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Science of Consciousness :: First-Person Approaches :: Verbal Reports and Heterophenomenology

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Adams, William A. (2006). Transpersonal heterophenomenology? Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (4):89-93.   (Cited by 1 | Google | Edit)
Abstract: Anthony Freeman's article on transpersonal psychology cited Jorge Ferrer's criticism that while the field claims to be non-dualistic or 'post-Cartesian' (no subject -object or mind-body split), it is nevertheless hopelessly dualistic. . .Freeman proposes a way of salvation for transpersonal psychology by invoking Daniel Dennettapos;s concept of heterophenomenology, which is a third-person investigation of someone elseapos;s first-person experience (as reported). . .Freeman's proposal is a fine demonstration of lateral thinking, calling upon atheist Dennett in support of transpersonal and religious inquiry. Unfortunately, it is a solution analogous to searching for lost keys under the lamppost where the light is better
Albahari, Miri (2002). Can heterophenomenology ground a complete science of consciousness? Noetica.   (Google | Edit)
Cytowic, Richard (2003). The clinician's paradox: Believing those you must not trust. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10.   (Google | Edit)
Dennett, Daniel C. (1982). How to study human consciousness empirically, or, nothing comes to mind. Synthese 53 (2):159-80.   (Cited by 16 | Google | More links | Annotation | Edit)
Dennett, Daniel C. (2003). Who's on first? Heterophenomenology explained. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (9):19-30.   (Google | Edit)
Dienes, Zoltán (2004). Assumptions of subjective measures of unconscious mental states: Higher order thoughts and bias. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (9):25-45.   (Cited by 14 | Google | Edit)
Dokic, Jérôme & Pacherie, Elisabeth (2007). Too much ado about belief. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2).   (Google | More links | Edit)
Abstract: Three commitments guide Dennett’s approach to the study of consciousness. First, an ontological commitment to materialist monism. Second, a methodological commitment to what he calls ‘heterophenomenology.’ Third, a ‘doxological’ commitment that can be expressed as the view that there is no room for a distinction between a subject’s beliefs about how things seem to her and what things actually seem to her, or, to put it otherwise, as the view that there is no room for a reality/appearance distinction for consciousness. We investigate how Dennett’s third doxological commitment relates to his first two commitments and whether its acceptance should be seen as a mere logical consequence of acceptance of the first two. We will argue that this is not the case, that Dennett’s doxological commitment is in need of independent motivation, and that this independent motivation is not forthcoming
Dreyfus, Hubert L. & Kelly, Sean D. (2007). Heterophenomenology: Heavy-handed Sleight-of-hand. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2).   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)
Abstract: We argue that heterophenomenology both over- and under-populates the intentional realm. For example, when one is involved in coping, one’s mind does not contain beliefs. Since the heterophenomenologist interprets all intentional commitment as belief, he necessarily overgenerates the belief contents of the mind. Since beliefs cannot capture the normative aspect of coping and perceiving, any method, such as heterophenomenology, that allows for only beliefs is guaranteed not only to overgenerate beliefs but also to undergenerate other kinds of intentional phenomena
Ericsson, K. A. (2003). Valid and non-reactive verbalization of thoughts during performance of tasks - towards a solution to the central problems of introspection as a source of scientific data. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (9-10):1-18.   (Google | Edit)
Falk, Arthur E. (1975). Learning to report one's introspections. Philosophy of Science 42 (September):223-241.   (Google | More links | Edit)
Goldman, A. (2004). Epistemology and the evidential status of introspective reports I. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (7-8):1-16.   (Google | More links | Edit)
Hartelius, G. (2006). All that glisters is not gold - heterophenomenology and transpersonal theory. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (6):63-77.   (Google | Edit)
