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1.4a. Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness (Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness on PhilPapers)

• Higher-Order Perception Theories of Consciousness [2]
• Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness, Misc [3]
• Higher-Order Thought Theories of Consciousness [79]
• Self-Representational Theories of Consciousness [33]

Higher-Order Perception Theories of Consciousness

• William G. Lycan (1995). Consciousness as internal monitoring.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Locke put forward the theory of consciousness as "internal Sense" or "reflection"; Kant made it inner sense, by means of which the mind intuits itself or its inner state." ¹ On that theory, consciousness is a perception-like second-order representing of our own psychological states events. The term "consciousness," of course, has many distinct uses
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=1520-8583(1995)9<1:CAIMIT>2.0.CO;2-M
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2214210.pdf
  http://www.nd.edu/%7Elstubenb/Lycan.html
  
• William G. Lycan (2004). The superiority of Hop to HOT.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=opsp_D9yOREC&oi=fnd&pg=PA93&dq=The+superiority+of+HOP+to+HOT+Lycan&ots=oEeR7CG3-m&sig=9oPpecPlMhu_U3lFmtDZSVBldGg
  

Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness, Misc

• Benj Hellie (2007). 'There's something it's like' and the structure of consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: I discuss the meaning of 'There's something e is like', in the context of a reply to Eric Lormand's 'The explanatory stopgap'. I argue that Lormand is wrong to think it has a specially perceptual meaning. Rather, it has one of at least four candidate meanings: (a) e is some way as regards its subject; (b) e is some way and e's being that way is in the possession of its subject; (c) e is some way in the awareness of its subject; (d) e's subject is the "experiencer" of e. I provide additional argumentation for the view in this paper that in the context, 'like this' functions as a predicate variable.
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://philreview.dukejournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/3/441
  
• William G. Lycan, A simple point about an alleged objection to higher-order theories of consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: For purposes of this paper, a conscious state is a mental state whose subject is directly or at least nonevidentially aware of being in it. (The state does not count as conscious if the subject has only been told about it by a cognitive scientist or psychologist; introspectively would be better, but no one should say that a state is conscious only if its subject actively introspects it.). N.b., this usage is only one among several quite different though of course not competing ones; the phrase has been used in at least two other senses, as by, respectively, Dretske (1993, 1995) and Block (1995).1 My definition is stipulative, but not brutely so; it settles on one thing that is often meant by conscious state cf. a conscious memory, a conscious desire, a conscious intention, a conscious decision. According to higher-order (HO) theories of consciousness in this sense of consciousness, what makes a mental state a conscious one is that it is represented by another of the subject’s mental states, that in virtue of which s/he is aware of it. Some practitioners follow Locke in taking the higher-order state to be quasi-perceptual (Armstrong, 1968, 1980, Lycan 1991, 1996); others say it may be merely a thought about the original state (Rosenthal, 1986, 1990).2 There is an alleged objection to such theories, that originated with Goldman (1993)Error: Illegal entry in bfrange block in ToUnicode CMapError: Illegal entry in bfrange block in ToUnicode CMapError: Illegal entry in bfrange block in ToUnicode CMap3 and has since been voiced and discussed by others (Dretske 1995, Stubenberg 1998, Van Gulick 2000, 2005, Gennaro 2005, Kriegel 2009). I say alleged, because
• Robert Van Gulick (2004). Higher-order global states (hogs): An alternative higher-order model of consciousness.   (More)

Higher-Order Thought Theories of Consciousness

• David M. Rosenthal, Consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: One phenomenon pertains roughly to being awake. A person or other creature is conscious when it's awake and mentally responsive to sensory input; otherwise it's unconscious. This kind of consciousness figures most often in everyday discourse
• David M. Rosenthal, The mind and its expression.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: pain' and ┌I think that p┐ express the pain and the thought that p, themselves. The book is most impressive. It is packed with careful argument, and addresses a remarkable range of important issues about the mind. I have very much enjoyed studying it
• Ned Block, Comparing the major theories of consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This article compares the three frameworks for theories of consciousness that are taken most seriously by neuroscientists, the view that consciousness is a biological state of the brain, the global workspace perspective and an account in terms of higher order states. The comparison features the “explanatory gap” (Nagel, 1974; Levine, 1983) the fact that we have no idea why the neural basis of an experience is the neural basis of that experience rather than another experience or no experience at all. It is argued that the biological framework handles the explanatory gap better than the global workspace of higher order views. The article does not discuss quantum theories or “panpsychist” accounts according to which consciousness is a feature of the smallest particles of inorganic matter (Chalmers, 1996; Rosenberg, 2004). Nor does it discuss the “representationist” proposals (Tye, 2000; Byrne, 2001a) that are popular among philosophers but not neuroscientists
• Ned Block (ms). Some concepts of consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Consciousness is a mongrel concept: there are a number of very different "consciousnesses". Phenomenal consciousness is experience; the phenomenally conscious aspect of a state is what it is like to be in that state
• Richard Brown (ms). Consciousness, (higher-order) thoughts, and what it's like.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: We have a vast range of conscious experience; from the taste of our favorite food, to the appearance of our favorite art, to the highs of accomplishing our goals, to the excruciating agony of a broken bone, or loss of a loved one, to wondering what time it is, or thinking about what one has to do to name but a few. Our conscious experience can be by turns exhilarating or frightening or overpowering, or just plain dull. Yet though all of this is common place it is quite mysterious how to fit this phenomenon into the natural world. Or so it seems to many philosophers and scientists, who feel, as Descartes did, that there is no hope of giving a scientific account of how consciousness arises in nature. These philosophers see ‘hard problems’ and ‘explanatory gaps’ that lead them to model consciousness as a non-physical phenomenon that is out of the reach of our scientific theories
• Derek Browne (1999). Carruthers on the deficits of animals.   (More)
• Alex Byrne (1997). Some like it HOT: Consciousness and higher-order thoughts.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Consciousness is the subject of many metaphors, and one of the most hardy perennials compares consciousness to a spotlight, illuminating certain mental goings-on, while leaving others to do their work in the dark. One way of elaborating the spotlight metaphor is this: mental events are loaded on to one end of a conveyer belt by the senses, and move with the belt
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://web.mit.edu/abyrne/www/SomeLikeItHOT.pdf
  http://pellenes-shoshonensis.mit.edu/abyrne/www/SomeLikeItHOT.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/m1mh117501w42017/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=86173&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/M1MH117501W42017.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/phil/1997/00000086/00000002/00086173
  
• Alex Byrne (2004). What phenomenal consciousness is like.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The terminology surrounding the dispute between higher-order and first-order theories of consciousness is piled so high that it sometimes obscures the view. When the debris is cleared away, there is a real prospect
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=opsp_D9yOREC&oi=fnd&pg=PA203&dq=What+phenomenal+consciousness+is+like+Byrne&ots=oEeR7BK40o&sig=Jl5Mr5eWYcPPqXFuT_C0-534tQA
  
