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8.9d. Consciousness and Anesthesia (Consciousness and Anesthesia on PhilPapers)

See also:
Aitkenhead, A. R. (1993). Conscious awareness. In P. S. Sebel, B. Bonke & E. Winograd (eds.), Memory and Awareness in Anesthesia. Prentice-Hall.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Alkire, M. T. & Miller, Jeff G. (2006). General anesthesia and the neural correlates of consciousness. In Steven Laureys (ed.), Boundaries of Consciousness. Elsevier.   (Cited by 17 | Google | More links)
Alkire, M. T.; Haier, R. J. & Fallon, J. H. (2000). Toward a unified theory of narcosis: Brain imaging evidence for a thalamocortical switch as the neurophysiologic basis of anesthetic-induced unconsciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (3):370-386.   (Google)
Abstract: A unifying theory of general anesthetic-induced unconsciousness must explain the common mechanism through which various anesthetic agents produce unconsciousness. Functional-brain-imaging data obtained from 11 volunteers during general anesthesia showed specific suppression of regional thalamic and midbrain reticular formation activity across two different commonly used volatile agents. These findings are discussed in relation to findings from sleep neurophysiology and the implications of this work for consciousness research. It is hypothesized that the essential common neurophysiologic mechanism underlying anesthetic-induced unconsciousness is, as with sleep-induced unconsciousness, a hyperpolarization block of thalamocortical neurons. A model of anesthetic-induced unconsciousness is introduced to explain how the plethora of effects anesthetics have on cellular functioning ultimately all converge on a single neuroanatomic/neurophysiologic system, thus providing for a unitary physiologic theory of narcosis related to consciousness
Alkire, M. T.; Haier, R. J. & James, H. F. (1998). Toward the neurobiology of consciousness: Using brain imaging and anesthesia to investigate the anatomy of consciousness. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness II. MIT Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Andrade, Jackie & Jones, J. G. (1997). Awareness in anesthesia. In G. Hall & Morris J. Morgan (eds.), Short Practice of Anesthesia. Chapman and Hall.   (Google)
Andrade, Jackie & Deeprose, Catherine (2006). A starting point for consciousness research: Reply to Thomas Schmidt. Consciousness and Cognition 15 (1):28-30.   (Google)
Andrade, Jackie; Deeprose, Catherine & Barker, Ian (2008). Incidence of awareness and memory priming in paediatric surgery with general anaesthesia. British Journal of Anaesthesia.   (Google)
Andrade, Jackie (1997). Investigations of hypesthesia: Using anesthetics to explore relationships between consciousness, learning, and memory. Consciousness and Cognition 5:562-80.   (Google)
Andrade, Jackie (1995). Learning during anesthesia: A review. British Journal of Psychology 86:479-506.   (Google)
Andrade, Jackie (2000). NMDa receptor--mediated consciousness: A theoretical framework for understanding the effects of anesthesia on cognition? In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Neural Correlates of Consciousness. MIT Press.   (Google)
Backman, S. B.; Fiset, P. & Plourde, G. (2004). Cholinergic mechanisms mediating anesthetic induced altered states of consciousness. Progress in Brain Research 145:197-206.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Berner, Knut (2001). Local anaesthesia, the increase of the evil through emotional impoverishment. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 4 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: Evil should be characterised as a specific constellation, which results from destructive connections between individual activities and systemic influences. The article shows some important aspects of the structure of evil and prefers the terms of wickedness and obscene coincidences to describe its own character. Therefore, also the division between rationality and affectivity appears as inadequate, because evil has on the one side an intrinsic attractiveness for individuals and is on the other side in modern societies more and more a product of a rationality, which is free from passion. Especially the emotional impoverishment is responsible for the increase of evil, which is demonstrated by two examples. Based on Paul Ricoeur, the evolution of malum can be developed by a short analyse of the relationship between Ethics and Emotions
Bonke, B.; Fitch, W. & Millar, K. (eds.) (1990). Memory and Awareness In Anesthesia. Swets & Zeitlinger.   (Google)
