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8.8f. Emotion and Consciousness in Psychology (Emotion and Consciousness in Psychology on PhilPapers)

See also:
Adolphs, Ralph (2004). Could a robot have emotions? Theoretical perspectives from social cognitive neuroscience. In J. Fellous (ed.), Who Needs Emotions. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Adolphs, Ralph (2000). Is reward an emotion? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (2):192-192.   (Google)
Abstract: The brain and emotion treats emotions as states elicited by reinforcers (reward or punishment), but it is unclear how this view can do justice to the diversity of emotions. It is also unclear how such a view distinguishes emotions from states such as hunger and thirst. A complementary approach to understanding emotions may begin by considering emotions as aspects of social cognition
Ainslie, George & Monterosso, John (2005). Why not emotions as motivated behaviors? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (2):194-195.   (Google)
Abstract: Lewis's dynamic systems approach is a refreshing change from the reflexology of most neuroscience, but it could go a step further: It could include the expected rewardingness of an emotion in the recursive feedback loop that determines whether the emotion will occur. Two possible objections to such a model are discussed: that emotions are not deliberate, and that negative emotions should lose out as instrumental choices
Alexandrov, Yuri I. & Sams, Mikko E. (2005). Emotion and consciousness: Ends of a continuum. Cognitive Brain Research 25 (2):387-405.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Anderson, C. M. (2000). From molecules to mindfulness: How vertically convergent fractal time fluctuations unify cognition and emotion. Consciousness and Emotion 1 (2):193-226.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Fractal time fluctuations of the spectral “1/f” form are universal in natural self-organizing systems. Neurobiology is uniquely infused with fractal fluctuations in the form of statistically self-similar clusters or bursts on all levels of description from molecular events such as protein chain fluctuations, ion channel currents and synaptic processes to the behaviors of neural ensembles or the collective behavior of Internet users. It is the thesis of this essay that the brain self-organizes via a vertical collation of these spontaneous events in order to perceive the world and generate adaptive behaviors. REM sleep, which coalesces from self-similar clusters of burst-within-burst behavior during ontogeny, is essential to cognitive-emotional function, and has recurrent fractal organization. Empirical fMRI observations further support the association of fractal fluctuations in the temporal lobes, brainstem and cerebellum during the expression of emotional memory, spontaneous fluctuations of thought and meditative practice. Cognitive-emotional integration arises as amygdaloid-brainstem-cerebellar systems harmonize the vertical “1/f” symphony of coupled isochronous cortical oscillations in the pursuit of mindfulness
Anders, Silke; Birbaumer, Niels; Sadowski, Bettina; Erb, Michael; Mader, Irina; Grodd, Wolfgang & Lotze, Martin (2004). Parietal somatosensory association cortex mediates affective blindsight. Nature Neuroscience 7 (4):339-340.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Antoine, Lutz; Brefczynski-Lewis, J.; Johnstone, T. & Davidson, R. J. (online). Regulation of the neural circuitry of emotion by compassion meditation: Effects of meditative expertise.   (Google)
Abstract: PLoS ONE 3(3): e1897. doi:10.1371/journal.pone
Atkinson, Anthony P. (2001). Emotion-specific clues to the neural substrate of empathy. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (1):22-23.   (Google)
Abstract: Research only alluded to by Preston & de Waal (P&deW) indicates the disproportionate involvement of some brain regions in the perception and experience of certain emotions. This suggests that the neural substrate of primitive emotional contagion has some emotion-specific aspects, even if cognitively sophisticated forms of empathy do not. Goals for future research include determining the ways in which empathy is emotion-specific and dependent on overt or covert perception
Ayton, Peter; Pott, Alice & Elwakili, Najat (2007). Affective forecasting: Why can't people predict their emotions? Thinking and Reasoning 13 (1):62 – 80.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Two studies explore the frequently reported finding that affective forecasts are too extreme. In the first study, driving test candidates forecast the emotional consequences of failing. Test failers overestimated the duration of their disappointment. Greater previous experience of this emotional event did not lead to any greater accuracy of the forecasts, suggesting that learning about one's own emotions is difficult. Failers' self-assessed chances of passing were lower a week after the test than immediately prior to the test; this difference correlated with the magnitude of individual immediate disappointments, suggesting the presence of a cognitive strategy for recovering from disappointments. A second study investigated the theory that undue focus on the differences between present and future biases affective forecasts. “Defocusing” that induced low-level construals of the future reduced the extremeness of affective forecasts but a higher-level construal did not. We conclude that a focusing effect may bias affective forecasts
Baars, Bernard J. (2000). Conscious emotional feelings--beyond the four taboos: An introductory comment. Consciousness and Emotion 1 (1):11-14.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Backhaus, Gary (2000). Emotions: The Fetters of instincts and the promise of dynamic systems. In The Caldron of Consciousness: Motivation, Affect and Self-Organization--An Anthology. Amsterdam: J Benjamins.   (Google)
Backhaus, G. (2001). Tymieniecka’s phenomenology of life: The “imaginatio creatrix,” subliminal passions, and the moral sense. Consciousness and Emotion 2 (1):103-134.   (Google)
Abstract: Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka expands the phenomenological study of meanings (sense-bestowal) into an onto-genetic inquiry by grounding it in a phenomenology of life, including the emotional dimension. This phenomenology of life is informed by the empirical sciences and its doctrines parallel the new scientific paradigm of open dynamic systems. Embedded in the dynamics of the real individuation of life forms, human consciousness emerges at a unique station in the evolutionary process. Tymieniecka treats the constitution of sense as a function of life, and thus the transcendental constitutive function of the cognitive, objectifying intentionality of consciousness, the purview of classical phenomenology, is viewed as a project that is limited in its scope. According to the phenomenology of life, meaning-genesis is exhibited throughout the various stages of structurization in the evolution of life. This paper highlights the transformative function of the “Imaginatio Creatrix,” which is the dynamic process at the human station of evolution that accounts for humanity’s inventive capacities necessary for the construction of a human world. The Imaginatio Creatrix transforms the more primitive stirrings of the human “soul” into subliminal passions of human existential significance. The enactive theory of the mind corroborates Tymieniecka’s rejection of Husserl’s doctrine of passive synthesis. However, Tymieniecka’s study of the creative function offers a key for further advancement in enactive theory. Three sense-bestowing functions of the Imaginatio Creatrix account for the human expansion of life: the Aesthetic/Poetic sense, the Objectifying Sense, and the Moral Sense. The Moral Sense, for Tymieniecka, is not the product of reasoning powers, but rather the fruit of subliminal passions that acquire their moral aspect through trans-actions guided by the “benevolent sentiment.”
