Compiled by David Chalmers (Editor) and David Bourget (Assistant Editor), Australian National University. Part of MindPapers. Suggest an entry.

		All fields Surname Advanced
		click here for help on how to search

Search tips

There are three kinds of search you can perform:

All fields

This mode searches for entries containing all the entered words in their title, author, date, comment field, or in any of many other fields showing on MindPapers pages.

Surname

This mode searches for entries containing the text string you entered in their author field. Note that the database does not have first names for all authors, so it is preferable to search only by surnames. If you search for a full name or a name with an initial, enter it in the format used internally by MindPapers, namely the "Lastname, Firstname" or "Lastname, F." format.

Advanced

This mode differs from the all fields mode in two respects. First, some information not publicly available on MindPapers is searched, e.g., abstracts and excerpts gathered by the MindPapers crawler, which are not always accurate but can help broaden one's search. Second, you may prefix any term with a '+' or '-' to narrow the search to entries containing it or not containing it, respectively. Terms which are not prefixed by a '+' are not mandatory. Instead, they are weighed depending on their frequency in order to determine the best search results. You may also search for a literal string composed of several words by putting them in double quotation marks (").

Note that short and / or common words are ignored by the search engine.

Try MindPapers to find published items which are available on a subscription basis.

close help

Philosophy of consciousness :: Consciousness and content

• Consciousness and intentionality [19]
• Representationalism [56]
• Phenomenal intentionality [12]
• Conscious thought [3]
• Internalism and externalism about experience [12]
• Phenomenal concepts [24]
• Consciousness and content, misc [5]

Consciousness and intentionality

See also: Representationalism, Phenomenal intentionality, Conscious thought, Internalism and externalism about experience, Consciousness and content, misc, The status of intentionality.

• John Barresi (2007). Consciousness and intentionality. (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/2007/00000014/F0020001/art00006
  
• Rebecca Copenhaver (2006). Thomas Reid's philosophy of mind: Consciousness and intentionality. (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2006.00023.x
  
• Tim Crane (1998). Intentionality as the mark of the mental. (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ucl.ac.uk/philosophy/adobedocs/Intentionality as the mark.pdf
  http://sas-space.sas.ac.uk/dspace/handle/10065/219
  
• Martin Davies (1995). Consciousness and the varieties of aboutness. (More)
• Jerry Fodor & Ernest Lepore (1994). What is the connection principle? (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8205(199412)54:4<837:WITCP>2.0.CO;2-H
  
• Oscar Gonzalez-Castan (1999). The connection principle and the classificatory scheme of reality. (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://sammelpunkt.philo.at:8080/archive/00001208/
  
• Ted Honderich (2001). Consciousness as existence and the end of intentionality. (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ucl.ac.uk/~uctytho/consciousness_as_existence3.htm
  
• Donovan Hulse & Cynthia Read (online). Searle's intentional mistake. (More)
• Pierre Jacob (1995). Consciousness, intentionality, and function: What is the right order of explanation? (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/docs/00/05/33/12/HTML/
  http://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/documents/disk0/00/00/03/55/ijn_00000355_00/ijn_00000355_00.htm
  http://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/ijn_00000355
  http://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/documents/disk0/00/00/01/63/ijn_00000163_00/ijn_00000163_00.htm
  http://pierrejacob.hautetfort.com/files/searle.pdf
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8205(199503)55:1<195:CIAFWI>2.0.CO;2-3
  
• Kirk Ludwig (1993). A dilemma for Searle's argument for the connection principle. (More)
• Alva Noë (2006). Experience without the head. (More)
• Adam Pautz (manuscript). The intentional structure of consciousness: A primitivist theory. (More)
• William Robinson (manuscript). Phenomenal consciousness and intentionality: Vive la difference! (More)
• Paul Schweizer (1994). Intentionality, qualia, and mind/brain identity. (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/R4Q42N7277354062.pdf
  
• Nigel Thomas (manuscript). Coding dualism: Conscious thought without cartesianism or computationalism. (More)
• Amie Thomasson (2001). Two puzzles for a new theory of consciousness. (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/v8/psyche-8-03-thomasson.html
  
