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8.8d. Control and Consciousness (Control and Consciousness on PhilPapers)

See also:
Bargh, John A. (1996). Automaticity in social psychology. In E. E. Higgins & A. Kruglanski (eds.), Social Psychology: Handbook of Basic Principles. Guilford.   (Cited by 136 | Google)
Bargh, John A. (2005). Bypassing the will: Toward demystifying the nonconscious control of social behavior. In Ran R. Hassin, James S. Uleman & John A. Bargh (eds.), The New Unconscious. Oxford Series in Social Cognition and Social Neuroscience. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 23 | Google)
Bargh, John A. (ed.) (2007). Social Psychology and the Unconscious: The Automaticity of Higher Mental Processes. Psychology Press.   (Google)
Bargh, John A. (1994). The four horsemen of automaticity: Awareness, intention, efficiency, and control in social cognition. In R. Wyer & T. Srull (eds.), Handbook of Social Cognition. Lawrence Erlbaum.   (Cited by 48 | Google)
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Behrendt, Ralf-Peter (2004). A neuroanatomical model of passivity phenomena. Consciousness and Cognition 13 (3):579-609.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Carlson, Richard A. (2002). Conscious intentions in the control of skilled mental activity. In Brian H. Ross (ed.), The Psychology of Learning and Motivation: Advances in Research and Theory, Vol. 41. Academic Press.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Carr, T. H.; McCauley, C.; Sperber, R. D. & Parmelee, C. M. (1982). Words, pictures, and priming: On semantic activation, conscious identification, and the automaticity of information processing. Journal of Experimental Psychology 8:757-777.   (Cited by 76 | Google)
Chartrand, Tanya L. (2005). The role of conscious awareness in consumer behavior. Journal of Consumer Psychology 15 (3):203-210.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Clark, Andy (2001). Visual experience and motor action: Are the bonds too tight? Philosophical Review 110 (4):495-519.   (Cited by 78 | Google | More links)
Abstract: How should we characterize the functional role of conscious visual experience? In particular, how do the conscious contents of visual experience guide, bear upon, or otherwise inform our ongoing motor activities? According to an intuitive and (I shall argue) philosophically influential conception, the links are often quite direct. The contents of conscious visual experience, according to this conception, are typically active in the control and guidance of our fine-tuned, real-time engagements with the surrounding three-dimensional world. But this idea (which I shall call the Assumption of Experience-Based Control) is hostage to empirical fortune. It is a hostage, moreover, whose safety is in serious doubt. Thus Milner and Goodale (1995) argue for a deep and abiding dissociation between the contents of conscious seeing, on the one hand, and the resources used for the on-line guidance of visuo-motor action, on the other. This ‘dual visual systems’ hypothesis, which finds many echoes in various other bodies of cognitive scientific research, poses a prima facie challenge to the Assumption of Experience-Based Control. More importantly, it provides (I shall argue) fuel for an alternative and philosophically suggestive account of the functional role of conscious visual experience
Clark, Andy (2007). What reaching teaches: Consciousness, control, and the inner zombie. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: What is the role of conscious visual experience in the control and guidance of human behaviour? According to some recent treatments, the role is surprisingly indirect. Conscious visual experience, on these accounts, serves the formation of plans and the selection of action types and targets, while the control of ‘online’ visually guided action proceeds via a quasi-independent non-conscious route. In response to such claims, critics such as (Wallhagen [2007], pp. 539–61) have suggested that the notions of control and guidance invoked are unacceptably vague, and that that the image of ‘zombie systems’ guiding action fails to take account of the possibility that there is genuine but unconceptualized, unnoticed, and/or unreportable experience taking place and guiding or controlling the actions. I address both sets of concerns. I try to show that refining and clarifying the key notions of control and guidance leaves the original argument intact, as does the appeal to unconceptualized, unnoticed, or unreportable experiences. The exercise serves, however, to highlight an important complex of considerations concerning the relations between control, agency, and experience. Better understanding these relations is, I suggest, an important source of insights concerning the nature of phenomenal experience