Bagaric, M. (2002). Internalism and the part-time moralist: An essay about the objectivity of moral judgments. Consciousness and Emotion 2 (2):255-271.   (Google)
Abstract: This paper contends that internalism with respect moral motivation (the view that we are always moved to act in accordance with our moral judgments) is wrong. While internalism can accommodate amoralists, it cannot explain the phenomenon of ‘part-time moralists’ — the person who is (ostensibly at least) moved by some of his or her moral judgments but not others — and hence should be rejected. This suggests that moral judgments are beliefs (or conscious representations) as opposed to desires. It is contended that morality consists of the set of principles which will maximise happiness and that our moral consciousness is motivated when a desire to maximise happiness is copresent with such a belief. Finally, it is argued that this does not entail that morality is a subjective or relative concept
Balconi, Michela & Lucchiari, Claudio (2007). Consciousness and emotional facial expression recognition: Subliminal/supraliminal stimulation effect on n200 and p300 ERPs. Journal of Psychophysiology 21 (2):100-108.   (Google)
Balconi, Michela & Lucchiari, Claudio (2005). Consciousness, emotion and face: An event-related potentials (ERP) study. In Ralph D. Ellis & Natika Newton (eds.), Consciousness & Emotion: Agency, Conscious Choice, and Selective Perception. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Balconi, Michela (2006). Exploring consciousness in emotional face decoding: An event-related potential analysis. Genetic, Social, and General Psychology Monographs 132 (2):129-150.   (Google)
Balconi, M. & Pozzoli, U. (2003). ERPs (event-related potentials), semantic attribution, and facial expression of emotions. Consciousness and Emotion 4 (1):63-80.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: ERPs (event-related potentials) correlates are largely used in cognitive psychology and specifically for analysis of semantic information processing. Previous research has underlined a strong correlation between a negative-ongoing wave (N400), more frontally distributed, and semantic linguistic or extra-linguistic anomalies. With reference to the extra-linguistic domain, our experiment analyzed ERP variation in a semantic task of comprehension of emotional facial expressions. The experiment explored the effect of expectancy violation when subjects observed congruous or incongruous emotional facial patterns. Four prototypical (anger, sadness, happiness and surprise) and four morphed faces were presented. Moreover, two distinct cognitive tasks (an implicit vs an explicit elaboration) were analyzed in order to evaluate the influence of spontaneous decoding in N400-like effects. An automatic, high-order cognitive process was found, elicited by a negative ERP variation similar to the linguistic N400 effect, which allows us to explain the congruous/incongruous decoding in semantic extra-linguistic comprehension
Baldwin, Mark W. & Baccus, Jodene R. (2004). Maintaining a focus on the social goals underlying self-conscious emotions. Psychological Inquiry 15 (2):139-144.   (Google)
Barbalet, Jack (2004). Consciousness, emotions and science. In Jonathan H. Turner (ed.), Advances in Group Processes, Vol 21: Theory and Research on Human Emotions. Elsevier Science.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Barrett, Lisa Feldman; Niedenthal, Paula M. & Winkielman, Piotr (2005). Emotion and Consciousness. Guilford Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Barnes, Allison & Thagard, Paul, Emotional decisions.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Recent research has yielded an explosion of literature that establishes a strong connection between emotional and cognitive processes. Most notably, Antonio Damasio draws an intimate connection between emotion and cognition in practical decision making. Damasio presents a "somatic marker" hypothesis which explains how emotions are biologically indispensable to decisions. His research on patients with frontal lobe damage indicates that feelings normally accompany response options and operate as a biasing device to dictate choice. What Damasio's hypothesis lacks is a theoretical model of decision making which can advance the conceptual connection between emotional and cognitive decision making processes. In this paper we combine Damasio's somatic marker hypothesis with the coherence theory of decision put forward by Thagard and Millgram. The juxtaposition of Damasio's hypothesis with a cognitive theory of decision making leads to a new and better theory of emotional decisions
Barrett, Lisa Feldman (2005). Feeling is perceiving: Core affect and conceptualization in the experience of emotion. In Lisa Feldman Barrett, Paula M. Niedenthal & Piotr Winkielman (eds.), Emotion and Consciousness.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Barrett, Lisa Feldman; Ochsner, Kevin N. & Gross, James J. (2007). On the automaticity of emotion. In John A. Bargh (ed.), Social Psychology and the Unconscious: The Automaticity of Higher Mental Processes. Frontiers of Social Psychology. Psychology Press.   (Google)
Barnard, Philip & Dalgleish, Tim (2005). Psychological-level systems theory: The missing link in bridging emotion theory and neurobiology through dynamic systems modeling. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (2):196-197.   (Google)
Abstract: Bridging between psychological and neurobiological systems requires that the system components are closely specified at both the psychological and brain levels of analysis. We argue that in developing his dynamic systems theory framework, Lewis has sidestepped the notion of a psychological level systems model altogether, and has taken a partisan approach to his exposition of a brain-level systems model
Beauregard, Mario (ed.) (2004). Consciousness, Emotional Self-Regulation and the Brain. John Benjamins.   (Google)
Abstract: This book will undoubtedly be useful to scholars and graduate students interested in the relationships between self-consciousness, emotion, the brain, and the...
Beauregard, Mario; Levesque, J. & Paquette, V. (2004). Neural Basis of Conscious and Voluntary Self-Regulation of Emotion. Consciousness, Emotional Self-Regulation and the Brain. John Benjamins.   (Google)
Beauregard, Mario; Lévesque, Johanne & Paquette, Vincent (2004). Neural basis of conscious and voluntary self-regulation of emotion. In Mario Beauregard (ed.), Consciousness, Emotional Self-Regulation and the Brain. Advances in Consciousness Research. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Beauregard, Mario; Lévesque, Johanne & Bourgouin, Pierre (2001). Neural correlates of conscious self-regulation of emotion. Journal of Neuroscience 21 (18):6993-7000.   (Cited by 192 | Google | More links)
Bechara, Antoine & Naqvi, Nasir (2004). Listening to your heart: Interoceptive awareness as a gateway to feeling. Nature Neuroscience 7 (2):102-103.   (Cited by 11 | Google)
Becker, Marjorie (2002). Talking back to frida: Houses of emotional mestizaje. History and Theory 41 (4):56–71.   (Google | More links)
Bednar, James A. (2000). Internally-generated activity, non-episodic memory, and emotional salience in sleep. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):908-909.   (Google)
Abstract: (1) Substituting (as Solms does) forebrain for brainstem in the search for a dream “controller” is counterproductive, since a distributed system need have no single controller. (2) Evidence against episodic memory consolidation does not show that REM sleep has no role in other types of memory, contra Vertes & Eastman. (3) A generalization of Revonsuo's “threat simulation” model in reverse is more plausible and is empirically testable. [Hobson et al.; Solms; Revonsuo; Vertes & Eastman]
Beer, Jennifer S. & Keltner, Dacher (2004). What is unique about self-conscious emotions? Psychological Inquiry 15 (2):126-128.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Belzung, Catherine & Chevalley, Catherine (2001). Models of complexity: The example of emotions. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (6):1053-1054.   (Google)
Abstract: Using the example of the difficulties which emerge when trying to model complex behaviors – such as emotional expression – that result from stochastic interactions between different components, we argue that biorobotics may well describe one possible evolution of certain features of a biological system, but cannot pretend to be a simulation of the whole behavior of the system
Ben-Ze'ev, Aaron (2000). Are emotions so simple? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (2):194-194.   (Google)
Abstract: Rolls's book, The brain and emotion is an important and valuable contribution to our understanding of the brain mechanisms that underlie emotional processes. Its explanatory value is less obvious when it comes to psychological and philosophical issues concerning the nature of emotions
Berridge, Kent C. & Winkielman, Piotr (2003). What is an unconscious emotion? (The case for unconscious "liking"). Cognition and Emotion 17 (2):181-211.   (Cited by 52 | Google | More links)
Bickhard, Mark H. (2000). Motivation and Emotion: An Interactive Process Model. In Ralph D. Ellis & Natika Newton (eds.), The Caldron of Consciousness: Motivation, Affect and Self-Organization. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 19 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In this chapter, I outline dynamic models of motivation and emotion. These turn out not to be autonomous subsystems, but, instead, are deeply integrated in the basic interactive dynamic character of living systems. Motivation is a crucial aspect of particular kinds of interactive systems -- systems for which representation is a sister aspect. Emotion is a special kind of partially reflective interaction process, and yields its own emergent motivational aspects. In addition, the overall model accounts for some of the crucial properties of consciousness
Brownell, Philip (2004). Perceiving you perceiving me: Self-conscious emotions and gestalt therapy. Gestalt! 8 (1).   (Google)
Buck, Ross (2005). Adding ingredients to the self-organizing dynamic system stew: Motivation, communication, and higher-level emotions – and don't forget the genes! Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (2):197-198.   (Google)
Abstract: Self-organizing dynamic systems (DS) modeling is appropriate to conceptualizing the relationship between emotion and cognition-appraisal. Indeed, DS modeling can be applied to encompass and integrate additional phenomena at levels lower than emotional interpretations (genes), at the same level (motives), and at higher levels (social, cognitive, and moral emotions). Also, communication is a phenomenon involved in dynamic system interactions at all levels
Buck, Ross (2000). Conceptualizing motivation and emotion. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (2):195-196.   (Google)
Abstract: Motivation and emotion are not clearly defined and differentiated in Rolls's The brain and emotion, reflecting a widespread problem in conceptualizing these phenomena. An adequate theory of emotion cannot be based upon reward and punishment alone. Basic mechanisms of arousal, agonistic, and prosocial motives-emotions exist in addition to reward-punishment systems
Cardon, Alain (2006). Artificial consciousness, artificial emotions, and autonomous robots. Cognitive Processing 7 (4):245-267.   (Google | More links)
Cardena, Etzel (2008). Consciousness and emotions as interpersonal and transpersonal systems: This paper is dedicated to the living memory of may buelna de cardeña (1924-2008). Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (s 10-11):249-263.   (Google)
Abstract: Emotions and consciousness are intimately linked and often conceived from a purely intrapersonal perspective. This paper explores the implications of considering emotions as not only intrapersonal but also as interpersonal and transpersonal heterarchical (i.e., every component has potentially equal importance) systems. It is telling that in contemplative traditions and contemporary research on hypnotic experience, deep 'inner' experience is pregnant with interpersonal and transpersonal meanings. Similarly, the propensity to have porous conscious experiences is paralleled by the tendency to be affected by the emotion of others. Anecdotal and experimental evidence on anomalous events clearly suggests that strong emotions can have non-local effects. That consciousness and emotions are embedded within interpersonal and transpersonal fields has important epistemological and ethical implications
Carver, Charles S. (2005). Emotion theory is about more than affect and cognition: Taking triggers and actions into account. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (2):198-199.   (Google)
