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8.9b. Conscious and Unconscious Memory (Conscious and Unconscious Memory on PhilPapers)

See also:
Aitkenhead, A. R. (1993). Conscious awareness. In P. S. Sebel, B. Bonke & E. Winograd (eds.), Memory and Awareness in Anesthesia. Prentice-Hall.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Alechina, Natasha; Logan, Brian; Nguyen, Hoang Nga & Rakib, Abdur (2009). Verifying time, memory and communication Bounds in systems of reasoning agents. Synthese 169 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: We present a framework for verifying systems composed of heterogeneous reasoning agents, in which each agent may have differing knowledge and inferential capabilities, and where the resources each agent is prepared to commit to a goal (time, memory and communication bandwidth) are bounded. The framework allows us to investigate, for example, whether a goal can be achieved if a particular agent, perhaps possessing key information or inferential capabilities, is unable (or unwilling) to contribute more than a given portion of its available computational resources or bandwidth to the problem. We present a novel temporal epistemic logic, BMCL-CTL , which allows us to describe a set of reasoning agents with bounds on time, memory and the number of messages they can exchange. The bounds on memory and communication are expressed as axioms in the logic. As an example, we show how to axiomatise a system of agents which reason using resolution and prove that the resulting logic is sound and complete. We then show how to encode a simple system of reasoning agents specified in BMCL-CTL in the description language of the Mocha model checker (Alur et al., Proceedings of the tenth international conference on computer-aided verification (CAV) , 1998), and verify that the agents can achieve a goal only if they are prepared to commit certain time, memory and communication resources
Alibali, Martha Wagner & Koedinger, Kenneth R. (1999). The developmental progression from implicit to explicit knowledge: A computational approach. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):755-756.   (Google)
Abstract: Dienes & Perner (D&P) argue that nondeclarative knowledge can take multiple forms. We provide empirical support for this from two related lines of research about the development of mathematical reasoning. We then describe how different forms of procedural and declarative knowledge can be effectively modeled in Anderson's ACT-R theory, contrasting this computational approach with D&P's logical approach. The computational approach suggests that the commonly observed developmental progression from more implicit to more explicit knowledge can be viewed as a consequence of accumulating and strengthening mental representations
Alkire, M. T.; Haier, R. J.; Fallon, J. H. & Barker, S. J. (1996). PET imaging of conscious and unconscious verbal memory. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3:448-62.   (Cited by 9 | Google)
Allik, J. (2000). Available and accessible information in memory and vision. In Endel Tulving (ed.), Memory, Consciousness, and the Brain: The Tallinn Conference. Psychology Press/Taylor & Francis.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Allport, D. A. (1979). Conscious and unconscious cognition: A computational metaphor for the mechanism of attention and integration. In L. Nilsson (ed.), Perspectives on Memory Research.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Al-Saji, Alia (2004). The memory of another past: Bergson, Deleuze and a new theory of time. Continental Philosophy Review 37 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: Through the philosophies of Bergson and Deleuze, my paper explores a different theory of time. I reconstitute Deleuze’s paradoxes of the past in Difference and Repetition and Bergsonism to reveal a theory of time in which the relation between past and present is one of coexistence rather than succession. The theory of memory implied here is a non-representational one. To elaborate this theory, I ask: what is the role of the “virtual image” in Bergson’s Matter and Memory? Far from representing the simple afterimage of a present perception, the “virtual image” carries multiple senses. Contracting the immediate past for the present, or expanding virtually to hold the whole of memory (and even the whole of the universe), the virtual image can form a bridge between the present and the non-representational past. This non-representational account of memory sheds light not only on the structure of time for Bergson, but also on his concepts of pure memory and virtuality. The rereading of memory also opens the way for Bergsonian intuition to play an intersubjective role; intuition becomes a means for navigating the resonances and dissonances that can be felt between different rhythms of becoming or planes of memory, which constitute different subjects
Anderson, Norman H. (1997). Functional memory versus reproductive memory. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):19-20.   (Google)
Abstract: A functional theory of memory has already been developed as part of a general functional theory of cognition. The traditional conception of memory as “reproductive” touches on only a minor function. The primary function of memory is in constructing values for goal-directedness of everyday thought and action. This functional approach to memory rests on a solid empirical foundation
Andreasen, N. (2000). Is schizophrenia a disorder of memory or consciousness? In Endel Tulving (ed.), Memory, Consciousness, and the Brain: The Tallinn Conference. Psychology Press/Taylor & Francis.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Andersen, Holly (ms). Two causal mistakes in Wegner's illusion of conscious will.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Daniel Wegner argues that our feelings of conscious will are illusory: these feelings are not causally involved in the production of action, which is rather governed by unconscious neural processes. I argue that Wegner's interpretation of neuroscientific results rests on two fallacious causal assumptions, neither of which are supported by the evidence. Each assumption involves a Cartesian disembodiment of conscious will, and it is this disembodiment that results in the appearance of causal inefficacy, rather than any interesting features of conscious will. Wegner's fallacies illustrate two take-away points to heed if making claims about the causal structure of agency
Andrade, Jackie (2001). The contribution of working memory to conscious experience. In Jackie Andrade (ed.), Working Memory in Perspective. Psychology Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Ansorge, Ulrich; Scharlau, Ingrid; Heumann, Manfred & Klotz, Werner (2001). Visual conscious perception could be grounded in a nonconscious sensorimotor domain. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):974-975.   (Google)
Abstract: Visual conscious perception could be grounded in a nonconscious sensorimotor domain. Although invisible, information can be processed up to the level of response activation. Moreover, these nonconscious processes are modified by actual intentions. This notion bridges a gap in the theoretical framework of O'Regan & Noë
Antony, Michael V. (ms). Are our concepts "conscious state" and "conscious creature" vague?   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Abstract: are sharp rather than vague, that they can have no borderline cases. On the other hand, many who take conscious states to be identical to, or realized by, complex physical states are committed to the vagueness of those concepts. In the paper I argue that conscious state and conscious creature are sharp by presenting four necessary conditions for conceiving borderline cases in general, and showing that some of those conditions cannot be met with conscious state. I conclude that conscious state is sharp, and the conclusion is then extended to conscious creature. The paper ends with a brief discussion of some implications
Antony, Michael V. (2008). Are our concepts conscious state and conscious creature vague? Erkenntnis 68 (2).   (Google | More links)
Arcaya, Jose M. (1989). Memory and temporality: A phenomenological alternative. Philosophical Psychology 2 (1):101-110.   (Google)
Abstract: The notion of memory storage, central to most contemporary theories of remembering, is challenged from a philosophical perspective as being contradictory and untenable. It criticizes this storage hypothesis as relying upon a linear explanation of time, an assumption which results in infinite regression, solipsism, and a failure to contact the real past. A model based on the phenomenological viewpoints of Edmund Husserl and Maurice Merleau-Ponty is offered as an alternative paradigm. Finally, a research method suggested by this descriptive approach to memory is presented and illustrated
Aristotle, , On memory and recollection.   (Google)
Baars, Bernard J. (2001). A biocognitive approach to the conscious core of immediate memory. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (1):115-116.   (Google)
Abstract: The limited capacity of immediate memory “rides” on the even more limited capacity of consciousness, which reflects the dynamic activity of the thalamocortical core of the brain. Recent views of the conscious narrow-capacity component of the brain are explored with reference to global workspace theory (Baars 1988; 1993; 1998). The radical limits of immediate memory must be explained in terms of biocognitive brain architecture
Baars, Bernard J. (1998). Attention, self, and conscious self-monitoring. In A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: ?In everday language, the word ?attention? implies control of access to consciousness, and we adopt this usage here. Attention itself can be either voluntary or automatic. This can be readily modeled in the theory. Further, a contrastive analysis of spontaneously self?attributed vs. self?alien experiences suggests that ?self? can be interpreted as the more enduring, higher levels of the dominant context hierarchy, which create continuity over the changing flow of events. Since context is by definition unconscious in GW theory, self in this sense is thought to be inherently unconscious as well. This proposal is consistent with a great deal of objective evidence. However, aspects of self may become known through ?conscious self-monitoring,? a process that ??is useful for self-evaluation and self?control. The results of conscious self-monitoring are combined with self?evaluation criteria, presumably of social origin, to produce a stable ?self?concept?, which functions as a supervisory system within the larger self organization
Baars, Bernard J.; Ramsoy, Thomas Zoega & Laureys, Steven (2003). Brain, conscious experience, and the observing self. Trends in Neurosciences 26 (12):671-5.   (Cited by 58 | Google | More links)
Baars, Bernard J. & Franklin, Stan (2003). How conscious experience and working memory interact. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (4):166-172.   (Cited by 42 | Google | More links)
Baars, Bernard J.; Ramamurthy, Uma & Franklin, Stan (2007). How deliberate, spontaneous, and unwanted memories emerge in a computational model of consciousness. In John H. Mace (ed.), Involuntary Memory. New Perspectives in Cognitive Psychology. Blackwell Publishing.   (Google | More links)
Baars, Bernard J. (2002). The conscious access hypothesis: Origins and recent evidence. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 6 (1):47-52.   (Cited by 88 | Google | More links)
Baars, Bernard J. (1987). What is conscious in the control of action? A modern ideomotor theory of voluntary action. In D. Gorfein & Robert R. Hoffman (eds.), Learning and Memory: The Ebbinghaus Centennial Symposium. Lawrence Erlbaum.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Baars, Bernard J. (2003). Working memory requires conscious processes, not vice versa: A global workspace account. In Naoyuki Osaka (ed.), Neural Basis of Consciousness. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Bacon, E.; Danion, J. M.; Kauffmann-Muller, F. & Bruant, A. (2001). Consciousness in schizophrenia: A metacognitive approach to semantic memory. Consciousness and Cognition 10 (4):473-484.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Recent studies have shown that schizophrenia may be a disease affecting the states of consciousness. The present study is aimed at investigating metamemory, i.e., the knowledge about one's own memory capabilities, in patients with schizophrenia. The accuracy of the Confidence level (CL) in the correctness of the answers provided during a recall phase, and the predictability of the Feeling of Knowing (FOK) when recall fails were measured using a task consisting of general information questions and assessing semantic memory. Nineteen outpatients were paired with 19 control subjects with respect to age, sex, and education. Results showed that patients with schizophrenia exhibited an impaired semantic memory. CL ratings as well as CL and FOK accuracy were not significantly different in the schizophrenic and the control groups. However, FOK ratings were significantly reduced for the patient group, and discordant FOK judgments were also observed more frequently. Such results suggest that FOK judgments are impaired in patients with schizophrenia, which confirms that schizophrenia is an illness characterized by an impaired conscious awareness of one's own knowledge
Badgaiyan, Rajendra D. (2005). Conscious awareness of retrieval: An exploration of the cortical connectivity. International Journal of Psychophysiology 55 (2):257-262.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Badgaiyan, Rajendra D. (2002). Nonconscious processing, anterior cingulate, and catatonia. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (5):578-579.   (Google)
Abstract: A composite cognitive model of a neuropsychiatric condition should integrate clinical symptoms with the impairments of cognitive information processing. A model of catatonia, for example, should emphasize deficits of nonconscious information processing that impair a patient's ability to use implicit motor feedback for execution and termination of a voluntary motor activity
Baddeley, A. D. (1993). Working memory and conscious awareness. In A. Collins, S. Gathercole, Martin A. Conway & P. E. Morris (eds.), Theories of Memory. Lawrence Erlbaum.   (Cited by 37 | Google)
Baillargeon, Renée (2004). Can 12 large clowns fit in a mini Cooper? Or when are beliefs and reasoning explicit and conscious? Developmental Science 7 (4):422-424.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Baillie, J. B. (1917). On the nature of memory-knowledge. Mind 26 (103):249-272.   (Google | More links)
Balint, E. (1987). Memory and consciousness. International Journal of Psychoanalysis 68:475-483.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Bargh, John A. (2005). Bypassing the will: Toward demystifying the nonconscious control of social behavior. In Ran R. Hassin, James S. Uleman & John A. Bargh (eds.), The New Unconscious. Oxford Series in Social Cognition and Social Neuroscience. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 23 | Google)
Bar, Moshe (2000). Conscious and nonconscious processing of visual object identity. In Yves Rossetti & Antti Revonsuo (eds.), Beyond Dissociation: Interaction Between Dissociated Implicit and Explicit Processing. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Barba, G. (2000). Memory, consciousness, and temporality: What is retrieved and who exactly is controlling the retrieval? In Endel Tulving (ed.), Memory, Consciousness, and the Brain: The Tallinn Conference. Psychology Press/Taylor & Francis.   (Google)
Beloff, John (1980). Is normal memory a paranormal phenomenon? Theoria to Theory 14 (September):145-162.   (Google)
Bergström, Zara M.; Velmans, Max; de Fockert, Jan & Richardson-Klavehn, Alan (2007). ERP evidence for successful voluntary avoidance of conscious recollection. Brain Research 1151:119-133.   (Google | More links)
Berry, Dianne C. & Dienes, Zoltán (eds.) (1993). Implicit Learning: Theoretical and Empirical Issues. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.   (Cited by 372 | Google)
Abstract: This book presents an overview of these studies and attempts to clarify apparently disparate results by placing them in a coherent theoretical framework.
Bergson, Henri (1991). Matter and Memory. MIT Press.   (Cited by 220 | Google | More links)
Abstract: A monumental work by an important modern philosopher, Matter and Memory (1896) represents one of the great inquiries into perception and memory, movement and time, matter and mind. Nobel Prize-winner Henri Bergson surveys these independent but related spheres, exploring the connection of mind and body to individual freedom of choice. Bergson’s efforts to reconcile the facts of biology to a theory of consciousness offered a challenge to the mechanistic view of nature, and his original and innovative views exercised a profound influence on other philosophers--including James, Whitehead, and Santayana--as well as novelists such as Dos Passos and Proust. Matter and Memory is essential to an understanding of Bergson’s philosophy and its legacy
Bernecker, Sven (2010). Memory: A Philosophical Study. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Berry, Christopher J.; Shanks, David R. & Henson, Richard N. A. (2006). On the status of unconscious memory: Merikle and Reingold (1991) revisited. Journal of Experimental Psychology 32 (4):925-934.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Bhandare, Shaila (1993). Memory in Indian Epistemology, its Nature and Status. Sri Satguru Publications.   (Google)
Bickle, John (2006). Reducing mind to molecular pathways: Explicating the reductionism implicit in current cellular and molecular neuroscience. Synthese 151 (3):411-434.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: As opposed to the dismissive attitude toward reductionism that is popular in current philosophy of mind, a “ruthless reductionism” is alive and thriving in “molecular and cellular cognition”—a field of research within cellular and molecular neuroscience, the current mainstream of the discipline. Basic experimental practices and emerging results from this field imply that two common assertions by philosophers and cognitive scientists are false: (1) that we do not know much about how the brain works, and (2) that lower-level neuroscience cannot explain cognition and complex behavior directly. These experimental practices involve intervening directly with molecular components of sub-cellular and gene expression pathways in neurons and then measuring specific behaviors. These behaviors are tracked using tests that are widely accepted by experimental psychologists to study the psychological phenomenon at issue (e.g., memory, attention, and perception). Here I illustrate these practices and their importance for explanation and reduction in current mainstream neuroscience by describing recent work on social recognition memory in mammals
Billig, Michael (2001). Discursive approaches to studying conscious and unconscious thoughts. In Deborah L. Tolman & Mary Brydon-Miller (eds.), From Subjects to Subjectivities: A Handbook of Interpretive and Participatory Methods. New York University Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Block, Richard A. & Zakay, Dan (2001). Retrospective and prospective timing: Memory, attention and consciousness. In Christoph Hoerl & Teresa McCormark (eds.), Time and Memory. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Block, Ned (2003). Spatial perception via tactile sensation. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (7):285-286.   (Google)
Abstract: I’m now looking at a soccer ball and a Nintendo Game Cube, and thus am having a perceptual experience of a sphere and a cube. My friend, blind from birth, (who’s helping me with the cleaning) is touching these items, and is thus having a perceptual experience of the same things. Not only are we perceiving the same items, but in doing so we apply the terms ‘sphere’ and ‘cube’, respectively, to them. Are we, in doing so, applying the same, or different, perceptual concepts?
Blustein, Jeffrey (2008). The Moral Demands of Memory. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: There is considerable contemporary interest in memory, both within the academy and in the public sphere. Little has been written by moral philosophers on the subject, however. In this timely book, Jeffrey Blustein explores the moral aspects and implications of memory, both personal and collective. He provides a systematic and philosophically rigorous account of a morality of memory, focusing on the value of memory, its relationship to identity, and the responsibilities associated with memory
Bánréti, Zoltán (1999). Interfaces in memory. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):96-96.   (Google)
Abstract: A distinction between interpretive processing and post-interpretive processing calls for a consideration of interface relations in systems of verbal memory. Syntactic movement of a phrase and the cognitive system of thought/mind interact. Systems of declarative memory and procedural memory interact
Bonanno, Giacomo (2003). Memory of past beliefs and actions. Studia Logica 75 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: Two notions of memory are studied both syntactically and semantically: memory of past beliefs and memory of past actions. The analysis is carried out in a basic temporal logic framework enriched with beliefs and actions
Booth, Kate (2008). Risdon Vale: Place, memory, and suburban experience. Ethics, Place and Environment 11 (3):299 – 311.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The author reflects upon the notions of personal memory, collective memory, myth, and evolved memory within her lived experience of Risdon Vale. These interrelated forms of memory influence understanding of place and sense of place. Personal memories corroborate and collaborate with intersubjective memories to inform collective memory. Both personal and collective memories are held within a fusion of cultural myths. Evolved memory binds us deeply within the history of the earth and the evolution of life. Risdon Vale provides fertile ground for considerations of place and memory. This former public housing suburb is adjacent to Risdon Cove, the site of first occupation by the British in 1803 and the site of the first massacre of Aboriginal Tasmanians in 1804
Born, Jan & Wagner, Ullrich (2004). Awareness in memory: Being explicit about the role of sleep. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 8 (6):242-244.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Bornstein, Robert F. (1999). Unconscious motivation and phenomenal knowledge: Toward a comprehensive theory of implicit mental states. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):758-758.   (Google)
Abstract: A comprehensive theory of implicit and explicit knowledge must explain phenomenal knowledge (e.g., knowledge regarding one's affective and motivational states), as well as propositional (i.e., “fact”-based) knowledge. Findings from several research areas (i.e., the subliminal mere exposure effect, artificial grammar learning, implicit and self-attributed dependency needs) are used to illustrate the importance of both phenomenal and propositional knowledge for a unified theory of implicit and explicit mental states
Boucher, Jill (1999). Time and the implicit-explicit continuum. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):758-759.   (Google)
Abstract: Dienes & Perner's target article contains numerous but unsystematic references to the implicit or explicit knowledge of the temporal context of a known state of affairs such as may constitute the content of a propositional attitude. In this commentary, the forms of cognition that, according to D&P, require only implicit knowledge of time are contrasted with those for which explicit temporal knowledge is needed. It is suggested that the explicit representation of time may have been important in human evolution and that certain developmental disorders including autism may be (partly) caused by defective ability to represent time
Brandom, Robert B. (1994). Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment. Harvard University Press.   (Cited by 778 | Google | More links)
Braude, Stephen, Memory without a trace.   (Google)
Abstract: Ever since Plato proposed that memories are analogous to im- pressions in wax, many have suggested that memories are formed through the creation of traces, representations of the things remem- bered. That is still the received view among most cognitive scientists, who believe the remaining challenge is simply to determine the pre- cise physical nature of memory traces. However, there are compelling reasons for thinking that this standard view of memory is profoundly wrongheaded — in fact, disguised nonsense. This paper considers, firstly, what those reasons are in detail. Secondly and more briefly, it considers how trace-like constructs have undermined various areas of parapsychological theorizing, especially in connection with the evi- dence for postmortem survival-for example, speculations about cellu- lar memory in transplant cases and genetic memory in reincarnation cases. Similar problems also emerge in areas often related to para- psychology — for example, Sheldrake’s (1981) account of morphic resonance
Bradley, Francis H. (1908). On memory and judgment. Mind 17 (66):153-174.   (Google | More links)
Brainerd, C. J.; Stein, L. M. & Reyna, V. F. (1998). On the development of conscious and unconscious memory. Developmental Psychology 34:342-357.   (Cited by 23 | Google | More links)
Brewer, William F. (1992). Phenomenal experience in laboratory and autobiographical memory. In Martin A. Conway, David C. Rubin, H. Spinnler & W. Wagenaar (eds.), Theoretical Perspectives on Autobiographical Memory. Kluwer.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Breitmeyer, Bruno G. & Ögmen, Haluk (2006). Visual masking reveals differences between the nonconscious and conscious processing of form and surface attributes. In Haluk Ögmen & Bruno G. Breitmeyer (eds.), The First Half Second: The Microgenesis and Temporal Dynamics of Unconscious and Conscious Visual Processes. MIT Press.   (Google)
Brewer, William F. (1996). What is recollective memory? In David C. Rubin (ed.), Remembering Our Past: Studies in Autobiographical Memory. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 67 | Google)
Bridgeman, Bruce (1992). Consciousness and memory. Psycoloquy.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Rosenthal makes assertions about what can and cannot happen without being conscious. Although his distinctions are informative, they do not substitute for data. We have little precise information that differentiates the immediate feeling of awareness, such as that possible for Korsakoff patients, from the later episodic memory of conscious experience. Appeals to introspection are useful starting points, but they are clearly are not to be trusted in this context. Rosenthal also asks why conscious thinking would be more efficacious than thinking that is not conscious. The answer is that the whole armamentarium of planning becomes available to conscious thought, together with episodic memory and the linguistic mediation that goes along with it
Bridgeman, Bruce (1999). Implicit and explicit representations of visual space. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):759-760.   (Google)
Abstract: The visual system captures a unique contrast between implicit and explicit representation where the same event (location of a visible object) is coded in both ways in parallel. A method of differentiating the two representations is described using an illusion that affects only the explicit representation. Consistent with predictions, implicit information is available only from targets presently visible, but, surprisingly, a two-alternative decision does not disturb the implicit representation
Brinck, Ingar (1999). Nonconceptual content and the distinction between implicit and explicit knowledge. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):760-761.   (Google)
Abstract: The notion of nonconceptual content in Dienes & Perner's theory is examined. A subject may be in a state with nonconceptual content without having the concepts that would be used to describe the state. Nonconceptual content does not seem to be a clear-cut case of either implicit or explicit knowledge. It underlies a kind of practical knowledge, which is not reducible to procedural knowledge, but is accessible to the subject and under voluntary control
Brown, Gordon D. A. & Chater, Nick (2001). The chronological organisation of memory. In Christoph Hoerl & Teresa McCormark (eds.), Time and Memory. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Brody, Nathan (1989). Unconscious learning of rules: Comment on Reber's analysis of implicit learning. Journal of Experimental Psychology 118:236-238.   (Cited by 20 | Google)
Buchner, A.; Erdfelder, E. & Vaterrodt-Plunnecke, B. (1995). Toward unbiased measurement of conscious and unconscious memory processes within the process dissociation framework. Journal of Experimental Psychology 124:137-60.   (Cited by 88 | Google)
Bunting, Michael F. & Cowan, Nelson (2005). Working memory and flexibility in awareness and attention. Psychological Research/Psychologische Forschung 69 (5):412-419.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Burgess, Adrian P. & Ali, Lia (2002). Functional connectivity of gamma EEG activity is modulated at low frequency during conscious recollection. International Journal of Psychophysiology 46 (2):91-100.   (Cited by 21 | Google | More links)
Butler, Laurie T. & Berry, Dianne C. (2001). Implicit memory: Intention and awareness revisited. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 5 (5):192-197.   (Cited by 46 | Google)
Campbell, J. (1997). The structure of time in autobiographical memory. European Journal of Philosophy 5 (2):105-17.   (Cited by 17 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Much of ordinary memory is autobiographical; memory of what one saw and did, where and when. It may derive from your own past experiences, or from what other people told you about your past life. It may be phenomenologically rich, redolent of that autumn afternoon so long ago, or a few austere reports of what happened. But all autobiographical memory is first-person memory, stateable using ‘I’. It is a memory you would express by saying, ‘I remember I . . .’
