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8.8h. Self-Consciousness in Psychology (Self-Consciousness in Psychology on PhilPapers)

See also:
Andersen, Susan M.; Reznik, Inga & Glassman, Noah S. (2005). The unconscious relational self. In Ran R. Hassin, James S. Uleman & John A. Bargh (eds.), The New Unconscious. Oxford Series in Social Cognition and Social Neuroscience. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Arenander, Alarik T. & Travis, Frederick T. (2004). Brain patterns of self-awareness. In Bernard D. Beitman & Jyotsna Nair (eds.), Self-Awareness Deficits in Psychiatric Patients: Neurobiology, Assessment, and Treatment. W.W. Norton & Co.   (Google)
Asendorpf, J. B.; Warkentin, V. & Baudonniere, P. (1996). Self-awareness and other-awareness. Ii 32.   (Cited by 57 | Google)
Baars, Bernard J. (1998). Attention, self, and conscious self-monitoring. In A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: ?In everday language, the word ?attention? implies control of access to consciousness, and we adopt this usage here. Attention itself can be either voluntary or automatic. This can be readily modeled in the theory. Further, a contrastive analysis of spontaneously self?attributed vs. self?alien experiences suggests that ?self? can be interpreted as the more enduring, higher levels of the dominant context hierarchy, which create continuity over the changing flow of events. Since context is by definition unconscious in GW theory, self in this sense is thought to be inherently unconscious as well. This proposal is consistent with a great deal of objective evidence. However, aspects of self may become known through ?conscious self-monitoring,? a process that ??is useful for self-evaluation and self?control. The results of conscious self-monitoring are combined with self?evaluation criteria, presumably of social origin, to produce a stable ?self?concept?, which functions as a supervisory system within the larger self organization
Bach, Laura J. & David, Anthony S. (2006). Self-awareness after acquired and traumatic brain injury. Neuropsychological Rehabilitation 16 (4):397-414.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Beitel, Mark; Ferrer, Elena & Cecero, John J. (2005). Psychological mindedness and awareness of self and others. Journal of Clinical Psychology 61 (6):739-750.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Beitman, Bernard D. & Nair, Jyotsna (2004). Self-Awareness Deficits in Psychiatric Patients: Neurobiology, Assessment, and Treatment. W.W.Norton.   (Google)
Beitman, Bernard D.; Nair, Jyotsna & Viamontes, George I. (2004). Why self-awareness? In Bernard D. Beitman & Jyotsna Nair (eds.), Self-Awareness Deficits in Psychiatric Patients: Neurobiology, Assessment, and Treatment. W.W. Norton & Co.   (Google)
Blachowicz, James A. (2002). The dialogue of the soul with itself. In Shaun Gallagher & Jonathan Shear (eds.), Models of the Self. Thorverton UK: Imprint Academic.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Bob, Petr (2006). Self-awareness deficits in psychiatric patients. Neurobiology. Assessment and treatment. Journal of Analytical Psychology 51 (2):311-312.   (Google | More links)
Boyer, Pascal; Robbins, Philip & Jack, Anthony I. (2005). Varieties of self-systems worth having. Consciousness and Cognition 14 (4):647-660.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Burch, Richard J. (2004). Attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder: A disorder of self-awareness. In Bernard D. Beitman & Jyotsna Nair (eds.), Self-Awareness Deficits in Psychiatric Patients: Neurobiology, Assessment, and Treatment. W.W. Norton & Co.   (Google)
Butterworth, George (1995). The self as an object of consciousness in infancy. In P. Rochat (ed.), The Self in Infancy: Theory and Research. Elsevier.   (Cited by 9 | Google)
Carruthers, Glenn (forthcoming). A problem for Wegner and colleagues' model of the sense of agency. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences.   (Google)