Bonke, B.; Bovill, J. G. & Moerman, N. (eds.) (1996). Memory and Awareness in Anesthesia III. Van Gorcum.   (Google)
Brusseau, Roland R. & Mashour, George A. (2007). Subcortical consciousness: Implications for fetal anesthesia and analgesia. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (1):86-87.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In this commentary we discuss the possibility of subcortical consciousness and its implications for fetal anesthesia and analgesia. We review the neural development of structural and functional elements that may participate in conscious representation, with a particular focus on the experience of pain. (Published Online May 1 2007)
Cariani, Peter (2000). Anesthesia, neural information processing, and consciousness awareness. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (3):387-395.   (Google)
Abstract: Possible systemic effects of general anesthetic agents on neural information processing are discussed in the context of the thalamocortical suppression hypothesis presented by Drs. Alkire, Haier, and Fallon (this issue) in their PET study of the anesthetized state. Accounts of the neural requisites of consciousness fall into two broad categories. Neuronal-specificity theories postulate that activity in particular neural populations is sufficient for conscious awareness, while process-coherence theories postulate that particular organizations of neural activity are sufficient. Accounts of anesthetic narcosis, on the other hand, explain losses of consciousness in terms of neural signal-suppressions, transmission blocks, and the disruptions of signal interpretation. While signal-suppression may account for the actions of some anesthetic agents, the existence of anesthetics, such as choralose, that cause both loss of consciousness and elevated discharge rates, is problematic for a general theory of narcosis that is based purely on signal suppression and transmission-block. However, anesthetic agents also alter relative firing rates and temporal discharge patterns that may disrupt the coherence of neural signals and the functioning of the neural networks that interpret them. It is difficult at present, solely on the basis of regional brain metabolic rates, to test process-coherence hypotheses regarding organizational requisites for conscious awareness. While these pioneering PET studies have great merit as panoramic windows of mind-brain correlates, wider ranges of theory and empirical evidence need to be brought into the formulation of truly comprehensive theories of consciousness and anesthesia
Caseley-Rondi, G.; Merikle, Philip M. & Bowers, K. S. (1994). Unconscious cognition in the context of general anesthesia. Consciousness and Cognition 3:166-95.   (Cited by 9 | Google)
Cogliolo, P.; Romano, V.; Villani, R. & Galano, M. (1993). Effectiveness of Evans' technique for the evaluation of awareness. In P. S. Sebel, B. Bonke & E. Winograd (eds.), Memory and Awareness in Anesthesia 2. Prentice-Hall.   (Google)
Corner, M. (1976). The nature of consciousness: Some persistent conceptual difficulties and a practical suggestion. Progress in Brain Research 45:471-5.   (Google)
Deeprose, Catherine & Andrade, Jackie (2006). Is priming during anesthesia unconscious? Consciousness and Cognition 15 (1):1-23.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Dierckx, Vicky & Andr, (2004). Plugging a tooth before anaesthetising the patient? The influence of people's beliefs on reasoning about the temporal order of actions. Thinking and Reasoning 10 (4):371 – 404.   (Google)
Abstract: According to the mental models theory, reasoning performance is primarily influenced by the number of models of a problem that can be constructed. This study investigates whether the content of the model may also influence performance. Linear reasoning problems were devised that either described a believable (script-consistent) or an unbelievable (script-inconsistent) order of actions. The results of two experiments showed that conclusions were inferred more slowly and less accurately on the basis of an unbelievable model than on a believable one. Experiment 2 revealed that script knowledge facilitated as well as impeded reasoning performance. Conclusion evaluation was faster and more accurately for script-consistent problems than for neutral problems, whereas model construction and conclusion evaluation occurred respectively more slowly and less accurately for script-inconsistent problems than for neutral problems. These results show that the content of the model is a noteworthy factor influencing reasoning performance
