1. Philosophy of Consciousness (Philosophy of Consciousness on PhilPapers)
Philosophy of Consciousness, Miscellaneous
Philosophy of Consciousness, General Works
The Concept of Consciousness
- Michael V. Antony (ms). Are our concepts "conscious state" and "conscious creature" vague? (Abstract & more)
- Michael V. Antony (2006). Consciousness and vagueness. (Abstract & more)
- Michael V. Antony (2002). Concepts of consciousness, kinds of consciousness, meanings of 'consciousness'. (More)
- Michael V. Antony (2001). Conceiving simple experiences. (Abstract & more)
- Michael V. Antony (2001). Is 'consciousness' ambiguous? (Abstract & more)
- Michael V. Antony (1999). Outline of a general methodology for consciousness research. (Abstract & more)
- Rodrigo Becerra (2004). Homonymous mistakes with ontological aspirations: The persisting problem with the word 'consciousness'. (More)
- Mark H. Bickhard (2005). Consciousness and reflective consciousness. (Abstract & more)
- Ned Block (1997). Author's response. (Abstract & more)
- Gregg Caruso (2005). Sensory States, Consciousness, and the Cartesian Assumption. (More)
- David J. Chalmers (1997). Availability: The cognitive basis of experience? (Abstract & more)
- Austen Clark (2001). Phenomenal consciousness so-called. (Abstract & more)
- Felipe De Brigard (forthcoming). Attention, Consciousness, and Commonsense. (Abstract & more)
- Daniel C. Dennett (2001). Consciousness: How much is that in real money? (More)
- Ronald B. de Sousa (2002). Twelve varieties of subjectivity. (More)
- Andrew A. Fingelkurts, Alexander A. Fingelkurts & Carlos F. H. Neves (2010). Natural World Physical, Brain Operational, and Mind Phenomenal Space-Time. (Abstract & more)
- Alvin Goldman (1993). Consciousness, folk psychology, and cognitive science. (Abstract & more)
- Gilbert Harman (online). What is cognitive access? (More)
- Benj Hellie (2010). An externalist's guide to inner experience. (Abstract & more)
- Benj Hellie (2007). Factive phenomenal characters. (Abstract & more)
- Boris Hennig (2007). Cartesian conscientia. (Abstract & more)
- Ted Honderich (1998). Consciousness as existence. (More)
- Ted Honderich (2004). Consciousness as existence, devout physicalism, spiritualism. (Abstract & more)
- Ted Honderich (2003). Perceptual, reflective, and affective consciousness as existence. (Abstract & more)
- Daniel D. Hutto (2001). Consciousness and Conceptual Schema. (More)
- William James (1904). Does "consciousness" exist? (More)
- Joshua Knobe & Jesse J. Prinz (2008). Intuitions about consciousness: Experimental studies. (Abstract & more)
- Uriah Kriegel (2006). Consciousness: Phenomenal consciousness, access consciousness, and scientific practice. (Abstract & more)
- Eric Lormand (1996). Nonphenomenal consciousness. (Abstract & more)
- William G. Lycan (online). The plurality of consciousness. (Abstract & more)
- Neil Campbell Manson (2002). Epistemic consciousness. (More)
- Gyorgy Markus (1975). The Marxian concept of consciousness. (More)
- Thomas Natsoulas (1999). The concept of consciousness: The general state meaning. (More)
- Thomas Natsoulas (1996). The sciousness hypothesis: Part I. (More)
- Gregory Nixon (2010). Hollows of Experience. (Abstract & more)
- Gualtiero Piccinini (2007). The ontology of creature consciousness: A challenge for philosophy. (More)
- Charles Ripley (1984). Sperry's concept of consciousness. (More)
- David Rosenthal (web). Concepts and definitions of consciousness. (Abstract & more)
- David Rosenthal (2001). Consciousness and sensation: Philosophical aspects. (Abstract & more)
- David M. Rosenthal (2002). How many kinds of consciousness? (More)