Capon, Alison; Handley, Simon & Dennis, Ian (2003). Working memory and reasoning: An individual differences perspective. Thinking and Reasoning 9 (3):203 – 244.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This article reports three experiments that investigated the relationship between working memory capacity and syllogistic and five-term series spatial inference. A series of complex and simple verbal and spatial working memory measures were employed. Correlational analyses showed that verbal and spatial working memory span tasks consistently predicted syllogistic and spatial reasoning performance. A confirmatory factor analysis showed that three factors best accounted for the data--a verbal, a spatial, and a general factor. Syllogistic reasoning performance loaded all three factors, whilst spatial reasoning loaded only the general factor. The implications of these findings are discussed in the context of reasoning theories and contemporary accounts of the structure of working memory
Carruthers, Peter (2006). Conscious experience versus conscious thought. In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Consciousness and Self-Reference. MIT Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: Are there different constraints on theories of conscious experience as against theories of conscious propositional thought? Is what is problematic or puzzling about each of these phenomena of the same, or of different, types? And to what extent is it plausible to think that either or both conscious experience and conscious thought involve some sort of selfreference? In pursuing these questions I shall also explore the prospects for a defensible form of eliminativism concerning conscious thinking, one that would leave the reality of conscious experience untouched. In the end, I shall argue that while there might be no such thing as conscious judging or conscious wanting, there is (or may well be) such a thing as conscious generic thinking
Carruthers, Peter (1998). Conscious thinking: Language or elimination? Mind and Language 13 (4):457-476.   (Cited by 21 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Do we conduct our conscious propositional thinking in natural language? Or is such language only peripherally related to human conscious thought-processes? In this paper I shall present a partial defence of the former view, by arguing that the only real alternative is eliminativism about conscious propositional thinking. Following some introductory remarks, I shall state the argument for this conclusion, and show how that conclusion can be true. Thereafter I shall defend each of the three main premises in turn
Carr, Brian (2000). Sankara on memory and the continuity of the self. Religious Studies 36 (4):419-434.   (Google)
Abstract: An issue much discussed by Indian philosophers and Western philosophers alike is one that concerns the need to assume a continuing self (or subject of experience) in giving an account of the world and our experience of it. This paper concentrates on two arguments put forward by the eighth-century AD Indian philosopher Sankara, in a short passage of his commentary on Badarayana's Brahmasutra. The innovative peculiarity of these arguments is that they rest on an appeal to the content of memory judgements. Sankara takes the line that an analysis of the content of memory judgements shows that a Buddhist attempt to reconstrue memory as mere similarity between successive experiences is fundamentally flawed. Our concern, therefore, is whether Sankara's account of the content of memory judgements is correct, and whether it establishes the required continuity
Carruthers, Peter (2007). The illusion of conscious will. Synthese 96.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Wegner (Wegner, D. (2002). The illusion of conscious will. MIT Press) argues that conscious will is an illusion, citing a wide range of empirical evidence. I shall begin by surveying some of his arguments. Many are unsuccessful. But one—an argument from the ubiquity of self-interpretation—is more promising. Yet is suffers from an obvious lacuna, offered by so-called ‘dual process’ theories of reasoning and decision making (Evans, J., & Over, D. (1996). Rationality and reasoning. Psychology Press; Stanovich, K. (1999). Who is rational? Studies of individual differences in reasoning. Lawrence Erlbaum; Frankish, K. (2004). Mind and supermind. Cambridge University Press). I shall argue that this lacuna can be filled by a plausible a priori claim about the causal role of anything deserving to be called ‘a will.’ The result is that there is no such thing as conscious willing: conscious will is, indeed, an illusion.
Cavanaugh, J. C. (1989). The importance of awareness in memory aging. In L. Poon, David C. Rubin & B. Wilson (eds.), Everyday Cognition in Adulthood and Late Life. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 26 | Google)
Changeux, Jean-Pierre; Dehaene, Stanislas; Naccache, Lionel; Sackura, Jérôme & Sergenta, Claire (2006). Conscious, preconscious, and subliminal processing: A testable taxonomy. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 10 (5):204-211.   (Google)
Abstract: Amidst the many brain events evoked by a visual stimulus, which are specifically associated with conscious perception, and which merely reflect non-conscious processing? Several recent neuroimaging studies have contrasted conscious and non-conscious visual processing, but their results appear inconsistent. Some support a correlation of conscious perception with early occipital events, others with late parieto-frontal activity. Here we attempt to make sense of those dissenting results. On the basis of a minimal neuro-computational model, the global neuronal workspace hypothesis, we propose a taxonomy which distinguishes between vigilance and access to conscious report, as well as between subliminal, preconscious and conscious processing. We suggest that these distinctions map onto different neural mechanisms, and that conscious perception is systematically associated with a sudden surge of parieto-frontal activity causing top-down amplification
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Abstract: Conscious experience is at once the most familiar thing in the world and the most mysterious. There is nothing we know about more directly than consciousness, but it is extraordinarily hard to reconcile it with everything else we know. Why does it exist? What does it do? How could it possibly arise from neural processes in the brain? These questions are among the most intriguing in all of science
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Abstract:   A tacit and highly idealized model of the agent's memory is presupposed in philosophy. The main features of a more psychologically realistic duplex (orn-plex) model are sketched here. It is argued that an adequate understanding of the rationality of an agent's actions is not possible without a satisfactory theory of the agent's memory and of the trade-offs involved in management of the memory, particularly involving compartmentalization of the belief set. The discussion identifies some basic constraints on the organization of knowledge representations in general
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Abstract: referred to as implicit learning (Reber, 1989). Implicit learning contrasts with explicit learning (exhibited for
Cleeremans, Axel, Fishing with the wrong nets: How the implicit slips through the representational theory of mind.   (Google)
Abstract: Dienes and Perner’s theory is not a satisfactory theory of implicit knowledge because by endorsing the representational theory of knowledge, the authors also inadvertently accept that only explicit knowledge can be causally efficacious, and hence that implicit knowledge is an inert category. This conflation between causal efficacy, knowledge, and explicitness is made clear through the authors' strategy, which consists of attributing any observable effect to the existence of representations that are as minimally explicit as needed to account for behavior. In contrast, we believe that causally efficacious and fully implicit knowledge exists, and is best embodied in frameworks that depart radically from classical assumptions
Cleeremans, Axel (1998). Implicit learning. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 2 (10):406-416.   (Cited by 201 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Implicit learning is the process through which we become sensitive to certain regularities in the environment (1) in the absence of intention to learn about those regularities (2) in the absence of awareness that one is learning, and (3) in such a way that the resulting knowledge is difficult to express
Cleeremans, Axel & Jimenez, Luis (2002). Implicit Learning and Consciousness: A Graded, Dynamic Perspective. In Robert M. French & Axel Cleeremans (eds.), Implicit Learning and Consciousness: An Empirical. Psychology Press.   (Cited by 45 | Google | More links)
Abstract: While the study of implicit learning is nothing new, the field as a whole has come to embody — over the last decade or so — ongoing questioning about three of the most fundamental debates in the cognitive sciences: The nature of consciousness, the nature of mental representation (in particular the difficult issue of abstraction), and the role of experience in shaping the cognitive system. Our main goal in this chapter is to offer a framework that attempts to integrate current thinking about these three issues in a way that specifically links consciousness with adaptation and learning. Our assumptions about this relationship are rooted in further assumptions about the nature of processing and of representation in cognitive systems. When considered together, we believe that these assumptions offer a new perspective on the relationships between conscious and unconscious processing and on the function of consciousness in cognitive systems
Cleeremans, Axel, Implicit learning in the presence of multiple cues.   (Google)
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Cleeremans, Axel; Destrebecqz, Arnaud & Boyer, Maud (1998). Implicit learning: News from the front. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 2 (10):406-416.   (Cited by 201 | Google | More links)
Abstract: 69 Thompson-Schill, S.L. _et al. _(1997) Role of left inferior prefrontal cortex 59 Buckner, R.L. _et al. _(1996) Functional anatomic studies of memory in retrieval of semantic knowledge: a re-evaluation _Proc. Natl. Acad._ retrieval for auditory words and pictures _J. Neurosci. _16, 6219–6235 _Sci. U. S. A. _94, 14792–14797 60 Buckner, R.L. _et al. _(1995) Functional anatomical studies of explicit and 70 Baddeley, A. (1992) Working memory: the interface between memory implicit memory retrieval tasks _J. Neurosci. _15, 12–29 and cognition _J. Cogn. Neurosci. _4, 281–288 61 Bäckman, L. _et al. _(1997) Brain activation in young and older adults 71 Petrides, M. (1994) Frontal lobes and behavior _Curr. Opin. Neurobiol._ during implicit and explicit retrieval _J. Cogn. Neurosci. _9, 378–391
Cleeremans, Axel & JimC)nez, L. (1998). Implicit sequence learning: The truth is in the details. In Michael A. Stadler & Peter A. Frensch (eds.), Handbook of Implicit Learning. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.   (Cited by 69 | Google)
Abstract: Over the past decade, sequence learning has gradually become a central paradigm through which to study implicit learning. In this chapter, we start by briefly summarizing the results obtained with different variants of the sequence learning paradigm. We distinguish three subparadigms in terms of whether the stimulus material is generated either by following a fixed and repeating sequence (e.g., Nissen & Bullemer, 1987), by relying on a complex set of rules from which one can produce several alternative deterministic sequences (e.g., Lewicki, Hill & Bizot, 1988; Stadler, 1989), or by following the output of a probabilistic set of rules such as instantiated by noisy finite-state grammars (Cleeremans & McClelland, 1991; Jiménez, Mendéz & Cleeremans, 1996). Next, we focus on the processes involved in sequence representation and acquisition. We suggest that the sensitivity to the sequential structure observed in the probabilistic subparadigm can only be a result of the acquisition of a representation of the statistical constraints of the material, and that this sensitivity emerges through the operation of mechanisms that are well instantiated by connectionist models such as the Simple Recurrent Network (Elman, 1990; Cleeremans, 1993b). We present new simulation work meant to explore to what extent the model can also account for specific data obtained in a paradigmatic instance of deterministic, rule-based sequence learning task: Lewicki et al. (1988)'s situation. Finally, we report on the results of an experiment that compares learning on otherwise similar deterministic and probabilistic structures, and we show that learning of both types of structures is equivalent only under conditions that maximally hinder explicit acquisition. Taken together, these simulation and experimental data lend support to the claim that implicit learning in all three sequence learning subparadigms can amount to a form of statistical sequence learning. They also suggest that distinguishing among several theories of sequence representation and acquisition may require us to analize the data in great detail. Hopefully, however, some truth can be found in such details..
Cleeremans, Axel (1993). Mechanisms of Implicit Learning: Connectionist Models of Sequence Processing. MIT Press.   (Cited by 277 | Google | More links)
Abstract: What do people learn when they do not know that they are learning? Until recently, all of the work in the area of implicit learning focused on empirical questions and methods. In this book, Axel Cleeremans explores unintentional learning from an information-processing perspective. He introduces a theoretical framework that unifies existing data and models on implicit learning, along with a detailed computational model of human performance in sequence-learning situations
Cleeremans, Axel (1997). Principles for Implicit Learning. In Dianne C. Berry (ed.), How Implicit is Implicit Learning? Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 126 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Complete URL to this document:
Cleeremans, Axel, Rules vs. statistics in implicit learning of biconditional grammars.   (Google)
Abstract: A significant part of everyday learning occurs incidentally — a process typically described as implicit learning. A central issue in this domain and others, such as language acquisition, is the extent to which performance depends on the acquisition and deployment of abstract rules. Shanks and colleagues [22], [11] have suggested (1) that discrimination between grammatical and ungrammatical instances of a biconditional grammar requires the acquisition and use of abstract rules, and (2) that training conditions — in particular whether instructions orient participants to identify the relevant rules or not — strongly influence the extent to which such rules will be learned. In this paper, we show (1) that a Simple Recurrent Network can in fact, under some conditions, learn a biconditional grammar, (2) that training conditions indeed influence learning in simple auto-associators networks and (3) that such networks can likewise learn about biconditional grammars, albeit to a lesser extent than human participants. These findings suggest that mastering biconditional grammars does not require the acquisition of abstract rules to the extent implied by Shanks and colleagues, and that performance on such material may in fact be based, at least in part, on simple associative learning mechanisms
Cleeremans, Axel (2006). Time, action, and consciousness. Human Movement Science.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Time plays a central role in consciousness, at different levels and in different aspects of information processing. Subliminal perception experiments demonstrate that stimuli presented too briefly to enter conscious awareness are nevertheless processed to some extent. Implicit learning, implicit memory, and conditioning studies suggest that the extent to which memory traces are available for verbal report and for cognitive control is likewise dependent on the time available for processing during acquisition. Differences in the time available for processing also determine not only the extent to which one becomes conscious of action, but also provides the basis for making attributions of authorship to experienced acts. In this paper, we offer a brief overview of these different findings and suggest that they can all be understood based on the fact that consciousness takes time. From this perspective, the availability of representations to conscious awareness depends on the quality of these representations — the extent to which they are strong, stable in time, and distinctive. High-quality representations occur when processes of global competition have had sufficient time to operate so as to make the system settle into the best possible interpretation of the input. Such processes implement global constraint satisfaction and critically depend on reentrant processing, through which representations can be further enriched by high-level constraints. We discuss these ideas in light of current theories of consciousness, emphasizing the fact that consciousness should be viewed as a process rather than as a static property associated with some states and not with others
Clement, F. & Malerstein, Abraham J. (2003). What is it like to be conscious? The ontogenesis of consciousness. Philosophical Psychology 16 (1):67-85.   (Google)
Abstract: In recent years, numerous studies have tried to highlight, from a naturalistic point of view, the apparent mysteries of consciousness. Many authors concentrated their efforts on explaining the phylogenetic origins of consciousness. Paradoxically, comments on the ontogenesis of consciousness are almost nonexistent. By crossing the results of psychology of development with a philosophical analysis, this paper aims to make up for this omission. After having characterized the different conceptual aspects of consciousness, we combine these, with observations made by developmental psychologists, to trace the empirical development of consciousness during the first months of life. This combination leads to a theoretical proposal: the intentional characteristics of consciousness, namely, aboutness and purposefulness, depend on the phenomenal properties of conscious states. From this perspective, the phenomenal aspect of conscious states (the "what it is like" effect) is therefore far from being an epiphenomenon
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Abstract: Walker's target article proposes a refinement of the well known two-stage model of memory formation to explain the positive effects of sleep on consolidation. After a first stage in which a labile memory representation is formed, a further stabilisation of the memory trace takes place in the second stage, which is dependent on (REM) sleep. Walker has refined the latter stage into a stage in which a consolidation-based enhancement occurs. It is not completely clear what consolidation-based enhancement implies and how it can be dissociated from a stage for memory-stabilisation. A more serious consideration, however, is whether a second stage in memory consolidation that is solely dependent on sleep, is really necessary. The classical, passive, interference theory is able to explain adequately the findings related to the effects of sleep and memory, and can lead perhaps better to an understanding of the highly variable data in this field
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Abstract: Miller (1956) summarized evidence that people can remember about seven chunks in short-term memory (STM) tasks. However, that number was meant more as a rough estimate and a rhetorical device than as a real capacity limit. Others have since suggested that there is a more precise capacity limit, but that it is only three to five chunks. The present target article brings together a wide variety of data on capacity limits suggesting that the smaller capacity limit is real. Capacity limits will be useful in analyses of information processing only if the boundary conditions for observing them can be carefully described. Four basic conditions in which chunks can be identified and capacity limits can accordingly be observed are: (1) when information overload limits chunks to individual stimulus items, (2) when other steps are taken specifically to block the recoding of stimulus items into larger chunks, (3) in performance discontinuities caused by the capacity limit, and (4) in various indirect effects of the capacity limit. Under these conditions, rehearsal and long-term memory cannot be used to combine stimulus items into chunks of an unknown size; nor can storage mechanisms that are not capacity-limited, such as sensory memory, allow the capacity-limited storage mechanism to be refilled during recall. A single, central capacity limit averaging about four chunks is implicated along with other, noncapacity-limited sources. The pure STM capacity limit expressed in chunks is distinguished from compound STM limits obtained when the number of separately held chunks is unclear. Reasons why pure capacity estimates fall within a narrow range are discussed and a capacity limit for the focus of attention is proposed. Key Words: attention; enumeration; information chunks; memory capacity; processing capacity; processing channels; serial recall; short-term memory; storage capacity; verbal recall; working memory capacity
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Abstract: The present commentary agrees with many of the points made by Ruchkin et al., but brings up several important differences in assumptions. These assumptions have to do with the nature of the capacity limit in working memory and the possible bases of working-memory activation
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Abstract: Norman Malcolm has maintained that impure memory is a de dicto mixture of factual memory and later knowledge or inference. E. Stiffler objects that impure memory must be given a de re analysis because later knowledge must be applied to earlier memory to yield impure memory. I show that the conditions of Stiffler's de re analysis are neither necessary nor sufficient and that Malcolm can easily give a de dicto solution to the application problem.