Abstract: Understanding how emotions emerge is difficult without determining what characteristic of the trigger actually triggers them. Knowing whether emotional experiences self-stabilize is difficult without remembering what other processes are set in play as the emotion emerges. It is not clear either that positive feedback is required for the emergence of emotion or that an attractor model captures well what is happening when an emotion arises
Chakrabarti, Bhismadev & Baron-Cohen, Simon (2008). Can the shared circuits model (SCM) explain joint attention or perception of discrete emotions? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (1):24-25.   (Google)
Charland, Louis C. (2005). Emotion Experience and the Indeterminacy of Valence. In Lisa Feldman Barrett, Paula M. Niedenthal & Piotr Winkielman (eds.), Emotion and Consciousness. Guilford Press.   (Google)
Charland, Louis C. (1999). Perceptual symbol systems and emotion. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (4):612-613.   (Google)
Abstract: In his target article, Barsalou cites current work on emotion theory but does not explore its relevance for this project. The connection is worth pursuing, since there is a plausible case to be made that emotions form a distinct symbolic information processing system of their own. On some views, that system is argued to be perceptual: a direct connection with Barsalou's perceptual symbol systems theory. Also relevant is the hypothesis that there may be different modular subsystems within emotion and the perennial tension between cognitive and perceptual theories of emotion
Chiappelli, F.; Prolo, P.; Cajulis, E.; Harper, S.; Sunga, E. & Concepcion, E. (2004). Consciousness, Emotional Self-Regulation, and the Psychosomatic Network: Relevance to Oral Biology and Medicine. Consciousness, Emotional Self-Regulation and the Brain. John Benjamins.   (Google)
Ciompi, Luc (2003). Reflections on the role of emotions in consciousness and subjectivity, from the perspective of affect-logic. Consciousness and Emotion 4 (2):181-196.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The phenomena of human consciousness and subjectivity are explored from the perspective of affect-logic, a comprehensive meta-theory of the interactions between emotion and cognition based mainly on cognitive and social psychology, psychopathology, neurobiology Piaget?s genetic epistemology, psychoanalysis, and evolutionary science. According to this theory, overt or covert affective-cognitive interactions are obligatorily present in all mental activity, seemingly ?neutral? thinking included. Emotions continually exert numerous so-called operator-effects, both linear and nonlinear, on attention, on memory and on comprehensive thought, or logic in a broad sense. They deeply ?affect? also consciousness and subjectivity, as showed by the analysis of four crucially involved phenomena, namely (1) attention, (2) abstraction, (3) language, and (4) the prevailing affective state. The conclusion is that neither consciousness nor subjectiovity can be adequately understood without fully considering their emotional aspects
Cioffi, D. (1991). Sensory awareness versus sensory impression: Affect and attention interact to produce somatic meaning. Cognition and Emotion 5:275-94.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Clore, Gerald L.; Storbeck, Justin; Robinson, Michael D. & Centerbar, David B. (2005). Seven sins in the study of unconscious affect. In Lisa Feldman Barrett, Paula M. Niedenthal & Piotr Winkielman (eds.), Emotion and Consciousness. Guilford Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Cogan, John (2003). Emotion and the growth of consciousness: Gaining insight through a phenomenology of rage. Consciousness and Emotion 4 (2):207-241.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Some attempts to understand emotion have failed to account for important features of our emotional experience ? notably, the experience of gaining insight when we express our emotions. In this essay I will hold that if we properly understand emotions, then we see that the expression of emotion contributes to the growth of consciousness by providing a process wherein consciousness can recognize and reclaim its inherent wholeness, and thereby overcome fragmentation. Hence, in this essay I will strive to: (1) demonstrate that we do get insight when we express our emotions, (2) offer a suggestion as to why this feature is often overlooked, (3) propose a model for understanding the emotions that helps to explain this holistic feature of emotion, and (4) show how this insight into the nature of emotion contributes to our understanding of the growth of consciousness
Cook, N. D. (2002). Tone of Voice and Mind: The Connections Between Intonation, Emotion, Cognition and Consciousness. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 57 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Includes bibliographical references (p. [271]-285) and index.
Critchley, Hugo D.; Wiens, Stefan; Rotshtein, Pia; Öhman, Arne & Dolan, Raymond J. (2004). Neural systems supporting interoceptive awareness. Nature Neuroscience 7 (2):189-195.   (Cited by 145 | Google | More links)
Dalgleish, Tim (2000). Roads not taken: The case for multiple functional-level routes to emotion. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (2):196-197.   (Google)
Abstract: This review focuses on the theory of emotion outlined in Chapter 3 of Rolls's The brain and emotion. It is proposed that Rolls's emphasis on a relatively simple neurobiologically derived emotion scheme does not allow him to present a comprehensive account of emotion. Consequently, high-level cognitive processes, such as appraisal, end up being retained in the theory despite Rolls's skepticism about their utility. An argument is put forward that the concept of appraisal in the emotion literature is more than semantic convention and actually allows us to talk about multiple functional-level routes to the generation of emotion – a characteristic of the latest generation of theories in the cognition-emotion literature
Dalton, T. C. (2000). Review of “a revolutionary way of thinking: From a near fatal accident to a new science of healing” by Charles Krebs. Consciousness and Emotion 1 (2):324-329.   (Google | More links)
Dalton, Thomas C. (2000). The developmental roots of consciousness and emotional experience. Consciousness and Emotion 1 (1):55-89.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Charles Darwin is generally credited with having formulated the first systematic attempt to explain the evolutionary origins and function of the expression of emotions in animals and humans. His ingenious theory, however, was burdened with popular misconceptions about human phylogenetic heritage and bore the philosophical and theoretical deficiencies of the brain science of his era that his successors strove to overcome. In their attempts to rectify Darwin?s errors, William James, James Mark Baldwin and John Dewey each made important contributions to a theory of emotion, which attempted to put it on a more secure philosophical and scientific footing. My contention is that Dewey and his collaborator, infant experimentalist Myrtle McGraw, succeeded where their contemporaries failed. They pointed the way out of the morass of recapitulationism, and showed how a developmental theory of consciousness, mind and emotion could be formulated that avoided the epistemological and ontological pitfalls of Darwin?s theory. Drawing on an extensive body of research from contemporary experimental studies of infant development, this essay attempts to put the questions raised by these historical figures about the structure, function and value of emotions in a theoretical framework. A developmental theory is proposed about the complex, interacting neurobiological and neurobehavioral factors that contribute to human emotional development. This theory identifies the possible relationships among emotions, consciousness and mind and how their co-development influences the capacity of young children to form moral judgments
Dalgleish, Tim & Power, Michael J. (2004). The I of the storm: Relations between self and conscious emotion experience: Comment on lambie and Marcel (2002). Psychological Review 111 (3):812-819.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Damasio, Antonio R. (1999). The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness. Harcourt Brace and Co.   (Cited by 2364 | Google)
de Gelder, Beatrice; Vroomen, Jean; Pourtois, Gilles & Weiskrantz, Lawrence (2000). Affective blindsight: Are we blindly led by emotions? Response to Heywood and Kentridge (2000). Trends in Cognitive Sciences 4 (4):126-127.   (Google | More links)
de Gelder, Beatrice (2005). Nonconscious emotions: New findings and perspectives on nonconscious facial expression recognition and its voice and whole-body contexts. In Lisa Feldman Barrett, Paula M. Niedenthal & Piotr Winkielman (eds.), Emotion and Consciousness. Guilford Press.   (Google)
de Gelder, Beatrice & Hadjikhani, Nouchine (2006). Non-conscious recognition of emotional body language. Neuroreport 17 (6):583-586.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
deluty, E. W. (2001). Consciousness, affect and objectifying in cassirer’s conception of symbolizing. Consciousness and Emotion 2 (1):135-155.   (Google)
Abstract: An examination of Cassirer’s conception of symbolizing, which is born in his critique of Kant, will show that objectifying human experience without external absolutes is grounded in affect, not cognition. When there is no external absolute to guide objectifying, then the roots of objectifying begin with how we are affected by experience and led to reflect. Affect formulates how we become conscious of what there is and express this consciousness so as to objectify it. Affect thus has an indirect influence on consciousness and objectifying. Cassirer expands the scope of the free play of the imagination, which Kant restricted to aesthetic judgments, to account for how order arises through any modality when a rule is not given. He anchors this generative source in human expression itself, and thereby prevents objectifying from sinking into relativism. Affect is thus shown to play a regulative role in consciousness when we objectify human experience without external absolutes
DeLancey, Craig (1996). Emotion and the function of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (5-6):492-99.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
de Preester, H. (2002). Intentionality and the inside/outside distinction in sensitive systems. Consciousness and Emotion 3 (1):65-79.   (Google)
Abstract: Working from both a phenomenological and a biological background, the conditions under which the emergence of intentionality occurs, are approached. This is done via two particularities of biological systems: the inside/outside distinction they exhibit and the fact that they are sensitive. The phenomenon of boundaries turns out to be a crucial issue in such an account. To start from a biological level is an indispensable preparation for a proper understanding of intentionality, phenomenologically conceived
Derryberry, Douglas (2001). Emotion and conscious experience: Perceptual and attentional influences of anxiety. In Peter G. Grossenbacher (ed.), Finding Consciousness in the Brain: A Neurocognitive Approach. Advances in Consciousness Research. John Benjamins.   (Google)
de Sousa, Ronald B. (2002). Fringe consciousness and the multifariousness of emotions. Psyche 8 (14):i.   (Google)
Dimberg, U.; Thunberg, M. & Elmehed, K. (2000). Unconscious facial reactions to emotional facial expressions. Psychological Science 11 (1):86-89.   (Cited by 174 | Google)
Downey, Greg (2005). The contribution of cross-cultural study to dynamic systems modeling of emotions. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (2):201-202.   (Google)
Abstract: Lewis neglects cross-cultural data in his dynamic systems model of emotion, probably because appraisal theory disregards behavior and because anthropologists have not engaged discussions of neural plasticity in the brain sciences. Considering cultural variation in emotion-related behavior, such as grieving, indigenous descriptions of emotions, and alternative developmental regimens, such as sport, opens up avenues to test dynamic systems models
Eastwood, John D. & Smilek, Daniel (2005). Functional consequences of perceiving facial expressions of emotion without awareness. Consciousness and Cognition 14 (3):565-584.   (Google | More links)
Ellis, Ralph D. & Newton, Natika (2005). Consciousness and Emotion: Agency, Conscious Choice, and Selective Perception. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: The papers in this volume of Consciousness & Emotion Book Series are organized around the theme of "enaction.