• Peter Carruthers (2001). Consciousness: Explaining the phenomena.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Can phenomenal consciousness be given a reductive natural explanation? Many people argue not. They claim that there is an
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/2235/0/Explaining-the-phenomena.htm
  http://www.philosophy.umd.edu/Faculty/pcarruthers/Explaining-the-phenomena.htm
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:2235
  http://cogprints.org/2235/1/Explaining%2Dthe%2Dphenomena.htm
  http://cogprints.org/2235/0/Explaining%2Dthe%2Dphenomena.htm
  
• Peter Carruthers (2004). Hop over FOR, HOT theory.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Following a short introduction, this chapter begins by contrasting two different forms of higher-order perception (HOP) theory of phenomenal consciousness - inner sense theory versus a dispositionalist kind of higher-order thought (HOT) theory - and by giving a brief statement of the superiority of the latter. Thereafter the chapter considers arguments in support of HOP theories in general. It develops two parallel objections against both first-order representationalist (FOR) theories and actualist forms of HOT theory. First, neither can give an adequate account of the distinctive features of our recognitional concepts of experience. And second, neither can explain why there are some states of the relevant kinds that are phenomenal and some that aren
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=opsp_D9yOREC&oi=fnd&pg=PA115&dq=HOP+over+FOR,+HOT+theory+Carruthers&ots=oEeR7BK81g&sig=WlRKs2rVn4hSkIELdyzRXXoQxfc
  
• Peter Carruthers (online). Higher-order theories of consciousness.   (More)
• Peter Carruthers (1998). Natural theories of consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Many people have thought that consciousness
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/119131614/PDFSTART
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/1468-0378.00058
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1468-0378.00058
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/ejop/1998/00000006/00000002/art00005
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/ejop/1998/00000006/00000002/art00058
  
• Peter Carruthers (online). Precis of Phenomenal Consciousness: A Naturalistic Theory.   (More)
• Peter Carruthers (2000). Replies to critics: Explaining subjectivity.   (More)
• Peter Carruthers (online). Reply to Seager.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://lgxserve.ciseca.uniba.it/lei/mind/forums/002_0006.htm
  
• David Rosenthal (2005). The higher-order model of consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: All mental states, including thoughts, feelings, perceptions, and sensations, often occur consciously. But they all occur also without being conscious. So the first thing a theory of consciousness must do is explain the difference between thoughts, feelings, perceptions, and sensations that are conscious and those which are not
• Peter Carruthers (2005). Why the question of animal consciousness might not matter very much.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: According to higher-order thought accounts of phenomenal consciousness it is unlikely that many non-human animals undergo phenomenally conscious experiences. Many people believe that this result would have deep and far-reaching consequences. More specifically, they believe that the absence of phenomenal consciousness from the rest of the animal kingdom must mark a radical and theoretically significant divide between ourselves and other animals, with important implications for comparative psychology. I shall argue that this belief is mistaken. Since phenomenal consciousness might be almost epiphenomenal in its functioning within human cognition, its absence in animals may signify only relatively trivial differences in cognitive architecture. Our temptation to think otherwise arises partly as a side-effect of imaginative identification with animal experiences, and partly from mistaken beliefs concerning the aspects of common-sense psychology that carry the main explanatory burden, whether applied to humans or to non-human animals
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/./ftinterface~content=a713997465~fulltext=713240930
  http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/index/R55R2K53440520Q1.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/routledg/cphp/2005/00000018/00000001/art00005
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/oso/1055408/2005/00000001/00000001/art00011
  
• David J. Cole (online). Sense and sentience.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Surely one of the most interesting problems in the study of mind concerns the nature of sentience. How is it that there are sensations, rather than merely sensings? What is it like to be a bat -- or why is it like anything at all? Why aren't we automata or responding but unfeeling Zombies? How does neural activity give rise to subjective experience? As Leibniz put the problem (Monadology section 17):

  _It must be confessed, however, that Perception_ [consciousness?]_, and that which depends upon it, are_
  _inexplicable by mechanical means, that is to say, by figures and motions. Supposing that there were a_
  _machine whose structure produced thought, sensation, and perceptions, we could conceive of it as increased_
  _in its interior size with the same proportions until one was able to enter into its interior, as he would into a_
  _mill. Now, on going into it he would find only pieces working upon one another, but never would he find_

  _anything to explain Perception._ [Montgomery trans.]
• Rebecca Copenhaver (ms). Reid on consciousness: HOP, HOT or FOR?   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2007.499.x
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/phiq/2007/00000057/00000229/art00006
  
• Barry F. Dainton (2004). Higher-order consciousness and phenomenal space: Reply to Meehan.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Meehan finds fault with a number of my arguments, and proposes that better solutions to the problems I was addressing are available if we adopt a higher-order theory of consciousness. I start with some general remarks on theories of this sort. I connect what I had to say about the A-thesis with different forms of higher-order sense theories, and explain why I ignored higher-order thought theories altogether: there are compelling grounds for thinking they cannot provide a viable account of phenomenal unity in phenomenal terms. Meehan
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://web.mac.com/barrydainton1/Research/Papers_files/Higher Order Reply to Meehan.pdf
  
• Paula Droege (online). Consciousness, higher-order theories of.   (More)
• Rocco J. Gennaro (2000). Fiction, pleasurable tragedy, and the HOT theory of consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: [Final version in Philosophical Papers, 2000] Much has been made over the past few decades of two related problems in aesthetics. First, the "feeling fiction problem," as I will call it, asks: is it rational to be moved by what happens to fictional characters? How can we care about what happens to people who we know are not real?[i] Second, the so-called "paradox of tragedy" is embodied in the question: Why or how is it that we take pleasure in artworks (e.g. tragedies) which are clearly designed to cause in us such feelings as sadness and fear?[ii] Various solutions to these puzzles have been proposed, but my primary aim is neither to offer a novel solution nor to summarize and critique most of the alternatives.[iii] My focus instead will be on the issue of consciousness and, more specifically, to view these problems from the point of the view of the so-called "higher-order thought theory of consciousness" (the HOT theory). Although some work on these puzzles have raised important questions about the nature of consciousness and "aesthetic experience," no attempt has yet been made to examine them in light of a specific theory
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://isu1.indstate.edu/rgennaro/papers/tragfictHOT.doc
  http://www.ajol.info/viewarticle.php?jid=190&id=28329&layout=abstract
  