Dalla Barba, Gianfranco (2001). Beyond the memory-trace paradox and the fallacy of homunculus: A hypothesis concerning the relationship between memory, consciousness and temporality. Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (3):51-78.   (Google)
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Abstract: from the fact that the subject reacts faster to those words than to words that were not on the list. The subject
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Debus, Dorothea (2008). Experiencing the past: A relational account of recollective memory. Dialectica 62 (4):405-432.   (Google)
Abstract: Sometimes we remember past objects or events in a vivid, experiential way. The present paper addresses some fundamental questions about the metaphysics of such experiential or 'recollective' memories. More specifically, it develops the 'Relational Account' of recollective memory, which consists of the following three claims. (1) A subject who recollectively remembers (or 'R-remembers') a past object or event stands in an experiential relation (namely, a 'recollective relation') to the relevant past object or event. (2) The R-remembered object or event itself is a part of the R-memory; that is, the subject's present R-memory is partly constituted by the relevant past object or event. (3) When a subject R-remembers a past object, the past object is a constitutive part of the conscious experience itself ; that is, the object is immediately available to the subject in conscious experience. In developing the Relational Account, the present paper hopes to make a substantial contribution to any attempt to account for the nature of recollective memory. Furthermore, in order to explain how a subject could understand the beliefs that she forms about the past on the basis of an R-memory, and how a subject could, on the basis of an R-memory, gain any knowledge about the past, we arguably also need to rely on the Relational Account of recollective memory. Thus, the Relational Account will also play an important role in an attempt to account for various other ways in which a subject might be related to the past in general, and to her own past in particular. Standing in such relations to the past is, in turn, a central feature of our human existence. Ultimately, therefore, the Relational Account of recollective memory should also play a crucial role in furthering our understanding of ourselves, and of our own existence in time
de Gelder, Beatrice (2005). Nonconscious emotions: New findings and perspectives on nonconscious facial expression recognition and its voice and whole-body contexts. In Lisa Feldman Barrett, Paula M. Niedenthal & Piotr Winkielman (eds.), Emotion and Consciousness. Guilford Press.   (Google)
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DePrince, Anne P.; Allard, Carolyn B.; Oh, Hannah & Freyd, Jennifer J. (2004). What's in a name for memory errors? Implications and ethical issues arising from the use of the term "false memory" for errors in memory for details. Ethics and Behavior 14 (3):201 – 233.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The term "false memories" has been used to refer to suggestibility experiments in which whole events are apparently confabulated and in media accounts of contested memories of childhood abuse. Since 1992 psychologists have increasingly used the term "false memory" when discussing memory errors for details, such as specific words within word lists. Use of the term to refer to errors in details is a shift in language away from other terms used historically (e.g., "memory intrusions"). We empirically examine this shift in language and discuss implications of the new use of the term "false memories." Use of the term presents serious ethical challenges to the data-interpretation process by encouraging over-generalization and misapplication of research findings on word memory to social issues
Destrebecqz, Arnaud; Peigneux, Philippe; Laureys, Steven; Degueldre, Christian; Del Fiore, Guy; Aerts, Joel; Luxen, Andre; van der Linden, Martial; Cleeremans, Axel & Maquet, Pierre (2003). Cerebral correlates of explicit sequence learning. Cognitive Brain Research 16 (3):391-398.   (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Using positron emission tomography (PET) and regional cerebral blood flow (rCBF) measurements, we investigated the cerebral correlates of consciousness in a sequence learning task through a novel application of the Process Dissociation Procedure, a behavioral paradigm that makes it possible to separately assess conscious and unconscious contributions to performance. Results show that the metabolic response in the anterior cingulate / mesial prefrontal cortex (ACC / MPFC) is exclusively and specifically correlated with the explicit component of performance during recollection of a learned sequence. This suggests a significant role for the ACC / MPFC in the explicit processing of sequential material.  2003 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved
Destrebecqz, Arnaud & Cleeremans, Axel (2001). Can sequence learning be implicit? New evidence with the process dissociation procedure. Psychonomic Bulletin and Review 8 (2):343-350.   (Cited by 72 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Running head: Implicit sequence learning ABSTRACT Can we learn without awareness? Although this issue has been extensively explored through studies of implicit learning, there is currently no agreement about the extent to which knowledge can be acquired and projected onto performance in an unconscious way. The controversy, like that surrounding implicit memory, seems to be at least in part attributable to unquestioned acceptance of the unrealistic assumption that tasks are process-pure, that is, that a given task exclusively involves either implicit or explicit knowledge
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Abstract: One has to face numerous difficulties when trying to establish a dissociation between conscious and unconscious knowledge. In this paper, we review several of these problems as well as the different methodological solutions that have been proposed to address them. We suggest that each of the different methodological solutions offered refers to a different operational definition of consciousness, and present empirical examples of sequence learning studies in which these different procedures were applied to differentiate between implicit and explicit knowledge acquisition. We also show how the use of a sensitive behavioural method, the process dissociation procedure, confers a distinctive advantage in brain imaging studies when aiming to delineate the neural correlates of conscious and unconscious processes in sequence learning
Destrebecqz, Arnaud; Peigneux, Philippe; Laureys, Steven; Degueldre, Christian; Del Fiore, Guy; Aerts, Joel; Luxen, Andre; Van Der Linden, Martia; Cleeremans, Axel & Maquet, Pierre (2005). The neural correlates of implicit and explicit sequence learning: Interacting networks revealed by the process dissociation procedure. Learning and Memory 12 (5):480-490.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In cognitive neuroscience, dissociating the brain networks that ing—has thus become one of the best empirical situations subtend conscious and nonconscious memories constitutes a through which to study the mechanisms of implicit learning, very complex issue, both conceptually and methodologically
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Abstract: We consider Perruchet & Vinter's (P&V's) central claim that all mental representations are conscious. P&V require some way of fixing their meaning of representation to avoid the claim becoming either obviously false or unfalsifiable. We use the framework of Dienes and Perner (1999) to provide a well-specified possible version of the claim, in which all representations of a minimal degree of explicitness are postulated to be conscious
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Abstract: What type of artificial systems will claim to be conscious and will claim to experience qualia? The ability to comment upon physical states of a brain-like dynamical system coupled with its environment seems to be sufficient to make claims. The flow of internal states in such system, guided and limited by associative memory, is similar to the stream of consciousness. Minimal requirements for an artificial system that will claim to be conscious were given in form of specific architecture named articon. Nonverbal discrimination of the working memory states of the articon gives it the ability to experience different qualities of internal states. Analysis of the inner state flows of such a system during typical behavioral process shows that qualia are inseparable from perception and action. The role of consciousness in learning of skills, when conscious information processing is replaced by subconscious, is elucidated. Arguments confirming that phenomenal experience is a result of cognitive processes are presented. Possible philosophical objections based on the Chinese room and other arguments are discussed, but they are insufficient to refute claims articon’s claims. Conditions for genuine understanding that go beyond the Turing test are presented. Articons may fulfill such conditions and in principle the structure of their experiences may be arbitrarily close to human
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Duzel, Emrah; Yonelinas, Andrew P.; Mangun, G. R.; Heinze, H. J. & Tulving, Endel (1997). Event related brain potential correlates of two states of conscious awareness in memory. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 94:5973-8.   (Cited by 191 | Google | More links)
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Duzel, Emrah (2000). What brain activity tells us about conscious awareness of memory retrieval. In Endel Tulving (ed.), Memory, Consciousness, and the Brain: The Tallinn Conference. Psychology Press.   (Google)
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Abstract: The extent to which concepts, memory, and planning are necessary to the simulation of intelligent behavior is a fundamental philosophical issue in Artificial Intelligence. An active and productive segement of the AI community has taken the position that multiple low-level agents, properly organized, can account for high-level behavior. Empirical research on these questions with fully operational systems has been restricted to mobile robots that do simple tasks. This paper recounts experiments with Hoyle, a system in a cerebral, rather than a physical, domain. The program learns to perform well and quickly, often outpacing its human creators at two-person, perfect information board games. Hoyle demonstrates that a surprising amount of intelligent behavior can be treated as if it were situation-determined, that often planning is unnecessary, and that the memory required to support this learning is minimal. Concepts, however, are crucial to this reactive program's ability to learn and perform
Erdelyi, Matthew H. (1984). The recovery of unconscious (inaccessible) memories: Laboratory studies of hypermnesia. In Gordon H. Bower (ed.), The Psychology of Learning and Motivation. Academic Press.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Evans, Jonathan St B. T. & Over, David E. (1999). Explicit representations in hypothetical thinking. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):763-764.   (Google)
Abstract: Dienes' & Perner's proposals are discussed in relation to the distinction between explicit and implicit systems of thinking. Evans and Over (1996) propose that explicit processing resources are required for hypothetical thinking, in which mental models of possible world states are constructed. Such thinking requires representations in which the individuals' propositional attitudes including relevant beliefs and goals are made fully explicit
Faulkner, Deborah & Foster, Jonathan K. (2002). The decoupling of "explicit" and "implicit" processing in neuropsychological disorders: Insights into the neural basis of consciousness? Psyche 8 (2).   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Faw, Bill (2003). Pre-frontal executive committee for perception, working memory, attention, long-term memory, motor control, and thinking: A tutorial review. Consciousness and Cognition 12 (1):83-139.   (Cited by 40 | Google | More links)
Fay, Séverine; Isingrini, Michel & Pouthas, Viviane (2005). Does priming with awareness reflect explicit contamination? An approach with a response-time measure in word-stem completion. Consciousness and Cognition 14 (3):459-473.   (Google)
Fernandez-Duque, Diego & Thornton, Ian (2000). Change detection without awareness: Do explicit reports underestimate the representation of change in the visual system? Visual Cognition 7 (1):323-344.   (Cited by 81 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Evidence from many different paradigms (e.g. change blindness, inattentional blindness, transsaccadic integration) indicate that observers are often very poor at reporting changes to their visual environment. Such evidence has been used to suggest that the spatio-temporal coherence needed to represent change can only occur in the presence of focused attention. In four experiments we use modified change blindness tasks to demonstrate (a) that sensitivity to change does occur in the absence of awareness, and (b) this sensitivity does not rely on the redeploy- ment of attention. We discuss these results in relation to theories of scene percep- tion, and propose a reinterpretatio n of the role of attention in representing change
Fernandez-Duque, Diego & Thornton, Ian (2003). Explicit mechanisms do not account for implicit localization and identification of change: An empirical reply to Mitroff et al (2000). Journal of Experimental Psychology 29 (5).   (Google)
Abstract: Several recent findings support the notion that changes in the environment can be implicitly represented by the visual system. S. R. Mitroff, D. J. Simons, and S. L. Franconeri (2002) challenged this view and proposed alternative interpretations based on explicit strategies. Across 4 experiments, the current study finds no empirical support for such alternative proposals. Experiment 1 shows that subjects do not rely on unchanged items when locating an unaware change. Experiments 2 and 3 show that unaware changes affect performance even when they occur at an unpredictable location. Experiment 4 shows that the unaware congruency effect does not depend simply on the pattern of the final display. The authors point to converging evidence from other methodologies and highlight several weaknesses in Mitroff et al.’s theoretical arguments. It is concluded here that implicit representation of change provides the most parsimonious explanation for both past and present findings
Fernandez, Jordi (2008). Memory and time. Philosophical Studies 141 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: The purpose of this essay is to clarify the notion of mnemonic content. Memories have content. However, it is not clear whether memories are about past events in the world, past states of our own minds, or some combination of those two elements. I suggest that any proposal about mnemonic content should help us understand why events are presented to us in memory as being in the past. I discuss three proposals about mnemonic content and, eventually, I put forward a positive view. According to this view, when a subject seems to remember a certain event, that event is presented to her as making true a perceptual experience that caused the very memory experience that she is having
Fernández, Jordi (2008). Memory, past and self. Synthese 160 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: The purpose of this essay is to determine how we should construe the content of memories. First, I distinguish two features of memory that a construal of mnemic content should respect. These are the ‘attribution of pastness’ feature (a subject is inclined to believe of those events that she remembers that they happened in the past) and the ‘attribution of existence’ feature (a subject is inclined to believe that she existed at the time that those events that she remembers took place). Next, I distinguish two kinds of theories of memory, which I call ‘perceptual’ and ‘self-based’ theories. I argue that those theories that belong to the first kind but not the second one have trouble accommodating the attribution of existence. And theories that belong to the second kind but not the first one leave the attribution of pastness unexplained. I then discuss two different theories that are both perceptual and self-based, which I eventually reject. Finally, I propose a perceptual, self-based theory that can account for both the attribution of pastness and the attribution of past existence
Fernandez, Jordi (2006). The intentionality of memory. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (1):39-57.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The purpose of this essay is to determine how we should construe the content of memories or, in other words, to determine what the intentional objects of memory are.1 The issue that will concern us is, then, analogous to the traditional philosophical question of whether perception directly puts us in cognitive contact with entities in the world or with entities in our own minds. As we shall see, there are some interesting aspects of the phenomenology and the epistemology of memory, and I shall aim at a specification of the content of memories that is in accordance with those aspects of them
Fernández, Jordi (2006). The intentionality of memory. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (1):39 – 57.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Memory differs from both introspection and perception in scope. One can only introspect one's own mental states and one can only perceive events in the external world. However, one can remember events in the world as well as one's own perceptual experiences of them. An interesting phenomenological fact about memory is that those two kinds of memories come together. You can't apparently remember a fact without apparently remember having perceived it. And you can't apparently remember what perceiving a certain fact was like without apparently remembering the fact in question. Why is that? The project in this essay is to try to explain this by appealing to the content that memory experiences have
Filoteo, J. Vincent; Friedrich, Frances J.; Rabbel, Catherine & Stricker, John L. (2002). Visual perception without awareness in a patient with posterior cortical atrophy: Impaired explicit but not implicit processing of global information. Journal of the International Neuropsychological Society 8 (3):461-472.   (Google)
Fitting, Melvin, A logic of explicit knowledge.   (Google)
Abstract: A well-known problem with Hintikka-style logics of knowledge is that of logical omniscience. One knows too much. This breaks down into two subproblems: one knows all tautologies, and one’s knowledge is closed under consequence. A way of addressing the second of these is to move from knowledge simpliciter, to knowledge for a reason. Then, as consequences become ‘further away’ from one’s basic knowledge, reasons for them become more complex, thus providing a kind of resource measurement. One kind of reason is a formal proof. Sergei Artemov has introduced a logic of explicit proofs, LP. I present a semantics for this, based on the idea that it is a logic of knowledge with explicit reasons. A number of fundamental facts about LP can be established using this semantics. But it is equally important to realize that it provides a natural logic of more general applicability than its original provenance, arithmetic provability
Fitting, Melvin, Explicit logics of knowledge and conservativity.   (Google)
Abstract: Several justification logics have evolved, starting with the logicLP, (Artemov 2001). These can be thought of as explicit versions of modal logics, or logics of knowledge or belief, in which the unanalyzed necessity (knowledge, belief) operator has been replaced with a family of explicit justification terms. Modal logics come in various strengths. For their corresponding justification logics, differing strength is reflected in different vocabularies. What we show here is that for justification logics corresponding to modal logics extending T, various familiar extensions are actually conservative with respect to each other. Our method of proof is very simple, and general enough to handle several justification logics not directly corresponding to distinct modal logics. Our methods do not, however, allow us to prove comparable results for justification logics corresponding to modal logics that do not extend T. That is, we are able to handle explicit logics of knowledge, but not explicit logics of belief. This remains open
Forgas, Joseph P. & Ciarrochi, J. (2000). Affect infusion and affect control: The interactive role of conscious and unconscious processing strategies in mood management. In Yves Rossetti & Antti Revonsuo (eds.), Beyond Dissociation: Interaction Between Dissociated Implicit and Explicit Processing. John Benjamins.   (Google)
Foster, Jonathan K. & Wilson, Andrew C. (2005). Sleep and memory: Definitions, terminology, models, and predictions? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (1):71-72.   (Google)
Abstract: In this target article, Walker seeks to clarify the current state of knowledge regarding sleep and memory. Walker's review represents an impressively heuristic attempt to synthesize the relevant literature. In this commentary, we question the focus on procedural memory and the use of the term “consolidation,” and we consider the extent to which empirically testable predictions can be derived from Walker's model
Foster, Jonathan K. (2003). Thoughts from the long-term memory chair. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (6):734-735.   (Google)
Abstract: With reference to Ruchkins et al.'s framework, this commentary briefly considers the history of working memory, and whether, heuristically, this is a useful concept. A neuropsychologically motivated critique is offered, specifically with regard to the recent trend for working-memory researchers to conceptualise this capacity more as a process than as a set of distinct task-specific stores
Frankish, Keith (2009). How we know our conscious minds: Introspective access to conscious thoughts. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):145-146.   (Google)
Frankish, Keith (2002). Language, consciousness, and cross-modular thought. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (6):685-686.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Carruthers suggests that natural language, in the form of inner speech, may be the vehicle of conscious propositional thought, but he argues that its fundamental cognitive role is as the medium of cross-modular thinking, both conscious and nonconscious. I argue that there is no evidence for nonconscious cross-modular thinking and that the most plausible view is that cross-modular thinking, like conscious propositional thinking, occurs only in inner speech
Frankfurt, Harry G. (1962). Memory and the cartesian circle. Philosophical Review 71 (4):504-511.   (Google | More links)
Franklin, S.; Baars, B. J.; Ramamurthy, U. & Ventura, M. (2005). The role of consciousness in memory. Brains, Minds and Media 1.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
French, Robert M. (2002). Implicit Learning and Consciousness: An Empirical, Philosophical, and Computational Consensus in the Making. Psychology Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Implicit Learning and Consciousness challenges conventional wisdom and presents the most up-to-date studies to define, quantify and test the predictions of the main models of implicit learning. The chapters include a variety of research from computer modeling, experimental psychology and neural imaging to the clinical data resulting from work with amnesics. The result is a topical book that provides an overview of the debate on implicit learning, and the various philosophical, psychological and neurological frameworks in which it can be placed. It will be of interest to undergraduates, postgraduates and the philosophical, psychological and modeling research community
Freyd, Jennifer J. (1998). Science in the memory debate. Ethics and Behavior 8 (2):101 – 113.   (Google)
Abstract: Experimental psychology has much to offer the current debate about memories of childhood abuse. However, laboratory scientists, with their enormous cognitive authority to define reality for the rest of the population, must be especially conservative when arguing that laboratory results on memory generalize to contested memories of abuse. Researchers must make an effort to untangle the appropriate from inappropriate application of research results to this debate. A crucial untangling strategy for future research on general phenomena involves taking care to pose questions separately. When the research is disseminated, its relevance and its limitations must be carefully communicated. Finally, scientists must attend to their power to define reality for others
Furlong, E. J. (1951). A Study in Memory: A Philosophical Essay. Nelson.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Furlong, E. J. (1948). Memory. Mind 57 (January):16-44.   (Google | More links)
Fuster, Joaquín M. (2003). More than working memory rides on long-term memory. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (6):737-737.   (Google)
Abstract: Single-unit data from the cortex of monkeys performing working-memory tasks support the main point of the target article. Those data, however, also indicate that the activation of long-term memory is essential to the processing of all cognitive functions. The activation of cortical long-term memory networks is a key neural mechanism in attention (working memory is a form thereof), perception, memory acquisition and retrieval, intelligence, and language
Gabriel, Michael & Smith, David M. (1999). What does the limbic memory circuit actually do? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):451-451.   (Google)
Abstract: We applaud Aggleton & Brown's affirmation of limbic diencephalic-hippocampal interaction as a key memory substrate. However, we do not agree with a thesis of diencephalic-hippocampal strict dedication to episodic memory. Instead, this circuitry supports the production of context-specific patterns of activation that subserve retrieval for a broad class of memory phenomena, including goal-directed instrumental behavior of animals and episodic memory of humans
Gaillard, Vincian; Vandenberghe, Muriel; Destrebecqz, Arnaud & Cleeremans, Axel (2006). First and third-person approaches in implicit learning research. Consciousness and Cognition 15 (4):709-722.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: How do we find out whether someone is conscious of some information or not? A simple answer is “We just ask them”! However, things are not so simple. Here, we review recent developments in the use of subjective and objective methods in implicit learning research and discuss the highly complex methodological problems that their use raises in the domain
