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8.8c. Metacognition and Consciousness (Metacognition and Consciousness on PhilPapers)

See also:
Baron-Cohen, Simon (2001). Consciousness of the physical and the mental: Evidence from autism. In Peter G. Grossenbacher (ed.), Finding Consciousness in the Brain: A Neurocognitive Approach. Advances in Consciousness Research. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Barresi, John (2001). Extending self-consciousness into the future. In C. Moore & Karen Lemmon (eds.), The Self in Time: Developmental Perspectives. Erlbaum.   (Cited by 9 | Google)
Brown, Steven Ravett (2000). Reply to Bruce Mangan's commentary on What Feeling is the "Feeling of Knowing?". Consciousness and Cognition 9 (4):545-549.   (Google)
Brown, S. (2000). Tip-of-the-tongue phenomena: An introductory phenomenological analysis. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (4):516-537.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The issue of meaningful yet unexpressed background-to language and to our experiences of the body-is one whose exploration is still in its infancy. There are various aspects of ''invisible,'' implicit, or background experiences which have been investigated from the viewpoints of phenomenology, cognitive psychology, and linguistics. I will argue that James's concept of the phenomenon of fringes, as explicated by Gurwitsch, provides a structural framework from which to investigate and better understand ideas and concepts that are indeterminate, particularly those experienced in the sense of being sought-after. Johnson's conception of the image-schematic gestalt (ISG) provides an approach to bridging the descriptive gap between phenomenology and cognitive psychology. Starting from an analysis of the fringes, I will turn to a consideration of the tip-of-tongue (TOT) state, as a kind of feeling-of-knowing (FOK) state, from a variety of approaches, focusing mainly on cognitive psychology and phenomenology. I will then integrate a phenomenological analysis of these experiences, from the James/Gurwitsch structural viewpoint, with a cognitive/phenomenological analysis in terms of ISGs, and further integrate that with a cognitive/functional analysis of the relation between consciousness and retrieval, employing Anderson et al's theory of inhibitory mechanisms in cognition. This synthesis of these viewpoints will be employed to explore the thesis that the TOT state and similar experiences may relate to the gestalt nature of schemas, and that figure/ground and other contrast-enhancing structures may be both explanatory and descriptive characterizations of the field of consciousness
Brown, R. & McNeill, David N. (1966). The "tip of the tongue" phenomenon. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior 5:325-37.   (Cited by 410 | Google)
Fernandez-Duque, Diego; Baird, J. A. & Posner, Michael I. (2000). Attention and awareness in self regulation [reply to commentaries]. Consciousness and Cognition 9:324-326.   (Google)
Fernandez-Duque, Diego; Baird, J. A. & Posner, Michael I. (2000). Awareness and metacognition. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):324-326.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Kentridge and Heywood (this issue) extend the concept of metacognition to include unconscious processes. We acknowledge the possible contribution of unconscious processes, but favor a central role of awareness in metacognition. We welcome Shimamura's (this issue) extension of the concept of metacognitive regulation to include aspects of working memory, and its relation to executive attention
Fernandez-Duque, Diego; Baird, J. A. & Posner, Michael I. (2000). Executive attention and metacognitive regulation. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):288-307.   (Cited by 67 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Metacognition refers to any knowledge or cognitive process that monitors or controls cognition. We highlight similarities between metacognitive and executive control functions, and ask how these processes might be implemented in the human brain. A review of brain imaging studies reveals a circuitry of attentional networks involved in these control processes, with its source located in midfrontal areas. These areas are active during conflict resolution, error correction, and emotional regulation. A developmental approach to the organization of the anatomy involved in executive control provides an added perspective on how these mechanisms are influenced by maturation and learning, and how they relate to metacognitive activity