- David M. Rosenthal (1997). Phenomenal consciousness and what it's like. (Abstract & more)
- David M. Rosenthal (1994). State consciousness and transitive consciousness. (More)
- Ulrich Schlösser (ms). Hegel's conception of philosophical critique. The concept of consciousness and the structure of proof in the introduction to the phenomenology of spirit. (Abstract & more)
- Aaron Sloman (ms). What is it like to be a rock? (Abstract & more)
- Justin Sytsma (2010). Folk psychology and phenomenal consciousness. (Abstract & more)
- Justin Sytsma & Edouard Machery (2009). How to study folk intuitions about phenomenal consciousness. (Abstract & more)
- Justin Sytsma & Edouard Machery (forthcoming). Two conceptions of subjective experience. (Abstract & more)
- Nigel J. T. Thomas (1998). Imagination, eliminativism, and the pre-history of consciousness. (Abstract & more)
- Mario Vaneechoutte (2000). Experience, awareness, and consciousness: Suggestions for definitions as offered by an evolutionary approach. (Abstract & more)
- Max Velmans, Defining consciousness. (Abstract & more)
- Prof Max Velmans (2009). How to define consciousness—and how not to define consciousness. (Abstract & more)
Philosophy of Consciousness, Misc
- Joe Becker (2008). Conceptualizing Mind and Consciousness: Using Constructivist Ideas to Transcend the Physical Bind. (Abstract & more)
- Alex Byrne, David Hilbert & Susanna Siegel (online). Do we see more than we can access? (More)
- Peter Carruthers (2001). Who is blind to blindsight? (More)
- David J. Chalmers (unknown). On ``consciousness and the philosophers''. (Abstract & more)
- David J. Chalmers (unknown). Reply to mulhauser's review of the conscious mind. (Abstract & more)
- David J. Chalmers (1997). Response to Searle. (Abstract & more)
- Daniel C. Dennett (2005). Two steps closer on consciousness. (Abstract & more)
- Fred Dretske (2001). First person warrant: Comments on Siewert's The Significance of Consciousness. (More)
- Richard M. Gale (online). William James on the misery and glory of consciousness. (More)
- Brie Gertler (2001). The relationship between phenomenality and intentionality: Comments on Siewert's The Significance of Consciousness. (Abstract & more)
- George Graham & Terence E. Horgan (1998). Sensations and grain processes. (More)
- Susan L. Hurley (online). Is there a substantive disagreement here? Reply to Chemero and Cordeiro. (More)
- Susan L. Hurley (online). The space of reasons vs. the space of inference: Reply to Noe. (More)
- Robert E. Kirk (2002). Thinking about Papineau's Thinking About Consciousness. (More)
- Joseph Levine (2001). Phenomenal consciousness and the first-person. (More)
- Vili Lähteenmäki (2007). Orders of Consciousness and Forms of Reflexivity in Descartes. (More)
- Vili Lähteenmäki (2008). The Sphere of Experience in Locke: The Relations Between Reflection, Consciousness, and Ideas. (More)
- Paul M. Livingston (2002). Experience and structure: Philosophical history and the problem of consciousness. (More)
- Kirk A. Ludwig (2002). Phenomenal consciousness and intentionality: Comments on The Significance of Consciousness. (Abstract & more)
- Robert W. Lurz (2001). Taking the first-person approach: Two worries for Siewert's sense of 'consciousness'. (More)
- William G. Lycan (2001). Have we neglected phenomenal consciousness? (Abstract & more)
- Andrew Melnuk (2002). Papineau on the intuition of distinctness. (More)
- Thomas Nagel (1993). The mind wins. (More)
- Dana K. Nelkin (2001). Phenomenal consciousness and intentionality. (Abstract & more)
- Alva Noe (ms). Perception, action, and nonconceptual content. (Abstract & more)
- David Papineau (2003). Reply to Kirk and Melnyk. (Abstract & more)
