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8.8b. Attention and Consciousness in Psychology (Attention and Consciousness in Psychology on PhilPapers)

See also:
Anderson, Adam K. (2005). Affective influences on the attentional dynamics supporting awareness. Journal of Experimental Psychology 134 (2):258-281.   (Cited by 30 | Google | More links)
Baars, Bernard J. (1999). Attention vs consciousness in the visual brain: Differences in conception, phenomenology, behavior, neuroanatomy, and physiology. Journal of General Psychology 126:224-33.   (Google)
Baars, Bernard J. (1997). Some essential differences between consciousness and attention, perception, and working memory. Consciousness and Cognition 6:363-371.   (Cited by 27 | Google | More links)
Baddeley, A. D. & Weiskrantz, Lawrence (eds.) (1993). Attention: Selection, Awareness, and Control. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 13 | Google | More links)
Bailey, Brian P. & Konstan, Joseph A. (2006). On the need for attention-aware systems: Measuring effects of interruption on task performance, error rate, and affective state. Computers in Human Behavior 22 (4):685-708.   (Cited by 15 | Google)
Bartolomeo, Paolo (2002). Commentary: Can attention capture visual awareness? Psicologica International Journal of Methodology and Experimental Psychology 23 (2):314-317.   (Google)
Botterell, Andrew (2003). Continuing commentary. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26:785-794.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Color experiences have representational content. But this content need not include a propositional component, particularly for reflectance physicalists such as Byrne and Hilbert. Insisting on such content gives primacy to language where it is not required, and makes the extension of the argument to non-human animals suspect
Brinck, Ingar (2001). Attention and the evolution of intentional communication. Pragmatics and Cognition 9 (2):259-277.   (Google)
Bridgeman, Bruce (1986). Relations between the physiology of attention and the physiology of consciousness. Psychological Research 48:259-266.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Bunting, Michael F. & Cowan, Nelson (2005). Working memory and flexibility in awareness and attention. Psychological Research/Psychologische Forschung 69 (5):412-419.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Cheyne, James A.; Carriere, Jonathan S. A. & Smilek, Daniel (2006). Absent-mindedness: Lapses of conscious awareness and everyday cognitive failures. Consciousness and Cognition 15 (3):578-592.   (Google | More links)
Chun, Marvin & Wolfe, Jeremy (2001). Visual attention. In E.B. Goldstein (ed.), Blackwell Handbook of Perception. Blackwell.   (Cited by 52 | Google | More links)
Cobb, C. (1955). Awareness, Attention, and Physiology of the Brain Stem. In P. Hoch & J. Zubin (eds.), Experimental Psychopathology. Grune & Stratton.   (Google)
Coslett, H. B. (1997). Consciousness and attention. Seminars in Neurology 17:137-44.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Cowan, Nelson & Wood, N. L. (1997). Constraints on awareness, attention, processing, and memory: Some recent investigations with ignored speech. Consciousness and Cognition 6:182-203.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Csikszentmihalyi, Mihaly (1978). Attention and the holistic approach to behavior. In K. S. Pope & Jerome L. Singer (eds.), The Stream of Consciousness: Scientific Investigation Into the Flow of Experience. Plenum.   (Cited by 28 | Google)
Fernandez-Duque, Diego & Johnson, Mark (1999). Attention metaphors: How metaphors guide the cognitive psychology of attention. Cognitive Science 23 (1):83-116.   (Cited by 21 | Google | More links)
Fernandez-Duque, Diego (2001). Brain imaging of attentional networks in normal and pathological states. Journal of Clinical and Experimental Neuropsychology 23 (1):74-93.   (Cited by 46 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The ability to image the human brain has provided a new perspective for neuropsychologists in their efforts to understand, diagnose, and treat insults to the human brain that might occur as the result of stroke, tumor, traumatic injury, degenerative disease, or errors in development. These new ®ndings are the major theme of this special issue. In our article, we consider brain networks that carry out the functions of attention. We outline several such networks that have been studied in normal and pathological states. These include networks for orienting to sensory stimuli, for maintaining the alert state, and for orchestrating volitional control
Fernandez-Duque, Diego (2002). Cause and effect theories of attention: The role of conceptual metaphors. Review of General Psychology 6 (2):153-165.   (Cited by 9 | Google)