Cranacvonh, Marion (2000). Freedom of the will--the basis of control. In Walter J. Perrig & Alexander Grob (eds.), Control of Human Behavior, Mental Processes, and Consciousness: Essays in Honor of the 60th Birthday of August Flammer. Erlbaum.   (Google)
Derakhshan, Iraj (2003). The preservation of consciousness, automatism, and movement control. Journal of Neuropsychiatry and Clinical Neurosciences 15 (4):456.   (Google | More links)
Dewan, Edmond M. (1976). Consciousness as an emergent causal agent in the context of control system theory. In Gordon G. Globus, Grover Maxwell & I. Savodnik (eds.), Consciousness and the Brain. Plenum Press.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Glaser, Jack & Kihlstrom, John F. (2005). Compensatory automaticity: Unconscious volition is not an oxymoron. In Ran R. Hassin, James S. Uleman & John A. Bargh (eds.), The New Unconscious. Oxford Series in Social Cognition and Social Neuroscience. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Gordon, A. M. & Rosenbaum, D. A. (1984). Conscious and subconscious arm movements: Application of signal detection theory to motor control. Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 22:214-216.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Gott, P. S.; Hughes, E. C. & Whipple, K. (1984). Voluntary control of two lateralized conscious states: Validation of electrical and behavioral studies. Neuropsychologia 22:65-72.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Gray, Jeffrey A. (1998). Abnormal contents of consciousness: The transition from automatic to controlled processing. In H. Jasper, L. Descarries, V. Castellucci & S. Rossignol (eds.), Consciousness: At the Frontiers of Neuroscience. Lippincott-Raven.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Hassin, Ran R. (2005). Nonconscious control and implicit working memory. In Ran R. Hassin, James S. Uleman & John A. Bargh (eds.), The New Unconscious. Oxford Series in Social Cognition and Social Neuroscience. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Hommel, Bernhard (2007). Consciousness and control: Not identical twins. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (1):155-176.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: Human cognition and action are intentional and goal-directed, and explaining how they are controlled is one of the most important tasks of the cognitive sciences. After half a century of benign neglect this task is enjoying increased attention. Unfortunately, however, current theorizing about control in general, and the role of consciousness for/in control in particular, suffers from major conceptual flaws that lead to confusion regarding the following distinctions: (i) automatic and unintentional processes, (ii) exogenous control and disturbance (in a control-theoretical sense) of endogenous control, (iii) conscious control and conscious access to control, and (iv) personal and systems levels of analysis and explanation. Only if these flaws are overcome will a comprehensive understanding of the relationship between consciousness and control emerge
Horowitz, M. J. & Stinson, C. H. (1995). Consciousness and processes of control. Journal of Psychotherapy Practice and Research 4:123-139.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Hurley, Susan L. (2006). Bypassing conscious control: Media violence, unconscious imitation, and freedom of speech. In S. Pockett, W. Banks & S. Gallagher (eds.), Does Consciousness Cause Behavior? MIT Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: Why does it matter whether and how individuals consciously control their behavior? It matters for many reasons. Here I focus on concerns about social influences of which agents are typically unaware on aggressive behavior
Jacoby, Larry L.; Ste-Marie, D. & Toth, J. P. (1993). Redefining automaticity: Unconscious influences, awareness, and control. In A. D. Baddeley & Lawrence Weiskrantz (eds.), Attention: Selection, Awareness,and Control. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 16 | Google)
Jordan, J. Scott & Ghin, Marcello (2007). The role of control in a science of consciousness: Causality, regulation and self-sustainment. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (1):177-197.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: There is quite a bit of disagreement in cognitive science regarding the role that consciousness and control play in explanations of how people do what they do. The purpose of the present paper is to do the following: (1) examine the theoretical choice points that have lead theorists to conflicting positions, (2) examine the philosophical and empirical problems different theories encounter as they address the issue of conscious agency, and (3) provide an integrative framework (Wild Systems Theory) that addresses these problems and potentially naturalizes conscious agency. It does so by grounding conscious and control in the notion of self-sustaining energy-transformation systems (i.e., living systems), versus computational or self- organizing systems, as is the case in information processing theory and dynamical systems theory, respectively. Given its assertion that content (and consciousness) emerges in self-sustaining systems, Wild Systems Theory may also provide a sound theoretical basis for a science of consciousness in general