- Gualtiero Piccinini (2007). The Ontology of Creature Consciousness: A Challenge for Philosophy. (Abstract & more)
- Philip Robbins (2008). Consciousness and the social mind. (More)
- William E. Seager (2001). Consciousness, value and functionalism. (More)
- Charles Siewert (2004). Replies. (More)
- Par Sundstrom (2006). Review of Papineau's Thinking About Consciousness. (More)
- Pär Sundström (2005). Wittgenstein, consciousness, and the mind. (More)
- Justin Sytsma (2009). Phenomenological obviousness and the new science of consciousness. (Abstract & more)
- Alan Thomas (1997). Kant, McDowell and the theory of consciousness. (Abstract & more)
- Nigel Thomas (ms). The study of imagination as an approach to consciousness. (Abstract & more)
- Michael Tranchina, Freedom and Spirituality. (Abstract & more)
- William Uzgalis (2008). Review of Barry Dainton, The Phenomenal Self. (More)
- Prof Max Velmans (2009). Psychophysical nature. (Abstract & more)
- Gottfried Vosgerau (2009). Mental Representation and Self-Consciousness: From Basic Self-Representation to Self-Related Cognition. (Abstract & more)
- D. Gene Witmer (2001). Experience, appearance, and hidden features. (More)
Explaining Consciousness?
What is it Like?
Subjectivity and Objectivity
The Explanatory Gap
- Katalin Balog (forthcoming). In Defense of the Phenomenal Concept Strategy. (Abstract & more)
- Ansgar Beckermann (2000). The perennial problem of the reductive explainability of phenomenal consciousness: C. D. broad on the explanatory gap. (Abstract & more)
- David Bengtsson (2003). The nature of explanation in a theory of consciousness. (More)
- Ned Block & Robert Stalnaker (1999). Conceptual analysis, dualism, and the explanatory gap. (Abstract & more)
- Alex Byrne (online). Tye on color and the explanatory gap. (Abstract & more)
- Peter Carruthers (2004). Reductive explanation and the "explanatory gap". (Abstract & more)
- David J. Chalmers (2006). Phenomenal concepts and the explanatory gap. (Abstract & more)
- Austen Clark (online). I am Joe's explanatory gap. (Abstract & more)
- Sam Coleman (ms). Chalmers's Master Argument and Type Bb Physicalism. (Abstract & more)
- Tim Crane (online). Cosmic hermeneutics vs emergence: The challenge of the explanatory gap. (Abstract & more)
- Esa Diaz-Leon (online). Can phenomenal concepts explain the explanatory gap? (Abstract & more)
- Esa Diaz-Leon (2009). How many explanatory gaps are there? (Abstract & more)
- Brie Gertler (2001). The explanatory gap is not an illusion: A reply to Michael Tye. (Abstract & more)
- Franz-Peter Griesmaier (2003). On explaining phenomenal consciousness. (More)
- Gilbert Harman (online). Explaining an explanatory gap. (Abstract & more)
- C. L. Hardin (1992). Physiology, phenomenology, and Spinoza's true colors. (More)
- Stevan Harnad (1994). Why and how we are not zombies. (Abstract & more)
- Valerie Gray Hardcastle (1997). Why science is important for philosophy. (Abstract & more)
- Ted Honderich (2000). Consciousness and inner tubes. (More)
- J. P. Kline (1998). Another opening in the explanatory gap. (More)
- Dr Marc Krellenstein (ms). Point of view: A modern nihilism. (Abstract & more)
- Uriah Kriegel (forthcoming). Self-Representationalism and the Explanatory Gap. (Abstract & more)
- Joseph Levine (1983). Materialism and qualia: The explanatory gap. (More)
- J. M. Musacchio (2002). Dissolving the explanatory gap: Neurobiological differences between phenomenal and propositional knowledge. (Abstract & more)
- Yujin Nagasawa (web). Formulating the explanatory gap. (Abstract & more)
- Ram Neta (2004). Skepticism, abductivism, and the explanatory gap. (More)
