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Philosophy of consciousness :: Specific views on consciousness

• Higher-order thought approaches [48]
• Self-representational approaches [18]
• Dennett's functionalism [27]
• Searle's biological naturalism [3]
• Functionalism [3]
• Eliminativism [2]
• Panpsychism [23]
• Russellian monism [8]
• Neutral monism [5]
• Idealism and phenomenalism [5]

Higher-order thought approaches

See also: Self-representational approaches, Self-consciousness, Consciousness and metacognition.

• Colin Allen (online). Evolving phenomenal consciousness. (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.swif.uniba.it/lei/mind/forums/002_0003.htm
  
• Jose Luis Bermudez (online). Commentary on Carruthers' Phenomenal Consciousness. (More)
• Jose Luis Bermudez (online). Properties, first-order representationalism and reinforcement: Reply to Carruthers. (More)
• Derek Browne (1999). Carruthers on the deficits of animals. (More)
• Alex Byrne (2001). Review of Phenomenal Consciousness, by Peter Carruthers. (More)
• Alex Byrne (1997). Some like it HOT: Consciousness and higher-order thoughts. (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://pellenes-shoshonensis.mit.edu/abyrne/www/SomeLikeItHOT.pdf
  http://web.mit.edu/abyrne/www/SomeLikeItHOT.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/M1MH117501W42017.pdf
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=86173&PDF=1
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/phil/1997/00000086/00000002/00086173
  
• Alex Byrne (2004). What phenomenal consciousness is like. (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=opsp_D9yOREC&oi=fnd&pg=PA203&dq=What+phenomenal+consciousness+is+like+Byrne&ots=oEeR7BK40o&sig=Jl5Mr5eWYcPPqXFuT_C0-534tQA
  
• Peter Carruthers (2001). Consciousness: Explaining the phenomena. (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:2235
  http://cogprints.org/2235/00/Explaining-the-phenomena.htm
  
• Peter Carruthers (2004). HOP over FOR, HOT theory. (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=opsp_D9yOREC&oi=fnd&pg=PA115&dq=HOP+over+FOR,+HOT+theory+Carruthers&ots=oEeR7BK81g&sig=WlRKs2rVn4hSkIELdyzRXXoQxfc
  
• Peter Carruthers (online). Precis of Phenomenal Consciousness: A Naturalistic Theory. (More)
• Peter Carruthers (2000). Replies to critics: Explaining subjectivity. (More)
• Peter Carruthers (online). Reply to Colin Allen. (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://lgxserve.ciseca.uniba.it/lei/mind/forums/002_0004.htm
  
• Peter Carruthers (online). Reply to José Luis Bermúdez. (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://lgxserve.ciseca.uniba.it/lei/mind/forums/002_0010.htm
  
• Peter Carruthers (online). Reply to Joe Levine. (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://lgxserve.ciseca.uniba.it/lei/mind/forums/002_0008.htm
  
• Peter Carruthers (online). Reply to Seager. (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://lgxserve.ciseca.uniba.it/lei/mind/forums/002_0006.htm
  
• Paola Cavalieri & Harlan Miller (1999). Automata, receptacles, and selves. (More)
• David Cole (online). Sense and sentience. (More)
• Rebecca Copenhaver (online). Reid on consciousness: HOP, HOT or FOR? (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/phiq/2007/00000057/00000229/art00006
  
• Rocco Gennaro (2000). Fiction, pleasurable tragedy, and the HOT theory of consciousness. (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://isu1.indstate.edu/rgennaro/papers/tragfictHOT.doc
  http://www.ajol.info/viewarticle.php?jid=190&id=28329&layout=abstract
  