Eich, Eric; Reeves, J. L. & Katz, R. L. (1985). Anesthesia, amnesia, and the memory/awareness distinction. Anesthesia and Analgesia 64:1143-48.   (Cited by 20 | Google | More links)
Evans, J. M. (1987). Patient's experiences of awareness during general anesthesia. In Michael Rosen & J. N. Lunn (eds.), Consciousness, Awareness, and Pain in General Anesthesia. Butterworths.   (Google)
Fiset, P.; Plourde, G. & Backman, S. B. (2006). Brain imaging in research on anesthetic mechanisms: Studies with propofol. In Steven Laureys (ed.), Boundaries of Consciousness. Elsevier.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Flohr, Hans (1995). An information-processing theory of anesthesia. Neuropsychologia 33:1169-80.   (Google)
Flood, Pamela (2002). General anesthetics. In Elaine Perry, Heather Ashton & Allan Young (eds.), Neurochemistry of Consciousness: Neurotransmitters in Mind. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Flohr, Hans (2000). NMDA-receptor-mediated computational processes and phenomenal consciousness. In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Neural Correlates of Consciousness. MIT Press.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Flohr, Hans (1998). On the mechanism of action of anesthetic agents. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness II. MIT Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Franks, N. P. & Lieb, W. R. (1998). The molecular basis of general anesthesia: Current ideas. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness II. MIT Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Franks, N. P. & Lieb, W. R. (2000). The role of NMDA receptors in consciousness: What we learn from anesthetic mechanisms? In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Neural Correlates of Consciousness. MIT Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Gabora, Liane (1999). Microtubules, anesthetics, and quantum consciousness:An interview with Stuart Hameroff. Foundations of Science 4 (2).   (Google)
Gajwani, Prashant; Muzina, David; Gao, Kerning & Calabrese, Joseph R. (2006). Awareness under anesthesia during electroconvulsive therapy treatment. Journal of ECT 22 (2):158-159.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Ghoneim, M. M. & Block, R. I. (1992). Learning and consciousness during general anesthesia. Anesthesiology 76:279-305.   (Cited by 132 | Google | More links)
Hagan, Scott; Jibu, Marj & Yasue, Kunio (1994). Consciousness and anesthesia: A hypothesis involving biophoton emission in the microtubular cytoskeleton of the brain. In Karl H. Pribram (ed.), Origins: Brain and Self-Organization. Lawrence Erlbaum.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Hameroff, Stuart (ms). Anesthesia, consciousness and hydrophobic pockets a unitary quantum hypothesis of anesthetic action.   (Google)
Abstract: Anesthetic gas molecules are recognized to act by van der Waals (London dispersion) forces in hydrophobic pockets of select brain proteins to ablate consciousness. Enigmatic features of consciousness have defied conventional neurophysiological exp lanations and prompted suggestions for supplemental occurrence of macroscopic quantum coherent states and quantum computation in the brain. Are these feasible? During conscious (non-anesthetic) conditions, endogenous Van der Waals London dispersion forces occur among non-polar amino acid groups in hydrophobic pockets of neural proteins and help regulate their conformation/function. London forces are weak instantaneous couplings between pairs of electron induced dipoles (e.g. between adjacent non-polar amino acid groups), and are quantum mechanical effects capable of supporting quantum superposition/computation and macroscopic quantum coherence. Quantum effects mediated by endogenous London forces in hydrophobic pockets of select neural proteins may be necessary for consciousness. The mechanism of anesthetics may be to inhibit (by exogenous London forces) the necessary quantum states
Hameroff, Stuart R. (2001). Anesthesia: The "other side" of consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 10 (2):217-229.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Hameroff, Stuart R. (2006). The entwined mysteries of anesthesia and consciousness. Anesthesiology 105 (2):400-412.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: feelings (brainstem, limbic system). The best scientific synchrony and consciousness.21,27 Anesthesiology, V 105, No 2, Aug 2006
Hill, D. S. & Hill, D. S. (1910). The loss and recovery of consciousness under anesthesia. Psychological Bulletin 7:77-83.   (Google)
Hu, Huping & Wu, Maoxin (ms). Photon induced non-local effects of general anaesthetics on the brain.   (Google)
