research, suggesting that conscious and nonconscious effects result from qualitatively different processes. A connectionist view of these processes is put forward in which consciousness is the consequence of construction processes taking place in three types of working memory in a specific type of recurrent neural network. The recurrences arise by feeding back output to the input of a central (representational) network. They are assumed to be intemalizations of motor-sensory feedback through the environment. In this manner, a subvocal-phonological, a visuo-spatial, and a somatosensory working memory may have developed. Representations in the central network, which constitutes long-term memory, can be kept active by rehearsal in the feedback loops. The sequentially recurrent architecture allows for recursive symbolic operations and the formation of (auditory, visual, or somatic) models of the external world which can be maintained, transformed and temporarily combined with other information in working memory. Moreover, the quasi-input from the loop directs subsequent attentional processing. The view may contribute to a formal framework to accommodate findings from disparate fields such as working memory, sequential reasoning, and conscious and nonconscious processes in memory and emotion. In theory, but probably not very soon in practice, such connectionist models might simulate aspects of consciousness
Prinz, Jesse J. (2007). The intermediate level theory of consciousness. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Restian, A. (1981). Informational analysis of consciousness. International Journal of Neuroscience 13:229-37.   (Google)
Revonsuo, Antti (1993). Cognitive models of consciousness. In Matti Kamppinen (ed.), Consciousness, Cognitive Schemata, and Relativism. Kluwer.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Roberts, Hugh M. (1968). Consciousness in animals and automata. Psychological Reports 22:1226-28.   (Google)
Rockwell, W. Teed (1997). Global workspace or pandemonium? Journal of Consciousness Studies 4 (4):334-337.   (Google)
Rolls, Edmund T. (1997). Consciousness in neural networks? Neural Networks 10:1227-1303.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Rosenthal, David M. (1997). Perceptual and cognitive models of consciousness. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association 45.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Sanz, Ricardo; Lopez, Ignacio; Rodriguez, Manuel & Hernandez, Carlos (2007). Principles for consciousness in integrated cognitive control. [Journal (Paginated)] 20 (9):938-946.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In this article we will argue that given certain conditions for the evolution of bi- ological controllers, these will necessarily evolve in the direction of incorporating consciousness capabilities. We will also see what are the necessary mechanics for the provision of these capabilities and extrapolate this vision to the world of artifi- cial systems postulating seven design principles for conscious systems. This article was published in the journal Neural Networks special issue on brain and conscious- ness
Schneider, Walter E. & Pimm-Smith, M. (1997). Consciousness as a message-aware control mechanism to modulate cognitive processing. In Jonathan D. Cohen & Jonathan W. Schooler (eds.), Scientific Approaches to Consciousness. Lawrence Erlbaum.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Schacter, Daniel L. (1989). On the relation between memory and consciousness: Dissociable interactions and conscious experience. In Henry L. I. Roediger & Fergus I. M. Craik (eds.), Varieties of Memory and Consciousness.   (Cited by 99 | Google)
Shanahan, Murray (2006). A cognitive architecture that combines internal simulation with a global workspace. Consciousness and Cognition 15 (2):433-449.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Shanon, Benny (2001). Against the spotlight model of consciousness. New Ideas in Psychology 19 (1):77-84.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Shallice, T. (1972). Dual functions of consciousness. Psychological Review 79:383-93.   (Cited by 67 | Google)
Shanahan, Murray (2005). Global access, embodiment, and the conscious subject. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (12):46-66.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Shallice, T. (1988). Information-processing models of consciousness: Possibilities and problems. In Anthony J. Marcel & E. Bisiach (eds.), Consciousness in Contemporary Science. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 36 | Google)
Shallice, T. (1978). The dominant action system: An information-processing approach to consciousness. In K. S. Pope & Jerome L. Singer (eds.), The Stream of Consciousness: Scientific Investigation Into the Flow of Experience. Plenum.   (Cited by 25 | Google)
Sommerhoff, G. & MacDorman, Karl F. (1994). An account of consciousness in physical and functional terms: A target for research in the neurosciences. Integrative Physiological and Behavioral Science 29:151-81.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Sommerhoff, G. (1996). Consciousness as an internal integrating system. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3:139-57.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Strehler, B. L. (1989). Monitors: Key mechanisms and roles in the development and aging of the consciousness and self. Mechanisms of Ageing and Development 47:85-132.   (Google | More links)
Sun, Ron (1999). Accounting for the computational basis of consciousness: A connectionist approach. Consciousness and Cognition 8 (4):529-565.   (Cited by 14 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper argues for an explanation of the mechanistic (computational) basis of consciousness that is based on the distinction between localist (symbolic) representation and distributed representation, the ideas of which have been put forth in the connectionist literature. A model is developed to substantiate and test this approach. The paper also explores the issue of the functional roles of consciousness, in relation to the proposed mechanistic explanation of consciousness. The model, embodying the representational difference, is able to account for the functional role of consciousness, in the form of the synergy between the conscious and the unconscious. The fit between the model and various cognitive phenomena and data (documented in the psychological literatures) is discussed to accentuate the plausibility of the model and its explanation of consciousness. Comparisons with existing models of consciousness are made in the end
Sun, Ron (2004). Criteria for an effective theory of consciousness and some preliminary attempts. Consciousness and Cognition 13 (2):268-301.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In the physical sciences a rigorous theory is a hierarchy of descriptions in which causal relationships between many general types of entity at a phenomenological level can be derived from causal relationships between smaller numbers of simpler entities at more detailed levels. The hierarchy of descriptions resembles the modular hierarchy created in electronic systems in order to be able to modify a complex functionality without excessive side effects. Such a hierarchy would make it possible to establish a rigorous scientific theory of consciousness. The causal relationships implicit in definitions of access consciousness and phe- nomenal consciousness are made explicit, and the corresponding causal relationships at the more detailed levels of perception, memory, and skill learning described. Extension of these causal relationships to physiological and neural levels is discussed. The general capability of a range of current consciousness models to support a modular hierarchy which could generate these causal relationships is reviewed, and the specific capabilities of two models with good general capabilities are compared in some detail. Ó 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved
Sun, Ron & Franklin, Stan (2007). Computational models of consciousness: A taxonomy and some examples. In Philip David Zelazo, Morris Moscovitch & Evan Thompson (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness. Cambridge.   (Google)
Sun, Ron (2001). Computation, reduction, and teleology of consciousness. Cognitive Systems Research 1 (1):241-249.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper aims to explore mechanistic and teleological explanations of consciousness. In terms of mechanistic explanations, it critiques various existing views, especially those embodied by existing computational cognitive models. In this regard, the paper argues in favor of the explanation based on the distinction between localist (symbolic) representation and distributed representation (as formulated in the connectionist literature), which reduces the phenomenological difference to a mechanistic difference. Furthermore, to establish a teleological explanation of consciousness, the paper discusses the issue of the functional role of consciousness on the basis of the aforementioned mechanistic explanation. A proposal based on synergistic interaction between the conscious and the unconscious is advanced that encompasses various existing views concerning the functional role of consciousness. This two-step deepening explanation has some empirical support, in the form of a cognitive model and various cognitive data that it captures. © 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved
Sun, Ron (1997). Learning, action, and consciousness: A hybrid approach toward modeling consciousness. Neural Networks 10:1317-33.   (Cited by 45 | Google | More links)
Abstract: _role, especially in learning, and through devising hybrid neural network models that (in a qualitative manner) approxi-_ _mate characteristics of human consciousness. In doing so, the paper examines explicit and implicit learning in a variety_ _of psychological experiments and delineates the conscious/unconscious distinction in terms of the two types of learning_ _and their respective products. The distinctions are captured in a two-level action-based model C_larion_. Some funda-_ _mental theoretical issues are also clari?ed with the help of the model. Comparisons with existing models of conscious-_
Sviderskaya, N. E. (1991). Consciousness and information selection. Neuroscience and Behavioral Physiology 21:526-31.   (Google | More links)
Taylor, John G. (1996). A competition for consciousness? Neurocomputing 11:271-96.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Taylor, Kenneth A. (2001). Applying continuous modelling to consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (2):45-60.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Taylor, John G. (1998). Constructing the relational mind. Psyche 4 (10).   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Taylor, John G. (ms). Modeling consciousness.   (Google)
Taylor, John G. (1996). Modeling what it is like to be. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness. MIT Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Taylor, John G. & Mueller-Gaertner, H. (1997). Non-invasive analysis of awareness. Neural Networks 10:1185-1194.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Taylor, John G. (1997). Neural networks for consciousness. Neural Networks 10:1207-27.   (Cited by 24 | Google | More links)
Taylor, John G. (1997). The emergence of mind. Communication and Cognition 30 (3-4):301-343.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Taylor, John G. (2007). Through machine attention to machine consciousness. In Antonio Chella & Riccardo Manzotti (eds.), Artificial Consciousness. Imprint Academic.   (Google)
Toates, Frederick (2006). A model of the hierarchy of behaviour, cognition, and consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 15 (1):75-118.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Tononi, Giulio Srinivasan (2006). Consciousness, information integration and the brain. In Steven Laureys (ed.), Boundaries of Consciousness. Elsevier.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Tononi, Giulio Srinivasan (2007). The information integration theory of consciousness. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell.   (Cited by 36 | Google | More links)
van Leeuwen, Cees (2007). What needs to emerge to make you conscious? Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (1):115-136.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: Perceptual experience can be explained by contextualized brain dynamics. An inner loop of ongoing activity within the brain produces dynamic patterns of synchronization and de- synchronization that are necessary, but not sufficient, for visual experience. This inner loop is controlled by evolution, development, socialization, learning, task and perception- action contingencies, which constitute an outer loop. This outer loop is sufficient, but not necessary, for visual experience. Jointly, the inner and outer loop may offer sufficient and necessary conditions for the emergence of visual experience. This hypothesis has methodological, empirical, theoretical, and philosophical implications
von der Malsburg, Christoph (1997). The coherence definition of consciousness. In M. Ito, Y. Miyashita & Edmund T. Rolls (eds.), [Book Chapter]. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 16 | Google | More links)
Abstract: I will focus in this essay on a riddle that in my view is central to the consciousness issue: How does the mind or brain create the unity we perceive out of the diversity that we know is there? I contend this is a technical issue, not a philosophical one, although its resolution will have profound philosophical repercussions, and although we have at present little more than the philosophical method to attack it
Wallace, Rodrick (ms). A modular network treatment of Baars' global workspace consciousness model.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Abstract: Network theory provides an alternative to the renormalization and phase transition methods used in Wallace's (2005a) treatment of Baars' Global Workspace model. Like the earlier study, the new analysis produces the workplace itself, the tunable threshold of consciousness, and the essential role for embedding contexts, in an explicitly analytic 'necessary conditions' manner which suffers neither the mereological fallacy inherent to brain-only theories nor the sufficiency indeterminacy of neural network or agent-based simulations. This suggests that the new approach, and the earlier, represent different analytically solvable limits in a broad continuum of possible models, analogous to the differences between bond and site percolation or between the two and many-body limits of classical mechanics. The development significantly extends the theoretical foundations for an empirical general cognitive model (GCM) based on the Shannon-McMillan Theorem. Patterned after the general linear model which reflects the Central Limit Theorem, the proposed technique should be both useful for the reduction of expermiental data on consciousness and in the design of devices with capacities which may transcend those of conventional machines and provide new perspectives on the varieties of biological consciousness
Wallace, Rodrick (ms). Entering the blackboard jungle: Canonical dysfunction in conscious machines.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The central paradigm of Artificial Intelligence is rapidly shifting toward biological models for both robotic devices and systems performing such critical tasks as network management and process control. Here we apply recent mathematical analysis of the necessary conditions for consciousness in humans in an attempt to gain some understanding of the likely canonical failure modes inherent to a broad class of global workspace/blackboard machines designed to emulate biological functions. Similar problems are likely to confront other possible architectures, although their mathematical description may be far less straightforward
Werbos, P. (1997). Optimization: A foundation for understanding consciousness. In D. Levine & W. Elsberry (eds.), Optimality in Biological and Artificial Networks? Lawrence Erlbaum.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
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8.8b Attention and Consciousness in Psychology

Anderson, Adam K. (2005). Affective influences on the attentional dynamics supporting awareness. Journal of Experimental Psychology 134 (2):258-281.   (Cited by 30 | Google | More links)
Baars, Bernard J. (1999). Attention vs consciousness in the visual brain: Differences in conception, phenomenology, behavior, neuroanatomy, and physiology. Journal of General Psychology 126:224-33.   (Google)
Baars, Bernard J. (1997). Some essential differences between consciousness and attention, perception, and working memory. Consciousness and Cognition 6:363-371.   (Cited by 27 | Google | More links)
Baddeley, A. D. & Weiskrantz, Lawrence (eds.) (1993). Attention: Selection, Awareness, and Control. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 13 | Google | More links)
Bailey, Brian P. & Konstan, Joseph A. (2006). On the need for attention-aware systems: Measuring effects of interruption on task performance, error rate, and affective state. Computers in Human Behavior 22 (4):685-708.   (Cited by 15 | Google)
Bartolomeo, Paolo (2002). Commentary: Can attention capture visual awareness? Psicologica International Journal of Methodology and Experimental Psychology 23 (2):314-317.   (Google)
Botterell, Andrew (2003). Continuing commentary. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26:785-794.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Color experiences have representational content. But this content need not include a propositional component, particularly for reflectance physicalists such as Byrne and Hilbert. Insisting on such content gives primacy to language where it is not required, and makes the extension of the argument to non-human animals suspect
Brinck, Ingar (2001). Attention and the evolution of intentional communication. Pragmatics and Cognition 9 (2):259-277.   (Google)
Bridgeman, Bruce (1986). Relations between the physiology of attention and the physiology of consciousness. Psychological Research 48:259-266.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Bunting, Michael F. & Cowan, Nelson (2005). Working memory and flexibility in awareness and attention. Psychological Research/Psychologische Forschung 69 (5):412-419.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Cheyne, James A.; Carriere, Jonathan S. A. & Smilek, Daniel (2006). Absent-mindedness: Lapses of conscious awareness and everyday cognitive failures. Consciousness and Cognition 15 (3):578-592.   (Google | More links)
Chun, Marvin & Wolfe, Jeremy (2001). Visual attention. In E.B. Goldstein (ed.), Blackwell Handbook of Perception. Blackwell.   (Cited by 52 | Google | More links)
Cobb, C. (1955). Awareness, Attention, and Physiology of the Brain Stem. In P. Hoch & J. Zubin (eds.), Experimental Psychopathology. Grune & Stratton.   (Google)
Coslett, H. B. (1997). Consciousness and attention. Seminars in Neurology 17:137-44.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Cowan, Nelson & Wood, N. L. (1997). Constraints on awareness, attention, processing, and memory: Some recent investigations with ignored speech. Consciousness and Cognition 6:182-203.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Csikszentmihalyi, Mihaly (1978). Attention and the holistic approach to behavior. In K. S. Pope & Jerome L. Singer (eds.), The Stream of Consciousness: Scientific Investigation Into the Flow of Experience. Plenum.   (Cited by 28 | Google)
Fernandez-Duque, Diego & Johnson, Mark (1999). Attention metaphors: How metaphors guide the cognitive psychology of attention. Cognitive Science 23 (1):83-116.   (Cited by 21 | Google | More links)
Fernandez-Duque, Diego (2001). Brain imaging of attentional networks in normal and pathological states. Journal of Clinical and Experimental Neuropsychology 23 (1):74-93.   (Cited by 46 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The ability to image the human brain has provided a new perspective for neuropsychologists in their efforts to understand, diagnose, and treat insults to the human brain that might occur as the result of stroke, tumor, traumatic injury, degenerative disease, or errors in development. These new ®ndings are the major theme of this special issue. In our article, we consider brain networks that carry out the functions of attention. We outline several such networks that have been studied in normal and pathological states. These include networks for orienting to sensory stimuli, for maintaining the alert state, and for orchestrating volitional control
Fernandez-Duque, Diego (2002). Cause and effect theories of attention: The role of conceptual metaphors. Review of General Psychology 6 (2):153-165.   (Cited by 9 | Google)
Abstract: Scientific concepts are defined by metaphors. These metaphors determine what atten- tion is and what count as adequate explanations of the phenomenon. The authors analyze these metaphors within 3 types of attention theories: (a) --cause-- theories, in which attention is presumed to modulate information processing (e.g., attention as a spotlight; attention as a limited resource); (b) --effect-- theories, in which attention is considered to be a by-product of information processing (e.g., the competition meta- phor); and (c) hybrid theories that combine cause and effect aspects (e.g., biased- competition models). The present analysis reveals the crucial role of metaphors in cognitive psychology, neuroscience, and the efforts of scientists to find a resolution to the classic problem of cause versus effect interpretations
Franconeri, Steve & Simons, Daniel J. (2003). Moving and looming stimuli capture attention. Perception and Psychophysics 65 (7):999-1010.   (Cited by 39 | Google | More links)
Franconeri, Steve; Simons, Daniel J. & Junge, J. (2004). Searching for stimulus-driven shifts of attention. Psychonomic Bulletin and Review 11 (5):876-881.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
Giersch, Anne & Caparos, Serge (2005). Focused attention is not enough to activate discontinuities in lines, but scrutiny is. Consciousness and Cognition 14 (3):613-632.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Grossberg, S. (1999). The link between brain learning, attention, and consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 8 (1):1-44.   (Cited by 130 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The processes whereby our brains continue to learn about a changing world in a stable fashion throughout life are proposed to lead to conscious experiences. These processes include the learning of top-down expectations, the matching of these expectations against bottom-up data, the focusing of attention upon the expected clusters of information, and the development of resonant states between bottom-up and top-down processes as they reach an attentive consensus between what is expected and what is there in the outside world. It is suggested that all conscious states in the brain are resonant states and that these resonant states trigger learning of sensory and cognitive representations. The models which summarize these concepts are therefore called Adaptive Resonance Theory, or ART, models. Psychophysical and neurobiological data in support of ART are presented from early vision, visual object recognition, auditory streaming, variable-rate speech perception, somatosensory perception, and cognitive-emotional interactions, among others. It is noted that ART mechanisms seem to be operative at all levels of the visual system, and it is proposed how these mechanisms are realized by known laminar circuits of visual cortex. It is predicted that the same circuit realization of ART mechanisms will be found in the laminar circuits of all sensory and cognitive neocortex. Concepts and data are summarized concerning how some visual percepts may be visibly, or modally, perceived, whereas amodal percepts may be consciously recognized even though they are perceptually invisible. It is also suggested that sensory and cognitive processing in the What processing stream of the brain obey top-down matching and learning laws that are often complementary to those used for spatial and motor processing in the brain's Where processing stream. This enables our sensory and cognitive representations to maintain their stability as we learn more about the world, while allowing spatial and motor representations to forget learned maps and gains that are no longer appropriate as our bodies develop and grow from infanthood to adulthood. Procedural memories are proposed to be unconscious because the inhibitory matching process that supports these spatial and motor processes cannot lead to resonance
He, S.; Cavanagh, P. & Intrilagator, J. (1996). Attentional resolution and the locus of visual awareness. Nature 383:334-37.   (Cited by 237 | Google | More links)
Hochberg, Julian (1970). Attention, organization, and consciousness. In D. Mostofsky (ed.), Attention: Contemporary Theory and Analysis. Appleton-Century-Crofts.   (Cited by 45 | Google)
Huguet, Pascal; Dumas, Florence & Monteil, Jean-M. (2004). Competing for a desired reward in the stroop task: When attentional control is unconscious but effective versus conscious but ineffective. Canadian Journal of Experimental Psychology 58 (3):153-167.   (Google)
Ivanoff, Jason & Klein, Raymond M. (2003). Orienting of attention without awareness is affected by measurement-induced attentional control settings. Journal of Vision. Special Issue 3 (1):32-40.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Iwasaki, S. (1993). Spatial attention and two modes of visual consciousness. Cognition 49:211-233.   (Cited by 10 | Google)
Jaskoski, Piotr; van der Lubbe, Rob H. J.; Schlotterbeck, Erik & Verleger, Rolf (2002). Traces left on visual selective attention by stimuli that are not consciously identified. Psychological Science 13 (1):48-54.   (Google)
Kiefer, Markus & Brendel, Doreen (2006). Attentional modulation of unconscious "automatic" processes: Evidence from event-related potentials in a masked priming paradigm. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 18 (2):184-198.   (Google)
Kingstone, Alan; Danziger, Shai; Langton, Stephen R. H. & Soto-Faraco, Salvador (2002). A review of Attentional Capture: On its Automaticity and Sensitivity to Endogenous Control. PsicolóGica International Journal of Methodology and Experimental Psychology 23 (2):343-346.   (Google)
Koivisto, Mika; Revonsuo, Antti & Lehtonen, Minna (2006). Independence of visual awareness from the scope of attention: An electrophysiological study. Cerebral Cortex 16 (3):415-424.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
LaBerge, David (1997). Attention, awareness, and the triangular circuit. Consciousness and Cognition 9:149-81.   (Cited by 61 | Google | More links)
LaBerge, David (2001). Attention, consciousness, and electrical wave activity within the cortical column. International Journal of Psychophysiology 43 (1):5-24.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
LaBerge, David (2000). Clarifying the triangular circuit theory of attention and its relations to awareness replies to seven commentaries. Psyche 6 (6).   (Google)
LaBerge, David (1998). Defining awareness by the triangular circuit of attention. Psyche 4 (7).   (Cited by 2 | Google)
LaBerge, David; Auclair, L. & Sieroff, E. (2000). Preparatory attention: Experiment and theory. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (3):396-434.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This study investigated attention to a spatial location using a new spatial preparation task. Participants responded to a target dot presented in the center of a display and ignored a distractor dot presented to the right or left of the center. In an attempt to vary the level of preparatory attention directed to the target, the distractor dot was presented prior to the onset time of the target and the relative frequency of distractor dots to target dots within a block of trials was varied. The results from the first three experiments showed that when instructions induce weak preparatory attention to the target location, response times to a target on target-only trials increase substantially as the percentage of trials containing a distractor increases from 0 to 75%. In Experiments 2 and 3, instructions and display saliency were used to induce strong preparatory attention to the target location, resulting in almost constant response times across distractor percentages. Experiment 4 varied percentage of target trials in the absence of distractors, with the result that response times decreased as target trial percentage increased. Accounts of these data by early ''activity-based'' and late ''criterion-based'' attention theories are compared, and the early theory is given a more detailed description within the context of a cognitive neuroscience theory of attention
Lamme, Victor A. F. (2005). Independent neural definitions of visual awareness and attention. In Athanassios Raftopoulos (ed.), Cognitive Penetrability of Perception: Attention, Action, Strategies, and Bottom-Up Constraints. Nova Science Publishers.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
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Lamme, Victor A. F. (2003). Why visual attention and awareness are different. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (1):12-18.   (Cited by 129 | Google | More links)
Lavie, Nilli (2007). Attention and consciousness. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell.   (Google)
Lavie, Nilli (2006). The role of perceptual load in visual awareness. Brain Research. Special Issue 1080 (1):91-100.   (Google | More links)
Loper, A. B. & Hallahan, D. P. (1982). Meta-attention: The development of awareness of the attentional process. Journal of General Psychology 106:27-33.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
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Mack, Arien & Rock, Irvin (1998). Inattentional Blindness. MIT Press.   (Cited by 739 | Google | More links)
Mack, Arien; Pappas, Zissis; Silverman, Michael E. & Gay, Robin (2002). What we see: Inattention and the capture of attention by meaning. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (4):488-506.   (Cited by 22 | Google | More links)
Marti, Sébastien; Paradis, Véronique; Thibeault, Marc & Richer, Francois (2006). New object onsets reduce conscious access to unattended targets. Vision Research 46 (10):1646-1654.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
McCormick, P. A. (1997). Orienting attention without awareness. Journal of Experimental Psychology 23:168-180.   (Cited by 71 | Google)
Merikle, Philip M. & Joordens, S. (1997). Parallels between perception without attention and perception without awareness. Consciousness and Cognition 6:219-36.   (Cited by 73 | Google | More links)
Mole, Christopher (2008). Attention and consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (4):86-104.   (Google)
Abstract: According to commonsense psychology, one is conscious of everything that one pays attention to, but one does not pay attention to all the things that one is conscious of. Recent lines of research purport to show that commonsense is mistaken on both of these points: Mack and Rock (1998) tell us that attention is necessary for consciousness, while Kentridge and Heywood (2001) claim that consciousness is not necessary for attention. If these lines of research were successful they would have important implications regarding the prospects of using attention research to inform us about consciousness. The present essay shows that these lines of research are not successful, and that the commonsense picture of the relationship between attention and consciousness can be
Mole, Christopher (2008). Attention in the absence of consciousness? Trends in Cognitive Science 12 (2):44.   (Google)
Abstract: A response to Christof Koch and Naotsugu Tsuchiya's 'Attention and Consciousness: Two Distinct Brain Processes'
Most, Steven B. & Simons, Daniel J. (2001). Attention capture, orienting, and awareness. In Charles L. Folk & Bradley S. Gibson (eds.), Attraction, Distraction and Action: Multiple Perspectives on Attentional Capture. Advances in Psychology. Elsevier.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Naghavi, Hamid R. & Nyberg, Lars (2005). Common fronto-parietal activity in attention, memory, and consciousness: Shared demands on integration? Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2):390-425.   (Cited by 21 | Google)
Newman, J. B.; Baars, Bernard J. & Cho, S. (1997). A neural global workspace model for conscious attention. Neural Networks 10:1195-1206.   (Cited by 35 | Google | More links)
Newman, J. B. (1995). Thalamic contributions to attention and consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 4:172-93.   (Cited by 62 | Google)
Newsome, W. T. (1996). Visual attention: Spotlights, highlights and visual awareness. Current Biology 6:357-60.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Oehlmann, R. (2002). Perspective changes affect attentional access to conscious experience. In Kunio Yasue, Marj Jibu & Tarcisio Della Senta (eds.), No Matter, Never Mind. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Poolton, J. M.; Maxwell, J. P.; Masters, R. S. W. & Raab, M. (2006). Benefits of an external focus of attention: Common coding or conscious processing? Journal of Sports Sciences 24 (1):89-99.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Posner, Michael I. & Rothbart, M. K. (1992). Attentional mechanisms and conscious experience. In A. David Milner & M. D. Rugg (eds.), The Neuropsychology of Consciousness. Academic Press.   (Cited by 144 | Google)
Posner, Michael I. (1994). Attention: The mechanisms of consciousness. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA 91:7398-7403.   (Cited by 273 | Google | More links)
Prinzmetal, W. Amiri; Nwachuku, I.; Bodanski, L. & Blumenfeld, L. (1997). The phenomenology of attention, part 2: Brightness and contrast. Consciousness and Cognition 6:372-412.   (Cited by 21 | Google | More links)
Prinzmetal, W. Amiri; H., Allen & K., Edwards (1997). The phenomenology of attention, part 1: Color, location, orientation, and "clarity". Journal of Experimental Psychology.   (Cited by 9 | Google)
Rees, Geraint & Lavie, Nilli (2001). What can functional imaging tell us about the role of attentional load in awareness? Neuropsychologia 39:1343-1353.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Rensink, Ronald A. (2006). Attention, consciousness, and data display. 2006 Proceedings of the American Statistical Association, Statistical Graphics Section.   (Google)
Abstract: Recent advances in our understanding of visual perception have shown it to be a far more complex and counterintuitive process than previously believed. Several important consequences follow from this. First, the design of an effective statistical graphics system is unlikely to succeed based on intuition alone; instead, it must rely on a more sophisticated, systematic approach. The basic elements of such an approach are outlined here, along with several design principles. An overview is then given of recent advances in our understanding of visual perception, including rapid perception, visual attention, and scene perception. It then is argued that the mechanisms involved can be successfully harnessed to allow data to be displayed more effectively than at present. Several directions of development are discussed, including effective use of visual attention, the display of dynamic information, and the effective use of nonattentional and nonconscious perceptual systems
Rensink, R. (2000). Visual search for change: A probe into the nature of attentional processing. Visual Cognition 7:345-376.   (Cited by 89 | Google | More links)
Abstract: A set of visual search experiments tested the proposal that focused attention is needed to detect change. Displays were arrays of rectangles, with the target being the item that continually changed its orientation or contrast polarity. Five aspects of performance were examined: linearity of response, processing time, capacity, selectivity, and memory trace. Detection of change was found to be a self-terminating process requiring a time that increased linearly with the number of items in the display. Capacity for orientation was found to be about 5 items, a value comparable to estimates of attentional capacity. Observers were able to filter out both static and dynamic variations in irrelevant properties. Analysis also indicated a memory for previously-attended locations. These results support the hypothesis that the process needed to detect change is much the same as the attentional process needed to detect complex static patterns. Interestingly, the features of orientation and polarity were found to be handled in somewhat different ways. Taken together, these results not only provide evidence that focused attention is needed to see change, but also show that change detection itself can provide new insights into the nature of attentional processing
Scholey, Andrew (2002). Attention. In Elaine Perry, Heather Ashton & Allan Young (eds.), Neurochemistry of Consciousness: Neurotransmitters in Mind. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Scholl, Brian J. (2000). Attenuated change blindness for exogenously attended items in a flicker paradigm. Visual Cognition 7:377-396.   (Cited by 53 | Google | More links)
Schwitzgebel, Eric (2007). Do you have constant tactile experience of your feet in your shoes? Or is experience limited to what's in attention? Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (3):5-35.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: According to rich views of consciousness (e.g., James, Searle), we have a constant, complex flow of experience (or 'phenomenology') in multiple modalities simultaneously. According to thin views (e.g., Dennett, Mack and Rock), conscious experience is limited to one or a few topics, regions, objects, or modalities at a time. Existing introspective and empirical arguments on this issue (including arguments from 'inattentional blindness') generally beg the question. Participants in the present experiment wore beepers during everyday activity. When a beep sounded, they were to take note of the conscious experience, if any, they were having at the last undisturbed moment immediately prior to the beep. Some participants were asked to report any experience they could remember. Others were asked simply to report whether there was visual experience or not (and if so, what it was). Still others were asked about experience in the far right visual field, or tactile experience, or tactile experience in the left foot. A majority of participants in the full experience and the visual conditions reported visual experience in every single sample. Tactile and peripheral visual experience were reported less often. However, the proper interpretation of these results is uncertain
Scheier, M. F. Matthews & K. A., Carver (1983). Focus of attention and awareness of bodily states. In G. Underwood (ed.), Aspects of Consciousness, Volume 3: Awareness and Self-Awareness. Academic Press.   (Google)
Sergent, Claire & Dehaene, Stanislas (2004). Is consciousness a gradual phenomenon? Evidence for an all-or-none bifurcation during the attentional blink. Psychological Science 15 (11):720-728.   (Cited by 26 | Google | More links)
Sergent, Claire; Baillet, Sylvain & Dehaene, Stanislas (2005). Timing of the brain events underlying access to consciousness during the attentional blink. Nature Neuroscience 8 (10):1391-1400.   (Cited by 41 | Google | More links)
Shiffrin, Richard M. (1997). Attention, automatism, and consciousness. In Jonathan D. Cohen & Jonathan W. Schooler (eds.), Scientific Approaches to Consciousness. Lawrence Erlbaum.   (Cited by 12 | Google)
Smallwood, J.; Davies, J. B.; Heim, D.; Finnigan, F.; Sudberry, M. & O'Connor R., Obonsawin M. (2004). Subjective experience and the attentional lapse: Task engagement and disengagement during sustained attention. Consciousness and Cognition 13 (4):657-90.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Smilek, Daniel; Eastwood, Jonathan & Merikle, Philip M. (2000). Does unattended information facilitate change detection? Journal of Experimental Psychology 26:480-487.   (Cited by 31 | Google | More links)
Sonnerat, Xavier (ms). The effects of spatial attention on unconscious, affective, location, and feature priming.   (Google)
Sumner, Petroc; Tsai, Pei-Chun; Yu, Kenny & Nachev, Parashkev (2006). Attentional modulation of sensorimotor processes in the absence of perceptual awareness. PNAS Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 103 (27):10520-10525.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Umilta, Carlo & Moscovitch, Morris (1994). Attention and Performance 15: Conscious and Nonconscious Information Processing. MIT Press.   (Google)
Underwood, G. (1977). Attention, awareness, and hemispheric differences in word recognition. Neuropsychologia 15:61-67.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Underwood, G. (1983). Selective attention and selective awareness of conscious processes. In G. Underwood (ed.), Aspects of Consciousness, Volume 3: Awareness and Self-Awareness. Academic Press.   (Google)
van Rullen, Rufin & Koch, Christof (2003). Competition and selection during visual procesing of natural scenes and objects. Journal of Vision 3 (1).   (Google)
Visser, Troy A. W.; Merikle, Philip M. & Di Lollo, Vincent (2005). Priming in the attentional blink: Perception without awareness? Visual Cognition 12 (7):1362-1372.   (Google | More links)
Wolfe, Jeremy (2000). The deployment of visual attention: Two surprises. In Search and Target Acquisition. .   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Wolfe, Jeremy (2003). The level of attention: Mediating between the stimulus and perception. In L. Harris & M. Jenkin (eds.), Levels of Perception: A Festschrift for Ian Howard. Springer-Verlag.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Wolfe, Jeremy (2000). Visual Attention. In K.K. De Valois (ed.), Seeing. Academic Press.   (Cited by 33 | Google | More links)
Woodman, Geoffrey F. & Luck, Steven J. (2003). Dissociations among attention, perception, and awareness during object-substitution masking. Psychological Science 14 (6):605-611.   (Cited by 24 | Google | More links)