• Rocco Gennaro (2004). Higher-order theories of consciousness: An overview. (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.benjamins.com/cgi-bin/t_bookview.cgi?bookid=AiCR 56
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=opsp_D9yOREC&oi=fnd&pg=PR11&ots=oDmU3DD2_k&sig=KzUOHkbKPdpEk8wuK5vVE95wsBs
  http://www.benjamins.nl/cgi-bin/t_bookview.cgi?bookid=AiCR 56
  http://www.benjamins.nl/cgi-bin/t_bookview.cgi?bookid=AiCR_56
  http://isu1.indstate.edu/rgennaro/papers/JohnBenjintro.doc
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=opsp_D9yOREC&oi=fnd&pg=RA1-PR11&ots=oDmU3DD2_k&sig=rKQ95_J-ebwnjXBDBjnbpwfQOrs
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=opsp_D9yOREC&oi=fnd&pg=PR11&ots=oEeR7CC93g&sig=yHXMNgPVGwoc3sDJCdZhlPt-v5U
  
• Rocco Gennaro (2004). Higher-order theories of consciousness. (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=opsp_D9yOREC&oi=fnd&pg=PA1&ots=oEeR7CD3-f&sig=Ufi-kJUW4XaZNQKKZ_WwR1BQZmY
  http://isu1.indstate.edu/rgennaro/papers/JohnBenjintro.doc
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=opsp_D9yOREC&oi=fnd&pg=PR11&ots=oEeR7CD3-f&sig=9XHMwRG7BDjjKiKbZzyz_4MoIek
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=opsp_D9yOREC&oi=fnd&pg=PR11&ots=oDmP2BL30f&sig=7KzfdXCn5wiDNvzUn19LdKPye4U
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=opsp_D9yOREC&oi=fnd&pg=RA1-PR11&ots=oDmU3DD3_i&sig=CAFmBA1urwtLH2r-43halohCPek
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=opsp_D9yOREC&oi=fnd&pg=RA1-PR11&ots=oDmP2BL30f&sig=QeUsjb_yBp-G5Ic6e1Qs8D3s2yw
  
• Rocco Gennaro (2002). Jean-Paul Sartre and the HOT theory of consciousness. (More)
• Rocco Gennaro (2003). Papineau on the actualist HOT theory of consciousness. (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.informaworld.com/index/713659742.pdf
  http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/index/H4LAP1936KMPJVM5.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/routledg/ajphil/2003/00000081/00000004/art00010
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/routledg/ajphil/2003/00000081/00000004/art00581
  
• Rocco Gennaro (2005). The HOT theory of consciousness: Between a rock and a hard place. (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.imprint.co.uk/jcs_12_2.html
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/2005/00000012/00000002/art00001
  
• Benj Hellie (2007). Higher-order intentionalism and higher-order acquaintance. (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/d17pm453577u60k6/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/D17PM453577U60K6.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/phil/2007/00000134/00000003/00000241
  
• Pierre Jacob (1996). State consciousness revisited. (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/docs/00/05/33/13/HTML/
  
• Mark Krause & Gordon Burghardt (1999). Access to another mind: Naturalistic theories require naturalistic data. (More)
• Joseph Levine (online). Commentary on Carruthers' Phenomenal Consciousness. (More)
• Robert Lurz (2000). A defense of first-order representationalist theories of mental-state consciousness. (More)
• Robert Lurz (2003). Neither hot nor cold: An alternative account of consciousness. (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://psyche.csse.monash.edu.au/articles/lurz/
  http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/articles/lurz/
  
• William Lycan (1999). A response to Carruthers' Natural Theories of Consciousness. (More)
• William Lycan (2001). A simple argument for a higher-order representation theory of consciousness. (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/1467-8284.00261
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1467-8284.00261
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/anal/2001/00000061/00000269/art00002
  
• William Lycan (1995). Consciousness as internal monitoring. (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=1520-8583(1995)9<1:CAIMIT>2.0.CO;2-M
  
• William Lycan & Z. Ryder (2003). The loneliness of the long-distance truck-driver. (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1467-8284.00022
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/1467-8284.00022/abs/
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/anal/2003/00000063/00000278/art00006
  
• William Lycan (2004). The superiority of HOP to HOT. (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.unc.edu/~ujanel/HOPHOT.htm
  