Kamiya, J. (1968). Conscious control of brain waves. Psychology Today 1:56-60.   (Cited by 45 | Google)
Knoblich, G. & Kircher, T. T. J. (2004). Deceiving oneself about being in control: Conscious detection of changes in visuomotor coupling. Journal of Experimental Psychology - Human Perception and Performance 30 (4):657-66.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Langer, E. J. (1992). Matters of mind: Mindfulness/mindlessness in perspective. Consciousness and Cognition 1:289-305.   (Cited by 37 | Google)
Levy, Neil & Bayne, Timothy J. (2004). A will of one's own: Consciousness, control, and character. International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 27 (5):459-470.   (Google)
Linser, Katrin & Goschke, Thomas (2007). Unconscious modulation of the conscious experience of voluntary control. Cognition 104 (3):459-475.   (Google)
McLeod, Hamish J.; Byrne, Mitchell K. & Aitken, Rachel (2004). Automatism and dissociation: Disturbances of consciousness and volition from a psychological perspective. International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 27 (5):471-487.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Mole, Christopher (2009). Illusions, Demonstratives and the Zombie Action Hypothesis. Mind 118 (472).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: David Milner and Melvyn Goodale, and the many psychologists and philosophers who have been influenced by their work, claim that ‘the visual system that gives us our visual experience of the world is not the same system that guides our movements in the world’. The arguments that have been offered for this surprising claim place considerable weight on two sources of evidence — visual form agnosia and the reaching behaviour of normal subjects when picking up objects that induce visual illusions. The present article shows that, if we are careful to consider the possibility that a demonstrative gesture can contribute content to a conscious experience, then neither source of evidence is compelling.
Moors, Agnes & Houweder, Jan (2007). What is automaticity? An analysis of its component features and their interrelations. In Bargh, John A. (2007). Social Psychology and the Unconscious: The Automaticity of Higher Mental Processes. Frontiers of Social Psychology. (Pp. 11-50). New York, NY, US: Psychology Press. X, 341 Pp.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Naccache, Lionel; Dehaene, Stanislas; Cohen, L. Jonathan; Habert, Marie-Odile; Guichart-Gomez, Elodie; Galanaud, Damien & Willer, Jean-Claude (2005). Effortless control: Executive attention and conscious feeling of mental effort are dissociable. Neuropsychologia 43 (9):1318-1328.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Oikawa, Masanori (2004). Moderation of automatic achievement goals by conscious monitoring. Psychological Reports 95 (3):975-980.   (Google)
Oswald, M. & Gadenne, Volker (2000). Are controlled processes conscious? In Walter J. Perrig & Alexander Grob (eds.), Control of Human Behavior, Mental Processes, and Consciousness: Essays in Honor of the 60th Birthday of August Flammer. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.   (Google)
Payne, B. Keith; Jacoby, Larry L. & Lambert, Alan J. (2005). Attitudes as accessibility bias: Dissociating automatic and controlled processes. In Ran R. Hassin, James S. Uleman & John A. Bargh (eds.), The New Unconscious. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 47 | Google)
Plotkin, William B. (1981). A rapprochement of the operant-conditioning and awareness views of biofeedback training: The role of discrimination in voluntary control. Journal of Experimental Psychology 110:415-428.   (Google)
Plotkin, William B. (1976). On the self-regulation of the occipital alpha rhythm: Control strategies, states of consciousness, and the role of physiological feedback. Journal of Experimental Psychology 105:66-99.   (Google)
Posner, Michael I. & Snyder, C. R. R. (1975). Attention and cognitive control. In Robert L. Solso (ed.), Information Processing and Cognition: The Loyola Symposium. Lawrence Erlbaum.   (Cited by 764 | Google | More links)