8.8c Metacognition and Consciousness

Baron-Cohen, Simon (2001). Consciousness of the physical and the mental: Evidence from autism. In Peter G. Grossenbacher (ed.), Finding Consciousness in the Brain: A Neurocognitive Approach. Advances in Consciousness Research. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Barresi, John (2001). Extending self-consciousness into the future. In C. Moore & Karen Lemmon (eds.), The Self in Time: Developmental Perspectives. Erlbaum.   (Cited by 9 | Google)
Brown, Steven Ravett (2000). Reply to Bruce Mangan's commentary on What Feeling is the "Feeling of Knowing?". Consciousness and Cognition 9 (4):545-549.   (Google)
Brown, S. (2000). Tip-of-the-tongue phenomena: An introductory phenomenological analysis. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (4):516-537.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The issue of meaningful yet unexpressed background-to language and to our experiences of the body-is one whose exploration is still in its infancy. There are various aspects of ''invisible,'' implicit, or background experiences which have been investigated from the viewpoints of phenomenology, cognitive psychology, and linguistics. I will argue that James's concept of the phenomenon of fringes, as explicated by Gurwitsch, provides a structural framework from which to investigate and better understand ideas and concepts that are indeterminate, particularly those experienced in the sense of being sought-after. Johnson's conception of the image-schematic gestalt (ISG) provides an approach to bridging the descriptive gap between phenomenology and cognitive psychology. Starting from an analysis of the fringes, I will turn to a consideration of the tip-of-tongue (TOT) state, as a kind of feeling-of-knowing (FOK) state, from a variety of approaches, focusing mainly on cognitive psychology and phenomenology. I will then integrate a phenomenological analysis of these experiences, from the James/Gurwitsch structural viewpoint, with a cognitive/phenomenological analysis in terms of ISGs, and further integrate that with a cognitive/functional analysis of the relation between consciousness and retrieval, employing Anderson et al's theory of inhibitory mechanisms in cognition. This synthesis of these viewpoints will be employed to explore the thesis that the TOT state and similar experiences may relate to the gestalt nature of schemas, and that figure/ground and other contrast-enhancing structures may be both explanatory and descriptive characterizations of the field of consciousness
Brown, R. & McNeill, David N. (1966). The "tip of the tongue" phenomenon. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior 5:325-37.   (Cited by 410 | Google)
Fernandez-Duque, Diego; Baird, J. A. & Posner, Michael I. (2000). Attention and awareness in self regulation [reply to commentaries]. Consciousness and Cognition 9:324-326.   (Google)
Fernandez-Duque, Diego; Baird, J. A. & Posner, Michael I. (2000). Awareness and metacognition. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):324-326.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Kentridge and Heywood (this issue) extend the concept of metacognition to include unconscious processes. We acknowledge the possible contribution of unconscious processes, but favor a central role of awareness in metacognition. We welcome Shimamura's (this issue) extension of the concept of metacognitive regulation to include aspects of working memory, and its relation to executive attention
Fernandez-Duque, Diego; Baird, J. A. & Posner, Michael I. (2000). Executive attention and metacognitive regulation. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):288-307.   (Cited by 67 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Metacognition refers to any knowledge or cognitive process that monitors or controls cognition. We highlight similarities between metacognitive and executive control functions, and ask how these processes might be implemented in the human brain. A review of brain imaging studies reveals a circuitry of attentional networks involved in these control processes, with its source located in midfrontal areas. These areas are active during conflict resolution, error correction, and emotional regulation. A developmental approach to the organization of the anatomy involved in executive control provides an added perspective on how these mechanisms are influenced by maturation and learning, and how they relate to metacognitive activity
Graham, George & Neisser, J. (2000). Probing for relevance: What metacognition tells us about the power of consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):172-177.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Metacognitive attitudes can affect behavior but do they do so, as Koriat claims, because they enhance voluntary control? This Commentary makes a case for saying that metacognitive consciousness may enhance not control but subjective predictability and may be best studied by examining not just healthy, well-integrated cognizers, but victims of multilevel mental disorders
Hart, J. T. (1965). Memory and the feeling-of-knowing experience. Journal of Educational Psychology 56:208-16.   (Cited by 126 | Google)
Johnson, M. K. & Reeder, J. A. (1997). Consciousness as meta-processing. In Jonathan D. Cohen & Jonathan W. Schooler (eds.), Scientific Approaches to Consciousness. Lawrence Erlbaum.   (Cited by 20 | Google)
Johnson, M. K. (1991). Reflection, reality monitoring, and the self. In Robert G. Kunzendorf (ed.), Mental Imagery. Plenum Press.   (Cited by 9 | Google)
Kahan, Tracey L. & LaBerge, S. (1994). Lucid dreaming as metacognition: Implications for cognitive science. Consciousness and Cognition 3:246-64.   (Cited by 13 | Google)
Kentridge, Robert W. & Heywood, Charles A. (2000). Metacognition and awareness. Consciousness And Cognition 9 (2):308-312.   (Cited by 13 | Google | More links)
Abstract: It is tempting to assume that metacognitive processes necessarily evoke awareness. We review a number of experiments in which cognitive schema have been shown to develop without awareness. Implicit learning of a novel schema may not involve metacognitive regulation per se. Substitution of one automatic process by another as a result of the inadequacy of the former as circumstances change does, however, clearly involve metacognitive and executive processes of error correction and schema selection. We describe a recently published study in which we serendipitously discovered that a blindsight subject could change the schema with which he processed cue information in orienting spatial attention task without reporting any awareness of this change, or of the cues and targets which respectively directed and were the object his attention
Kirsh, David (2005). Metacognition, Distributed Cognition and Visual Design. In Peter Gardenfors, Petter Johansson & N. J. Mahwah (eds.), Cognition, education, and communication technology. Erlbaum Associates.   (Google)
Abstract: Metacognition is associated with planning, monitoring, evaluating and repairing performance Designers of elearning systems can improve the quality of their environments by explicitly structuring the visual and interactive display of learning contexts to facilitate metacognition. Typically page layout, navigational appearance, visual and interactivity design are not viewed as major factors in metacognition. This is because metacognition tends to be interpreted as a process in the head, rather than an interactive one. It is argued here, that cognition and metacognition are part of a continuum and that both are highly interactive. The tenets of this view are explained by reviewing some of the core assumptions of the situated and distribute approach to cognition and then further elaborated by exploring the notions of active vision, visual complexity, affordance landscape and cue structure. The way visual cues are structured and the way interaction is designed can make an important difference in the ease and effectiveness of cognition and metacognition. Documents that make effective use of markers such as headings, callouts, italics can improve students' ability to comprehend documents and 'plan' the way they review and process content. Interaction can be designed to improve 'the proximal zone of planning' - the look ahead and apprehension of what is nearby in activity space that facilitates decisions. This final concept is elaborated in a discussion of how e-newspapers combine effective visual and interactive design to enhance user control over their reading experience.
Kobes, Bernard W. (1997). Metacognition and consciousness: Review essay of Janet Metcalfe and Arthur P. shimamura (eds), Metacognition: Knowing About Knowing. Philosophical Psychology 10 (1):93-102.   (Google)
Abstract: The field of metacognition, richly sampled in the book under review, is recognized as an important and growing branch of psychology. However, the field stands in need of a general theory that (1) provides a unified framework for understanding the variety of metacognitive processes, (2) articulates the relation between metacognition and consciousness, and (3) tells us something about the form of meta-level representations and their relations to object-level representations. It is argued that the higher-order thought theory of consciousness supplies us with the rudiments of a theory that meets these desiderata and integrates the principal findings reported in this collection
Koriat, A. & Levy-Sadot, R. (2000). Conscious and unconscious metacognition: A rejoinder. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):193-202.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In this rejoinder we clarify several issues raised by the commentators with the hope of resolving some disagreements. In particular, we address the distinction between information-based and experience-based metacognitive judgments and the idea that memory monitoring may be mediated by direct access to internal representations. We then examine the possibility of unconscious metacognitive processes and expand on the critical role that conscious metacognitive feelings play in mediating between unconscious activations and explicit-controlled action. Finally, several open questions are articulated for further scrutiny
Koriat, Asher (2007). Metacognition and consciousness. In P D Zelazo, M Moscovitch & E Thompson (eds.), Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Abstract: The study of metacognition can shed light on some fundamental issues about consciousness and its role in behavior. Metacognition research concerns the processes by which people self reflect on their own cognitive and memory processes (monitoring), and how they put their metaknowledge to use in regulating their information processing and behavior (control). Experimental research on metacognition has addressed the following questions: First, what are the bases of metacognitive judgments that people make in monitoring their learning, remembering, and performance? Second, how valid are such judgments and what are the factors that affect the correspondence between subjective and objective indexes of knowing? Third, what are the processes that underlie the accuracy and inaccuracy of metacognitive judgments? Fourth, how does the output of metacognitive monitoring contribute to the strategic regulation of learning and remembering? Finally, how do the metacognitive processes of monitoring and control affect actual performance? Research addressing these questions is reviewed, emphasizing its implication for issues concerning consciousness, in particular, the genesis of subjective experience, the function of self-reflective consciousness, and the cause-and-effect relation between subjective experience and behavior
Koriat, A. (2000). The feeling of knowing: Some metatheoretical implications for consciousness and control. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):149-171.   (Cited by 52 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The study of the feeling of knowing may have implications for some of the metatheoretical issues concerning consciousness and control. Assuming a distinction between information-based and experience-based metacognitive judgments, it is argued that the sheer phenomenological experience of knowing (''noetic feeling'') occupies a unique role in mediating between implicit-automatic processes, on the one hand, and explicit-controlled processes, on the other. Rather than reflecting direct access to memory traces, noetic feelings are based on inferential heuristics that operate implicitly and unintentionally. Once such heuristics give rise to a conscious feeling that feeling can then affect controlled action. Examination of the cues that affect noetic feelings suggest that not only do these feelings inform controlled action, but they are also informed by feedback from the outcome of that action
Mangan, Bruce (2000). What feeling is the "feeling of knowing?". Consciousness and Cognition 9 (4):538-544.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Metcalfe, J. (2000). Feelings and judgments of knowing: Is there a special noetic state? Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):178-186.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: A. Koriat distinguishes between feeling-based and inferentially based feeling-of-knowing judgments. The former are attributable to partial information that is activated in implicit memory but not fully articulated. They are not, however, attributable to direct access to the target-an hypothesis that Koriat specifically repudiates. While there is considerable merit in the distinction that Koriat draws, and his emphasis on the possibility that people base at least some of their metacognitive judgments on implicit information seems well founded, it is argued that his rejection of the direct access view is premature. There may be a state-a true noetic state-in which people actually know the answer before they are able to express it. A case is made for further consideration of the scientific merits of the direct-access view of the noetic feelings people experience in imminent tip-of-the-tongue (TOT) states
Metcalfe, John F. & Shimamura, P. (1994). Metacognition: Knowing About Knowing. MIT Press.   (Cited by 184 | Google)
Murphy, Dominic (2009). Varieties of self-explanation. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):155-156.   (Google)
Nelson, T. O. (1996). Consciousness and metacognition. American Psychologist 51:102-16.   (Cited by 135 | Google)
Nelson, T. O. (2000). Consciousness, self-consciousness, and metacognition. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):220-223.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Nelson, T. O. (1992). Metacognition: Core Readings. Allyn and Bacon.   (Cited by 67 | Google)
NJohnson, M. K. (1988). Reality monitoring: An experimental phenomenological approach. Journal of Experimental Psychology 117:390-94.   (Google)
Otani, H. & Hodge, M. (1991). Mechanisms of feelings of knowing: The role of elaloration and familiarity. Psychological Record 41:523-35.   (Google)
Reder, L. M. (1996). Implicit Memory and Metacognition. Lawrence Erlbaum.   (Cited by 44 | Google)
Abstract: The editor of this volume takes it to mean that a prior experience affects behavior without the individual's appreciation (ability to report) of this...
Reder, L. M. & Schunn, C. D. (1996). Metacognition does not imply awareness: Strategy choice is governed by implicit learning and memory. In L. M. Reder (ed.), Implicit Memory and Metacognition. Lawrence Erlbaum.   (Cited by 82 | Google)
Ricciardelli, L. A. (1993). Two components of metalinguistic awareness: Control of linguistic processing and analysis of linguistic knowledge. Applied Psycholinguistics 14:349-367.   (Cited by 11 | Google)
Rosenthal, David M. (1998). Consciousness and metacognition. In Dan Sperber (ed.), Metarepresentation. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 16 | Google)
Schooler, Jonathan W. (2002). Re-representing consciousness: Dissociations between experience and meta-consciousness. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 6 (8):339-344.   (Cited by 40 | Google | More links)
Schooler, Jonathan W. & Schreiber, Charles A. (2005). To know or not to know: Consciousness, meta-consciousness, and motivation. In Joseph P. Forgas, Kipling D. Williams & Simon M. Laham (eds.), Social Motivation: Conscious and Unconscious Processes. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Shimamura, A. P. (2000). Toward a cognitive neuroscience of metacognition. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):313-323.   (Cited by 33 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The relationship between metacognition and executive control is explored. According to an analysis by Fernandez-Duque, Baird, and Posner (this issue), metacognitive regulation involves attention, conflict resolution, error correction, inhibitory control, and emotional regulation. These aspects of metacognition are presumed to be mediated by a neural circuit involving midfrontal brain regions. An evaluation of the proposal by Fernandez-Duque et al. is made, and it is suggested that there is considerable convergence of issues associated with metacognition, executive control, working memory, and frontal lobe function. By integrating these domains and issues, significant progress could be made toward a cognitive neuroscience of metacognition
Spehn, M. K. & Reder, L. M. (2000). The unconscious feeling of knowing: A commentary on koriat's paper. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):187-192.   (Cited by 29 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In Koriat's paper ''The Feeling of Knowing: Some Metatheoretical Implications for Consciousness and Control,'' he asserts that the feeling of knowing straddles the implicit and explicit, and that these conscious feelings enter into a conscious control process that is necessary for controlled behavior. This assertion allows him to make many speculations on the nature of consciousness itself. We agree that feelings of knowing are produced through a monitoring of one's knowledge, and that this monitoring can affect the control of behavior such as whether or not to search memory for an answer. Further, we believe that monitoring of performance with a strategy can also affect cognition control and strategy selection; however, we also believe that frequently this monitoring and control occurs without conscious awareness. Feeling of knowing has received an inordinate amount of attention because it lies behind the highly recognizable tip-of-the-tongue phenomenon that represents one of the rare cases of conscious monitoring. There are other feelings of knowing which are much more common and are not accompanied by conscious awareness. These are evident in the early selection of a strategy for answering a problem. In our view, the research on feeling of knowing will not resolve the question of whether consciousness is merely epiphenomenal
Wegner, Daniel M. (1989). White Bears and Other Unwanted Thoughts: Suppression, Obsession, and the Psychology of Mental Control. Penguin.   (Cited by 186 | Google)
Abstract: Drawing on theories of William James, Freud, and Dewey, as well as on studies in mood control, cognitive therapy, and artificial intelligence, this...
Wegner, Daniel M. (1997). Why the mind wanders. In Jonathan D. Cohen & Jonathan W. Schooler (eds.), Scientific Approaches to Consciousness. Lawrence Erlbaum.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Whetstone, Tony & Cross, Mark (1998). Control of conscious contents in directed forgetting and thought suppression. Psyche 4 (16).   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Wilson, Timothy D. (1997). The psychology of metapsychology. In Jonathan D. Cohen & Jonathan W. Schooler (eds.), Scientific Approaches to Consciousness. Lawrence Erlbaum.   (Google)

