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8.8i. Development of Consciousness (Development of Consciousness on PhilPapers)

See also:
Anderson, John R. (1984). The development of self-recognition: A review. Developmental Psychobiology 17:35-49.   (Cited by 37 | Google | More links)
Austin, James H. (2000). Consciousness evolves when the self dissolves. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (11-12):209-230.   (Cited by 20 | Google)
Baillargeon, Renée (2004). Can 12 large clowns fit in a mini Cooper? Or when are beliefs and reasoning explicit and conscious? Developmental Science 7 (4):422-424.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Baron-Cohen, Simon (1999). Can studies of autism teach us about consciousness of the physical and the mental? Philosophical Explorations 2 (3):175-188.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Most scientists and theorists concerned with the problem of consciousness focus on our consciousness of the physical world (our sensations, feelings, and awareness). In this paper I consider our consciousness of the mental world (our thoughts about thoughts, intentions, wishes, and emotions).The argument is made that these are two distinct forms of consciousness, the evidence for this deriving from studies of autism. Autism is a severe childhood psychiatric condition in which individuals may be conscious of the physical world but not of the mental world. Relevant experimental evidence is described, including some recent neuroimaging studies pointing towards the neural basis of our consciousness of the mental
Becker, Joe (2008). Conceptualizing Mind and Consciousness: Using Constructivist Ideas to Transcend the Physical Bind. Human Development 51 (3):165-189.   (Google)
Abstract: Philosophers and scientists seeking to conceptualize consciousness, and subjective experience in particular, have focused on sensation and perception, and have emphasized binding – how a percept holds together. Building on a constructivist approach to conception centered on separistic-holistic complexes incorporating multiple levels of abstraction, the present approach reconceptualizes binding and opens a new path to theorizing the emergence of consciousness. It is proposed that all subjective experience involves multiple levels of abstraction, a central feature of conception. This modifies the prevalent idea of sequential development from sensation through perception to conception. Further, this approach to mind and consciousness links constructivist theory to artistic activity and suggests that conception, subjective experience, aboutness (intentionality), and agency are linked together through separistic-holistic complexes. It also argues for change in the prevailing constructivist view that regards the process of production of new levels of conception as inherently directed towards better fit with the external environment. Copyright © 2008 S. Karger AG, Basel
Brainerd, C. J.; Stein, L. M. & Reyna, V. F. (1998). On the development of conscious and unconscious memory. Developmental Psychology 34:342-357.   (Cited by 23 | Google | More links)
Briskin, A. S. (1974). A developmental model of self-awareness. Counseling and Values 18:79-85.   (Google)
Burgess, John A. & Tawia, S. A. (1996). When did you first begin to feel it? Locating the Beginnings of Human Consciousness? Bioethics 10:1-26.   (Google)
Butterworth, George (1995). The self as an object of consciousness in infancy. In P. Rochat (ed.), The Self in Infancy: Theory and Research. Elsevier.   (Cited by 9 | Google)
Clement, F. & Malerstein, Abraham J. (2003). What is it like to be conscious? The ontogenesis of consciousness. Philosophical Psychology 16 (1):67-85.   (Google)
Abstract: In recent years, numerous studies have tried to highlight, from a naturalistic point of view, the apparent mysteries of consciousness. Many authors concentrated their efforts on explaining the phylogenetic origins of consciousness. Paradoxically, comments on the ontogenesis of consciousness are almost nonexistent. By crossing the results of psychology of development with a philosophical analysis, this paper aims to make up for this omission. After having characterized the different conceptual aspects of consciousness, we combine these, with observations made by developmental psychologists, to trace the empirical development of consciousness during the first months of life. This combination leads to a theoretical proposal: the intentional characteristics of consciousness, namely, aboutness and purposefulness, depend on the phenomenal properties of conscious states. From this perspective, the phenomenal aspect of conscious states (the "what it is like" effect) is therefore far from being an epiphenomenon