Abstract: Photons are intrinsically quantum objects and natural long-distance carriers of information in both classical and quantum communications1. Since brain functions involve information and many experiments have shown that quantum entanglement is physically real, we have contemplated from the perspective of our recent hypothesis2 on the possibility of entangling the quantum entities inside the brain with those in an external anaesthetic sample and carried out experiments toward that end. Here we report that applying magnetic pulses to the brain when a general anaesthetic sample was placed in between caused the brain to feel the effect of said anaesthetic for several hours after the treatment as if the test subject had actually inhaled the same. The said effect is consistently reproducible on all four subjects tested. We further found that drinking water exposed to magnetic pulses, laser light, microwave or even flashlight when an anaesthetic sample was placed in between also causes consistently reproducible brain effects in various degrees. We have in addition tested several medications including morphine and obtained consistently reproducible results. Further, through additional experiments we have verified that the said brain effect is the consequence of quantum entanglement between quantum entities inside the brain and those of the chemical substance under study induced by the photons of the magnetic pulses or applied lights. We suggest that the said quantum entities inside the brain are nuclear and/or electron spins and discuss the profound implications of these results
Jansen, C. K.; Bonke, B.; Klein, J. Theodore & Bezstarosti, J. (1990). Unconscious perception during balanced anesthesia? In B. Bonke, W. Fitch, K. Millar & 1990 Unconscious perception during balanced anesthesia? (eds.), Memory and Awareness in Anesthesia. Swets & Zeitlinger.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
John, E. R.; Prichep, L. S.; Kox, W.; Valdes-Sosa, P.; Bosch-Bayard, J.; Aubert, E.; Tom, M.; diMichele, F. & Gugino, L. D. (2001). Invariant reversible QEEG effects of anesthetics. Consciousness and Cognition 10 (2):165-183.   (Google)
Abstract: Continuous recordings of brain electrical activity were obtained from a group of 176 patients throughout surgical procedures using general anesthesia. Artifact-free data from the 19 electrodes of the International 10/20 System were subjected to quantitative analysis of the electroencephalogram (QEEG). Induction was variously accomplished with etomidate, propofol or thiopental. Anesthesia was maintained throughout the procedures by isoflurane, desflurane or sevoflurane (N = 68), total intravenous anesthesia using propofol (N = 49), or nitrous oxide plus narcotics (N = 59). A set of QEEG measures were found which reversibly displayed high heterogeneity of variance between four states as follows: (1) during induction; (2) just after loss of consciousness (LOC); (3) just before return of consciousness (ROC); (4) just after ROC. Homogeneity of variance across all agents within states was found. Topographic statistical probability images were compared between states. At LOC, power increased in all frequency bands in the power spectrum with the exception of a decrease in gamma activity, and there was a marked anteriorization of power. Additionally, a significant change occurred in hemispheric relationships, with prefrontal and frontal regions of each hemisphere becoming more closely coupled, and anterior and posterior regions on each hemisphere, as well as homologous regions between the two hemispheres, uncoupling. All of these changes reversed upon ROC. Variable resolution electromagnetic tomography (VARETA) was performed to localize salient features of power anteriorization in three dimensions. A common set of neuroanatomical regions appeared to be the locus of the most probable generators of the observed EEG changes
John, E. R.; Prichep, L. S.; Kox, W.; Valdes-Sosa, P.; Bosch-Bayard, J.; Aubert, E.; Tom, M.; diMichele, F. & Gugino, L. D. (2002). Invariant reversible QEEG effects of anesthetics - volume 10, number 2 (2001), pages 165-183. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (1):138-138.   (Google)
Jones, J. G. (1988). Awareness during anesthesia. Anaesthesia Rounds.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Kihlstrom, John F. & Schacter, Daniel L. (1990). Anesthesia, amnesia, and the cognitive unconscious. In B. Bonke, W. Fitch, K. Millar, amnesia Anesthesia & 1990 the cognitive unconscious. (eds.), Memory and Awareness in Anesthesia. Swets & Zeitlinger.   (Google)