- Brian Fiala, Adam Arico & Shaun Nichols (ms). On the psychological origins of dualism: Dual-process cognition and the explanatory gap. (Abstract & more)
- David Papineau (1998). Mind the gap. (Abstract & more)
- Thomas W. Polger & Kenneth J. Sufka (ms). Closing the gap on pain. (Abstract & more)
- Thomas W. Polger & Robert B. Skipper (online). Naturalism, explanation, and identity. (More)
- Karol Polcyn (2006). Phenomenal consciousness and the explanatory gap. (More)
- Philip Robbins & Anthony I. Jack (2006). The phenomenal stance. (Abstract & more)
- Max Seeger (ms). The Reductive Explanation of Boiling Water in Levine's Explanatory Gap Argument. (Abstract & more)
- Michael Silberstein (2002). Reductive physicalism and the explanatory gap: A dilemma. (More)
- Drozdstoj Stoyanov, Peter Machamer & Kenneth Schaffner, In Quest for scientific psychiatry: Towards bridging the explanatory gap. (Abstract & more)
- Par Sundstrom (2007). Colour and consciousness: Untying the metaphysical knot. (More)
- Nicholas Unwin (ms). Explaining Colour Phenomenology: Reduction versus Connection. (Abstract & more)
- Robert van Gulick (2003). Maps, gaps, and traps. (More)
`Hard' and `Easy' Problems
Cognitive Closure
Conceptual Analysis and A Priori Entailment
Explaining Consciousness, Misc
Consciousness and Materialism
The Knowledge Argument
- Torin Alter (1998). A limited defense of the knowledge argument. (More)
- Torin Alter (2006). Does representationalism undermine the knowledge argument? (Abstract & more)
- Torin Alter (online). Knowledge argument against physicalism. (More)
- Torin Alter (online). The knowledge argument. (Abstract & more)
- James T. Anderson (online). A simple refutation of the knowledge argument against physicalism. (Abstract & more)
- István Aranyosi (2008). Review of Torin Alter and Sven Walter (eds.) Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge. (More)
- Katalin Balog (2008). Review of Torin Alter, Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. (Abstract & more)
- Michael Beaton (2005). What RoboDennett still doesn't know. (Abstract & more)
- Alex Byrne (2006). Review of There's Something About Mary. (More)
- Alex Byrne (2002). Something about Mary. (Abstract & more)
- Yuri Cath (2009). The ability hypothesis and the new knowledge-how. (More)
- David J. Chalmers (2004). Phenomenal concepts and the knowledge argument. (Abstract & more)
- Sam Coleman (2009). Why the Ability Hypothesis is best forgotten. (Abstract & more)
- Tim Crane (2003). Subjective facts. (Abstract & more)
- Daniel C. Dennett (1991). "Epiphenomenal" qualia? (More)
- Max Deutsch (ms). Subjective physical facts. (More)
- Brie Gertler (1999). A defense of the knowledge argument. (More)
- Brie Gertler (2005). The Knowledge Argument. (Abstract & more)
- Gilbert Harman (1993). Can science understand the mind? (More)
- Benj Hellie (2004). Inexpressible truths and the allure of the knowledge argument. (Abstract & more)
- David Hodgson (2008). The knowledge argument: A response to Elizabeth Schier. (Abstract & more)
- Amir Horowitz & Hilla Jacobson-Horowitz (2005). The knowledge argument and higher-order properties. (More)
- Frank Jackson (1982). Epiphenomenal qualia. (More)
- Frank Jackson (2003). Mind and illusion. (More)
- Dunja Jutronic (2004). The knowledge argument--some comments. (More)
- Guy Kahane (2010). Feeling pain for the very first time: The normative knowledge argument. (Abstract & more)
- Jesper Kallestrup (2006). Epistemological physicalism and the knowledge argument. (Abstract & more)
- William G. Lycan (2003). Perspectival representation and the knowledge argument. (Abstract & more)
- Luca Malatesti (2004). The Knowledge Argument. (More)