• Robbert Van Baaren (1999). A critical evaluation of Searle's connection principle. (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://sammelpunkt.philo.at:8080/archive/00001206/01/BAAREN.pdf
  
• Kenneth Williford (2005). The intentionality of consciousness and consciousness of intentionality. (More)
• Dan Zahavi (2005). Intentionality and experience. (More)

Representationalism

See also: Higher-order thought approaches, Self-representational approaches, Internalism and externalism about experience, Representation, Intentionalism, The contents of perception, Illusion and hallucination, Transparency.

• Torin Alter (2006). Does synesthesia undermine representationalism? (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/symposia/rosenberg/Alter.pdf
  
• Kent Bach (1997). Engineering the mind (review of Dretske 1995, Naturalizing the Mind). (More)
• Andrew Bailey (2005). What is it like to see a bat? A critique of Dretske's representationalist theory of qualia. (More)
• Ansgar Beckermann (1995). Visual information-processing and phenomenal consciousness. (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.uni-bielefeld.de/(de)/philosophie/personen/beckermann/phben_ww.pdf
  http://www.uni-bielefeld.de/(en)/philosophie/personen/beckermann/phben_ww.pdf
  
• Ned Block (2005). Bodily sensations as an obstacle for representationism. (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/faculty/block/papers/Representationism1.pdf
  
• Ned Block (1998). Is experiencing just representing? (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8205(199809)58:3<663:IEJR>2.0.CO;2-O
  
• Ned Block (2003). Mental paint. (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.phil.canterbury.ac.nz/tom_bestor/e-texts/Block, Ned - Mental paint mentalpaint.pdf
  
• Ned Block (1999). Sexism, ageism, racism, and the nature of consciousness. (More)
• Andrew Brook & Paul Raymont (2006). The representational base of consciousness. (More)
• Tyler Burge (2003). Qualia and intentional content: Reply to Block. (More)
• Alex Byrne (online). Don't PANIC: Tye's intentionalist theory of consciousness. (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://host.uniroma3.it/progetti/kant/field/tyesymp_byrne.htm
  
• Alex Byrne (2001). Intentionalism defended. (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://pellenes-shoshonensis.mit.edu/abyrne/www/Intentionalism.pdf
  http://web.mit.edu/abyrne/www/Intentionalism.pdf
  http://stripe.colorado.edu/~leeds/byrne.pdf
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8108(200104)110:2<199:ID>2.0.CO;2-N
  http://philreview.dukejournals.org/cgi/reprint/110/2/199.pdf
  http://philreview.dukejournals.org/cgi/reprint/110/2/199
  http://philreview.dukejournals.org/cgi/content/citation/110/2/199
  
• Alex Byrne (online). Tye on color and the explanatory gap. (More)
• David Chalmers (2004). The representational character of experience. (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://consc.net/papers/representation.pdf
  http://consc.net/papers/representation.html
  
• David Cole (online). Dretske on naturalizing the mind. (More)
• Tim Crane (2003). The intentional structure of consciousness. (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ucl.ac.uk/philosophy/adobedocs/The intentional structure.pdf
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=8AHDK62jPSgC&oi=fnd&pg=PA33&dq=+The+intentional+structure+of+consciousness+Crane&ots=fGNdQUFEcm&sig=prJYG9YXgMUxdP7OoGzPC1Zm6oc
  http://sas-space.sas.ac.uk/dspace/handle/10065/221
  
• Fred Dretske (2003). Experience as representation. (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1533-6077.00005
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/1533-6077.00005
  
• Paula Droege (manuscript). Second sense: A theory of sensory consciousness. (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://digitalcommons.uconn.edu/dissertations/AAI3002679
  
• Guven Guzeldere & Murat Aydede (2000). On the relation between phenomenal and representational properties. (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://humanities.uchicago.edu/faculty/aydede/BBS.html
  http://web.clas.ufl.edu/users/maydede/BBS.html
  http://cogprints.org/354/00/BBS.html
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000354/
  http://cogprints.org/354/
  http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0140525X97270056
  http://www.journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0140525X97270056
  