Kihlstrom, John F. & Couture, L. J. (1992). Awareness and information processing during general anesthesia. Journal of Psychopharmacology 6:410-17.   (Google)
Kihlstrom, John F. & Cork, Randall C. (2007). Consciousness and anesthesia. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell.   (Google)
Kiviniemi, K. (1994). Conscious awareness and memory during general anesthesia. Aana Journal 62:441-9.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Kulli, J. & Koch, Christof (1991). Does anaesthesia cause loss of consciousness? Trends in Neurosciences 14.   (Google)
Lamdan, Ruth M.; Ahmed, Ziauddin & Lee, Jean (1998). General anesthesia: An extreme form of chemical and physical restraint. HEC Forum 10 (3-4).   (Google)
Lennmarken, Claes & Sandin, Rolf (2004). Neuromonitoring for awareness during surgery. Lancet 363 (9423).   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Levinson, B. W. (1965). States of awareness during general anaesthesia. British Journal of Anaesthesia 37:544-546.   (Cited by 58 | Google)
Lewis, S. A.; Jenkinson, J. & Wilson, J. (1973). An EEG investigation of awareness during anaesthesia. British Journal of Psychology 64:413-5.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Locke, Don (1971). Must a materialist pretend he's anaesthetized? Philosophical Quarterly 21 (July):217-31.   (Cited by 2 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Mashour, George A. (2004). Consciousness unbound: Toward a paradigm of general anesthesia. Anesthesiology 100:428-433.   (Cited by 27 | Google | More links)
Mashour, George A. (2006). Integrating the science of consciousness and anesthesia. Anesthesia and Analgesia 103:975-982.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Mashour, George A. & LaRock, Eric (forthcoming). Inverse Zombies, Anesthesia Awareness, and the Hard Problem of Unconsciousness. Consciousness and Cognition.   (Google)
Abstract: Philosophical (p-) zombies are constructs that possess all of the behavioral features and responses of a sentient human being, yet are not conscious. P-zombies are intimately linked to the hard problem of consciousness and have been invoked as arguments against physicalist approaches. But what if we were to invert the characteristics of p-zombies? Such an inverse (i-) zombie would possess all of the behavioral features and responses of an insensate being yet would nonetheless be conscious. While p-zombies are logically possible but naturally improbable, an approximation of i-zombies actually exists: individuals experiencing what is referred to as “anesthesia awareness.” Patients under general anesthesia may be intubated (preventing speech), paralyzed (preventing movement), and narcotized (minimizing response to nociceptive stimuli). Thus, they appear—and typically are—unconscious. In 1-2 cases/1000, however, patients may be aware of intraoperative events, sometimes without any objective indices. Furthermore, a much higher percentage of patients (22% in a recent study) may have the subjective experience of dreaming during general anesthesia. P-zombies confront us with the hard problem of consciousness—how do we explain the presence of qualia? I-zombies present a more practical problem—how do we detect the presence of qualia? The current investigation compares p-zombies to i-zombies and explores the “hard problem” of unconsciousness with a focus on anesthesia awareness.
Mashour, George A. (2008). Toward a General Theory of Unconscious Processes in Psychoanalysis and Anesthesiology. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association 56 (1):203-222.   (Google)
Merikle, Philip M. & Daneman, M. (1996). Memory for events during anesthesia: A meta-analysis. In B. Bonke, J. G. Bovill & N. Moerman (eds.), Memory and Awareness in Anesthesia III. Van Gorcum.   (Google)
Merikle, Philip M. & Daneman, M. (1996). Memory for unconsciously perceived events: Evidence from anesthetized patients. Consciousness and Cognition 5:525-541.   (Cited by 41 | Google | More links)
Moerman, N.; Bonke, B. & Oosting, J. (1993). Awareness and recall during general anesthesia: Facts and feelings. Anesthesiology 79:454-64.   (Google)
Mostert, J. W. (1975). States of awareness during general anesthesia. Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 19:68-76.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Munglani, R. & Jones, J. G. (1992). Sleep and general anesthesia as altered states of consciousness. Journal of Psychopharmacology 6:399-409.   (Google)
Myles, P. S.; Leslie, K.; McNeil, J.; Forbes, A. & Chan, M. T. V. (2004). Bispectral index monitoring to prevent awareness during anaesthesia: The b-aware randomised controlled trial. Lancet 363 (9423).   (Cited by 152 | Google | More links)