• Rocco J. Gennaro (2004). Higher-order thoughts, animal consciousness, and misrepresentation: A reply to Carruthers and Levine.   (More)
• Rocco J. Gennaro (2004). Higher-order theories of consciousness: An overview.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.benjamins.nl/cgi-bin/t_bookview.cgi?bookid=AiCR 56
  http://www.benjamins.nl/cgi-bin/t_bookview.cgi?bookid=AiCR_56
  http://www.benjamins.com/cgi-bin/t_bookview.cgi?bookid=AiCR 56
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=opsp_D9yOREC&oi=fnd&pg=PA1&ots=oEeR7CC93g&sig=wl5lXzQHGMEP_nhBbAp8QnwhIk4
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=opsp_D9yOREC&oi=fnd&pg=PA1&ots=oEeR7CD3-f&sig=Ufi-kJUW4XaZNQKKZ_WwR1BQZmY
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=opsp_D9yOREC&oi=fnd&pg=PR11&ots=oDmU3DD3_i&sig=h6iVMycgK3YIWJh_pAcwp8qE4x4
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=opsp_D9yOREC&oi=fnd&pg=PR11&ots=oDmU3DD2_k&sig=KzUOHkbKPdpEk8wuK5vVE95wsBs
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=opsp_D9yOREC&oi=fnd&pg=PR11&ots=oEeR7CD3-f&sig=9XHMwRG7BDjjKiKbZzyz_4MoIek
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=opsp_D9yOREC&oi=fnd&pg=PR11&ots=oDmP2BL30f&sig=7KzfdXCn5wiDNvzUn19LdKPye4U
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=opsp_D9yOREC&oi=fnd&pg=PR11&ots=oEeR7CC93g&sig=yHXMNgPVGwoc3sDJCdZhlPt-v5U
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=opsp_D9yOREC&oi=fnd&pg=RA1-PR11&ots=oDmU3DD2_k&sig=rKQ95_J-ebwnjXBDBjnbpwfQOrs
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=opsp_D9yOREC&oi=fnd&pg=RA1-PR11&ots=oDmU3DD3_i&sig=CAFmBA1urwtLH2r-43halohCPek
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=opsp_D9yOREC&oi=fnd&pg=RA1-PR11&ots=oDmP2BL30f&sig=QeUsjb_yBp-G5Ic6e1Qs8D3s2yw
  
• Rocco J. Gennaro (2002). Jean-Paul Sartre and the HOT theory of consciousness.   (More)
• Rocco J. Gennaro (2003). Papineau on the actualist HOT theory of consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In Thinking About Consciousness , David Papineau [2002] presents a criticism of so-called 'actualist HOT theories of consciousness'. The HOT theory, held most notably by David Rosenthal, claims that the best explanation for what makes a mental state conscious is that it is the object of an actual higher-order thought directed at the mental state. Papineau contends that actualist HOT theory faces an awkward problem in relation to higher-order memory judgements; for example, that the theory cannot explain how one could later recall an earlier experience that was not introspected. He argues that, on the HOT theory, we are even left with the absurd conclusion that the consciousness of, say, an earlier visual experience might even depend on the later act of memory. I show that Papineau's criticism of actualist HOT theory not only fails, but also that it seriously mischaracterizes and underestimates the theory. In particular, Papineau badly conflates the crucial difference between an introspective state (i.e., where a conscious HOT is directed at a mental state) and an outer-directed first-order conscious state (i.e., a case where one has a nonconscious HOT)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/./ftinterface~content=a713659742~fulltext=713240930
  http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/index/H4LAP1936KMPJVM5.pdf
  http://www.informaworld.com/index/713659742.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/routledg/ajphil/2003/00000081/00000004/art00010
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/routledg/ajphil/2003/00000081/00000004/art00581
  
• Rocco J. Gennaro (2005). The HOT theory of consciousness: Between a rock and a hard place.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The so-called 'higher-order thought' (HOT) theory of consciousness says that what makes a mental state conscious is the presence of a suitable higher-order thought directed at it (Rosenthal, 1986; 1990; 1993; 2002; 2004; Gennaro, 1996; 2004). The HOT theory has been or could be attacked from two apparently opposite directions. On the one hand, there is what Stubenberg (1998) has called 'the problem of the rock' which, if successful, would show that the HOT theory proves too much. On the other hand, it might also be alleged that the HOT theory does not or cannot address the so-called 'hard problem' of phenomenal consciousness. If so, then the HOT theory would prove too little. We might say, then, that the HOT theory is arguably between a rock and a hard place. In this paper, I critically examine these objections and defend the HOT theory against them. In doing so, I hope to show that the HOT theory, or at least some version of it, neither proves too little nor too much, but is just right. I also show that these two objections are really just two sides of the same coin, and that the HOT theory is immune from David Chalmers' (1995; 1996) criticisms of other attempted reductionist accounts of consciousness
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://isu1.indstate.edu/rgennaro/papers/rockhd.rtf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/2005/00000012/00000002/art00001
  
• Valerie Gray Hardcastle (2004). HOT theories of consciousness: More sad tales of philosophical intuitions gone astray.   (More)
• Benj Hellie (2007). Higher-order intentionalism and higher-order acquaintance.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: I argue against such "Relation Intentionalist" theories of consciousness as the higher-order thought and inner sense views on the grounds that they understand a subject's awareness of his or her phenomenal characters to be intentional, like seeming-seeing, rather than "direct", like seeing. The trouble with such views is that they reverse the order of explanation between phenomenal character and intentional awareness. A superior theory of consciousness, based on views expressed by Russell and Price, takes the relation of awareness to be a nonintentional "acquaintance".
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/d17pm453577u60k6/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/D17PM453577U60K6.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/phil/2007/00000134/00000003/00000241
  
• Pierre Jacob (1996). State consciousness revisited.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/documents/disk0/00/00/01/64/ijn_00000164_00/ijn_00000164_00.htm
  
• Uriah Kriegel (2007). A cross-order integration hypothesis for the neural correlate of consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: b>. One major problem many hypotheses regarding the neural correlate of consciousness (NCC) face is what we might call “the why question”: _why _would this particular neural feature, rather than another, correlate with consciousness? The purpose of the present paper is to develop an NCC hypothesis that answers this question. The proposed hypothesis is inspired by the Cross-Order Integration (COI) theory of consciousness, according to which consciousness arises from the functional integration of a first-order representation of an external stimulus and a second-order representation of that first-order representation. The proposal comes in two steps. The first step concerns the “general shape” of the NCC and can be directly derived from COI theory. The second step is a concrete hypothesis that can be arrived at by combining the general shape with empirical considerations
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://uriahkriegel.com/downloads/COI.pdf
  
• Uriah Kriegel (2003). Consciousness, higher-order content, and the individuation of vehicles.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: One of the distinctive properties of conscious states is the peculiar self- awareness implicit in them. Two rival accounts of this self-awareness are discussed. According to a Neo-Brentanian account, a mental state M is conscious iff M represents its very own occurrence. According to the Higher-Order Monitoring account, M is merely accompanied by a numerically distinct representation of its occurrence. According to both, then, M is conscious in virtue of figuring in a higher-order content. The disagreement is over the question whether the higher-order content is carried by M itself or by a differ- ent state. While the Neo-Brentanian theory is phenomenologically more attractive, it is often felt to be somewhat mysterious. It is argued (i) that the difference between the Neo- Brentanian and Higher-Order Monitoring theories is smaller and more empirical than may initially seem, and (ii) that the Neo-Brentanian theory can be readily demystified. These considerations make it prima facie preferable to the Higher-Order Monitoring theory.
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.uriahkriegel.com/downloads/synthese 2003.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/v3w0777v30xx17g0/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=5091964&PDF=1
  http://journals.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=5091964
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/V3W0777V30XX17G0.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/synt/2003/00000134/00000003/05091964
  