Abstract: Anthony Freeman (2006) proposes that Dennett's heterophenomenology (HP) be fully integrated into transpersonal studies as a solution to the 'subtle Cartesianism' that Jorge Ferrer (2002) detects within the field. Methods virtually indistinguishable from HP are already in use within transpersonal research, so the issue of comparison lies deeper. On close analysis, Ferrer's approach cannot be situated within Dennett's (2003) data levels at all, for participatory transpersonalism conceives a profoundly different relationship between conscious subject and the world: a relational matrix of interacting subjects participating in the co- creation of the cosmos. HP, while valuable, is not adequate for a comprehensive study of consciousness. Its shortcomings can be illustrated by imagining an analogical discipline in the natural sciences: heterobotany. Limiting transpersonal inquiry to HP would represent a step backwards in the ongoing process of pioneering effective methods of consciousness research
Hurlburt, R. & Heavey, C. L. (2004). To beep or not to beep: Obtaining accurate reports about awareness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (7):113-128.   (Cited by 4 | Google | Edit)
Marbach, Eduard (2007). No heterophenomenology without autophenomenology: Variations on a theme of mine. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2).   (Google | More links | Edit)
Abstract: The paper assumes that the very source for an appropriate concept formation and categorization of the phenomena of consciousness is provided by pre-reflectively living through one’s own experiences (of perceiving, remembering, imagining, picturing, judging, etc.) and reflecting upon them. It tries to argue that without reflective auto-phenomenological theorizing about such phenomena, there is no prospect for a scientific study of consciousness doing fully justice to the phenomena themselves. To substantiate the point, a detailed reflective and descriptive analysis of re-presentational experiences is presented, an essential property of which is their containing in themselves components that can only be individuated on the basis of reflection by the experiencing subject him- or herself. For heterophenomenology to account for them, autophenomenology is therefore presupposed
Marbach, Eduard (1994). Troubles with heterophenomenology. In Roberto Casati, B. Smith & Stephen L. White (eds.), Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences. Holder-Pichler-Tempsky.   (Cited by 47 | Google | Edit)
Marcel, Anthony J. (2003). Introspective report - trust, self-knowledge and science. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (9-10):167-186.   (Google | Edit)
Nahmias, Eddy A. (2002). Verbal reports on the contents of consciousness: Reconsidering introspectionist methodology. Psyche 8.   (Cited by 6 | Google | Edit)
Nahmias, Eddy A. (2002). Verbal reports on the contents of consciousness. Psyche 8 (21).   (Cited by 6 | Google | Edit)
Abstract: how different schools of psychology (introspectionism, behaviorism, cognitive psychology) have treated verbal reports about the contents of consciousness. After examining these differences, I suggest that, with new methods of mapping data about neurobiological states with behavioral data and with verbal reports about conscious experience, we should reconsider some of the introspectionists' goals and methods. I discuss examples from cognitive psychology, including pain researchers' attempts to develop self-reports of pain so that they can be, like other vital signs, reliable indicators of internal states
Nisbett, Richard E. & Wilson, Timothy D. (1977). Telling more than we can know: Verbal reports on mental processes. Psychological Review 84:231-59.   (Cited by 2376 | Google | More links | Edit)
Overgaard, Morten (2001). The role of phenomenological reports in experiments on consciousness. Psycoloquy 12 (29):1-10.   (Cited by 7 | Google | Edit)
Petitmengin, Claire (2006). Describing one's subjective experience in the second person: An interview method for the science of consciousness. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 5 (3-4).   (Cited by 1 | Google | Edit)
Abstract: This article presents an interview method which enables us to bring a person, who may not even have been trained, to become aware of his or her subjective experience, and describe it with great precision. It is focused on the difficulties of becoming aware of one’s subjective experience and describing it, and on the processes used by this interview technique to overcome each of these difficulties. The article ends with a discussion of the criteria governing the validity of the descriptions obtained, and then with a brief review of the functions of these descriptions
Piccinini, Gualtiero (2003). Data from introspective reports: Upgrading from common sense to science. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (9-10):141-156.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links | Edit)
Abstract: Journal of Consciousness Studies, 10.9-10 (2003), pp. 141-156. Argues that when properly understood and handled, introspective reports are a legitimate source of public scientific data