David Zelazo, Philip; Gao, Helena H. & Todd, Rebecca M. (2007). The development of consciousness. In Philip David Zelazo, Morris Moscovitch & Evan Thompson (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness. Cambridge.   (Google)
Derbyshire, S. (2001). Fetal pain: An infantile debate. Bioethics 15 (1):77-84.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Fivaz-Depeursinge, E.; Favez, N. & Frascarolo, F. (2004). Threesome intersubjectivity in infancy: A contribution to the development of self-awareness. In Dan Zahavi, T. Grunbaum & Josef Parnas (eds.), The Structure and Development of Self-Consciousness: Interdisciplinary Perspectives. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Flavell, John H.; Green, F. L. & Flavell, E. R. (1993). Children's understanding of the stream of consciousness. Child Development 64:387-398.   (Cited by 48 | Google | More links)
Flavell, John H.; Green, F. L. & Flavell, E. R. (2000). Development of children's awareness of their own thoughts. Journal of Cognition and Development 1 (1):97-112.   (Cited by 20 | Google | More links)
Flavell, John H.; Green, F. L.; Flavell, E. R. & Grossman, J. B. (1997). The development of children's knowledge about inner speech. Child Development 68:39-47.   (Cited by 26 | Google | More links)
Flavell, John H.; Green, F. L. & Flavell, E. R. (1995). The development of children's knowledge about attentional focus. Developmental Psychology 31:706-12.   (Cited by 22 | Google)
Flavell, John H. (1993). Young children's understanding of thinking and consciousness. Current Directions in Psychological Science 2:40-43.   (Cited by 12 | Google)
Foulkes, D. (1999). Children's Dreaming and the Development of Consciousness. Harvard University Press.   (Cited by 39 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In this book, which distills a lifetime of study, Foulkes shows that dreaming as we normally understand it--active stories in which the dreamer is an actor-...
Gallagher, Shaun & Meltzoff, Andrew N. (1996). The earliest sense of self and others: Merleau-ponty and recent developmental studies. Philosophical Psychology 9 (2):211-33.   (Cited by 99 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Recent studies in developmental psychology have found evidence to suggest that there exists an innate system that accounts for the possibilities of early infant imitation and the existence of phantom limbs in cases of congenital absence of limbs. These results challenge traditional assumptions about the status and development of the body schema and body image, and about the nature of the translation process between perceptual experience and motor ability
Gopnik, Alison & Meltzoff, Andrew N. (1994). Minds, bodies, and persons: Young children's understanding of the self and others as reflected in imitation and theory of mind research. In S. T. Parker, R. Mitchell & M. L. Boccia (eds.), Self-Awareness in Animals and Humans: Developmental Perspectives. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Griffin, Susan (1991). Young children's awareness of their inner world: A neo-structural analysis of the development of intrapersonal intelligence. In Roland Case (ed.), The Mind's Staircase: Exploring the Conceptual Underpinnings of Children's Thought and Knowledge. Lawrence Erlbaum.   (Google)
Hardcastle, Valerie Gray (2003). The development of the self. In Gary D. Fireman, T. E. McVay & Owen J. Flanagan (eds.), Narrative and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Harding, M. Esther (1965). The "I" and the "Not-I": A Study in the Development of Consciousness. Princeton University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: This book provides a very accessible general introduction to the Jungian concept of ego development and Jung's theory of personality structure--the collective unconscious, anima, animus, shadow, archetypes
Hobson, R. Peter (2006). Developing self/other awareness: A reply. Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development 71 (2):180-186.   (Google)
Hobson, Peter; Chidambi, Gayathri; Lee, Anthony & Meyer, Jessica (2006). Foundations for Self-Awareness: An Exploration Through Autism. Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Infante, Mauricio & Wells, Lloyd A. (2004). Children's dreaming and the development of consciousness. Journal of the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry 43 (12):1519-1520.   (Google | More links)
Jonathan, Ruth (1993). Educating the virtues: A problem in the social development of consciousness? Journal of Philosophy of Education 27 (1):115–124.   (Google | More links)
Kagan, Jerome (1981). The Second Year: The Emergence of Self-Awareness. Harvard University Press.   (Cited by 160 | Google)
Abstract: In this book, Jerome Kagan takes a provocative look at the mental developments underlying the startling transitions in the child's second year.It is Kagan&...