Ellis, Ralph D. (1995). Questioning Consciousness: The Interplay of Imagery, Cognition, and Emotion in the Human Brain. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 92 | Google | More links)
Abstract: ... Geoffrey Underwood (University of Nottingham) Francisco Varela (CREA, Ecole Polytechnique. Paris) Volume 2 Ralph D. Ellis Questioning Consciousness ...
Ellis, R. (2000). Review of “affective neuroscience” by Jaak Panksepp. Consciousness and Emotion 1 (2):313-318.   (Google | More links)
Ellis, R. D. (2002). Review of “consciousness and intentionality” by grant R. Gillett and John McMillan. Consciousness and Emotion 3 (1):98-103.   (Google)
Ellis, Ralph D. (ed.) (2000). The Caldron of Consciousness: Motivation, Affect and Self-Organization. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
Ellis, Ralph D. & Newton, Natika (2000). The interdependence of consciousness and emotion. Consciousness and Emotion 1 (1):1-10.   (Google)
Ellis, Ralph D. (2005). The roles of imagery and metaemotion in deliberate choice and moral psychology. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (8-10):140-157.   (Google)
Elster, Jon (2004). Emotion and action. In Robert C. Solomon (ed.), Thinking About Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Eslinger, Paul J.; Moll, Jorge & de Oliveira-Souza, Ricardo (2001). Emotional and cognitive processing in empathy and moral behavior. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (1):34-35.   (Google)
Abstract: Within the perception-action framework, the underlying mechanisms of empathy and its related processes of moral behavior need to be investigated. fMRI studies have shown different frontal cortex activation patterns during automatic processing and judgment tasks when stimuli have moral content. Clinical neuropsychological studies reveal different patterns of empathic alterations after dorsolateral versus orbital frontal cortex damage, related to deficient cognitive and emotional processing. These processing streams represent different neural levels and mechanisms underlying empathy
Esrock, E. J. (2002). Touching art: Intimacy, embodiment, and the somatosensory system. Consciousness and Emotion 2 (2):233-253.   (Google)
Abstract: Viewers have a way of using their somatosensory system to create temporary boundary changes that bring them into intimate relationships with art objects. Spectators experience this imaginary fusion when simultaneously attending to their own somatosensory sensations, which occur inside the body, and to qualities of the artwork, which exist in the external world. At such moments viewers reinterpret their somatosensory sensations as a quality of the artwork. When inside and outside are reinterpreted, viewers cross the conventional boundary between self and object. This effect can be illustrated in first person reports and supported by current research in the neurosciences and the humanities
Evans, Cathryn E. Y.; Bowman, Caroline H. & Turnbull, Oliver H. (2005). Subjective awareness on the iowa gambling task: The key role of emotional experience in schizophrenia. Journal of Clinical and Experimental Neuropsychology 27 (6):656-664.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Faw, Bill (2000). Consciousness, motivation, and emotion: Biopsychological reflections. In Ralph D. Ellis & Natika Newton (eds.), The Caldron of Consciousness: Motivation, Affect and Self-Organization- An Anthology. Advances in Consciousness Research. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 11 | Google)
Faw, B. (2002). Review of “microgenetic approach to the conscious mind” by Talis bachman. Consciousness and Emotion 3 (1):91-98.   (Google)
Fentress, John C. (2000). Emotional networks: The heart of brain design. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (2):198-199.   (Google)
Abstract: The concept of emotion as defined by Rolls is based upon reinforcement mechanisms and their underlying neural networks. He shows how these networks process signals at many levels, through both separate and convergent pathways essential for adaptive action. While many behavioral issues related to emotion are omitted from his review, he succeeds admirably in summarizing both the “current state of the art” in single unit analyses and in pointing out how future research directions may be crafted
Fischer, N. (2000). Review of “Daniel Hutto” by Daniel Hutto. Consciousness and Emotion 1 (2):318-323.   (Google | More links)
Flanagan, O. (2000). Destructive emotions. Consciousness and Emotion 1 (2):259-281.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper discusses the problem of destructive emotions by comparing Eastern and Western assumptions about emotions. In the case of anger, for example, Eastern thinkers straightforwardly posit that it is entirely possible to cultivate attitudes in which anger is naturally absent. In the West, by contrast, it is generally assumed that anger is a “basic” emotion that can be suppressed or managed, but not eliminated from one's basic emotional constitution. Thus, in the Eastern way of thinking, emotion is a force that more easily harmonizes with rational approaches to life and to the specific problems in life
Forgas, Joseph P. & Ciarrochi, J. (2000). Affect infusion and affect control: The interactive role of conscious and unconscious processing strategies in mood management. In Yves Rossetti & Antti Revonsuo (eds.), Beyond Dissociation: Interaction Between Dissociated Implicit and Explicit Processing. John Benjamins.   (Google)
Fox, Elaine (2002). Processing emotional facial expressions: The role of anxiety and awareness. Cognitive, Affective and Behavioral Neuroscience 2 (1):52-63.   (Google)
Freeman, Walter J. (2005). Emotion is from preparatory brain chaos; irrational action is from premature closure. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (2):204-205.   (Google)
Abstract: EEG evidence supports the view that each cerebral hemisphere maintains a scale-free network that generates and maintains a global state of chaos. By its own evolution, and under environmental impacts, this hemispheric chaos can rise to heights that may either escape containment and engender incontinent action or be constrained by predictive control and yield creative action of great power and beauty
Gaillard, Raphaël; Del Cul, Antoine; Naccache, Lionel; Vinckier, Fabien; Cohen, Laurent; Dehaene, Stanislas & Smith, Edward E. (2006). Nonconscious semantic processing of emotional words modulates conscious access. PNAS Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 103 (19):7524-7529.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Getz, I. & Lubart, T. I. (2000). An emotional-experiential perspective on creative symbolic-metaphorical processes. Consciousness and Emotion 1 (2):283-312.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Following some initial interrogations on the experiential and creative nature of symbolic-metaphorical processes (e.g. Gendlin, 1997a; Gruber, 1988) and some work on the production and interpretation of linguistically novel metaphors (e.g. Gibbs, 1994; Lakoff & Turner, 1989), we propose a new, `emotional-experiential' perspective on creative metaphors — perhaps, the most historically and sociologically important type of symbolic constructions. The emotional-experiential perspective accounts for the production and interpretation of creative metaphors through idiosyncratic emotion-based associations. Introspective, laboratory, and illustrative case study evidence from several Western cultures is provided. Implications for broad issues concerning creative metaphor and symbolization are discussed
Gibbs Jr, R. W. & Van Orden, G. C. (2003). Are emotional expressions intentional?: A self-organizational approach. Consciousness and Emotion 4 (1):1-16.   (Google)
Abstract: This paper discusses the debate over whether emotional expressions are spontaneous or intentional actions. We describe a variety of empirical evidence supporting these two possibilities. But we argue that the spontaneous-intentional distinction fails to explain the psychological dynamics of emotional expressions. We claim that a complex systems perspective on intentions, as self-organized critical states, may yield a unified view of emotional expressions as a consequence of situated action. This account simultaneously acknowledges the embodied status of environment, evolution, culture and mind in theories of emotion
Gray, Jeffrey A. (1999). Cognition, emotion, conscious experience and the brain. In Tim Dalgleish & M. J. Powers (eds.), Handbook of Cognition and Emotion. Wiley.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Grose, Jonathan, Genuine versus deceptive emotional displays.   (Google)
Abstract: This paper contributes to the explanation of human cooperative behaviour, examining the implications of Brian Skyrms’ modelling of the prisoner’s dilemma (PD). Augmenting a PD with signalling strategies promotes cooperation, but a challenge that must be addressed is what prevents signals being subverted by deceptive behaviour. Empirical results suggest that emotional displays can play a signalling role and, to some extent, are secure from subversion. I examine proximate explanations and then offer an evolutionary explanation for the translucency of emotional displays. Selection acts on the basis of lifetime fitness consequences and, crucially for my argument, the intensity of selection decreases over the course of a lifetime. Hence we tend to possess traits that promote survival when young and, with regard to emotional displays, translucency allows successful maturation over our protracted period of nurturing by close kin. This is due to the vital role played by emotional interactions in the normal cognitive and social development of Homo sapiens
Grossberg, Stephen (2005). STaRT: A bridge between emotion theory and neurobiology through dynamic system modeling. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (2):207-208.   (Google)
Abstract: Lewis proposes a “reconceptualization” of how to link the psychology and neurobiology of emotion and cognitive-emotional interactions. His main proposed themes have actually been actively and quantitatively developed in the neural modeling literature for more than 30 years. This commentary summarizes some of these themes and points to areas of particularly active research in this area