Graham, George & Neisser, J. (2000). Probing for relevance: What metacognition tells us about the power of consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):172-177.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Metacognitive attitudes can affect behavior but do they do so, as Koriat claims, because they enhance voluntary control? This Commentary makes a case for saying that metacognitive consciousness may enhance not control but subjective predictability and may be best studied by examining not just healthy, well-integrated cognizers, but victims of multilevel mental disorders
Hart, J. T. (1965). Memory and the feeling-of-knowing experience. Journal of Educational Psychology 56:208-16.   (Cited by 126 | Google)
Johnson, M. K. & Reeder, J. A. (1997). Consciousness as meta-processing. In Jonathan D. Cohen & Jonathan W. Schooler (eds.), Scientific Approaches to Consciousness. Lawrence Erlbaum.   (Cited by 20 | Google)
Johnson, M. K. (1991). Reflection, reality monitoring, and the self. In Robert G. Kunzendorf (ed.), Mental Imagery. Plenum Press.   (Cited by 9 | Google)
Kahan, Tracey L. & LaBerge, S. (1994). Lucid dreaming as metacognition: Implications for cognitive science. Consciousness and Cognition 3:246-64.   (Cited by 13 | Google)
Kentridge, Robert W. & Heywood, Charles A. (2000). Metacognition and awareness. Consciousness And Cognition 9 (2):308-312.   (Cited by 13 | Google | More links)
Abstract: It is tempting to assume that metacognitive processes necessarily evoke awareness. We review a number of experiments in which cognitive schema have been shown to develop without awareness. Implicit learning of a novel schema may not involve metacognitive regulation per se. Substitution of one automatic process by another as a result of the inadequacy of the former as circumstances change does, however, clearly involve metacognitive and executive processes of error correction and schema selection. We describe a recently published study in which we serendipitously discovered that a blindsight subject could change the schema with which he processed cue information in orienting spatial attention task without reporting any awareness of this change, or of the cues and targets which respectively directed and were the object his attention
Kirsh, David (2005). Metacognition, Distributed Cognition and Visual Design. In Peter Gardenfors, Petter Johansson & N. J. Mahwah (eds.), Cognition, education, and communication technology. Erlbaum Associates.   (Google)
Abstract: Metacognition is associated with planning, monitoring, evaluating and repairing performance Designers of elearning systems can improve the quality of their environments by explicitly structuring the visual and interactive display of learning contexts to facilitate metacognition. Typically page layout, navigational appearance, visual and interactivity design are not viewed as major factors in metacognition. This is because metacognition tends to be interpreted as a process in the head, rather than an interactive one. It is argued here, that cognition and metacognition are part of a continuum and that both are highly interactive. The tenets of this view are explained by reviewing some of the core assumptions of the situated and distribute approach to cognition and then further elaborated by exploring the notions of active vision, visual complexity, affordance landscape and cue structure. The way visual cues are structured and the way interaction is designed can make an important difference in the ease and effectiveness of cognition and metacognition. Documents that make effective use of markers such as headings, callouts, italics can improve students' ability to comprehend documents and 'plan' the way they review and process content. Interaction can be designed to improve 'the proximal zone of planning' - the look ahead and apprehension of what is nearby in activity space that facilitates decisions. This final concept is elaborated in a discussion of how e-newspapers combine effective visual and interactive design to enhance user control over their reading experience.