• Caleb Liang & Timothy Lane (2008). Higher-Order Thought and the Problem of Radical Confabulation.   (More)
• Hakwan Lau (ms). A higher order bayesian decision theory of consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: It is usually taken as given that consciousness involves superior or more elaborate forms of information processing. Contemporary models equate consciousness with global processing, system complexity, or depth or stability of computation. This is in stark contrast with the powerful philosophical intuition that being conscious is more than just having the ability to compute. I argue that it is also incompatible with current empirical findings. I present a model that is free from the strong assumption that consciousness predicts superior performance. The model is based on Bayesian decision theory, of which signal detection theory is a special case. It reflects the fact that the capacity for perceptual decisions is fundamentally limited by the presence and amount of noise in the system. To optimize performance, one therefore needs to set decision criteria that are based on the behaviour, i.e. the probability distributions, of the internal signals. One important realization is that the knowledge of how our internal signals behave statistically has to be learned over time. Essentially, we are doing statistics on our own brain. This ‘higherorder’ learning, however, may err, and this impairs our ability to set and maintain optimal criteria for perceptual decisions, which I argue is central to perception consciousness. I outline three possibilities of how conscious perception might be affected by failures of ‘higher-order’ representation. These all imply that one can have a dissociation between consciousness and performance. This model readily explains blindsight and hallucinations in formal terms, and is beginning to receive direct empirical support. I end by discussing some philosophical implications of the model
• JeeLoo Liu (2006). Review of Peter Carruthers, Consciousness: Essays From a Higher-Order Perspective.   (More)
• Robert W. Lurz (2000). A defense of first-order representationalist theories of mental-state consciousness.   (More)
• Robert W. Lurz (2003). Neither hot nor cold: An alternative account of consciousness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://psyche.csse.monash.edu.au/articles/lurz/
  http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/v9/psyche-9-01-lurz.html
  
• William G. Lycan (1999). A response to Carruthers' Natural Theories of Consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: I have very little disagreement with Carruthers' article, for our views are very similar. I think he is terminologically a bit hard on Michael Tye. I think that in invoking Swampman he is in danger of conflating teleological theories of representation with etiological theories of teleology. In response to his criticism of my own higher-order experience (HOE) view, I argue that there is good reason to believe that we human beings sport as great a degree of computational complexity as is needed for HOEs. If other animals do not exhibit a comparable degree, we should deny that they have "phenomenal-consciousness" in the strong sense of that term
• William G. Lycan (2001). A simple argument for a higher-order representation theory of consciousness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/119013542/PDFSTART
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/1467-8284.00261
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1467-8284.00261
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/anal/2001/00000061/00000269/art00002
  
• William G. Lycan (1995). Consciousness as internal monitoring.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Locke put forward the theory of consciousness as "internal Sense" or "reflection"; Kant made it inner sense, by means of which the mind intuits itself or its inner state." ¹ On that theory, consciousness is a perception-like second-order representing of our own psychological states events. The term "consciousness," of course, has many distinct uses
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=1520-8583(1995)9<1:CAIMIT>2.0.CO;2-M
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2214210.pdf
  http://www.nd.edu/%7Elstubenb/Lycan.html
  
• William G. Lycan & Z. Ryder (2003). The loneliness of the long-distance truck-driver.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/1467-8284.00022/abs/
  http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/118827723/PDFSTART
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1467-8284.00022
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/anal/2003/00000063/00000278/art00006
  
• William G. Lycan (2004). The superiority of Hop to HOT.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=opsp_D9yOREC&oi=fnd&pg=PA93&dq=The+superiority+of+HOP+to+HOT+Lycan&ots=oEeR7CG3-m&sig=9oPpecPlMhu_U3lFmtDZSVBldGg
  
• Pete Mandik (2009). Beware of the unicorn: Consciousness as being represented and other things that don't exist.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Higher-Order Representational theories of consciousness — HORs — primarily seek to explain a mental state’s being conscious in terms of the mental state’s being represented by another mental state. First-Order Representational theories of consciousness — FORs — primarily seek to explain a property’s being phenomenal in terms of the property being represented in experience. Despite differences in both explanans and explananda, HORs and FORs share a reliance on there being such a property as being represented. In this paper I develop an argument — the Unicorn Argument — against both HORs and FORs. The core of the Unicorn is that since there are mental rep- resentations of things that do not exist, there cannot be any such prop- erty as being represented, and thus no such property with which to identify either being conscious or being phenomenal.
• Jennifer Matey (2006). Two HOTS to handle: The concept of state consciousness in the higher-order thought theory of consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: David Rosenthal's higher-order thought (HOT) theory is one of the most widely argued for of the higher-order accounts of consciousness. I argue that Rosenthal vacillates between two models of the HOT theory. First, I argue that these models employ different concepts of 'state consciousness'; the two concepts each refer to mental state tokens, but in virtue of different properties. In one model, the concept of 'state consciousness' is more consistent with how the term is typically used, both by philosophers and scientists, and in commonsense usage. This model, however, also has its problems. In the second part of the paper, I develop a modified version of Rosenthal's transitivity principle, thereby avoiding some complications that stem from the original transitivity principle. I suggest that Rosenthal occasionally employs this modified model himself, and that the inconsistency identified in the first section of this paper might really reflect Rosenthal's vacillation between these two versions of the transitivity principle. I offer one explanation for how this equivocation may have occurred. These two versions would result if articulations of the transitivity principle employed the term 'mental state' inconsistently, to refer on some occasions merely to mental state types, and on others, to tokened mental states. I conclude by arguing, contrary to Rosenthal and others, that the theory is not incompatible with view that conscious states are uniquely casual efficacious
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/./ftinterface~content=a743786471~fulltext=713240930
  http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/index/J232735274660780.pdf
  http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/./ftinterface~db=all~content=a743786471~fulltext=713240930
  
