MindPapers: 8.8b. Animal Consciousness

Allen, Colin (online). Animal consciousness. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. (Google | Edit)

Allen, Colin & Bekoff, Mark (2007). Animal consciousness. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell. (Google | Edit)

Allen, Colin (2004). Animal pain. Noûs 38 (4):617-43. (Cited by 4 | Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: Which nonhuman animals experience conscious pain?1 This question is central to the debate about animal welfare, as well as being of basic interest to scientists and philosophers of mind. Nociception—the capacity to sense noxious stimuli—is one of the most primitive sensory capacities. Neurons functionally specialized for nociception have been described in invertebrates such as the leech Hirudo medicinalis and the marine snail Aplysia californica (Walters 1996). Is all nociception accompanied by conscious pain, even in relatively primitive animals such as Aplysia, or is it the case, as some philosophers continue to maintain, that conscious experiences are the exclu- sive province of human beings? What philosophical and scientific resources are presently available for assessing claims lying between these extremes?

Allen, Colin; Fuchs, Perry N.; Shriver, Adam & Wilson, Hilary M. (2005). Deciphering animal pain. In Murat Aydede (ed.), Pain: New Essays on Its Nature and the Methodology of Its Study. Cambridge MA: Bradford Book/MIT Press. (Cited by 2 | Google | Edit)

Allen, Garland E. (1987). Materialism and reductionism in the study of animal consciousness. In G. Greenberg & E. Tobach (eds.), Cognition, Language, and Consciousness: Integrative Levels. Lawrence Erlbaum. (Cited by 2 | Google | Edit)

Appleton, Tim (1976). Consciousness in animals. Zygon 11 (December):337-345. (Google | Edit)

Baars, Bernard J. (2005). Subjective experience is probably not limited to humans: The evidence from neurobiology and behavior. Consciousness and Cognition 14 (1):7-21. (Cited by 1 | Google | Edit)

Baars, Bernard J. (2001). There are no known differences in brain mechanisms of consciousness between humans and other mammals. Animal Welfare Supplement 10:31- 40. (Cited by 4 | Google | More links | Edit)

Bekoff, Marc (2003). Considering animals--not higher primates. Zygon 38 (2):229-245. (Google | More links | Edit)

Bekoff, Marc (1992). Scientific ideology, animal consciousness, and animal protection: A principled plea for unabashed common sense. New Ideas in Psychology 10:79-94. (Cited by 1 | Google | Edit)

Bermond, B. (2001). A neuropsychological and evolutionary approach to animal consciousness and animal suffering. Animal Welfare Supplement 10:47- 62. (Cited by 4 | Google | Edit)

Bradshaw, R. H. (1998). Consciousness in nonhuman animals: Adopting the precautionary principle. Journal of Consciousness Studies 5 (1):108-14. (Cited by 2 | Google | Edit)

Bremer, Manuel (2006). Animal consciousness, anthromorphism and heterophenomenology. Philosophisches Jahrbuch 113 (2):397-410. (Google | Edit)

Burghardt, Gordon M. (1985). Animal awareness: Current perceptions and historical perspective. American Psychologist 40:905-919. (Cited by 28 | Google | Edit)

Carruthers, Peter (1998). Animal subjectivity. Psyche. (Cited by 8 | Google | Edit)

Carruthers, Peter (1989). Brute experience. Journal of Philosophy 86 (May):258-269. (Cited by 44 | Annotation | Google | More links | Edit)

Carruthers, Peter (2005). Consciousness might matter very much - reply. Philosophical Psychology 18 (1):113-122. (Google | Edit)

Carruthers, Peter (2004). On being simple minded. American Philosophical Quarterly 41 (3):205-220. (Cited by 6 | Google | More links | Edit)