Praetorius, Nini (2004). Intersubjectivity of cognition and language: Principled reasons why the subject may be Trusted. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3 (2):195-214.   (Google | More links | Edit)
Abstract:   The paper aims to show that scepticism concerning the status of first-person reports of mental states and their use as evidence in scientific cognitive research is unfounded. Rather, principled arguments suggest that the conditions for the intersubjectivity of cognition and description of publicly observable things apply equally for our cognition and description of our mental or internal states. It is argued that on these conditions relies the possibility of developing well-defined scientific criteria for distinguishing between first-person and third-person cognition and description. The paper concludes by outlining the consequences for cognitive research and for functional theories of mind
Radner, Daisie M. (1994). Heterophenomenology: Learning about the birds and the bees. Journal of Philosophy 91 (8):389-403.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)
Roepstorff, Andreas (2003). Why trust the subject? Journal of Consciousness Studies 10.   (Google | Edit)
Roy, Jean-Michel (2007). Heterophenomenology and phenomenological skepticism. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2).   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Edit)
Abstract: This paper is an attempt to clarify and assess Dennett’s opinion about the relevance of the phenomenological tradition to contemporary cognitive science, focussing on the very idea of a phenomenological investigation. Dennett can be credited with four major claims on this topic: (1) Two kinds of phenomenological investigations must be carefully distinguished: autophenomenology and heterophenomenology; (2) autophenomenology is wrong, because it fails to overcome what might be called the problem of phenomenological scepticism; (3) the phenomenological tradition mainly derived from Husserl is based on an autophenomenological conception of phenomenology, and, consequently, can be of no help to contemporary cognitive science; (4) however, heterophenomenology is indispensable for obtaining an adequate theory of consciousness. In response to Dennett’s analysis, the paper develops two main counterclaims: (1) Although the traditional conception of phenomenology does indeed fit Dennett’s notion of autophenomenology, his sceptical arguments fail to rule out at least the possibility of a modified version of this traditional conception, such as the one defended in Roy et al. (Naturalizing Phenomenology, 1999); (2) the distinction between autophenomenology and heterophenomenology is at any rate misconceived, because, upon closer analysis, heterophenomenology proves to include the essential characteristics of autophenomenology
Soldati, Gianfranco (2007). Subjectivity in heterophenomenology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2).   (Google | More links | Edit)
Abstract: I distinguish between naïve phenomenology and really existing phenomenology, a distinction that is too often ignored. As a consequence, the weaknesses inherent in naïve phenomenology are mistakenly attributed to phenomenology. I argue that the critics of naïve phenomenology have unwittingly adopted a number of precisely those weaknesses they wish to point out. More precisely, I shall argue that Dennett’s criticism of the naïve or auto-phenomenological conception of subjectivity fails to provide a better understanding of the intended phenomenon
Thompson, David L. (2000). Phenomenology and heterophenomenology: Husserl and Dennett on reality and science. In Andrew Brook, Don Ross & David L. Thompson (eds.), Dennett's Philosophy: A Comprehensive Assessment. MIT Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google | Edit)
Velmans, Max (2007). Heterophenomenology vs. critical phenomenology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2).   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links | Edit)
Abstract: Dennett’s heterophenomenology and the critical phenomenology that I outline may be thought of as competing accounts of a cautious approach to phenomenal description and method. One can be critical or cautious about how well or how reliably a subject can communicate his or her subjective experience in experimental settings, without for a moment doubting their existence or claiming them to be something completely different to how they seem. Given this, Dennett’s heterophenomenology with its accompanying “qualia denial” looks like nothing more than an attempt to shore up his counterintuitive, eliminativist philosophy of mind
White, Patricia D. (1980). Limitations on verbal reports of internal events: A refutation of Nisbett and Wilson and of Bem. Psychological Review 87:105-12.   (Google | Edit)

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