Gaillard, Raphaël; Del Cul, Antoine; Naccache, Lionel; Vinckier, Fabien; Cohen, Laurent; Dehaene, Stanislas & Smith, Edward E. (2006). Nonconscious semantic processing of emotional words modulates conscious access. PNAS Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 103 (19):7524-7529.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Gallo, David A. & Seamon, John G. (2004). Are nonconscious processes sufficient to produce false memories? Consciousness and Cognition 13 (1):158-168.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Gardiner, John M. & Parkin, A. J. (1990). Attention and recollective experience in recognition memory. Memory and Cognition 18:579-583.   (Cited by 135 | Google)
Gardiner, John M. (2002). Episodic memory and autonoetic consciousness: A first-person approach. In Alan Baddeley, John P. Aggleton & Martin A. Conway (eds.), Episodic Memory: New Directions in Research. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 36 | Google | More links)
Gardiner, John M.; Ramponi, C. & Richardson-Klavehn, A. (1998). Experiences of remembering, knowing, and guessing. Consciousness and Cognition 7 (1):1-26.   (Cited by 72 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This article presents and discusses transcripts of some 270 explanations subjects provided subsequently for recognition memory decisions that had been associated with remember, know, or guess responses at the time the recognition decisions were made. Only transcripts for remember responses included reports of recollective experiences, which seemed mostly to reflect either effortful elaborative encoding or involuntary reminding at study, especially in relation to the self. Transcripts for know responses included claims of just knowing, and of feelings of familiarity. These transcripts indicated that subjects were often quite confident of the accuracy of their decisions, compared with those for guess responses. Transcripts for decisions associated with guess responses also expressed feelings of familiarity but additionally revealed various strategies and inferences that did not directly reflect memory for studied items. The article concludes with a historical and theoretical overview of some interpretations of the states of awareness measured by these responses
Gardiner, John M. (1988). Functional aspects of recollective experience. Memory and Cognition 16:309-13.   (Cited by 358 | Google | More links)
Gardiner, John M. (1996). On consciousness in relation to memory and learning. In Max Velmans (ed.), The Science of Consciousness. Routledge.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Gardiner, John M. & Richardson-Klavehn, A. (2000). Remembering and knowing. In Endel Tulving (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Memory. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 112 | Google)
Gardiner, John M. (1993). Recognition memory and awareness: An experiential approach. European Journal of Cognitive Psychology 5:337-46.   (Cited by 40 | Google)
Gawronski, Bertram; Hofmann, Wilhelm & Wilbur, Christopher J. (2006). Are "implicit" attitudes unconscious? Consciousness and Cognition 15 (3):485-499.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Gennaro, Rocco J. (1992). Consciousness, self-consciousness, and episodic memory. Philosophical Psychology 5 (4):333-47.   (Cited by 4 | Annotation | Google)
Abstract: My aim in this paper is to show that consciousness entails self-consciousness by focusing on the relationship between consciousness and memory. More specifically, I addreess the following questions: (1) does consciousness require episodic memory?; and (2) does episodic memory require self-consciousness? With the aid of some Kantian considerations and recent empirical data, it is argued that consciousness does require episodic memory. This is done after defining episodic memory and distinguishing it from other types of memory. An affirmative answer to (2) is also warranted especially in the light of the issues raised in answering (1). I claim that 'consciousness entails self-consciousness' is thereby shown via the route through episodic memory, i.e. via affirmative answers to (1) and (2). My aim is to revive this Kantian thesis and to bring together current psychological research on amnesia with traditional philosophical perspectives on consciousness and memory
Gentilucci, M.; Daprati, E. & Gangitano, M. (1998). Implicit visual analysis in handedness recognition. Consciousness and Cognition 7 (3):478-493.   (Google)
Abstract: In the present study, we addressed the problem of whether hand representations, derived from the control of hand gesture, are used in handedness recognition. Pictures of hands and fingers, assuming either common or uncommon postures, were presented to right-handed subjects, who were required to judge their handedness. In agreement with previous results (Parsons, 1987, 1994; Gentilucci, Daprati, & Gangitano, 1998), subjects recognized handedness through mental movement of their own hand in order to match the posture of the presented hand. This was proved by a control experiment of physical matching. The new finding was that presentation of common finger postures affected responses differently from presentation of less common finger postures. These effects could be not attributed to mental matching movements nor related to richness in hand-finger cues useful for handedness recognition. The results of the present study are discussed in the context of the notion that implicit visual analysis of the presented hands is performed before mental movement of one's hand takes place (Parsons, 1987; Gentilucci et al., 1998). In this process, hand representation acquired by experience in the control and observation of one's and other people's hand gestures is used. We propose that such an immediate recognition mechanism belongs to the class of mental processes which are grouped under the name of intuition, that is, the processes by which situations or people's intentions are immediately understood, without conscious reasoning
Georgieff, Nicolas & Rossetti, Yves (1999). How does implicit and explicit knowledge fit in the consciousness of action? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):765-766.   (Google)
Abstract: Dienes & Perner's (D&P's) target articles proposes an analysis of explicit knowledge based on a progressive transformation of implicit into explicit products, applying this gradient to different aspects of knowledge that can be represented. The goal is to integrate a philosophical concept of knowledge with relevant psychophysical and neuropsychological data. D&P seem to fill an impressive portion of the gap between these two areas. We focus on two examples where a full synthesis of theoretical and empirical data seems difficult to establish and would require further refinement of the model: action representation and the closely related consciousness of action, which is in turn related to self-consciousness
Gert, Bernard (2006). Making the morally relevant features explicit: A response to Carson strong. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 16 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: : Carson Strong criticizes the application of my moral theory to bioethics cases. Some of his criticisms are due to my failure to make explicit that both the irrationality or rationality of a decision and the irrationality or rationality of the ranking of evils are part of morally relevant feature 3. Other criticisms are the result of his not using the two-step procedure in a sufficiently rigorous way. His claim that I come up with a wrong answer depends upon his incorrectly regarding a weakly justified violation as one that all impartial rational persons would agree was permitted, rather than as one about which rational persons disagree
Geraci, Lisa & Rajaram, Suparna (2004). The distinctiveness effect in the absence of conscious recollection: Evidence from conceptual priming. Journal of Memory and Language 51 (2):217-230.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Gilhooly, K. J.; Wynn, V.; Phillips, L. H.; Logie, R. H. & Sala, S. Della (2002). Visuo-spatial and verbal working memory in the five-disc tower of London task: An individual differences approach. Thinking and Reasoning 8 (3):165 – 178.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper reports a study of the roles of visuo-spatial and verbal working memory capacities in solving a planning task - the five-disc Tower of London (TOL) task. An individual differences approach was taken. Sixty adult participants were tested on 20 TOL tasks of varying difficulty. Total moves over the 20 TOL tasks was taken as a measure of performance. Participants were also assessed on measures of fluid intelligence (Raven's matrices), verbal short-term storage (Digit span), verbal working memory span (Silly Sentence span), visuo-spatial short-term storage (Visual Pattern span and Corsi Block span), visuo-spatial working memory (Corsi Distance Estimation), visuo-spatial processing speed (Manikin test), and verbal speed (Rehearsal speed). Exploratory factor analysis using an oblique rotation method revealed three factors which were interpreted as (1) a visuo-spatial working memory factor, (2) an age-speed factor, and (3) a verbal working memory factor. The visuo-spatial and verbal factors were only moderately correlated. Performance on the TOL task loaded on the visuo-spatial factor but did not load on the other factors. It is concluded that the predominant goal-selection strategy adopted in solving the TOL relies on visuo-spatial working memory capacity and particularly involves the active ''inner scribe'' spatial rehearsal mechanism. These correlational analyses confirm and extend results previously obtained by use of dual task methods, (Phillips, Wynn, Gilhooly, Della Sala, & Logie, 1999)
Ginet, Carl (1975). Knowledge, Perception, and Memory. D. Reidel Pub. Co..   (Google)
Glaser, Jack & Knowles, Eric D., Implicit motivation to control prejudice.   (Google)
Abstract:      This research examines whether spontaneous, unintentional discriminatory behavior can be moderated by an implicit (nonconscious) motivation to control prejudice. We operationalize implicit motivation to control prejudice (IMCP) in terms of an implicit negative attitude toward prejudice (NAP) and an implicit belief that oneself is prejudiced (BOP). In the present experiment, an implicit stereotypic association of Blacks (vs. Whites) with weapons was positively correlated with the tendency to "shoot" armed Black men faster than armed White men (the "Shooter Bias") in a computer simulation. However, participants relatively high in implicit negative attitude toward prejudice showed no relation between the race-weapons stereotype and the shooter bias. Implicit belief that oneself is prejudiced had no direct effect on this relation, but the interaction of NAP and BOP did. Participants who had a strong association between self and prejudice (high BOP) but a weak association between prejudice and bad (low NAP) showed the strongest relation between the implicit race-weapons stereotype and the Shooter Bias, suggesting that these individuals freely employed their stereotypes in their behavior
Glenberg, Arthur M. (1997). What memory is for. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):1-19.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: I address the commentators' calls for clarification of theoretical terms, discussion of similarities to other proposals, and extension of the ideas. In doing so, I keep the focus on the purpose of memory: enabling the organism to make sense of its environment so that it can take action appropriate to constraints resulting from the physical, personal, social, and cultural situations
Goertzel, Ben (1993). Phase transitions in associative memory networks. Minds and Machines 3 (3).   (Google)
Abstract:   Ideas from random graph theory are used to give an heuristic argument that associative memory structure depends discontinuously on pattern recognition ability. This argument suggests that there may be a certain minimal size for intelligent systems
Goldin-Meadow, Susan & Alibali, Martha Wagner (1999). Does the hand reflect implicit knowledge? Yes and no. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):766-767.   (Google)
Abstract: Gesture does not have a fixed position in the Dienes & Perner framework. Its status depends on the way knowledge is expressed. Knowledge reflected in gesture can be fully implicit (neither factuality nor predication is explicit) if the goal is simply to move a pointing hand to a target. Knowledge reflected in gesture can be explicit (both factuality and predication are explicit) if the goal is to indicate an object. However, gesture is not restricted to these two extreme positions. When gestures are unconscious accompaniments to speech and represent information that is distinct from speech, the knowledge they convey is factuality-implicit but predication-explicit
Goldman-Rakic, P. S. (1988). The prefrontal contribution to working memory and conscious experience. In O. D. Creutzfeld & John C. Eccles (eds.), The Brain and Conscious Experience. Pontifical Academy.   (Cited by 13 | Google)
Gomes, G. (1998). The timing of conscious experience: A critical review and reinterpretation of Libet's research. Consciousness and Cognition 7 (4):559-595.   (Google)
Abstract: An extended examination of Libet's works led to a comprehensive reinterpretation of his results. According to this reinterpretation, the Minimum Train Duration of electrical brain stimulation should be considered as the time needed to create a brain stimulus efficient for producing conscious sensation and not as a basis for inferring the latency for conscious sensation of peripheral origin. Latency for conscious sensation with brain stimulation may occurafterthe Minimum Train Duration. Backward masking with cortical stimuli suggests a 125-300 ms minimum value for the latency for conscious sensation of threshold skin stimuli. Backward enhancement is not suitable for inferring this latency. For determining temporal relations between stimuli that correspond to subjects' reports, theendof cerebral Minimum Train Duration should be used as reference, rather than its onset. Results of coupling peripheral and cortical stimuli are explained by a latency after the cortical Minimum Train Duration, having roughly the same duration as the latency for supraliminal skin stimuli. Results of coupling peripheral stimuli and stimuli to medial lemniscus (LM) are explained by a shorter LM latency and/or a longer peripheral latency. This interpretation suggests a 230 ms minimum value for the latency for conscious sensation of somatosensory near-threshold stimuli. The backward referral hypothesis, as formulated by Libet, should not be retained. Long readiness potentials preceding spontaneous conscious or nonconscious movements suggest that both kinds of movement are nonconsciously initiated. The validity of Libet's measures of W and M moments (Libet et al., 1983a) is questionable due to problems involving latencies, training, and introspective distinction of W and M. Veto of intended actions may be initially nonconscious but dependent on conscious awareness
Gorman, Michael E. (1999). Implicit knowledge in engineering judgment and scientific reasoning. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):767-768.   (Google)
Abstract: Dienes & Perner's theoretical framework should be applicable to two related areas: technological innovation and the psychology of scientific reasoning. For the former, this commentary focuses on the example of nuclear weapon design, and on the decision to launch the space shuttle Challenger. For the latter, this commentary focuses on Klayman and Ha's positive test heuristic and the invention of the telephone
Goshen-Gottstein, Yonatan (1999). The functional role of representations cannot explain basic implicit memory phenomena. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):768-769.   (Google)
Abstract: The propositional account of explicit and implicit knowledge interprets cognitive differences between direct and indirect test performance as emerging from the elements in different hierarchical levels of the propositional representation that have been made explicit. The hierarchical nature of explicitness is challenged, however, on the basis of neuropsychological dissociations between direct and indirect tests of memory, as well as the stochastic independence that has been observed between these two types of tests. Furthermore, format specificity on indirect test of memory challenges the basic notion of a propositional theory of implicit and explicit knowledge
Graves, R. E. & Jones, B. S. (1992). Conscious visual perceptual awareness vs non-conscious visual spatial localisation examined with normal subjects using possible analogues of blindsight and neglect. Cognitive Neuropsychology 9:487-508.   (Google)
Graham, Kim S. & Hodges, John R. (1999). Episodic memory in semantic dementia: Implications for the roles played by the perirhinal and hippocampal memory systems in new learning. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):452-453.   (Google)
Abstract: Aggleton & Brown (A&B) propose that the hippocampal-anterior thalamic and perirhinal-medial dorsal thalamic systems play independent roles in episodic memory, with the hippocampus supporting recollection-based memory and the perirhinal cortex, recognition memory. In this commentary we discuss whether there is experimental support for the A&B model from studies of long-term memory in semantic dementia
Graf, P. & Uttl, B. (2001). Prospective memory: A new focus for research. Consciousness and Cognition 10 (4):437-450.   (Google)
Abstract: Prospective memory is required for many aspects of everyday cognition, its breakdown may be as debilitating as impairments in retrospective memory, and yet, the former has received relatively little attention by memory researchers. This article outlines a strategy for changing the fortunes of prospective memory, for guiding new research to shore up the claim that prospective memory is a distinct aspect of cognition, and to obtain evidence for clear performance dissociations between prospective memory and other memory functions. We begin by identifying the unique requirements of prospective memory tasks and by dividing memory's prospective functions into subdomains that are analogous to divisions in retrospective memory (e.g., short- versus long-term memory). We focus on one prospective function, called prospective memory proper; we define this function in the spirit of James (1890) as requiring that we are aware of a plan, of which meanwhile we have not been thinking, with the additional consciousness that we made the plan earlier. We give an operational definition of prospective memory proper and specify how it differs from explicit and implicit retrospective memory and how it might be empirically assessed
Gratton, Gabriele; Fabiani, Monica & Corballis, Paul M. (2001). Working memory capacity and the hemispheric organization of the brain. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (1):121-122.   (Google)
Abstract: Different hypotheses about the mechanisms underlying working memory lead to different predictions about working memory capacity when information is distributed across the two hemispheres. We present preliminary data suggesting that memory scanning time (a parameter often associated with working memory capacity) varies depending on how information is subdivided across hemispheres. The data are consistent with a distributed model of working memory
Gärdenfors, Peter (1997). The role of memory in planning and pretense. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):24-25.   (Google)
Abstract: Corresponding to Glenberg's distinction between the automatic and effortful modes of memory, I propose a distinction between cued and detached mental representations. A cued representation stands for something that is present in the external situation of the representing organism, while a detached representation stands for objects or events that are not present in the current situation. This distinction is important for understanding the role of memory in different cognitive functions like planning and pretense
Greenwald, Anthony (ms). A unified theory of implicit attitudes, stereotypes, self-esteem, and self-concept.   (Google)
Abstract: This theoretical integration of social psychology’s main cognitive and affective constructs was shaped by 3 influences: (a) recent widespread interest in automatic and implicit cognition, (b) development of the Implicit Association Test (IAT; A. G. Greenwald, D. E. McGhee, & J. L. K. Schwartz, 1998), and (c) social psychology’s consistency theories of the 1950s, especially F. Heider’s (1958) balance theory. The balanced identity design is introduced as a method to test correlational predictions of the theory. Data obtained with this method revealed that predicted consistency patterns were strongly apparent in the data for implicit (IAT) measures but not in those for parallel explicit (self-report) measures. Two additional not-yet-tested predictions of the theory are described
Greene, Anthony J. (2008). Implicit analogy: New direct evidence and a challenge to the theory of memory. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (4):388-388.   (Google)
Greenwald, Anthony (ms). Implicit association test: Validity debates.   (Google)
Abstract: Note posted 9 Jun 08 : Modifications made today include a new section on predictive validity, and addition of recently published article and in in-press article, both by Nosek & Hansen, under the "CULTURE VS. PERSON" heading, which replaces a previously listed unpublished ms. of theirs. I continue to encourage all interested to send material that they are willing to be included on this page. Please also to let me know about errors, including faulty links
Greenwald, Anthony G.; Abrams, R. L.; Naccache, Lionel & Dehaene, Stanislas (2003). Long-term semantic memory versus contextual memory in unconscious number processing. Journal of Experimental Psychology 29 (2):235-247.   (Cited by 25 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Subjects classified visible 2-digit numbers as larger or smaller than 55. Target numbers were preceded by masked 2-digit primes that were either congruent (same relation to 55) or incongruent. Experiments 1 and 2 showed prime congruency effects for stimuli never included in the set of classified visible targets, indicating subliminal priming based on long-term semantic memory. Experiments 2 and 3 went further to demonstrate paradoxical unconscious priming effects resulting from task context. For example, after repeated practice classifying 73 as larger than 55, the novel masked prime 37 paradoxically facilitated the “larger” response. In these experiments task context could induce subjects to unconsciously process only the leftmost masked prime digit, only the rightmost digit, or both independently. Across 3 experiments, subliminal priming was governed by both task context and long-term semantic memory
Gregg, V. H. & Gardiner, John M. (1994). Recognition memory and awareness: A large effect of study-test modalities on "know" responses following a highly perceptual orienting task. European Journal of Cognitive Psychology 6:137-47.   (Google)
Green, Christopher R. (ms). The epistemic parity of testimony, memory, and perception.   (Google)
Abstract:      Extensive literatures exist on the epistemology of testimony, memory, and perception, but for the most part these literatures do not systematically consider the extent of the analogies between the three epistemic sources. A number of the same problems reappear in all three literatures, however. Dealing simultaneously with all three sources and making a careful accounting of the analogies and disanalogies between them should therefore avoid unnecessary duplication of effort. Other than limits on the scope of which memorially- and testimonially-based beliefs should be included in the Parity Thesis, I argue that most of the disanalogies that different philosophers have proffered between the sources do not mark distinctions among the universes of possible testimonially-, memorially-, and perceptually-based beliefs regarding the explanation of those beliefs' epistemic status. I first criticize the suggestion that perception is a generative epistemic source, while testimony and memory are not; I propose and defend counterexamples in which testimony and memory produce new beliefs. Next, I criticize a variety of distinctions that have been drawn between testimony and perception, taken chiefly from the reductionist-antireductionist literature on testimony. I criticize the suggestion that the conceptualization of content and the transparency of experience affect the epistemologies of testimony and perception in different ways. Regarding memory and testimony, I advocate modeling testimony on the legal relationship of a principal and an agent, arguing that law's apparatus used to analyze such situations suggests that using others' epistemic services in testimony will supply the same epistemic benefits and burdens as if we had performed those epistemic tasks personally and then relied only on memory. I apply this analysis to the transmission of defeaters in testimony. I argue that memory does feature the epistemic equivalent of a perceptual image and that both perceptually- and memorially-based beliefs can concern either the past or the present. Finally, I construct a set of six transformations that turn individual possible instances of perceptually-, memorially-, or testimonially-based beliefs into individual possible instances of the other two types of beliefs without changing the structure of those beliefs' epistemologies
Groeger, John A. & Dijk, Derk-Jan (2005). Consolidating consolidation? Sleep stages, memory systems, and procedures. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (1):73-74.   (Google)
Abstract: We argue that by neglecting the fact that procedural memory may also have episodic qualities, and by considering only a systems approach to memory, Walker's account of consolidation of learning during subsequent sleep ignores alternative accounts of how sleep stages may be interdependent. We also question the proposition that sleep-based consolidation largely bypasses hippocampal structures
Grossberg, Stephen (2003). From working memory to long-term memory and back: Linked but distinct. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (6):737-738.   (Google)
Abstract: Neural models have proposed how short-term memory (STM) storage in working memory and long-term memory (LTM) storage and recall are linked and interact, but are realized by different mechanisms that obey different laws. The authors' data can be understood in the light of these models, which suggest that the authors may have gone too far in obscuring the differences between these processes
Grote, Irene (2003). More memory? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (6):738-739.   (Google)