8.8d Control and Consciousness

Bargh, John A. (1996). Automaticity in social psychology. In E. E. Higgins & A. Kruglanski (eds.), Social Psychology: Handbook of Basic Principles. Guilford.   (Cited by 136 | Google)
Bargh, John A. (2005). Bypassing the will: Toward demystifying the nonconscious control of social behavior. In Ran R. Hassin, James S. Uleman & John A. Bargh (eds.), The New Unconscious. Oxford Series in Social Cognition and Social Neuroscience. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 23 | Google)
Bargh, John A. (ed.) (2007). Social Psychology and the Unconscious: The Automaticity of Higher Mental Processes. Psychology Press.   (Google)
Bargh, John A. (1994). The four horsemen of automaticity: Awareness, intention, efficiency, and control in social cognition. In R. Wyer & T. Srull (eds.), Handbook of Social Cognition. Lawrence Erlbaum.   (Cited by 48 | Google)
Bayles, G. H. & Cleary, P. J. (1986). The role of awareness in the control of frontalis muscle activity. Biological Psychology 22:23-35.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Behrendt, Ralf-Peter (2004). A neuroanatomical model of passivity phenomena. Consciousness and Cognition 13 (3):579-609.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Carlson, Richard A. (2002). Conscious intentions in the control of skilled mental activity. In Brian H. Ross (ed.), The Psychology of Learning and Motivation: Advances in Research and Theory, Vol. 41. Academic Press.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Carr, T. H.; McCauley, C.; Sperber, R. D. & Parmelee, C. M. (1982). Words, pictures, and priming: On semantic activation, conscious identification, and the automaticity of information processing. Journal of Experimental Psychology 8:757-777.   (Cited by 76 | Google)
Chartrand, Tanya L. (2005). The role of conscious awareness in consumer behavior. Journal of Consumer Psychology 15 (3):203-210.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Clark, Andy (2001). Visual experience and motor action: Are the bonds too tight? Philosophical Review 110 (4):495-519.   (Cited by 78 | Google | More links)
Abstract: How should we characterize the functional role of conscious visual experience? In particular, how do the conscious contents of visual experience guide, bear upon, or otherwise inform our ongoing motor activities? According to an intuitive and (I shall argue) philosophically influential conception, the links are often quite direct. The contents of conscious visual experience, according to this conception, are typically active in the control and guidance of our fine-tuned, real-time engagements with the surrounding three-dimensional world. But this idea (which I shall call the Assumption of Experience-Based Control) is hostage to empirical fortune. It is a hostage, moreover, whose safety is in serious doubt. Thus Milner and Goodale (1995) argue for a deep and abiding dissociation between the contents of conscious seeing, on the one hand, and the resources used for the on-line guidance of visuo-motor action, on the other. This ‘dual visual systems’ hypothesis, which finds many echoes in various other bodies of cognitive scientific research, poses a prima facie challenge to the Assumption of Experience-Based Control. More importantly, it provides (I shall argue) fuel for an alternative and philosophically suggestive account of the functional role of conscious visual experience
Clark, Andy (2007). What reaching teaches: Consciousness, control, and the inner zombie. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: What is the role of conscious visual experience in the control and guidance of human behaviour? According to some recent treatments, the role is surprisingly indirect. Conscious visual experience, on these accounts, serves the formation of plans and the selection of action types and targets, while the control of ‘online’ visually guided action proceeds via a quasi-independent non-conscious route. In response to such claims, critics such as (Wallhagen [2007], pp. 539–61) have suggested that the notions of control and guidance invoked are unacceptably vague, and that that the image of ‘zombie systems’ guiding action fails to take account of the possibility that there is genuine but unconceptualized, unnoticed, and/or unreportable experience taking place and guiding or controlling the actions. I address both sets of concerns. I try to show that refining and clarifying the key notions of control and guidance leaves the original argument intact, as does the appeal to unconceptualized, unnoticed, or unreportable experiences. The exercise serves, however, to highlight an important complex of considerations concerning the relations between control, agency, and experience. Better understanding these relations is, I suggest, an important source of insights concerning the nature of phenomenal experience
Cranacvonh, Marion (2000). Freedom of the will--the basis of control. In Walter J. Perrig & Alexander Grob (eds.), Control of Human Behavior, Mental Processes, and Consciousness: Essays in Honor of the 60th Birthday of August Flammer. Erlbaum.   (Google)
Derakhshan, Iraj (2003). The preservation of consciousness, automatism, and movement control. Journal of Neuropsychiatry and Clinical Neurosciences 15 (4):456.   (Google | More links)
Dewan, Edmond M. (1976). Consciousness as an emergent causal agent in the context of control system theory. In Gordon G. Globus, Grover Maxwell & I. Savodnik (eds.), Consciousness and the Brain. Plenum Press.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Glaser, Jack & Kihlstrom, John F. (2005). Compensatory automaticity: Unconscious volition is not an oxymoron. In Ran R. Hassin, James S. Uleman & John A. Bargh (eds.), The New Unconscious. Oxford Series in Social Cognition and Social Neuroscience. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Gordon, A. M. & Rosenbaum, D. A. (1984). Conscious and subconscious arm movements: Application of signal detection theory to motor control. Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 22:214-216.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Gott, P. S.; Hughes, E. C. & Whipple, K. (1984). Voluntary control of two lateralized conscious states: Validation of electrical and behavioral studies. Neuropsychologia 22:65-72.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Gray, Jeffrey A. (1998). Abnormal contents of consciousness: The transition from automatic to controlled processing. In H. Jasper, L. Descarries, V. Castellucci & S. Rossignol (eds.), Consciousness: At the Frontiers of Neuroscience. Lippincott-Raven.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Hassin, Ran R. (2005). Nonconscious control and implicit working memory. In Ran R. Hassin, James S. Uleman & John A. Bargh (eds.), The New Unconscious. Oxford Series in Social Cognition and Social Neuroscience. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Hommel, Bernhard (2007). Consciousness and control: Not identical twins. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (1):155-176.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: Human cognition and action are intentional and goal-directed, and explaining how they are controlled is one of the most important tasks of the cognitive sciences. After half a century of benign neglect this task is enjoying increased attention. Unfortunately, however, current theorizing about control in general, and the role of consciousness for/in control in particular, suffers from major conceptual flaws that lead to confusion regarding the following distinctions: (i) automatic and unintentional processes, (ii) exogenous control and disturbance (in a control-theoretical sense) of endogenous control, (iii) conscious control and conscious access to control, and (iv) personal and systems levels of analysis and explanation. Only if these flaws are overcome will a comprehensive understanding of the relationship between consciousness and control emerge
Horowitz, M. J. & Stinson, C. H. (1995). Consciousness and processes of control. Journal of Psychotherapy Practice and Research 4:123-139.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Hurley, Susan L. (2006). Bypassing conscious control: Media violence, unconscious imitation, and freedom of speech. In S. Pockett, W. Banks & S. Gallagher (eds.), Does Consciousness Cause Behavior? MIT Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: Why does it matter whether and how individuals consciously control their behavior? It matters for many reasons. Here I focus on concerns about social influences of which agents are typically unaware on aggressive behavior
Jacoby, Larry L.; Ste-Marie, D. & Toth, J. P. (1993). Redefining automaticity: Unconscious influences, awareness, and control. In A. D. Baddeley & Lawrence Weiskrantz (eds.), Attention: Selection, Awareness,and Control. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 16 | Google)
Jordan, J. Scott & Ghin, Marcello (2007). The role of control in a science of consciousness: Causality, regulation and self-sustainment. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (1):177-197.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: There is quite a bit of disagreement in cognitive science regarding the role that consciousness and control play in explanations of how people do what they do. The purpose of the present paper is to do the following: (1) examine the theoretical choice points that have lead theorists to conflicting positions, (2) examine the philosophical and empirical problems different theories encounter as they address the issue of conscious agency, and (3) provide an integrative framework (Wild Systems Theory) that addresses these problems and potentially naturalizes conscious agency. It does so by grounding conscious and control in the notion of self-sustaining energy-transformation systems (i.e., living systems), versus computational or self- organizing systems, as is the case in information processing theory and dynamical systems theory, respectively. Given its assertion that content (and consciousness) emerges in self-sustaining systems, Wild Systems Theory may also provide a sound theoretical basis for a science of consciousness in general
Kamiya, J. (1968). Conscious control of brain waves. Psychology Today 1:56-60.   (Cited by 45 | Google)
Knoblich, G. & Kircher, T. T. J. (2004). Deceiving oneself about being in control: Conscious detection of changes in visuomotor coupling. Journal of Experimental Psychology - Human Perception and Performance 30 (4):657-66.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Langer, E. J. (1992). Matters of mind: Mindfulness/mindlessness in perspective. Consciousness and Cognition 1:289-305.   (Cited by 37 | Google)
Levy, Neil & Bayne, Timothy J. (2004). A will of one's own: Consciousness, control, and character. International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 27 (5):459-470.   (Google)
Linser, Katrin & Goschke, Thomas (2007). Unconscious modulation of the conscious experience of voluntary control. Cognition 104 (3):459-475.   (Google)
McLeod, Hamish J.; Byrne, Mitchell K. & Aitken, Rachel (2004). Automatism and dissociation: Disturbances of consciousness and volition from a psychological perspective. International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 27 (5):471-487.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Mole, Christopher (2009). Illusions, Demonstratives and the Zombie Action Hypothesis. Mind 118 (472).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: David Milner and Melvyn Goodale, and the many psychologists and philosophers who have been influenced by their work, claim that ‘the visual system that gives us our visual experience of the world is not the same system that guides our movements in the world’. The arguments that have been offered for this surprising claim place considerable weight on two sources of evidence — visual form agnosia and the reaching behaviour of normal subjects when picking up objects that induce visual illusions. The present article shows that, if we are careful to consider the possibility that a demonstrative gesture can contribute content to a conscious experience, then neither source of evidence is compelling.
Moors, Agnes & Houweder, Jan (2007). What is automaticity? An analysis of its component features and their interrelations. In Bargh, John A. (2007). Social Psychology and the Unconscious: The Automaticity of Higher Mental Processes. Frontiers of Social Psychology. (Pp. 11-50). New York, NY, US: Psychology Press. X, 341 Pp.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Naccache, Lionel; Dehaene, Stanislas; Cohen, L. Jonathan; Habert, Marie-Odile; Guichart-Gomez, Elodie; Galanaud, Damien & Willer, Jean-Claude (2005). Effortless control: Executive attention and conscious feeling of mental effort are dissociable. Neuropsychologia 43 (9):1318-1328.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Oikawa, Masanori (2004). Moderation of automatic achievement goals by conscious monitoring. Psychological Reports 95 (3):975-980.   (Google)
Oswald, M. & Gadenne, Volker (2000). Are controlled processes conscious? In Walter J. Perrig & Alexander Grob (eds.), Control of Human Behavior, Mental Processes, and Consciousness: Essays in Honor of the 60th Birthday of August Flammer. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.   (Google)
Payne, B. Keith; Jacoby, Larry L. & Lambert, Alan J. (2005). Attitudes as accessibility bias: Dissociating automatic and controlled processes. In Ran R. Hassin, James S. Uleman & John A. Bargh (eds.), The New Unconscious. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 47 | Google)
Plotkin, William B. (1981). A rapprochement of the operant-conditioning and awareness views of biofeedback training: The role of discrimination in voluntary control. Journal of Experimental Psychology 110:415-428.   (Google)
Plotkin, William B. (1976). On the self-regulation of the occipital alpha rhythm: Control strategies, states of consciousness, and the role of physiological feedback. Journal of Experimental Psychology 105:66-99.   (Google)
Posner, Michael I. & Snyder, C. R. R. (1975). Attention and cognitive control. In Robert L. Solso (ed.), Information Processing and Cognition: The Loyola Symposium. Lawrence Erlbaum.   (Cited by 764 | Google | More links)
Posner, Michael I. (2006). Genes and experience shape brain networks of conscious control. In Steven Laureys (ed.), Boundaries of Consciousness. Elsevier.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Pylyshynb, Zenon W.; Feldmanb, Jacob & Scholla, Brian J. (2001). What is a visual object? Evidence from target merging in multiple object tracking. Cognition 80 (1-2):159-177.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The notion that visual attention can operate over visual objects in addition to spatial locations has recently received much empirical support, but there has been relatively little empirical consideration of what can count as an `object' in the ®rst place. We have investi- gated this question in the context of the multiple object tracking paradigm, in which subjects must track a number of independently and unpredictably moving identical items in a ®eld of identical distractors. What types of feature clusters can be tracked in this manner? In other words, what counts as an `object' in this task? We investigated this question with a technique we call target merging: we alter tracking displays so that distinct target and distractor loca- tions appear perceptually to be parts of the same object by merging pairs of items (one target with one distractor) in various ways ± for example, by connecting item locations with a simple line segment, by drawing the convex hull of the two items, and so forth. The data show that target merging makes the tracking task far more dif®cult to varying degrees depending on exactly how the items are merged. The effect is perceptually salient, involving in some conditions a total destruction of subjects' capacity to track multiple items. These studies provide strong evidence for the object-based nature of tracking, con®rming that in some contexts attention must be allocated to objects rather than arbitrary collections of features. In addition, the results begin to reveal the types of spatially organized scene components that can be independently attended as a function of properties such as connectedness, part struc- ture, and other types of perceptual grouping. q 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved
Rabbitt, Patrick (2002). Consciousness is slower than you think. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology A 55 (4):1081-1092.   (Cited by 18 | Google | More links)
Raichle, M. E. (1997). Automaticity: From reflective to reflexive information processing. In M. Ito, Y. Miyashita & Edmund T. Rolls (eds.), Cognition, Computation, and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Schneider, Walter E. & Shiffrin, Richard M. (1977). Controlled and automatic human information processing: I. Detection, Search, and Attention. Psychological Review 84:1-66.   (Google)
Scott Jordan, J. & Ghin, Marcello (2007). The role of control in a science of consciousness: Causality, regulation and self- sustainment. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (s 1-2):177-197.   (Google)
Abstract: There is quite a bit of disagreement in cognitive science regarding the role that consciousness and control play in explanations of how people do what they do. The purpose of the present paper is to do the following: (1) examine the theoretical choice points that have lead theorists to conflicting positions, (2) examine the philosophical and empirical problems different theories encounter as they address the issue of conscious agency, and (3) provide an integrative framework (Wild Systems Theory) that addresses these problems and potentially naturalizes conscious agency. It does so by grounding conscious and control in the notion of self-sustaining energy-transformation systems (i.e., living systems), versus computational or self- organizing systems, as is the case in information processing theory and dynamical systems theory, respectively. Given its assertion that content (and consciousness) emerges in self-sustaining systems, Wild Systems Theory may also provide a sound theoretical basis for a science of consciousness in general
Shiffrin, Richard M. & Schneider, Walter E. (1977). Controlled and automatic human information processing: Perceptual learning, automatic attending, and a general theory. Psychological Review 84:128-90.   (Cited by 1705 | Google | More links)
Szelag, Elzbieta; Rymarczyk, Krystyna & Poppel, Ernst (2001). Conscious control of movements: Increase of temporal precision in voluntarily delayed actions. Acta Neurobiologiae Experimentalis 61 (3):175-179.   (Google)
Tzelgov, Joseph; Porat, Z. & Henik, A. (1997). Automaticity and consciousness: Is perceiving the word necessary for reading it? American Journal of Psychology 110:429-48.   (Cited by 18 | Google | More links)
Tzelgov, Joseph (1997). Automatic but conscious: That is how we act most of the time. In R. Wyer (ed.), The Automaticity of Everyday Life. Lawrence Erlbaum.   (Cited by 21 | Google)
Tzelgov, Joseph (1997). Specifying the relations between automaticity and consciousness: A theoretical note. Consciousness and Cognition 6:441-51.   (Google)
Uleman, James S. (1987). Consciousness and control: The case of spontaneous trait inferences. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 13:337-54.   (Cited by 41 | Google | More links)
Umilta, Carlo (1988). The control operations of consciousness. In Anthony J. Marcel & E. Bisiach (eds.), Consciousness in ContemporaryScience. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 23 | Google)
Wallhagen, Morgan (2007). Consciousness and action: Does cognitive science support (mild) epiphenomenalism? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: of consciousness have long been central to discussions of consciousness in philosophy and psychology. Intuitively, consciousness has an important role to play in the control of many everyday behaviors. However, this view has recently come under attack. In particular, it is becoming increasingly common for scientists and philosophers to argue that a significant body of data emerging from cognitive science shows that conscious states are not involved in the control of behavior. According to these theorists, nonconscious states control most everyday behaviors. Andy Clark ([2001]) does an admirable job of summarizing and defending the most important data thought to support this view. In this paper, I argue that the evidence available does not in fact threaten the view that conscious states play an important and intimate role in the control of much everyday behavior. I thereby defend a philosophically intuitive view about the functions of conscious states in action. 1 Introduction 2 Clarifying EBC 2.1 Control and guidance 2.2 Fine-tuned activity 3 The empirical case against EBC 4 Conclusion
Wegner, Daniel M. (2005). Who is the controller of controlled processes? In Ran R. Hassin, James S. Uleman & John A. Bargh (eds.), The New Unconscious. Oxford Series in Social Cognition and Social Neuroscience. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 14 | Google)
Abstract: Are we the robots? This question surfaces often in current psychological re- search, as various kinds of robot parts-automatic actions, mental mechanisms, even neural circuits-keep appearing in our explanations of human behavior. Automatic processes seem responsible for a wide range of the things we do, a fact that may leave us feeling, if not fully robotic, at least a bit nonhuman. The complement of the automatic process in contemporary psychology, of course, is the controlled process (Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968; Bargh, 1984; Posner & Snyder, 1975; Shiffrin & Schnieder, 1977), and it is in theories of controlled processes that vestiges of our humanity reappear. Controlled processes are viewed as conscious, effortful, and intentional. and as drawing on more sources of information than automatic processes. With this power of conscious will, controlled processes seem to bring the civilized quality back to psychological explanation that automatic processes leave out. Yet by reintroducing this touch of humanity, the notion of a controlled process also brings us within glimpsing range of a fatal theoretical error-the idea that there is a controller
Westen, Drew; Weinberger, Joel & Bradley, Rebekah (2007). Motivation, decision making, and consciousness: From psychodynamics to subliminal priming and emotional constraint satisfaction. In Philip David Zelazo, Morris Moscovitch & Evan Thompson (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness. Cambridge.   (Google)
White, Willard A. (1920). Extending the field of conscious control. Mental Hygiene 4:857-66.   (Google)
Wigley, Simon (2007). Automaticity, consciousness and moral responsibility. Philosophical Psychology 20 (2):209-225.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Cognitive scientists have long noted that automated behavior is the rule, while consciousness acts of self-regulation are the exception to the rule. On the face of it automated actions appear to be immune to moral appraisal because they are not subject to conscious control. Conventional wisdom suggests that sleepwalking exculpates, while the mere fact that a person is performing a well-versed task unthinkingly does not. However, our apparent lack of conscious control while we are undergoing automaticity challenges the idea that there is a relevant moral difference between these two forms of unconscious behavior. In both cases the agent lacks access to information that might help them guide their actions so as to avoid harms. In response it is argued that the crucial distinction between the automatic agent and the agent undergoing an automatism, such as somnambulism or petit mal epilepsy, lies in the fact that the former can preprogram the activation and interruption of automatic behavior. Given that, it is argued that there is elbowroom for attributing responsibility to automated agents based on the quality of their will
Zelazo, P. D. & Frye, Douglas (1997). Cognitive complexity and control: A theory of the development of deliberate reasoning and intentional action. In Maxim I. Stamenov (ed.), Language Structure, Discourse, and the Access to Consciousness. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 60 | Google)
Zelazo, P. D. (2004). The development of conscious control in childhood. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 8 (1):12-17.   (Cited by 57 | Google | More links)

8.8e Action and Consciousness in Psychology

Baars, Bernard J. (1992). Experimental Slips and Human Error: Exploring the Architecture of Volition. Plenum Press.   (Cited by 45 | Google)
Abstract: This work makes three valuable contributions to the study of human slips and errors.
Baars, Bernard J. (1987). What is conscious in the control of action? A modern ideomotor theory of voluntary action. In D. Gorfein & Robert R. Hoffman (eds.), Learning and Memory: The Ebbinghaus Centennial Symposium. Lawrence Erlbaum.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Baars, Bernard J. (1993). Why volition is a foundation issue for psychology. Consciousness and Cognition 2:281-309.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Banks, William P. (2006). Does consciousness cause misbehavior? In Susan Pockett, William P. Banks & Shaun Gallagher (eds.), Does Consciousness Cause Behavior? MIT Press.   (Google)
Bargh, John A. (1996). Automaticity in action: The unconscious as repository of chronic goals and motives. In P. Gollwitzer & John A. Bargh (eds.), The Psychology of Action: Linking Cognition and Motivation to Behavior. Guilford.   (Cited by 137 | Google)
Bargh, John A. (2004). Being here now: Is consciousness necessary for human freedom? In Jeff Greenberg, Sander L. Koole & Tom Pyszczynski (eds.), Handbook of Experimental Existential Psychology. Guilford Press.   (Google)
Becchio, Cristina & Bertone, Cesare (2005). Beyond cartesian subjectivism: Neural correlates of shared intentionality. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (7):20-30.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In the present paper we present a short review of some recent neuro- physiological and neuropsychological findings which suggest that self-generated actions and actions of others are mapped on the same neural substratum. Since this substratum is neutral with respect to the agent, correctly attributing an action to its proper author requires the co-activation of areas specific to the self and the other. A conceptual analysis of the empirical data will lead us to conclude that from a neurobiological point of view the problem is not 'how is it possible to share the intentions of others', but rather 'how one can distinguish one's own action/intention from those of other people'
Becchio, Cristina & Bertone, Cesare (2004). Wittgenstein running: Neural mechanisms of collective intentionality and we-mode. Consciousness and Cognition 13 (1):123-133.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Blakemore, Sarah-Jayne; Wolpert, Daniel M. & Frith, Christopher D. (2002). Abnormalities in the awareness of action. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 6 (6):237-242.   (Cited by 62 | Google | More links)
Blakemore, Sarah-Jane (2003). Deluding the motor system. Consciousness and Cognition 12 (4):647-655.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
Abstract: How do we know that our own actions belong to us? How are we able to distinguish self-generated sensory events from those that arise externally? In this paper, I will briefly discuss experiments that were designed to investigate these questions. In particularly, I will review psychophysical and neuroimaging studies that have investigated how we recognise the consequences of our own actions, and why patients with delusions of control confuse self-produced and externally produced actions and sensations. Studies investigating the failure of this 'self-monitoring' mechanism in patients with delusions of control will be discussed in the context of the hypothesis that overactivity in the parietal cortex and the cerebellum contribute to the misattribution of an action to an external source ()
Blakemore, Sarah-Jayne & Frith, Chris (2003). Self-awareness and action. Current Opinion in Neurobiology. Special Issue 13 (2):219-224.   (Cited by 29 | Google | More links)
Cleeremans, Axel (forthcoming). How do we know what we are doing?: Time, intention and awareness of action. Consciousness and Cognition.   (Google)
Abstract: Time is a fundamental dimension of consciousness. Many studies of the “sense of agency” have investigated whether we attribute actions to ourselves based on a conscious experience of intention occurring prior to action, or based on a reconstruction after the action itself has occurred. Here we ask the same question about a lower-level aspect of action experience, namely awareness of the detailed spatial form of a simple movement. Subjects reached for a target, which unpredictably jumped to the side on some trials. Participants (1) expressed their expectancy of a target shift during the upcoming movement, (2) pointed at the target as quickly and accurately as possible before returning to the start position, making a visuomotor adjustment to the target shift if required and (3) reproduced the spatial path of the movement they had just made, as accurately as possible, to give an indication of their awareness of the pointing movement. We analysed the spatial disparity between the initial and the reproduced movements on those with a target shift. A negative disparity value, or undershoot, suggests that motor awareness merely reflects a sluggish record of coordinated motor performance, while a positive value, or overshoot, suggests that participants’ intention to point to the shifting target contributes more to their awareness of action than their actual pointing movement. Undershoot and overshoot thus measure the reconstructive (motoric) and the preconstuctive (intentional) aspects of action awareness, respectively. We found that trials on which subjects strongly expected a target shift showed greater overshoot and less undershoot than trials with lower expectancy. Conscious expectancy therefore strongly influences the experience of the detailed motor parameters of our actions. Further, a delay inserted either between the expectancy judgement and the pointing movement, or between the pointing movement and the reproduction of the movement, had no effect on visuomotor adjustment but strongly influenced action awareness..
Daprati, E.; Franck, N.; Georgieff, N.; Proust, Joëlle; Pacherie, Elisabeth; Dalery, J. & Jeannerod, Marc (1997). Looking for the agent: An investigation into consciousness of action and self-consciousness in schizophrenic patients. Cognition 65:71-86.   (Cited by 179 | Google | More links)
Delabarre, E. B. (1911). Volition and motor consciousness: Theory. Psychological Bulletin 8:378-82.   (Google)
Delabarre, E. B. (1912). Volition and motor consciousness: Theory. Psychological Bulletin 9:409-13.   (Google)
Delabarre, E. B. (1913). Volition and motor consciousness. Psychological Bulletin 10:441-44.   (Google)
de Vignemont, F. & Fourneret, P. (2004). The sense of agency: A philosophical and empirical review of the "who" system. Consciousness and Cognition 13 (1):1-19.   (Cited by 12 | Google)
Ellis, Ralph D. (1997). Purposeful processes, personalism, and the contemporary natural and cognitive sciences. Personalist Forum 13 (1):49-67.   (Google)
Freeman, Walter J. (2006). Consciousness, Intentionality, and Causality. In Susan Pockett, William P. Banks & Shaun Gallagher (eds.), Does Consciousness Cause Behavior? MIT Press.   (Cited by 37 | Google)
Frith, Christopher D. (2002). Attention to action and awareness of other minds. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (4):481-487.   (Cited by 60 | Google | More links)
Georgieff, N. & Jeannerod, Marc (1998). Beyond consciousness of external reality: A ''who'' system for consciousness of action and self-consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 7 (3):465-477.   (Cited by 88 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper offers a framework for consciousness of internal reality. Recent PET experiments are reviewed, showing partial overlap of cortical activation during self-produced actions and actions observed from other people. This overlap suggests that representations for actions may be shared by several individuals, a situation which creates a potential problem for correctly attributing an action to its agent. The neural conditions for correct agency judgments are thus assigned a key role in self/other distinction and self-consciousness. A series of behavioral experiments that demonstrate, in normal subjects, the poor monitoring of action-related signals and the difficulty in recognizing self-produced actions are described. In patients presenting delusions, this difficulty dramatically increases and actions become systematically misattributed. These results point to schizophrenia and related disorders as a paradigmatic alteration of a ''Who?'' system for self-consciousness
Ginsburg, Carl (1999). Body-image, movement and consciousness: Examples from a somatic practice in the Feldenkrais method. Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (2-3):79-91.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
Gonzalez, E.; Broens, M. & Haselager, Pim (2004). Consciousness and agency: The importance of self-organized action. Networks 3:103-13.   (Google)
Grafman, Jordan & Krueger, Frank (2006). Volition and the human prefrontal cortex. In Natalie Sebanz & Wolfgang Prinz (eds.), Disorders of Volition. MIT Press.   (Google)
Gustafson, Don (2007). Neurosciences of action and noncausal theories. Philosophical Psychology 20 (3):367–374.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Recent neuroscience and psychology of behavior have suggested that conscious decisions may have no causal role in the etiology of intentional action. Such results pose a threat to traditional philosophical analyses of action. On such views beliefs, desires and conscious willing are part of the causal structure of intentional action. But if the suggestions from neuroscience/psychology are correct, analyses of this kind are wrong. Conscious antecedents of action are epiphenomenal. This essay explores this consequence. It also notes that the traditional alternative to causal analyses of intentional action is not threatened by the putative scientific findings. This, in turn, is ironic in that defenders of the noncausal accounts of action were thought to be in opposition to the natural sciences of action whereas the analyses in the causal style were "on the side of physicalism." This result is also assessed in what follows
Haggard, Patrick; Catledge, P.; Dafydd, M. & Oakley, David A. (2004). Anomalous control: When "free will" is not conscious. Consciousness and Cognition 13 (3):646-654.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Haggard, Patrick (2006). Conscious intention and the sense of agency. In Natalie Sebanz & Wolfgang Prinz (eds.), Disorders of Volition. MIT Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Haggard, Patrick (2005). Conscious intention and motor cognition. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9 (6):290-295.   (Cited by 14 | Google | More links)
Haggard, Patrick & Johnson, Henry C. (2003). Experiences of voluntary action. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10.   (Cited by 9 | Google)
Haggard, Patrick & Clark, S. (2003). Intentional action: Conscious experience and neural prediction. Consciousness and Cognition 12 (4):695-707.   (Cited by 16 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Intentional action involves both a series of neural events in the motor areas of the brain, and also a distinctive conscious experience that ''I'' am the author of the action. This paper investigates some possible ways in which these neural and phenomenal events may be related. Recent models of motor prediction are relevant to the conscious experience of action as well as to its neural control. Such models depend critically on matching the actual consequences of a movement against its internally predicted effects. However, it remains unclear whether our conscious experience of action depends on a precise matching process, or a retrospective inference that ''I'' must have been responsible for a particular event. We report an experiment in which normal subjects judged the perceived time of either intentional actions, involuntary movements, or subsequent effects (auditory tones) of these. We found that the subject's intention to produce the auditory tone produced an intentional binding between the perceived times of the subject's action and the tone. However, if the intention was interrupted by an imposed involuntary movement, followed by the identical tone, no such binding occurred. The phenomenology of intentional action requires an appropriate predictive link between intentions and effects, rather than a retrospective inference that ''I'' caused the effect
Haggard, Patrick; Clark, Sam & Kalogeras, Jeri (2002). Voluntary action and conscious awareness. Nature Neuroscience 5 (4):382-385.   (Cited by 85 | Google | More links)
Hurley, Susan L. (2006). Bypassing conscious control: Unconscious imitation, media violence, and freedom of speech. In Susan Pockett, William P. Banks & Shaun Gallagher (eds.), Does Consciousness Cause Behavior? MIT Press.   (Google)
Hurley, Susan L. (1998). Consciousness in Action. Harvard University Press.   (Cited by 296 | Google | More links)
Hyder, Fahmeed (1997). "Willed action": A functional MRI study of the human prefrontal cortex during a sensorimitor task. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci 94:6989-6994.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Jeannerod, Marc (2003). Consciousness of action and self-consciousness: A cognitive neuroscience approach. In Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford: Clarendon Press.   (Cited by 12 | Google)
Jeannerod, Marc (2006). Consciousness of action as an embodied consciousness. In Susan Pockett, William P. Banks & Shaun Gallagher (eds.), Does Consciousness Cause Behavior? MIT Press.   (Google)
Jeannerod, Marc (2007). Consciousness of action. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell.   (Google)
Jeannerod, Marc (2006). From volition to agency: The mechanism of action recognition and its failures. In Natalie Sebanz & Wolfgang Prinz (eds.), Disorders of Volition. MIT Press.   (Google)
Johnson, Helen & Haggard, Patrick (2005). Motor awareness without perceptual awareness. Neuropsychologia. Special Issue 43 (2):227-237.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Jordan, J. Scott (2003). Emergence of self and other in perception and action: An event-control approach. Consciousness and Cognition 12 (4):633-646.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The present paper analyzes the regularities referred to via the concept 'self.' This is important, for cognitive science traditionally models the self as a cognitive mediator between perceptual inputs and behavioral outputs. This leads to the assertion that the self causes action. Recent findings in social psychology indicate this is not the case and, as a consequence, certain cognitive scientists model the self as being epiphenomenal. In contrast, the present paper proposes an alternative approach (i.e., the event-control approach) that is based on recently discovered regularities between perception and action. Specifically, these regularities indicate that perception and action planning utilize common neural resources. This leads to a coupling of perception, planning, and action in which the first two constitute aspects of a single system (i.e., the distal-event system) that is able to pre-specify and detect distal events. This distal-event system is then coupled with action (i.e., effector-control systems) in a constraining, as opposed to 'causal' manner. This model has implications for how we conceptualize the manner in which one infers the intentions of another, anticipates the intentions of another, and possibly even experiences another. In conclusion, it is argued that it may be possible to map the concept 'self' onto the regularities referred to in the event-control model, not in order to reify 'the self' as a causal mechanism, but to demonstrate its status as a useful concept that refers to regularities that are part of the natural order
Judd, Charles H. (1909). Motor processes and consciousness. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 6 (4):85-91.   (Google | More links)
Kibele, Armin (2006). Non-consciously controlled decision making for fast motor reactions in sports--a priming approach for motor responses to non-consciously perceived movement features. Psychology of Sport and Exercise 7 (6):591-610.   (Google)
Kimble, G. A. & Perlmuter, L. C. (1970). The problem of volition. Psychological Review 77:361-84.   (Cited by 48 | Google)
Kinsbourne, Marcel (2000). Consciousness in action: Antecedents and origins. Mind and Language 15 (5):545-555.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Libet, Benjamin W. (1985). Unconscious cerebral initiative and the role of conscious will in voluntary action. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8:529-66.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
MacDonald, Penny A. & Paus, Tomás (2003). The role of parietal cortex in awareness of self-generated movements: A transcranial magnetic stimulation study. Cerebral Cortex 13 (9):962-967.   (Cited by 28 | Google | More links)
Mangan, Bruce (2003). Volition and property dualism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (12):29-34.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Marcel, Anthony J. (2003). The sense of agency: Awareness and ownership of action. In Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford: Clarendon Press.   (Cited by 59 | Google)
Metzinger, Thomas (2003). Motor ontology: The representational reality of goals, actions and selves. Philosophical Psychology.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The representational dynamics of the brain is a subsymbolic process, and it has to be_
Metzinger, Thomas & Gallese, Vittorio (2003). Of course they do. Consciousness and Cognition 12 (4):574-576.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Metzinger, Thomas & Gallese, Vittorio (2003). The emergence of a shared action ontology: Building blocks for a theory. Consciousness and Cognition 12 (4):549-571.   (Cited by 32 | Google | More links)
Abstract: To have an ontology is to interpret a world. In this paper we argue that the brain, viewed as a representational system aimed at interpreting our world, possesses an ontology too. It creates primitives and makes existence assumptions. It decomposes target space in a way that exhibits a certain invariance, which in turn is functionally significant. We will investigate which are the functional regularities guiding this decomposition process, by answering to the following questions: What are the explicit and implicit assumptions about the structure of reality, which at the same time shape the causal profile of the brain's motor output and its representational deep structure, in particular of the conscious mind arising from it (its ''phenomenal output'')? How do they constrain high-level phenomena like conscious experience, the emergence of a first-person perspective, or social cognition? By reviewing a series of neuroscientific results and integrating them with a wider philosophical perspective, we will emphasize the contribution the motor system makes to this process. As it will be shown, the motor system constructs goals, actions, and intending selves as basic constituents of the world it interprets. It does so by assigning a single, unified causal role to them. Empirical evidence demonstrates that the brain models movements and action goals in terms of multimodal representations of organism-object-relations. Under a representationalist analysis, this process can be conceived of as an internal, dynamic representation of the intentionality-relation itself. We will show how such a complex form of representational content, once it is in place, can later function as a functional building block for social cognition and for a more complex, consciously experienced representation of the first-person perspective as well
Moore, James (2007). Awareness of action: Inference and prediction. Consciousness and Cognition.   (Google)
Abstract: This study investigates whether the conscious awareness of action is based on predictive motor control processes, or on inferential “sense-making” process that occur after the action itself. We investigated whether the temporal binding between perceptual estimates of operant actions and their effects depends on the occurrence of the effect (inferential processes) or on the prediction that the effect will occur (predictive processes). By varying the probability with which a simple manual action produced an auditory effect, we showed that both the actual and the predicted occurrence of the effect played a role. When predictability of the effect of action was low, temporal binding was found only on those trials where the auditory effect occurred. In contrast, when predictability of the effect of action was high, temporal binding occurred even on trials where the action produced no effect. Further analysis showed that the predictive process is modulated by recent experience of the action-effect relation. We conclude that the experience of action depends on a dynamic combination of predictive and inferential processes
Mulert, Christoph; Menzinger, Elisabeth; Leicht, Gregor; Pogarell, Oliver & Hegerl, Ulrich (2005). Evidence for a close relationship between conscious effort and anterior cingulate cortex activity. International Journal of Psychophysiology 56 (1):65-80.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Newton, Natika (2001). The function of the cerebellum in cognition, affect and consciousness: Empirical support for the embodied mind--introduction. Consciousness and Emotion 2 (2):273-276.   (Google)
Obhi, Sukhvinder S. (2007). Evidence for feedback dependent conscious awareness of action. Brain Research 1161:88-94.   (Google)
O'Regan, Kevin J. (ms). Skill, corporality and alerting capacity in an account of sensory consciousness.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Passingham, Richard E. & Lau, Hakwan C. (2006). Free choice and the human brain. In Susan Pockett, William P. Banks & Shaun Gallagher (eds.), Does Consciousness Cause Behavior? MIT Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Pontius, Anneliese A. (2003). From volitional action to automatized homicide: Changing levels of self and consciousness during partial limbic seizures. Aggression and Violent Behavior 8 (5):547-561.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Prinz, Wolfgang (2003). Neurons don't represent. Consciousness and Cognition 12 (4):572-573.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Pronin, E.; Wegner, Daniel M.; McCarthy, K. & Rodriguez, S. (2006). Everyday magical powers: The role of apparent mental causation in the overestimation of personal influence. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 91:218-231.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: These studies examined whether having thoughts related to an event before it occurs leads people to infer that they caused the event— even when such causation might otherwise seem magical. In Study 1, people perceived that they had harmed another person via a voodoo hex. These perceptions were more likely among those who had first been induced to harbor evil thoughts about their victim. In Study 2, spectators of a peer’s basketball-shooting performance were more likely to perceive that they had influenced his success if they had first generated positive visualizations consistent with that success. Observers privy to those spectators’ visualizations made similar attributions about the spectators’ influence. Finally, addi- tional studies suggested that these results occur even when the thought-about outcome is viewed as unwanted by the thinker and even in field settings where the relevant outcome is occurring as part of a live athletic competition
Simonson, Itamar (2005). In defense of consciousness: The role of conscious and unconscious inputs in consumer choice. Journal of Consumer Psychology 15 (3):211-217.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Spence, Sean A. (2001). Alien control: From phenomenology to cognitive neurobiology. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 8 (2-3):163-172.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
Stöttinger, Elisabeth & Perner, Josef (2006). Dissociating size representation for action and for conscious judgment: Grasping visual illusions without apparent obstacles. Consciousness and Cognition 15 (2):269-284.   (Google)
Umilta, Carlo (2007). Consciousness and control of action. In Philip David Zelazo, Morris Moscovitch & Evan Thompson (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness. Cambridge.   (Google)
van Duijn, Marc & Bem, Sacha (2005). On the alleged illusion of conscious will. Philosophical Psychology 18 (6):699-714.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The belief that conscious will is merely "an illusion created by the brain" appears to be gaining in popularity among cognitive neuroscientists. Its main adherents usually refer to the classic, but controversial 'Libet-experiments', as the empirical evidence that vindicates this illusion-claim. However, based on recent work that provides other interpretations of the Libet-experiments, we argue that the illusion-claim is not only empirically invalid, but also theoretically incoherent, as it is rooted in a category mistake; namely, the presupposition that neuronal activity causes conscious will. We show that the illusion-claim is based on the behaviorist 'input-output' paradigm, and discuss the notions of 'self-organization' and 'self-steering' to provide an alternative perspective on the causal efficacy of conscious will. In the final sections, a tentative theoretical picture is sketched of conscious will as an instance of self-steered self-organization. We conclude that the subjective experience of conscious will is not a misguided one, but rather that the mechanisms supporting conscious will are considerably more complex than mainstream cognitive neuroscience currently acknowledges
Wegner, Daniel M. (2003). The Illusion of Conscious Will. MIT Press.   (Cited by 467 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In this book Daniel Wegner offers a novel understanding of the issue.
Wegner, Daniel M. (2003). The mind's best trick: How we experience conscious will. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (2):65-69.   (Google | More links)
Wegner, Daniel M. & Erskine, J. (2003). Voluntary involuntariness: Thought suppression and the regulation of the experience of will. Consciousness and Cognition 12 (4):684-694.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Participants were asked to carry out a series of simple tasks while following mental control instructions. In advance of each task, they either suppressed thoughts of their intention to perform the task, concentrated on such thoughts, or monitored their thoughts without trying to change them. Suppression resulted in reduced reports of intentionality as compared to monitoring, and as compared to concentration. There was a weak trend for suppression to enhance reported intentionality for a repetition of the action carried out after suppression instructions had been discontinued
Weiss, A. P. (1918). Conscious behavior. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 15 (23):631-641.   (Google | More links)
Wohlschläger, Andreas; Engbert, Kai & Haggard, Patrick (2003). Intentionality as a constituting condition for the own self--and other selves. Consciousness and Cognition 12 (4):708-716.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Introspectively, the awareness of actions includes the awareness of the intentions accompanying them. Therefore, the awareness of self-generated actions might be expected to differ from the awareness of other-generated actions to the extent that access to one's own and to other's intentions differs. However, we recently showed that the perceived onset times of self- vs. other-generated actions are similar, yet both are different from comparable events that are conceived as being generated by a machine. This similarity raises two interesting possibilities. First we could infer the intentions of others from their actions. Second and more radically, we could equally infer our own intentions from the actions we perform rather than sense them. We present two new experiments which investigate the role of action effects in the awareness of self- and other-generated actions by means of measuring the estimated onset time. The results show that the presence of action effects is necessary for the similarity of awareness of self- and other-generated actions
Young, G. (2006). Preserving the role of conscious decision making in the initiation of intentional action. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (3):51-68.   (Google)
Abstract: The aim of this paper is to challenge the claim that the neural activity commonly referred to as 'readiness potential' constitutes evidence for the unconscious initiation of action. Although I accept that such neural activity seriously challenges the commonly held view that one's sense of volition is causally efficacious, I nevertheless contend that much of our everyday engagement with the world is consciously initiated. Thus, a distinction is made between awareness and what the awareness is of: the latter constituting the conscious decision to act in accordance with one's goal, or what I have termed intentional project. Initiation of an action in accordance with one's intentional project grounds the action in meaning, something that would be lacking in an exclusively unconscious decision to act
Zhu, Jing (2004). Locating volition. Consciousness and Cognition 13 (2):302-322.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Abstract: In this paper, it is examined how neuroscience can help to understand the nature of volition by addressing the question whether volitions can be localized in the brain. Volitions, as acts of the will, are special mental events or activities by which an agent consciously and actively exercises her agency to voluntarily direct her thoughts and actions. If we can pinpoint when and where volitional events or activities occur in the brain and find out their neural underpinnings, this can substantively aid to demystify the concept of volition. After first discussing some methodological issues regarding whether it is possible to locate volition in the brain, various approaches by which neuroscientists and psychologists explore the neural correlates and substrates of volition are examined. Although different psychological conceptualizations of volition shape different perspectives toward understanding the functions of volition, the explorations of the neural basis of volition converge on certain common brain areas and structures. A unifying conception of volition that helps to make better sense of recent empirical findings is then suggested.
Zhu, Jing (2003). Reclaiming volition: An alternative interpretation of Libet's experiment. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (11):61-77.   (Google)
Zhu, Jing (2004). Understanding volition. Philosophical Psychology 17 (2):247-274.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The concept of volition has a long history in Western thought, but is looked upon unfavorably in contemporary philosophy and psychology. This paper proposes and elaborates a unifying conception of volition, which views volition as a mediating executive mental process that bridges the gaps between an agent's deliberation, decision and voluntary bodily action. Then the paper critically examines three major skeptical arguments against volition: volition is a mystery, volition is an illusion, and volition is a fundamentally flawed conception that leads to infinite regress. It is shown that all these charges are untenable and the arguments are far from decisive to dismiss the concept of volition. In addition, it is suggested that a naturalistic approach, which takes philosophical inquiry as continuous with the scientific study of volition, is a promising way to demystify volition