Carruthers, Peter (2005). Reply to Shriver and Allen. Philosophical Psychology 18 (1):113-122. (Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: Shriver and Allen (this volume, this journal; hereafter S&A) make three unconnected criticisms of my views concerning phenomenal consciousness and the question of animal consciousness. First, they claim that my dispositional higher-order thought theory of consciousness has much greater significance for ethics than I recognize. Second, they claim that, in the course of attempting to motivate that theory, I have presented inadequate criticisms of first-order theories (according to which phenomenal consciousness may well be rampant in the animal world). And third, they claim that my argument that the question of animal consciousness might not matter a great deal for comparative psychology may prove too much, showing that such consciousness is genuinely epiphenomenal in ourselves, and undermining some of my own evolutionary arguments in support of higher-order theories. I shall focus mostly on the second and third criticisms. But I begin with a few remarks about the first

Carruthers, Peter (1999). Sympathy and subjectivity. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (4):465-82. (Cited by 10 | Google | More links | Edit)

Carruthers, Peter (2004). Suffering without subjectivity. Philosophical Studies 121 (2):99-125. (Cited by 5 | Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: This paper argues that it is possible for suffering to occur in the absence of phenomenal consciousness – in the absence of a certain sort of experiential subjectivity, that is. (Phenomenal consciousness is the property that some mental states possess, when it is like something to undergo them, or when they have subjective feels, or possess qualia.) So even if theories of phenomenal consciousness that would withhold such consciousness from most species of non-human animal are correct, this neednt mean that those animals dont suffer, and arent appropriate objects of sympathy and concern

Carruthers, Peter (2005). Why the question of animal consciousness might not matter very much. Philosophical Psychology 18 (1):83-102. (Cited by 4 | Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: According to higher-order thought accounts of phenomenal consciousness it is unlikely that many non-human animals undergo phenomenally conscious experiences. Many people believe that this result would have deep and far-reaching consequences. More specifically, they believe that the absence of phenomenal consciousness from the rest of the animal kingdom must mark a radical and theoretically significant divide between ourselves and other animals, with important implications for comparative psychology. I shall argue that this belief is mistaken. Since phenomenal consciousness might be almost epiphenomenal in its functioning within human cognition, its absence in animals may signify only relatively trivial differences in cognitive architecture. Our temptation to think otherwise arises partly as a side-effect of imaginative identification with animal experiences, and partly from mistaken beliefs concerning the aspects of common-sense psychology that carry the main explanatory burden, whether applied to humans or to non-human animals

Chandroo, K. P.; Yue, S. & Moccia, R. D. (2004). An evaluation of current perspectives on consciousness and pain in fishes. Fish and Fisheries 5:281-95. (Cited by 13 | Google | More links | Edit)

Cheney, Dorothy L. & Seyfarth, Robert M. (1990). How Monkeys See the World: Inside the Mind of Another Species. University of Chicago Press. (Cited by 1064 | Google | More links | Edit)

Collins, Arthur W. (1998). Beastly experience. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2):375-380. (Cited by 3 | Google | Edit)

Crook, J. H. (1983). On attributing consciousness to animals. Nature 303:11-14. (Cited by 8 | Google | More links | Edit)

Dawkins, Marian S. (1993). Through Our Eyes Only: The Search for Animal Consciousness. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 97 | Google | Edit)

Dawkins, Marian S. (2001). Who needs consciousness? Animal Welfare Supplement 10:19- 29. (Cited by 4 | Google | Edit)

Dennett, Daniel C. (1995). Animal consciousness: What matters and why? Social Research 62:691-710. (Cited by 7 | Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: But perhaps we really don't want to know the answers to these questions. We should not despise the desire to be kept in ignorance--aren't there many facts about yourself and your loved ones that you would wisely choose not to know? Speaking for myself, I am sure that I would go to some lengths to prevent myself from learning all the secrets of those around me--whom they found disgusting, whom they secretly adored, what crimes and follies they had committed, or thought I had committed! Learning all these facts would destroy my composure, cripple my attitude towards those around me. Perhaps learning too much about our animal cousins would have a similarly poisonous effect on our relations with them. But if so, then let's make a frank declaration to that effect and drop the topic, instead of pursuing any further the pathetic course many are now embarked upon

Dol, M.; Kasanmoentalib, Soemini; Lijmbach, Susanne; Rivas, E. & van den Bos, Ruud (2002). Animal Consciousness and Animal Ethics. Van Gorcum and Co. (Cited by 1 | Google | Edit)