Abstract: Modern investigators of cognition ask about the conditions under which faculties occur rather than about their existence. This tendency, combined with the axiom of parsimony, emphasizes a paradigm shift in the fundamental principles of economic thought in science, mimicking evolutionary conceptualizations. The Ruchkin model of memory-related brain activity replaces less economic models. From interdisciplinary approaches, proceduralist models for other memory-related processes analogously support this model
Gutbrod, Klemens; Krouzel, Claudine; Hofer, Helene; Müri, René; Perrig, Walter J. & Ptak, Radek (2006). Decision-making in amnesia: Do advantageous decisions require conscious knowledge of previous behavioural choices? Neuropsychologia 44 (8):1315-1324.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Guy, S. C. & Cahill, L. (1999). The role of overt rehearsal in enhanced conscious memory for emotional events. Consciousness and Cognition 8 (1):114-122.   (Google)
Abstract: This study tested the hypothesis that overt rehearsal is sufficient to explain enhanced memory associated with emotion by experimentally manipulating rehearsal of emotional material. Participants viewed two sets of film clips, one set of emotional films and one set of relatively neutral films. One set of films was viewed in each of two sessions, with approximately 1 week between the sessions. Participants were given a free recall test of all of films viewed approximately 1 week after the second session. Rehearsal was manipulated by instructing one group of participants not to discuss the films with anyone (no talkgroup) and instructing a second group to discuss both sets of films with at least three people (forced talkgroup). A third group consisted of participants instructed not to discuss the films with anyone, but who did not comply with these instructions (talkersgroup). All groups recalled significantly more of the emotional films than the neutral films. Furthermore, the relative number of emotional and neutral films recalled did not differ significantly among the three groups. The results indicate that overt rehearsal is insufficient to explain the enhancing effects of emotion on memory
Hadley, Robert F. (1993). Connectionism, explicit rules, and symbolic manipulation. Minds and Machines 3 (2):183-200.   (Cited by 13 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   At present, the prevailing Connectionist methodology forrepresenting rules is toimplicitly embody rules in neurally-wired networks. That is, the methodology adopts the stance that rules must either be hard-wired or trained into neural structures, rather than represented via explicit symbolic structures. Even recent attempts to implementproduction systems within connectionist networks have assumed that condition-action rules (or rule schema) are to be embodied in thestructure of individual networks. Such networks must be grown or trained over a significant span of time. However, arguments are presented herein that humanssometimes follow rules which arevery rapidly assignedexplicit internal representations, and that humans possessgeneral mechanisms capable of interpreting and following such rules. In particular, arguments are presented that thespeed with which humans are able to follow rules ofnovel structure demonstrates the existence of general-purpose rule following mechanisms. It is further argued that the existence of general-purpose rule following mechanisms strongly indicates that explicit rule following is not anisolated phenomenon, but may well be a common and important aspect of cognition. The relationship of the foregoing conclusions to Smolensky''s view of explicit rule following is also explored. The arguments presented here are pragmatic in nature, and are contrasted with thekind of arguments developed by Fodor and Pylyshyn in their recent, influential paper
Hadley, Robert F. (1995). The 'explicit-implicit' distinction. Minds and Machines 5 (2):219-42.   (Cited by 25 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   Much of traditional AI exemplifies the explicit representation paradigm, and during the late 1980''s a heated debate arose between the classical and connectionist camps as to whether beliefs and rules receive an explicit or implicit representation in human cognition. In a recent paper, Kirsh (1990) questions the coherence of the fundamental distinction underlying this debate. He argues that our basic intuitions concerning explicit and implicit representations are not only confused but inconsistent. Ultimately, Kirsh proposes a new formulation of the distinction, based upon the criterion ofconstant time processing.The present paper examines Kirsh''s claims. It is argued that Kirsh fails to demonstrate that our usage of explicit and implicit is seriously confused or inconsistent. Furthermore, it is argued that Kirsh''s new formulation of the explicit-implicit distinction is excessively stringent, in that it banishes virtually all sentences of natural language from the realm of explicit representation. By contrast, the present paper proposes definitions for explicit and implicit which preserve most of our strong intuitions concerning straightforward uses of these terms. It is also argued that the distinction delineated here sustains the meaningfulness of the abovementioned debate between classicists and connectionists
Hampton, James A. (1999). Implicit and explicit knowledge: One representational medium or many? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):769-770.   (Google)
Abstract: In Dienes & Perner's analysis, implicitly represented knowledge differs from explicitly represented knowledge only in the attribution of properties to specific events and to self-awareness of the knower. This commentary questions whether implicit knowledge should be thought of as being represented in the same conceptual vocabulary; rather, it may involve a quite different form of representation
Hamann, S. B. & Squire, L. R. (1997). Intact perceptual memory in the absence of conscious memory. Behavioral Neuroscience 111:850-54.   (Cited by 96 | Google | More links)
Hampton, Robert Russell (2003). Metacognition as evidence for explicit representation in nonhumans. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (3):346-347.   (Google)
Abstract: Metacognition is either direct, as when information is recalled before making a confidence judgment, or indirect, as when the probability of successful future retrieval is determined inferentially. Direct metacognition may require an explicit mental representation as its object and can only be demonstrated under specific experimental circumstances. Other forms of metacognition can be based on publicly observable stimuli rather than introspection
Hamilton, Maryellen & Rajaram, Suparna (2003). States of awareness across multiple memory tasks: Obtaining a "pure" measure of conscious recollection. Acta Psychologica 112 (1):43-69.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Harnad, Stevan (2003). Can a machine be conscious? How? Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (4):67-75.   (Cited by 16 | Google | More links)
Abstract: A "machine" is any causal physical system, hence we are machines, hence machines can be conscious. The question is: which kinds of machines can be conscious? Chances are that robots that can pass the Turing Test -- completely indistinguishable from us in their behavioral capacities -- can be conscious (i.e. feel), but we can never be sure (because of the "other-minds" problem). And we can never know HOW they have minds, because of the "mind/body" problem. We can only know how they pass the Turing Test, but not how, why or whether that makes them feel
Harrod, R. F. (1942). Memory. Mind 51 (January):47-68.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Hassin, Ran R. (2005). Nonconscious control and implicit working memory. In Ran R. Hassin, James S. Uleman & John A. Bargh (eds.), The New Unconscious. Oxford Series in Social Cognition and Social Neuroscience. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Henke, Katharina; Treyer, Valerie; Nagy, Eva T.; Kneifel, Stefan; Düsteler, Max; Nitsch, Roger M. & Buck, Alfred (2003). Active hippocampus during nonconscious memories. Consciousness and Cognition 12 (1):31-48.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Herba, Catherine M.; Heining, Maike; Young, Andrew W.; Browning, Michael; Benson, Philip J.; Phillips, Mary L. & Gray, Jeffrey A. (2007). Conscious and nonconscious discrimination of facial expressions. Visual Cognition 15 (1):36-47.   (Google | More links)
Hermans, Dirk; Raes, Filip; Iberico, Carlos & Williams, J. Mark G. (2006). Reduced autobiographical memory specificity, avoidance, and repression. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 29 (5):522-522.   (Google)
Abstract: Recent empirical work indicates that reduced autobiographical memory specificity can act as an avoidant processing style. By truncating the memory search before specific elements of traumatic memories are accessed, one can ward off the affective impact of negative reminiscences. This avoidant processing style can be viewed as an instance of what Erdelyi describes as the “subtractive” class of repressive processes
Hetem, L. A. B.; Danion, J. M.; Diemunsch, P. & Brandt, C. (2000). Effect of a subanesthetic dose of ketamine on memory and conscious awareness in healthy volunteers. Psychopharmacology 152 (3):283-288.   (Cited by 24 | Google | More links)
Heyman, Gene M. (2004). The sense of conscious will. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (5):663-664.   (Google)
Abstract: Wegner's conclusion that conscious will is an illusion follows from a key omission in his analysis. Although he describes conscious will as an experience, akin to one of the senses, he omits its objective correlate. The degree to which behavior can be influenced by its consequences (voluntariness) provides an objective correlate for conscious will. With conscious will anchored to voluntariness, the illusion disappears
Höffding, Harald & Lowndes, Mary E. (2004). The conscious and the unconscious: From outlines of psychology (1881). American Imago. Special Issue 1750 (3):379-395.   (Google)
Hight, Marc A. (2001). Locke's implicit ontology of ideas. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 9 (1):17 – 42.   (Google | More links)
Hirshman, E. & Master, S. (1997). Modeling the conscious correlates of recognition memory: Reflections on the remember-know paradigm. Memory and Cognition 25:345-351.   (Cited by 108 | Google)
Hirst, W. (1989). On consciousness, recall, recognition, and the architecture of memory. In S. Lewandowsky, J. M. Dunn & K. Kirsner (eds.), Implicit Memory: Theoretical Issues. Lawrence Erlbaum.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Hoerl, Christoph (2007). Episodic memory, autobiographical memory, narrative: On three key notions in current approaches to memory development. Philosophical Psychology 20 (5):621 – 640.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: According to recent social interactionist accounts in developmental psychology, a child's learning to talk about the past with others plays a key role in memory development. Most accounts of this kind are centered on the theoretical notion of autobiographical memory and assume that socio-communicative interaction with others is important, in particular, in explaining the emergence of memories that have a particular type of connection to the self. Most of these accounts also construe autobiographical memory as a species of episodic memory, but its episodic character, as such, is not typically seen as falling within the remit of an explanation in social interactionist terms. I explore the idea that socio-communicative interaction centered on talk about the past might also have an important role to play, quite independently of considerations about the involvement of the self in memory, in accounting for the emergence of memories that are episodic in character, i.e., memories that involve the recollection of particular past events. In doing so, I also try to shed light on a distinctive role that talk about the past plays in socio-communicative interaction
Hoerl, Christoph & McCormack, Teresa (eds.) (2001). Time and Memory: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Time and Memory throws new light on fundamental aspects of human cognition and consciousness by bringing together, for the first time, psychological and philosophical approaches dealing with the connection between the capacity to represent and think about time, and the capacity to recollect the past. Fifteen specially written essays offer insights into current theories of memory processes and of the mechanisms and cognitive abilities underlying temporal judgements, and draw out key issues concerning the phenomenology and epistemology of memory and its role in our understanding of time
Hoffman, Donald (2008). Conscious realism and the mind-body problem. Mind and Matter 6 (1):87-121.   (Google)
Abstract: Despite substantial efforts by many researchers, we still have no scientific theory of how brain activity can create or be con- scious experience. This is troubling since we have a large body of correlations between brain activity and consciousness, correlations normally assumed to entail that brain activity creates conscious experience. Here I explore a solution to the mind-body problem that starts with the converse assumption: these correlations arise because consciousness creates brain activity and indeed creates all objects and properties of the physical world To this end, I develop two theses. The multimodal user interface theory of perception states that perceptual experiences do not match or approximate properties of the objective world but instead provide a simplified species-specific, user interface to that world Conscious realism states that the objective world consists of conscious agents and their experiences; these can be mathematically modeled and em- pirically explored in the normal scientific manner
Holland, R. F. (1954). The empiricist theory of memory. Mind 63 (October):464-86.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Homer, Bruce D. & Ramsay, Jason T. (1999). Making implicit explicit: The role of learning. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):770-770.   (Google)
Abstract: Three forms of implicit knowledge are presented (functional, structural, and procedural). These forms differ in the way they are made explicit and hence in how they are represented by the individual. We suggest that the framework presented by Dienes & Perner does not account for these differences
Howe, Mark L. (2000). Consciousness, memory, and development. In Mark L. Howe (ed.), The Fate of Early Memories: Developmental Science and the Retention of Childhood Experiences. American Psychological Association.   (Google)
Howard, A., Ritual, memory, and emotion: Comparing two cognitive hypotheses.   (Google)
Abstract: Without systems of public, external symbols for recording information, nonliterate communities have to rely on human memory for the retention and transmission of cultural knowledge. Religious expressions either evolved in directions that rendered them memorable or they were--quite literally--forgotten. Most religious systems, including all of the great world religions, emerged among populations that were mostly illiterate (even if there was a literate elite). Thus, it should come as no surprise that religious systems and ritual systems, in particular, have evolved so as to exploit variables that facilitate memory. No doubt, the invention of literacy ameliorates these variables' influence, however, the availability of such cultural tools neither eliminates that influence nor even surmounts it. Experimental psychologists have clarified variables that contribute to extraordinary recall for events that arise in the normal course of life. Probably, the most obvious is frequency. Experiencing events of the same type frequently aids memory for that type of event, though not necessarily for the details of any of the particular instances of that type. When Jains carry out the Puja ritual day after day, they become adept at its performance. Although they are fluent with the ritual's details, it is possible that they do not remember even one of their previous performances distinctively
Imanaka, K. & Abernethy, Brad (2000). Distance-location interference in movement reproduction: An interaction between conscious and unconscious processing? In Yves Rossetti & Antti Revonsuo (eds.), Beyond Dissociation: Interaction Between Dissociated Implicit and Explicit Processing. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Ito, Masao (2004). How neuroscience accounts for the illusion of conscious will. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (5):664-665.   (Google)
Abstract: Wegner's monograph presents the view that conscious will is a feeling that we experience when we perform an action through a mechanistic process of the brain, rather than a mental force that causes the action. The view is supported by several lines of evidence in which conscious will is dissociated from the actual performance of voluntary movements, as in automatism. The book further extends an insightful analysis of the mental system behind the illusion of conscious will and inspires neuroscientists to reflect on its neural substrates
Jacoby, Larry L. (1991). A process dissociation framework: Separating automatic from intentional uses of memory. Journal of Memory and Language 30:513-41.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Jackson, Georgina & Jackson, Stephen (1995). Do measures of explicit learning actually measure what is being learnt in the serial reaction time task? Psyche 2 (20).   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Studies of implicit learning have shown that individuals exposed to a rule-governed environment often learn to exploit 'rules' which describe the structural relationship between environmental events. While some authors have interpreted such demonstrations as evidence for functionally separate implicit learning systems, others have argued that the observed changes in performance result from explicit knowledge which has been inadequately assessed. In this paper we illustrate this issue by considering one commonly used implicit learning task, the Serial reaction time task, and outline what we see as an important problem associated with each of the commonly used methods used to assess explicit knowledge. This is that each measure requires a form of response which is dependent on the subjects having some knowledge of the serial-order of the sequence. We argue that such methods, or more specifically their analyses, seriously underestimate other sources of knowledge, which may be available to subjects during their performance of the SRT task. In support of this argument we demonstrate that subjects' serial-order knowledge can, in principle, be independent of subjects' knowledge of the statistical structure of the sequence, and we propose an alternative method for analysing performance on the Generate task which avoids this problem
Jackson, Frank (2002). Memory traces and representation. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1 (4).   (Google)
Jackson, Frank (2000). Psychological explanation and implicit theory. Philosophical Explorations 3 (1):83-95.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: I offer an account of the relation between explanations of behaviour in terms of psychological states and explanations in terms of neural states that: makes it transparent how they can be true together; explains why explanations in terms of psychological states are characteristically of behaviour described in general and relational terms, and explains why certain sorts of neurological investigations undermine psychological explanations of behaviour, while others leave them intact. In the course of the argument, I offer an account of implicit theories
Jacoby, Larry L. & Witherspoon, D. (1982). Remembering without awareness. Canadian Journal of Psychology 36:300-324.   (Cited by 160 | Google)
Jacoby, Larry L.; Toth, J. P. & Yonelinas, Andrew P. (1993). Separating conscious and unconscious influences of memory: Measuring recollection. Journal of Experimental Psychology 122:139-54.   (Cited by 357 | Google)
Jacoby, Larry L.; Yonelinas, Andrew P. & Jennings, J. M. (1997). The relation between conscious and unconscious (automatic) influences: A declaration of independence. In Jonathan D. Cohen & Jonathan W. Schooler (eds.), Scientific Approaches to Consciousness. Lawrence Erlbaum.   (Cited by 123 | Google)
Jacoby, Larry L.; Toth, J. P.; Yonelinas, Andrew P. & Debner, J. A. (1994). The relation between conscious and unconscious influences: Independence or redundancy? Journal of Experimental Psychology.   (Google)
Jacoby, Larry L. & Kelley, Clarence M. (1987). Unconscious influences of memory for a prior event. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 13:314-36.   (Cited by 89 | Google)
Jacoby, Larry L. & Kelley, Clarence M. (1991). Unconscious influences of memory: Dissociations and automaticity. In A. David Milner & M. D. Rugg (eds.), The Neuropsychology of Consciousness. Academic Press.   (Cited by 60 | Google)
Jahn, Michael A. (1999). Implicit measurements of dynamic complexity properties and splittings of speedable sets. Journal of Symbolic Logic 64 (3):1037-1064.   (Google | More links)
Jamieson, Dale W. & Bekoff, Marc (1992). Carruthers on nonconscious experience. Analysis 52 (1):23-28.   (Cited by 12 | Annotation | Google)
Janzen, Greg (2006). Phenomenal character as implicit self-awareness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (12):44-73.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: One of the more refractory problems in contemporary discussions of consciousness is the problem of determining what a mental state's being conscious consists in. This paper defends the thesis that a mental state is conscious if and only if it has a certain reflexive character, i.e., if and only if it has a structure that includes an awareness (or consciousness) of itself. Since this thesis finds one of its clearest expressions in the work of Brentano, it is his treatment of the thesis on which I initially focus, though I subsequently bring in Sartre where he is required to improve on Brentano, i.e., where he addresses himself to an important point not considered by Brentano. As part of this investigation, the paper also, more specifically, aims to exhibit as perspicuously as possible the relationship between self-awareness and the phenomenal, or 'what-it- is-like', dimension of conscious experience. I attempt to show, in particular, that the phenomenal character of at least perceptual consciousness can be fully explained in terms of self- awareness, i.e., in terms of a low-level or 'implicit' self- awareness that is built into every conscious perceptual state
Jimenez, Luis (ed.) (2003). Attention and Implicit Learning. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 9 | Google)
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Jiménez, Luis & Cleeremans, Axel (1999). Fishing with the wrong nets: How the implicit slips through the representational theory of mind. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):771-771.   (Google)
Abstract: Dienes & Perner's target article is not a satisfactory theory of implicit knowledge because in endorsing the representational theory of knowledge, the authors also inadvertently accept that only explicit knowledge can be causally efficacious, and hence that implicit knowledge is an inert category. This conflation between causal efficacy, knowledge, and explicitness is made clear through the authors' strategy, which consists of attributing any observable effect to the existence of representations that are as minimally explicit as needed to account for behavior. In contrast, we believe that causally efficacious and fully implicit knowledge exists, and is best embodied in frameworks that depart radically from classical assumptions
Johnson, M. K.; Foley, M. A.; Suengas, A. G. & Raye, C. L. (1988). Phenomenal characteristics of memories for perceivedand imagined autobiographical events. Journal of Experimental Psychology 117:371-76.   (Google)
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J., P.; S., W. & F., F. (2003). The role of working memory in motor learning and performance. Consciousness and Cognition 12 (3):376-402.   (Google)
Abstract: Three experiments explore the role of working memory in motor skill acquisition and performance. Traditional theories postulate that skill acquisition proceeds through stages of knowing, which are initially declarative but later procedural. The reported experiments challenge that view and support an independent, parallel processing model, which predicts that procedural and declarative knowledge can be acquired separately and that the former does not depend on the availability of working memory, whereas, the latter does. The behaviour of these two processes was manipulated by providing or withholding visual (and auditory) appraisal of outcome feedback. Withholding feedback was predicted to inhibit the use of working memory to appraise success and, thus, prevent the formation of declarative knowledge without affecting the accumulation of procedural knowledge. While the first experiment failed to support these predictions, the second and third experiments demonstrated that procedural and declarative knowledge can be acquired independently. It is suggested that the availability of working memory is crucial to motor performance only when the learner has come to rely on its use
Kabasenche, William P. (2007). Emotions, memory suppression, and identity. American Journal of Bioethics 7 (9):33 – 34.   (Google)
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Kansteiner, Wolf (2002). Finding meaning in memory: A methodological critique of collective memory studies. History and Theory 41 (2):179–197.   (Google | More links)
Kaschak, Michael & Glenberg, Arthur (2004). Interactive alignment: Priming or memory retrieval? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (2):201-202.   (Google)
Abstract: Pickering & Garrod's (P&G's) interactive alignment model explains the existence of alignment between speakers via an automatic priming mechanism. We propose that it may be preferable to explain alignment through processes of memory retrieval. Our discussion highlights how memory retrieval can produce the same results as the priming mechanism and presents data that favor the memory-based view
Kelley, Clarence M. & Lindsay, D. S. (1996). Conscious and unconscious forms of memory. In E. Bjork & R. Bjork (eds.), Memory: Handbook of Perception and Cognition. Academic Press.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
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Kihlstrom, John F.; Dorfman, Jennifer & Park, Lillian (2007). Implicit and explicit memory and learning. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell.   (Google)
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Kirsh, David (2003). Implicit and Explicit Representation. In Implicit and Explicit Representation.   (Google)
Abstract: The degree to which information is encoded explicitly in a representation is related to the computational cost of recovering or using the information. Knowledge that is implicit in a system need not be represented at all, even implicitly, if the cost of recovering it is prohibitive.