Abstract: Scientific concepts are defined by metaphors. These metaphors determine what atten- tion is and what count as adequate explanations of the phenomenon. The authors analyze these metaphors within 3 types of attention theories: (a) --cause-- theories, in which attention is presumed to modulate information processing (e.g., attention as a spotlight; attention as a limited resource); (b) --effect-- theories, in which attention is considered to be a by-product of information processing (e.g., the competition meta- phor); and (c) hybrid theories that combine cause and effect aspects (e.g., biased- competition models). The present analysis reveals the crucial role of metaphors in cognitive psychology, neuroscience, and the efforts of scientists to find a resolution to the classic problem of cause versus effect interpretations
Franconeri, Steve & Simons, Daniel J. (2003). Moving and looming stimuli capture attention. Perception and Psychophysics 65 (7):999-1010.   (Cited by 39 | Google | More links)
Franconeri, Steve; Simons, Daniel J. & Junge, J. (2004). Searching for stimulus-driven shifts of attention. Psychonomic Bulletin and Review 11 (5):876-881.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
Giersch, Anne & Caparos, Serge (2005). Focused attention is not enough to activate discontinuities in lines, but scrutiny is. Consciousness and Cognition 14 (3):613-632.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Grossberg, S. (1999). The link between brain learning, attention, and consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 8 (1):1-44.   (Cited by 130 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The processes whereby our brains continue to learn about a changing world in a stable fashion throughout life are proposed to lead to conscious experiences. These processes include the learning of top-down expectations, the matching of these expectations against bottom-up data, the focusing of attention upon the expected clusters of information, and the development of resonant states between bottom-up and top-down processes as they reach an attentive consensus between what is expected and what is there in the outside world. It is suggested that all conscious states in the brain are resonant states and that these resonant states trigger learning of sensory and cognitive representations. The models which summarize these concepts are therefore called Adaptive Resonance Theory, or ART, models. Psychophysical and neurobiological data in support of ART are presented from early vision, visual object recognition, auditory streaming, variable-rate speech perception, somatosensory perception, and cognitive-emotional interactions, among others. It is noted that ART mechanisms seem to be operative at all levels of the visual system, and it is proposed how these mechanisms are realized by known laminar circuits of visual cortex. It is predicted that the same circuit realization of ART mechanisms will be found in the laminar circuits of all sensory and cognitive neocortex. Concepts and data are summarized concerning how some visual percepts may be visibly, or modally, perceived, whereas amodal percepts may be consciously recognized even though they are perceptually invisible. It is also suggested that sensory and cognitive processing in the What processing stream of the brain obey top-down matching and learning laws that are often complementary to those used for spatial and motor processing in the brain's Where processing stream. This enables our sensory and cognitive representations to maintain their stability as we learn more about the world, while allowing spatial and motor representations to forget learned maps and gains that are no longer appropriate as our bodies develop and grow from infanthood to adulthood. Procedural memories are proposed to be unconscious because the inhibitory matching process that supports these spatial and motor processes cannot lead to resonance
He, S.; Cavanagh, P. & Intrilagator, J. (1996). Attentional resolution and the locus of visual awareness. Nature 383:334-37.   (Cited by 237 | Google | More links)
Hochberg, Julian (1970). Attention, organization, and consciousness. In D. Mostofsky (ed.), Attention: Contemporary Theory and Analysis. Appleton-Century-Crofts.   (Cited by 45 | Google)
Huguet, Pascal; Dumas, Florence & Monteil, Jean-M. (2004). Competing for a desired reward in the stroop task: When attentional control is unconscious but effective versus conscious but ineffective. Canadian Journal of Experimental Psychology 58 (3):153-167.   (Google)
Ivanoff, Jason & Klein, Raymond M. (2003). Orienting of attention without awareness is affected by measurement-induced attentional control settings. Journal of Vision. Special Issue 3 (1):32-40.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Iwasaki, S. (1993). Spatial attention and two modes of visual consciousness. Cognition 49:211-233.   (Cited by 10 | Google)
Jaskoski, Piotr; van der Lubbe, Rob H. J.; Schlotterbeck, Erik & Verleger, Rolf (2002). Traces left on visual selective attention by stimuli that are not consciously identified. Psychological Science 13 (1):48-54.   (Google)
Kiefer, Markus & Brendel, Doreen (2006). Attentional modulation of unconscious "automatic" processes: Evidence from event-related potentials in a masked priming paradigm. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 18 (2):184-198.   (Google)