Abstract: The sense of agency, that is the sense that one is the agent of one’s bodily actions, is one component of our self-consciousness. Recently, Wegner and colleagues have developed a model of the causal history of this sense. Their model takes it that the sense of agency is elicited for an action when one infers that one or other of one’s mental states caused that action. In their terms, the sense of agency is elicited by the inference to apparent mental state causation. Here, I argue that this model is inconsistent with data from developmental psychology that suggests children can identify the agent behind an action without being capable of understanding the relationship between their intentions and actions. Furthermore, I argue that this model is inconsistent with the preserved sense of agency in autism. In general, the problem is that there are cases where subjects can experience themselves as the agent behind their actions despite lacking the resources to make the inference to apparent mental state causation
Carruthers, Glenn (2009). Commentary on Synofzik, Vosgerau and Newen. Consciousness and Cognition 18:515 - 520.   (Google)
Abstract: Synofzik, Vosgerau, and Newen (2008) offer a powerful explanation of the sense of agency. To argue for their model they attempt to show that one of the standard models (the comparator model) fails to explain the sense of agency and that their model offers a more general account than is aimed at by the standard model. Here I offer comment on both parts of this argument. I offer an alternative reading of some of the data they use to argue against the comparator model. I argue that contrary to Synofzik, Vosgerau and Newen’s reading the case of G.L. supports rather than contradicts the comparator model. Next I suggest how the comparator model can differentiate failures of action attribution in patients suffering parietal lobe lesions and delusions of alien control. I also argue that the apparently unexpected phenomenon of ‘‘hyperassociation” is predicted by the comparator model. Finally I suggest that as it stands Synofzik, Vosgerau and Newen’s model is not well specified enough to explain deficits in the sense of agency associated with delusions of thought insertion. Thus they have not met their second argumentative burden of showing how their model is more general than the comparator model.
Carver, Charles S. (2003). Self-awareness. In Mark R. Leary & June Price Tangney (eds.), Handbook of Self and Identity. Guilford Press.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Carver, Charles S. & Scheier, M. F. Matthews (1983). Self-awareness and the self-regulation of behaviour. In G. Underwood (ed.), Aspects of Consciousness, Volume 3: Awareness and Self-Awareness. Academic Press.   (Google)
Carruthers, Glenn (forthcoming). The case for the comparator model as an explanation of the sense of agency and its breakdowns. Consciousness and Cognition.   (Google)
Abstract: I compare Frith and colleagues’ influential comparator account of how the sense of agency is elicited to the multifactorial weighting model advocated by Synofzik and colleagues. I defend the comparator model from the common objection that the actual sensory consequences of action are not needed to elicit the sense of agency. I examine the comparator model’s ability to explain the performance of healthy subjects and those suffering from delusions of alien control on various self-attribution tasks. It transpires that the comparator model needs case-by-case adjustment to deal with problematic data. In response to this, the multifactorial weighting model of Synofzik and colleagues is introduced. Although this model is incomplete, it is more naturally constrained by the cases that are problematic for the comparator model. However, this model may be untestable. I conclude that currently the comparator model approach has stronger support than the multifactorial weighting model approach.
