Javascript Menu by
MindPapers is now part of PhilPapers: online research in philosophy, a new service with many more features.
 Compiled by David Chalmers (Editor) & David Bourget (Assistant Editor), Australian National University. Submit an entry.
click here for help on how to search

8.8g. Time and Consciousness in Psychology (Time and Consciousness in Psychology on PhilPapers)

See also:
Albertazzi, Liliana (1999). The time of presentness. A chapter in positivistic and descriptive psychology. Axiomathes 10 (1-3).   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Allport, D. A. (1968). Phenomenal similarity and the perceptual moment hypothesis. British Journal of Psychology 59:395-406.   (Google)
Atmanspacher, Harald (ms). The significance of causally coupled, stable neuronal assemblies for the psychological time arrow.   (Google)
Abstract: Stable neuronal assemblies are generally regarded as neural correlates of mental representations. Their temporal sequence corresponds to the experience of a direction of time, sometimes called the psychological time arrow. We show that the stability of particular, biophysically motivated models of neuronal assemblies, called coupled map lattices, is supported by causal interactions among neurons and obstructed by non-causal or anti-causal interactions among neurons. This surprising relation between causality and stability suggests that those neuronal assemblies that are stable due to causal neuronal interactions, and thus correlated with mental representations, generate a psychological time arrow. Yet this impact of causal interactions among neurons on the directed sequence of mental representations does not rule out the possibility of mentally less efficacious non-causal or anti-causal interactions among neurons
Banks, R. & Cappon, D. (1962). Effect of reduced sensory input on time perception. Perceptual and Motor Skills 14.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Block, Richard A. (ed.) (1990). Cognitive Models of Psychological Time. Lawrence Erlbaum.   (Cited by 64 | Google)
Abstract: Models of psychological time / Richard A. Block -- Implicit and explicit representations of time / John A. Michon -- The evasive art of subjective time...
Block, Richard A. (1996). Psychological time and memory systems of the brain. In J. T. Fraser & M. Soulsby (eds.), Dimensions of Time and Life: The Study of Time. , Volume 8.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Block, Richard A. (1979). Time and consciousness. In G. Underwood & R. Stevens (eds.), Aspects of Consciousness, Volume 1. Academic Press.   (Cited by 20 | Google)
Brown, Jason W. (1990). Psychology of time awareness. Brain and Cognition 14:144-64.   (Cited by 17 | Google)
Brown, Jason W. (1991). Self and Process: Brain States and the Conscious Present. Springer-Verlag.   (Cited by 30 | Google)
Cohen, Jonathan (1954). The experience of time. Acta Psychologica 10:207-19.   (Google)
Efron, Robert (1970). The measurement of perceptual durations. Studium Generale 23:550-561.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Eisler, H. (1975). Subjective duration and psychophysics. Psychological Review 82:429-50.   (Cited by 16 | Google | More links)
Evans, Vyvyan (2004). The Structure of Time: Language, Meaning and Temporal Cognition. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.   (Cited by 29 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Drawing on findings in psychology, neuroscience, and utilising the perspective of cognitive linguistics, this work argues that our experience of time may...
Fraser, J. T. (ed.) (1989). Time and Mind: Interdisciplinary Issues. International Universities Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Friedman, William J. (1990). About Time: Inventing the Fourth Dimension. Cambridge: MIT Press.   (Cited by 64 | Google)
Gallistel, C. Randy (1996). The perception of time. In Kathleen Akins (ed.), Perception. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Glicksohn, Joseph (2001). Temporal cognition and the phenomenology of time: A multiplicative function for apparent duration. Consciousness and Cognition 10 (1):1-25.   (Cited by 14 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The literature on time perception is discussed. This is done with reference both to the ''cognitive-timer'' model for time estimation and to the subjective experience of apparent duration. Three assumptions underlying the model are scrutinized. I stress the strong interplay among attention, arousal, and time perception, which is at the base of the cognitive-timer model. It is suggested that a multiplicative function of two key components (the number of subjective time units and their size) should predict apparent duration. Implications for other cognitive domains are drawn, and in particular an analogy is suggested between apparent duration and apparent movement
Gooddy, W. (1967). Introduction to problems of time awareness. Studium Generale 20:33-41.   (Google)
Hameroff, Stuart R. (online). Time, consciousness, and quantum events in fundamental space-time geometry.   (Google)
Abstract: 1. Introduction: The problems of time and consciousness What is time? St. Augustine remarked that when no one asked him, he knew what time was; however when someone asked him, he did not. Is time a process which flows? Is time a dimension in which processes occur? Does time actually exist? The notion that time is a process which "flows" directionally may be illusory (the "myth of passage") for if time did flow it would do so in some medium or vessel (e.g. minutes per what?) [1]. But if time is a dimension in which processes occurred, e.g. as one component of a 4 dimensional spacetime, then why would processes occur unidirectionally in time? Yet we perceive time as an orderly, unidirectional process. An alternative explanation is that time does not exist as either a process or dimension, but that reality is a collage of discrete, disconnected and haphazardly arranged configurations of the universe, e.g. as described in Julian Barbour's "The end of time" [2]. In this view our perception of a unidirectional flow of time occurs because each moment, or "Now" as Barbour terms them, involves memory of other conceptually relevant moments, and the orderly flow of time is an illusion. Barbour's deconstruction of time contrasts the Newtonian reality of objects moving deterministically through 4 dimensional spacetime. Newton's contemporary (and rival) Leibniz [3] viewed the world in a manner consistent with Barbour (and with Mach's principle that the spatiotemporal structure of the universe is dependent on the distribution of mass, a foundation of Einstein's general relativity). According to Leibniz the world is to be understood not as matter/mass moving in a framework of space and time, but of more fundamental snapshot-like entities that momentarily fuse space and matter into single possible arrangements or configurations of the entire universe. Such configurations, which can be fabulously rich and complex considering the vastness of the universe, are the ultimate "things" of reality, which Leibniz termed "monads"..