• Gregory Minissale (2009). Enacting Higher Order Thoughts: Velazquez and Las Meninas.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This paper bridges art history and consciousness studies and investigates the network of gazes and frames in Las Meninas and how this engages with a system of higher-order thoughts and reflexive operations.
• Mark Pharoah (ms). Enhancing dispositional higher-order thought theory.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Through the utilization of a descriptive illustration and detailed referencing of Carruthers (2000), a comparison of Hierarchical Systems theory (Pharoah, 2007) with Dispositional Higher-Order Thought theory identifies and reinforces their complementary status. However, this also determines some key distinctions, particularly with regard to the conclusions each make regarding the mentality of animals and the autistic, and regarding the moral consequences of these conclusions.
• William S. Robinson (2004). A few thoughts too many?   (More)
• William S. Robinson (1999). A theory of phenomenal consciousness?   (More)
• Edmund T. Rolls (2004). A higher order syntactic thought (HOST) theory of consciousness.   (More)
• David M. Rosenthal (1997). Apperception, sensation, and dissociability.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Recent writing on consciousness has increasingly stressed ways in which the terms
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-0017.1997.tb00071.x
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/1468-0017.00045
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1468-0017.00045
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/mila/1997/00000012/00000002/art00007
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/mila/1997/00000012/00000002/art00045
  
• David Rosenthal, Commentaries.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: But there is another reason, equally important. We distinguish among thoughts, feelings, and sensations by virtue of their characteristic representational properties. In particular, we describe thoughts and emotions in terms of the things they are about and how they represent those things. And we characterize sensations by reference to their qualitative properties and the things..
• David M. Rosenthal, Consciousness (.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: (1) Most commonly these terms are used to describe people. People and other creatures are conscious if they are awake and responsive to sensory stimulation. Because this is a property of creatures, we can call it creature consciousness. An individual lacks such consciousness if it is asleep, in a coma, anesthetized, and so forth. Creature consciousness demands a mainly biological explanation, as against an explanation in mainly psychological terms
• David Rosenthal (web). Concepts and definitions of consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: in Encyclopedia of Consciousness, ed. William P. Banks, Amsterdam: Elsevier, forthcoming in 2009
• David M. Rosenthal (2002). Consciousness and higher-order thought.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The problem of consciousness is to say what it is for some of our thoughts, feelings, and sensations to be conscious, given that others are not. This is different from saying what it is for a person to be conscious or not conscious. Even when people are conscious, many of their thoughts and sensations typically are not. And there's nothing problematic about a person's being conscious; it's just the person's being awake and responsive to sensory input
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Higher-order_Thought
  
• David Rosenthal (ms). Consciousness and intrinsic higher-order content.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: PowerPoint presentation at Tucson VII, Toward a Science of Consciousness 2006, session on Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness
• David M. Rosenthal (2000). Consciousness, content, and metacognitive judgments.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Because metacognition consists in our having mental access to our cognitive states and mental states are conscious only when we are conscious of them in some suitable way, metacognition and consciousness shed important theoretical light on one another. Thus, our having metacognitive access to information carried by states that are not conscious helps con?rm the hypothesis that a mental state
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=10924242&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=10924239&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/10538100/2000/00000009/00000002/art90437
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/ap/cc/2000/00000009/00000002/art00440
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/ap/cc/2000/00000009/00000002/art00437
  
• David M. Rosenthal (2000). Consciousness, interpretation, and consciousness.   (More)
• David Rosenthal (2010). Expressing one's mind.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Remarks such as ‘I am in pain’ and ‘I think that it’s raining’ are puzzling, since they seem to literally describe oneself as being in pain or having a particular thought, but their conditions of use tend to coincide with unequivocal expressions of pain or of that thought. This led Wittgenstein, among others, to treat such remarks as expressing, rather than as reporting, one’s mental states. Though such expressivism is widely recognized as untenable, Bar-On has recently advanced a neo-expressivist view, on which such remarks exhibit characteristics of both expressions of mental states and reports of those states. I argue against any attempt to see such remarks as both reporting and expressing the same mental states, and that a correct account rests on distinguishing the truth conditions of such remarks from their conditions of use
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/l15842q71x705207/fulltext.pdf
  
• David M. Rosenthal (2002). How many kinds of consciousness?   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=12470629&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/sites/entrez?db=pubmed&uid=12470629&cmd=showdetailview&indexed=google
  http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S105381000200017X
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/ap/cc/2002/00000011/00000004/art00017
  
• David Rosenthal & Josh Weisberg (online). Higher-order theories of consciousness.   (More)
• David M. Rosenthal (2000). Metacognition and higher-order thoughts.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Because there is a fair amount of overlap in the points by Balog and Rey, I will organize this response topically, referring specifically to each commentator as rele- vant. And, because much of the discussion focuses on my higher-order-thought (HOT) hypothesis independent of questions about metacognition, I will begin by addressing a cluster of issues that have to do with the status, motivation, and exact formulation of that hypothesis
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=10924243&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/10538100/2000/00000009/00000002/art90441
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/ap/cc/2000/00000009/00000002/art00441
  
• David M. Rosenthal (1995). Multiple drafts and the facts of the matter.   (More)
• David M. Rosenthal (1997). Phenomenal consciousness and what it's like.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: be realized. Whatever gets access to phenomenal awareness (to consciousness and P-consciousness are almost always present or P-consciousness as described by Block) is represented within this absent together.
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=1&fid=29560&jid=BBS&volumeId=20&issueId=01&aid=29559
  http://www.journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0140525X9731005X
  
• David Rosenthal (online). Reflections on five questions: Autobiographical and disciplinary.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: in Mind and Consciousness: Five Questions, ed. Patrick Grim, New York and London: Automatic Press, forthcoming
• David Rosenthal (online). “Replies to Galen Strawson and Ned Block.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: (not intended for publication), Replies to Strawson and Block in Colloquium at the CUNY Graduate Center, December 13, 2006
• David M. Rosenthal (1994). State consciousness and transitive consciousness.   (More)
• David M. Rosenthal (2004). Subjective character and reflexive content.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: I. Zombies and the Knowledge Argument John Perry
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2004.tb00335.x
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/ips/ppr/2004/00000068/00000001/art00012
  
• David Rosenthal (online). The mind and its expression.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: MS., for an Eastern Division APA Author-Meets-Critics Session on Dorit Bar-On, Speaking My Mind: Expression and Self-Knowledge, Baltimore, December 2007
• David Rosenthal, V. consciousness, interpretation, and higher-order-thought.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Few contemporary researchers in psychology, philosophy, and the cognitive sciences have any doubt about whether mental phenomena occur without being conscious. There is extensive and convincing clinical and experimental evidence for the existence of thoughts, desires, and related mental states that aren’t conscious. We characterize thoughts, desires, intentions, expectations, hopes, and many other mental states in terms of the things they are about and, more fully, in terms of their content, as captured by a sentence nominalization, such as a clause beginning with the word ‘that’. The philosophical literature follows Franz Brentano’s adaptation of Thomist terminology in referring to all such states as intentional states. But there is another type of mental phenomena, which lack intentionality and whose mental nature consists instead of some qualitative feature. These states include bodily sensations, such as aches and pains, and perceptual states, such as visual sensations of color and tactile sensations of heat and cold. And these states all exhibit some mental quality or another, such as the mental quality distinctive of pain or the mental quality of red or blue.1 And even theorists who acknowledge that intentional states can and do occur without being conscious have sometimes insisted that qualitative states cannot. There is, according to these theorists, nothing to a state’s being qualitative or exhibiting some mental quality unless that state is conscious – unless it is, as we might metaphorically say, “lighted up”. It’s striking that Freud himself seems to have adopted this double standard toward the two types of mental state. In his metapsychological paper, “The Unconscious”, for example, he writes that “all the categories which we employ to describe conscious mental acts, such as ideas, purposes, resolutions, and so forth, can be applied to [unconscious mental occurrences]” (Freud 1915e, p. 168). But he seems here to have in..
• David Rosenthal (2004). Varieties of higher-order theory.   (More)
• Eric Saidel (1999). Consciousness without awareness?   (More)
• William E. Seager (2004). A cold look at HOT theory.   (More)
• William E. Seager (online). Dispositions and consciousness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://lgxserve.ciseca.uniba.it/lei/mind/forums/002_0005.htm
  