Posner, Michael I. (2006). Genes and experience shape brain networks of conscious control. In Steven Laureys (ed.), Boundaries of Consciousness. Elsevier.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Pylyshynb, Zenon W.; Feldmanb, Jacob & Scholla, Brian J. (2001). What is a visual object? Evidence from target merging in multiple object tracking. Cognition 80 (1-2):159-177.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The notion that visual attention can operate over visual objects in addition to spatial locations has recently received much empirical support, but there has been relatively little empirical consideration of what can count as an `object' in the ®rst place. We have investi- gated this question in the context of the multiple object tracking paradigm, in which subjects must track a number of independently and unpredictably moving identical items in a ®eld of identical distractors. What types of feature clusters can be tracked in this manner? In other words, what counts as an `object' in this task? We investigated this question with a technique we call target merging: we alter tracking displays so that distinct target and distractor loca- tions appear perceptually to be parts of the same object by merging pairs of items (one target with one distractor) in various ways ± for example, by connecting item locations with a simple line segment, by drawing the convex hull of the two items, and so forth. The data show that target merging makes the tracking task far more dif®cult to varying degrees depending on exactly how the items are merged. The effect is perceptually salient, involving in some conditions a total destruction of subjects' capacity to track multiple items. These studies provide strong evidence for the object-based nature of tracking, con®rming that in some contexts attention must be allocated to objects rather than arbitrary collections of features. In addition, the results begin to reveal the types of spatially organized scene components that can be independently attended as a function of properties such as connectedness, part struc- ture, and other types of perceptual grouping. q 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved
Rabbitt, Patrick (2002). Consciousness is slower than you think. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology A 55 (4):1081-1092.   (Cited by 18 | Google | More links)
Raichle, M. E. (1997). Automaticity: From reflective to reflexive information processing. In M. Ito, Y. Miyashita & Edmund T. Rolls (eds.), Cognition, Computation, and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Schneider, Walter E. & Shiffrin, Richard M. (1977). Controlled and automatic human information processing: I. Detection, Search, and Attention. Psychological Review 84:1-66.   (Google)
Scott Jordan, J. & Ghin, Marcello (2007). The role of control in a science of consciousness: Causality, regulation and self- sustainment. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (s 1-2):177-197.   (Google)
Abstract: There is quite a bit of disagreement in cognitive science regarding the role that consciousness and control play in explanations of how people do what they do. The purpose of the present paper is to do the following: (1) examine the theoretical choice points that have lead theorists to conflicting positions, (2) examine the philosophical and empirical problems different theories encounter as they address the issue of conscious agency, and (3) provide an integrative framework (Wild Systems Theory) that addresses these problems and potentially naturalizes conscious agency. It does so by grounding conscious and control in the notion of self-sustaining energy-transformation systems (i.e., living systems), versus computational or self- organizing systems, as is the case in information processing theory and dynamical systems theory, respectively. Given its assertion that content (and consciousness) emerges in self-sustaining systems, Wild Systems Theory may also provide a sound theoretical basis for a science of consciousness in general
Shiffrin, Richard M. & Schneider, Walter E. (1977). Controlled and automatic human information processing: Perceptual learning, automatic attending, and a general theory. Psychological Review 84:128-90.   (Cited by 1705 | Google | More links)
Szelag, Elzbieta; Rymarczyk, Krystyna & Poppel, Ernst (2001). Conscious control of movements: Increase of temporal precision in voluntarily delayed actions. Acta Neurobiologiae Experimentalis 61 (3):175-179.   (Google)
Tzelgov, Joseph; Porat, Z. & Henik, A. (1997). Automaticity and consciousness: Is perceiving the word necessary for reading it? American Journal of Psychology 110:429-48.   (Cited by 18 | Google | More links)
Tzelgov, Joseph (1997). Automatic but conscious: That is how we act most of the time. In R. Wyer (ed.), The Automaticity of Everyday Life. Lawrence Erlbaum.   (Cited by 21 | Google)
Tzelgov, Joseph (1997). Specifying the relations between automaticity and consciousness: A theoretical note. Consciousness and Cognition 6:441-51.   (Google)
Uleman, James S. (1987). Consciousness and control: The case of spontaneous trait inferences. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 13:337-54.   (Cited by 41 | Google | More links)
Umilta, Carlo (1988). The control operations of consciousness. In Anthony J. Marcel & E. Bisiach (eds.), Consciousness in ContemporaryScience. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 23 | Google)