Kuhn, D. (2000). Metacognitive development. Current Directions in Psychological Science 9:178-181.   (Cited by 86 | Google | More links)
Lewis, Michael (2005). Origins of the self-conscious child. In Crozier, W. Ray (Ed); Alden, Lynn E. (Ed). (2005). The Essential Handbook of Social Anxiety for Clinicians. (Pp. 81-98). New York, NY, US.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Lewis, M. (1990). The development of intentionality and the role of consciousness. Psychological Inquiry 1:231-247.   (Cited by 16 | Google | More links)
Lewis, M. (1991). Ways of knowing: Objective self-awareness or consciousness. Developmental Review 11:231-43.   (Cited by 18 | Google)
Lunzer, E. A. (1979). The development of consciousness. In G. Underwood & R. Stevens (eds.), Aspects of Consciousness. Academic Press.   (Google)
Marbach, Eduard (1987). Laws of consciousness as norms of mental development. In B. Inhelder, D. de Caprona & A. Cornu-Wells (eds.), Piaget Today. Lawrence Erlbaum.   (Google)
Markova, Ivana (1990). The development of self-consciousness: Baldwin, Mead, and vygotsky. In James E. Faulconer & R. Williams (eds.), Reconsidering Psychology. Duquesne University Press.   (Google)
McCune, L. (1993). The development of play as the development of consciousness. In Marc Bornstein & A. O'Reilly (eds.), The Role of Play in the Development of Thought. Jossey-Bass.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Mellor, David J.; Diesch, Tamara J.; Gunn, Alistair J. & Bennet, Laura (2005). The importance of 'awareness' for understanding fetal pain. Brain Research Reviews 49 (3):455-471.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Mounoud, P. (1990). Consciousness as a necessary transitional phenomenon in cognitive development. Psychological Inquiry 1:253-58.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Neisser, U. (1992). The development of consciousness and the acquisition of self. In Frank S. Kessel, P. M. Cole, D. L. Johnson & D. Johnson (eds.), Self and Consciousness: Multiple Perspectives. Lawrence Erlbaum.   (Google)
Nelson, Katherine (2005). Emerging levels of consciousness in early human development. In Herbert S. Terrace & Janet Metcalfe (eds.), The Missing Link in Cognition: Origins of Self-Reflective Consciousness. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Otte, Lisa Marie, The relationship between children's early literacy skills and awareness of inner speech.   (Google)
Parker, S. T.; Mitchell, R. M. & Boccia, M. L. (1994). Self-Awareness in Animals and Humans: Developmental Perspectives. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 100 | Google)
Perner, Josef & Dienes, Zoltán (2003). Developmental aspects of consciousness: How much theory of mind do you need to be consciously aware? Consciousness and Cognition 12 (1):63-82.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Piaget, Jean (1954). The problem of consciousness in child psychology: Devlopmental changes in awareness. In H. A. Abramson (ed.), Problems of Consciousness: Transactions of the Fourth Conference. Josiah Macy Foundation.   (Cited by 9 | Google)
Pons, Fransisco & Harris, Paul L. (2001). Piaget's conception of the development of consciousness: An examination of two hypotheses. Human Development 44 (4):220-227.   (Google)
Povinelli, Daniel J. (2001). The self: Elevated in consciousness and extended in time. In Chris Moore & Karen Lemmon (eds.), The Self in Time: Developmental Perspectives. Lawrence Erlbaum.   (Cited by 15 | Google)
Rochat, Philippe (2004). Emerging co-awareness. In Gavin Bremner & Alan Slater (eds.), Theories of Infant Development. Blackwell.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Rochat, P. (2004). The emergence of self awareness as co-awareness in early child development. In Dan Zahavi, T. Grunbaum & Josef Parnas (eds.), The Structure and Development of Self-Consciousness: Interdisciplinary Perspectives. John Benjamins.   (Google)
Singer, Jerome L. & Singer, Dorothy G. (2006). Preschoolers' imaginative play as precursor of narrative consciousness. Imagination, Cognition and Personality 25 (2):97-117.   (Google)
Stewart, Jeffrey B. (ms). The development of consciousness from affective sources.   (Google)
Tirassa, Maurizio; Bosco, Francesca M. & Colle, Livia (2006). Rethinking the ontogeny of mindreading. Consciousness and Cognition 15 (1):197-217.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: We propose a mentalistic and nativist view of human early mental and social life and of the ontogeny of mindreading. We define the mental state of sharedness as the primitive, one-sided capability to take one's own mental states as mutually known to an i nteractant. We argue that this capability is an innate feature of the human mind, which the child uses to make a subjective sense of the world and of her actions. We argue that the child takes all of her mental states as shared with her caregivers. This a llows her to interact with her caregivers in a mentalistic way from the very beginning and provides the grounds on which the later maturation of mindreading will build. As the latter process occurs, the child begins to understand the mental world in terms of differences between the mental states of different agents; subjectively, this also corresponds to the birth of privateness. ?