Kingstone, Alan; Danziger, Shai; Langton, Stephen R. H. & Soto-Faraco, Salvador (2002). A review of Attentional Capture: On its Automaticity and Sensitivity to Endogenous Control. PsicolóGica International Journal of Methodology and Experimental Psychology 23 (2):343-346.   (Google)
Koivisto, Mika; Revonsuo, Antti & Lehtonen, Minna (2006). Independence of visual awareness from the scope of attention: An electrophysiological study. Cerebral Cortex 16 (3):415-424.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
LaBerge, David (1997). Attention, awareness, and the triangular circuit. Consciousness and Cognition 9:149-81.   (Cited by 61 | Google | More links)
LaBerge, David (2001). Attention, consciousness, and electrical wave activity within the cortical column. International Journal of Psychophysiology 43 (1):5-24.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
LaBerge, David (2000). Clarifying the triangular circuit theory of attention and its relations to awareness replies to seven commentaries. Psyche 6 (6).   (Google)
LaBerge, David (1998). Defining awareness by the triangular circuit of attention. Psyche 4 (7).   (Cited by 2 | Google)
LaBerge, David; Auclair, L. & Sieroff, E. (2000). Preparatory attention: Experiment and theory. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (3):396-434.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This study investigated attention to a spatial location using a new spatial preparation task. Participants responded to a target dot presented in the center of a display and ignored a distractor dot presented to the right or left of the center. In an attempt to vary the level of preparatory attention directed to the target, the distractor dot was presented prior to the onset time of the target and the relative frequency of distractor dots to target dots within a block of trials was varied. The results from the first three experiments showed that when instructions induce weak preparatory attention to the target location, response times to a target on target-only trials increase substantially as the percentage of trials containing a distractor increases from 0 to 75%. In Experiments 2 and 3, instructions and display saliency were used to induce strong preparatory attention to the target location, resulting in almost constant response times across distractor percentages. Experiment 4 varied percentage of target trials in the absence of distractors, with the result that response times decreased as target trial percentage increased. Accounts of these data by early ''activity-based'' and late ''criterion-based'' attention theories are compared, and the early theory is given a more detailed description within the context of a cognitive neuroscience theory of attention
Lamme, Victor A. F. (2005). Independent neural definitions of visual awareness and attention. In Athanassios Raftopoulos (ed.), Cognitive Penetrability of Perception: Attention, Action, Strategies, and Bottom-Up Constraints. Nova Science Publishers.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Lamme, Victor A. F. (2004). Separate neural definitions of visual consciousness and visual attention: A case for phenomenal awareness. Neural Networks 17 (5):861-872.   (Cited by 23 | Google | More links)
Lamme, Victor A. F. (2003). Why visual attention and awareness are different. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (1):12-18.   (Cited by 129 | Google | More links)
Lavie, Nilli (2007). Attention and consciousness. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell.   (Google)
Lavie, Nilli (2006). The role of perceptual load in visual awareness. Brain Research. Special Issue 1080 (1):91-100.   (Google | More links)
Loper, A. B. & Hallahan, D. P. (1982). Meta-attention: The development of awareness of the attentional process. Journal of General Psychology 106:27-33.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
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Mack, Arien & Rock, Irvin (1998). Inattentional Blindness. MIT Press.   (Cited by 739 | Google | More links)
Mack, Arien; Pappas, Zissis; Silverman, Michael E. & Gay, Robin (2002). What we see: Inattention and the capture of attention by meaning. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (4):488-506.   (Cited by 22 | Google | More links)
Marti, Sébastien; Paradis, Véronique; Thibeault, Marc & Richer, Francois (2006). New object onsets reduce conscious access to unattended targets. Vision Research 46 (10):1646-1654.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
McCormick, P. A. (1997). Orienting attention without awareness. Journal of Experimental Psychology 23:168-180.   (Cited by 71 | Google)
Merikle, Philip M. & Joordens, S. (1997). Parallels between perception without attention and perception without awareness. Consciousness and Cognition 6:219-36.   (Cited by 73 | Google | More links)
Mole, Christopher (2008). Attention and consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (4):86-104.   (Google)