Hicks, R. E.; Miller, George W.; Gaes, G. & Bierman, K. (1977). Concurrent processing demands and the experience of time-in-passing. American Journal of Psychology 90:431-46.   (Cited by 33 | Google)
Hoagland, Hudson (1950). Consciousness and the chemistry of time. In H. A. Abramson (ed.), Problems of Consciousness: Transactions of the First Conference. Josiah Macy Foundation.   (Google)
Hoagland, Hudson (1943). The chemistry of time. Scientific Monthly 56 (3):56-61.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Knight, Robert T. & Grabowecky, M. (1995). Escape from linear time: Prefrontal cortex and conscious experience. In Michael S. Gazzaniga (ed.), The Cognitive Neurosciences. MIT Press.   (Cited by 66 | Google)
Lynds, Peter (ms). Subjective perception of time and a progressive present moment: The neurobiological key to unlocking consciousness.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The conclusion of physics, within both a historical and more recent context, that an objectively progressive time and present moment are derivative notions without actual physical foundation in nature, illustrate that these perceived chronological features originate from subjective conscious experience and the neurobiological processes underlying it. Using this conclusion as a stepping stone, it is posited that the phenomena of an in-built subjective conception of a progressive present moment in time and that of conscious awareness are actually one and the same thing, and as such, are also the outcome of the same neurobiological processes. A possible explanation as to how this might be achieved by the brain through employing the neuronal induced nonconscious cognitive manipulation of a small interval of time is proposed. The CIP phenomenon, elucidated within the context of this study is also then discussed
Malmgren, Helge (online). Why the past is sometimes perceived, and not only remembered.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Updated abstract Historical landmarks Temporal Gestalts How does the sensory buffer ”retain” a temporal Gestalt? What is memory and what is perception in speech perception? Varieties of motor control Are ”ballistic” movements really ballistic? State or time representations? How to implement a temporal motor code Acknowledgments References
Melges, F. T. (1989). Disorders of time and the brain in severe mental illness. In J. T. Fraser (ed.), Time and Mind: Interdisciplinary Issues. International Universities Press.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Michon, John A. (1972). Processing of temporal information and the cognitive theory of time experience. In J. T. Fraser, F. Haber & G. Muller (eds.), The Study of Time. Springer-Verlag.   (Cited by 17 | Google)
Michon, John A. (1975). Time experience and memory processes. In J. T. Fraser & Nathaniel M. Lawrence (eds.), The Study of Time II. Springer-Verlag.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Moiseeva, N. I. (1988). Perception of time by human consciousness. Chronobiologia 15:301-317.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Newman, M. A. (1982). Time as an index of expanding consciousness with age. Nursing Research 31:290-293.   (Cited by 9 | Google)
Orme, J. E. (1969). Time, Experience and Behaviour. Illife.   (Cited by 17 | Google)
Ornstein, Robert E. (1969). On the Experience of Time. Harmondsworth.   (Cited by 169 | Google | More links)
Poppel, Ernst (1988). Mindworks: Time and Conscious Experience. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Poppel, Ernst & Schwender, D. (1993). Temporal mechanisms of consciousness. International Anesthesiology Clinics 31:27-38.   (Google)
Reidhead, V. A. & Wolford, J. B. (1998). Context, conditioning, and meaning of time-consciousness in a trappist monastery. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness II. MIT Press.   (Google)
Robertson, T. B. (1923). Consciousness and the sense of time. Scientific Monthly 16:649-657.   (Google)
Sanders, S. A. (1986). Development of a tool to measure subjective time experience. Nursing Research 35:178-182.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Schaltenbrand, G. (1967). Consciousness and time. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 138:632-645.   (Google | More links)
Smythies, J. (2003). Space, time and consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (3):47-56.   (Google)
Strong, Charles A. (1896). Consciousness and time. Psychological Review 3:149-57.   (Google)
Stroud, J. M. (1967). The fine structure of psychological time. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 138:623-631.   (Cited by 125 | Google | More links)
Stroud, J. M. (1957). The fine structure of psychological time. In H. Quastler (ed.), Information Theory in Psychology: Problems and Methods. Free Press.   (Cited by 125 | Google | More links)
Treisman, Michel (1999). The perception of time: Philosophical views and psychological evidence. In The Arguments of Time. New York: Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Tulving, Endel (2002). Chronesthesia: Conscious awareness of subjective time. In Donald T. Stuss & Robert T. Knight (eds.), Principles of Frontal Lobe Function. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 19 | Google)
Vogeley, Kai & Kupke, Christian (2007). Disturbances of time consciousness from a phenomenological and neuroscientific perspective. Schizophrenia Bulletin 33 (1):157-165.   (Google | More links)
Yarrow, K.; Haggard, Patrick & Rothwell, J. (2004). Action, arousal, and subjective time. Consciousness and Cognition 13 (2):373-390.   (Cited by 3 | Google)