• Benj Hellie (2002). Consciousness and representationalism. (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://individual.utoronto.ca/benj/ecs.pdf
  
• Benj Hellie (forthcoming). Representationalism. (More)
• Christopher Hill (2006). Harman on self referential thoughts. (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1533-6077.2006.00118.x
  
• James Hopkins (manuscript). Representation of the inner and the concept of mind. (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://sas-space.sas.ac.uk/dspace/handle/10065/795
  
• Frank Jackson (2004). Representation and experience. (More)
• Frank Jackson (manuscript). Some reflections on representationalism. (More)
• Michael Jacovides (manuscript). Do experiences represent? (More)
• Amy Kind (manuscript). Restrictions on representationalism. (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/t441t16j8w3174m0/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/T441T16J8W3174M0.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/phil/2007/00000134/00000003/00009079
  
• Uriah Kriegel (2002). PANIC theory and the prospects for a representational theory of phenomenal consciousness. (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.uriahkriegel.com/downloads/PhilPsych.pdf
  http://www.consc.net/cgi/go.fcgi?id=KRIPTA&free=0&u=http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/index/9HFYHL2WD9AYG700.pdf
  http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/index/9HFYHL2WD9AYG700.pdf
  http://www.informaworld.com/index/9HFYHL2WD9AYG700.pdf
  http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/./ftinterface~content=a713690557~fulltext=713240930
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/routledg/cphp/2002/00000015/00000001/art00004
  
• Dan Lloyd (1997). Consciousness and its discontents. (More)
• William Lycan (online). Representational theories of consciousness. (More)
• Fiona Macpherson (2006). Ambiguous figures and the content of experience. (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.0029-4624.2006.00602.x
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/nous/2006/00000040/00000001/art00003
  
• Fiona Macpherson (2005). Colour inversion problems for representationalism. (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/1996/
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2005.tb00508.x
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/ips/ppr/2005/00000070/00000001/art00005
  
• Fiona Macpherson (2003). Novel colours and the content of experience. (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/archive/00000581/
  http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/archive/00000581/01/macpherson_ppq84.pdf
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1468-0114.00162
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/1468-0114.00162/enhancedabs/
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/papq/2003/00000084/00000001/art00004
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/papq/2003/00000084/00000001/art00162
  
• Fiona Macpherson (1999). Perfect pitch and the content of experience. (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.gla.ac.uk/media/media_21951_en.pdf
  
• Fiona Macpherson (2000). Representational Theories of Phenomenal Character. (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  https://dspace.stir.ac.uk/dspace/bitstream/1893/25/1/Macpherson_Thesis_Complete.pdf
  
• J. Barry Maund (online). Tye on phenomenal character and color. (More)
• Ronald McIntyre (1999). Naturalizing phenomenology? Dretske on qualia. (More)
• Sofia Miguens (2002). Qualia or non epistemic perception: D. Dennett's and F. Dretske's representational theories of consciousness. (More)
• Karen Neander (1998). The division of phenomenal labor: A problem for representationalist theories of consciousness. (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0029-4624(1998)32<411:TDOPLA>2.0.CO;2-4
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/0029-4624.32.s12.18
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/0029-4624.32.s12.18
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/nous/1998/00000032/A0120s12/art00126
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/nous/1998/00000032/A0020s12/art00126
  
• Paul Noordhof (2001). In pain. (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www-users.york.ac.uk/~pjpn500/paulnpapers/PaulNoordhof_InPain.pdf
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1467-8284.00277
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/anal/2001/00000061/00000270/art00001
  
• Elisabeth Pacherie (1999). Qualia and representations. (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/docs/00/05/33/70/PDF/ijn_00000244_00.pdf
  http://hal.ccsd.cnrs.fr/docs/00/05/33/70/PDF/ijn_00000244_00.pdf
  http://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/documents/disk0/00/00/02/44/ijn_00000244_00/ijn_00000244_00.pdf
  http://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/docs/00/05/33/70/PDF/ijn_00000244_00.pdf
  http://www.consc.net/cgi/go.fcgi?id=PACQAR&free=1&u=http://hal.ccsd.cnrs.fr/docs/00/05/33/70/PDF/ijn_00000244_00.pdf
  