Nikolinakos, Drakon (1994). General anesthesia, consciousness, and the skeptical challenge. Journal of Philosophy 91 (2):88-104.   (Cited by 1 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Nixon, Reginald D. V.; Bryant, Richard A. & Moulds, Michelle L. (2006). Cognitive-behavioural treatment of posttraumatic stress disorder following awareness under anaesthesia: A case study. Behavioural and Cognitive Psychotherapy 34 (1):113-118.   (Google)
Osterman, Janet E.; Hopper, James; Heran, William J.; Keane, Terence M. & van der Kolk, Bessel A. (2001). Awareness under anesthesia and the development of posttraumatic stress disorder. General Hospital Psychiatry 23 (4):198-204.   (Cited by 44 | Google | More links)
Plourde, G. (2001). Identifying the neural correlates of consciousness: Strategies with general anesthetics. Consciousness and Cognition 10 (2):241-44.   (Google | More links)
Pockett, Susan (1999). Anesthesia and the electrophysiology of auditory consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 8 (1):45-61.   (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Empirical work is reviewed which correlates the presence or absence of various parts of the auditory evoked potential with the disappearance and reemergence of auditory sensation during induction of and recovery from anesthesia. As a result, the hypothesis is generated that the electrophysiological correlate of auditory sensation is whatever neural activity generates the middle latency waves of the auditory evoked potential. This activity occurs from 20 to 80 ms poststimulus in the primary and secondary areas of the auditory cortex. Evidence is presented suggesting that earlier or later waves in the auditory evoked potential do not covary with auditory sensation (as opposed to auditory perception) and it is therefore suggested that they are possibly not the electrophysiological correlates of sensation
Rosen, Michael & Lunn, J. N. (1987). Consciousness, Awareness, and Pain in General Anesthesia. Butterworths.   (Google)
Schmidt, Thomas (2006). Learning under anesthesia: Checking the light in the fridge? Commentary on deeprose and Andrade (2006). Consciousness and Cognition 15 (1):24-27.   (Google)
Sebel, P. S.; Bonke, B. & Winograd, E. (eds.) (1993). Memory and Awareness in Anesthesia. Prentice-Hall.   (Google)
Senhadji, L.; Carrault, G.; Gauvrit, H.; Wodey, E.; Pladys, P. & Carré, F. (2000). Pediatric anesthesia monitoring with the help of EEG and ECG. Acta Biotheoretica 48 (3-4).   (Google)
Abstract: This paper presents research regarding the monitoring of the brain and the adequacy of anesthesia during surgery. Particular variables are derived from EEG and ECG signals and are correlated to anesthetic gas (sevoflurane) concentration, in pediatric anesthesia. The methods used for parameter extraction are based on change detection theory and time-frequency representation. Preliminary results show that the expired anesthetic gas concentration modulates both the heart rate variability and the duration of the burst suppression. Monitors of the central nervous system and autonomic nervous system activities can be expected to be based on these variables
Smuts, Aaron (2005). Anesthetic experience. Philosophy and Literature 29 (1):97-113.   (Google)
Abstract: While working to build his aesthetic theory from the qualities of normal, healthy experience, John Dewey diagnoses a rarely recognized experiential ailment -- what might be called the anesthetic malady. This illness generally results when experience is deprived of meaning due to the poverty of the predominant forms of activity available in one's environment. In Dewey's theory of aesthetic experience lies an easily overlooked social/political approach that predates, by almost half a century, recent social theoretical concerns in phenomenology and everyday aesthetics. Dewey takes notice of experience and prompts inquiry into sometimes obviously important, but often dismissed as irrelevant and mundane, paths.
Sukhotinsky, I.; Zalkind, V.; Lu, J.; Hopkins, D. A.; Saper, B. & Devor, M. (2007). Neural pathways associated with loss of consciousness caused by intracerebral microinjection of GABA-sub(A)-active anesthetics. European Journal of Neuroscience 25 (5):1417-1436.   (Google)
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Abstract: Amidst competing claims of beauty, truth and goodness, Trajan, a young man named after a once celebrated Roman Emperor, attempts to decipher why it is that Kant is wrong, love is capricious, and why you should never take advice from a puppet.