• William E. Seager (ms). On dispositional HOT theories of consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Higher Order Thought (HOT) theories of consciousness contend that consciousness can be explicated in terms of a relation between mental states of different
• Lawrence A. Shapiro (1999). Saving the phenomenal.   (More)
• Josh Weisberg (1999). Active, thin, and HOT: An actualist response to Carruthers' dispositionalist HOT view.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Carruthers proposes that for a mental state to be conscious (state consciousness), it must be present in a
• Josh Weisberg (2008). Same old, same old: The same-order representational theory of consciousness and the division of phenomenal labor.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The same-order representation theory of consciousness holds that conscious mental states represent both the world and themselves. This complex representational structure is posited in part to avoid a powerful objection to the more traditional higher-order representation theory of consciousness. The objection contends that the higher-order theory fails to account for the intimate relationship that holds between conscious states and our awareness of them--the theory 'divides the phenomenal labor' in an illicit fashion. This 'failure of intimacy' is exposed by the possibility of misrepresentation by higher-order states. In this paper, I argue that despite appearances, the same-order theory fails to avoid the objection, and thus also has troubles with intimacy
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/017t8t28216558h5.pdf
  
• Josh Weisberg (2001). The appearance of unity: A higher-order interpretation of the unity of consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: subjective appearance of unity, but respects unity can be adequately dealt with by the theory. I the actual and potential disunity of the brain will close by briefly considering some worries about processes that underwrite consciousness. eliminativism that often accompany discussions of unity and consciousness
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.joshweisberg.com/The Appearance of Unity.pdf
  
• Wayne Wright (2005). Distracted drivers and unattended experience.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Consider the much-discussed case of the distracted driver, who is alleged to successfully navigate his car for miles despite being completely oblivious to his visual states. Perhaps he is deeply engrossed in the music playing over the radio or in philosophical reflection, and as a result he goes about unaware of the scene unfolding before him on the road. That the distracted driver has visual experiences of which he is not aware is a possibility that first-order representationalists (FOR) happily accept, but higher-order representationalists (HOR) steadfastly deny. HOR claims that perceptual states become conscious only as the object of higher-order states; perceptual states are not intrinsically conscious. According to HOR, since the driver is supposed to be completely distracted by other cognitive tasks, he cannot form higher-order representations of his visual states, with the result that those states are disqualified as experiences.1 HOR theories have come in two flavors, those that claim that the relevant higher-order representations are thought-like (HOT) and those that that rely on an inner perception-like mechanism that is directed toward one
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.mindstuff.net/Ddue_wtw.pdf
  http://www.mindstuff.net/DDUE_wtw.doc
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/k0p1461283j78px8/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/K0P1461283J78PX8.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/synt/2005/00000144/00000001/00009128
  

Self-Representational Theories of Consciousness

• Berit Brogaard (ms). Are conscious states conscious in virtue of representing Themselves?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This is an excellent book, one of the best I have read on consciousness in recent years. It is rigorously argued and contains interesting suggestions as to how to solve the mystery of consciousness. Following the standard literature, Uriah Kriegel takes consciousness to be the "what it is like for me"-ness of conscious mental states. This is also what is sometimes called the 'phenomenal character' of conscious mental states. For Kriegel (as for Levine), phenomenal character has two components: qualitative character and subjective character. If I have a red experience, the phenomenal redness of my experience is the qualitative character of my experience, whereas the for-me-ness is the subjective character of the experience. Kriegel states that the qualitative character of conscious mental states is what makes the conscious mental state the kind of conscious experience it is, whereas the for-me-ness of the mental state is what makes the mental state a conscious state in the first place. The mystery of consciousness, he says, does not lie in the qualitative character of experience. According to him, the question of how brain processes can give rise to purely qualitative redness is no harder to answer than that of how physical matter can instantiate colors. The mystery of consciousness lies in the for-me-ness of conscious experience. Kriegel then goes on to give an account of the subjective character of
  conscious mental states. He argues that the subjective character of conscious mental states
  consists in the state representing itself. It's the self-representational nature of conscious mental
  states that makes them conscious. The self-representational nature of conscious mental states is
  a kind of peripheral awareness. If I have a red experience, I am focally aware of redness but I
  am peripherally aware of the experience itself. Along the way Kriegel rebuts a number of
  alternative theories of subjective character: among others, that it is a kind of primitive property
  of conscious mental states, and that it is a representation of the conscious mental state by a
  higher-order state. I agree with many of Kriegel's arguments against both the naive primitivist
  view and the higher-order theoretical approach. My main concerns lie elsewhere. My three
  main points of disagreement can be summarized as follows: (1) Assuming that it makes sense to
  separate qualitative and subjective character I believe that the qualitative character of conscious
  mental states is at least as mysterious as the subjective character. (2) I believe Uriah's theory is
  at odds with plausible gradability theories of perception. (3) I am skeptical about the project of
  developing a reductive metaphysical theory of consciousness in terms of self-representation.
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://brogaardb.googlepages.com/CommentsonUriahKriegel.pdf
  http://sites.google.com/site/brogaardb/CommentsonUriahKriegel.pdf
  
• Victor Caston (2006). Comment on Amie Thomasson's "self-awareness and self-knowledge".   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In this paper, I raise an objection to Thomasson
• Angela Coventry & Uriah Kriegel (2008). Locke on consciousness.   (More)
• Rocco J. Gennaro (2006). Between pure self-referentialism and the (extrinsic) HOT theory of consciousness.   (More)
• Rocco J. Gennaro (2007). Representationalism, peripheral awareness, and the transparency of experience.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: It is often said that some kind of peripheral (or inattentional) conscious awareness accompanies our focal (attentional) consciousness. I agree that this is often the case, but clarity is needed on several fronts. In this paper, I lay out four distinct theses on peripheral awareness and show that three of them are true. However, I then argue that a fourth thesis, commonly associated with the so-called "self-representational approach to consciousness," is false. The claim here is that we have outer focal consciousness accompanied often (or even always) by inner peripheral (self-)awareness. My criticisms stem from both methodological and phenomenological considerations. In doing so, I offer a diagnosis as to why the fourth thesis has seemed true to so many and also show how the so-called "transparency of experience," frequently invoked by representationalists, is importantly relevant to my diagnosis. Finally, I respond to several objections and to further attempts to show that thesis four is true. What emerges is that if one wishes to hold that some form of self-awareness accompanies all outer-directed conscious states, one is better off holding that such self-awareness is itself unconscious, as is held for example by standard higher-order theories of consciousness.
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/c628645863404p3q.pdf
  