• Dan Ryder (manuscript). The autonomic nervous system and Dretske on phenomenal consciousness. (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://homepage.mac.com/ancientportraits/drsite/ANS-Ryder_Martin.pdf
  
• William Seager & David Bourget (2007). Representationalism about consciousness. (More)
• William Seager (online). Some awkwardness in poised content? (More)
• Sydney Shoemaker (online). Content, color, and character I: Against standard representationalism. (More)
• Sydney Shoemaker (manuscript). Content, color, and character II: A better sort of representationalism. (More)
• Daniel Stoljar (2007). Consequences of intentionalism. (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://humanities.ucsc.edu/NEH/stoljar.htm
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/Y31138G826U7132V.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/y31138g826u7132v/fulltext.pdf
  
• Michael Tye (2005). In defense of representationalism: Reply to commentaries. (More)
• Michael Tye (1998). Inverted earth, swampman, and representationalism. (More)
• Michael Tye (online). Phenomenal character and color - reply to Maund. (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/LT86450NL07170TQ.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/lt86450nl07170tq/fulltext.pdf
  
• Michael Tye (online). Precis of Color, Content, and Consciousness. (More)
• Michael Tye (1998). Reply to Block, Jackson, and Shoemaker on Ten Problems of Consciousness. (More)
• Michael Tye (forthcoming). Representationalist theories of consciousness. (More)
• Michael Tye (online). To PANIC or not to PANIC? -Reply to Byrne. (More)
• Michael Tye (2002). Visual qualia and visual content revisited. (More)
• Michael Tye (1994). What what it's like is really like. (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0003-2638(199504)55:2<125:WWILIR>2.0.CO;2-T
  

Phenomenal intentionality

See also: Consciousness and intentionality, Conscious thought, Internalism and externalism about experience, Consciousness and content, misc, Phenomenology, The contents of perception.

• Katalin Farkas (2008). Phenomenal intentionality without compromise. (More)
• Terence Horgan & Uriah Kriegel (forthcoming). Phenomenal intentionality meets the extended mind. (More)
• Uriah Kriegel (2007). Intentional inexistence and phenomenal intentionality. (More)
• Uriah Kriegel (2003). Is intentionality dependent upon consciousness? (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://consc.net/cgi/go.fcgi?id=KRIIID&free=0&u=http://www.springerlink.com/index/M616061Q582225K4.pdf
  http://www.uriahkriegel.com/downloads/kriegel, philosophical studies 2003.pdf
  http://uriahkriegel.com/downloads/kriegel, philosophical studies 2003.pdf
  http://journals.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=5121118
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=5121118&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/M616061Q582225K4.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/m616061q582225k4/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/phil/2003/00000116/00000003/05121118
  
• Uriah Kriegel (2002). Phenomenal content. (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://journals.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=401548
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=401548&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/W630422Q04033077.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/erke/2002/00000057/00000002/00401548
  
• Uriah Kriegel (manuscript). The intentionality of conscious experience and mind-relative content. (More)
• Brian Loar (2003). Phenomenal intentionality as the basis of mental content. (More)
• Adam Pautz (forthcoming). The interdependence of phenomenology and intentionality. (More)
• David Pitt (manuscript). Intentional psychologism. (More)
• David Pitt (2004). The phenomenology of cognition, or, what is it like to think that P? (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://humanities.ucsc.edu/NEH/pitt.htm
  http://humanities.ucsc.edu/NEH/pitt.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/ips/ppr/2004/00000069/00000001/art00001
  
• Sydney Shoemaker (2001). Introspection and phenomenal character. (More)
• Brad Thompson (2003). Shoemaker on phenomenal content. (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://faculty.smu.edu/bthompso/shoemaker.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/gh46608568x56h70/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/GH46608568X56H70.pdf
  

Conscious thought

See also: Consciousness and intentionality, Phenomenal intentionality, Consciousness and content, misc, The stream of consciousness, Thinking, Perception and thought.