• Michael Lyvers (1999). Who has subjectivity? (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://epublications.bond.edu.au/hss_pubs/12
  http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/v5/psyche-5-31-lyvers.html
  
• Pete Mandik (online). Beware of the unicorn: Consciousness as being represented and other things that don't exist. (More)
• Jennifer Matey (2006). Two HOTS to handle: The concept of state consciousness in the higher-order thought theory of consciousness. (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://eprints.assc.caltech.edu/140/
  http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/index/J232735274660780.pdf
  
• Mark Pharoah (online). Enhancing dispositional higher-order thought theory. (More)
• Susanna Radovic (online). Watching representations. (More)
• William Robinson (1999). A theory of phenomenal consciousness? (More)
• Eric Saidel (1999). Consciousness without awareness? (More)
• William Seager (online). Dispositions and consciousness. (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.swif.uniba.it/lei/mind/forums/002_0005.htm
  
• William Seager (manuscript). On dispositional HOT theories of consciousness. (More)
• Lawrence Shapiro (1999). Saving the phenomenal. (More)
• Robert van Gulick (2004). Higher-order global states (HOGS): An alternative higher-order model of consciousness. (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://web.syr.edu/~rnvangul/HOGS.pdf
  
• Josh Weisberg (1999). Active, thin, and HOT: An actualist response to Carruthers' dispositionalist HOT view. (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.joshweisberg.com/Carruthers.htm
  http://www.joshweisberg.com/Carruthers.pdf
  
• Wayne Wright (2005). Distracted drivers and unattended experience. (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.consc.net/cgi/go.fcgi?id=WRIDDA&free=0&u=http://www.springerlink.com/index/K0P1461283J78PX8.pdf
  http://www.mindstuff.net/Ddue_wtw.pdf
  http://www.mindstuff.net/DDUE_wtw.doc
  http://consc.net/cgi/go.fcgi?id=WRIDDA&free=0&u=http://www.springerlink.com/index/K0P1461283J78PX8.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/k0p1461283j78px8/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/K0P1461283J78PX8.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/synt/2005/00000144/00000001/00009128
  

Self-representational approaches

See also: Self-consciousness.

• Victor Caston (2006). Comment on Amie Thomasson's "Self-awareness and self-knowledge". (More)
• A. Coventry & U. Kriegel (forthcoming). Locke on consciousness. (More)
• Rocco Gennaro (2006). Between pure self-referentialism and the (extrinsic) HOT theory of consciousness. (More)
• Gilbert Harman (2006). Self-reflexive thoughts. (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1533-6077.2006.00117.x
  
• Jenann Ismael (2006). Doublemindedness: A model for a dual content cognitive architecture. (More)
• Uriah Kriegel (2003). Consciousness as intransitive self-consciousness: Two views and an argument. (More)
• Uriah Kriegel (2003). Consciousness, higher-order content, and the individuation of vehicles. (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://journals.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=5091964
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=5091964&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/V3W0777V30XX17G0.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/synt/2003/00000134/00000003/05091964
  
• Uriah Kriegel (2004). Moore's paradox and the structure of conscious belief. (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/R78343N174207058.pdf
  http://journals.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=5274979
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=5274979&PDF=1
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/erke/2004/00000061/00000001/05274979
  
• Uriah Kriegel (2005). Naturalizing subjective character. (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://espritmetaphysique.free.fr/pacherie/kriegel.pdf
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2005.tb00429.x
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/ips/ppr/2005/00000071/00000001/art00002
  
• Uriah Kriegel (forthcoming). Self-representationalism and phenomenology. (More)
• Joseph Levine (manuscript). Conscious awareness and (self-)representation. (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/courses/consciousness05/LevineAwareness.pdf
  
• Thomas Natsoulas (1996). The case for intrinsic theory: I. An introduction. (More)
• William Seager (2006). Is self-representation necessary for consciousness? (More)
• Brad Thompson (2006). Comments on Ismael's "Double-mindedness: A model for a dual content cognitive architecture?". (More)
• Robert van Gulick (2006). Mirror, mirror -- is that all? (More)
• Josh Weisberg (online). Same old, same old: The same-order representational theory of consciousness and the division of phenomenal labor. (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.joshweisberg.com/Same Old.htm
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/017t8t28216558h5.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/017t8t28216558h5/fulltext.pdf
  