- Pete Mandik (2010). Swamp Mary's revenge: Deviant phenomenal knowledge and physicalism. (Abstract & more)
- Yujin Nagasawa (online). Knowledge argument. (Abstract & more)
- Yujin Nagasawa (2002). The knowledge argument against dualism. (Abstract & more)
- Yujin Nagasawa (2010). The knowledge argument and epiphenomenalism. (Abstract & more)
- Bence Nanay (2009). Imagining, recognizing and discriminating: Reconsidering the ability hypothesis. (More)
- Mr D. M. Nicholson (ms). From a flaw in the knowledge argument to a physicalist account of qualia. (Abstract & more)
- Dennis Nicholson (ms). Solving the mind-body problem - the real significance of the knowledge argument. (Abstract & more)
- Martine Nida-Rumelin (online). The knowledge argument. (More)
- Knut Nordby (1990). Vision in a complete achromat: A personal account. (More)
- Michael W. Pelczar (2005). Enlightening the fully informed. (Abstract & more)
- Michael Pelczar (2009). The knowledge argument, the open question argument, and the moral problem. (Abstract & more)
- Derk Pereboom (1994). Bats, brain scientists, and the limitations of introspection. (More)
- John Perry (2001). Time, consciousness and the knowledge argument. (More)
- Philip Pettit (2004). Motion blindness and the knowledge argument. (Abstract & more)
- Jesse J. Prinz (ms). Mental maintenance: A response to the knowledge argument. (More)
- Diana Raffman (2005). Even zombies can be surprised: A reply to Graham and Horgan. (More)
- Paul Raymont (1999). The know-how response to Jackson's knowledge argument. (Abstract & more)
- Howard M. Robinson (1993). Dennett on the knowledge argument. (More)
- John R. Skoyles (ms). The case of Milton: A counter-example to Chalmers' case of Mary. (Abstract & more)
- Robert Stalnaker (ms). Knowing where we are, and what it is like. (More)
- Fredrik Stjernberg (online). Not so epiphenomenal qualia. (More)
- Daniel Stoljar & Yujin Nagasawa (2003). Introduction to There's Something About Mary. (Abstract & more)
- Nigel J. T. Thomas (online). Mary doesn't know science: On misconceiving a science of consciousness. (Abstract & more)
- Evan Thompson (1992). Novel colors. (More)
- David L. Thompson (online). On naturalizing intentionality. (Abstract & more)
- Michael Tye (2000). Knowing what it is like: The ability hypothesis and the knowledge argument. (More)
- Author unknown (online). The know-how response to Jackson's knowledge argument. (More)
- Robert van Gulick (2004). So many ways of saying no to Mary. (More)
- Tillmann Vierkant (2002). Zombie Mary and the blue banana. On the compatibility of the 'knowledge argument' with the argument from modality. (More)
- Sven Walter (2002). Terry, Terry, quite contrary. (Abstract & more)
- Jessica M. Wilson (2002). Review of John Perry's Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness. (Abstract & more)
Zombies and the Conceivability Argument
- Torin Alter (2007). Imagining subjective absence: Marcus on zombies. (Abstract & more)
- István Aranyosi (forthcoming). A new argument for mind-brain identity. (Abstract & more)
- Istvan A. Aranyosi (2005). Chalmers' zombie argument. (More)
- István Aranyosi (2010). Powers and the mind–body problem. (Abstract & more)
- Murat Aydede & Guven Guzeldere (2004). Cognitive architecture, concepts, and introspection: An information-theoretic solution to the problem of phenomenal consciousness. (Abstract & more)
- Murat Aydede & Guven Guzeldere (2001). Consciousness, conceivability arguments, and perspectivalism: The dialectics of the debate. (More)
- Andrew R. Bailey (ms). Physicalism and the preposterousness of zombies. (More)
- Andrew R. Bailey (ms). The unsoundness of arguments from conceivability. (Abstract & more)