Kirsh, David (2009). Knowledge, Implicit vs Explicit. In T. Bayne, A. Cleeremans & P. Wilken (eds.), The Oxford Companion to Consciousness. Cambridge.   (Google)
Abstract: In the scientific study of mind a distinction is drawn between explicit knowledge–knowledge that can be elicited from a subject by suitable inquiry or prompting, can be brought to consciousness, and externally expressed in words–and implicit knowledge–knowledge that cannot be elicited, cannot be made directly conscious, and cannot be articulated. Michael Polanyi (1967) argued that we usually ‘know more than we can say’. The part we can articulate is explicitly known; the part we cannot is implicit.
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Konstantinou, Ira & Gardiner, John M. (2005). Conscious control and memory awareness when recognising famous faces. Memory 13 (5):449-457.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Koriat, A. & Levy-Sadot, R. (2000). Conscious and unconscious metacognition: A rejoinder. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):193-202.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In this rejoinder we clarify several issues raised by the commentators with the hope of resolving some disagreements. In particular, we address the distinction between information-based and experience-based metacognitive judgments and the idea that memory monitoring may be mediated by direct access to internal representations. We then examine the possibility of unconscious metacognitive processes and expand on the critical role that conscious metacognitive feelings play in mediating between unconscious activations and explicit-controlled action. Finally, several open questions are articulated for further scrutiny
Koriat, Asher & Goldsmith, Morris (1997). The myriad functions and metaphors of memory. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):27-28.   (Google)
Abstract: Glenberg provides a new and exciting view that is especially useful for capturing some functional aspects of memory. However, memory and its functions are too multifarious to be handled by any one conceptualization. We suggest that Glenberg's proposal be restricted to its own “focus of convenience.” In addition, its value will ultimately depend on its success in generating detailed and testable theories
Kraay, Klaas J. (2002). Externalism, memory, and self-knowledge. Erkenntnis 56 (3):297-317.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Externalism holds that the individuation of mental content depends on factors external to the subject. This doctrine appears to undermine both the claim that there is a priori self-knowledge, and the view that individuals have privileged access to their thoughts. Tyler Burge’s influential inclusion theory of self-knowledge purports to reconcile externalism with authoritative self-knowledge. I first consider Paul Boghossian’s claim that the inclusion theory is internally inconsistent. I reject one line of response to this charge, but I endorse another. I next suggest, however, that the inclusion theory has little explanatory value
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Kukla, Rebecca (2000). Myth, memory and misrecognition in Sellars' ``empiricism and the philosophy of mind''. Philosophical Studies 101 (2-3).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: William James, in order to shew that thought is possible without speech, quotes the recollection of a deaf-mute, Mr. Ballard, who wrote that in his early youth, even before he could speak, he had thoughts about God and the world. – What could he have meant? . . . And why does this question – which otherwise seemed not to exist – raise its head here? Do I want to say that the writer’s memory deceives him? – I don’t even know if I should say that. These recollections are a queer memory phenomenon – and I do not know what conclusions one can draw from them about the past of the man who recounts them
Kunde, Wilfried; Kiesel, Andrea & Hoffman, Joachim (2003). Conscious control over the content of unconscious cognition. Cognition 88 (2):223-242.   (Cited by 37 | Google | More links)
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Kurthen, Martin (2002). The conscious and the unconscious: A package deal. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (3):343-344.   (Google)
Abstract: Parsimony and simplicity in cognition theory are not achieved by excluding either the “cognitive unconscious” or consciousness from theoretical modeling, but rather, by eliminating redundant constructs independent of their location on the conscious-unconscious axis. Hence, Perruchet & Vinter's (P&V's) case against the “cognitive unconscious” does not work as an argument for consciousness, but rather as a rejection of the redundant background computational processes postulated in traditional cognition theory
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Latash, Lev P. (1997). LTP is neither a memory trace nor an ultimate mechanism for its formation: The beginning of the end of the synaptic theory of neural memory. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (4):621-622.   (Google)
Abstract: The problem of neural memory storage is discussed, based on the results of studies of memory impairment after hippocampal lesions, motor learning, and electrophysiological research on “spinal memory.” I support Shors & Matzel's major statements. The absence of reliable evidence on the LTP memory storage function and other data cast doubt on the synaptic theory of memory
Lauro-Grotto, R.; Reich, S. & Virasoro, M. A. (1997). The computational role of conscious processing in a model of semantic memory. In M. Ito, Y. Miyashita & Edmund T. Rolls (eds.), Cognition, Computation, and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 12 | Google)
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Abstract:   Tyler Burge defends the idea that memory preserves beliefswith their justifications, so that memory's role in inferenceadds no new justificatory demands. Against Burge's view,Christensen and Kornblith argue that memory is reconstructiveand so introduces an element of a posteriori justificationinto every inference. I argue that Burge is right,memory does preserve content, but to defend this viewwe need to specify a preservative mechanism. Toward thatend, I develop the idea that there is something worthcalling anaphoric thinking, which preserves content inBurge's sense of ``content preservation.'' I providea model on which anaphoric thought is a fundamentalfeature of cognitive architecture, consequentlyrejecting the idea that there are mental pronounsin a Language of Thought. Since preservativememory is a matter of anaphoric thinking, thereare limits on the analogy of memory and testimony
Lebiere, Christian & Wallach, Dieter (1999). Implicit and explicit learning in a hybrid architecture of cognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):772-773.   (Google)
Abstract: We present a theoretical account of implicit and explicit learning in terms of ACT-R, an integrated architecture of human cognition as a computational supplement to Dienes & Perner's conceptual analysis of knowledge. Explicit learning is explained in ACT-R by the acquisition of new symbolic knowledge, whereas implicit learning amounts to statistically adjusting subsymbolic quantities associated with that knowledge. We discuss the common foundation of a set of models that are able to explain data gathered in several signature paradigms of implicit learning
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Abstract:      This article reviews four books that question the premises, logic, techniques, evidentiary grounding, and effects of recovered memory therapy: 1) Lawrence Wright, Remembering Satan: A Case of Recovered Memory and the Shattering of an American Family (1994). 2) Richard Ofshe and Ethan Watters, Making Monsters: False Memories, Psychotherapy, and Sexual Hysteria (1994). 3) Elizabeth Loftus and Katherine Ketcham, The Myth of Repressed Memory: False Memories and Allegations of Sexual Abuse (1994). 4) Mark Pendergrast, Victims of Memory: Incest Accusations and Shattered Lives (1995). The article concludes that no scientific evidence supports the theory that the mind is capable of repressing such traumatic events. The article also analyzes the ways in which the recovered memory controversy has been socially and legally constructed and suggests how sociolegal scholars might further understanding of this phenomenon more generally. Finally, the article asserts that recovered memory therapy leads to prosecutions of innocent individuals and diverts scarce resources away from real social and political problems
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Abstract: We are reviewing and summarizing evidence for the processes of acquisition of information outside of conscious awareness (processing information about covariations, nonconscious indirect and interactive inferences, self-perpetuation of procedural knowledge). A considerable amount of data indicates that as compared to consciously controlled cognition, the nonconscious information-acquisition processes are not only much faster but also structurally more sophisticated in the sense that they are capable of efficient processing of multidimensional and interactive relations between variables. Those mechanisms of nonconscious acquisition of information provide a major channel for the development of procedural knowledge which is indispensable for such important aspects of cognitive functioning as encoding and interpretation of stimuli and the triggering emotional reactions
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Abstract: Working-memory retention as activated long-term memory fails to capture orchestrated processing and storage, the hallmark of the concept of working memory. The event-related potential (ERP) data are compatible with working memory as a mental workspace that holds and manipulates information on line, which is distinct from long-term memory, and deals with the products of activated traces from stored knowledge
Mace, John H. (2005). Experimentally manipulating the effects of involuntary conscious memory on a priming task. American Journal of Psychology 118 (2):159-182.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Mace, John H. (2006). Episodic remembering creates access to involuntary conscious memory: Demonstrating involuntary recall on a voluntary recall task. Memory 14 (8):917-924.   (Google | More links)
Mace, John H. (2003). Involuntary aware memory enhances priming on a conceptual implicit memory task. American Journal of Psychology 116 (2):281-290.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
MacLeod, Colin M. (1997). Is memory caught in the mesh? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):30-30.   (Google)
Abstract: Can memory be cast as a system that meshes events to actions? This commentary considers the concepts of mesh versus association, arguing that thus far the distinction is inadequate. However, the goal of shifting to an action-based view of memory has merit, most notably in emphasizing memory as a skill and in focusing on processes as opposed to structures
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Abstract: Three studies investigated implicit brand attitudes and their relation to explicit attitudes, prod- uct usage, and product differentiation. Implicit attitudes were measured using the Implicit As- sociation Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). Study 1 showed expected differ- ences in implicit attitudes between users of two leading yogurt brands, also revealing significant correlations between IAT-measured implicit attitudes and explicit attitudes. In Study 2, users of two fast food restaurants (McDonald’s and Milk Bar) showed implicit attitudi- nal preference for their favorite restaurant. In Study 3, implicit attitudes of users of two soft drinks (Coca-Cola and Pepsi) predicted brand preference, product usage, and brand recognition in a blind taste test. A meta-analytic combination of the three studies showed that the use of IAT measures increased the prediction of behavior relative to explicit attitude measures alone
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Abstract: I present a view of conscious perception that supposes a processual unity between the activity in the brain and the perceived event in the external world. I use the rainbow to provide a first example, and subsequently extend the same rationale to more complex examples such as perception of objects, faces and movements. I use a process-based approach as an explanation of ordinary perception and other variants, such as illusions, memory, dreams and mental imagery. This approach provides new insights into the problem of conscious representation and phenomenal consciousness. It is a form of anti- cranialism different from but related to other kinds of externalism
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Abstract: This study examined the hypothesis that conditional reasoning involves visual short-term memory resources (Johnson-Laird, 1985). A total of 147 university students were given measures of verbal and visual short-term memory capacity and a series of concrete and abstract conditional reasoning problems. Results indicate that there is a positive correlation between verbal working memory capacity and reasoning with both concrete and abstract premises. A positive correlation was also obtained between visual working memory capacity and reasoning with concrete premises
Marcovitch, Stuart & Zelazo, Philip David (2001). On the need for conscious control and conceptual understanding. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (1):48-49.   (Google)
Abstract: The dynamic systems approach simulates a wide range of effects and generates novel predictions, but it fails to explain age-related behavioral changes in psychological terms. We argue that the roles of conscious control and explicit knowledge must be addressed in any model of A-not-B performance, and a fortiori, in any model of goal-directed action
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Markman, Arthur; Maddox, W. & Baldwin, G. C. (2007). Using regulatory focus to explore implicit and explicit processing in concept learning. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (s 9-10):132-155.   (Google)
Abstract: Complex cognitive processes like concept learning involve a mixture of redundant explicit and implicit processes that are active simultaneously. This aspect of cognitive architecture creates difficulties in determining the influence of consciousness on processing. We propose that the interaction between an individual's regulatory focus and the reward structure of the current task influences the degree to which explicit processing is active. Thus, by manipulating people's motivational state and the nature of the task they perform, we can vary the influence of conscious processing in cognitive performance. We demonstrate the utility of this view by focusing on studies in which people acquire new perceptual concepts by learning to classify them. This technique will allow us to better tease apart the roles of explicit and implicit processing in a variety of cognitive tasks
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Abstract: As reported by Vertes & Eastman, convincing evidence rules out any role for REM sleep in memory consolidation. However, they do not provide convincing evidence for their claim that sleep in generaI – as opposed to REM sleep per se – has no influence on memory consolidation. Recent correlational data suggest that the number of NREM/REM cycles is associated with performance on a verbal recall task. [Vertes & Eastman]
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Abstract: Memory researchers have discussed the relationship between consciousness and memory frequently in the last few decades. Beginning with research by Warrington and Weiskrantz (1968; 1970), memory has been shown to influence task performance even without awareness of retrieval. Data from amnesic patients show that a study episode influences task performance despite their lack of conscious memory for the study session. More recently, issues of intentionality, awareness, and the relationship between conscious and unconscious forms of memory have come to the forefront. Conscious memory has sometimes been defined by intention to retrieve and sometimes by awareness of retrieval. This distinction has been debated as measurement methodologies have developed. In addition, the functional relationship between conscious and automatic forms of memory has implications for measurement of memory processes and the development of models of memory task performance. Several measurement techniques for conscious and automatic memory are reviewed. The current state of these issues is also discussed
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Abstract: Using explicit memory measures, Cowan predicts a new circumstance in which the central capacity limit of 4 chunks should obtain. Supporting results for such an experiment, using continuous old-new recognition, are described. With implicit memory measures, Cowan assumes that short-term repetition priming reflects the central capacity limit. I argue that this phenomenon instead reflects limits within individual perceptual processing modules
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Abstract: Glenberg tries to explain how and why memories have semantic content. The theory succeeds in specifying the relations between two major classes of memory phenomena – explicit and implicit memory – but it may fail in its assignment of relative importance to these phenomena and in its account of meaning. The theory is syntactic and extensional, instead of semantic and intensional
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Abstract: The theoretical framework proposed by Dienes & Perner sets the wrong standards for knowledge to be considered explicit. Animals other than humans possess knowledge, too, some of which is probably explicit. We argue that a comparative approach to investigating knowledge is likely to be more fruitful than one based on linguistic constructs and unobservable phenomena
Merrillb, Edward & Petersonb, Todd, From implicit skills to explicit knowledge: A bottom-up model of skill learning.   (Google)
Abstract: This paper presents a skill learning model CLARION. Different from existing models of mostly high-level skill learning that use a top-down approach (that is, turning declarative knowledge into procedural knowledge through practice), we adopt a bottom-up approach toward low-level skill learning, where procedural knowledge develops first and declarative knowledge develops later. Our model is formed by integrating connectionist, reinforcement, and symbolic learning methods to perform on-line reactive learning. It adopts a two-level dual-representation framework (Sun, 1995), with a combination of localist and distributed representation. We compare the model with human data in a minefield navigation task, demonstrating some match between the model and human data in several respects. © 2001 Cognitive Science Society, Inc. All rights reserved
Minati, Gianfranco (2004). From evolutionary consciousness to conscious evolution: Are we in control? World Futures 60 (8):567 – 575.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This article discusses implicit assumptions in the conference theme to understand the complexity involved in trying to gain control of globalization, in particular: (1) We, (2) being in control (not only in cybernetic way) and (3) globalization. I introduce distinctions between single conscious agents, systems of conscious agents, and emergent we, as a collective entity understood as a Collective Being (a complex, multidimensional society to be studied with multiple, systemic knowledge) that has collective consciousness. The focus is the issue of being in control. This issue is understood as the ability to design and manage emergent processes of development
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Abstract: There is remarkable agreement between Ruchkin et al.'s psychophysiological views and my own model, based on developmental-experimental evidence, of working memory as activated long-term memory (LTM). I construe subvocal rehearsal as an operative scheme that maintains order information and demands attentional resources. Encoding and retrieving operations also demand attention. Another share of resources is used for keeping activated specific LTM representations
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Abstract: This commentary discusses how Dienes & Perner's theory of implicit and explicit knowledge applies to memory research. As currently formulated, their theory does seem to account simultaneously for population dissociations and dissociations between conceptual and perceptual priming tasks. In addition, the specification of four distinct memorial states (correlated with different recognition test responses) faces important methodological challenges
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Abstract: Partial matching theory, which maintains that some memory representations of target items in immediate memory are overwritten by others, can predict both a “theoretical” and an “actual” maximum memory span provided no chunking takes place during presentation. The latter is around 4 ± 2 items, the exact number being determined by the degree of similarity between the memory representations of two immediately successive target items
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Abstract: In The illusion of conscious will , Daniel Wegner offers an exciting, informative, and potentially threatening treatise on the psychology of action. I offer several interpretations of the thesis that conscious will is an illusion. The one Wegner seems to suggest is "modular epiphenomenalism": conscious experience of will is produced by a brain system distinct from the system that produces action; it interprets our behavior but does not, as it seems to us, cause it. I argue that the evidence Wegner presents to support this theory, though fascinating, is inconclusive and, in any case, he has not shown that conscious will does not play a crucial causal role in planning, forming intentions, etc. This theory's potential blow to our self-conception turns out to be a glancing one
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Abstract: Distinguishing explicit from implicit knowledge on the basis of the active representation of certain propositional attitudes fails to provide an explanation for dissociations in learning performance under implicit and explicit conditions. This suggests an account of implicit and explicit knowledge grounded in the presence of multiple learning mechanisms, and multiple brain systems more generally. A rough outline of a connectionist account of this kind is provided
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Abstract: _7(18)._
ABSTRACT: In Mangan's (2001) account of fringe consciousness there is a tension between the proposal that fringe
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Abstract: Dienes & Perner offer us a theory of explicit and implicit knowledge that promises to systematise a large and diverse body of research in cognitive psychology. Their advertised strategy is to unpack this distinction in terms of explicit and implicit representation. But when one digs deeper one finds the “Higher-Order Thought” theory of consciousness doing much of the work. This reduces both the plausibility and usefulness of their account. We think their strategy is broadly correct, but that consensus on the explicit/implicit knowledge distinction is still a fair way off
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Parker, Amanda (1999). Memory systems, frontal cortex, and the hippocampal axis. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):464-465.   (Google)
Abstract: Three comments are made. The proposal that recollection and familiarity-based recognition take different thalamic routes does not fit recent experimental evidence, suggesting that mediodorsal thalamus acts in an integrative role with respect to prefrontal cortex. Second, the role of frontal cortex in episodic memory has been understated. Third, the role of the hippocampal axis is likely to be the computation and storage of ideothetic information
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Abstract: Dissociative identity disorder (DID; called multiple personality disorder in DSMIII-R) is a psychiatric condition in which two or more identity states recurrently take control of the person's behavior. A characteristic feature of DID is the occurrence of apparently severe amnestic symptoms. This paper is concerned with experimental research of memory function in DID and focuses on between-identity transfer of newly learned neutral material. Previous studies on this subject are reviewed and a pilot study with four subjects is described. This study is specifically concerned with the question whether self-reported asymmetries in between-identity transfer can be replicated on experimental memory tests. A secondary aim was to examine whether, in the absence of explicit transfer, implicit transfer of information would occur. The results showed that the apparent amnestic asymmetry for explicit information was substantiated in the laboratory, although at least some leakage was present between the apparently amnestic identities. No evidence was found for better performance on implicit than on explicit memory tests in the apparently amnestic identities. In the discussion, parallels between apparent amnesia in DID and state-dependent memory are drawn, and the question of simulated amnesia is addressed
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Abstract: Recent experimental findings reveal dissociations of conscious and nonconscious performance in many fields of psychological research, suggesting that conscious and nonconscious effects result from qualitatively different processes. A connectionist view of these processes is put forward in which consciousness is the consequence of construction processes taking place in three types of working memory in a specific type of recurrent neural network. The recurrences arise by feeding back output to the input of a central (representational) network. They are assumed to be intemalizations of motor-sensory feedback through the environment. In this manner, a subvocal-phonological, a visuo-spatial, and a somatosensory working memory may have developed. Representations in the central network, which constitutes long-term memory, can be kept active by rehearsal in the feedback loops. The sequentially recurrent architecture allows for recursive symbolic operations and the formation of (auditory, visual, or somatic) models of the external world which can be maintained, transformed and temporarily combined with other information in working memory. Moreover, the quasi-input from the loop directs subsequent attentional processing. The view may contribute to a formal framework to accommodate findings from disparate fields such as working memory, sequential reasoning, and conscious and nonconscious processes in memory and emotion. In theory, but probably not very soon in practice, such connectionist models might simulate aspects of consciousness
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Piolino, Pascale; Belliard, Serge; Desgranges, Béatrice; Perron, Mélisa & Eustache, Francis (2003). Autobiographical memory and autonoetic consciousness in a case of semantic dementia. Cognitive Neuropsychology 20 (7):619-639.   (Google)
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Abstract: Early childhood is characterized by many cognitive developmentalists as a period of considerable change with respect to representational format. Dienes & Perner present a potentially viable theory for the stages involved in the increasingly explicit representation of knowledge. However, in our view they fail to map their multi-level system of explicitness onto cognitive developmental changes that occur in the first years of life. Specifically, we question the theory's heuristic value when applied to the development of early mind reading and categorization. We conclude that the authors fail to present evidence that dispels the view that knowledge change in these areas is dichotomous
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Abstract: Religionists often presuppose that “mysticism” aims at somehow emptying the mind. In the light of evidence, however, meditation seems rather to consist of ritualized action without an explicit emphasis on subjective experience. Boyer & Lienard's (B&L's) theory of ritualized action as “swamping” working memory thus might help explain the effects of meditation without postulating experiential goals the “mystics” obviously do not have. (Published Online February 8 2007)
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Abstract: If consciousness has no influence on my behaviour,what shall I do with it ? In this paper it is contended, that even if neuroscience is right, if some conscious experiences such as emotional experiences have no influence on our behavior, they still constitute a significant part of our world, our existence. For understanding the significance of conscious experiences we should go beyond behaviour, biology and biological evolution. This paper and its understanding of consciousness and natural science is based on an idealist philosophy maintaining, that only conscious experience is real. Conscious experience is supposed to be known directly or intuitively, it cannot be explained. Key words: Consciousness as existence; behaviour; communication; language; free will; idealist philosophy; collective conscious experience; cognition
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Abstract: In this new volume in the Oxford Psychology Series, the author presents a highly readable account of the cognitive unconscious, focusing in particular on the problem of implicit learning. Implicit learning is defined as the acquisition of knowledge that takes place independently of the conscious attempts to learn and largely in the absence of explicit knowledge about what was acquired. One of the core assumptions of this argument is that implicit learning is a fundamental, "root" process, one that lies at the very heart of the adaptive behavioral repertoire of every complex organism. The author's goals are to outline the essential features of implicit learning that have emerged from the many studies that have been carried out in a variety of experimental laboratories over the past several decades; to present the various alternative perspectives on this issue that have been proposed by other researchers and to try to accommodate these views with his own; to structure the literature so that it can be seen in the context of standard heuristics of evolutionary biology; to present the material within a functionalist approach and to try to show why the experimental data should be seen as entailing particular epistemological perspectives; and to present implicit processing as encompassing a general and ubiquitous set of operations that have wide currency and several possible applications. Chapter 1 begins with the core problem under consideration in this book, a characterization of "implicit learning" as it has come to be used in the literature. Reber puts this seemingly specialized topic into a general framework and suggests a theoretical model based on standard heuristics of evolutionary biology. In his account, Reber weaves a capsule history of interest in and work on the cognitive unconscious. Chapter 2 turns to a detailed overview of the experimental work on the acquisition of implicit knowledge, which currently is of great interest. Chapter 3 develops the evolutionary model within which one can see learning and cognition as richly intertwining issues and not as two distinct fields with one dominating the other. Finally, Chapter 4 explores a variety of entailments and speculations concerning implicit cognitive processes and their general role in the larger scope of human performance
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Abstract: In Making It Explicit, Robert Brandom has suggested an "inferentialist" alternative to the dominant "representationalist" paradigm within modern philosophy, an alternative based upon a form of pragmatism that he describes as both rationalist and linguistic.1 Representationalists typically think of awareness in terms of mental contents which somehow represent or picture worldly things, events, or states of affairs. Linguistic, rationalist pragmatists, in contrast, shift the focus from conscious experience to human linguistic practices, and specifically to the norms of rationality implicit within these practices — a shift from sentience to sapience — and approach the meanings of our linguistic claims entirely in terms of the normative inferential relations between them
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Abstract: This analysis explores theories of recollective memories and their shortcomings to show how certain recollective memories are to some extent the initial experiencing of past conscious mental states. While dedicated memory theorists over the past century show remembering to be an active and subjective process, they usually make simplistic assumptions regarding the experience that is remembered. Their treatment of experience leaves unexplored the notion that the truth of memory is a dynamic interaction between experience and recollection. The argument's seven sections examine how experience, consciousness, and the self produce memories in odd but actual situations. Examples are presented that are either actual or technologically possible, and they pose a challenge for some theories of memory. Showing that an experience and a memory must be bound by psychological continuity, the sections build upon each other to challenge aprioristic beliefs about the self and consciousness. The later sections examine the lack of available accounts of memory that acknowledge consciousness, dissociation, and "selfhood" to be matters of degree, thus rendering memory theories next to useless when trying to effectively incorporate the notions of experience and reality
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Abstract: Why do major historical events such as the Holocaust occupy the forefront of the collective consciousness, while profound moments such as the Armenian genocide, the McCarthy era, and France's role in North Africa stand distantly behind? Is it possible that history "overly remembers" some events at the expense of others? A landmark work in philosophy, Paul Ricoeur's Memory, History, Forgetting examines this reciprocal relationship between remembering and forgetting, showing how it affects both the perception of historical experience and the production of historical narrative. Memory, History, Forgetting , like its title, is divided into three major sections. Ricoeur first takes a phenomenological approach to memory and mnemonical devices. The underlying question here is how a memory of present can be of something absent, the past. The second section addresses recent work by historians by reopening the question of the nature and truth of historical knowledge. Ricoeur explores whether historians, who can write a history of memory, can truly break with all dependence on memory, including memories that resist representation. The third and final section is a profound meditation on the necessity of forgetting as a condition for the possibility of remembering, and whether there can be something like happy forgetting in parallel to happy memory. Throughout the book there are careful and close readings of the texts of Aristotle and Plato, of Descartes and Kant, and of Halbwachs and Pierre Nora. A momentous achievement in the career of one of the most significant philosophers of our age, Memory, History, Forgetting provides the crucial link between Ricoeur's Time and Narrative and Oneself as Another and his recent reflections on ethics and the problems of responsibility and representation
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Abstract: Within Piaget there is an implicit theory of the development of explicit memory. It rests in the dynamical trajectory underlying the development of causality, object, space and time – a complex (COST) supporting a symbolic relationship integral to the explicit. Cassirer noted the same dependency in the phenomena of aphasias, insisting that a symbolic function is being undermined in these deficits. This is particularly critical given the reassessment of Piaget’s stages as the natural bifurcations of a self-organizing dynamic system. The elements of a theoretical framework required to support explicit memory are developed, to include, (1) the complex developmental trajectory supporting the emergence of the explicit in Piaget, (2) the concrete dynamical system and the concept of a non-differentiable time contained in Bergson’s theory required to support a conscious, as opposed to an implicit remembrance, (3) the relation to current theories of amnesia, difficulties posed by certain retrograde amnesic phenomena, the role of the hippocampus and limitations of connectionist models, (4) the fact that nowhere in this overall framework does the loss of explicit memory imply or require the destruction of experience “stored in the brain.”