Eccles, John C. (1982). Animal consciousness and human self-consciousness. Experientia 38:1384-91. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)

Edelman, D. B.; Baars, Bernard J. & Seth, Anil K. (2005). Identifying hallmarks of consciousness in non-mammalian species. Consciousness and Cognition 14 (1):169-87. (Cited by 23 | Google | More links | Edit)

Gallup, G. G. (1985). Do minds exist in species other than our own? Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews 9:631-41. (Cited by 27 | Google | Edit)

Griffin, Donald R. (1985). Animal consciousness. Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews 9:615-22. (Cited by 9 | Google | Edit)

Griffin, Donald R. (1992). Animal Minds. University of Chicago Press. (Cited by 332 | Google | More links | Edit)

Abstract: University of Chicago Press, 2001 Review by Adriano Palma, Ph.D. on Aug 1st 2001 Volume: 5, Number: 31

Griffin, Donald R. (2001). Animal Minds: Beyond Cognition to Consciousness. University of Chicago Press. (Cited by 332 | Google | More links | Edit)

Griffin, Donald R. & Speck, G. B. (2004). New evidence of animal consciousness. Animal Cognition 7 (1):5-18. (Cited by 9 | Google | More links | Edit)

Griffin, Donald R. (1981). The Question of Animal Awareness: Evolutionary Continuity of Mental Experience. William Kaufmann. (Cited by 186 | Google | Edit)

Griffin, Donald R. (1995). Windows on animal minds. Consciousness and Cognition 4:194-204. (Cited by 1 | Google | Edit)

Hampton, Robert R. & Hampstead, Benjamin M. (2006). Spontaneous behavior of a rhesus monkey (Macaca Mulatta) during memory tests suggests memory awareness. Behavioural Processes 72 (2):184-189. (Google | More links | Edit)

Hanna, Robert (ms). What is it like to be a bat in pain? Kinds of animal minds and the moral comparison principle. (Google | Edit)

Heinrich, Bernd (2002). Raven consciousness. In Marc Bekoff, Colin Allen & Gordon M. Burghardt (eds.), The Cognitive Animal: Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives on Animal Cognition. MIT Press. (Cited by 2 | Google | Edit)

Helton, William S. (2005). Animal expertise, conscious or not. Animal Cognition 8 (2):67-74. (Cited by 2 | Google | More links | Edit)

Heyes, Cecilia M. (1987). Cognisance of consciousness in the study of animal knowledge. In Werner Callebaut & R. Pinxten (eds.), Evolutionary Epistemology: A Multiparadigm Program. Reidel. (Cited by 6 | Google | Edit)

Hughes, Henry S. (2001). Sensory Exotica: A World Beyond Human Experience. MIT Press. (Cited by 21 | Google | Edit)

Jolley, N. (1995). Sensation, intentionality, and animal consciousness. Ratio 8 (2):128-42. (Google | Edit)

Jolly, A. (1991). Conscious chimpanzees? A review of recent literature. In C. A. Ristau (ed.), Cognitive Ethology. Lawrence Erlbaum. (Cited by 4 | Google | Edit)

Kirkwood, J. K. & Hubrecht, R. (2001). Animal consciousness, cognition and welfare. Animal Welfare Supplement 10. (Cited by 4 | Google | Edit)

Kretz, Lisa (2004). Peter Carruthers and brute experience: Descartes revisited. Essays in Philosophy 5 (2):1-13. (Google | Edit)

Kuczaj, S.; Tranel, K.; Trone, M. & Hill, H. Hamner (2001). Are animals capable of deception or empathy? Implications for animal consciousness and animal welfare. Animal Welfare. Special Issue 10:161- 173. (Cited by 1 | Google | Edit)

Kuczaj, S.; Tranel, K.; Trone, M. & Hill, H. Hamner (2001). Are animals capable of deception or empathy? Implications for Animal Consciousness and Animal Welfare. Animal Welfare Supplement 10. (

8.8b	Animal Consciousness [83]

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