- Andrew R. Bailey, Zombies and epiphenomenalism. (Abstract & more)
- Andrew R. Bailey (ms). Zombies support biological theories of consciousness. (More)
- Katalin Balog (forthcoming). Acquaintance and the mind-body problem. (Abstract & more)
- Katalin Balog (forthcoming). In Defense of the Phenomenal Concept Strategy. (Abstract & more)
- Katalin Balog, Illuminati, zombies and metaphysical gridlock. (Abstract & more)
- George Bealer (2002). Modal epistemology and the rationalist renaissance. (Abstract & more)
- George Bealer (1987). The philosophical limits of scientific essentialism. (Abstract & more)
- Karen Bennett (online). Zombies everywhere! (More)
- Peter Bokulich (ms). Putting zombies to rest: The role of dynamics in reduction. (Abstract & more)
- Selmer Bringsjord (1995). In defense of impenetrable zombies. (More)
- Selmer Bringsjord (1999). The zombie attack on the computational conception of mind. (More)
- Richard Brown (2010). Deprioritizing the A Priori Arguments against Physicalism. (Abstract & more)
- Richard Brown (2007). Review of Zombies and consciousness by Robert Kirk. (Abstract & more)
- David J. Chalmers (2002). Does conceivability entail possibility? (Abstract & more)
- David J. Chalmers (2004). Imagination, indexicality, and intensions. (Abstract & more)
- David J. Chalmers (manuscript). Mind and modality. (Abstract & more)
- David J. Chalmers (1999). Materialism and the metaphysics of modality. (Abstract & more)
- David J. Chalmers (1996). Naturalistic dualism. (More)
- David J. Chalmers (1993). Self-ascription without qualia: A case-study. (Abstract & more)
- David J. Chalmers (forthcoming). The two-dimensional argument against materialism. (Abstract & more)
- David Chalmers (unknown). Zombies on the web. (Abstract & more)
- Daniel C. Dennett (1995). The unimagined preposterousness of zombies. (Abstract & more)
- Daniel C. Dennett (2001). The zombic hunch: Extinction of an intuition? (More)
- Esa Diaz-Leon (2008). Defending the phenomenal concept strategy. (Abstract & more)
- Esa Diaz-Leon, The conceivability argument against behaviourism and the phenomenal concept strategy. (Abstract & more)
- Eric Dietrich & Anthony S. Gillies (2001). Consciousness and the limits of our imaginations. (More)
- Eric Dietrich (1998). It only seems as if zombies are logically possible, or how consciousness hides the truth of materialism: A critical review of The Conscious Mind. (More)
- Heimir Geirsson (2005). Conceivability and defeasible modal justification. (Abstract & more)
- Brie Gertler (2002). Explanatory reduction, conceptual analysis, and conceivability arguments about the mind. (Abstract & more)
- Philip Goff (2010). Ghosts and sparse properties: Why physicalists have more to fear from ghosts than zombies. (Abstract & more)
- Stevan Harnad (1994). Why and how we are not zombies. (Abstract & more)
- Stevan Harnad (1995). Why and how we are not zombies. (Abstract & more)
- Larry Hauser (online). Revenge of the zombies. (Abstract & more)
- Ivan Havel (1999). Living in conceivable worlds. (Abstract & more)
- Charles Huenemann (2004). The Sage meets the zombie: Spinoza's wise man and Chalmers' The Conscious Mind. (More)
- Mark Johnston (ms). It necessarily ain't so. (More)
- Jesper Kallestrup (2006). Physicalism, conceivability and strong necessities. (More)
- Mike Kearns (online). Could Daniel Dennett be a zombie? (More)
- Robert E. Kirk (online). Zombies. (More)
- Christof Koch & Francis Crick (2001). On the zombie within. (More)
- Uriah Kriegel (2008). Review of D. Stoljar, Ignorance and Imagination. (More)
- Manfred Kupffer (online). Conceivability and the A Priori. (More)