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Abstract: The identity of working-memory and long-term memory representations follows from many lines of evidence. However, the data provided by Ruchkin et al. are hardly compelling, as they make unproved assumptions about hypothetical generators. We cite studies from our lab in which congruent slow-wave topographies were found for short-term and long-term memory tasks, strongly suggesting that both activate identical cell assemblies
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Abstract: High temporal resolution event-related brain potential and electroencephalographic coherence studies of the neural substrate of short-term storage in working memory indicate that the sustained coactivation of both prefrontal cortex and the posterior cortical systems that participate in the initial perception and comprehension of the retained information are involved in its storage. These studies further show that short-term storage mechanisms involve an increase in neural synchrony between prefrontal cortex and posterior cortex and the enhanced activation of long-term memory representations of material held in short-term memory. This activation begins during the encoding/comprehension phase and evidently is prolonged into the retention phase by attentional drive from prefrontal cortex control systems. A parsimonious interpretation of these findings is that the long-term memory systems associated with the posterior cortical processors provide the necessary representational basis for working memory, with the property of short-term memory decay being primarily due to the posterior system. In this view, there is no reason to posit specialized neural systems whose functions are limited to those of short-term storage buffers. Prefrontal cortex provides the attentional pointer system for maintaining activation in the appropriate posterior processing systems. Short-term memory capacity and phenomena such as displacement of information in short-term memory are determined by limitations on the number of pointers that can be sustained by the prefrontal control systems. Key Words: coherence; event-related potentials; imaging; long-term memory; memory; short-term memory; working memory
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Abstract: This commentary focuses on how Dienes & Perner's (D&P's) claims relate to aspects of development. First, I discuss recent research that supports D&P's claim that anticipatory looking in a false belief task is guided by implicit knowledge. Second, I argue that implicit knowledge may be based on exposure to regularities in the world as D&P argue, but equally, it may sometimes be based on theories that conflict with real world regularities. Third, I discuss Munakata et al.'s notion of graded representations as an alternative to the implicit-explicit distinction in explaining dissociations in infancy
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Abstract: We applaud Dienes & Perner's efforts while raising some concerns regarding their assimilation of diverse data into a unifying framework. Some of the findings need not fit the framework they suggest. It is also not always clear what, above logico-semantic consistency, assimilation adds to the data that do fit their framework. These concerns are highlighted with reference to their arguments regarding the developmental data and the neuropsychological data, respectively
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Abstract: We offer additional points that support a distributed semantic memory: (1) the activation of representations that are modality-specific; (2) patients with inferotemporal lesions fail to activate visual object representations in semantic tasks, although normal subjects do; (3) direct activation of action systems from pictorial information, but not from words; (4) patients who demonstrate superiority with abstract words fail to access perceptual representations
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Abstract: We report two studies on the effect of implicitly versus explicitly conveying affirmation and denial problems about conditionals. Recently Evans and Handley (1999) and Schroyens et al. (1999b, 2000b) showed that implicit referencing elicits matching bias: Fewer determinate inferences are made, when the categorical premise (e.g., B) mismatches the conditional's referred clause (e.g., A). Also, the effect of implicit affirmation (B affirms not-A) is larger than the effect of implicit denial (B denies A). Schroyens et al. hypothesised that this interaction is due to uncertainty in the case-wise affirmation of the contrast class of negated elements involved in implicit affirmations. In Experiment 1 we tested this hypothesis by manipulating the set size of the conditional clauses. The results confirm that binary sets, where the contrast class is a singleton, eliminate the differential effect of implicit affirmation and denial. With non-binary sets the interaction is not modulated by the scope of the contrast class (3, 5, 9 elements). Experiment 2 further investigated the role of contrast classes by using class inclusion to construct implicit affirmations (Mammal vs Mammal or Monkey) and implicit denial (No-Mammal vs Mammal or Monkey), in addition to the standard implicit problems mediated by contrast-class inclusion [(No-)Mammal/No-Mammal; Reptile; Snake). Findings indicate that class inclusion (Mammal/Monkey; Reptile/ Snake) only marginally affects performance, and is independent of the type of problem. This would suggest that the implicitness problem-type interaction is dependent on constructing contrast classes. However, the experiment failed to replicate the interaction, even on the subset of problems repeating the abstract letter/number format of Experiment 1. Moreover, with the natural binary set-sizes (vowels/consonants) the implicitness effect was eliminated entirely
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Abstract: In this paper I examine Daniel M. Wegner's line of argument against the causal efficacy of conscious will, as presented in Wegner's book "The Illusion of Conscious Will" (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2002). I argue that most of the evidence adduced in the book can be interpreted in ways that do not threaten the efficacy of conscious will. Also, I argue that Wegner's view of conscious will is not an empirical thesis, and that certain views of consciousness and the self are immune to Wegner's line of argument
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Abstract: Does sleep restore brain function or does it consolidate memory? I argue that memory consolidation during sleep is an offshoot of restitution. Continual learning causes local synapse-specific neural fatigue, which then masks expression of that learning, especially on time-limited tests of procedural skills. Sleep serves to restore the fatigued synapses, revealing the consolidation-based enhancement observed as a “latent” overnight improvement in learning
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Abstract: The neurophysiological phenomenon of LTP (long term potentiation) is considered by many to represent an adequate mechanism for acquiring or storing memories in the mammalian brain. In our target article, we reviewed the various arguments put forth in support of the LTP/memory hypothesis. We concluded that these arguments were inconsistent with the purported data base and proposed an alternative interpretation that we suggested was at least as compatible with the available data as the more widely held view. In doing so, we attempted to illustrate that the inadequacy of present experimental designs did not permit us to distinguish between equally viable hypotheses. In the four years since we wrote the first draft of our target article, hundreds of additional studies on LTP have been published and their results have been incorporated into current theories about memory. A diverse group of commentators responded to our target article with their own theories of how memories might be stored in the brain, some of which rely on LTP. Some commentators doubted whether memories can be stored through modifications of synaptic strength. Some assert that it will never be possible to understand the neural mechanisms of memory; still others remain hopeful that we will accomplish some semblance of a resolution, provided we appreciate LTP's role in a subset of seemingly amorphous memory systems. In summary, although it is commonly written that “LTP is a memory storage device,” the divergence of views among the commentators suggests, at least as strongly as our target article, that such conviction is unwarranted and fails to acknowledge both the lack of consensus regarding the role of LTP in memory and the complexity of the phenomenon of memory itself
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Abstract: Various systems that learn are examined to show how content is carried in connections installed by a learning history. Agents do not explicitly use the content of such states in practical reasoning, yet the content plays an important role in explaining behavior, and the physical state carrying that content plays a role in causing behavior, given other occurrent beliefs and desires. This leads to an understanding of the environmental reasons which are the determinate content of these states, and leads to a better grasp of how representational content can be carried by systems without an explicit representation
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Son, Lisa K.; Schwartz, Bennett L. & Kornell, Nate (2003). Implicit metacognition, explicit uncertainty, and the monitoring/control distinction in animal metacognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (3):355-356.   (Google)
Abstract: Smith et al. demonstrate the viability of animal metacognition research. We commend their effort and suggest three avenues of research. The first concerns whether animals are explicitly aware of their metacognitive processes. The second asks whether animals have metaknowledge of their own uncertain responses. The third issue concerns the monitoring/control distinction. We suggest some ways in which these issues elucidate metacognitive processes in nonhuman animals
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Abstract: In Koriat's paper ''The Feeling of Knowing: Some Metatheoretical Implications for Consciousness and Control,'' he asserts that the feeling of knowing straddles the implicit and explicit, and that these conscious feelings enter into a conscious control process that is necessary for controlled behavior. This assertion allows him to make many speculations on the nature of consciousness itself. We agree that feelings of knowing are produced through a monitoring of one's knowledge, and that this monitoring can affect the control of behavior such as whether or not to search memory for an answer. Further, we believe that monitoring of performance with a strategy can also affect cognition control and strategy selection; however, we also believe that frequently this monitoring and control occurs without conscious awareness. Feeling of knowing has received an inordinate amount of attention because it lies behind the highly recognizable tip-of-the-tongue phenomenon that represents one of the rare cases of conscious monitoring. There are other feelings of knowing which are much more common and are not accompanied by conscious awareness. These are evident in the early selection of a strategy for answering a problem. In our view, the research on feeling of knowing will not resolve the question of whether consciousness is merely epiphenomenal
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Stadler, Michael A. & Frensch, Peter A. (1998). Handbook of Implicit Learning. Sage Publications.   (Cited by 95 | Google)
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Sullivan, E. Thomas (2009). Proportionality Principles in American Law: Controlling Excessive Government Actions. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Proportionality in international and foreign law -- Proportionality principles in the common law of damages -- Implicit proportionality principles in American standards of constitutional review -- Explicit proportionality principles in discrete areas of American jurisprudence -- Procedure : implicit proportionality limits on police powers and defendant rights -- Criminal law : implicit proportionality limitations on criminal liability -- Punishment : explicit and implicit proportionality limits on sanction severity.
Sun, Ron; Mathews, R. & Lane, and S. (online). Implicit and explicit processes in the development of cognitive skills: A theoretical interpretation with some practical implications for science education.   (Google)
Abstract: In: E. Vargios (ed.), Educational Psychology Research Focus, pp.1-26. Nova Science Publishers, Hauppauge, NY. 2007
Sun, Ron, The interaction of explicit and implicit learning: An integrated model.   (Google)
Abstract: This paper explicates the interaction between the implicit and explicit learning processes in skill acquisition, contrary to the common tendency in the literature of studying each type of learning in isolation. It highlights the interaction between the two types of processes and its various effects on learning, including the synergy effect. This work advocates an integrated model of skill learning that takes into account both implicit and explicit processes; moreover, it embodies a bottom-up approach (first learning implicit knowledge and then explicit knowledge on its basis) towards skill learning. The paper shows that this approach accounts for various effects in the process control task data, in addition to accounting for other data reported elsewhere
Sun, Ron (ms). The symposium on the synergy between implicit and explicit learning processes.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Implicit processes are thought to be relatively fast, inaccessible, holistic, and imprecise, while explicit processes are slow, accessible and precise (e.g., Reber, 1989, Sun 2002). This dichotomy is closely related to some other wellknown dichotomies including symbolic versus subsymbolic processing (Rumelhart et al., 1986), conceptual versus subconceptual processing (Smolensky, 1988), and conscious versus unconscious processing (Jacoby et al., 1994). This dichotomy has been justified by extensive studies of implicit and explicit learning, implicit and explicit memory, and implicit versus explicit metacognition (Reder, 1996)
Sun, Ron, Top-down versus bottom-up learning in cognitive skill acquisition.   (Google)
Abstract: This paper explores the interaction between implicit and explicit processes during skill learning, in terms of top-down learning (that is, learning that goes from explicit to implicit knowledge) versus bottom-up learning (that is, learning that goes from implicit to explicit knowledge). Instead of studying each type of knowledge (implicit or explicit) in isolation, we stress the interaction between the two types, especially in terms of one type giving rise to the other, and its effects on learning. The work presents an integrated model of skill learning that takes into account both implicit and explicit processes and both top-down and bottom-up learning. We examine and simulate human data in the Tower of Hanoi task. The paper shows how the quantitative data in this task may be captured using either top-down or bottom-up approaches, although top-down learning is a more apt explanation of the human data currently available. These results illustrate the two different directions of learning (top-down versus bottom-up), and thereby provide a new perspective on skill learning. Ó 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved
Sutton, John (1999). Distributed memory, coupling, and history. In R. Heath, B. Hayes, A. Heathcote & C. Hooker (eds.), Dynamical Cognitive Science: Proceedings of the Fourth Australasian Cognitive Science Conference. University of Newcastle.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: A case study in historical cognitive science, this paper addresses two claims made by radical proponents of new dynamical approaches. It queries their historical narrative, which sees embodied, situated cognition as correcting an individualist, atemporal framework originating in Descartes. In fact, new Descartes scholarship shows that 17th-century animal spirits neurophysiology realized a recognizably distributed model of memory; explicit representations are patterns of spirit flow, and memory traces are changes left by experience in connections between brain pores. This historical sketch supports the second dynamicist claim, that connectionists' stress on the cognitive importance of pattern-recreation needs supplementing by dynamicists' real-time focus and attention to the active roles of body and environment. Animal spirits theory exhibits just the 'continuous reciprocal causation' between brain, body, and environment which Andy Clark sees as dynamicism's central contribution, and allows for the embedding of brains in culture as well as the physical world
Barnier, Amanda & Sutton, John (2008). From individual memory to collective memory: Theoretical and empirical perspectives. Memory 16 (3):177-182.   (Google)
Sutton, John (2006). Introduction: Memory, embodied cognition, and the extended mind. Philosophical Psychology 19 (3):281-289.   (Cited by 21 | Google | More links)
Abstract: I introduce the seven papers in this special issue, by Andy Clark, J
Sutton, John (2007). Language, memory, and concepts of memory: Semantic diversity and scientific psychology. In Mengistu Amberber (ed.), The Language of Memory in a Cross-linguistic Perspective. John Benjamins.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: There are many different ways to think about what has happened before. I think about my own recent actions, and about what happened to me a long time ago; I can think about times before I lived, and about what will happen after my death. I know many things about the past, and about what has happened because people did things before now, or because some good or bad things happened to me
Sutton, John (online). Memory. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Remembering is one of the most characteristic and most puzzling of human activities. Personal memory, in particular - the ability mentally to travel back into the past, as leading psychologist Endel Tulving puts it - often has intense emotional or moral significance: it is perhaps the most striking manifestation of the peculiar way human beings are embedded in time, and of our limited but genuine freedom from our present environment and our immediate needs. Memory has been significant in the history of philosophy as much in relation to ethics and to epistemology as in theories of psyche, mind, and self
Sutton, John, Memory: Philosophical issues.   (Google)
Abstract: Memory is a set of cognitive capacities by which humans and other animals retain information and reconstruct past experiences, usually for present purposes. Philosophical investigation into memory is in part continuous with the development of cognitive scientific theories, but includes related inquiries into metaphysics and personal identity
Sutton, John (1998). Philosophy and Memory Traces: Descartes to Connectionism. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 35 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Philosophy and Memory Traces defends two theories of autobiographical memory. One is a bewildering historical view of memories as dynamic patterns in fleeting animal spirits, nervous fluids which rummaged through the pores of brain and body. The other is new connectionism, in which memories are 'stored' only superpositionally, and reconstructed rather than reproduced. Both models, argues John Sutton, depart from static archival metaphors by employing distributed representation, which brings interference and confusion between memory traces. Both raise urgent issues about control of the personal past, and about relations between self and body. Sutton demonstrates the role of bizarre body fluids in moral physiology, as philosophers from Descartes and Locke to Coleridge struggled to control their own innards and impose cognitive discipline on 'the phantasmal chaos of association'. Going on to defend connectionism against Fodor and critics of passive mental representations, he shows how problems of the self are implicated in cognitive science
Sutton, John (1998). Preface to philosophy and memory traces: Descartes to connectionism. In [Book Chapter].   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Philosophy and Memory Traces, the book to which this is the preface, defends two theories of autobiographical memory. One is a bewildering historical view of memories as dynamic patterns in fleeting animal spirits, nervous fluids which rummaged through the pores of brain and body. The other is new connectionism, in which memories are ‘stored’ only superpositionally, and are reconstructed rather than reproduced. Both models depart from static archival metaphors by employing distributed representation, which brings interference and confusion between memory traces. Both raise urgent issues about control of the personal past, and about relations between self and body. The book’s historical argument is anchored by a reinterpretation of Descartes’ dynamic physiology of memory and strange philosophy of the body. English critics of Descartes’ view of memories as motions complained that mechanistic neurophilosophy could not guarantee order in memory, and instead sought techniques for controlling the brain. In a new account of 18th-century philosophers’ fears of confusion in remembering, the author demonstrates the role of bizarre body fluids in moral physiology, as philosophers from Locke to Reid and Coleridge struggled to control their own innards and impose cognitive discipline on ‘the phantasmal chaos of association’. Finally, in a defence of connectionism against Jerry Fodor and against phenomenological and Wittgensteinian critics of passive mental representations, the author shows how problems of the self are implicated in contemporary sciences of mind. The book is an experiment in historical cognitive science, based on a belief that the interdisciplinary study of memory can exemplify the simultaneous attention to brain, body, and culture towards which psychological sciences must aim
Taatgen, Niels A. (2001). Dispelling the magic: Towards memory without capacity. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (1):147-148.   (Google)
Abstract: The limited capacity for unrelated things is a fact that needs to be explained by a general theory of memory, rather than being itself used as a means of explaining data. A pure storage capacity is therefore not the right assumption for memory research. Instead an explanation is needed of how capacity limitations arise from the interaction between the environment and the cognitive system. The ACT-R architecture, a theory without working memory but a long-term memory based on activation, may provide such an explanation
Taatgen, Niels A. (1999). Implicit versus explicit: An ACT-R learning perspective. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):785-786.   (Google)
Abstract: Dienes & Perner propose a theory of implicit and explicit knowledge that is not entirely complete. It does not address many of the empirical issues, nor does it explain the difference between implicit and explicit learning. It does, however, provide a possible unified explanation, as opposed to the more binary theories like the systems and the processing theories of implicit and explicit memory. Furthermore, it is consistent with a theory in which implicit learning is viewed as based on the mechanisms of the cognitive architecture, and explicit learning as strategies that exploit these mechanisms
Terry, Rohini; Brodie, Eric E. & Niven, Catherine A. (2007). Exploring the phenomenology of memory for pain: Is previously experienced acute pain consciously remembered or simply known? Journal of Pain 8 (6):467-475.   (Google)
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Abstract: The target article differentiates a new, syntactic component in verbal working memory. We suggest that several more components could be differentiated to make a model of working memory complete. Next, syntax is not always separable from the subject's verbal memory capacity as measured by standard working memory tasks. Finally, interference between different processes cannot be taken as evidence for the processes sharing the same resources. Interference might be a result of active mutual inhibition
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Abstract: In this commentary I show that the SOC framework implies automaticity of both the materialization of phenomenological conscious experience and the application of the primitives resulting from the emergence of consciousness. In addition, SOC implies that cognition refers to conscious experience. Consequently, I propose automatic/nonautomatic instead of unconscious/conscious as the basic contrast characterizing human cognition
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Abstract: This book brings together several internationally known authors with conflicting views on the subject, providing a lively and informative overview of this...