Abstract: According to commonsense psychology, one is conscious of everything that one pays attention to, but one does not pay attention to all the things that one is conscious of. Recent lines of research purport to show that commonsense is mistaken on both of these points: Mack and Rock (1998) tell us that attention is necessary for consciousness, while Kentridge and Heywood (2001) claim that consciousness is not necessary for attention. If these lines of research were successful they would have important implications regarding the prospects of using attention research to inform us about consciousness. The present essay shows that these lines of research are not successful, and that the commonsense picture of the relationship between attention and consciousness can be
Mole, Christopher (2008). Attention in the absence of consciousness? Trends in Cognitive Science 12 (2):44.   (Google)
Abstract: A response to Christof Koch and Naotsugu Tsuchiya's 'Attention and Consciousness: Two Distinct Brain Processes'
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Posner, Michael I. & Rothbart, M. K. (1992). Attentional mechanisms and conscious experience. In A. David Milner & M. D. Rugg (eds.), The Neuropsychology of Consciousness. Academic Press.   (Cited by 144 | Google)
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Prinzmetal, W. Amiri; Nwachuku, I.; Bodanski, L. & Blumenfeld, L. (1997). The phenomenology of attention, part 2: Brightness and contrast. Consciousness and Cognition 6:372-412.   (Cited by 21 | Google | More links)
Prinzmetal, W. Amiri; H., Allen & K., Edwards (1997). The phenomenology of attention, part 1: Color, location, orientation, and "clarity". Journal of Experimental Psychology.   (Cited by 9 | Google)
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Abstract: Recent advances in our understanding of visual perception have shown it to be a far more complex and counterintuitive process than previously believed. Several important consequences follow from this. First, the design of an effective statistical graphics system is unlikely to succeed based on intuition alone; instead, it must rely on a more sophisticated, systematic approach. The basic elements of such an approach are outlined here, along with several design principles. An overview is then given of recent advances in our understanding of visual perception, including rapid perception, visual attention, and scene perception. It then is argued that the mechanisms involved can be successfully harnessed to allow data to be displayed more effectively than at present. Several directions of development are discussed, including effective use of visual attention, the display of dynamic information, and the effective use of nonattentional and nonconscious perceptual systems
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Abstract: A set of visual search experiments tested the proposal that focused attention is needed to detect change. Displays were arrays of rectangles, with the target being the item that continually changed its orientation or contrast polarity. Five aspects of performance were examined: linearity of response, processing time, capacity, selectivity, and memory trace. Detection of change was found to be a self-terminating process requiring a time that increased linearly with the number of items in the display. Capacity for orientation was found to be about 5 items, a value comparable to estimates of attentional capacity. Observers were able to filter out both static and dynamic variations in irrelevant properties. Analysis also indicated a memory for previously-attended locations. These results support the hypothesis that the process needed to detect change is much the same as the attentional process needed to detect complex static patterns. Interestingly, the features of orientation and polarity were found to be handled in somewhat different ways. Taken together, these results not only provide evidence that focused attention is needed to see change, but also show that change detection itself can provide new insights into the nature of attentional processing
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Abstract: According to rich views of consciousness (e.g., James, Searle), we have a constant, complex flow of experience (or 'phenomenology') in multiple modalities simultaneously. According to thin views (e.g., Dennett, Mack and Rock), conscious experience is limited to one or a few topics, regions, objects, or modalities at a time. Existing introspective and empirical arguments on this issue (including arguments from 'inattentional blindness') generally beg the question. Participants in the present experiment wore beepers during everyday activity. When a beep sounded, they were to take note of the conscious experience, if any, they were having at the last undisturbed moment immediately prior to the beep. Some participants were asked to report any experience they could remember. Others were asked simply to report whether there was visual experience or not (and if so, what it was). Still others were asked about experience in the far right visual field, or tactile experience, or tactile experience in the left foot. A majority of participants in the full experience and the visual conditions reported visual experience in every single sample. Tactile and peripheral visual experience were reported less often. However, the proper interpretation of these results is uncertain
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