- Dan Lloyd (online). Twilight of the zombies. (Abstract & more)
- William G. Lycan (2003). Vs. a new a priorist argument for dualism. (Abstract & more)
- Pete Mandik (ms). Transcending zombies. (Abstract & more)
- Eric Marcus (2004). Why zombies are inconceivable. (Abstract & more)
- Wallace I. Matson (ms). Logical possibility, laws of nature, and mind in the history of philosophy. (More)
- Chris Mathieson (2000). Reining in Chalmers: On the logical possibility of zombies. (More)
- John McCarthy (1995). Todd Moody's zombies. (Abstract & more)
- Todd C. Moody (1994). Conversations with zombies. (More)
- Thomas Nagel (1998). Conceiving the impossible and the mind-body problem. (Abstract & more)
- Derk Pereboom (web). Consciousness and introspective inaccuracy. (More)
- Matthew Phillips (ms). Why positive and negative conceivability can't save the conceivability-possibility link. (More)
- Gualtiero Piccinini (2008). Access denied to zombies. (Abstract & more)
- Karol Polcyn (2006). Conceivability, possibility, and a posteriori necessity: On Chalmers' argument for dualism. (Abstract & more)
- Thomas W. Polger (online). Zombies. (More)
- Thomas W. Polger (2000). Zombies explained. (More)
- David Robb (2008). Zombies from Below. (Abstract & more)
- David M. Rosenthal (1968). Intentionality: A study of the views of Chisholm and Sellars. (Abstract & more)
- David M. Rosenthal & Wilfrid S. Sellars (1972). The Rosenthal-Sellars correspondence on intentionality. (Abstract & more)
- William E. Seager (ms). Are zombies logically possible? -- And why it matters. (Abstract & more)
- Jan Sleutels (2006). Greek zombies. (Abstract & more)
- Tamler Sommers (2002). Of zombies, color scientists, and floating iron bars. (Abstract & more)
- Daniel Stoljar (2006). Actors and zombies. (Abstract & more)
- Daniel Stoljar (forthcoming). Review of Perry's Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness. (Abstract & more)
- Daniel Stoljar (2001). The conceivability argument and two conceptions of the physical. (Abstract & more)
- Daniel Stoljar (2007). Two conceivability arguments compared. (Abstract & more)
- Julia Tanney (2004). On the conceptual, psychological, and moral status of zombies, swamp-beings, and other 'behaviourally indistinguishable' creatures. (More)
- Nigel J. T. Thomas (1998). Zombie killer. (Abstract & more)
- Nicholas Unwin (ms). Expressivism and the Metaphysics of Consciousness. (Abstract & more)
- Robert van Gulick (1999). Conceiving beyond our means: The limits of thought experiments. (More)
- Tillmann Vierkant (2002). Zombie Mary and the blue banana. On the compatibility of the 'knowledge argument' with the argument from modality. (More)
- Brian Weatherson (ms). Morality in fiction and consciousness in imagination. (More)
- Stephen Yablo (1999). Concepts and consciousness. (More)
- Stephen Yablo (2002). Coulda, woulda, shoulda. (More)
- Stephen Yablo (ms). No Fool's Cold: Notes on Illusions of Possibility. (More)
- Stephen Yablo (online). Modal rationalism and logical empiricism: Some similarities. (More)
Kripke's Modal Argument
Arguments from Disembodiment
Other Anti-Materialist Arguments
Consciousness and Materialism, Misc
Mind-Body Problem, General
- István Aranyosi (2010). Powers and the mind–body problem. (Abstract & more)
- Alexander Bain (1883). Mind and body. (More)
- Lynne Rudder Baker, Our place in nature: Material persons and theism. (Abstract & more)
- Katalin Balog (forthcoming). Acquaintance and the mind-body problem. (Abstract & more)
- Paul Richard Blum (online). Epistemology and Cosmology in Neoplatonism: Is Cognition a Mind-Body-Problem? Paper at Cosmos, Nature, Culture - A Transdisciplinary Conference Metanexus Conference July 18-21, 2009, Phoenix, Arizona. (More)