Chakravarti, Sibapada (1961). Philosophy and self-consciousness. Philosophical Quarterly (India) 33 (January):223-229.   (Google)
Cheeks, J. M. & Briggs, S. R. (1982). Self-consciousness and aspects of personality. Journal of Research in Personality 16:401-8.   (Google)
Cohen, Robyn J. & Calamari, John E. (2004). Thought-focused attention and obsessive-compulsive symptoms: An evaluation of cognitive self-consciousness in a nonclinical Sample. Cognitive Therapy and Research 28 (4):457-471.   (Google)
Cole, Jonathan (2004). Tetraplegia and self-consciousness. In Dan Zahavi, T. Grunbaum & Josef Parnas (eds.), The Structure and Development of Self-Consciousness: Interdisciplinary Perspectives. John Benjamins.   (Google)
Collins, Mick (2001). Who is occupied? Consciousness, self-awareness and the process of human adaptation. Journal of Occupational Science 8 (1):25-32.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Cooney, Brian (1979). The neural basis of self-consciousness. Nature and System 1 (March):16-31.   (Google)
Decety, J. & Chaminade, T. (2003). When the self represents the other: A new cognitive neuroscience view on psychological identification. Consciousness and Cognition 12 (4):577-596.   (Cited by 43 | Google | More links)
Abstract: There is converging evidence from developmental and cognitive psychology, as well as from neuroscience, to suggest that the self is both special and social, and that self-other interaction is the driving force behind self-development. We review experimental findings which demonstrate that human infants are motivated for social interactions and suggest that the development of an awareness of other minds is rooted in the implicit notion that others are like the self. We then marshal evidence from functional neuroimaging explorations of the neurophysiological substrate of shared representations between the self and others, using various ecological paradigms such as mentally representing one's own actions versus others' actions, watching the actions executed by others, imitating the others' actions versus being imitated by others. We suggest that within this shared neural network the inferior parietal cortex and the prefrontal cortex in the right hemisphere play a special role in the essential ability to distinguish the self from others, and in the way the self represents the other. Interestingly, the right hemisphere develops its functions earlier than the left
Duval, Shelley & Wicklund, R. A. (1972). A Theory of Objective Self-Awareness. Academic Press.   (Cited by 648 | Google)
Dymond, S. & Barnes, D. (1997). Behavior-analytic approaches to self-awareness. Psychological Record 47:181-200.   (Cited by 15 | Google)
Fenigstein, A. & Scheier, M. F. Matthews (1975). Public and private self-consciousness: Assessment and theory. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology 43:522-27.   (Cited by 871 | Google)
Fenigstein, A. (1997). Self-consciousness and its relation to psychological mindedness. In M. McCallum & W. Piper (eds.), Psychological Mindedness: A Contemporary Understanding. Lawrence Erlbaum.   (Cited by 9 | Google)
Fletcher, Clive & Bailey, Caroline (2003). Assessing self-awareness: Some issues and methods. Journal of Managerial Psychology 18 (5):395-404.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Frantz, Cynthia; Mayer, F. Stephan; Norton, Chelsey & Rock, Mindi (2005). There is no "I" in nature: The influence of self-awareness on connectedness to nature. Journal of Environmental Psychology 25 (4):427-436.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Freeman, Walter J. & Watts, J. W. (1941). The frontal lobes and consciousness of self. Psychosomatic Medicine 3:111-19.   (Google)
Frith, Christopher D. (1996). The role of the prefrontal cortex in self-consciousness: The case of auditory hallucinations. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London B 351:1505-12.   (Cited by 70 | Google | More links)
Gallup, G. G. (1998). Self-awareness and the evolution of social intelligence. Behavioural Processes 42:239-247.   (Cited by 27 | Google)
Gardiner, John M. (2000). On the objectivity of subjective experiences and autonoetic and noetic consciousness. In Endel Tulving (ed.), Memory, Consciousness, and the Brain: The Tallinn Conference. Psychology Press/Taylor & Francis.   (Cited by 9 | Google)
Gusnard, Debra A. (2005). Being a self: Considerations from functional imaging. Consciousness and Cognition 14 (4):679-697.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Hart, Daniel & Fegley, S. (1994). Social imitation and the emergence of a mental model of self. In S. T. Parker, R. Mitchell & M. L. Boccia (eds.), Self-Awareness in Animals and Humans: Developmental Perspectives. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 12 | Google)