Wallhagen, Morgan (2007). Consciousness and action: Does cognitive science support (mild) epiphenomenalism? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: of consciousness have long been central to discussions of consciousness in philosophy and psychology. Intuitively, consciousness has an important role to play in the control of many everyday behaviors. However, this view has recently come under attack. In particular, it is becoming increasingly common for scientists and philosophers to argue that a significant body of data emerging from cognitive science shows that conscious states are not involved in the control of behavior. According to these theorists, nonconscious states control most everyday behaviors. Andy Clark ([2001]) does an admirable job of summarizing and defending the most important data thought to support this view. In this paper, I argue that the evidence available does not in fact threaten the view that conscious states play an important and intimate role in the control of much everyday behavior. I thereby defend a philosophically intuitive view about the functions of conscious states in action. 1 Introduction 2 Clarifying EBC 2.1 Control and guidance 2.2 Fine-tuned activity 3 The empirical case against EBC 4 Conclusion
Wegner, Daniel M. (2005). Who is the controller of controlled processes? In Ran R. Hassin, James S. Uleman & John A. Bargh (eds.), The New Unconscious. Oxford Series in Social Cognition and Social Neuroscience. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 14 | Google)
Abstract: Are we the robots? This question surfaces often in current psychological re- search, as various kinds of robot parts-automatic actions, mental mechanisms, even neural circuits-keep appearing in our explanations of human behavior. Automatic processes seem responsible for a wide range of the things we do, a fact that may leave us feeling, if not fully robotic, at least a bit nonhuman. The complement of the automatic process in contemporary psychology, of course, is the controlled process (Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968; Bargh, 1984; Posner & Snyder, 1975; Shiffrin & Schnieder, 1977), and it is in theories of controlled processes that vestiges of our humanity reappear. Controlled processes are viewed as conscious, effortful, and intentional. and as drawing on more sources of information than automatic processes. With this power of conscious will, controlled processes seem to bring the civilized quality back to psychological explanation that automatic processes leave out. Yet by reintroducing this touch of humanity, the notion of a controlled process also brings us within glimpsing range of a fatal theoretical error-the idea that there is a controller
Westen, Drew; Weinberger, Joel & Bradley, Rebekah (2007). Motivation, decision making, and consciousness: From psychodynamics to subliminal priming and emotional constraint satisfaction. In Philip David Zelazo, Morris Moscovitch & Evan Thompson (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness. Cambridge.   (Google)
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Wigley, Simon (2007). Automaticity, consciousness and moral responsibility. Philosophical Psychology 20 (2):209-225.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Cognitive scientists have long noted that automated behavior is the rule, while consciousness acts of self-regulation are the exception to the rule. On the face of it automated actions appear to be immune to moral appraisal because they are not subject to conscious control. Conventional wisdom suggests that sleepwalking exculpates, while the mere fact that a person is performing a well-versed task unthinkingly does not. However, our apparent lack of conscious control while we are undergoing automaticity challenges the idea that there is a relevant moral difference between these two forms of unconscious behavior. In both cases the agent lacks access to information that might help them guide their actions so as to avoid harms. In response it is argued that the crucial distinction between the automatic agent and the agent undergoing an automatism, such as somnambulism or petit mal epilepsy, lies in the fact that the former can preprogram the activation and interruption of automatic behavior. Given that, it is argued that there is elbowroom for attributing responsibility to automated agents based on the quality of their will
Zelazo, P. D. & Frye, Douglas (1997). Cognitive complexity and control: A theory of the development of deliberate reasoning and intentional action. In Maxim I. Stamenov (ed.), Language Structure, Discourse, and the Access to Consciousness. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 60 | Google)
Zelazo, P. D. (2004). The development of conscious control in childhood. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 8 (1):12-17.   (Cited by 57 | Google | More links)