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Abstract: Everyday tasks, such as getting groceries en route from work, involve two distinct components, one prospective (i.e., remembering the plan) and the other retrospective (i.e., remembering the grocery list). The present investigation examined the size of the age-related performance declines in these components, as well as the relationship between these components and age-related differences in processing resources. The subjects were 133 community-dwelling adults between 65 and 95 years of age. They completed a large battery of tests, including tests of pro- and retrospective memory as well as tests for indexing processing resources. The results showed similar age-related declines in pro- and retrospective memory. There was only a weak relationship between pro- and retrospective memory, and the age-related decline in processing resources was related more strongly to retro- than prospective memory
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Abstract: The view that short-term memory should be conceived of as being a process based on the activation of long-term memory is inconsistent with neuropsychological evidence. Data from brain-damaged patients, showing specific patterns of impairment, are compatible with a vision of memory as a multiple-component system, whose different aspects, in neurologically unimpaired subjects, show a high degree of interaction
Varelius, Jukka (2009). Minimally conscious state and human dignity. Neuroethics 2 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: Recent progress in neurosciences has improved our understanding of chronic disorders of consciousness. One example of this advancement is the emergence of the new diagnostic category of minimally conscious state (MCS). The central characteristic of MCS is impaired consciousness. Though the phenomenon now referred to as MCS pre-existed its inclusion in diagnostic classifications, the current medical ethical concepts mainly apply to patients with normal consciousness and to non-conscious patients. Accordingly, how we morally should stand with persons in minimally conscious state remains unclear. In this paper, I examine whether the notion of human dignity could provide us with guidance with the moral difficulties MCS gives rise to. More precisely, I focus on the question of whether we are justified in holding that persons in minimally conscious state possess human dignity
Velmans, Max (1991). Is human information processing conscious? [Journal (Paginated)] 14 (4):651-69.   (Cited by 162 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Abstract: Investigations of the function of consciousness in human information processing have focused mainly on two questions: (1) where does consciousness enter into the information processing sequence and (2) how does conscious processing differ from preconscious and unconscious processing. Input analysis is thought to be initially "preconscious," "pre-attentive," fast, involuntary, and automatic. This is followed by "conscious," "focal-attentive" analysis which is relatively slow, voluntary, and flexible. It is thought that simple, familiar stimuli can be identified preconsciously, but conscious processing is needed to identify complex, novel stimuli. Conscious processing has also been thought to be necessary for choice, learning and memory, and the organization of complex, novel responses, particularly those requiring planning, reflection, or creativity
Velmans, Max (1991). Is human information processing conscious? [Journal (Paginated)].   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Investigations of the function of consciousness in human information processing have focused mainly on two questions: (1) where does consciousness enter into the information processing sequence and (2) how does conscious processing differ from preconscious and unconscious processing. Input analysis is thought to be initially "preconscious," "pre-attentive," fast, involuntary, and automatic. This is followed by "conscious," "focal-attentive" analysis which is relatively slow, voluntary, and flexible. It is thought that simple, familiar stimuli can be identified preconsciously, but conscious processing is needed to identify complex, novel stimuli. Conscious processing has also been thought to be necessary for choice, learning and memory, and the organization of complex, novel responses, particularly those requiring planning, reflection, or creativity
Velmans, Max (1990). Is the mind conscious, functional or both? [Journal (Paginated)].   (Google | More links)
Abstract: What, in essence, characterizes the mind? According to Searle, the potential to be conscious provides the only definitive criterion. Thus, conscious states are unquestionably "mental"; "shallow unconscious" states are also "mental" by virtue of their capacity to be conscious (at least in principle); but there are no "deep unconscious mental states" - i.e. those rules and procedures without access to consciousness, inferred by cognitive science to characterize the operations of the unconscious mind are not mental at all. Indeed, according to Searle, they have no ontological status - they are simply ways of describing some interesting facets of purely physiological phenomena
Velmans, Max (1999). When perception becomes conscious. British Journal Of Psychology 90 (4):543-566.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The study of preconscious versus conscious processing has an extensive history in cognitive psychology, dating back to the writings of William James. Much of the experimental work on this issue has focused on perception, conceived of as input analysis, and on the relation of consciousness to attentional processing. The present paper examines when input analysis becomes conscious from the perspectives of cognitive modelling, methodology, and a more detailed understanding of what is meant by "conscious processing." Current evidence suggests that perception becomes conscious at a late-arising stage of focal-attentive processing concerned with information integration and dissemination. Reliable criteria for determining when perception becomes conscious combine the evidence of "first-person," phenomenological reports with "third-person" functional dissociations between preconscious and conscious processing. There are three, distinct senses in which a process may be said to be "conscious." It might be "conscious" (a) in the sense that one is conscious of the process, (b) in the sense that the operation of the process is accompanied by consciousness (of its results) and (c) in the sense that consciousness enters into or causally influences the process. Consciousness of familiar stimuli, rather than entering into input analysis, appears to follow it, in human information processing. Processes closely associated with the appearance of consciousness such as information integration and dissemination appear to operate unconsciously. Consequently, perception appears to be "conscious" only in sense (b)
Verleger, Rolf; Jaskowski, Piotr; Aydemir, Aytaç; van der Lubbe, Rob H. J. & Groen, Margriet (2004). Qualitative differences between conscious and nonconscious processing? On inverse priming induced by masked arrows. Journal of Experimental Psychology 133 (4):494-515.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Vertes, Robert P. & Eastman, Kathleen E. (2000). Rem sleep is not committed to memory. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):1057-1063.   (Google)
Abstract: We believe that this has been a constructive debate on the topic of memory consolidation and REM sleep. It was a lively and spirited exchange – the essence of science. A number of issues were discussed including: the pedestal technique, stress, and early REMD work in animals; REM windows; the processing of declarative versus procedural memory in REM in humans; a mnemonic function for theta rhythm in waking but not in REM sleep; the lack of cognitive deficits in patients on antidepressant drugs that suppress or eliminate REM sleep; the disposition of conscious (dreams) and nonconscious material of REM sleep; and finally our theory of REM sleep. Although our position was strongly challenged, we still hold that REM sleep serves no role in the processing and consolidation of memory
Vertes, Robert P. & Eastman, Kathleen E. (2000). The case against memory consolidation in Rem sleep. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):867-876.   (Google)
Abstract: We present evidence disputing the hypothesis that memories are processed or consolidated in REM sleep. A review of REM deprivation (REMD) studies in animals shows these reports to be about equally divided in showing that REMD does, or does not, disrupt learning/memory. The studies supporting a relationship between REM sleep and memory have been strongly criticized for the confounding effects of very stressful REM deprivation techniques. The three major classes of antidepressant drugs, monoamine oxidase inhibitors (MAOIs), tricyclic antidepressants (TCAs), and selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs), profoundly suppress REM sleep. The MAOIs virtually abolish REM sleep, and the TCAs and SSRIs have been shown to produce immediate (40–85%) and sustained (30–50%) reductions in REM sleep. Despite marked suppression of REM sleep, these classes of antidepressants on the whole do not disrupt learning/memory. There have been a few reports of patients who have survived bilateral lesions of the pons with few lingering complications. Although these lesions essentially abolished REM sleep, the patients reportedly led normal lives. Recent functional imaging studies in humans have revealed patterns of brain activity in REM sleep that are consistent with dream processes but not with memory consolidation. We propose that the primary function of REM sleep is to provide periodic endogenous stimulation to the brain which serves to maintain requisite levels of central nervous system (CNS) activity throughout sleep. REM is the mechanism used by the brain to promote recovery from sleep. We believe that the cumulative evidence indicates that REM sleep serves no role in the processing or consolidation of memory. Key Words: antidepressant drugs; brain stem lesions; dreams; functional imaging; memory consolidation; REM deprivation; REM sleep; theta rhythm
Verfaellie, Mieke & Keane, M. M. (1997). The neural basis of aware and unaware forms of memory. Seminars in Neurology 17:153-61.   (Cited by 13 | Google)
Visser, Troy A. W. & Merikle, Philip M. (1999). Conscious and unconscious processes: The effects of motivation. Consciousness and Cognition 8 (1):94-113.   (Cited by 19 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The process-dissociation procedure has been used in a variety of experimental contexts to assess the contributions of conscious and unconscious processes to task performance. To evaluate whether motivation affects estimates of conscious and unconscious processes, participants were given incentives to follow inclusion and exclusion instructions in a perception task and a memory task. Relative to a control condition in which no performance incentives were given, the results for the perception task indicated that incentives increased the participants' ability to exclude previously presented information, which in turn both increased the estimate of conscious processes and decreased the estimate of unconscious processes. However, the results also indicated that incentives did not influence estimates of conscious or unconscious processes in the memory task. The findings suggest that the process-dissociation procedure is relatively immune to influences of motivation when used with a memory task, but that caution should be exercised when the process-dissociation is used with a perception task
Vokey, John R. & Higham, Philip A. (1999). Implicit knowledge as automatic, latent knowledge. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):787-788.   (Google)
Abstract: Implicit knowledge is perhaps better understood as latent knowledge so that it is readily apparent that it contrasts with explicit knowledge in terms of the form of the knowledge representation, rather than by definition in terms of consciousness or awareness. We argue that as a practical matter any definition of the distinction between implicit and explicit knowledge further involves the notion of control
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Walker, David L. & Gold, Paul E. (1997). NMDA receptors: Substrates or modulators of memory formation. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (4):634-634.   (Google)
Abstract: We agree with Shors & Matzel's general hypothesis that the proposed link between NMDA-dependent LTP and memory is weak. They suggest that NMDA-dependent LTP is important to arousal or attentional processes which influence learning in an anterograde manner. However, current evidence is also consistent with the view that NMDA receptors modulate memory consolidation retroactively, as occurs in several other receptor classes
Wang, Yingxu; Liu, Dong & Wang, Ying (2003). Discovering the capacity of human memory. Brain and Mind 4 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: Despite the fact that the number of neurons in the human brain has been identified in cognitive and neural sciences, the magnitude of human memory capacity is still unknown. This paper reports the discovery of the memory capacity of the human brain, which is on the order of 10 8432 bits. A cognitive model of the brain is created, which shows that human memory and knowledge are represented by relations, i.e., connections of synapses between neurons, rather than by the neurons themselves as the traditional container metaphor described. The determination of the magnitude of human memory capacity is not only theoretically significant in cognitive science, but also practically useful to unveil the human potential, as well as the gap between the natural and machine intelligence
Wegner, Daniel M. (2004). Frequently asked questions about conscious will. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (5):679-692.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The commentators' responses to The Illusion of Conscious Will reveal a healthy range of opinions – pro, con, and occasionally stray. Common concerns and issues are summarized here in terms of 11 “frequently asked questions,” which often center on the theme of how the experience of conscious will supports the creation of the self as author of action
Wegner, Daniel M. (2004). Précis of the illusion of conscious will. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (5):649-659.   (Google)
Abstract: The experience of conscious will is the feeling that we are doing things. This feeling occurs for many things we do, conveying to us again and again the sense that we consciously cause our actions. But the feeling may not be a true reading of what is happening in our minds, brains, and bodies as our actions are produced. The feeling of conscious will can be fooled. This happens in clinical disorders such as alien hand syndrome, dissociative identity disorder, and schizophrenic auditory hallucinations. And in people without disorders, phenomena such as hypnosis, automatic writing, Ouija board spelling, water dowsing, facilitated communication, speaking in tongues, spirit possession, and trance channeling also illustrate anomalies of will – cases when actions occur without will or will occurs without action. This book brings these cases together with research evidence from laboratories in psychology to explore a theory of apparent mental causation. According to this theory, when a thought appears in consciousness just prior to an action, is consistent with the action, and appears exclusive of salient alternative causes of the action, we experience conscious will and ascribe authorship to ourselves for the action. Experiences of conscious will thus arise from processes whereby the mind interprets itself – not from processes whereby mind creates action. Conscious will, in this view, is an indication that we think we have caused an action, not a revelation of the causal sequence by which the action was produced. Key Words: apparent mental causation; automatism; conscious will; determinism; free will; perceived control
Wegner, Daniel M. (2003). The mind's best trick: How we experience conscious will. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (2):65-69.   (Google | More links)
Weiskrantz, Lawrence (1995). Blindsight: Conscious vs. unconscious aspects. In Joseph E. King & Karl H. Pribram (eds.), Scale in Conscious Experience. Lawrence Erlbaum.   (Google)
Weiskrantz, Lawrence (1990). Outlooks for blindsight: Explicit methodologies for implicit processes. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London B 239:247-78.   (Google)
Westerberg, Carmen E. & Marsolek, Chad J. (1999). Questioning explicit properties of implicit individuals in knowledge representation. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):788-789.   (Google)
Abstract: Dienes & Perner argue that the explicit representation of an individual to which a property is attributed requires explicit representation of the attributed property. The reasons for this conclusion are similar to the reasons why another of their conclusions may be considered suspect: A property may be explicit without an explicit representation of an individual or the predication of the property to an individual. We question the latter conclusion and draw connections to neurophysiological and cognitive evidence
Wheeler, Mark A. (2000). Episodic memory and autonoetic awareness. In Endel Tulving & Fergus I. M. Craik (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Memory. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 20 | Google)
Wheeler, Mark A.; Stuss, ; Donald, T. & Tulving, Endel (1997). Toward a theory of episodic memory: The frontal lobes and autonoetic consciousness. Psychological Bulletin 121:331-54.   (Cited by 433 | Google | More links)
Wheeler, M. (2000). Varieties of consciousness and memory in the developing child. In Endel Tulving (ed.), Memory, Consciousness, and the Brain: The Tallinn Conference. Psychology Press/Taylor & Francis.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Whittlesea, B. W. A. & Dorken, M. D. (1997). Implicit learning: Indirect, not unconscious. Psychonomic Bulletin and Review 4:63-67.   (Cited by 20 | Google)
Wilber, Ken (ms). Foreword to the spirit of conscious business , Fred Kofman.   (Google)
Abstract: So "conscious business" might mean, engaging in an occupation, work, or trade in a mindful, awake fashion. This implies, of course, that many people do not do so. In my experience, that is often the case. So I would definitely be in favor of conscious business; or conscious anything, for that matter
Willingham, Daniel & Preuss, Laura (1995). The death of implicit memory. Psyche 2 (15).   (Cited by 13 | Google | More links)
Wippich, W. (1992). Implicit and explicit memory without awareness. Psychological Research 54:212-24.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Yonelinas, Andrew P. (2001). Consciousness, control, and confidence: The 3 cs of recognition memory. Journal of Experimental Psychology 130 (3):361-379.   (Cited by 60 | Google | More links)
Zanga, Aldo & Jean-Fran, (2004). Implicit learning in rule induction and problem solving. Thinking and Reasoning 10 (1):55 – 83.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Using the Chinese Ring Puzzle (Kotovsky & Simon, 1990; P. J. Reber & Kotovsky, 1997), we studied the effect on rule discovery of having to plan actions or not in order to reach a goal state. This was done by asking participants to predict legal moves as in implicit learning tasks (Experiment 1) and by asking participants to make legal moves as in problem-solving tasks (Experiment 2). Our hypothesis was that having a specific goal state to reach has a dual effect on rule discovery. The first effect is positive and related to feedback from moves done in order to attain the goal: generalising the results of action and associating them to the conditions in which they were obtained allows discovery of the rule and learning it. The second effect is negative. In attempting to reach a specific goal, participants first tend to reduce the distance that separates the current state from the goal state (hill climbing) and so neglect the kind of exploration that facilitates rule and procedure discovery because this would seem to be a detour from the goal. Results show that having to plan actions improved performance in implicit learning tasks (Experiment 1), yet it impaired performance in problem-solving tasks (Experiment 2). Although implicit learning and problem solving are based on rule discovery, and entail noticing regularities in the material, in both cases, rule discovery processes appear to be task-dependent
Zeelenberg, René; Plomp, Gijs & Raaijmakers, Jeroen G. W. (2003). Can false memories be created through nonconscious processes? Consciousness and Cognition 12 (3):403-412.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Presentation times of study words presented in the Deese/Roediger and McDermott (DRM) paradigm varied from 20 to 2000 ms per word in an attempt to replicate the false memory effect following extremely short presentations reported by . Both in a within-subjects design (Experiment 1) and in a between-subjects design (Experiment 2) subjects showed memory for studied words as well as a false memory effect for related critical lures in the 2000-ms condition. However, in the conditions with shorter presentation times (20 ms in Experiment 1; 20 and 40 ms in Experiment 2) no memory for studied words, nor a false memory effect was found. We argue that there is at present no strong evidence supporting the claim for a nonconscious basis of the false memory effect
Zizzo, Daniel John (2000). Implicit learning of (boundedly) rational behaviour. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (5):700-701.   (Google)
Abstract: Stanovich & West's target article undervalues the power of implicit learning (particularly reinforcement learning). Implicit learning may allow the learning of more rational responses–and sometimes even generalisation of knowledge–in contexts where explicit, abstract knowledge proves only of limited value, such as for economic decision-making. Four other comments are made
Zorzi, Marco & Umiltà, Carlo (1999). Priming in neglect is problematic for linking consciousness to stability. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):174-175.   (Google)
Abstract: O'Brien & Opie argue that (1) only explicit representations give rise to conscious experience, and (2) explicit representations depend on stable patterns of activation. In neglect patients, the stimuli presented to the neglected hemifield are not consciously experienced but exert causal effects on the processing of other stimuli presented to the intact hemifield. We argue that O'Brien & Opie cannot account for a nonconscious representation that is stable, as attested by the fact that it affects behavior, but is neither potentially explicit nor tacit