Guy, S. C. & Cahill, L. (1999). The role of overt rehearsal in enhanced conscious memory for emotional events. Consciousness and Cognition 8 (1):114-122.   (Google)
Abstract: This study tested the hypothesis that overt rehearsal is sufficient to explain enhanced memory associated with emotion by experimentally manipulating rehearsal of emotional material. Participants viewed two sets of film clips, one set of emotional films and one set of relatively neutral films. One set of films was viewed in each of two sessions, with approximately 1 week between the sessions. Participants were given a free recall test of all of films viewed approximately 1 week after the second session. Rehearsal was manipulated by instructing one group of participants not to discuss the films with anyone (no talkgroup) and instructing a second group to discuss both sets of films with at least three people (forced talkgroup). A third group consisted of participants instructed not to discuss the films with anyone, but who did not comply with these instructions (talkersgroup). All groups recalled significantly more of the emotional films than the neutral films. Furthermore, the relative number of emotional and neutral films recalled did not differ significantly among the three groups. The results indicate that overt rehearsal is insufficient to explain the enhancing effects of emotion on memory
Hartmann, Ernest (2000). The waking-to-dreaming continuum and the effects of emotion. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):947-950.   (Google)
Abstract: The three-dimensional “AIM model” proposed by Hobson et al. is imaginative. However, many kinds of data suggest that the “dimensions” are not orthogonal, but closely correlated. An alternative view is presented in which mental functioning is considered as a continuum, or a group of closely linked continua, running from focused waking activity at one end, to dreaming at the other. The effect of emotional state is increasingly evident towards the dreaming end of the continuum. [Hobson et al.; Nielsen; Solms]
Heerey, Erin A.; Keltner, Dacher & Capps, Lisa M. (2003). Making sense of self-conscious emotion: Linking theory of mind and emotion in children with autism. Emotion 3 (4):394-400.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Heilman, K. M. (2000). Emotional experience: A neurological model. In Richard D. R. Lane, L. Nadel, G. L. Ahern, J. Allen & Alfred W. Kaszniak (eds.), Cognitive Neuroscience of Emotion. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 18 | Google)
Herba, Catherine M.; Heining, Maike; Young, Andrew W.; Browning, Michael; Benson, Philip J.; Phillips, Mary L. & Gray, Jeffrey A. (2007). Conscious and nonconscious discrimination of facial expressions. Visual Cognition 15 (1):36-47.   (Google | More links)
Heywood, Charles A. & Kentridge, Robert W. (2000). Affective blindsight? Trends in Cognitive Sciences 4 (4):125-126.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Hinde, Robert A. (2001). Emotion: The relation between breadth of definition and explanatory power. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (1):37-38.   (Google)
Abstract: Attempts to integrate diverse phenomena in terms of common processes are much needed in psychology, but definitional precision is a necessary preliminary to explanation. It is also preferable to use caution in juxtaposing concepts from different realms of discourse
Öhman, Arne; Flykt, Anders & Lundqvist, Daniel (2000). Unconscious emotion: Evolutionary perspectives, psychophysiological data and neuropsychological mechanisms. In Richard D. R. Lane, L. Nadel & G. L. Ahern (eds.), Cognitive Neuroscience of Emotion. Series in Affective Science. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Hocutt, M. (2003). Review of “the blank slate” by Steven Pinker. Consciousness and Emotion 4 (1):135-143.   (Google | More links)
Honvank, Jack & Haaden, Edward H. F. (2001). Conscious and unconscious processing of emotional faces. In Beatrice De Gelder, Edward H. F. De Haan & Charles A. Heywood (eds.), Out of Mind: Varieties of Unconscious Processes. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Horacio Fabrega Jr, (2004). Consciousness and emotions are minimized. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (6):736-737.   (Google)
Abstract: In the case of religion, explanations based on emotion should be privileged over those based on “cold” cognition. The origins of religious beliefs are as critical to understanding religion as are the group phenomena which sustain them. In addition, religion's relationship to the growth of knowledge is neglected by the target authors. The balance between the costs and benefits of religion will vary depending upon the phase of an individual society's cultural evolution
Houston, Alasdair I. & McNamara, John M. (2000). Adaptive accounts of physiology and emotion. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (2):201-202.   (Google)
Abstract: Rolls discusses various adaptive explanations of physiological processes and the emotions. We give a critical analysis of some of these from the perspective of behavioural ecology. While agreeing with the approach adopted by Rolls, we identify topics that could have been better presented by making use of the existing literature
H., M. (2003). Spinoza’s anticipation of contemporary affective neuroscience. Consciousness and Emotion 4 (2):257-290.   (Google)
Abstract: Spinoza speculated on how ethics could emerge from biology and psychology rather than disrupt them and recent evidence suggests he might have gotten it right. His radical deconstruction and reconstruction of ethics is supported by a number of avenues of research in the cognitive and neurosciences. This paper gathers together and presents a composite picture of recent research that supports Spinoza’s theory of the emotions and of the natural origins of ethics. It enumerates twelve naturalist claims of Spinoza that now seem to be supported by substantial evidence from the neurosciences and recent cognitive science. I focus on the evidence provided by Lakoff and Johnson in their summary of recent cognitive science in Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought (1999); by Antonio Damasio in his assessment of the state of affective neuroscience in Descartes’ Error (1994) and in The Feeling of What Happens (1999) (with passing references to his recent Looking for Spinoza (2003); and by Giacomo Rizzolatti, Vittorio Gallese and their colleagues in the neural basis of emotional contagion and resonance, i.e., the neural basis of primitive sociality and intersubjectivity, that bear out Spinoza’s account of social psychology as rooted in the mechanism he called attention to and identified as affective imitation
Hunt, Caroline; Keogh, Edmund & French, Christopher C. (2006). Anxiety sensitivity: The role of conscious awareness and selective attentional bias to physical threat. Emotion 6 (3):418-428.   (Google)
Izard, Carroll E. (2004). Emotions and emotion cognition contribute to the construction and understanding of mind. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (1):111-112.   (Google)
Abstract: Carpendale & Lewis's (C&L's) interesting and insightful article did not integrate several potentially useful notions from emotion theory and research into their explanatory framework. I propose that emotions are indigenous elements of mind and that children's understanding of them is fundamental to their understanding of the mental life of self and others, understandings critical to the development of social and emotional competence
Izard, Carroll (2007). Levels of emotion and levels of consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (1):96-98.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Merker makes a strong case for the upper brain stem as being the neural home of primary or phenomenal consciousness. Though less emphasized, he makes an equally strong and empirically supported argument for the critical role of the mesodiencephalon in basic emotion processes. His evidence and argument on the functions of brainstem systems in primary consciousness and basic emotion processes present a strong challenge to prevailing assumptions about the primacy of cognition in emotion-cognition-behavior relations. (Published Online May 1 2007)
Izard, Carroll (2000). Reinforcement, emotion, and consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (2):202-204.   (Google)
Abstract: Rolls presents a good integrative summary of the neural bases of emotions, adds new findings and insights, and takes a stance on controversial issues such as separate or distinct brain systems for processing emotion information and for planning and action. This commentary raises questions about his explanations of emotion activation, response to novelty, the evolution of emotions, and the phenomenal experience of emotions in human consciousness
Jarvilehto, Timo (2000). Feeling as knowing--part I: Emotion as reorganization of the organism-environment system. Consciousness and Emotion 1 (2):245-257.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The theoretical approach described in a series of articles (Jarvilehto, 1998a,b,c, 1999, 2000) is developed further in relation to the problems of emotion, consciousness, and brain activity. The approach starts with the claim that many conceptual confusions in psychology are due to the postulate that the organism and the environment are two interacting systems (”Two systems theory”). The gist of the approach is the idea that the organism and environment form a unitary system which is the basis of subjective experience. This starting point leads to the conception of emotions as reorganization of the organism-environment system, and entails that emotion and knowledge are only different aspects of the same process. In the first part of the article the general outline of the approach is sketched, and in a subsequent second part (Jarvilehto, 2001) the relations between emotions, consciousness, and brain activity will be discussed in detail
J., A. & K., L. (2003). Intentional avoidance and social understanding in repressors and nonrepressors: Two functions for emotion experience? Consciousness and Emotion 4 (1):17-42.   (Google)