8.8f Emotion and Consciousness in Psychology

Adolphs, Ralph (2004). Could a robot have emotions? Theoretical perspectives from social cognitive neuroscience. In J. Fellous (ed.), Who Needs Emotions. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Adolphs, Ralph (2000). Is reward an emotion? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (2):192-192.   (Google)
Abstract: The brain and emotion treats emotions as states elicited by reinforcers (reward or punishment), but it is unclear how this view can do justice to the diversity of emotions. It is also unclear how such a view distinguishes emotions from states such as hunger and thirst. A complementary approach to understanding emotions may begin by considering emotions as aspects of social cognition
Ainslie, George & Monterosso, John (2005). Why not emotions as motivated behaviors? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (2):194-195.   (Google)
Abstract: Lewis's dynamic systems approach is a refreshing change from the reflexology of most neuroscience, but it could go a step further: It could include the expected rewardingness of an emotion in the recursive feedback loop that determines whether the emotion will occur. Two possible objections to such a model are discussed: that emotions are not deliberate, and that negative emotions should lose out as instrumental choices
Alexandrov, Yuri I. & Sams, Mikko E. (2005). Emotion and consciousness: Ends of a continuum. Cognitive Brain Research 25 (2):387-405.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Anderson, C. M. (2000). From molecules to mindfulness: How vertically convergent fractal time fluctuations unify cognition and emotion. Consciousness and Emotion 1 (2):193-226.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Fractal time fluctuations of the spectral “1/f” form are universal in natural self-organizing systems. Neurobiology is uniquely infused with fractal fluctuations in the form of statistically self-similar clusters or bursts on all levels of description from molecular events such as protein chain fluctuations, ion channel currents and synaptic processes to the behaviors of neural ensembles or the collective behavior of Internet users. It is the thesis of this essay that the brain self-organizes via a vertical collation of these spontaneous events in order to perceive the world and generate adaptive behaviors. REM sleep, which coalesces from self-similar clusters of burst-within-burst behavior during ontogeny, is essential to cognitive-emotional function, and has recurrent fractal organization. Empirical fMRI observations further support the association of fractal fluctuations in the temporal lobes, brainstem and cerebellum during the expression of emotional memory, spontaneous fluctuations of thought and meditative practice. Cognitive-emotional integration arises as amygdaloid-brainstem-cerebellar systems harmonize the vertical “1/f” symphony of coupled isochronous cortical oscillations in the pursuit of mindfulness
Anders, Silke; Birbaumer, Niels; Sadowski, Bettina; Erb, Michael; Mader, Irina; Grodd, Wolfgang & Lotze, Martin (2004). Parietal somatosensory association cortex mediates affective blindsight. Nature Neuroscience 7 (4):339-340.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Antoine, Lutz; Brefczynski-Lewis, J.; Johnstone, T. & Davidson, R. J. (online). Regulation of the neural circuitry of emotion by compassion meditation: Effects of meditative expertise.   (Google)
Abstract: PLoS ONE 3(3): e1897. doi:10.1371/journal.pone
Atkinson, Anthony P. (2001). Emotion-specific clues to the neural substrate of empathy. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (1):22-23.   (Google)
Abstract: Research only alluded to by Preston & de Waal (P&deW) indicates the disproportionate involvement of some brain regions in the perception and experience of certain emotions. This suggests that the neural substrate of primitive emotional contagion has some emotion-specific aspects, even if cognitively sophisticated forms of empathy do not. Goals for future research include determining the ways in which empathy is emotion-specific and dependent on overt or covert perception
Ayton, Peter; Pott, Alice & Elwakili, Najat (2007). Affective forecasting: Why can't people predict their emotions? Thinking and Reasoning 13 (1):62 – 80.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Two studies explore the frequently reported finding that affective forecasts are too extreme. In the first study, driving test candidates forecast the emotional consequences of failing. Test failers overestimated the duration of their disappointment. Greater previous experience of this emotional event did not lead to any greater accuracy of the forecasts, suggesting that learning about one's own emotions is difficult. Failers' self-assessed chances of passing were lower a week after the test than immediately prior to the test; this difference correlated with the magnitude of individual immediate disappointments, suggesting the presence of a cognitive strategy for recovering from disappointments. A second study investigated the theory that undue focus on the differences between present and future biases affective forecasts. “Defocusing” that induced low-level construals of the future reduced the extremeness of affective forecasts but a higher-level construal did not. We conclude that a focusing effect may bias affective forecasts
Baars, Bernard J. (2000). Conscious emotional feelings--beyond the four taboos: An introductory comment. Consciousness and Emotion 1 (1):11-14.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Backhaus, Gary (2000). Emotions: The Fetters of instincts and the promise of dynamic systems. In The Caldron of Consciousness: Motivation, Affect and Self-Organization--An Anthology. Amsterdam: J Benjamins.   (Google)
Backhaus, G. (2001). Tymieniecka’s phenomenology of life: The “imaginatio creatrix,” subliminal passions, and the moral sense. Consciousness and Emotion 2 (1):103-134.   (Google)
Abstract: Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka expands the phenomenological study of meanings (sense-bestowal) into an onto-genetic inquiry by grounding it in a phenomenology of life, including the emotional dimension. This phenomenology of life is informed by the empirical sciences and its doctrines parallel the new scientific paradigm of open dynamic systems. Embedded in the dynamics of the real individuation of life forms, human consciousness emerges at a unique station in the evolutionary process. Tymieniecka treats the constitution of sense as a function of life, and thus the transcendental constitutive function of the cognitive, objectifying intentionality of consciousness, the purview of classical phenomenology, is viewed as a project that is limited in its scope. According to the phenomenology of life, meaning-genesis is exhibited throughout the various stages of structurization in the evolution of life. This paper highlights the transformative function of the “Imaginatio Creatrix,” which is the dynamic process at the human station of evolution that accounts for humanity’s inventive capacities necessary for the construction of a human world. The Imaginatio Creatrix transforms the more primitive stirrings of the human “soul” into subliminal passions of human existential significance. The enactive theory of the mind corroborates Tymieniecka’s rejection of Husserl’s doctrine of passive synthesis. However, Tymieniecka’s study of the creative function offers a key for further advancement in enactive theory. Three sense-bestowing functions of the Imaginatio Creatrix account for the human expansion of life: the Aesthetic/Poetic sense, the Objectifying Sense, and the Moral Sense. The Moral Sense, for Tymieniecka, is not the product of reasoning powers, but rather the fruit of subliminal passions that acquire their moral aspect through trans-actions guided by the “benevolent sentiment.”
Bagaric, M. (2002). Internalism and the part-time moralist: An essay about the objectivity of moral judgments. Consciousness and Emotion 2 (2):255-271.   (Google)
Abstract: This paper contends that internalism with respect moral motivation (the view that we are always moved to act in accordance with our moral judgments) is wrong. While internalism can accommodate amoralists, it cannot explain the phenomenon of ‘part-time moralists’ — the person who is (ostensibly at least) moved by some of his or her moral judgments but not others — and hence should be rejected. This suggests that moral judgments are beliefs (or conscious representations) as opposed to desires. It is contended that morality consists of the set of principles which will maximise happiness and that our moral consciousness is motivated when a desire to maximise happiness is copresent with such a belief. Finally, it is argued that this does not entail that morality is a subjective or relative concept
Balconi, Michela & Lucchiari, Claudio (2007). Consciousness and emotional facial expression recognition: Subliminal/supraliminal stimulation effect on n200 and p300 ERPs. Journal of Psychophysiology 21 (2):100-108.   (Google)
Balconi, Michela & Lucchiari, Claudio (2005). Consciousness, emotion and face: An event-related potentials (ERP) study. In Ralph D. Ellis & Natika Newton (eds.), Consciousness & Emotion: Agency, Conscious Choice, and Selective Perception. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Balconi, Michela (2006). Exploring consciousness in emotional face decoding: An event-related potential analysis. Genetic, Social, and General Psychology Monographs 132 (2):129-150.   (Google)
Balconi, M. & Pozzoli, U. (2003). ERPs (event-related potentials), semantic attribution, and facial expression of emotions. Consciousness and Emotion 4 (1):63-80.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: ERPs (event-related potentials) correlates are largely used in cognitive psychology and specifically for analysis of semantic information processing. Previous research has underlined a strong correlation between a negative-ongoing wave (N400), more frontally distributed, and semantic linguistic or extra-linguistic anomalies. With reference to the extra-linguistic domain, our experiment analyzed ERP variation in a semantic task of comprehension of emotional facial expressions. The experiment explored the effect of expectancy violation when subjects observed congruous or incongruous emotional facial patterns. Four prototypical (anger, sadness, happiness and surprise) and four morphed faces were presented. Moreover, two distinct cognitive tasks (an implicit vs an explicit elaboration) were analyzed in order to evaluate the influence of spontaneous decoding in N400-like effects. An automatic, high-order cognitive process was found, elicited by a negative ERP variation similar to the linguistic N400 effect, which allows us to explain the congruous/incongruous decoding in semantic extra-linguistic comprehension
Baldwin, Mark W. & Baccus, Jodene R. (2004). Maintaining a focus on the social goals underlying self-conscious emotions. Psychological Inquiry 15 (2):139-144.   (Google)
Barbalet, Jack (2004). Consciousness, emotions and science. In Jonathan H. Turner (ed.), Advances in Group Processes, Vol 21: Theory and Research on Human Emotions. Elsevier Science.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Barrett, Lisa Feldman; Niedenthal, Paula M. & Winkielman, Piotr (2005). Emotion and Consciousness. Guilford Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Barnes, Allison & Thagard, Paul, Emotional decisions.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Recent research has yielded an explosion of literature that establishes a strong connection between emotional and cognitive processes. Most notably, Antonio Damasio draws an intimate connection between emotion and cognition in practical decision making. Damasio presents a "somatic marker" hypothesis which explains how emotions are biologically indispensable to decisions. His research on patients with frontal lobe damage indicates that feelings normally accompany response options and operate as a biasing device to dictate choice. What Damasio's hypothesis lacks is a theoretical model of decision making which can advance the conceptual connection between emotional and cognitive decision making processes. In this paper we combine Damasio's somatic marker hypothesis with the coherence theory of decision put forward by Thagard and Millgram. The juxtaposition of Damasio's hypothesis with a cognitive theory of decision making leads to a new and better theory of emotional decisions
Barrett, Lisa Feldman (2005). Feeling is perceiving: Core affect and conceptualization in the experience of emotion. In Lisa Feldman Barrett, Paula M. Niedenthal & Piotr Winkielman (eds.), Emotion and Consciousness.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Barrett, Lisa Feldman; Ochsner, Kevin N. & Gross, James J. (2007). On the automaticity of emotion. In John A. Bargh (ed.), Social Psychology and the Unconscious: The Automaticity of Higher Mental Processes. Frontiers of Social Psychology. Psychology Press.   (Google)
Barnard, Philip & Dalgleish, Tim (2005). Psychological-level systems theory: The missing link in bridging emotion theory and neurobiology through dynamic systems modeling. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (2):196-197.   (Google)
Abstract: Bridging between psychological and neurobiological systems requires that the system components are closely specified at both the psychological and brain levels of analysis. We argue that in developing his dynamic systems theory framework, Lewis has sidestepped the notion of a psychological level systems model altogether, and has taken a partisan approach to his exposition of a brain-level systems model
Beauregard, Mario (ed.) (2004). Consciousness, Emotional Self-Regulation and the Brain. John Benjamins.   (Google)
Abstract: This book will undoubtedly be useful to scholars and graduate students interested in the relationships between self-consciousness, emotion, the brain, and the...
Beauregard, Mario; Levesque, J. & Paquette, V. (2004). Neural Basis of Conscious and Voluntary Self-Regulation of Emotion. Consciousness, Emotional Self-Regulation and the Brain. John Benjamins.   (Google)
Beauregard, Mario; Lévesque, Johanne & Paquette, Vincent (2004). Neural basis of conscious and voluntary self-regulation of emotion. In Mario Beauregard (ed.), Consciousness, Emotional Self-Regulation and the Brain. Advances in Consciousness Research. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Beauregard, Mario; Lévesque, Johanne & Bourgouin, Pierre (2001). Neural correlates of conscious self-regulation of emotion. Journal of Neuroscience 21 (18):6993-7000.   (Cited by 192 | Google | More links)
Bechara, Antoine & Naqvi, Nasir (2004). Listening to your heart: Interoceptive awareness as a gateway to feeling. Nature Neuroscience 7 (2):102-103.   (Cited by 11 | Google)
Becker, Marjorie (2002). Talking back to frida: Houses of emotional mestizaje. History and Theory 41 (4):56–71.   (Google | More links)
Bednar, James A. (2000). Internally-generated activity, non-episodic memory, and emotional salience in sleep. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):908-909.   (Google)
Abstract: (1) Substituting (as Solms does) forebrain for brainstem in the search for a dream “controller” is counterproductive, since a distributed system need have no single controller. (2) Evidence against episodic memory consolidation does not show that REM sleep has no role in other types of memory, contra Vertes & Eastman. (3) A generalization of Revonsuo's “threat simulation” model in reverse is more plausible and is empirically testable. [Hobson et al.; Solms; Revonsuo; Vertes & Eastman]
Beer, Jennifer S. & Keltner, Dacher (2004). What is unique about self-conscious emotions? Psychological Inquiry 15 (2):126-128.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Belzung, Catherine & Chevalley, Catherine (2001). Models of complexity: The example of emotions. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (6):1053-1054.   (Google)
Abstract: Using the example of the difficulties which emerge when trying to model complex behaviors – such as emotional expression – that result from stochastic interactions between different components, we argue that biorobotics may well describe one possible evolution of certain features of a biological system, but cannot pretend to be a simulation of the whole behavior of the system
Ben-Ze'ev, Aaron (2000). Are emotions so simple? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (2):194-194.   (Google)
Abstract: Rolls's book, The brain and emotion is an important and valuable contribution to our understanding of the brain mechanisms that underlie emotional processes. Its explanatory value is less obvious when it comes to psychological and philosophical issues concerning the nature of emotions
Berridge, Kent C. & Winkielman, Piotr (2003). What is an unconscious emotion? (The case for unconscious "liking"). Cognition and Emotion 17 (2):181-211.   (Cited by 52 | Google | More links)
Bickhard, Mark H. (2000). Motivation and Emotion: An Interactive Process Model. In Ralph D. Ellis & Natika Newton (eds.), The Caldron of Consciousness: Motivation, Affect and Self-Organization. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 19 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In this chapter, I outline dynamic models of motivation and emotion. These turn out not to be autonomous subsystems, but, instead, are deeply integrated in the basic interactive dynamic character of living systems. Motivation is a crucial aspect of particular kinds of interactive systems -- systems for which representation is a sister aspect. Emotion is a special kind of partially reflective interaction process, and yields its own emergent motivational aspects. In addition, the overall model accounts for some of the crucial properties of consciousness
Brownell, Philip (2004). Perceiving you perceiving me: Self-conscious emotions and gestalt therapy. Gestalt! 8 (1).   (Google)
Buck, Ross (2005). Adding ingredients to the self-organizing dynamic system stew: Motivation, communication, and higher-level emotions – and don't forget the genes! Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (2):197-198.   (Google)
Abstract: Self-organizing dynamic systems (DS) modeling is appropriate to conceptualizing the relationship between emotion and cognition-appraisal. Indeed, DS modeling can be applied to encompass and integrate additional phenomena at levels lower than emotional interpretations (genes), at the same level (motives), and at higher levels (social, cognitive, and moral emotions). Also, communication is a phenomenon involved in dynamic system interactions at all levels
Buck, Ross (2000). Conceptualizing motivation and emotion. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (2):195-196.   (Google)
Abstract: Motivation and emotion are not clearly defined and differentiated in Rolls's The brain and emotion, reflecting a widespread problem in conceptualizing these phenomena. An adequate theory of emotion cannot be based upon reward and punishment alone. Basic mechanisms of arousal, agonistic, and prosocial motives-emotions exist in addition to reward-punishment systems
Cardon, Alain (2006). Artificial consciousness, artificial emotions, and autonomous robots. Cognitive Processing 7 (4):245-267.   (Google | More links)
Cardena, Etzel (2008). Consciousness and emotions as interpersonal and transpersonal systems: This paper is dedicated to the living memory of may buelna de cardeña (1924-2008). Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (s 10-11):249-263.   (Google)
Abstract: Emotions and consciousness are intimately linked and often conceived from a purely intrapersonal perspective. This paper explores the implications of considering emotions as not only intrapersonal but also as interpersonal and transpersonal heterarchical (i.e., every component has potentially equal importance) systems. It is telling that in contemplative traditions and contemporary research on hypnotic experience, deep 'inner' experience is pregnant with interpersonal and transpersonal meanings. Similarly, the propensity to have porous conscious experiences is paralleled by the tendency to be affected by the emotion of others. Anecdotal and experimental evidence on anomalous events clearly suggests that strong emotions can have non-local effects. That consciousness and emotions are embedded within interpersonal and transpersonal fields has important epistemological and ethical implications
Carver, Charles S. (2005). Emotion theory is about more than affect and cognition: Taking triggers and actions into account. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (2):198-199.   (Google)
Abstract: Understanding how emotions emerge is difficult without determining what characteristic of the trigger actually triggers them. Knowing whether emotional experiences self-stabilize is difficult without remembering what other processes are set in play as the emotion emerges. It is not clear either that positive feedback is required for the emergence of emotion or that an attractor model captures well what is happening when an emotion arises
Chakrabarti, Bhismadev & Baron-Cohen, Simon (2008). Can the shared circuits model (SCM) explain joint attention or perception of discrete emotions? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (1):24-25.   (Google)
Charland, Louis C. (2005). Emotion Experience and the Indeterminacy of Valence. In Lisa Feldman Barrett, Paula M. Niedenthal & Piotr Winkielman (eds.), Emotion and Consciousness. Guilford Press.   (Google)
Charland, Louis C. (1999). Perceptual symbol systems and emotion. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (4):612-613.   (Google)
Abstract: In his target article, Barsalou cites current work on emotion theory but does not explore its relevance for this project. The connection is worth pursuing, since there is a plausible case to be made that emotions form a distinct symbolic information processing system of their own. On some views, that system is argued to be perceptual: a direct connection with Barsalou's perceptual symbol systems theory. Also relevant is the hypothesis that there may be different modular subsystems within emotion and the perennial tension between cognitive and perceptual theories of emotion
Chiappelli, F.; Prolo, P.; Cajulis, E.; Harper, S.; Sunga, E. & Concepcion, E. (2004). Consciousness, Emotional Self-Regulation, and the Psychosomatic Network: Relevance to Oral Biology and Medicine. Consciousness, Emotional Self-Regulation and the Brain. John Benjamins.   (Google)
Ciompi, Luc (2003). Reflections on the role of emotions in consciousness and subjectivity, from the perspective of affect-logic. Consciousness and Emotion 4 (2):181-196.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The phenomena of human consciousness and subjectivity are explored from the perspective of affect-logic, a comprehensive meta-theory of the interactions between emotion and cognition based mainly on cognitive and social psychology, psychopathology, neurobiology Piaget?s genetic epistemology, psychoanalysis, and evolutionary science. According to this theory, overt or covert affective-cognitive interactions are obligatorily present in all mental activity, seemingly ?neutral? thinking included. Emotions continually exert numerous so-called operator-effects, both linear and nonlinear, on attention, on memory and on comprehensive thought, or logic in a broad sense. They deeply ?affect? also consciousness and subjectivity, as showed by the analysis of four crucially involved phenomena, namely (1) attention, (2) abstraction, (3) language, and (4) the prevailing affective state. The conclusion is that neither consciousness nor subjectiovity can be adequately understood without fully considering their emotional aspects
Cioffi, D. (1991). Sensory awareness versus sensory impression: Affect and attention interact to produce somatic meaning. Cognition and Emotion 5:275-94.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Clore, Gerald L.; Storbeck, Justin; Robinson, Michael D. & Centerbar, David B. (2005). Seven sins in the study of unconscious affect. In Lisa Feldman Barrett, Paula M. Niedenthal & Piotr Winkielman (eds.), Emotion and Consciousness. Guilford Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Cogan, John (2003). Emotion and the growth of consciousness: Gaining insight through a phenomenology of rage. Consciousness and Emotion 4 (2):207-241.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Some attempts to understand emotion have failed to account for important features of our emotional experience ? notably, the experience of gaining insight when we express our emotions. In this essay I will hold that if we properly understand emotions, then we see that the expression of emotion contributes to the growth of consciousness by providing a process wherein consciousness can recognize and reclaim its inherent wholeness, and thereby overcome fragmentation. Hence, in this essay I will strive to: (1) demonstrate that we do get insight when we express our emotions, (2) offer a suggestion as to why this feature is often overlooked, (3) propose a model for understanding the emotions that helps to explain this holistic feature of emotion, and (4) show how this insight into the nature of emotion contributes to our understanding of the growth of consciousness
Cook, N. D. (2002). Tone of Voice and Mind: The Connections Between Intonation, Emotion, Cognition and Consciousness. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 57 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Includes bibliographical references (p. [271]-285) and index.
Critchley, Hugo D.; Wiens, Stefan; Rotshtein, Pia; Öhman, Arne & Dolan, Raymond J. (2004). Neural systems supporting interoceptive awareness. Nature Neuroscience 7 (2):189-195.   (Cited by 145 | Google | More links)
Dalgleish, Tim (2000). Roads not taken: The case for multiple functional-level routes to emotion. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (2):196-197.   (Google)
Abstract: This review focuses on the theory of emotion outlined in Chapter 3 of Rolls's The brain and emotion. It is proposed that Rolls's emphasis on a relatively simple neurobiologically derived emotion scheme does not allow him to present a comprehensive account of emotion. Consequently, high-level cognitive processes, such as appraisal, end up being retained in the theory despite Rolls's skepticism about their utility. An argument is put forward that the concept of appraisal in the emotion literature is more than semantic convention and actually allows us to talk about multiple functional-level routes to the generation of emotion – a characteristic of the latest generation of theories in the cognition-emotion literature
Dalton, T. C. (2000). Review of “a revolutionary way of thinking: From a near fatal accident to a new science of healing” by Charles Krebs. Consciousness and Emotion 1 (2):324-329.   (Google | More links)
Dalton, Thomas C. (2000). The developmental roots of consciousness and emotional experience. Consciousness and Emotion 1 (1):55-89.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Charles Darwin is generally credited with having formulated the first systematic attempt to explain the evolutionary origins and function of the expression of emotions in animals and humans. His ingenious theory, however, was burdened with popular misconceptions about human phylogenetic heritage and bore the philosophical and theoretical deficiencies of the brain science of his era that his successors strove to overcome. In their attempts to rectify Darwin?s errors, William James, James Mark Baldwin and John Dewey each made important contributions to a theory of emotion, which attempted to put it on a more secure philosophical and scientific footing. My contention is that Dewey and his collaborator, infant experimentalist Myrtle McGraw, succeeded where their contemporaries failed. They pointed the way out of the morass of recapitulationism, and showed how a developmental theory of consciousness, mind and emotion could be formulated that avoided the epistemological and ontological pitfalls of Darwin?s theory. Drawing on an extensive body of research from contemporary experimental studies of infant development, this essay attempts to put the questions raised by these historical figures about the structure, function and value of emotions in a theoretical framework. A developmental theory is proposed about the complex, interacting neurobiological and neurobehavioral factors that contribute to human emotional development. This theory identifies the possible relationships among emotions, consciousness and mind and how their co-development influences the capacity of young children to form moral judgments
Dalgleish, Tim & Power, Michael J. (2004). The I of the storm: Relations between self and conscious emotion experience: Comment on lambie and Marcel (2002). Psychological Review 111 (3):812-819.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Damasio, Antonio R. (1999). The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness. Harcourt Brace and Co.   (Cited by 2364 | Google)
de Gelder, Beatrice; Vroomen, Jean; Pourtois, Gilles & Weiskrantz, Lawrence (2000). Affective blindsight: Are we blindly led by emotions? Response to Heywood and Kentridge (2000). Trends in Cognitive Sciences 4 (4):126-127.   (Google | More links)
de Gelder, Beatrice (2005). Nonconscious emotions: New findings and perspectives on nonconscious facial expression recognition and its voice and whole-body contexts. In Lisa Feldman Barrett, Paula M. Niedenthal & Piotr Winkielman (eds.), Emotion and Consciousness. Guilford Press.   (Google)
de Gelder, Beatrice & Hadjikhani, Nouchine (2006). Non-conscious recognition of emotional body language. Neuroreport 17 (6):583-586.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
deluty, E. W. (2001). Consciousness, affect and objectifying in cassirer’s conception of symbolizing. Consciousness and Emotion 2 (1):135-155.   (Google)
Abstract: An examination of Cassirer’s conception of symbolizing, which is born in his critique of Kant, will show that objectifying human experience without external absolutes is grounded in affect, not cognition. When there is no external absolute to guide objectifying, then the roots of objectifying begin with how we are affected by experience and led to reflect. Affect formulates how we become conscious of what there is and express this consciousness so as to objectify it. Affect thus has an indirect influence on consciousness and objectifying. Cassirer expands the scope of the free play of the imagination, which Kant restricted to aesthetic judgments, to account for how order arises through any modality when a rule is not given. He anchors this generative source in human expression itself, and thereby prevents objectifying from sinking into relativism. Affect is thus shown to play a regulative role in consciousness when we objectify human experience without external absolutes
DeLancey, Craig (1996). Emotion and the function of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (5-6):492-99.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
de Preester, H. (2002). Intentionality and the inside/outside distinction in sensitive systems. Consciousness and Emotion 3 (1):65-79.   (Google)
Abstract: Working from both a phenomenological and a biological background, the conditions under which the emergence of intentionality occurs, are approached. This is done via two particularities of biological systems: the inside/outside distinction they exhibit and the fact that they are sensitive. The phenomenon of boundaries turns out to be a crucial issue in such an account. To start from a biological level is an indispensable preparation for a proper understanding of intentionality, phenomenologically conceived
Derryberry, Douglas (2001). Emotion and conscious experience: Perceptual and attentional influences of anxiety. In Peter G. Grossenbacher (ed.), Finding Consciousness in the Brain: A Neurocognitive Approach. Advances in Consciousness Research. John Benjamins.   (Google)
de Sousa, Ronald B. (2002). Fringe consciousness and the multifariousness of emotions. Psyche 8 (14):i.   (Google)
Dimberg, U.; Thunberg, M. & Elmehed, K. (2000). Unconscious facial reactions to emotional facial expressions. Psychological Science 11 (1):86-89.   (Cited by 174 | Google)
Downey, Greg (2005). The contribution of cross-cultural study to dynamic systems modeling of emotions. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (2):201-202.   (Google)
Abstract: Lewis neglects cross-cultural data in his dynamic systems model of emotion, probably because appraisal theory disregards behavior and because anthropologists have not engaged discussions of neural plasticity in the brain sciences. Considering cultural variation in emotion-related behavior, such as grieving, indigenous descriptions of emotions, and alternative developmental regimens, such as sport, opens up avenues to test dynamic systems models
Eastwood, John D. & Smilek, Daniel (2005). Functional consequences of perceiving facial expressions of emotion without awareness. Consciousness and Cognition 14 (3):565-584.   (Google | More links)
Ellis, Ralph D. & Newton, Natika (2005). Consciousness and Emotion: Agency, Conscious Choice, and Selective Perception. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: The papers in this volume of Consciousness & Emotion Book Series are organized around the theme of "enaction.
