Philosophy of consciousness :: Specific views on consciousness
See also: Explaining consciousness?, Materialism and dualism, Representationalism, The nature of perceptual experience, Identity theory.
Higher-order thought approaches
See also: Self-representational approaches, Self-consciousness, Consciousness and metacognition.
- Colin Allen (online). Evolving phenomenal consciousness. (More)
- Jose Luis Bermudez (online). Commentary on Carruthers' Phenomenal Consciousness. (More)
- Jose Luis Bermudez (online). Properties, first-order representationalism and reinforcement: Reply to Carruthers. (More)
- Derek Browne (1999). Carruthers on the deficits of animals. (More)
- Alex Byrne (2001). Review of Phenomenal Consciousness, by Peter Carruthers. (More)
- Alex Byrne (1997). Some like it HOT: Consciousness and higher-order thoughts. (More)
- Alex Byrne (2004). What phenomenal consciousness is like. (More)
- Peter Carruthers (2001). Consciousness: Explaining the phenomena. (More)
- Peter Carruthers (2004). HOP over FOR, HOT theory. (More)
- Peter Carruthers (online). Precis of Phenomenal Consciousness: A Naturalistic Theory. (More)
- Peter Carruthers (2000). Replies to critics: Explaining subjectivity. (More)
- Peter Carruthers (online). Reply to Colin Allen. (More)
- Peter Carruthers (online). Reply to José Luis Bermúdez. (More)
- Peter Carruthers (online). Reply to Joe Levine. (More)
- Peter Carruthers (online). Reply to Seager. (More)
- Paola Cavalieri & Harlan Miller (1999). Automata, receptacles, and selves. (More)
- David Cole (online). Sense and sentience. (More)
- Rebecca Copenhaver (online). Reid on consciousness: HOP, HOT or FOR? (More)
- Rocco Gennaro (2000). Fiction, pleasurable tragedy, and the HOT theory of consciousness. (More)
- Rocco Gennaro (2004). Higher-order theories of consciousness: An overview. (More)
- Rocco Gennaro (2004). Higher-order theories of consciousness. (More)
- Rocco Gennaro (2002). Jean-Paul Sartre and the HOT theory of consciousness. (More)
- Rocco Gennaro (2003). Papineau on the actualist HOT theory of consciousness. (More)
- Rocco Gennaro (2005). The HOT theory of consciousness: Between a rock and a hard place. (More)
- Benj Hellie (2007). Higher-order intentionalism and higher-order acquaintance. (More)
- Pierre Jacob (1996). State consciousness revisited. (More)
- Mark Krause & Gordon Burghardt (1999). Access to another mind: Naturalistic theories require naturalistic data. (More)
- Joseph Levine (online). Commentary on Carruthers' Phenomenal Consciousness. (More)
- Robert Lurz (2000). A defense of first-order representationalist theories of mental-state consciousness. (More)
- Robert Lurz (2003). Neither hot nor cold: An alternative account of consciousness. (More)
- William Lycan (1999). A response to Carruthers' Natural Theories of Consciousness. (More)
- William Lycan (2001). A simple argument for a higher-order representation theory of consciousness. (More)
- William Lycan (1995). Consciousness as internal monitoring. (More)
- William Lycan & Z. Ryder (2003). The loneliness of the long-distance truck-driver. (More)
- William Lycan (2004). The superiority of HOP to HOT. (More)
- Michael Lyvers (1999). Who has subjectivity? (More)
- Pete Mandik (online). Beware of the unicorn: Consciousness as being represented and other things that don't exist. (More)
- Jennifer Matey (2006). Two HOTS to handle: The concept of state consciousness in the higher-order thought theory of consciousness. (More)
- Mark Pharoah (online). Enhancing dispositional higher-order thought theory. (More)
- Susanna Radovic (online). Watching representations. (More)
- William Robinson (1999). A theory of phenomenal consciousness? (More)
- Eric Saidel (1999). Consciousness without awareness? (More)
- William Seager (online). Dispositions and consciousness. (More)
- William Seager (manuscript). On dispositional HOT theories of consciousness. (More)
- Lawrence Shapiro (1999). Saving the phenomenal. (More)
- Robert van Gulick (2004). Higher-order global states (HOGS): An alternative higher-order model of consciousness. (More)
- Josh Weisberg (1999). Active, thin, and HOT: An actualist response to Carruthers' dispositionalist HOT view. (More)
- Wayne Wright (2005). Distracted drivers and unattended experience. (More)
Self-representational approaches
See also: Self-consciousness.
Dennett's functionalism
See also: Functionalism, Eliminativism, Eliminativism about qualia, Verbal reports and heterophenomenology, The intentional stance.
Searle's biological naturalism
See also: Consciousness and intentionality, The Chinese room.