• Kenneth Williford (2006). Zahavi versus Brentano: A rejoinder. (More)
• Dan Zahavi (2006). Two takes on a one-level account of consciousness. (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/symposia/kriegel/4Zahavi.pdf
  http://cfs.ku.dk/staff/cv-danzahavi/4zahavi.pdf
  

Dennett's functionalism

See also: Functionalism, Eliminativism, Eliminativism about qualia, Verbal reports and heterophenomenology, The intentional stance.

• John Barresi & John Christie (2002). Using illusory line motion to differentiate misrepresentation (Stalinesque) and misremembering (Orwellian) accounts of consciousness. (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=12191955&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/ap/cc/2002/00000011/00000002/art00539
  
• Ned Block (1995). What is Dennett's theory a theory of? (More)
• Selmer Bringsjord (online). Explaining phi without Dennett's exotica: Good ol' computation suffices. (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/72531.html
  http://www.rpi.edu/~brings/SELPAP/phi/phi.html
  
• Andrew Brook (2000). Judgments and drafts eight years later. (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=jDwFYqcMEScC&oi=fnd&pg=PA219&dq=Judgments+and+drafts+eight+years+later+Brook&ots=QFBPrhLJo3&sig=Zvzi1JcFARzaqIQ-U6lBMrklY9o
  
• Andrew Brook (online). The appearance of things. (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.carleton.ca/~abrook/dennett-appearance.htm
  http://http-server.carleton.ca/~abrook/papers/2002-Dennet-2Appearance.pdf
  
• Mark Crooks (2003). Phenomenology in absentia: Dennett's philosophy of mind. (More)
• Daniel Dennett (2001). Are we explaining consciousness yet? (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://eric.ed.gov/ERICWebPortal/recordDetail?accno=EJ628448
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=11164029&dopt=Abstract
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=11164029&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/00100277/2001/00000079/00000001/art00130
  
• Daniel Dennett (1993). Caveat emptor. (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/caveatem.htm
  
• Daniel Dennett & Marcel Kinsbourne (1992). Escape from the Cartesian theater. Reply to commentaries on Time and the Observer: The Where and When of Consciousness in the Brain. (More)
• Daniel Dennett (1995). Get real. (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000280/00/getreal.htm
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:280
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000280/
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?id=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:280
  
• Daniel Dennett (1995). Is perception the "leading edge" of memory? (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/ispercep.htm
  
• Daniel Dennett (1992). Is perception the "leading edge" of memory? (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/ispercep.htm
  
• Daniel Dennett (1993). Living on the edge. (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/270/
  http://cogprints.org/270/00/liveedge.htm
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?id=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:270
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:270
  http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/liveedge.htm
  
• Daniel Dennett & Marcel Kinsbourne (1995). Multiple drafts: An eternal golden braid? Reply to Glicksohn and Salter. (More)
• Daniel Dennett (1994). Self-portrait. (More)
• Daniel Dennett (1996). Seeing is believing -- or is it? (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000284/00/seebelie.htm
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:284
  http://cogprints.org/284/00/seebelie.htm
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000284/
  http://cogprints.org/284/
  