Hart, Daniel & Fegley, S. (1997). The development of self-awareness and self-understanding in cultural context. In U. Neisser (ed.), The Conceptual Self in Context. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Hodgins, Holley S. & Knee, C. Raymond (2002). The integrating self and conscious experience. In Edward L. Deci & Richard M. Ryan (eds.), Handbook of Self-Determination Research. University of Rochester Press.   (Cited by 19 | Google)
Hull, Jay G.; Slone, Laurie B.; Meteyer, Karen B. & Matthews, Amanda R. (2002). The nonconsciousness of self-consciousness. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 83 (2):406-424.   (Cited by 12 | Google)
Jaynes, Julian (1976). The Origins of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind. Houghton Mifflin.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Jeannerod, Marc (2004). From self-recognition to self-consciousness. In Dan Zahavi, T. Grunbaum & Josef Parnas (eds.), The Structure and Development of Self-Consciousness: Interdisciplinary Perspectives. John Benjamins.   (Google)
Keenan, Julian Paul; Wheeler, Mark A. & Ewers, Michael (2003). The neural correlates of self-awareness and self-recognition. In Tilo Kircher & Anthony S. David (eds.), The Self in Neuroscience and Psychiatry. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Kessel, Frank S.; Cole, P. M. & Johnson, D. L. (eds.) (1992). Self and Consciousness: Multiple Perspectives. Lawrence Erlbaum.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This volume contains an array of essays that reflect, and reflect upon, the recent revival of scholarly interest in the self and consciousness. Various relevant issues are addressed in conceptually challenging ways, such as how consciousness and different forms of self-relevant experience develop in infancy and childhood and are related to the acquisition of skill; the role of the self in social development; the phenomenology of being conscious and its metapsychological implications; and the cultural foundations of conceptualizations of consciousness. Written by notable scholars in several areas of psychology, philosophy, cognitive neuroscience, and anthropology, the essays are of interest to readers from a variety of disciplines concerned with central, substantive questions in contemporary social science, and the humanities
Kihlstrom, John F. (1997). ConsciousNess and me-Ness. In Jonathan D. Cohen & Jonathan W. Schooler (eds.), Scientific Approaches to Consciousness. Lawrence Erlbaum.   (Cited by 21 | Google)
Kihlstrom, John F. & Klein, S. B. (1997). Self-knowledge and self-awareness. In James G. Snodgrass & R. Thompson (eds.), The Self Across Psychology: Self-Recognition, Self-Awareness, and the Self Concept. New York Academy of Sciences.   (Google)
Kinsbourne, Marcel (1995). Awareness of one's own body: An attentional theory of its nature, development, and brain basis. In Jose Luis Bermudez, Anthony J. Marcel & Naomi M. Eilan (eds.), The Body and the Self. MIT Press.   (Google)
Kinsbourne, Marcel (1998). Representations in consciousness and the neuropsychology of insight. In Xavier F. Amador & A. David (eds.), Insight and Psychosis. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Kircher, Tilo & David, Anthony S. (2003). Self-consciousness: An integrative approach from philosophy, psychopathology and the neurosciences. In Tilo Kircher & Anthony S. David (eds.), The Self in Neuroscience and Psychiatry. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 10 | Google)
Kober, Hedy; Ray, Alysa; Obhi, Sukhvinder; Guise, Kevin & Keenan, Julian Paul (2005). The neural correlates of depersonalization: A disorder of self-awareness. In Todd E. Feinberg & Julian Paul Keenan (eds.), The Lost Self: Pathologies of the Brain and Identity. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Kunzendorf, Robert G. (2000). Individual differences in self-conscious source monitoring: Theoretical, experimental, and clinical considerations. In Robert G. Kunzendorf & B. Alan Wallace (eds.), Individual Differences in Conscious Experience. John Benjamins.   (Google)
Kunzendorf, Robert G. (1988). Self-consciousness as the monitoring of cognitive states: A theoretical perspective. Imagination, Cognition and Personality 7:3-22.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Kunzendorf, Robert G.; Beltz, S. M. & Tymowicz, G. (1992). Self-awareness in autistic subjects and deeply hypnotized subjects: Dissociation of self-concept versus self-consciousness. Imagination, Cognition and Personality 11:129-41.   (Google)
Legrand, Dorothée (2003). How not to find the neural signature of self-consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 12 (4):544-546.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Lenggenhager, Bigna; Tadi, Tej; Metzinger, Thomas & Blanke, Olaf (2007). Video ergo sum: Manipulating bodily self-consciousness. Science 317 (5841):1096-1099.   (Google)
Levine, Brian (2000). Self-regulation and autonoetic consciousness. In Endel Tulving (ed.), Memory, Consciousness, and the Brain: The Tallinn Conference. Psychology Press/Taylor & Francis.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Lewis, M. (1994). Myself and me. In S. T. Parker, R. Mitchell & M. L. Boccia (eds.), Self-Awareness in Animals and Humans: Developmental Perspectives. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 13 | Google)