Abstract: Two putative functions of emotion experience — its roles in intentional action and in social understanding — were investigated using a group of individuals (repressors) known to have impaired anxiety experience. Repressors, low-anxious, high-anxious, and defensive high-anxious individuals were asked to give a public presentation, and then given the opportunity to avoid the presentation. Repressors were the group most likely to avoid giving the presentation, but were the least likely to give an emotional explanation for their avoidance. By contrast, they were not less likely than other groups to provide negative emotional explanations of another person’s behaviour in a film clip. We concluded that: (1) repressors are impaired in self- but not in other-explanation using emotion, implying that “simulation” is not the method used by repressors to ground their folk psychology, (2) the intentional avoidance shown by repressors is indicative of some intact first-order phenomenal anxiety experience but that they lack second-order awareness of this anxiety experience
Johnson, Gregory (2008). LeDoux's Fear Circuit and the Status of Emotion as a Non-cognitive Process. Philosophical Psychology 21 (6):739 - 757.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: LeDoux (1996) has identified a sub-cortical neural circuit that mediates fear responses in rats. The existence of this neural circuit has been used to support the claim that emotion is a non-cognitive process. In this paper I argue that this sub-cortical circuit cannot have a role in the explanation of emotions in humans. This worry is raised by looking at the properties of this neural pathway, which does not have the capacity to respond to the types of stimuli that are generally taken to trigger emotion responses. In particular, the neurons in this pathway cannot represent the stimulus as a complete object or event, rather they represent the simple information that is encoded at the periphery. If it is assumed that an object or event in the world is what, even in simple cases, causes an emotion, then this sub-cortical pathway has limited use in a theory of emotion.
Joseph, R. (2003). Emotional trauma and childhood amnesia. Consciousness and Emotion 4 (2):151-179.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: It has been reported that, on average, most adults recall first memories formed around age 3.5. In general, most first memories are positive. However, whether these first memories tend to be visual or verbal and whether the period for childhood amnesia (CA) is greater for visual or verbal or for positive versus negative memories has not been determined. Because negative, stressful experiences disrupt memory and can injure memory centers such as the hippocampus and amygdala, and since adults who were traumatized or abused during childhood (TA) reportedly suffer memory disturbances, it was hypothesized that those with a history of early trauma might suffer from a lengthier childhood amnesia and form their first recallable memories at a later age as compared to the general population (GP). Because the right hemisphere matures earlier than the language-dominant left hemisphere, and is dominant for visual and emotional memory, as well as the stress reponse, it was hypothesized that first recallable memories would be visual rather than verbal. Lastly, since stress can injure the brain and disrupt memory, it was hypothesized that the traumatized group would demonstrate memory and intellectual disturbances associated with right hemisphere injury as based on WAIS-R, Wechsler Memory Scale, and facial-memory testing. All hypotheses were supported. Positive and visual memories are formed before negative and verbal memories. TA CA offset, on average, is at age 6.1 versus 3.5 for GPs. TA PIQ (performance IQ), short-term visual memory, and facial memory were significantly reduced
Joseph, Jacob; Berry, Kevin & Deshpande, Satish P. (2009). Impact of emotional intelligence and other factors on perception of ethical behavior of Peers. Journal of Business Ethics 89 (4).   (Google)
Joseph, R. (1988). The right cerebral hemisphere: Emotion, music, visual-spatial skills, body-image, dreams, and awareness. Journal of Clinical Psychology 44:630-673.   (Cited by 45 | Google | More links)
Järvilehto, Timo (2001). Feeling as knowing--part II: Emotion, consciousness and brain activity. Consciousness and Emotion. Special Issue 2 (1):75-102.   (Google)
Abstract: In the latter part of this two-article sequence, the concept of emotion as reorganization of the organism-environment system is developed further in relation to consciousness, subjective experience and brain activity. It is argued that conscious emotions have their origin in reorganizational changes in primitive co-operative organizations, in which they get a more local character with the advent of personal consciousness and individuality, being expressed in conscious emotions. However, the conscious emotion is not confined to the individual only, but it gets its content and the emotional quale in the social context, and in relation to the norms of the given culture. Emotion is fundamentally the process of ascription of meaning to the parts of the world which are relevant in the achievement of results of behavior. Although emotions may be studied as reorganizational processes in the organism-environment system with the help of physiological recordings and behavioral observations, it is argued — in contrast to the mainstream cognitive science — that emotions cannot be localized in the brain, although the brain is important in their generation as a part of the organism-environment system. It is suggested that the parts of the brain most closely related to emotional expression contain neurons subserving functional systems which are formed in early development, and which are therefore most intimately related to reorganizational processes in the organism-environment system
Järvilehto, Timo (2001). Some background and further theoretical consequences of the organism-environment approach: A reply to the commentary by Panksepp. Consciousness and Emotion 2 (2):311-319.   (Google)
Juslin, Patrik N. & Västfjäll, Daniel (2008). All emotions are not created equal: Reaching beyond the traditional disputes. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (5):600-621.   (Google)
J., L. (2003). What role do the emotions play in cognition?: Towards a new alternative to cognitive theories of emotion. Consciousness and Emotion 4 (1):81-100.   (Google)
Abstract: This paper has two aims: (1) to point the way towards a novel alternative to cognitive theories of emotion, and (2) to delineate a number of different functions that the emotions play in cognition, functions that become visible from outside the framework of cognitive theories. First, I hold that the Higher Order Representational (HOR) theories of consciousness — as generally formulated — are inadequate insofar as they fail to account for selective attention. After posing this dilemma, I resolve it in such a manner that the following thesis arises: the emotions play a key role in shaping selective attention. This thesis is in accord with A. Damasio’s (1994) noteworthy neuroscientific work on emotion. I then begin to formulate an alternative to cognitive theories of emotion, and I show how this new account has implications for the following issues: face recognition, two brain disorders (Capgras’ and Fregoli syndrome), the frame problem in A. I., and the research program of affective computing
Kahn, D.; Pace-Schott, E. & Hobson, J. A. (2002). Emotion and cognition: Feeling and character identification in dreaming. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (1):34-50.   (Google)
Abstract: This study investigated the relationship between dream emotion and dream character identification. Thirty-five subjects provided 320 dream reports and answers to questions on characters that appeared in their dreams. We found that emotions are almost always evoked by our dream characters and that they are often used as a basis for identifying them. We found that affection and joy were commonly associated with known characters and were used to identify them even when these emotional attributes were inconsistent with those of the waking state. These findings are consistent with the finding that the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, associated with short-term memory, is less active in the dreaming compared to the wake brain, while the paleocortical and subcortical limbic areas are more active. The findings are also consistent with the suggestion that these limbic areas have minimal input from the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex in the dreaming brain
Kaszniak, A. W. (2002). Review of “the private life of the brain: Emotions, consciousness, and the secret of the self” by Susan Greenfield. Consciousness and Emotion 2 (2):321-329.   (Google)
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Katz, Leonard D. (2000). Emotion, representation, and consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (2):204-205.   (Google)
Abstract: Rolls's preliminary definitions of emotion and speculative restriction of consciousness, including emotional sentience, to humans, display behaviorist prejudice. Reinforcement and causation are not by themselves sufficient conceptual resources to define either emotion or the directedness of thought and motivated action. For any adequate definition of emotion or delimitation of consciousness, new physiology, such as Rolls is contributing to, and also the resources of other fields, will be required
Keltner, Dacher & Beer, Jennifer S. (2005). Self-conscious emotion and self-regulation. In Abraham Tesser, Joanne V. Wood & Diederik A. Stapel (eds.), On Building, Defending and Regulating the Self: A Psychological Perspective. Psychology Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
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Lambie, John A. & Marcel, Anthony J. (2002). Consciousness and the varieties of emotion experience: A theoretical framework. Psychological Review 109 (2):219-259.   (Cited by 78 | Google | More links)
Lambie, John A. & Baker, Kevin L. (2003). Intentional avoidance and social understanding in repressers and nonrepressors: Two functions for emotion experience? Consciousness and Emotion 4 (1):17-42.   (Google)