Ellis, Ralph D. (1995). Questioning Consciousness: The Interplay of Imagery, Cognition, and Emotion in the Human Brain. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 92 | Google | More links)
Abstract: ... Geoffrey Underwood (University of Nottingham) Francisco Varela (CREA, Ecole Polytechnique. Paris) Volume 2 Ralph D. Ellis Questioning Consciousness ...
Ellis, R. (2000). Review of “affective neuroscience” by Jaak Panksepp. Consciousness and Emotion 1 (2):313-318.   (Google | More links)
Ellis, R. D. (2002). Review of “consciousness and intentionality” by grant R. Gillett and John McMillan. Consciousness and Emotion 3 (1):98-103.   (Google)
Ellis, Ralph D. (ed.) (2000). The Caldron of Consciousness: Motivation, Affect and Self-Organization. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
Ellis, Ralph D. & Newton, Natika (2000). The interdependence of consciousness and emotion. Consciousness and Emotion 1 (1):1-10.   (Google)
Ellis, Ralph D. (2005). The roles of imagery and metaemotion in deliberate choice and moral psychology. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (8-10):140-157.   (Google)
Elster, Jon (2004). Emotion and action. In Robert C. Solomon (ed.), Thinking About Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Eslinger, Paul J.; Moll, Jorge & de Oliveira-Souza, Ricardo (2001). Emotional and cognitive processing in empathy and moral behavior. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (1):34-35.   (Google)
Abstract: Within the perception-action framework, the underlying mechanisms of empathy and its related processes of moral behavior need to be investigated. fMRI studies have shown different frontal cortex activation patterns during automatic processing and judgment tasks when stimuli have moral content. Clinical neuropsychological studies reveal different patterns of empathic alterations after dorsolateral versus orbital frontal cortex damage, related to deficient cognitive and emotional processing. These processing streams represent different neural levels and mechanisms underlying empathy
Esrock, E. J. (2002). Touching art: Intimacy, embodiment, and the somatosensory system. Consciousness and Emotion 2 (2):233-253.   (Google)
Abstract: Viewers have a way of using their somatosensory system to create temporary boundary changes that bring them into intimate relationships with art objects. Spectators experience this imaginary fusion when simultaneously attending to their own somatosensory sensations, which occur inside the body, and to qualities of the artwork, which exist in the external world. At such moments viewers reinterpret their somatosensory sensations as a quality of the artwork. When inside and outside are reinterpreted, viewers cross the conventional boundary between self and object. This effect can be illustrated in first person reports and supported by current research in the neurosciences and the humanities
Evans, Cathryn E. Y.; Bowman, Caroline H. & Turnbull, Oliver H. (2005). Subjective awareness on the iowa gambling task: The key role of emotional experience in schizophrenia. Journal of Clinical and Experimental Neuropsychology 27 (6):656-664.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Faw, Bill (2000). Consciousness, motivation, and emotion: Biopsychological reflections. In Ralph D. Ellis & Natika Newton (eds.), The Caldron of Consciousness: Motivation, Affect and Self-Organization- An Anthology. Advances in Consciousness Research. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 11 | Google)
Faw, B. (2002). Review of “microgenetic approach to the conscious mind” by Talis bachman. Consciousness and Emotion 3 (1):91-98.   (Google)
Fentress, John C. (2000). Emotional networks: The heart of brain design. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (2):198-199.   (Google)
Abstract: The concept of emotion as defined by Rolls is based upon reinforcement mechanisms and their underlying neural networks. He shows how these networks process signals at many levels, through both separate and convergent pathways essential for adaptive action. While many behavioral issues related to emotion are omitted from his review, he succeeds admirably in summarizing both the “current state of the art” in single unit analyses and in pointing out how future research directions may be crafted
Fischer, N. (2000). Review of “Daniel Hutto” by Daniel Hutto. Consciousness and Emotion 1 (2):318-323.   (Google | More links)
Flanagan, O. (2000). Destructive emotions. Consciousness and Emotion 1 (2):259-281.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper discusses the problem of destructive emotions by comparing Eastern and Western assumptions about emotions. In the case of anger, for example, Eastern thinkers straightforwardly posit that it is entirely possible to cultivate attitudes in which anger is naturally absent. In the West, by contrast, it is generally assumed that anger is a “basic” emotion that can be suppressed or managed, but not eliminated from one's basic emotional constitution. Thus, in the Eastern way of thinking, emotion is a force that more easily harmonizes with rational approaches to life and to the specific problems in life
Forgas, Joseph P. & Ciarrochi, J. (2000). Affect infusion and affect control: The interactive role of conscious and unconscious processing strategies in mood management. In Yves Rossetti & Antti Revonsuo (eds.), Beyond Dissociation: Interaction Between Dissociated Implicit and Explicit Processing. John Benjamins.   (Google)
Fox, Elaine (2002). Processing emotional facial expressions: The role of anxiety and awareness. Cognitive, Affective and Behavioral Neuroscience 2 (1):52-63.   (Google)
Freeman, Walter J. (2005). Emotion is from preparatory brain chaos; irrational action is from premature closure. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (2):204-205.   (Google)
Abstract: EEG evidence supports the view that each cerebral hemisphere maintains a scale-free network that generates and maintains a global state of chaos. By its own evolution, and under environmental impacts, this hemispheric chaos can rise to heights that may either escape containment and engender incontinent action or be constrained by predictive control and yield creative action of great power and beauty
Gaillard, Raphaël; Del Cul, Antoine; Naccache, Lionel; Vinckier, Fabien; Cohen, Laurent; Dehaene, Stanislas & Smith, Edward E. (2006). Nonconscious semantic processing of emotional words modulates conscious access. PNAS Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 103 (19):7524-7529.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Getz, I. & Lubart, T. I. (2000). An emotional-experiential perspective on creative symbolic-metaphorical processes. Consciousness and Emotion 1 (2):283-312.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Following some initial interrogations on the experiential and creative nature of symbolic-metaphorical processes (e.g. Gendlin, 1997a; Gruber, 1988) and some work on the production and interpretation of linguistically novel metaphors (e.g. Gibbs, 1994; Lakoff & Turner, 1989), we propose a new, `emotional-experiential' perspective on creative metaphors — perhaps, the most historically and sociologically important type of symbolic constructions. The emotional-experiential perspective accounts for the production and interpretation of creative metaphors through idiosyncratic emotion-based associations. Introspective, laboratory, and illustrative case study evidence from several Western cultures is provided. Implications for broad issues concerning creative metaphor and symbolization are discussed
Gibbs Jr, R. W. & Van Orden, G. C. (2003). Are emotional expressions intentional?: A self-organizational approach. Consciousness and Emotion 4 (1):1-16.   (Google)
Abstract: This paper discusses the debate over whether emotional expressions are spontaneous or intentional actions. We describe a variety of empirical evidence supporting these two possibilities. But we argue that the spontaneous-intentional distinction fails to explain the psychological dynamics of emotional expressions. We claim that a complex systems perspective on intentions, as self-organized critical states, may yield a unified view of emotional expressions as a consequence of situated action. This account simultaneously acknowledges the embodied status of environment, evolution, culture and mind in theories of emotion
Gray, Jeffrey A. (1999). Cognition, emotion, conscious experience and the brain. In Tim Dalgleish & M. J. Powers (eds.), Handbook of Cognition and Emotion. Wiley.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Grose, Jonathan, Genuine versus deceptive emotional displays.   (Google)
Abstract: This paper contributes to the explanation of human cooperative behaviour, examining the implications of Brian Skyrms’ modelling of the prisoner’s dilemma (PD). Augmenting a PD with signalling strategies promotes cooperation, but a challenge that must be addressed is what prevents signals being subverted by deceptive behaviour. Empirical results suggest that emotional displays can play a signalling role and, to some extent, are secure from subversion. I examine proximate explanations and then offer an evolutionary explanation for the translucency of emotional displays. Selection acts on the basis of lifetime fitness consequences and, crucially for my argument, the intensity of selection decreases over the course of a lifetime. Hence we tend to possess traits that promote survival when young and, with regard to emotional displays, translucency allows successful maturation over our protracted period of nurturing by close kin. This is due to the vital role played by emotional interactions in the normal cognitive and social development of Homo sapiens
Grossberg, Stephen (2005). STaRT: A bridge between emotion theory and neurobiology through dynamic system modeling. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (2):207-208.   (Google)
Abstract: Lewis proposes a “reconceptualization” of how to link the psychology and neurobiology of emotion and cognitive-emotional interactions. His main proposed themes have actually been actively and quantitatively developed in the neural modeling literature for more than 30 years. This commentary summarizes some of these themes and points to areas of particularly active research in this area
Guy, S. C. & Cahill, L. (1999). The role of overt rehearsal in enhanced conscious memory for emotional events. Consciousness and Cognition 8 (1):114-122.   (Google)
Abstract: This study tested the hypothesis that overt rehearsal is sufficient to explain enhanced memory associated with emotion by experimentally manipulating rehearsal of emotional material. Participants viewed two sets of film clips, one set of emotional films and one set of relatively neutral films. One set of films was viewed in each of two sessions, with approximately 1 week between the sessions. Participants were given a free recall test of all of films viewed approximately 1 week after the second session. Rehearsal was manipulated by instructing one group of participants not to discuss the films with anyone (no talkgroup) and instructing a second group to discuss both sets of films with at least three people (forced talkgroup). A third group consisted of participants instructed not to discuss the films with anyone, but who did not comply with these instructions (talkersgroup). All groups recalled significantly more of the emotional films than the neutral films. Furthermore, the relative number of emotional and neutral films recalled did not differ significantly among the three groups. The results indicate that overt rehearsal is insufficient to explain the enhancing effects of emotion on memory
Hartmann, Ernest (2000). The waking-to-dreaming continuum and the effects of emotion. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):947-950.   (Google)
Abstract: The three-dimensional “AIM model” proposed by Hobson et al. is imaginative. However, many kinds of data suggest that the “dimensions” are not orthogonal, but closely correlated. An alternative view is presented in which mental functioning is considered as a continuum, or a group of closely linked continua, running from focused waking activity at one end, to dreaming at the other. The effect of emotional state is increasingly evident towards the dreaming end of the continuum. [Hobson et al.; Nielsen; Solms]
Heerey, Erin A.; Keltner, Dacher & Capps, Lisa M. (2003). Making sense of self-conscious emotion: Linking theory of mind and emotion in children with autism. Emotion 3 (4):394-400.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Heilman, K. M. (2000). Emotional experience: A neurological model. In Richard D. R. Lane, L. Nadel, G. L. Ahern, J. Allen & Alfred W. Kaszniak (eds.), Cognitive Neuroscience of Emotion. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 18 | Google)
Herba, Catherine M.; Heining, Maike; Young, Andrew W.; Browning, Michael; Benson, Philip J.; Phillips, Mary L. & Gray, Jeffrey A. (2007). Conscious and nonconscious discrimination of facial expressions. Visual Cognition 15 (1):36-47.   (Google | More links)
Heywood, Charles A. & Kentridge, Robert W. (2000). Affective blindsight? Trends in Cognitive Sciences 4 (4):125-126.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Hinde, Robert A. (2001). Emotion: The relation between breadth of definition and explanatory power. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (1):37-38.   (Google)
Abstract: Attempts to integrate diverse phenomena in terms of common processes are much needed in psychology, but definitional precision is a necessary preliminary to explanation. It is also preferable to use caution in juxtaposing concepts from different realms of discourse
Öhman, Arne; Flykt, Anders & Lundqvist, Daniel (2000). Unconscious emotion: Evolutionary perspectives, psychophysiological data and neuropsychological mechanisms. In Richard D. R. Lane, L. Nadel & G. L. Ahern (eds.), Cognitive Neuroscience of Emotion. Series in Affective Science. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Hocutt, M. (2003). Review of “the blank slate” by Steven Pinker. Consciousness and Emotion 4 (1):135-143.   (Google | More links)
Honvank, Jack & Haaden, Edward H. F. (2001). Conscious and unconscious processing of emotional faces. In Beatrice De Gelder, Edward H. F. De Haan & Charles A. Heywood (eds.), Out of Mind: Varieties of Unconscious Processes. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Horacio Fabrega Jr, (2004). Consciousness and emotions are minimized. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (6):736-737.   (Google)
Abstract: In the case of religion, explanations based on emotion should be privileged over those based on “cold” cognition. The origins of religious beliefs are as critical to understanding religion as are the group phenomena which sustain them. In addition, religion's relationship to the growth of knowledge is neglected by the target authors. The balance between the costs and benefits of religion will vary depending upon the phase of an individual society's cultural evolution
Houston, Alasdair I. & McNamara, John M. (2000). Adaptive accounts of physiology and emotion. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (2):201-202.   (Google)
Abstract: Rolls discusses various adaptive explanations of physiological processes and the emotions. We give a critical analysis of some of these from the perspective of behavioural ecology. While agreeing with the approach adopted by Rolls, we identify topics that could have been better presented by making use of the existing literature
H., M. (2003). Spinoza’s anticipation of contemporary affective neuroscience. Consciousness and Emotion 4 (2):257-290.   (Google)
Abstract: Spinoza speculated on how ethics could emerge from biology and psychology rather than disrupt them and recent evidence suggests he might have gotten it right. His radical deconstruction and reconstruction of ethics is supported by a number of avenues of research in the cognitive and neurosciences. This paper gathers together and presents a composite picture of recent research that supports Spinoza’s theory of the emotions and of the natural origins of ethics. It enumerates twelve naturalist claims of Spinoza that now seem to be supported by substantial evidence from the neurosciences and recent cognitive science. I focus on the evidence provided by Lakoff and Johnson in their summary of recent cognitive science in Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought (1999); by Antonio Damasio in his assessment of the state of affective neuroscience in Descartes’ Error (1994) and in The Feeling of What Happens (1999) (with passing references to his recent Looking for Spinoza (2003); and by Giacomo Rizzolatti, Vittorio Gallese and their colleagues in the neural basis of emotional contagion and resonance, i.e., the neural basis of primitive sociality and intersubjectivity, that bear out Spinoza’s account of social psychology as rooted in the mechanism he called attention to and identified as affective imitation
Hunt, Caroline; Keogh, Edmund & French, Christopher C. (2006). Anxiety sensitivity: The role of conscious awareness and selective attentional bias to physical threat. Emotion 6 (3):418-428.   (Google)
Izard, Carroll E. (2004). Emotions and emotion cognition contribute to the construction and understanding of mind. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (1):111-112.   (Google)
Abstract: Carpendale & Lewis's (C&L's) interesting and insightful article did not integrate several potentially useful notions from emotion theory and research into their explanatory framework. I propose that emotions are indigenous elements of mind and that children's understanding of them is fundamental to their understanding of the mental life of self and others, understandings critical to the development of social and emotional competence
Izard, Carroll (2007). Levels of emotion and levels of consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (1):96-98.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Merker makes a strong case for the upper brain stem as being the neural home of primary or phenomenal consciousness. Though less emphasized, he makes an equally strong and empirically supported argument for the critical role of the mesodiencephalon in basic emotion processes. His evidence and argument on the functions of brainstem systems in primary consciousness and basic emotion processes present a strong challenge to prevailing assumptions about the primacy of cognition in emotion-cognition-behavior relations. (Published Online May 1 2007)
Izard, Carroll (2000). Reinforcement, emotion, and consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (2):202-204.   (Google)
Abstract: Rolls presents a good integrative summary of the neural bases of emotions, adds new findings and insights, and takes a stance on controversial issues such as separate or distinct brain systems for processing emotion information and for planning and action. This commentary raises questions about his explanations of emotion activation, response to novelty, the evolution of emotions, and the phenomenal experience of emotions in human consciousness
Jarvilehto, Timo (2000). Feeling as knowing--part I: Emotion as reorganization of the organism-environment system. Consciousness and Emotion 1 (2):245-257.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The theoretical approach described in a series of articles (Jarvilehto, 1998a,b,c, 1999, 2000) is developed further in relation to the problems of emotion, consciousness, and brain activity. The approach starts with the claim that many conceptual confusions in psychology are due to the postulate that the organism and the environment are two interacting systems (”Two systems theory”). The gist of the approach is the idea that the organism and environment form a unitary system which is the basis of subjective experience. This starting point leads to the conception of emotions as reorganization of the organism-environment system, and entails that emotion and knowledge are only different aspects of the same process. In the first part of the article the general outline of the approach is sketched, and in a subsequent second part (Jarvilehto, 2001) the relations between emotions, consciousness, and brain activity will be discussed in detail
J., A. & K., L. (2003). Intentional avoidance and social understanding in repressors and nonrepressors: Two functions for emotion experience? Consciousness and Emotion 4 (1):17-42.   (Google)
Abstract: Two putative functions of emotion experience — its roles in intentional action and in social understanding — were investigated using a group of individuals (repressors) known to have impaired anxiety experience. Repressors, low-anxious, high-anxious, and defensive high-anxious individuals were asked to give a public presentation, and then given the opportunity to avoid the presentation. Repressors were the group most likely to avoid giving the presentation, but were the least likely to give an emotional explanation for their avoidance. By contrast, they were not less likely than other groups to provide negative emotional explanations of another person’s behaviour in a film clip. We concluded that: (1) repressors are impaired in self- but not in other-explanation using emotion, implying that “simulation” is not the method used by repressors to ground their folk psychology, (2) the intentional avoidance shown by repressors is indicative of some intact first-order phenomenal anxiety experience but that they lack second-order awareness of this anxiety experience
Johnson, Gregory (2008). LeDoux's Fear Circuit and the Status of Emotion as a Non-cognitive Process. Philosophical Psychology 21 (6):739 - 757.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: LeDoux (1996) has identified a sub-cortical neural circuit that mediates fear responses in rats. The existence of this neural circuit has been used to support the claim that emotion is a non-cognitive process. In this paper I argue that this sub-cortical circuit cannot have a role in the explanation of emotions in humans. This worry is raised by looking at the properties of this neural pathway, which does not have the capacity to respond to the types of stimuli that are generally taken to trigger emotion responses. In particular, the neurons in this pathway cannot represent the stimulus as a complete object or event, rather they represent the simple information that is encoded at the periphery. If it is assumed that an object or event in the world is what, even in simple cases, causes an emotion, then this sub-cortical pathway has limited use in a theory of emotion.
Joseph, R. (2003). Emotional trauma and childhood amnesia. Consciousness and Emotion 4 (2):151-179.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: It has been reported that, on average, most adults recall first memories formed around age 3.5. In general, most first memories are positive. However, whether these first memories tend to be visual or verbal and whether the period for childhood amnesia (CA) is greater for visual or verbal or for positive versus negative memories has not been determined. Because negative, stressful experiences disrupt memory and can injure memory centers such as the hippocampus and amygdala, and since adults who were traumatized or abused during childhood (TA) reportedly suffer memory disturbances, it was hypothesized that those with a history of early trauma might suffer from a lengthier childhood amnesia and form their first recallable memories at a later age as compared to the general population (GP). Because the right hemisphere matures earlier than the language-dominant left hemisphere, and is dominant for visual and emotional memory, as well as the stress reponse, it was hypothesized that first recallable memories would be visual rather than verbal. Lastly, since stress can injure the brain and disrupt memory, it was hypothesized that the traumatized group would demonstrate memory and intellectual disturbances associated with right hemisphere injury as based on WAIS-R, Wechsler Memory Scale, and facial-memory testing. All hypotheses were supported. Positive and visual memories are formed before negative and verbal memories. TA CA offset, on average, is at age 6.1 versus 3.5 for GPs. TA PIQ (performance IQ), short-term visual memory, and facial memory were significantly reduced
Joseph, Jacob; Berry, Kevin & Deshpande, Satish P. (2009). Impact of emotional intelligence and other factors on perception of ethical behavior of Peers. Journal of Business Ethics 89 (4).   (Google)
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Järvilehto, Timo (2001). Feeling as knowing--part II: Emotion, consciousness and brain activity. Consciousness and Emotion. Special Issue 2 (1):75-102.   (Google)
Abstract: In the latter part of this two-article sequence, the concept of emotion as reorganization of the organism-environment system is developed further in relation to consciousness, subjective experience and brain activity. It is argued that conscious emotions have their origin in reorganizational changes in primitive co-operative organizations, in which they get a more local character with the advent of personal consciousness and individuality, being expressed in conscious emotions. However, the conscious emotion is not confined to the individual only, but it gets its content and the emotional quale in the social context, and in relation to the norms of the given culture. Emotion is fundamentally the process of ascription of meaning to the parts of the world which are relevant in the achievement of results of behavior. Although emotions may be studied as reorganizational processes in the organism-environment system with the help of physiological recordings and behavioral observations, it is argued — in contrast to the mainstream cognitive science — that emotions cannot be localized in the brain, although the brain is important in their generation as a part of the organism-environment system. It is suggested that the parts of the brain most closely related to emotional expression contain neurons subserving functional systems which are formed in early development, and which are therefore most intimately related to reorganizational processes in the organism-environment system
Järvilehto, Timo (2001). Some background and further theoretical consequences of the organism-environment approach: A reply to the commentary by Panksepp. Consciousness and Emotion 2 (2):311-319.   (Google)
Juslin, Patrik N. & Västfjäll, Daniel (2008). All emotions are not created equal: Reaching beyond the traditional disputes. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (5):600-621.   (Google)
J., L. (2003). What role do the emotions play in cognition?: Towards a new alternative to cognitive theories of emotion. Consciousness and Emotion 4 (1):81-100.   (Google)
Abstract: This paper has two aims: (1) to point the way towards a novel alternative to cognitive theories of emotion, and (2) to delineate a number of different functions that the emotions play in cognition, functions that become visible from outside the framework of cognitive theories. First, I hold that the Higher Order Representational (HOR) theories of consciousness — as generally formulated — are inadequate insofar as they fail to account for selective attention. After posing this dilemma, I resolve it in such a manner that the following thesis arises: the emotions play a key role in shaping selective attention. This thesis is in accord with A. Damasio’s (1994) noteworthy neuroscientific work on emotion. I then begin to formulate an alternative to cognitive theories of emotion, and I show how this new account has implications for the following issues: face recognition, two brain disorders (Capgras’ and Fregoli syndrome), the frame problem in A. I., and the research program of affective computing
Kahn, D.; Pace-Schott, E. & Hobson, J. A. (2002). Emotion and cognition: Feeling and character identification in dreaming. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (1):34-50.   (Google)
Abstract: This study investigated the relationship between dream emotion and dream character identification. Thirty-five subjects provided 320 dream reports and answers to questions on characters that appeared in their dreams. We found that emotions are almost always evoked by our dream characters and that they are often used as a basis for identifying them. We found that affection and joy were commonly associated with known characters and were used to identify them even when these emotional attributes were inconsistent with those of the waking state. These findings are consistent with the finding that the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, associated with short-term memory, is less active in the dreaming compared to the wake brain, while the paleocortical and subcortical limbic areas are more active. The findings are also consistent with the suggestion that these limbic areas have minimal input from the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex in the dreaming brain
Kaszniak, A. W. (2002). Review of “the private life of the brain: Emotions, consciousness, and the secret of the self” by Susan Greenfield. Consciousness and Emotion 2 (2):321-329.   (Google)
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Abstract: Rolls's preliminary definitions of emotion and speculative restriction of consciousness, including emotional sentience, to humans, display behaviorist prejudice. Reinforcement and causation are not by themselves sufficient conceptual resources to define either emotion or the directedness of thought and motivated action. For any adequate definition of emotion or delimitation of consciousness, new physiology, such as Rolls is contributing to, and also the resources of other fields, will be required
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Lambie, John A. & Baker, Kevin L. (2003). Intentional avoidance and social understanding in repressers and nonrepressors: Two functions for emotion experience? Consciousness and Emotion 4 (1):17-42.   (Google)
Abstract: Two putative functions of emotion experience ? its roles in intentional action and in social understanding ? were investigated using a group of individuals (repressors) known to have impaired anxiety experience. Repressors, low-anxious, high-anxious, and defensive high-anxious individuals were asked to give a public presentation, and then given the opportunity to avoid the presentation. Repressors were the group most likely to avoid giving the presentation, but were the least likely to give an emotional explanation for their avoidance. By contrast, they were not less likely than other groups to provide negative emotional explanations of another person?s behaviour in a film clip. We concluded that: (1) repressors are impaired in self- but not in other-explanation using emotion, implying that ?simulation? is not the method used by repressors to ground their folk psychology, (2) the intentional avoidance shown by repressors is indicative of some intact first-order phenomenal anxiety experience but that they lack second-order awareness of this anxiety experience
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Abstract: The target article developed a dynamic systems framework that viewed the causal basis of emotion as a self-organizing process giving rise to cognitive appraisal concurrently. Commentators on the article evaluated this framework and the principles and mechanisms it incorporated. They also suggested additional principles, mechanisms, modeling strategies, and phenomena related to emotion and appraisal, in place of or extending from those already proposed. There was general agreement that nonlinear causal processes are fundamental to the psychology and neurobiology of emotion
Lewis, Marc D. (2005). Bridging emotion theory and neurobiology through dynamic systems modeling. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (2):169-194.   (Google)
Abstract: Efforts to bridge emotion theory with neurobiology can be facilitated by dynamic systems (DS) modeling. DS principles stipulate higher-order wholes emerging from lower-order constituents through bidirectional causal processes – offering a common language for psychological and neurobiological models. After identifying some limitations of mainstream emotion theory, I apply DS principles to emotion–cognition relations. I then present a psychological model based on this reconceptualization, identifying trigger, self-amplification, and self-stabilization phases of emotion-appraisal states, leading to consolidating traits. The article goes on to describe neural structures and functions involved in appraisal and emotion, as well as DS mechanisms of integration by which they interact. These mechanisms include nested feedback interactions, global effects of neuromodulation, vertical integration, action-monitoring, and synaptic plasticity, and they are modeled in terms of both functional integration and temporal synchronization. I end by elaborating the psychological model of emotion–appraisal states with reference to neural processes. Key Words: appraisal; bidirectional causality; cognition; dynamic systems; emotion; neurobiology; part–whole relations; self-organization
Lewis, Marc D. & Todd, Rebecca M. (2005). Getting emotional - a neural perspective on emotion, intention, and consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (8-10):210-235.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