• Gilbert Harman (2006). Self-reflexive thoughts.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Alice has insomnia. She has trouble falling asleep and part of the problem is that she worries about it and realizes that her worrying about it tends to keep from falling asleep. It occurs to her that thinking that she will not be able to fall asleep may be a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy. Perhaps she even has a thought that might be expressed like this: I am not going to fall asleep because of my having this very thought. This thought (perhaps correctly) attributes to itself the property of keeping her awake
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.princeton.edu/~harman/Papers/Self-Ref.pdf
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1533-6077.2006.00117.x
  
• Christopher S. Hill (2006). Harman on self referential thoughts.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: I will be concerned in these pages with the views that Gilbert Harman puts forward in his immensely stimulating paper Self-Reflexive Thoughts.¹ Harman maintains that self referential thoughts are possible, and also that they are useful. I applaud both of these claims. An example of a self referential thought is the thought that every thought, including this present one, has a logical structure. I feel sure that this thought exists, for I have entertained it on a number of occasions. Moreover, I feel that it is extremely useful. Without deploying it, how could we tell the whole truth about the nature of thoughts?
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1533-6077.2006.00118.x
  
• Jenann Ismael (2006). Doublemindedness: A model for a dual content cognitive architecture.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The outstanding stumbling blocks to any reductive account of phenomenal consciousness remain the subjectivity of phenomenal properties and cognitive and epistemic gaps that plague the relationship between physical and phenomenal properties. I suggest that a deflationary interpretation of both is available to defenders of self- representational accounts
• Tomis Kapitan (1999). The ubiquity of self-awareness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Two claims have been prominent in recent discussions of self-consciousness. One is that first-person reference or first-person thinking is irreducible (the Irreducibility Thesis), and the other is that an awareness of self accompanies all conscious states, at least those through which one refers to something. The latter--here termed the Ubiquity Thesis--has long been associated with philosophers like Fichte, Brentano, and Sartre, though each articulated his own version of the claim. More recently, variants have been defended by Dieter Henrich (1970) and Manfred Frank (1991, 1995a, 1995b). In Frank's words
• Uriah Kriegel (2007). A cross-order integration hypothesis for the neural correlate of consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: b>. One major problem many hypotheses regarding the neural correlate of consciousness (NCC) face is what we might call “the why question”: _why _would this particular neural feature, rather than another, correlate with consciousness? The purpose of the present paper is to develop an NCC hypothesis that answers this question. The proposed hypothesis is inspired by the Cross-Order Integration (COI) theory of consciousness, according to which consciousness arises from the functional integration of a first-order representation of an external stimulus and a second-order representation of that first-order representation. The proposal comes in two steps. The first step concerns the “general shape” of the NCC and can be directly derived from COI theory. The second step is a concrete hypothesis that can be arrived at by combining the general shape with empirical considerations
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://uriahkriegel.com/downloads/COI.pdf
  
• Uriah Kriegel (2003). Consciousness as intransitive self-consciousness: Two views and an argument.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The word ?consciousness? is notoriously ambiguous. This is mainly because it is not a term of art, but a mundane word we all use quite frequently, for different purposes and in different everyday contexts. In this paper, I discuss consciousness in one specific sense of the word. To avoid the ambiguities, I introduce a term of art ? intransitive self-consciousness ? and suggest that this form of self-consciousness is an essential component of the folk notion of consciousness. I then argue for a specific account of consciousness as intransitive self-consciousness. According to this account, a mental state is conscious (i.e., intransitively self-conscious) iff it represents its own occurrence. The argument is a ?modernizing? modification of an older argument due to Aristotle and Brentano
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.uriahkriegel.com/downloads/CJP.pdf
  
• Uriah Kriegel (2003). Consciousness, higher-order content, and the individuation of vehicles.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: One of the distinctive properties of conscious states is the peculiar self- awareness implicit in them. Two rival accounts of this self-awareness are discussed. According to a Neo-Brentanian account, a mental state M is conscious iff M represents its very own occurrence. According to the Higher-Order Monitoring account, M is merely accompanied by a numerically distinct representation of its occurrence. According to both, then, M is conscious in virtue of figuring in a higher-order content. The disagreement is over the question whether the higher-order content is carried by M itself or by a differ- ent state. While the Neo-Brentanian theory is phenomenologically more attractive, it is often felt to be somewhat mysterious. It is argued (i) that the difference between the Neo- Brentanian and Higher-Order Monitoring theories is smaller and more empirical than may initially seem, and (ii) that the Neo-Brentanian theory can be readily demystified. These considerations make it prima facie preferable to the Higher-Order Monitoring theory.
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.uriahkriegel.com/downloads/synthese 2003.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/v3w0777v30xx17g0/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=5091964&PDF=1
  http://journals.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=5091964
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/V3W0777V30XX17G0.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/synt/2003/00000134/00000003/05091964
  
• Uriah Kriegel (2004). Moore's paradox and the structure of conscious belief.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/r78343n174207058/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=5274979&PDF=1
  http://journals.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=5274979
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/R78343N174207058.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/erke/2004/00000061/00000001/05274979
  
• Uriah Kriegel (2005). Naturalizing Subjective Character.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: When I have an experience of the blue sky, there is a bluish it is like for me to have the experience. There are two components to this “bluish way it is like for me”: the bluish component, which I call qualitative character; and the for-me component, which I call subjective character. The paper examines six options for naturalizing subjective character.
• Terry Horgan & Uriah Kriegel (2007). Phenomenal epistemology: What is consciousness that we may know it so well?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: It has often been thought that our knowledge of ourselves is _different_ from, perhaps in some sense _better_ than, our knowledge of things other than ourselves. Indeed, there is a thriving research area in epistemology dedicated to seeking an account of self-knowledge that would articulate and explain its difference from, and superiority over, other knowledge. Such an account would thus illuminate the descriptive and normative difference between self-knowledge and other knowledge.¹ At the same time, self- knowledge has also encountered its share of skeptics – philosophers who refuse to accord it any descriptive, let alone normative, distinction. In this paper, we argue that there is at least one _species_ of self-knowledge that is different from, and better than, other knowledge. It is a specific kind of knowledge of one’s concurrent phenomenal experiences. Call knowledge of one’s own phenomenal experiences _phenomenal knowledge_. Our claim is that some (though not all) phenomenal knowledge is different from, and better than, non-phenomenal knowledge. In other
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1533-6077.2007.00126.x
  