Trevarthen, Colwyn & Reddy, Vasuvedi (2007). Consciousness in infants. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell.   (Google)
van Eenwyk, J. R. (1996). Chaotic dynamics and the development of consciousness. In E. MacCormac & Maxim I. Stamenov (eds.), Fractals of Brain, Fractals of Mind: In Search of a Symmetry Bond. John Benjamins.   (Google)
Welsh, Talia (2006). Do neonates display innate self-awareness? Why neonatal imitation fails to provide sufficient grounds for innate self-and other-awareness. Philosophical Psychology 19 (2):221-238.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Until the 1970s, models of early infancy tended to depict the young child as internally preoccupied and incapable of processing visual-tactile data from the external world. Meltzoff and Moore's groundbreaking studies of neonatal imitation disprove this characterization of early life: They suggest that the infant is cognizant of its external environment and is able to control its own body. Taking up these experiments, theorists argue that neonatal imitation provides an empirical justification for the existence of an innate ability to engage in social communication. Since later imitation is taken as a benchmark for self- and other-awareness, theorists claim that a proto- or primitive self must exist in the infant. This paper takes up the issue of whether or not neonatal imitation does provide us with a ground to argue against developmental accounts that consider self-awareness to be a later acquisition. I argue that the enthusiasm over neonatal imitation is premature. Psychological studies that claim to prove neonatal imitation do not provide sufficient grounds for dismissing alternate philosophical and psychological theories about the self as being a post-birth "event" rather than an intrinsic condition. Therefore, I argue that there is no compelling reason to suppose that we come to the world with a primitive sense of self- or other-awareness
Wheeler, M. (2000). Varieties of consciousness and memory in the developing child. In Endel Tulving (ed.), Memory, Consciousness, and the Brain: The Tallinn Conference. Psychology Press/Taylor & Francis.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Wilber, Ken (1979). A developmental view of consciousness. Journal of Transpersonal Psychology 11:1-21.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Woodbridge, Frederick J. E. (1924). Mental development. Journal of Philosophy 21 (17):449-456.   (Google | More links)
Zachar, Peter (2000). Child development and the regulation of affect and cognition in consciousness: A view from object relations theory. In Ralph D. Ellis & Natika Newton (eds.), The Caldron of Consciousness: Motivation, Affect and Self-Organization. John Benjamins.   (Google)
Zahavi, Dan (2004). The embodied self-awareness of the infant: A challenge to the theory-theory of mind. In Dan Zahavi, T. Grunbaum, Josef Parnas & T. Grunbaum (eds.), The Structure and Development of Self-Consciousness. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This was originally written and presented at the National Endowment for the Humanities Summer Seminar for College Teachers on Folk Psychology vs. Mental Simulation: How Minds Understand Minds, run by Robert Gordon at the University of Missouri - St. Louis, June-July 1999. It has been only lightly revised since, and should be considered a rough draft. Needless to say, the ideas herein owe a lot to what I learned at the seminar from Robert Gordon and the other participants, particularly Jim Garson. However, any errors are my responsibility alone
Zelazo, Philip David & Sommerville, Jessica A. (2001). Levels of consciousness of the self in time. In Chris Moore & Karen Lemmon (eds.), The Self in Time: Developmental Perspectives. Lawrence Erlbaum.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Zelazo, P. (2000). Self-reflection and the development of consciously controlled processing. In P. Mitchell & Kevin J. Riggs (eds.), Children's Reasoning and the Mind. Psychology Press/Taylor & Francis.   (Cited by 18 | Google)
Zelazo, P. D. (1996). Towards a characterization of minimal consciousness. New Ideas in Psychology 14:63-80.   (Cited by 15 | Google)
Zelazo, Philip David; Gao, Helena Hong & Todd, Rebecca (2007). The development of consciousness. In Philip David Zelazo, Morris Moscovitch & Evan Thompson (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Zelazo, P. R. & Zelazo, P. D. (1998). The emergence of consciousness. In H. Jasper, L. Descarries, V. Castellucci & S. Rossignol (eds.), Consciousness: At the Frontiers of Neuroscience. Lippincott-Raven.   (Cited by 14 | Google)