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Linquist, Stefan (2007). Prospects for a dual inheritance model of emotional evolution. Philosophy of Science 74 (5).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: A common objection to adaptationist accounts of human emotions is that they ignore the influence of culture. If complex emotions like guilt, shame and romantic jealousy are largely culturally determined, how could they be biological adaptations? Dual inheritance models of gene/culture coevolution provide a potential answer to this question. If complex emotions are developmentally ‘scaffolded' by norms that are transmitted from parent to offspring with reasonably high fidelity, then these emotions can evolve to promote individual reproductive interests. This paper draws on case studies of emotional development to illustrate how complex emotions satisfy these conditions. Many of the norms and parenting strategies influencing emotional development are absorbed during the early stages of life when a child is in primary contact with its parents and before the onset of complex cognition. These conditions make it likely that emotion-governing norms are transmitted vertically and with relatively little cognitive ‘contamination'. ‡Thanks to Mark Colyvan, Paul Griffiths, Alexander Rosenberg, and John Wilkins for helpful comments on previous drafts. †To contact the author, please write to: Department of Philosophy, University of Queensland, Brisbane, Queensland 4072, Australia; e-mail: s.linquist@uq.edu.au
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Abstract: Erdelyi argues persuasively for his unified theory of repression. Beyond this, what can studying repression bring to our understanding of other aspects of emotional function? Here we consider ways in which work on repression might inform the study of, on one hand, emotional memory, and on the other, the emotional numbing seen in patients with chronic persistent depersonalization symptoms
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Abstract: The James–Lange theory considers emotional feelings as perceptions of physiological body changes. This approach has recently resurfaced and modified in both neuroscientific and philosophical concepts of embodiment of emotional feelings. In addition to the body, the role of the environment in emotional feeling needs to be considered. I here claim that the environment has not merely an indirect and thus instrumental role on emotional feelings via the body and its sensorimotor and vegetative functions. Instead, the environment may have a direct and non-instrumental, i.e., constitutional role in emotional feelings; this implies that the environment itself in the gestalt of the person–environment relation is constitutive of emotional feeling rather than the bodily representation of the environment. Since the person–environment relation is crucial in this approach, I call it the relational concept of emotional feeling. After introducing the relational concept of emotional feeling, the present paper investigates the neurophilosophical question whether current neuroimaging data on human emotion processing and anatomical connectivity are empirically better compatible with the “relational” or the “embodied” concept of emotional feeling. These data lend support to the empirical assumption that neural activity in subcortical and cortical midline regions code the relationship between intero- and exteroceptive stimuli in a relational mode, i.e. their actual balance, rather than in a translational mode, i.e., by translating extero- into interoceptive stimulus changes. Such intero-exteroceptive relational mode of neural coding may have implications for the characterization of emotional feeling with regard to phenomenal consciousness and intentionality. I therefore conclude that the here advanced relational concept of emotional feeling may be considered neurophilosophically more plausible and better compatible with current neuroscientific data than the embodied concept as presupposed in the James–Lange theory and its modern neuroscientific and philosophical versions
Northoff, Georg (2008). Is appraisal 'embodied' and 'embedded'? A neurophilosophical investigation of emotions. Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (5):68-99.   (Google)
Abstract: Emotion theories in present philosophical discussion propose different models of relationship between feeling and appraisal. The multicomponent model considers appraisal as separate component and distinguishes it from feeling and physiological body changes thus presupposing what may be called 'disembodied' and 'disembedded' appraisal as representational. The recently emerged concept of enactment, in contrast, argues that appraisal is closely linked to feeling and physiological body changes presupposing what can be called 'embodied' and 'embedded' appraisal as relational. The aim of the paper is to investigate which concept of appraisal, the 'disembedded' or the 'embedded' one, is better compatible with current neuroimaging data on emotion processing and thus neurophilosophically more tenable. The 'disembodied' and 'disembedded' concept implies distinct and independent brain regions underlying feeling and appraisal whereas 'embodied' and 'embedded' appraisal implies overlapping and dependent brain regions. Recent neuroimaging studies demonstrate that medial and lateral prefrontal cortical regions are involved in both feeling and appraisal and that there seems to be reciprocal modulation between these regions. Though preliminary, these data suggest that feeling and appraisal are associated with different patterns of neural activity across overlapping and interdependent brain regions. I therefore conclude that current neuroscientific evidence is rather in favor of the 'embodied' and 'embedded' concept of appraisal as relational than the one of 'disembodied' and 'disembedded' appraisal as representational that is presupposed in current multicomponent theories of emotions
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Panksepp, J. (2002). ADHD and the neural consequences of play and joy: A framing essay for the following empirical paper. Consciousness and Emotion 3 (1):1-6.   (Google)
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Panksepp, Jaak (2005). Affective consciousness: Core emotional feelings in animals and humans. Consciousness and Cognition 14 (1):30-80.   (Cited by 31 | Google | More links)
Panksepp, Jaak (2005). Commentary on "becoming aware of feelings": On the primal nature of affective consciousness: What are the relations between emotional awareness and affective experience? Neuro-Psychoanalysis 7 (1):40-55.   (Google)
Panksepp, Jaak (2001). Jarvilehto's seductive ideas: Provocative concepts without data? Consciousness and Emotion. Special Issue 2 (1):157-171.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: Introductory Note: This commentary developed out of an informal discussion of Part I (2000) of Jarvilehto?s two-part Consciousness & Emotion series with Ralph Ellis at the recent Amsterdam Symposium on Feelings and Emotions (June 13?16, 2001). Part II of Jarvilehto?s series appears in the present issue. Ellis asked me to share my critical concerns with Jarvilehto?s Part I in this commentary, with an advance copy supplied to Jarvilehto, who will reply in the next issue of Consciousness & Emotion. I think most of us recognize the need for pluralism in the study of complex processes such as consciousness and emotions, but to place emotions and feelings so strongly into the environment as does Jarvilehto strikes me simply as a category mistake. I acknowledge that my commentary comes from my own unique (and by some standards radical) perspective on how the field might best move forward empirically. I believe an honest understanding of how natural psychological kinds emerge from specifiable brain functions, which are obviously modulated by environmental events, is presently the most important and most poorly studied aspect of modern mind-science. I felt that Jarvilehto?s holistic approach would only further serve to discourage investigators from pursuing those important issues neuro-empirically
Panksepp, Jaak (2002). On the animalian values of the human spirit: The foundational role of affect in psychotherapy and the evolution of consciousness. European Journal of Psychotherapy, Counselling and Health 5 (3):225-245.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Panksepp, Jaak (2005). On the embodied neural nature of core emotional affects. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (8-10):158-184.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Panksepp, Jaak (2003). Review article: "Looking for Spinoza: Joy, sorrow, and the feeling brain" by A. Damasio. Consciousness and Emotion 4 (1):111-134.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Panksepp, J. & Gordon, N. (2003). The instinctual basis of human affect: Affective imaging of laughter and crying. Consciousness and Emotion 4 (2):197-205.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The goal of this study was to evaluate affective changes induced during mental imaging of instinctual action patterns. Subjects were first trained to simulate the bodily rhythms of laughter and crying and were then trained to image these processes without any movement. The mere imagination of the motor imagery of laughter and crying were sufficient to significantly facilitate happy and sad mood ratings as monitored by subjective self-report. In contrast, no changes in mood were reported while imaging the affectively neutral task of walking. The work suggests that motor imagery is sufficient to modify emotional feelings, suggesting the feasibility of this method for brain imaging of emotional processes
Panksepp, Jaak (2000). The neuro-evolutionary cusp between emotions and cognitions: Implications for understanding consciousness and the emergence of a unified mind science. Consciousness and Emotion 1 (1):15-54.   (Cited by 41 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The neurobiological systems that mediate the basic emotions are beginning to be understood. They appear to be constituted of genetically coded, but experientially refined executive circuits situated in subcortical areas of the brain which can coordinate the behavioral, physiological and psychological processes that need to be recruited to cope with a variety of primal survival needs (i.e., they signal evolutionary fitness issues). These birthrights allow newborn organisms to begin navigating the complexities of the world and to learn about the values and contingencies of the environment. Some of these systems have been identified and characterized using modern neuroscientific and psychobiological tools. The fundamental emotional systems can now be defined by the functional psychobiological characteristics of the underlying circuitries ? characteristics which help coordinate behavioral, physiological and psychological aspects of emotionality, including the valenced affective feeling states that provide fundamental values for the guidance of behavior. The various emotional circuits are coordinated by different neuropeptides, and the arousal of each system may generate distinct affective/neurodynamic states and imbalances may lead to various psychiatric disorders. The aim of this essay is to discuss the underlying conceptual issues that must be addressed for additional progress in understanding the nature of primary process affective consciousness
Panksepp, J.; Burgdorf, J.; Gordon, N. & Turner, C. (2002). Treatment of ADHD with methylphenidate may sensitize brain substrates of desire: Implications for changes in drug abuse potential from an animal model. Consciousness and Emotion 3 (1):7-19.   (Google)
Abstract: Aims. Currently, methylphenidate (MPH, trade name Ritalin) is the most widely prescribed medication for attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). We examined the ability of repeated MPH administration to produce a sensitized appetitive eagerness type response in laboratory rats, as indexed by 50-kHz ultrasonic vocalizations (50-kHz USVs). We also examined the ability of MPH to reduce play behavior in rats which may be partially implicated in the clinical efficacy of MPH in ADHD. Design. 56 adolescent rats received injections of either 5.0 mg/kg MPH, or vehicle each day for 8 consecutive days, and a week later received a challenge injection of either MPH or vehicle. Measurements. Both play behavior (pins) and 50-kHz USVs were recorded after each drug or vehicle administration. Results. MPH challenge produced a substantial 73% reduction in play behavior during the initial treatment phase, and during the last test (1 week post drug), 50-kHz USVs were elevated approximately threefold only in animals with previous MPH experience. Conclusions. These data suggest that MPH treatment may lead to psychostimulant sensitization in young animals, perhaps by increasing future drug-seeking tendencies due to an elevated eagerness for positive incentives. Further, we hypothesize that MPH may be reducing ADHD symptoms, in part, by blocking playful tendencies, whose neuro-maturational and psychological functions remain to be adequately characterized
Parr, Lisa A. (2001). Understanding other's emotions: From affective resonance to empathic action. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (1):44-45.   (Google)
Abstract: Empathy is a developmental process whereby individuals come to understand the emotional states of others. While the exact nature of this process remains unknown, PAM's utility is that it establishes empathy along a continuum of behavior ranging from emotional contagion to cognitive forms, a very useful distinction for understanding the phylogeny and ontogeny of this important process. The model will undoubtedly fuel future research, especially from comparative domains where data are most problematic
Penn, David (2006). Looking for the emotional unconscious in advertising. International Journal of Market Research 48 (5):515-524.   (Google)
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Pessoa, Luiz; Japee, Shruti; Sturman, David & Ungerleider, Leslie G. (2006). Target visibility and visual awareness modulate amygdala responses to fearful faces. Cerebral Cortex 16 (3):366-375.   (Cited by 18 | Google | More links)
Pessoa, Luiz (2005). To what extent are emotional visual stimuli processed without attention and awareness? Current Opinion in Neurobiology 15 (2):188-196.   (Cited by 23 | Google | More links)
Pessoa, Luiz; Japee, Shruti & Ungerleider, Leslie G. (2005). Visual awareness and the detection of fearful faces. Emotion 5 (2):243-247.   (Cited by 16 | Google)
Phelps, Elizabeth A. (2005). The interaction of emotion and cognition: The relation between the human amygdala and cognitive awareness. In Ran R. Hassin, James S. Uleman & John A. Bargh (eds.), The New Unconscious. Oxford Series in Social Cognition and Social Neuroscience. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
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Potegal, Michael (2005). Characteristics of anger: Notes for a systems theory of emotion. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (2):215-216.   (Google)
Abstract: Although emotion may subserve social function, as with anger-maintaining dominance, emotions are more than variant cognitions. Anger promotes risk-taking, attention-narrowing, and cognitive impairment. The proposition that appraised “blameworthiness” is necessary for anger excludes young children's anger as well as adults' pain-induced anger. To be complete, any systems model of anger must account for its temporal characteristics, including escalation and persistence
Pratto, F. (1994). Consciousness and automatic evaluation. In Paula M. Niedenthal & S. Kitayama (eds.), The Heart's Eye: Emotional Influences in Perception and Attention. Academic Press.   (Cited by 43 | Google)
Prinz, Jesse J. (2005). Emotions, embodiment, and awareness. In Lisa Feldman Barrett, Paula M. Niedenthal & Piotr Winkielman (eds.), Emotion and Consciousness. Guilford Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Radden, J. (2003). Review of “passionate engines: What emotions reveal about mind and artificial intelligence” by Craig DeLancey. Consciousness and Emotion 4 (1):143-148.   (Google | More links)
R., W. & G., C. (2003). Are emotional expressions intentional?: A self-organizational approach. Consciousness and Emotion 4 (1):1-16.   (Google)
Abstract: This paper discusses the debate over whether emotional expressions are spontaneous or intentional actions. We describe a variety of empirical evidence supporting these two possibilities. But we argue that the spontaneous-intentional distinction fails to explain the psychological dynamics of emotional expressions. We claim that a complex systems perspective on intentions, as self-organized critical states, may yield a unified view of emotional expressions as a consequence of situated action. This account simultaneously acknowledges the embodied status of environment, evolution, culture and mind in theories of emotion
Ramsay, Jason T. & Lewis, Marc D. (2000). The causal status of emotions in consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (2):215-216.   (Google)
Abstract: Rolls demonstrates how reward/punishment systems are key mediators of cognitive appraisal, and this suggests a fundamental, causal role for emotion in thought and behaviour. However, this causal role for emotion seems to drop out of Rolls's model of consciousness, to be replaced by the old idea that emotion is essentially epiphenomenal. We suggest a modification to Rolls's model in which cognition and emotion activate each other reciprocally, both in appraisal and consciousness, thus allowing emotion to maintain its causal status where it matters most
Ravven, H. M. (2003). Spinoza’s anticipation of contemporary affective neuroscience. Consciousness and Emotion 4 (2):257-290.   (Google)
Abstract: Spinoza speculated on how ethics could emerge from biology and psychology rather than disrupt them and recent evidence suggests he might have gotten it right. His radical deconstruction and reconstruction of ethics is supported by a number of avenues of research in the cognitive and neurosciences. This paper gathers together and presents a composite picture of recent research that supports Spinoza’s theory of the emotions and of the natural origins of ethics. It enumerates twelve naturalist claims of Spinoza that now seem to be supported by substantial evidence from the neurosciences and recent cognitive science. I focus on the evidence provided by Lakoff and Johnson in their summary of recent cognitive science in Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought (1999); by Antonio Damasio in his assessment of the state of affective neuroscience in Descartes’ Error (1994) and in The Feeling of What Happens (1999) (with passing references to his recent Looking for Spinoza (2003); and by Giacomo Rizzolatti, Vittorio Gallese and their colleagues in the neural basis of emotional contagion and resonance, i.e., the neural basis of primitive sociality and intersubjectivity, that bear out Spinoza’s account of social psychology as rooted in the mechanism he called attention to and identified as affective imitation
Reiman, E. M.; Lane, Richard D. R.; Ahern, G. L. & Schwartz, Gary E. (1996). Positron emission tomography, emotion, and consciousness. In S. Hamreoff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness. MIT Press.   (Google)
Rietveld, Erik (2008). The Skillful Body as a Concernful System of Possible Actions: Phenomena and Neurodynamics. Theory & Psychology 18 (3):341-361.   (Google)
Abstract: For Merleau-Ponty,consciousness in skillful coping is a matter of prereflective ‘I can’ and not explicit ‘I think that.’ The body unifies many domain-specific capacities. There exists a direct link between the perceived possibilities for action in the situation (‘affordances’) and the organism’s capacities. From Merleau-Ponty’s descriptions it is clear that in a flow of skillful actions, the leading ‘I can’ may change from moment to moment without explicit deliberation. How these transitions occur, however, is less clear. Given that Merleau-Ponty suggested that a better understanding of the self-organization of brain and behavior is important, I will re-read his descriptions of skillful coping in the light of recent ideas on neurodynamics. Affective processes play a crucial role in evaluating the motivational significance of objects and contribute to the individual’s prereflective responsiveness to relevant affordances.
Rolls, Edmund T. (1995). A theory of emotion and consciousness, and its application to understanding the neural basis of emotion. In Michael S. Gazzaniga (ed.), The Cognitive Neurosciences. MIT Press.   (Cited by 88 | Google)
Rolls, Edmund T. (2000). Précis of the brain and emotion. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (2):177-191.   (Google)
Abstract: The topics treated in The brain and emotion include the definition, nature, and functions of emotion (Ch. 3); the neural bases of emotion (Ch. 4); reward, punishment, and emotion in brain design (Ch. 10); a theory of consciousness and its application to understanding emotion and pleasure (Ch. 9); and neural networks and emotion-related learning (Appendix). The approach is that emotions can be considered as states elicited by reinforcers (rewards and punishers). This approach helps with understanding the functions of emotion, with classifying different emotions, and in understanding what information-processing systems in the brain are involved in emotion, and how they are involved. The hypothesis is developed that brains are designed around reward-and punishment-evaluation systems, because this is the way that genes can build a complex system that will produce appropriate but flexible behavior to increase fitness (Ch. 10). By specifying goals rather than particular behavioral patterns of responses, genes leave much more open the possible behavioral strategies that might be required to increase fitness. The importance of reward and punishment systems in brain design also provides a basis for understanding the brain mechanisms of motivation, as described in Chapters 2 for appetite and feeding, 5 for brain-stimulation reward, 6 for addiction, 7 for thirst, and 8 for sexual behavior. Key Words: amygdala; brain evolution; consciousness; dopamine; emotion; hunger; orbitofrontal cortex; punishment; reward; taste
Rolls, Edmund T. (2007). The affective neuroscience of consciousness: Higher order syntactic thoughts, dual routes to emotion and action, and consciousness. In Philip David Zelazo, Morris Moscovitch & Evan Thompson (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness. Cambridge.   (Google)
R., D. (2003). Review of “the hidden genius of emotion: Lifespan transformations of personality” by Carol magai and Jeanette haviland-Jones. Consciousness and Emotion 4 (1):148-150.   (Google)
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Safran, J. D. & Greenberg, L. S. (1987). Affect and the unconscious: A cognitive perspective. In Robert Stern (ed.), Theories of the Unconscious and Theories of the Self. Analytic Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Sander, David & Scherer, Klaus R. (2005). Amalgams and the power of analytical chemistry: Affective science needs to decompose the appraisal-emotion interaction. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (2):216-217.   (Google)
Abstract: The issues addressed in this commentary include: (1) the appropriate conceptualization of “appraisal”; (2) the nature and unfolding of emotional episodes over time; (3) the interrelationships between the dynamic elements of the appraisal process and their effects on other emotion components, as well as repercussions on ongoing appraisal in a recursive process; and (4) the use of brain research to constrain and inform models of emotion
Scheff, Thomas J. & Fearon Jr, David S. (2004). Cognition and emotion? The dead end in self-esteem research. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 34 (1):73–90.   (Google | More links)
Schutter, J. L. & van Honk, J. (2004). Extending the global workspace theory to emotion: Phenomenality without access. Consciousness and Cognition 13 (3):539-549.   (Cited by 24 | Google | More links)
Schwartz, J.; Stapp, Henry P. & Beauregard, Mario (2004). The Volitional Influence of the Mind on the Brain, with Special Reference to Emotional Self-Regulation. Consciousness, Emotional Self-Regulation and the Brain. In Mario Beauregard (ed.), Consciousness, Emotional Self-Regulation and the Brain. John Benjamins.   (Google)
Scherer, Klaus R. (2005). Unconscious processes in emotion: The bulk of the iceberg. In Lisa Feldman Barrett, Paula M. Niedenthal & Piotr Winkielman (eds.), Emotion and Consciousness. Guilford Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
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Smith, Stephen D. & Bulman-Fleming, M. Barbara (2006). Hemispheric asymmetries for the conscious and unconscious perception of emotional words. Laterality 11 (4):304-330.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Stacey, Ralph (2005). Affects and cognition in a social theory of unconscious processes. Group Analysis 38 (1):159-176.   (Google)
Stegge, Hedy & Terwogt, Mark Meerum (2007). Awareness and regulation of emotion in typical and atypical development. In James J. Gross (ed.), Handbook of Emotion Regulation. Guilford Press.   (Google)
Stewart, Jeffrey B. (ms). The development of consciousness from affective sources.   (Google)
Stolorow, R. D. (2003). Review of “the hidden genius of emotion: Lifespan transformations of personality” by Carol magai and Jeanette haviland-Jones. Consciousness and Emotion 4 (1):148-150.   (Google)
Sundararajan, L. (2000). Background-mood in emotional creativity: A microanalysis. Consciousness and Emotion 1 (2):227-243.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Background mood differs from focal emotions in that it is an inchoate “bodily felt sense” rather than full fledged emotional syndromes such as anger, sadness, etc. Microanalysis of a Focusing therapy session is made to illustrate how the cultivation and maintenance of background mood with its characteristic double vision is essential to emotional creativity
Suslow, Thomas; Ohrmann, Patricia; Bauer, Jochen; Rauch, Astrid V.; Schwindt, Wolfram; Arolt, Volker; Heindel, Walter & Kugel, Harald (2006). Amygdala activation during masked presentation of emotional faces predicts conscious detection of threat-related faces. Brain and Cognition 61 (3):243-248.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Szczepanowski, Remigiusz & Pessoa, Luiz (2007). Fear perception: Can objective and subjective awareness measures be dissociated? Journal of Vision 7 (4):1-17.   (Google | More links)
Taitano, Elizabeth K. (ms). Individual differences in emotional awareness and the lateralized processing of emotion.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Townsend, John Marshall (1998). Dominance, sexual activity, and sexual emotions. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (3):386-386.   (Google)
Abstract: Men's interest in sex partners' status traits and commitment (investment thoughts) declines with number of sex partners and permissiveness of attitudes; women's investment thoughts do not seem to decline. Testosterone, dominance, sexual attractiveness, and number of sex partners are correlated in men but not in women. It is plausible that these sex differences are part of sexually dimorphic feedback systems. This type of feedback is consistent with both reciprocal and basal models of testosterone
Tracy, Jessica L. & Robins, Richard W. (2004). Keeping the self in self-conscious emotions: Further arguments for a theoretical model. Psychological Inquiry 15 (2):171-177.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Tracy, Jessica L. & Robins, Richard W. (2004). Putting the self into self-conscious emotions: A theoretical model. Psychological Inquiry 15 (2):103-125.   (Cited by 24 | Google)
Tsuchiya, Naotsugu & Adolphs, Ralph (2007). Emotion and consciousness. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 11 (4):158-167.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
van Honk, Jack; Morgan, Barak E. & Schutter, Dennis J. L. G. (2007). Raw feeling: A model for affective consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (1):107-108.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Seeking to unlock the secrets of consciousness, neuroscientists have been studying neural correlates of sensory awareness, such as meaningless randomly moving dots. But in the natural world of species' survival, “raw feelings” mediate conscious adaptive responses. Merker connects the brainstem with vigilance, orientating, and emotional consciousness. However, depending on the brain's phylogenetic level, raw feeling takes particular forms. (Published Online May 1 2007)
van Baaren, Rick B.; Fockenberg, Daniel A.; Holland, Rob W.; Janssen, Loes & van Knippenberg, Ad (2006). The Moody chameleon: The effect of mood on non-conscious mimicry. Social Cognition 24 (4):426-437.   (Google)
Wakefield, Jerome C. (1991). Why emotions can't be unconscious: An exploration of Freud's essentialism. Psychoanalysis and Contemporary Thought 14:29-67.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Walther, E. (2001). Damasio on consciousness. Iyyun 50 (January):63-72.   (Google)
Watt, Douglas F. (2004). Consciousness, emotional self-regulation and the brain: Review article. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (9):77-82.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Watt, D. F. (2000). The centrecephalon and thalamocortical integration: Neglected contributions of periaqueductal gray. Consciousness and Emotion 1 (1):91-114.   (Google)
Abstract: I have argued in other work that emotion, attentional functions, and executive functions are three interpenetrant global state variables, essentially differential slices of the consciousness pie. This paper will outline the columnar architecture and connectivities of the PAG (periaqueductal gray), its role in organizing prototype states of emotion, and the re-entry of PAG with the extended reticular thalamic activating system (“ERTAS”). At the end we will outline some potential implications of these connectivities for possible functional correlates of PAG networks that are just starting to be mapped. Overall, we will look at many lines of evidence that PAG should be conceptualized as a peri-reticular structure that has a foundational role in emotion, in generating the meaningful organization of behavior by the brain through prototype emotional states, and in allowing the various emotional systems to globally influence and tune both the forebrain and brainstem. Finally, we address implications of these concepts for what is currently understood about consciousness, underlining the need for somewhat more humility within consciousness studies about our current level of understanding of consciousness in the brain, combined with a deeper appreciation of the intrinsic connections between emotion and consciousness. One hopes that more concerted empirical interest in structures underneath the thalamus, combined with a deeper appreciation for the fundamental role that organismic and social value must have in bootstrapping awareness in the developing brain, would begin more widely to influence the fundamental lines of neuroscientific research in both emotion studies and consciousness studies
Weiskrantz, Lawrence (2000). Blindsight: Implications for the conscious experience of emotion. In Richard D. R. Lane, L. Nadel & G. L. Ahern (eds.), Cognitive Neuroscience of Emotion. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Winkielman, Piotr & Nowak, Andrzej (2005). Dynamics of cognition-emotion interface: Coherence breeds familiarity and liking, and does it fast. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (2):222-223.   (Google)
Abstract: We present a dynamical model of interaction between recognition memory and affect, focusing on the phenomenon of “warm glow of familiarity.” In our model, both familiarity and affect reflect quick monitoring of coherence in an attractor neural network. This model parsimoniously explains a variety of empirical phenomena, including mere-exposure and beauty-in-averages effects, and the speed of familiarity and affect judgments
Winkielman, Piotr; Berridge, Kent C. & Wilbarger, Julia L. (2005). Emotion, behavior, and conscious experience: Once more without feeling. In Barr (ed.), Emotion and Consciousness. Guilford Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Winkielman, Piotr & Berridge, Kent C. (2004). Unconscious emotion. Current Directions in Psychological Science 13 (3):120-123.   (Cited by 32 | Google | More links)
Wong, Philip S. (2003). Unconscious emotion. NYS Psychologist. Special Issue 15 (3):23-26.   (Google)
Zachar, P. (2001). Review of “the subtlety of emotions (MIT press)” by Aaron Ben-zé ev (2000). Consciousness and Emotion 2 (1):180-188.   (Google)
Zachar, P. (2003). Review of “worlds of experience: Interweaving philosophical and clinical dimensions in psychoanalysis” by Robert D. Stolorow, George E. Atwood, and Donna M. orange. Consciousness and Emotion 4 (2):333-340.   (Google | More links)
Zajonc, R. B. (2000). Feeling and thinking: Closing the debate over the independence of affect. In Joseph P. Forgas (ed.), Feeling and Thinking: The Role of Affect in Social Cognition. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 69 | Google)