Kobes, Bernard W. (1997). Metacognition and consciousness: Review essay of Janet Metcalfe and Arthur P. shimamura (eds), Metacognition: Knowing About Knowing. Philosophical Psychology 10 (1):93-102.   (Google)
Abstract: The field of metacognition, richly sampled in the book under review, is recognized as an important and growing branch of psychology. However, the field stands in need of a general theory that (1) provides a unified framework for understanding the variety of metacognitive processes, (2) articulates the relation between metacognition and consciousness, and (3) tells us something about the form of meta-level representations and their relations to object-level representations. It is argued that the higher-order thought theory of consciousness supplies us with the rudiments of a theory that meets these desiderata and integrates the principal findings reported in this collection
Koriat, A. & Levy-Sadot, R. (2000). Conscious and unconscious metacognition: A rejoinder. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):193-202.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In this rejoinder we clarify several issues raised by the commentators with the hope of resolving some disagreements. In particular, we address the distinction between information-based and experience-based metacognitive judgments and the idea that memory monitoring may be mediated by direct access to internal representations. We then examine the possibility of unconscious metacognitive processes and expand on the critical role that conscious metacognitive feelings play in mediating between unconscious activations and explicit-controlled action. Finally, several open questions are articulated for further scrutiny
Koriat, Asher (2007). Metacognition and consciousness. In P D Zelazo, M Moscovitch & E Thompson (eds.), Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Abstract: The study of metacognition can shed light on some fundamental issues about consciousness and its role in behavior. Metacognition research concerns the processes by which people self reflect on their own cognitive and memory processes (monitoring), and how they put their metaknowledge to use in regulating their information processing and behavior (control). Experimental research on metacognition has addressed the following questions: First, what are the bases of metacognitive judgments that people make in monitoring their learning, remembering, and performance? Second, how valid are such judgments and what are the factors that affect the correspondence between subjective and objective indexes of knowing? Third, what are the processes that underlie the accuracy and inaccuracy of metacognitive judgments? Fourth, how does the output of metacognitive monitoring contribute to the strategic regulation of learning and remembering? Finally, how do the metacognitive processes of monitoring and control affect actual performance? Research addressing these questions is reviewed, emphasizing its implication for issues concerning consciousness, in particular, the genesis of subjective experience, the function of self-reflective consciousness, and the cause-and-effect relation between subjective experience and behavior
Koriat, A. (2000). The feeling of knowing: Some metatheoretical implications for consciousness and control. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):149-171.   (Cited by 52 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The study of the feeling of knowing may have implications for some of the metatheoretical issues concerning consciousness and control. Assuming a distinction between information-based and experience-based metacognitive judgments, it is argued that the sheer phenomenological experience of knowing (''noetic feeling'') occupies a unique role in mediating between implicit-automatic processes, on the one hand, and explicit-controlled processes, on the other. Rather than reflecting direct access to memory traces, noetic feelings are based on inferential heuristics that operate implicitly and unintentionally. Once such heuristics give rise to a conscious feeling that feeling can then affect controlled action. Examination of the cues that affect noetic feelings suggest that not only do these feelings inform controlled action, but they are also informed by feedback from the outcome of that action
Mangan, Bruce (2000). What feeling is the "feeling of knowing?". Consciousness and Cognition 9 (4):538-544.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Metcalfe, J. (2000). Feelings and judgments of knowing: Is there a special noetic state? Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):178-186.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: A. Koriat distinguishes between feeling-based and inferentially based feeling-of-knowing judgments. The former are attributable to partial information that is activated in implicit memory but not fully articulated. They are not, however, attributable to direct access to the target-an hypothesis that Koriat specifically repudiates. While there is considerable merit in the distinction that Koriat draws, and his emphasis on the possibility that people base at least some of their metacognitive judgments on implicit information seems well founded, it is argued that his rejection of the direct access view is premature. There may be a state-a true noetic state-in which people actually know the answer before they are able to express it. A case is made for further consideration of the scientific merits of the direct-access view of the noetic feelings people experience in imminent tip-of-the-tongue (TOT) states
Metcalfe, John F. & Shimamura, P. (1994). Metacognition: Knowing About Knowing. MIT Press.   (Cited by 184 | Google)
Murphy, Dominic (2009). Varieties of self-explanation. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):155-156.   (Google)
Nelson, T. O. (1996). Consciousness and metacognition. American Psychologist 51:102-16.   (Cited by 135 | Google)
Nelson, T. O. (2000). Consciousness, self-consciousness, and metacognition. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):220-223.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Nelson, T. O. (1992). Metacognition: Core Readings. Allyn and Bacon.   (Cited by 67 | Google)
NJohnson, M. K. (1988). Reality monitoring: An experimental phenomenological approach. Journal of Experimental Psychology 117:390-94.   (Google)
Otani, H. & Hodge, M. (1991). Mechanisms of feelings of knowing: The role of elaloration and familiarity. Psychological Record 41:523-35.   (Google)
Reder, L. M. (1996). Implicit Memory and Metacognition. Lawrence Erlbaum.   (Cited by 44 | Google)
Abstract: The editor of this volume takes it to mean that a prior experience affects behavior without the individual's appreciation (ability to report) of this...