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Maasen, Sabine (2007). Selves in turmoil - neurocognitive and societal challenges of the self. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (1-2):252-270.   (Google)
Abstract: As the cognitive neurosciences set out to challenge our understanding of consciousness, the existing conceptual panoply of meanings attached to the term remains largely unaccounted for. By way of bibliometric analysis, the following study first reveals the breadth and shift of meanings over the last decades, the main tendency being a more 'brainy' concept of consciousness. On this basis, the emergence of consciousness studies is regarded as a 'trading zone' (Galison) in which experimental, philosophical and experiential accounts are dialectically engaged. Outside of academic discourse, a neurocognitive concept of consciousness is embraced by popular self-help literature that sweepingly adopts this new discourse and the novel neuropharmacological tools in the self-help toolbox. Consciousness studies are hence not only the product of epistemological and methodological struggles (scientific dimension) but also part of the current re-alignments regarding the notion of consciously acting selves in society (societal dimension)
Malcolm, Sarah & Keenan, Julian Paul (2003). My right I: Deception detection and hemispheric differences in self-awareness. Social Behavior and Personality 31 (8):767-772.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Markova, Ivana (1990). The development of self-consciousness: Baldwin, Mead, and vygotsky. In James E. Faulconer & R. Williams (eds.), Reconsidering Psychology. Duquesne University Press.   (Google)
Metcalfe, Janet & Kober, Hedy (2005). Self-reflective consciousness and the projectable self. In Herbert S. Terrace & Janet Metcalfe (eds.), The Missing Link in Cognition: Origins of Self-Reflective Consciousness. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
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Mitchell, Robert W. (1993). Mental models of mirror self-recognition: Two theories. New Ideas in Psychology 11:295-325.   (Cited by 53 | Google)
Mitchell, Robert W. (1994). Multiplicities of self. In S. T. Parker, R. Mitchell & M. L. Boccia (eds.), Self-Awareness in Animals and Humans: Developmental Perspectives. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Mollon, P. (1987). Self-awareness, self-consciousness, and preoccupation with self. In K. Yardley & T. Honess (eds.), Self and Identity: Psychosocial Perspectives. Wiley.   (Google)
Morin, Alain (2004). A neurocognitive and socioecological model of self-awareness. Genetic Social And General Psychology Monographs 130 (3):197-222.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Morin, Alain (1995). Characteristics of an effective internal dialogue in the acquisition of self-information. Imagination, Cognition and Personality 15 (1):45-58.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This article raises the question of how self-talk mediates self-awareness. It is argued that the process of acquiring self-information can be seen as a problem-solving task, and that self-talk can facilitate this process (as it does for any other problem) by promoting a precise formulation and approach to the problem, by adequately focusing attention on the task, and through constant self-evaluations. A complementary analysis of the possible characteristics of an effective internal dialogue in the acquisition of self-information is undertaken. Among other things, taking others' perspective through self-talk, possessing a rich vocabulary about oneself, and paying attention to the content of one's self-talk are believed to be important in that respect. Clinical implications raised by this analysis are also discussed
Morin, Alain (ms). Developing self-awareness with inner speech: Theoretical background, underlying mechanisms, and empirical evidence.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Morin, Alain (1998). Imagery and self-awareness: A theoretical note. Theory and Review in Psychology.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This article suggests that one possible function of imagery is its role as a mediator of self-awareness and its significance in the acquisition of self- information. Sparse allusions of a relation between imagery and self-awareness have been mentioned before, but no real attempt to account for the nature of the link has been undertaken. The following hypothesis is put forward: some cognitive processes are capable of internally reproducing social mechanisms responsible for self-awareness. One such mechanism is the opportunity to see oneself as one is seen by others. It is postulated that imagery internalizes this social mechanism because mental images empower us to literally see ourselves acting (or having behaved) in given ways as others could see (or have seen) us acting. When one mentally sees oneself behaving in a given fashion, one is self-aware; furthermore, when one reflects on past behaviors by using mental images, one can deduct aspects of one's past functioning from what is internally seen, that is, acquire self- information and build a self-concept. The importance for mental images to have in their content the organism's body image (especially one's facial features) is underlined, and experiences with self-reflecting devices (e.g., mirrors) are presumed to be crucial in that respect