8.8g Time and Consciousness in Psychology

Albertazzi, Liliana (1999). The time of presentness. A chapter in positivistic and descriptive psychology. Axiomathes 10 (1-3).   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Allport, D. A. (1968). Phenomenal similarity and the perceptual moment hypothesis. British Journal of Psychology 59:395-406.   (Google)
Atmanspacher, Harald (ms). The significance of causally coupled, stable neuronal assemblies for the psychological time arrow.   (Google)
Abstract: Stable neuronal assemblies are generally regarded as neural correlates of mental representations. Their temporal sequence corresponds to the experience of a direction of time, sometimes called the psychological time arrow. We show that the stability of particular, biophysically motivated models of neuronal assemblies, called coupled map lattices, is supported by causal interactions among neurons and obstructed by non-causal or anti-causal interactions among neurons. This surprising relation between causality and stability suggests that those neuronal assemblies that are stable due to causal neuronal interactions, and thus correlated with mental representations, generate a psychological time arrow. Yet this impact of causal interactions among neurons on the directed sequence of mental representations does not rule out the possibility of mentally less efficacious non-causal or anti-causal interactions among neurons
Banks, R. & Cappon, D. (1962). Effect of reduced sensory input on time perception. Perceptual and Motor Skills 14.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
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Abstract: Models of psychological time / Richard A. Block -- Implicit and explicit representations of time / John A. Michon -- The evasive art of subjective time...
Block, Richard A. (1996). Psychological time and memory systems of the brain. In J. T. Fraser & M. Soulsby (eds.), Dimensions of Time and Life: The Study of Time. , Volume 8.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Block, Richard A. (1979). Time and consciousness. In G. Underwood & R. Stevens (eds.), Aspects of Consciousness, Volume 1. Academic Press.   (Cited by 20 | Google)
Brown, Jason W. (1990). Psychology of time awareness. Brain and Cognition 14:144-64.   (Cited by 17 | Google)
Brown, Jason W. (1991). Self and Process: Brain States and the Conscious Present. Springer-Verlag.   (Cited by 30 | Google)
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Evans, Vyvyan (2004). The Structure of Time: Language, Meaning and Temporal Cognition. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.   (Cited by 29 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Drawing on findings in psychology, neuroscience, and utilising the perspective of cognitive linguistics, this work argues that our experience of time may...
Fraser, J. T. (ed.) (1989). Time and Mind: Interdisciplinary Issues. International Universities Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Friedman, William J. (1990). About Time: Inventing the Fourth Dimension. Cambridge: MIT Press.   (Cited by 64 | Google)
Gallistel, C. Randy (1996). The perception of time. In Kathleen Akins (ed.), Perception. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Glicksohn, Joseph (2001). Temporal cognition and the phenomenology of time: A multiplicative function for apparent duration. Consciousness and Cognition 10 (1):1-25.   (Cited by 14 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The literature on time perception is discussed. This is done with reference both to the ''cognitive-timer'' model for time estimation and to the subjective experience of apparent duration. Three assumptions underlying the model are scrutinized. I stress the strong interplay among attention, arousal, and time perception, which is at the base of the cognitive-timer model. It is suggested that a multiplicative function of two key components (the number of subjective time units and their size) should predict apparent duration. Implications for other cognitive domains are drawn, and in particular an analogy is suggested between apparent duration and apparent movement
Gooddy, W. (1967). Introduction to problems of time awareness. Studium Generale 20:33-41.   (Google)
Hameroff, Stuart R. (online). Time, consciousness, and quantum events in fundamental space-time geometry.   (Google)
Abstract: 1. Introduction: The problems of time and consciousness What is time? St. Augustine remarked that when no one asked him, he knew what time was; however when someone asked him, he did not. Is time a process which flows? Is time a dimension in which processes occur? Does time actually exist? The notion that time is a process which "flows" directionally may be illusory (the "myth of passage") for if time did flow it would do so in some medium or vessel (e.g. minutes per what?) [1]. But if time is a dimension in which processes occurred, e.g. as one component of a 4 dimensional spacetime, then why would processes occur unidirectionally in time? Yet we perceive time as an orderly, unidirectional process. An alternative explanation is that time does not exist as either a process or dimension, but that reality is a collage of discrete, disconnected and haphazardly arranged configurations of the universe, e.g. as described in Julian Barbour's "The end of time" [2]. In this view our perception of a unidirectional flow of time occurs because each moment, or "Now" as Barbour terms them, involves memory of other conceptually relevant moments, and the orderly flow of time is an illusion. Barbour's deconstruction of time contrasts the Newtonian reality of objects moving deterministically through 4 dimensional spacetime. Newton's contemporary (and rival) Leibniz [3] viewed the world in a manner consistent with Barbour (and with Mach's principle that the spatiotemporal structure of the universe is dependent on the distribution of mass, a foundation of Einstein's general relativity). According to Leibniz the world is to be understood not as matter/mass moving in a framework of space and time, but of more fundamental snapshot-like entities that momentarily fuse space and matter into single possible arrangements or configurations of the entire universe. Such configurations, which can be fabulously rich and complex considering the vastness of the universe, are the ultimate "things" of reality, which Leibniz termed "monads"..
Hicks, R. E.; Miller, George W.; Gaes, G. & Bierman, K. (1977). Concurrent processing demands and the experience of time-in-passing. American Journal of Psychology 90:431-46.   (Cited by 33 | Google)
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Hoagland, Hudson (1943). The chemistry of time. Scientific Monthly 56 (3):56-61.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Knight, Robert T. & Grabowecky, M. (1995). Escape from linear time: Prefrontal cortex and conscious experience. In Michael S. Gazzaniga (ed.), The Cognitive Neurosciences. MIT Press.   (Cited by 66 | Google)
Lynds, Peter (ms). Subjective perception of time and a progressive present moment: The neurobiological key to unlocking consciousness.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The conclusion of physics, within both a historical and more recent context, that an objectively progressive time and present moment are derivative notions without actual physical foundation in nature, illustrate that these perceived chronological features originate from subjective conscious experience and the neurobiological processes underlying it. Using this conclusion as a stepping stone, it is posited that the phenomena of an in-built subjective conception of a progressive present moment in time and that of conscious awareness are actually one and the same thing, and as such, are also the outcome of the same neurobiological processes. A possible explanation as to how this might be achieved by the brain through employing the neuronal induced nonconscious cognitive manipulation of a small interval of time is proposed. The CIP phenomenon, elucidated within the context of this study is also then discussed
Malmgren, Helge (online). Why the past is sometimes perceived, and not only remembered.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Updated abstract Historical landmarks Temporal Gestalts How does the sensory buffer ”retain” a temporal Gestalt? What is memory and what is perception in speech perception? Varieties of motor control Are ”ballistic” movements really ballistic? State or time representations? How to implement a temporal motor code Acknowledgments References
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Poppel, Ernst (1988). Mindworks: Time and Conscious Experience. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Poppel, Ernst & Schwender, D. (1993). Temporal mechanisms of consciousness. International Anesthesiology Clinics 31:27-38.   (Google)
Reidhead, V. A. & Wolford, J. B. (1998). Context, conditioning, and meaning of time-consciousness in a trappist monastery. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness II. MIT Press.   (Google)
Robertson, T. B. (1923). Consciousness and the sense of time. Scientific Monthly 16:649-657.   (Google)
Sanders, S. A. (1986). Development of a tool to measure subjective time experience. Nursing Research 35:178-182.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Schaltenbrand, G. (1967). Consciousness and time. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 138:632-645.   (Google | More links)
Smythies, J. (2003). Space, time and consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (3):47-56.   (Google)
Strong, Charles A. (1896). Consciousness and time. Psychological Review 3:149-57.   (Google)
Stroud, J. M. (1967). The fine structure of psychological time. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 138:623-631.   (Cited by 125 | Google | More links)
Stroud, J. M. (1957). The fine structure of psychological time. In H. Quastler (ed.), Information Theory in Psychology: Problems and Methods. Free Press.   (Cited by 125 | Google | More links)
Treisman, Michel (1999). The perception of time: Philosophical views and psychological evidence. In The Arguments of Time. New York: Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Tulving, Endel (2002). Chronesthesia: Conscious awareness of subjective time. In Donald T. Stuss & Robert T. Knight (eds.), Principles of Frontal Lobe Function. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 19 | Google)
Vogeley, Kai & Kupke, Christian (2007). Disturbances of time consciousness from a phenomenological and neuroscientific perspective. Schizophrenia Bulletin 33 (1):157-165.   (Google | More links)
Yarrow, K.; Haggard, Patrick & Rothwell, J. (2004). Action, arousal, and subjective time. Consciousness and Cognition 13 (2):373-390.   (Cited by 3 | Google)