Abstract: Two putative functions of emotion experience ? its roles in intentional action and in social understanding ? were investigated using a group of individuals (repressors) known to have impaired anxiety experience. Repressors, low-anxious, high-anxious, and defensive high-anxious individuals were asked to give a public presentation, and then given the opportunity to avoid the presentation. Repressors were the group most likely to avoid giving the presentation, but were the least likely to give an emotional explanation for their avoidance. By contrast, they were not less likely than other groups to provide negative emotional explanations of another person?s behaviour in a film clip. We concluded that: (1) repressors are impaired in self- but not in other-explanation using emotion, implying that ?simulation? is not the method used by repressors to ground their folk psychology, (2) the intentional avoidance shown by repressors is indicative of some intact first-order phenomenal anxiety experience but that they lack second-order awareness of this anxiety experience
Lane, Richard D. R.; E., Ahern; G., Schwartz & G. E., Yun (1998). Anterior cingulate cortex participates in the conscious experience of emotion. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness II. MIT Press.   (Google)
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Lane, Richard D. R. (2000). Levels of emotional awareness: Neurological, psychological, and social perspectives. In Reuven Bar-On & James D. A. Parker (eds.), The Handbook of Emotional Intelligence: Theory, Development, Assessment, and Application at Home, School, and in the Workplace. Jossey-Bass.   (Google)
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Lewis, Marc D. (2005). An emerging dialogue among social scientists and neuroscientists on the causal bases of emotion. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (2):223-234.   (Google)
Abstract: The target article developed a dynamic systems framework that viewed the causal basis of emotion as a self-organizing process giving rise to cognitive appraisal concurrently. Commentators on the article evaluated this framework and the principles and mechanisms it incorporated. They also suggested additional principles, mechanisms, modeling strategies, and phenomena related to emotion and appraisal, in place of or extending from those already proposed. There was general agreement that nonlinear causal processes are fundamental to the psychology and neurobiology of emotion
Lewis, Marc D. (2005). Bridging emotion theory and neurobiology through dynamic systems modeling. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (2):169-194.   (Google)
Abstract: Efforts to bridge emotion theory with neurobiology can be facilitated by dynamic systems (DS) modeling. DS principles stipulate higher-order wholes emerging from lower-order constituents through bidirectional causal processes – offering a common language for psychological and neurobiological models. After identifying some limitations of mainstream emotion theory, I apply DS principles to emotion–cognition relations. I then present a psychological model based on this reconceptualization, identifying trigger, self-amplification, and self-stabilization phases of emotion-appraisal states, leading to consolidating traits. The article goes on to describe neural structures and functions involved in appraisal and emotion, as well as DS mechanisms of integration by which they interact. These mechanisms include nested feedback interactions, global effects of neuromodulation, vertical integration, action-monitoring, and synaptic plasticity, and they are modeled in terms of both functional integration and temporal synchronization. I end by elaborating the psychological model of emotion–appraisal states with reference to neural processes. Key Words: appraisal; bidirectional causality; cognition; dynamic systems; emotion; neurobiology; part–whole relations; self-organization
Lewis, Marc D. & Todd, Rebecca M. (2005). Getting emotional - a neural perspective on emotion, intention, and consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (8-10):210-235.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Lewis, Michael & Wolan Sullivan, Margaret (2005). The development of self-conscious emotions. In Andrew J. Elliot & Carol S. Dweck (eds.), Handbook of Competence and Motivation.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
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Abstract: The James–Lange theory considers emotional feelings as perceptions of physiological body changes. This approach has recently resurfaced and modified in both neuroscientific and philosophical concepts of embodiment of emotional feelings. In addition to the body, the role of the environment in emotional feeling needs to be considered. I here claim that the environment has not merely an indirect and thus instrumental role on emotional feelings via the body and its sensorimotor and vegetative functions. Instead, the environment may have a direct and non-instrumental, i.e., constitutional role in emotional feelings; this implies that the environment itself in the gestalt of the person–environment relation is constitutive of emotional feeling rather than the bodily representation of the environment. Since the person–environment relation is crucial in this approach, I call it the relational concept of emotional feeling. After introducing the relational concept of emotional feeling, the present paper investigates the neurophilosophical question whether current neuroimaging data on human emotion processing and anatomical connectivity are empirically better compatible with the “relational” or the “embodied” concept of emotional feeling. These data lend support to the empirical assumption that neural activity in subcortical and cortical midline regions code the relationship between intero- and exteroceptive stimuli in a relational mode, i.e. their actual balance, rather than in a translational mode, i.e., by translating extero- into interoceptive stimulus changes. Such intero-exteroceptive relational mode of neural coding may have implications for the characterization of emotional feeling with regard to phenomenal consciousness and intentionality. I therefore conclude that the here advanced relational concept of emotional feeling may be considered neurophilosophically more plausible and better compatible with current neuroscientific data than the embodied concept as presupposed in the James–Lange theory and its modern neuroscientific and philosophical versions
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Abstract: Emotion theories in present philosophical discussion propose different models of relationship between feeling and appraisal. The multicomponent model considers appraisal as separate component and distinguishes it from feeling and physiological body changes thus presupposing what may be called 'disembodied' and 'disembedded' appraisal as representational. The recently emerged concept of enactment, in contrast, argues that appraisal is closely linked to feeling and physiological body changes presupposing what can be called 'embodied' and 'embedded' appraisal as relational. The aim of the paper is to investigate which concept of appraisal, the 'disembedded' or the 'embedded' one, is better compatible with current neuroimaging data on emotion processing and thus neurophilosophically more tenable. The 'disembodied' and 'disembedded' concept implies distinct and independent brain regions underlying feeling and appraisal whereas 'embodied' and 'embedded' appraisal implies overlapping and dependent brain regions. Recent neuroimaging studies demonstrate that medial and lateral prefrontal cortical regions are involved in both feeling and appraisal and that there seems to be reciprocal modulation between these regions. Though preliminary, these data suggest that feeling and appraisal are associated with different patterns of neural activity across overlapping and interdependent brain regions. I therefore conclude that current neuroscientific evidence is rather in favor of the 'embodied' and 'embedded' concept of appraisal as relational than the one of 'disembodied' and 'disembedded' appraisal as representational that is presupposed in current multicomponent theories of emotions
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Abstract: Introductory Note: This commentary developed out of an informal discussion of Part I (2000) of Jarvilehto?s two-part Consciousness & Emotion series with Ralph Ellis at the recent Amsterdam Symposium on Feelings and Emotions (June 13?16, 2001). Part II of Jarvilehto?s series appears in the present issue. Ellis asked me to share my critical concerns with Jarvilehto?s Part I in this commentary, with an advance copy supplied to Jarvilehto, who will reply in the next issue of Consciousness & Emotion. I think most of us recognize the need for pluralism in the study of complex processes such as consciousness and emotions, but to place emotions and feelings so strongly into the environment as does Jarvilehto strikes me simply as a category mistake. I acknowledge that my commentary comes from my own unique (and by some standards radical) perspective on how the field might best move forward empirically. I believe an honest understanding of how natural psychological kinds emerge from specifiable brain functions, which are obviously modulated by environmental events, is presently the most important and most poorly studied aspect of modern mind-science. I felt that Jarvilehto?s holistic approach would only further serve to discourage investigators from pursuing those important issues neuro-empirically
Panksepp, Jaak (2002). On the animalian values of the human spirit: The foundational role of affect in psychotherapy and the evolution of consciousness. European Journal of Psychotherapy, Counselling and Health 5 (3):225-245.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Panksepp, Jaak (2005). On the embodied neural nature of core emotional affects. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (8-10):158-184.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Panksepp, Jaak (2003). Review article: "Looking for Spinoza: Joy, sorrow, and the feeling brain" by A. Damasio. Consciousness and Emotion 4 (1):111-134.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Panksepp, J. & Gordon, N. (2003). The instinctual basis of human affect: Affective imaging of laughter and crying. Consciousness and Emotion 4 (2):197-205.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The goal of this study was to evaluate affective changes induced during mental imaging of instinctual action patterns. Subjects were first trained to simulate the bodily rhythms of laughter and crying and were then trained to image these processes without any movement. The mere imagination of the motor imagery of laughter and crying were sufficient to significantly facilitate happy and sad mood ratings as monitored by subjective self-report. In contrast, no changes in mood were reported while imaging the affectively neutral task of walking. The work suggests that motor imagery is sufficient to modify emotional feelings, suggesting the feasibility of this method for brain imaging of emotional processes