Reder, L. M. & Schunn, C. D. (1996). Metacognition does not imply awareness: Strategy choice is governed by implicit learning and memory. In L. M. Reder (ed.), Implicit Memory and Metacognition. Lawrence Erlbaum.   (Cited by 82 | Google)
Ricciardelli, L. A. (1993). Two components of metalinguistic awareness: Control of linguistic processing and analysis of linguistic knowledge. Applied Psycholinguistics 14:349-367.   (Cited by 11 | Google)
Rosenthal, David M. (1998). Consciousness and metacognition. In Dan Sperber (ed.), Metarepresentation. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 16 | Google)
Schooler, Jonathan W. (2002). Re-representing consciousness: Dissociations between experience and meta-consciousness. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 6 (8):339-344.   (Cited by 40 | Google | More links)
Schooler, Jonathan W. & Schreiber, Charles A. (2005). To know or not to know: Consciousness, meta-consciousness, and motivation. In Joseph P. Forgas, Kipling D. Williams & Simon M. Laham (eds.), Social Motivation: Conscious and Unconscious Processes. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Shimamura, A. P. (2000). Toward a cognitive neuroscience of metacognition. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):313-323.   (Cited by 33 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The relationship between metacognition and executive control is explored. According to an analysis by Fernandez-Duque, Baird, and Posner (this issue), metacognitive regulation involves attention, conflict resolution, error correction, inhibitory control, and emotional regulation. These aspects of metacognition are presumed to be mediated by a neural circuit involving midfrontal brain regions. An evaluation of the proposal by Fernandez-Duque et al. is made, and it is suggested that there is considerable convergence of issues associated with metacognition, executive control, working memory, and frontal lobe function. By integrating these domains and issues, significant progress could be made toward a cognitive neuroscience of metacognition
Spehn, M. K. & Reder, L. M. (2000). The unconscious feeling of knowing: A commentary on koriat's paper. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):187-192.   (Cited by 29 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In Koriat's paper ''The Feeling of Knowing: Some Metatheoretical Implications for Consciousness and Control,'' he asserts that the feeling of knowing straddles the implicit and explicit, and that these conscious feelings enter into a conscious control process that is necessary for controlled behavior. This assertion allows him to make many speculations on the nature of consciousness itself. We agree that feelings of knowing are produced through a monitoring of one's knowledge, and that this monitoring can affect the control of behavior such as whether or not to search memory for an answer. Further, we believe that monitoring of performance with a strategy can also affect cognition control and strategy selection; however, we also believe that frequently this monitoring and control occurs without conscious awareness. Feeling of knowing has received an inordinate amount of attention because it lies behind the highly recognizable tip-of-the-tongue phenomenon that represents one of the rare cases of conscious monitoring. There are other feelings of knowing which are much more common and are not accompanied by conscious awareness. These are evident in the early selection of a strategy for answering a problem. In our view, the research on feeling of knowing will not resolve the question of whether consciousness is merely epiphenomenal
Wegner, Daniel M. (1989). White Bears and Other Unwanted Thoughts: Suppression, Obsession, and the Psychology of Mental Control. Penguin.   (Cited by 186 | Google)
Abstract: Drawing on theories of William James, Freud, and Dewey, as well as on studies in mood control, cognitive therapy, and artificial intelligence, this...
Wegner, Daniel M. (1997). Why the mind wanders. In Jonathan D. Cohen & Jonathan W. Schooler (eds.), Scientific Approaches to Consciousness. Lawrence Erlbaum.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Whetstone, Tony & Cross, Mark (1998). Control of conscious contents in directed forgetting and thought suppression. Psyche 4 (16).   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Wilson, Timothy D. (1997). The psychology of metapsychology. In Jonathan D. Cohen & Jonathan W. Schooler (eds.), Scientific Approaches to Consciousness. Lawrence Erlbaum.   (Google)