• Daniel Dennett & Marcel Kinsbourne (1992). Time and the observer: The where and when of consciousness in the brain. (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.bbsonline.org/documents/a/00/00/04/50/
  http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/time&obs.htm
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=eRBo6RcazOoC&oi=fnd&pg=PA141&ots=utZGMzEqLp&sig=1SCWU7sPJ7Inbppt7ZjX-s7lH60
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=eRBo6RcazOoC&oi=fnd&pg=PA141&ots=utZKICHsLu&sig=bAKJB3pL1Iu-DBySuzLwA6QQRdI
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=eRBo6RcazOoC&oi=fnd&pg=PA141&ots=utZJGBDtDu&sig=ml4NBpCWPpH2VRPRW-FGFvYsl88
  http://cogprints.org/264/00/time&obs.htm
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=eRBo6RcazOoC&oi=fnd&pg=PA141&ots=utZFKyDtKw&sig=Pfs53KXrMr3NiqacqU5To-PKsyk
  http://mind.ucsd.edu/syllabi/05-06/cogs200/dennett&kinsbourne.pdf
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=eRBo6RcazOoC&oi=fnd&pg=PA141&ots=utZJMBHsKt&sig=YLmTMIPKbc9GzApVDCJyw8K3ncM
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=eRBo6RcazOoC&oi=fnd&pg=PA141&ots=us6JKtIpIx&sig=IFMORl44INzpeJKG0ysCkqD1xYg
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=eRBo6RcazOoC&oi=fnd&pg=PA141&ots=utZHOAFwGw&sig=mqA1eKUcGXXeA6jcegHOaA_o1HE
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=eRBo6RcazOoC&oi=fnd&pg=PA141&ots=utZHIzJwGq&sig=3aXZKyTv4O4_VC5MEXa2OxTzviY
  http://cogprints.org/264/
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=eRBo6RcazOoC&oi=fnd&pg=PA141&ots=utZGGyJrJp&sig=PydxIL0HYSYP7qvfNKrFBmCFLkE
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000264/00/time&obs.htm
  
• Daniel Dennett (1994). Tiptoeing past the covered wagons. (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:278
  http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/tiptoe.htm
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000278/
  
• Shannon Densmore & Daniel Dennett (1999). The virtues of virtual machines. (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8205(199909)59:3<747:TVOVM>2.0.CO;2-#
  
• Daniel Hutto (1995). Consciousness demystified: A Wittgensteinian critique of Dennett. (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.herts.ac.uk/humanities/philosophy/Monist_78.html
  
• Dan Lloyd (2000). Popping the thought balloon. (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.trincoll.edu/~dlloyd/popping.htm
  
• Gerard O'Brien & Jonathan Opie (1999). A defense of Cartesian materialism. (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00001139/
  http://www.arts.adelaide.edu.au/humanities/philosophy/publications/A_Defense_of_Cartesian_Materialism.pdf
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:1139
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8205(199912)59:4<939:ADOCM>2.0.CO;2-9
  
• Roland Puccetti (1993). Dennett on the split-brain. (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://psycprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/perl/local/psyc/makedoc?id=346&type=html
  http://psycprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000346/01/psyc.93.4.52.split-brain.1.puccetti.xml
  http://psycprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000346/02/psyc.93.4.52.split-brain.1.puccetti
  
• Teed Rockwell (1996). Awareness, mental phenomena, and consciousness: A synthesis of Dennett and Rosenthal. (More)
• Susan Schneider (2007). Daniel Dennett on the nature of consciousness. (More)
• Dmirty Volkov (online). The moving target: Multiple drafts or fame in brain? (More)
• Edmond Wright (2006). Dennett as illusionist. (More)

Searle's biological naturalism

See also: Consciousness and intentionality, The Chinese room.

• Daniel Dennett (1993). Review of Searle's The Rediscovery of the Mind. (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:277
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000277/00/searle.htm
  http://cogprints.org/277/00/searle.htm
  
• Sam Page (2004). Searle's realism deconstructed. (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/j.1467-9191.2004.00173.x/pdf
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-9191.2004.00173.x
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/phil/2004/00000035/00000003/art00001
  
• John Searle (2002). Why I am not a property dualist. (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://ww2.unime.it/scienzeformazione/scienzecognitive/materiali/articolifil.mente/searle-final.pdf
  http://www.imprint.co.uk/pdf/searle-final.pdf
  http://garnet.berkeley.edu/~jsearle/PropertydualismFNL.doc
  http://ist-socrates.berkeley.edu/~jsearle/PropertydualismFNL.doc
  http://ist-socrates.berkeley.edu/~jsearle/132/PropertydualismFNL.doc