• Peter Carruthers (2006). Conscious experience versus conscious thought. (More)
• Peter Carruthers (1998). Conscious thinking: Language or elimination? (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00001203/
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?id=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:1203
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:1203
  http://cogprints.org/1203/00/Concthnk.htm
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/1468-0017.00087/abs/
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1468-0017.00087
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/mila/1998/00000013/00000004/art00001
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/mila/1998/00000013/00000004/art00087
  
• David Cole (1994). Thought and qualia. (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/U4467582020M8261.pdf
  

Internalism and externalism about experience

See also: Representationalism, Phenomenal intentionality, Internalism and externalism.

• Frederick Adams & Laura Dietrich (2004). Swampman's revenge: Squabbles among the representationalists. (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/index/G40E0Q1YMJXRLY0D.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/routledg/cphp/2004/00000017/00000003/art00001
  
• Alex Byrne & Michael Tye (2006). Qualia ain't in the head. (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://mit.edu/abyrne/www/qualiaaintinthehead.pdf
  http://web.mit.edu/abyrne/www/qualiaaintinthehead.pdf
  http://www.utexas.edu/cola/depts/philosophy/faculty/tye/QualiaAintInTheHead.pdf
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.0029-4624.2006.00608.x
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/nous/2006/00000040/00000002/art00002
  
• Andy Egan & James John (manuscript). A puzzle about perception. (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.sitemaker.umich.edu/egana/files/puzzperc.pdf
  
• Jonathan Ellis (manuscript). Can an externalist about concepts be an internalist about phenomenal character. (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://fortytwo.ucsc.edu/~jellis/Papers/PhenExt.pdf
  http://fortytwo.ucsc.edu/~jellis/
  
• Ted Honderich (2006). Radical externalism. (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/2006/00000013/F0020007/art00001
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/2006/00000013/f0020007
  
• William Lycan (2001). The case for phenomenal externalism. (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/0029-4624.35.s15.2
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/0029-4624.35.s15.2/abs/
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/nous/2001/00000035/A0150s15/art00309
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/nous/2001/00000035/A00100s1/art00309
  
• Adam Pautz (manuscript). Sensory awareness as irreducible: From internalist intentionalism to primitivism. (More)
• Adam Pautz (2006). Sensory awareness is not a wide physical relation: An empirical argument against externalist intentionalism. (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  https://webspace.utexas.edu/arp424/www/nous.pdf?uniq=o3o0eq
  http://philrsss.anu.edu.au/people-defaults/adamp/papers/abridged_pautz_sensoryawarenessnotwide.pdf
  https://webspace.utexas.edu/arp424/www/Sensory Awareness not Wide.pdf?uniq=o3o0ff
  http://philrsss.anu.edu.au/people-defaults/adamp/papers/sensory_awareness_not_wide.pdf
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.0029-4624.2006.00607.x
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/nous/2006/00000040/00000002/art00001
  
• Adam Pautz (online). Tracking intentionalism and optimal conditions: A reply to Byrne and Tye. (More)
• Barry Smith (2006). Consciousness: An inner view of the outer world. (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/2006/00000013/F0020007/art00011
  
• F. Tonneau (2004). Consciousness outside the head. (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://behavior.org/journals_BP/2004/13Tonneau.pdf
  https://www.behavior.org/journals_BP/2004/13Tonneau.pdf
  
• Michael Tye (forthcoming). Phenomenal externalism, Lolita, and the planet Xenon. (More)

Phenomenal concepts

See also: Explaining consciousness?, The knowledge argument, Zombies and the conceivability argument, Kripke's modal argument, Concepts.

• Torin Alter (2006). On the conditional analysis of phenomenal concepts. (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://consc.net/cgi/go.fcgi?id=ALTOTC-2&free=0&u=http://www.springerlink.com/index/314273727366L23U.pdf