Panksepp, Jaak (2000). The neuro-evolutionary cusp between emotions and cognitions: Implications for understanding consciousness and the emergence of a unified mind science. Consciousness and Emotion 1 (1):15-54.   (Cited by 41 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The neurobiological systems that mediate the basic emotions are beginning to be understood. They appear to be constituted of genetically coded, but experientially refined executive circuits situated in subcortical areas of the brain which can coordinate the behavioral, physiological and psychological processes that need to be recruited to cope with a variety of primal survival needs (i.e., they signal evolutionary fitness issues). These birthrights allow newborn organisms to begin navigating the complexities of the world and to learn about the values and contingencies of the environment. Some of these systems have been identified and characterized using modern neuroscientific and psychobiological tools. The fundamental emotional systems can now be defined by the functional psychobiological characteristics of the underlying circuitries ? characteristics which help coordinate behavioral, physiological and psychological aspects of emotionality, including the valenced affective feeling states that provide fundamental values for the guidance of behavior. The various emotional circuits are coordinated by different neuropeptides, and the arousal of each system may generate distinct affective/neurodynamic states and imbalances may lead to various psychiatric disorders. The aim of this essay is to discuss the underlying conceptual issues that must be addressed for additional progress in understanding the nature of primary process affective consciousness
Panksepp, J.; Burgdorf, J.; Gordon, N. & Turner, C. (2002). Treatment of ADHD with methylphenidate may sensitize brain substrates of desire: Implications for changes in drug abuse potential from an animal model. Consciousness and Emotion 3 (1):7-19.   (Google)
Abstract: Aims. Currently, methylphenidate (MPH, trade name Ritalin) is the most widely prescribed medication for attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). We examined the ability of repeated MPH administration to produce a sensitized appetitive eagerness type response in laboratory rats, as indexed by 50-kHz ultrasonic vocalizations (50-kHz USVs). We also examined the ability of MPH to reduce play behavior in rats which may be partially implicated in the clinical efficacy of MPH in ADHD. Design. 56 adolescent rats received injections of either 5.0 mg/kg MPH, or vehicle each day for 8 consecutive days, and a week later received a challenge injection of either MPH or vehicle. Measurements. Both play behavior (pins) and 50-kHz USVs were recorded after each drug or vehicle administration. Results. MPH challenge produced a substantial 73% reduction in play behavior during the initial treatment phase, and during the last test (1 week post drug), 50-kHz USVs were elevated approximately threefold only in animals with previous MPH experience. Conclusions. These data suggest that MPH treatment may lead to psychostimulant sensitization in young animals, perhaps by increasing future drug-seeking tendencies due to an elevated eagerness for positive incentives. Further, we hypothesize that MPH may be reducing ADHD symptoms, in part, by blocking playful tendencies, whose neuro-maturational and psychological functions remain to be adequately characterized
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Abstract: Empathy is a developmental process whereby individuals come to understand the emotional states of others. While the exact nature of this process remains unknown, PAM's utility is that it establishes empathy along a continuum of behavior ranging from emotional contagion to cognitive forms, a very useful distinction for understanding the phylogeny and ontogeny of this important process. The model will undoubtedly fuel future research, especially from comparative domains where data are most problematic
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Abstract: Spinoza speculated on how ethics could emerge from biology and psychology rather than disrupt them and recent evidence suggests he might have gotten it right. His radical deconstruction and reconstruction of ethics is supported by a number of avenues of research in the cognitive and neurosciences. This paper gathers together and presents a composite picture of recent research that supports Spinoza’s theory of the emotions and of the natural origins of ethics. It enumerates twelve naturalist claims of Spinoza that now seem to be supported by substantial evidence from the neurosciences and recent cognitive science. I focus on the evidence provided by Lakoff and Johnson in their summary of recent cognitive science in Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought (1999); by Antonio Damasio in his assessment of the state of affective neuroscience in Descartes’ Error (1994) and in The Feeling of What Happens (1999) (with passing references to his recent Looking for Spinoza (2003); and by Giacomo Rizzolatti, Vittorio Gallese and their colleagues in the neural basis of emotional contagion and resonance, i.e., the neural basis of primitive sociality and intersubjectivity, that bear out Spinoza’s account of social psychology as rooted in the mechanism he called attention to and identified as affective imitation
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Abstract: The topics treated in The brain and emotion include the definition, nature, and functions of emotion (Ch. 3); the neural bases of emotion (Ch. 4); reward, punishment, and emotion in brain design (Ch. 10); a theory of consciousness and its application to understanding emotion and pleasure (Ch. 9); and neural networks and emotion-related learning (Appendix). The approach is that emotions can be considered as states elicited by reinforcers (rewards and punishers). This approach helps with understanding the functions of emotion, with classifying different emotions, and in understanding what information-processing systems in the brain are involved in emotion, and how they are involved. The hypothesis is developed that brains are designed around reward-and punishment-evaluation systems, because this is the way that genes can build a complex system that will produce appropriate but flexible behavior to increase fitness (Ch. 10). By specifying goals rather than particular behavioral patterns of responses, genes leave much more open the possible behavioral strategies that might be required to increase fitness. The importance of reward and punishment systems in brain design also provides a basis for understanding the brain mechanisms of motivation, as described in Chapters 2 for appetite and feeding, 5 for brain-stimulation reward, 6 for addiction, 7 for thirst, and 8 for sexual behavior. Key Words: amygdala; brain evolution; consciousness; dopamine; emotion; hunger; orbitofrontal cortex; punishment; reward; taste
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Abstract: I have argued in other work that emotion, attentional functions, and executive functions are three interpenetrant global state variables, essentially differential slices of the consciousness pie. This paper will outline the columnar architecture and connectivities of the PAG (periaqueductal gray), its role in organizing prototype states of emotion, and the re-entry of PAG with the extended reticular thalamic activating system (“ERTAS”). At the end we will outline some potential implications of these connectivities for possible functional correlates of PAG networks that are just starting to be mapped. Overall, we will look at many lines of evidence that PAG should be conceptualized as a peri-reticular structure that has a foundational role in emotion, in generating the meaningful organization of behavior by the brain through prototype emotional states, and in allowing the various emotional systems to globally influence and tune both the forebrain and brainstem. Finally, we address implications of these concepts for what is currently understood about consciousness, underlining the need for somewhat more humility within consciousness studies about our current level of understanding of consciousness in the brain, combined with a deeper appreciation of the intrinsic connections between emotion and consciousness. One hopes that more concerted empirical interest in structures underneath the thalamus, combined with a deeper appreciation for the fundamental role that organismic and social value must have in bootstrapping awareness in the developing brain, would begin more widely to influence the fundamental lines of neuroscientific research in both emotion studies and consciousness studies
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Winkielman, Piotr & Nowak, Andrzej (2005). Dynamics of cognition-emotion interface: Coherence breeds familiarity and liking, and does it fast. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (2):222-223.   (Google)
Abstract: We present a dynamical model of interaction between recognition memory and affect, focusing on the phenomenon of “warm glow of familiarity.” In our model, both familiarity and affect reflect quick monitoring of coherence in an attractor neural network. This model parsimoniously explains a variety of empirical phenomena, including mere-exposure and beauty-in-averages effects, and the speed of familiarity and affect judgments
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Zajonc, R. B. (2000). Feeling and thinking: Closing the debate over the independence of affect. In Joseph P. Forgas (ed.), Feeling and Thinking: The Role of Affect in Social Cognition. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 69 | Google)