Morin, Alain & Everett, Jennifer (1990). Inner speech as a mediator of self-awareness, self-consciousness, and self-knowledge: An hypothesis. New Ideas in Psychology 8 (3):337-56.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Morin, Alain (2003). Inner speech and conscious experience. Science and Consciousness Review 4.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Abstract: Imagine that scientists have been successful at designing a drug that “freezes” brain areas producing our internal monologue. After taking the drug you can’t talk to yourself anymore. Every other mental activity is fine, but it’s now total silence in your head. Not a word. What would happen? What would it be like?
Morin, Alain (online). Language and self-awareness.   (Google)
Abstract: In my 2003 SCR paper “Inner speech and conscious experience” (LINK) I put forward the notion that we most often need to talk to ourselves in order to understand who we are. That is, inner speech is frequently required to access self-information and to gradually build a self- concept. To illustrate, let’s imagine that you want to reflect on an abdominal pain you are currently experiencing. It is very likely that you will engage in an internal monologue, thinking “Why is it that my belly hurts? I feel cramps... Ha! I get it—I skipped breakfast...” You could go on and also notice: “I’ve been missing breakfast often lately... I tend to sleep in, I don’t eat breakfast, and by noon I’m starving... And I didn’t go to the gym as often as I should have... This is bad—I’m getting _lazy_...” Here the adjective “lazy” constitutes the conclusion that you have drawn from your inner monologue; it may then become a more or less permanent part of your self-concept
Morin, Alain (2006). Levels of consciousness and self-awareness: A comparison and integration of various neurocognitive views. Consciousness and Cognition 15 (2):358-371.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Quite a few recent models are rapidly introducing new concepts describing different levels of consciousness. This situation is getting confusing because some theorists formulate their models without making reference to existing views, redundantly adding complexity to an already difficult problem. In this paper, I present and compare nine neurocognitive models to highlight points of convergence and divergence. Two aspects of consciousness seem especially important: perception of self in time and complexity of self-representations. To this I add frequency of self-focus, amount of self-related information, and accuracy of self-knowledge. Overall, I conclude that many novel concepts (e.g., reflective, primary, core, extended, recursive, and minimal consciousness) are useful in helping us distinguish between delicate variations in consciousness and in clarifying theoretical issues that have been intensely debated in the scientific literature—e.g., consciousness in relation to mirror self-recognition and language. Ó 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved
Morin, Alain (2004). Levels of consciousness and self-awareness: A comparison and integration of various views. Consciousness and Cognition 15 (2):358-371.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Quite a few recent models are rapidly introducing new concepts describing different levels of consciousness. This situ- ation is getting confusing because some theorists formulate their models without making reference to existing views, redun- dantly adding complexity to an already difficult problem. In this paper, I present and compare nine neurocognitive models to highlight points of convergence and divergence. Two aspects of consciousness seem especially important: perception of self in time and complexity of self-representations. To this I add frequency of self-focus, amount of self-related informa- tion, and accuracy of self-knowledge. Overall, I conclude that many novel concepts (e.g., reflective, primary, core, extend- ed, recursive, and minimal consciousness) are useful in helping us distinguish between delicate variations in consciousness and in clarifying theoretical issues that have been intensely debated in the scientific literature—e.g., consciousness in rela- tion to mirror self-recognition and language