8.8h Self-Consciousness in Psychology

Andersen, Susan M.; Reznik, Inga & Glassman, Noah S. (2005). The unconscious relational self. In Ran R. Hassin, James S. Uleman & John A. Bargh (eds.), The New Unconscious. Oxford Series in Social Cognition and Social Neuroscience. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Arenander, Alarik T. & Travis, Frederick T. (2004). Brain patterns of self-awareness. In Bernard D. Beitman & Jyotsna Nair (eds.), Self-Awareness Deficits in Psychiatric Patients: Neurobiology, Assessment, and Treatment. W.W. Norton & Co.   (Google)
Asendorpf, J. B.; Warkentin, V. & Baudonniere, P. (1996). Self-awareness and other-awareness. Ii 32.   (Cited by 57 | Google)
Baars, Bernard J. (1998). Attention, self, and conscious self-monitoring. In A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: ?In everday language, the word ?attention? implies control of access to consciousness, and we adopt this usage here. Attention itself can be either voluntary or automatic. This can be readily modeled in the theory. Further, a contrastive analysis of spontaneously self?attributed vs. self?alien experiences suggests that ?self? can be interpreted as the more enduring, higher levels of the dominant context hierarchy, which create continuity over the changing flow of events. Since context is by definition unconscious in GW theory, self in this sense is thought to be inherently unconscious as well. This proposal is consistent with a great deal of objective evidence. However, aspects of self may become known through ?conscious self-monitoring,? a process that ??is useful for self-evaluation and self?control. The results of conscious self-monitoring are combined with self?evaluation criteria, presumably of social origin, to produce a stable ?self?concept?, which functions as a supervisory system within the larger self organization
Bach, Laura J. & David, Anthony S. (2006). Self-awareness after acquired and traumatic brain injury. Neuropsychological Rehabilitation 16 (4):397-414.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Beitel, Mark; Ferrer, Elena & Cecero, John J. (2005). Psychological mindedness and awareness of self and others. Journal of Clinical Psychology 61 (6):739-750.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Beitman, Bernard D. & Nair, Jyotsna (2004). Self-Awareness Deficits in Psychiatric Patients: Neurobiology, Assessment, and Treatment. W.W.Norton.   (Google)
Beitman, Bernard D.; Nair, Jyotsna & Viamontes, George I. (2004). Why self-awareness? In Bernard D. Beitman & Jyotsna Nair (eds.), Self-Awareness Deficits in Psychiatric Patients: Neurobiology, Assessment, and Treatment. W.W. Norton & Co.   (Google)
Blachowicz, James A. (2002). The dialogue of the soul with itself. In Shaun Gallagher & Jonathan Shear (eds.), Models of the Self. Thorverton UK: Imprint Academic.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Bob, Petr (2006). Self-awareness deficits in psychiatric patients. Neurobiology. Assessment and treatment. Journal of Analytical Psychology 51 (2):311-312.   (Google | More links)
Boyer, Pascal; Robbins, Philip & Jack, Anthony I. (2005). Varieties of self-systems worth having. Consciousness and Cognition 14 (4):647-660.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Burch, Richard J. (2004). Attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder: A disorder of self-awareness. In Bernard D. Beitman & Jyotsna Nair (eds.), Self-Awareness Deficits in Psychiatric Patients: Neurobiology, Assessment, and Treatment. W.W. Norton & Co.   (Google)
Butterworth, George (1995). The self as an object of consciousness in infancy. In P. Rochat (ed.), The Self in Infancy: Theory and Research. Elsevier.   (Cited by 9 | Google)
Carruthers, Glenn (forthcoming). A problem for Wegner and colleagues' model of the sense of agency. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences.   (Google)
Abstract: The sense of agency, that is the sense that one is the agent of one’s bodily actions, is one component of our self-consciousness. Recently, Wegner and colleagues have developed a model of the causal history of this sense. Their model takes it that the sense of agency is elicited for an action when one infers that one or other of one’s mental states caused that action. In their terms, the sense of agency is elicited by the inference to apparent mental state causation. Here, I argue that this model is inconsistent with data from developmental psychology that suggests children can identify the agent behind an action without being capable of understanding the relationship between their intentions and actions. Furthermore, I argue that this model is inconsistent with the preserved sense of agency in autism. In general, the problem is that there are cases where subjects can experience themselves as the agent behind their actions despite lacking the resources to make the inference to apparent mental state causation
Carruthers, Glenn (2009). Commentary on Synofzik, Vosgerau and Newen. Consciousness and Cognition 18:515 - 520.   (Google)
Abstract: Synofzik, Vosgerau, and Newen (2008) offer a powerful explanation of the sense of agency. To argue for their model they attempt to show that one of the standard models (the comparator model) fails to explain the sense of agency and that their model offers a more general account than is aimed at by the standard model. Here I offer comment on both parts of this argument. I offer an alternative reading of some of the data they use to argue against the comparator model. I argue that contrary to Synofzik, Vosgerau and Newen’s reading the case of G.L. supports rather than contradicts the comparator model. Next I suggest how the comparator model can differentiate failures of action attribution in patients suffering parietal lobe lesions and delusions of alien control. I also argue that the apparently unexpected phenomenon of ‘‘hyperassociation” is predicted by the comparator model. Finally I suggest that as it stands Synofzik, Vosgerau and Newen’s model is not well specified enough to explain deficits in the sense of agency associated with delusions of thought insertion. Thus they have not met their second argumentative burden of showing how their model is more general than the comparator model.
Carver, Charles S. (2003). Self-awareness. In Mark R. Leary & June Price Tangney (eds.), Handbook of Self and Identity. Guilford Press.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Carver, Charles S. & Scheier, M. F. Matthews (1983). Self-awareness and the self-regulation of behaviour. In G. Underwood (ed.), Aspects of Consciousness, Volume 3: Awareness and Self-Awareness. Academic Press.   (Google)
Carruthers, Glenn (forthcoming). The case for the comparator model as an explanation of the sense of agency and its breakdowns. Consciousness and Cognition.   (Google)
Abstract: I compare Frith and colleagues’ influential comparator account of how the sense of agency is elicited to the multifactorial weighting model advocated by Synofzik and colleagues. I defend the comparator model from the common objection that the actual sensory consequences of action are not needed to elicit the sense of agency. I examine the comparator model’s ability to explain the performance of healthy subjects and those suffering from delusions of alien control on various self-attribution tasks. It transpires that the comparator model needs case-by-case adjustment to deal with problematic data. In response to this, the multifactorial weighting model of Synofzik and colleagues is introduced. Although this model is incomplete, it is more naturally constrained by the cases that are problematic for the comparator model. However, this model may be untestable. I conclude that currently the comparator model approach has stronger support than the multifactorial weighting model approach.
Chakravarti, Sibapada (1961). Philosophy and self-consciousness. Philosophical Quarterly (India) 33 (January):223-229.   (Google)
Cheeks, J. M. & Briggs, S. R. (1982). Self-consciousness and aspects of personality. Journal of Research in Personality 16:401-8.   (Google)
Cohen, Robyn J. & Calamari, John E. (2004). Thought-focused attention and obsessive-compulsive symptoms: An evaluation of cognitive self-consciousness in a nonclinical Sample. Cognitive Therapy and Research 28 (4):457-471.   (Google)
Cole, Jonathan (2004). Tetraplegia and self-consciousness. In Dan Zahavi, T. Grunbaum & Josef Parnas (eds.), The Structure and Development of Self-Consciousness: Interdisciplinary Perspectives. John Benjamins.   (Google)
Collins, Mick (2001). Who is occupied? Consciousness, self-awareness and the process of human adaptation. Journal of Occupational Science 8 (1):25-32.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Cooney, Brian (1979). The neural basis of self-consciousness. Nature and System 1 (March):16-31.   (Google)
Decety, J. & Chaminade, T. (2003). When the self represents the other: A new cognitive neuroscience view on psychological identification. Consciousness and Cognition 12 (4):577-596.   (Cited by 43 | Google | More links)
Abstract: There is converging evidence from developmental and cognitive psychology, as well as from neuroscience, to suggest that the self is both special and social, and that self-other interaction is the driving force behind self-development. We review experimental findings which demonstrate that human infants are motivated for social interactions and suggest that the development of an awareness of other minds is rooted in the implicit notion that others are like the self. We then marshal evidence from functional neuroimaging explorations of the neurophysiological substrate of shared representations between the self and others, using various ecological paradigms such as mentally representing one's own actions versus others' actions, watching the actions executed by others, imitating the others' actions versus being imitated by others. We suggest that within this shared neural network the inferior parietal cortex and the prefrontal cortex in the right hemisphere play a special role in the essential ability to distinguish the self from others, and in the way the self represents the other. Interestingly, the right hemisphere develops its functions earlier than the left
Duval, Shelley & Wicklund, R. A. (1972). A Theory of Objective Self-Awareness. Academic Press.   (Cited by 648 | Google)
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Fenigstein, A. (1997). Self-consciousness and its relation to psychological mindedness. In M. McCallum & W. Piper (eds.), Psychological Mindedness: A Contemporary Understanding. Lawrence Erlbaum.   (Cited by 9 | Google)
Fletcher, Clive & Bailey, Caroline (2003). Assessing self-awareness: Some issues and methods. Journal of Managerial Psychology 18 (5):395-404.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Frantz, Cynthia; Mayer, F. Stephan; Norton, Chelsey & Rock, Mindi (2005). There is no "I" in nature: The influence of self-awareness on connectedness to nature. Journal of Environmental Psychology 25 (4):427-436.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Freeman, Walter J. & Watts, J. W. (1941). The frontal lobes and consciousness of self. Psychosomatic Medicine 3:111-19.   (Google)
Frith, Christopher D. (1996). The role of the prefrontal cortex in self-consciousness: The case of auditory hallucinations. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London B 351:1505-12.   (Cited by 70 | Google | More links)
Gallup, G. G. (1998). Self-awareness and the evolution of social intelligence. Behavioural Processes 42:239-247.   (Cited by 27 | Google)
Gardiner, John M. (2000). On the objectivity of subjective experiences and autonoetic and noetic consciousness. In Endel Tulving (ed.), Memory, Consciousness, and the Brain: The Tallinn Conference. Psychology Press/Taylor & Francis.   (Cited by 9 | Google)
Gusnard, Debra A. (2005). Being a self: Considerations from functional imaging. Consciousness and Cognition 14 (4):679-697.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Hart, Daniel & Fegley, S. (1994). Social imitation and the emergence of a mental model of self. In S. T. Parker, R. Mitchell & M. L. Boccia (eds.), Self-Awareness in Animals and Humans: Developmental Perspectives. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 12 | Google)
Hart, Daniel & Fegley, S. (1997). The development of self-awareness and self-understanding in cultural context. In U. Neisser (ed.), The Conceptual Self in Context. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Hodgins, Holley S. & Knee, C. Raymond (2002). The integrating self and conscious experience. In Edward L. Deci & Richard M. Ryan (eds.), Handbook of Self-Determination Research. University of Rochester Press.   (Cited by 19 | Google)
Hull, Jay G.; Slone, Laurie B.; Meteyer, Karen B. & Matthews, Amanda R. (2002). The nonconsciousness of self-consciousness. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 83 (2):406-424.   (Cited by 12 | Google)
Jaynes, Julian (1976). The Origins of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind. Houghton Mifflin.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Jeannerod, Marc (2004). From self-recognition to self-consciousness. In Dan Zahavi, T. Grunbaum & Josef Parnas (eds.), The Structure and Development of Self-Consciousness: Interdisciplinary Perspectives. John Benjamins.   (Google)
Keenan, Julian Paul; Wheeler, Mark A. & Ewers, Michael (2003). The neural correlates of self-awareness and self-recognition. In Tilo Kircher & Anthony S. David (eds.), The Self in Neuroscience and Psychiatry. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Kessel, Frank S.; Cole, P. M. & Johnson, D. L. (eds.) (1992). Self and Consciousness: Multiple Perspectives. Lawrence Erlbaum.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This volume contains an array of essays that reflect, and reflect upon, the recent revival of scholarly interest in the self and consciousness. Various relevant issues are addressed in conceptually challenging ways, such as how consciousness and different forms of self-relevant experience develop in infancy and childhood and are related to the acquisition of skill; the role of the self in social development; the phenomenology of being conscious and its metapsychological implications; and the cultural foundations of conceptualizations of consciousness. Written by notable scholars in several areas of psychology, philosophy, cognitive neuroscience, and anthropology, the essays are of interest to readers from a variety of disciplines concerned with central, substantive questions in contemporary social science, and the humanities
Kihlstrom, John F. (1997). ConsciousNess and me-Ness. In Jonathan D. Cohen & Jonathan W. Schooler (eds.), Scientific Approaches to Consciousness. Lawrence Erlbaum.   (Cited by 21 | Google)
Kihlstrom, John F. & Klein, S. B. (1997). Self-knowledge and self-awareness. In James G. Snodgrass & R. Thompson (eds.), The Self Across Psychology: Self-Recognition, Self-Awareness, and the Self Concept. New York Academy of Sciences.   (Google)
Kinsbourne, Marcel (1995). Awareness of one's own body: An attentional theory of its nature, development, and brain basis. In Jose Luis Bermudez, Anthony J. Marcel & Naomi M. Eilan (eds.), The Body and the Self. MIT Press.   (Google)
Kinsbourne, Marcel (1998). Representations in consciousness and the neuropsychology of insight. In Xavier F. Amador & A. David (eds.), Insight and Psychosis. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Kircher, Tilo & David, Anthony S. (2003). Self-consciousness: An integrative approach from philosophy, psychopathology and the neurosciences. In Tilo Kircher & Anthony S. David (eds.), The Self in Neuroscience and Psychiatry. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 10 | Google)
Kober, Hedy; Ray, Alysa; Obhi, Sukhvinder; Guise, Kevin & Keenan, Julian Paul (2005). The neural correlates of depersonalization: A disorder of self-awareness. In Todd E. Feinberg & Julian Paul Keenan (eds.), The Lost Self: Pathologies of the Brain and Identity. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Kunzendorf, Robert G. (2000). Individual differences in self-conscious source monitoring: Theoretical, experimental, and clinical considerations. In Robert G. Kunzendorf & B. Alan Wallace (eds.), Individual Differences in Conscious Experience. John Benjamins.   (Google)
Kunzendorf, Robert G. (1988). Self-consciousness as the monitoring of cognitive states: A theoretical perspective. Imagination, Cognition and Personality 7:3-22.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Kunzendorf, Robert G.; Beltz, S. M. & Tymowicz, G. (1992). Self-awareness in autistic subjects and deeply hypnotized subjects: Dissociation of self-concept versus self-consciousness. Imagination, Cognition and Personality 11:129-41.   (Google)
Legrand, Dorothée (2003). How not to find the neural signature of self-consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 12 (4):544-546.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Lenggenhager, Bigna; Tadi, Tej; Metzinger, Thomas & Blanke, Olaf (2007). Video ergo sum: Manipulating bodily self-consciousness. Science 317 (5841):1096-1099.   (Google)
Levine, Brian (2000). Self-regulation and autonoetic consciousness. In Endel Tulving (ed.), Memory, Consciousness, and the Brain: The Tallinn Conference. Psychology Press/Taylor & Francis.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Lewis, M. (1994). Myself and me. In S. T. Parker, R. Mitchell & M. L. Boccia (eds.), Self-Awareness in Animals and Humans: Developmental Perspectives. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 13 | Google)
Lewis, Michael (2003). The development of self-consciousness. In Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford: Clarendon Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Lewis, M. (1991). Ways of knowing: Objective self-awareness or consciousness. Developmental Review 11:231-43.   (Cited by 18 | Google)
Lovejoy, Arthur O. (1907). The desires of the self-conscious. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 4 (2):29-39.   (Google | More links)
Maasen, Sabine (2007). Selves in turmoil - neurocognitive and societal challenges of the self. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (1-2):252-270.   (Google)
Abstract: As the cognitive neurosciences set out to challenge our understanding of consciousness, the existing conceptual panoply of meanings attached to the term remains largely unaccounted for. By way of bibliometric analysis, the following study first reveals the breadth and shift of meanings over the last decades, the main tendency being a more 'brainy' concept of consciousness. On this basis, the emergence of consciousness studies is regarded as a 'trading zone' (Galison) in which experimental, philosophical and experiential accounts are dialectically engaged. Outside of academic discourse, a neurocognitive concept of consciousness is embraced by popular self-help literature that sweepingly adopts this new discourse and the novel neuropharmacological tools in the self-help toolbox. Consciousness studies are hence not only the product of epistemological and methodological struggles (scientific dimension) but also part of the current re-alignments regarding the notion of consciously acting selves in society (societal dimension)
Malcolm, Sarah & Keenan, Julian Paul (2003). My right I: Deception detection and hemispheric differences in self-awareness. Social Behavior and Personality 31 (8):767-772.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Markova, Ivana (1990). The development of self-consciousness: Baldwin, Mead, and vygotsky. In James E. Faulconer & R. Williams (eds.), Reconsidering Psychology. Duquesne University Press.   (Google)
Metcalfe, Janet & Kober, Hedy (2005). Self-reflective consciousness and the projectable self. In Herbert S. Terrace & Janet Metcalfe (eds.), The Missing Link in Cognition: Origins of Self-Reflective Consciousness. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Mitchell, Robert W. (1997). A comparison of the self-awareness and kinesthetic-visual matching theories of self-recognition: Autistic children and others. In James G. Snodgrass & R. Thompson (eds.), The Self Across Psychology: Self-Recognition, Self-Awareness, and the Self Concept. New York Academy of Sciences.   (Google | More links)
Mitchell, Robert W. (1993). Mental models of mirror self-recognition: Two theories. New Ideas in Psychology 11:295-325.   (Cited by 53 | Google)
Mitchell, Robert W. (1994). Multiplicities of self. In S. T. Parker, R. Mitchell & M. L. Boccia (eds.), Self-Awareness in Animals and Humans: Developmental Perspectives. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Mollon, P. (1987). Self-awareness, self-consciousness, and preoccupation with self. In K. Yardley & T. Honess (eds.), Self and Identity: Psychosocial Perspectives. Wiley.   (Google)
Morin, Alain (2004). A neurocognitive and socioecological model of self-awareness. Genetic Social And General Psychology Monographs 130 (3):197-222.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Morin, Alain (1995). Characteristics of an effective internal dialogue in the acquisition of self-information. Imagination, Cognition and Personality 15 (1):45-58.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This article raises the question of how self-talk mediates self-awareness. It is argued that the process of acquiring self-information can be seen as a problem-solving task, and that self-talk can facilitate this process (as it does for any other problem) by promoting a precise formulation and approach to the problem, by adequately focusing attention on the task, and through constant self-evaluations. A complementary analysis of the possible characteristics of an effective internal dialogue in the acquisition of self-information is undertaken. Among other things, taking others' perspective through self-talk, possessing a rich vocabulary about oneself, and paying attention to the content of one's self-talk are believed to be important in that respect. Clinical implications raised by this analysis are also discussed
Morin, Alain (ms). Developing self-awareness with inner speech: Theoretical background, underlying mechanisms, and empirical evidence.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Morin, Alain (1998). Imagery and self-awareness: A theoretical note. Theory and Review in Psychology.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This article suggests that one possible function of imagery is its role as a mediator of self-awareness and its significance in the acquisition of self- information. Sparse allusions of a relation between imagery and self-awareness have been mentioned before, but no real attempt to account for the nature of the link has been undertaken. The following hypothesis is put forward: some cognitive processes are capable of internally reproducing social mechanisms responsible for self-awareness. One such mechanism is the opportunity to see oneself as one is seen by others. It is postulated that imagery internalizes this social mechanism because mental images empower us to literally see ourselves acting (or having behaved) in given ways as others could see (or have seen) us acting. When one mentally sees oneself behaving in a given fashion, one is self-aware; furthermore, when one reflects on past behaviors by using mental images, one can deduct aspects of one's past functioning from what is internally seen, that is, acquire self- information and build a self-concept. The importance for mental images to have in their content the organism's body image (especially one's facial features) is underlined, and experiences with self-reflecting devices (e.g., mirrors) are presumed to be crucial in that respect
Morin, Alain & Everett, Jennifer (1990). Inner speech as a mediator of self-awareness, self-consciousness, and self-knowledge: An hypothesis. New Ideas in Psychology 8 (3):337-56.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Morin, Alain (2003). Inner speech and conscious experience. Science and Consciousness Review 4.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Abstract: Imagine that scientists have been successful at designing a drug that “freezes” brain areas producing our internal monologue. After taking the drug you can’t talk to yourself anymore. Every other mental activity is fine, but it’s now total silence in your head. Not a word. What would happen? What would it be like?
Morin, Alain (online). Language and self-awareness.   (Google)
Abstract: In my 2003 SCR paper “Inner speech and conscious experience” (LINK) I put forward the notion that we most often need to talk to ourselves in order to understand who we are. That is, inner speech is frequently required to access self-information and to gradually build a self- concept. To illustrate, let’s imagine that you want to reflect on an abdominal pain you are currently experiencing. It is very likely that you will engage in an internal monologue, thinking “Why is it that my belly hurts? I feel cramps... Ha! I get it—I skipped breakfast...” You could go on and also notice: “I’ve been missing breakfast often lately... I tend to sleep in, I don’t eat breakfast, and by noon I’m starving... And I didn’t go to the gym as often as I should have... This is bad—I’m getting _lazy_...” Here the adjective “lazy” constitutes the conclusion that you have drawn from your inner monologue; it may then become a more or less permanent part of your self-concept
Morin, Alain (2006). Levels of consciousness and self-awareness: A comparison and integration of various neurocognitive views. Consciousness and Cognition 15 (2):358-371.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Quite a few recent models are rapidly introducing new concepts describing different levels of consciousness. This situation is getting confusing because some theorists formulate their models without making reference to existing views, redundantly adding complexity to an already difficult problem. In this paper, I present and compare nine neurocognitive models to highlight points of convergence and divergence. Two aspects of consciousness seem especially important: perception of self in time and complexity of self-representations. To this I add frequency of self-focus, amount of self-related information, and accuracy of self-knowledge. Overall, I conclude that many novel concepts (e.g., reflective, primary, core, extended, recursive, and minimal consciousness) are useful in helping us distinguish between delicate variations in consciousness and in clarifying theoretical issues that have been intensely debated in the scientific literature—e.g., consciousness in relation to mirror self-recognition and language. Ó 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved
Morin, Alain (2004). Levels of consciousness and self-awareness: A comparison and integration of various views. Consciousness and Cognition 15 (2):358-371.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Quite a few recent models are rapidly introducing new concepts describing different levels of consciousness. This situ- ation is getting confusing because some theorists formulate their models without making reference to existing views, redun- dantly adding complexity to an already difficult problem. In this paper, I present and compare nine neurocognitive models to highlight points of convergence and divergence. Two aspects of consciousness seem especially important: perception of self in time and complexity of self-representations. To this I add frequency of self-focus, amount of self-related informa- tion, and accuracy of self-knowledge. Overall, I conclude that many novel concepts (e.g., reflective, primary, core, extend- ed, recursive, and minimal consciousness) are useful in helping us distinguish between delicate variations in consciousness and in clarifying theoretical issues that have been intensely debated in the scientific literature—e.g., consciousness in rela- tion to mirror self-recognition and language
Morin, Alain (1999). On a relation between self-awareness and inner speech: Additional evidence from brain studies. Dynamical Psychology.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In this short paper I review past studies examining the neurological substrates of inner speech and self-awareness. The evidence points to a common neurological area: the left inferior frontal region. It is thus highly tempting to conclude that these two operations are deeply linked
Morin, Alain (2005). Possible links between self-awareness and inner speech: Theoretical background, underlying mechanisms, and empirical evidence. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (4-5):115-134.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract: been recently proposed (Morin, 2003; 2004). The model takes into account most known mechanisms and processes leading to self-awareness, and examines their multiple and complex interactions. Inner speech is postulated to play a key-role in this model, as it establishes important connections between many of its ele- ments. This paper first reviews past and current references to a link between self-awareness and inner speech. It then presents an analysis of the nature of the relation between these two concepts. It is suggested that inner speech can inter- nally reproduce and expand social and physical (ecological) sources of self- awareness. Inner speech can also create a psychological distance between the self and mental events it experiences (thus facilitating self-observation) it can act as a problem-solving device where the self represents the problem and self-information the solution, and can label aspects of one’s inner life that would otherwise be difficult to objectively perceive. Empirical evidence supporting the role of inner speech in self-awareness is also presented
Morin, Alain & Everett, James (1991). Self-awareness and introspective private speech in 6-year-old children. Psychological Reports 68:1299-1306.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Morin, Alain (1993). Self-talk and self-awareness: On the nature of the relation. Journal of Mind and Behavior 14 (3):223-234.   (Cited by 19 | Google | More links)
Morin, Alain (2002). Self-awareness review part 1: Do you "self-reflect" or "self-ruminate"? Science and Consciousness Review 1:1.   (Google)
Abstract: We all spend time analyzing our inner thoughts and feelings; past research looked at this activity as being unitary in nature (i.e., simply focusing on the self), examined how frequently people introspect, and identified the effects of self-focus on behavior. Current studies indicate that people actually engage in two different types of self-analysis: self-reflection (enjoying analyzing the self) and self-rumination (not being able to shut off thoughts about the self), each leading to opposite consequences
Morin, Alain (2003). Self-awareness review part 2: Changing or escaping the self. Science and Consciousness Review 1:1.   (Google)
Abstract: When we become self-aware we see who we are and what we would like to be. What do we do? Do we change who we are? Or do we escape self-awareness by watching TV—or worst, by drinking alcohol, doing drugs, or committing suicide?
Nasby, W. (1989). Private self-consciousness, self-awareness, and the reliability of self-reports. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 56:950-7.   (Cited by 17 | Google)
Neisser, U. (1992). The development of consciousness and the acquisition of self. In Frank S. Kessel, P. M. Cole, D. L. Johnson & D. Johnson (eds.), Self and Consciousness: Multiple Perspectives. Lawrence Erlbaum.   (Google)
Newen, Albert & Vogeley, Kai (2003). Self-representation: Searching for a neural signature of self-consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 12 (4):529-543.   (Cited by 14 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Human self-consciousness operates at different levels of complexity and at least comprises five different levels of representational processes. These five levels are nonconceptual representation, conceptual representation, sentential representation, meta-representation, and iterative meta-representation. These different levels of representation can be operationalized by taking a first-person-perspective that is involved in representational processes on different levels of complexity. We refer to experiments that operationalize a first-person-perspective on the level of conceptual and meta-representational self-consciousness. Interestingly, these experiments show converging evidence for a recruitment of medial cortical and parietal regions during taking a first-person-perspective, even when operating on different degrees of complexity. These data lend support for the speculative hypothesis, that there exist a neural signature for human self-consciousness that is recruited independent from the degree of representational complexity to be performed
Oatley, Keith (2007). Narrative modes of consciousness and selfhood. In Philip David Zelazo, Morris Moscovitch & Evan Thompson (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness. Cambridge.   (Google)
O'Donoghue, Ted & Rabin, Matthew (2003). Self-awareness and self-control. In George Loewenstein, Daniel Read & Roy. Baumeister (eds.), Time and Decision: Economic and Psychological Perspectives on Intertemporal Choice. Russell Sage Foundation.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Pinku, Guy & Tzelgov, Joseph (2006). Consciousness of the self (COS) and explicit knowledge. Consciousness and Cognition 15 (4):655-661.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Reddy, Vasudevi (2003). On being the object of attention: Implications for self-other consciousness. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (9):397-402.   (Cited by 23 | Google)
Rochat, P. (2003). Five levels of self-awareness as they unfold early in life. Consciousness and Cognition 12 (4):717-731.   (Cited by 20 | Google | More links)
Abstract: When do children become aware of themselves as differentiated and unique entity in the world? When and how do they become self-aware? Based on some recent empirical evidence, 5 levels of self-awareness are presented and discussed as they chronologically unfold from the moment of birth to approximately 4-5 years of age. A natural history of children's developing self-awareness is proposed as well as a model of adult self-awareness that is informed by the dynamic of early development. Adult self-awareness is viewed as the dynamic flux between basic levels of consciousness that develop chronologically early in life
Royce, Josiah (1895). Self-consciousness, social consciousness, and nature. II. Philosophical Review 4 (6):577-602.   (Google | More links)
Royce, Josiah (1895). Self-consciousness, social consciousness and nature. I. Philosophical Review 4 (5):465-485.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Scandell, D. (2001). Is self-reflectiveness an unhealthy aspect of private self-consciousness? Journal of Psychology 135 (4):451-461.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Schneider, Johann F.; Pospeschill, Markus & Ranger, Jochen (2005). Does self-consciousness mediate the relation between self-talk and self-knowledge? Psychological Reports 96 (2):387-396.   (Google)
Schneider, Johann F. (2002). Relations among self-talk, self-consciousness and self-knowledge. Psychological Reports 91 (3):807-812.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Sebanz, Natalie (2007). The emergence of self. In J. Scott Jordan & Dawn M. McBride (eds.), The Concepts of Consciousness: Integrating an Emerging Science. Imprint Academic.   (Google)
Abstract: This article explores the role of social factors in the emergence of self and other. It is suggested that the experience of causing actions contributes to a basic sense of self in which awareness of mental states and the experience of a mental self are grounded. According to the proposed evolutionary scenario, the experience of agency emerged as individuals acting in social context learned to differentiate between effects caused by their own actions and effects resulting from joint action. Through joint action, individuals also developed an understanding of others' actions as goal-directed, paving the way for imitation. The ability to distinguish between action capabilities of self and other and the understanding that action-effect principles apply equally to self and other may have provided important advantages in circumstances where cooperative action and social learning were critical. The current proposal adds to previous evolutionary scenarios in that it identifies social conditions that may have shaped a basic sense of self. This, in turn, could have given rise to theory of mind and the cultural construction of mental selves
Sherer, Mark; Hart, Tessa & Nick, Todd G. (2003). Measurement of impaired self-awareness after traumatic brain injury: A comparison of the patient competency rating scale and the awareness questionnaire. Brain Injury 17 (1):25-37.   (Google)
Shotter, J. (1983). Consciousness and self-consciousness: Inner games and alternative realities. In G. Underwood (ed.), Aspects of Consciousness, Volume 3: Awareness and Self-Awareness. Academic Press.   (Google)
Shrauger, J. S. & Osberg, T. M. (1983). Self-awareness: The ability to predict one's subsequent behaviour. In G. Underwood (ed.), Aspects of Consciousness, Volume 3: Awareness and Self-Awareness. Academic Press.   (Google)
Siegrist, M. (1995). Inner speech as a cognitive process mediating self-consciousness and inhibiting self-deception. Psychological Reports 76:259-65.   (Cited by 18 | Google)
Silvia, Paul J. & Duval, Thomas Shelley (2004). Self-awareness, self-motives, and self-motivation. In Wright, Rex A. (Ed); Greenberg, Jeff (Ed); Brehm, Sharon S. (Ed). (2004). Motivational Analyses of Social Behavior: Building on Jack Brehm's Contributions to Psychology. (Pp. 57-75). Mahwah, NJ, US.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Snodgrass, James G. & Thompson, R. L. (eds.) (1997). The Self Across Psychology: Self-Recognition, Self-Awareness, and the Self Concept. New York Academy of Sciences.   (Cited by 12 | Google)
Stuss, Donald T.; Rosenbaum, R. Shayna; Malcolm, Sarah; Christiana, William & Keenan, Julian Paul (2005). The frontal lobes and self-awareness. In Todd E. Feinberg & Julian Paul Keenan (eds.), The Lost Self: Pathologies of the Brain and Identity. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Théoret, Hugo; Kobayashi, Masahito; Merabet, Lotfi; Wagner, Tim; Tormos, Jose M. & Pascual-Leone, Alvaro (2004). Modulation of right motor cortex excitability without awareness following presentation of masked self-images. Cognitive Brain Research 20 (1):54-57.   (Google)
Titchener, Edward Bradford (1911). A note on the consciousness of self. American Journal of Psychology 22:540-52.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Travis, Frederick T.; Arenander, Alarik T. & DuBois, D. (2004). Psychological and physiological characteristics of a proposed object-referral/self-referral continuum of self-awareness. Consciousness and Cognition 13 (2):401-420.   (Google)
Viamontes, George I.; Beitman, Bernard D.; Viamontes, Claudia T. & Viamontes, Jorge A. (2004). Neural circuits for self-awareness: Evolutionary origins and implementation in the human brain. In Bernard D. Beitman & Jyotsna Nair (eds.), Self-Awareness Deficits in Psychiatric Patients: Neurobiology, Assessment, and Treatment. W.W. Norton & Co.   (Google)
Vogeley, Kai; Kurthen, M. Moskopp; Falkai, P. & Maier, W. (1999). Essential functions of the human self model are implemented in the prefrontal cortex. Consciousness and Cognition 8 (3):343-363.   (Cited by 30 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The human self model comprises essential features such as the experiences of ownership, of body-centered spatial perspectivity, and of a long-term unity of beliefs and attitudes. In the pathophysiology of schizophrenia, it is suggested that clinical subsyndromes like cognitive disorganization and derealization syndromes reflect disorders of this self model. These features are neurobiologically instantiated as an episodically active complex neural activation pattern and can be mapped to the brain, given adequate operationalizations of self model features. In its unique capability of integrating external and internal data, the prefrontal cortex (PFC) appears to be an essential component of the neuronal implementation of the self model. With close connections to other unimodal association cortices and to the limbic system, the PFC provides an internally represented world model and internal milieu data of the organism, both serving world orientation. In the pathophysiology of schizophrenia, it is the dysfunction of the PFC that is suggested to be the neural correlate for the different clinical schizophrenic subsyndromes. The pathophysiological study of psychiatric disorders may contribute to the theoretical debate on the neuronal basis of the self model
Vogeley, Kai (1999). Hallucinations emerge from an imbalance of self-monitoring and reality modelling. The Monist 82 (4):626-644.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Walla, Peter; Greiner, Katharina; Duregger, Cornelia; Deecke, Lüder & Thurner, Stefan (2007). Self-awareness and the subconscious effect of personal pronouns on word encoding: A magnetoencephalography (MEG) study. Neuropsychologia 45 (4):796-809.   (Google)
Watson, J. S. (1994). Detection of self: The perfect algorithm. In S. T. Parker, R. Mitchell & M. L. Boccia (eds.), Self-Awareness in Animals and Humans: Developmental Perspectives. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 27 | Google)
Watson, P. J.; Morris, R. J. & Ramsey, A. Hickman (1996). Further contrasts between self-reflectiveness and internal state awareness factors of private self-consciousness. Journal of Psychology 130:183-92.   (Cited by 17 | Google | More links)
Zaborowski, Zbigniew & Śląski, Sławomir (2003). Contents and forms theory of self-awareness. Imagination, Cognition and Personality 23 (2):99-119.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Zahavi, Dan; Grunbaum, T. & Parnas, Josef (eds.) (2004). The Structure and Development of Self-Consciousness: Interdisciplinary Perspectives. John Benjamins.   (Google)
Abstract: This volume presents essays on self-consciousness by prominent psychologists, cognitive neurologists, and philosophers.

8.8i Development of Consciousness

Anderson, John R. (1984). The development of self-recognition: A review. Developmental Psychobiology 17:35-49.   (Cited by 37 | Google | More links)
Austin, James H. (2000). Consciousness evolves when the self dissolves. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (11-12):209-230.   (Cited by 20 | Google)
Baillargeon, Renée (2004). Can 12 large clowns fit in a mini Cooper? Or when are beliefs and reasoning explicit and conscious? Developmental Science 7 (4):422-424.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Baron-Cohen, Simon (1999). Can studies of autism teach us about consciousness of the physical and the mental? Philosophical Explorations 2 (3):175-188.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Most scientists and theorists concerned with the problem of consciousness focus on our consciousness of the physical world (our sensations, feelings, and awareness). In this paper I consider our consciousness of the mental world (our thoughts about thoughts, intentions, wishes, and emotions).The argument is made that these are two distinct forms of consciousness, the evidence for this deriving from studies of autism. Autism is a severe childhood psychiatric condition in which individuals may be conscious of the physical world but not of the mental world. Relevant experimental evidence is described, including some recent neuroimaging studies pointing towards the neural basis of our consciousness of the mental
Becker, Joe (2008). Conceptualizing Mind and Consciousness: Using Constructivist Ideas to Transcend the Physical Bind. Human Development 51 (3):165-189.   (Google)
Abstract: Philosophers and scientists seeking to conceptualize consciousness, and subjective experience in particular, have focused on sensation and perception, and have emphasized binding – how a percept holds together. Building on a constructivist approach to conception centered on separistic-holistic complexes incorporating multiple levels of abstraction, the present approach reconceptualizes binding and opens a new path to theorizing the emergence of consciousness. It is proposed that all subjective experience involves multiple levels of abstraction, a central feature of conception. This modifies the prevalent idea of sequential development