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8.8k. Consciousness and Psychology, Foundational Issues (Consciousness and Psychology, Foundational Issues on PhilPapers)

See also:
Adolphs, Ralph (2007). Consciousness: Situated and social. In Philip David Zelazo, Morris Moscovitch & Evan Thompson (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness. Cambridge.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Baars, Bernard J. (1988). A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 953 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Conscious experience is one of the most difficult and thorny problems in psychological science. Its study has been neglected for many years, either because it was thought to be too difficult, or because the relevant evidence was thought to be poor. Bernard Baars suggests a way to specify empirical constraints on a theory of consciousness by contrasting well-established conscious phenomena - such as stimulus representations known to be attended, perceptual, and informative - with closely comparable unconscious ones - such as stimulus representations known to be preperceptual, unattended, or habituated. Adducing data to show that consciousness is associated with a kind of global workplace in the nervous system, and that several brain structures are known to behave in accordance with his theory, Baars helps to clarify many difficult problems
Baars, Bernard J. (1996). Understanding subjectivity: Global workspace theory and the resurrection of the observing self. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (3):211-17.   (Cited by 20 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The world of our experience consists at all times of two parts, an objective and a subjective part . . . The objective part is the sum total of whatsoever at any given time we may be thinking of, the subjective part is the inner 'state' in which the thinking comes to pass
Baars, Bernard J. (1986). What is a theory of consciousness a theory of? The search for criterial constraints on theory. Imagination, Cognition, and Personality 1:3-24.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
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Bindra, D. (1970). The problem of subjective experience. Psychological Review 77:581-84.   (Google)
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Bush, Wendell T. (1905). An empirical definition of consciousness. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 2 (21):561-568.   (Google | More links)
Carlson, Richard A. (1992). Starting with consciousness. American Journal of Psychology 105:598-604.   (Cited by 36 | Google)
Casler, L. (1976). The "consciousness problem" is not the problem. Perceptual and Motor Skills 42:227-32.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Cotterill, Rodney M. J. (2003). Consciousness, intelligence and creativity: A personal credo. In Neural Basis of Consciousness. Amsterdam: J Benjamins.   (Google)
Dienes, Zoltán & Perner, Josef (2004). Assumptions of a subjective measure of consciousness: Three mappings. In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 9 | Google)
Evans, Simon & Azzopardi, Paul (2007). Evaluation of a 'bias-free' measure of awareness. Spatial Vision. Special Issue 20 (1-2):61-77.   (Google | More links)
Fechner, Gustav (online). The measurement of sensation.   (Google)
Hebb, D. O. (1954). The problem of consciousness and introspection. In J. F. Delafresnaye (ed.), Brain Mechanisms and Consciousness. Blackwell.   (Cited by 9 | Google)
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Menon, Sangeetha (2008). Transpersonal Psychology of the Bhagavad Gita: Consciousness, Meditation, Work and Love. In K. Ramakrishna Rao (ed.), Handbook of Indian Psychology. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Merikle, Philip M. (1984). Toward a definition of awareness. Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 22:449-50.   (Cited by 16 | Google)
Natsoulas, Thomas (1981). Basic problems of consciousness. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 41:132-78.   (Cited by 13 | Google)
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Natsoulas, Thomas (1974). The subjective, experiential element in perception. Psychological Bulletin 81:611-31.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Revonsuo, Antti (1993). Is there a ghost in the cognitive machinery? Philosophical Psychology 6 (4):387-405.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: The cognitive mind-brain is haunted by the ghost of consciousness. Cognitive science must face this ghost, since consciousness is perhaps the most important mental phenomenon: it forms a seemingly united, multimodal phenomenological world around the subject who experiences this world from a certain point of view. Many current approaches to consciousness fail to illuminate the nature of this “experienced world”. Some philosophers want to eliminate consciousness from science for good, others build theories in which the concept of consciousness is distorted beyond recognition. I argue that elimination and Daniel Dennett's “multiple drafts” model do not offer genuine explanations for consciousness. However, certain empirically-based approaches to consciousness succeed in exorcising its ghostly reputation and, at the same time, in preserving the experienced world of consciousness as an important explanandum
Rychlak, Joseph F. (1997). In Defense of Human Consciousness. American Psychological Association.   (Cited by 19 | Google | More links)
Tolman, E. C. (1935). Psychology versus immediate experience. Philosophy of Science 2 (3):356-80.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Velmans, Max (ed.) (2000). Investigating Phenomenal Consciousness: New Methodologies and Maps. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Wilber, Ken & Walsh, Roger (2000). An integral approach to consciousness research: A proposal for integrating first, second, and third person approaches to consciousness. In Max Velmans (ed.), Investigating Phenomenal Consciousness: New Methodologies and Maps. John Benjamins.   (Google)
Wilson, D. L. (1978). Brain mechanisms, consciousness, and introspection. In A. A. Sugarman & R. E. Tarter (eds.), Expanding Dimensions of Consciousness. Springer.   (Google)
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