Morin, Alain (1999). On a relation between self-awareness and inner speech: Additional evidence from brain studies. Dynamical Psychology.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In this short paper I review past studies examining the neurological substrates of inner speech and self-awareness. The evidence points to a common neurological area: the left inferior frontal region. It is thus highly tempting to conclude that these two operations are deeply linked
Morin, Alain (2005). Possible links between self-awareness and inner speech: Theoretical background, underlying mechanisms, and empirical evidence. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (4-5):115-134.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract: been recently proposed (Morin, 2003; 2004). The model takes into account most known mechanisms and processes leading to self-awareness, and examines their multiple and complex interactions. Inner speech is postulated to play a key-role in this model, as it establishes important connections between many of its ele- ments. This paper first reviews past and current references to a link between self-awareness and inner speech. It then presents an analysis of the nature of the relation between these two concepts. It is suggested that inner speech can inter- nally reproduce and expand social and physical (ecological) sources of self- awareness. Inner speech can also create a psychological distance between the self and mental events it experiences (thus facilitating self-observation) it can act as a problem-solving device where the self represents the problem and self-information the solution, and can label aspects of one’s inner life that would otherwise be difficult to objectively perceive. Empirical evidence supporting the role of inner speech in self-awareness is also presented
Morin, Alain & Everett, James (1991). Self-awareness and introspective private speech in 6-year-old children. Psychological Reports 68:1299-1306.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Morin, Alain (1993). Self-talk and self-awareness: On the nature of the relation. Journal of Mind and Behavior 14 (3):223-234.   (Cited by 19 | Google | More links)
Morin, Alain (2002). Self-awareness review part 1: Do you "self-reflect" or "self-ruminate"? Science and Consciousness Review 1:1.   (Google)
Abstract: We all spend time analyzing our inner thoughts and feelings; past research looked at this activity as being unitary in nature (i.e., simply focusing on the self), examined how frequently people introspect, and identified the effects of self-focus on behavior. Current studies indicate that people actually engage in two different types of self-analysis: self-reflection (enjoying analyzing the self) and self-rumination (not being able to shut off thoughts about the self), each leading to opposite consequences
Morin, Alain (2003). Self-awareness review part 2: Changing or escaping the self. Science and Consciousness Review 1:1.   (Google)
Abstract: When we become self-aware we see who we are and what we would like to be. What do we do? Do we change who we are? Or do we escape self-awareness by watching TV—or worst, by drinking alcohol, doing drugs, or committing suicide?
Nasby, W. (1989). Private self-consciousness, self-awareness, and the reliability of self-reports. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 56:950-7.   (Cited by 17 | Google)
Neisser, U. (1992). The development of consciousness and the acquisition of self. In Frank S. Kessel, P. M. Cole, D. L. Johnson & D. Johnson (eds.), Self and Consciousness: Multiple Perspectives. Lawrence Erlbaum.   (Google)
Newen, Albert & Vogeley, Kai (2003). Self-representation: Searching for a neural signature of self-consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 12 (4):529-543.   (Cited by 14 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Human self-consciousness operates at different levels of complexity and at least comprises five different levels of representational processes. These five levels are nonconceptual representation, conceptual representation, sentential representation, meta-representation, and iterative meta-representation. These different levels of representation can be operationalized by taking a first-person-perspective that is involved in representational processes on different levels of complexity. We refer to experiments that operationalize a first-person-perspective on the level of conceptual and meta-representational self-consciousness. Interestingly, these experiments show converging evidence for a recruitment of medial cortical and parietal regions during taking a first-person-perspective, even when operating on different degrees of complexity. These data lend support for the speculative hypothesis, that there exist a neural signature for human self-consciousness that is recruited independent from the degree of representational complexity to be performed
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