• Uriah Kriegel (forthcoming). Precis of Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This is a Precis of my book _Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory_. It does the usual.
• Uriah Kriegel (2009). Self-representationalism and phenomenology.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: To a first approximation, self-representationalism is the view that a mental state M is phenomenally conscious just in case M represents itself in the appropriate way. Proponents of self-representationalism seem to think that the phenomenology of ordinary conscious experience is on their side, but opponents seem to think the opposite. In this paper, I consider the phenomenological merits and demerits of self-representationalism. I argue that there is phenomenological evidence in favor of self-representationalism, and rather more confidently, that there is no phenomenological evidence against self-representationalism
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/612q2835t6802k63/fulltext.pdf
  
• Uriah Kriegel (forthcoming). Self-Representationalism and the Explanatory Gap.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: According to the self-representational theory of consciousness – self- representationalism for short – a mental state is phenomenally conscious when, and only when, it represents itself in the right way. In this paper, I consider how self- representationalism might address the alleged explanatory gap between phenomenal consciousness and physical properties. I open with a presentation of self- representationalism and the case for it (§1). I then present what I take to be the most promising self-representational approach to the explanatory gap (§2). That approach is threatened, however, by an objection to self-representationalism, due to Levine, which I call the just more representation objection (§3). I close with a discussion of how the self-representationalist might approach the objection (§4).
• Uriah Kriegel (2006). The same-order monitoring theory of consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: One of the promising approaches to the problem of consciousness has been the Higher-Order Monitoring Theory of Consciousness. According to the Higher-Order Monitoring Theory, a mental state M of a subject S is conscious iff S has another mental state, M*, such that M* is an appropriate representation of M. Recently, several philosophers have developed a Higher-Order Monitoring theory with a twist. The twist is that M and M* are construed as entertaining some kind of constitutive relation, rather than being logically independent of each other. We may call this the Same-Order Monitoring Theory of Consciousness. In this paper, I discuss the nature of the Same-Order Monitoring Theory and argue for its superiority over the more traditional Higher-Order Monitoring Theory
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://uriahkriegel.com/downloads/vegasbabyvegas.pdf
  
• Joseph Levine (2006). Conscious awareness and (self-)representation.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/courses/consciousness05/LevineAwareness.pdf
  
• Thomas Natsoulas (1996). The case for intrinsic theory: I. An introduction.   (More)
• Paul Raymont (online). From HOTs to self-representing states.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: After briefly summarizing David Rosenthal
• David Rosenthal (ms). Consciousness and intrinsic higher-order content.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: PowerPoint presentation at Tucson VII, Toward a Science of Consciousness 2006, session on Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness
• David Rosenthal (2004). Varieties of higher-order theory.   (More)
• William Seager (2006). Is self-representation necessary for consciousness?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Brook and Raymont do not assert that self-representing representations are sufficient to generate consciousness, but they do assert that they are necessary, at least in the sense that self-representation provides the most plausible mechanism for generating conscious mental states. I argue that a first-order approach to consciousness is equally capable of accounting for the putative features of consciousness which are supposed to favor the self-representational account. If nothing is gained the simplicity of the first-order theory counts in its favor. I also advance a speculative proposal that we are never aware of any distinctively mental attributes of our own states of consciousness except via an independent act of reflective conceptualization, although this goes rather farther than the first-order theory strictly requires
• Brad J. Thompson (2006). Comments on Ismael's "double-mindedness: A model for a dual content cognitive architecture?".   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Two general worries are raised for the dual content approach to consciousness as presented by Ismael in
• Robert Van Gulick (2004). Higher-order global states (hogs): An alternative higher-order model of consciousness.   (More)
• Robert van Gulick (2000). Inward and upward: Reflection, introspection, and self-awareness.   (More)
• Robert Van Gulick (2006). Mirror, mirror -- is that all?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Consciousness and self-awareness seem intuitively linked, but how they intertwine is less than clear. Must one be self-aware in order to be consciousness? Indeed, is consciousness just a special type of self-awareness? Or perhaps it is the other way round: Is being self-aware a special way of being conscious? Discerning their connections is complicated by the fact that both the main relata themselves admit of many diverse forms and levels. One might be conscious or self- aware in many different ways or respects, and to varying degrees. Thus the real questions of linkage must be posed more specifically. We need to ask not whether the two are bound in general, but whether and how being conscious in some specific sense and degree relates to some particular sort of self-awareness. Only those more specific questions are likely to have fully determinate answers
• Josh Weisberg (2008). Same old, same old: The same-order representational theory of consciousness and the division of phenomenal labor.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The same-order representation theory of consciousness holds that conscious mental states represent both the world and themselves. This complex representational structure is posited in part to avoid a powerful objection to the more traditional higher-order representation theory of consciousness. The objection contends that the higher-order theory fails to account for the intimate relationship that holds between conscious states and our awareness of them--the theory 'divides the phenomenal labor' in an illicit fashion. This 'failure of intimacy' is exposed by the possibility of misrepresentation by higher-order states. In this paper, I argue that despite appearances, the same-order theory fails to avoid the objection, and thus also has troubles with intimacy
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/017t8t28216558h5.pdf
  
• Kenneth Williford (2006). Zahavi versus Brentano: A rejoinder.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Dan Zahavi has argued persuasively that some versions of self- representationalism are implausible on phenomenological and dialectical grounds: they fail to make sense of primitive self-knowledge and lead to an infinite regress. Zahavi proposes an alternative view of ubiquitous prereflective self-consciousness
• Dan Zahavi (2004). Back to Brentano?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: For a cou ple of decades, higher-order the o ries of con scious ness have enjoyed great pop u lar ity, but they have recently been met with grow ing dis sat is - fac tion. Many have started to look else where for via ble alter na tives, and within the last few years, quite a few have redis cov ered Brentano. In this paper such a (neo-)Brentanian one-level account of con scious ness will be out lined and dis - cussed. It will be argued that it can con trib ute impor tant insights to our under - stand ing of the rela tion between con scious ness and self-aware ness, but it will also be argued that the account remains beset with some prob lems, and that it will ulti mately make more sense to take a closer look at Sartre, Husserl, and Heidegger, if one is on the look out for prom is ing alter na tives to the higher-order the o ries, than to return all the way to Brentano
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/2004/00000011/F0020010/art00005
  
• Dan Zahavi (2006). Two takes on a one-level account of consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: My presentation will discuss two one-level accounts of consciousness, a Brentanian and a Husserlian. I will address some of the relevant differences
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cfs.ku.dk/staff/zahavi-publications/Two_Takes.pdf/
  http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/symposia/kriegel/4Zahavi.pdf
  http://psyche.csse.monash.edu.au/symposia/kriegel/4Zahavi.pdf