- David J. Chalmers (unknown). The first person and third person views (part I). (Abstract & more)
- Guy Claxton (2003). The mind-body problem--who cares? (More)
- Fergus Duniho (1991). The Mind/Body Problem and its Solution. (More)
- Avshalom C. Elitzur (2009). Consciousness makes a difference: A reluctant dualist’s confession. (Abstract & more)
- Andrew A. Fingelkurts, Alexander A. Fingelkurts & Carlos F. H. Neves (2010). Emergentist Monism, Biological Realism, Operations and Brain-Mind Problem. (Abstract & more)
- Jerry A. Fodor (1981). The mind-body problem. (More)
- Eugene T. Gendlin (2000). The 'mind'/'body' problem and first-person process: Three types of concepts. (More)
- Robert Hanna & Evan Thompson (2003). The mind-body-body problem. (Abstract & more)
- Stevan Harnad (online). Harnad on Dennett on Chalmers on consciousness: The mind/body problem is the feeling/function problem. (Abstract & more)
- Stevan Harnad (online). There is only one mind/body problem. (Abstract & more)
- Nicholas Humphrey (2000). How to solve the mind-body problem. (More)
- Nicholas Humphrey (2000). In reply [reply to commentaries on "how to solve the mind-body problem"]. (More)
- Piet Hut & Bas van Fraassen (1997). Elements of reality: A dialogue. (More)
- Mostyn W. Jones (forthcoming). How to make mind-brain relations clear. (Abstract & more)
- Peter King (2005). Why isn't the mind-body problem medieval? (More)
- KM Kniffin (2006). Show me the status: Money as a kind of currency. (Abstract & more)
- John-Michael M. Kuczynski (2004). A quasi-materialist, quasi-dualist solution to the mind-body problem. (More)
- Gordon McCabe (ms). Structural realism and the mind. (Abstract & more)
- Colin McGinn (2001). How not to solve the mind-body problem. (More)
- Thomas Nagel (2001). The psychophysical nexus. (Abstract & more)
- Thomas Nagel (2000). The psychophysical nexus. (Abstract & more)
- Steven Perkins (2005). An orthodox Christian look at the mind-body problem. (More)
- Michael Polanyi (1969). On body and mind. (More)
- David M. Rosenthal (2000). Addendum to introduction. (Abstract & more)
- Sydney Shoemaker (1994). The mind-body problem. (More)
- Peter Slezak (2000). The mind-brain problem. (Abstract & more)
- Robert H. Wozniak (online). Mind and body: Rene Descartes to William James. (More)
Specific Views on Consciousness
Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness
Higher-Order Perception Theories of Consciousness
Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness, Misc
Higher-Order Thought Theories of Consciousness
- David M. Rosenthal, Consciousness. (Abstract & more)
- David M. Rosenthal, The mind and its expression. (Abstract & more)
- Ned Block, Comparing the major theories of consciousness. (Abstract & more)
- Ned Block (ms). Some concepts of consciousness. (Abstract & more)
- Richard Brown (ms). Consciousness, (higher-order) thoughts, and what it's like. (Abstract & more)
- Derek Browne (1999). Carruthers on the deficits of animals. (More)
- Alex Byrne (1997). Some like it HOT: Consciousness and higher-order thoughts. (Abstract & more)
- Alex Byrne (2004). What phenomenal consciousness is like. (Abstract & more)
- Peter Carruthers (2001). Consciousness: Explaining the phenomena. (Abstract & more)
- Peter Carruthers (2004). Hop over FOR, HOT theory. (Abstract & more)
- Peter Carruthers (online). Higher-order theories of consciousness. (More)
- Peter Carruthers (1998). Natural theories of consciousness. (Abstract & more)
- Peter Carruthers (online). Precis of Phenomenal Consciousness: A Naturalistic Theory. (More)
- Peter Carruthers (2000). Replies to critics: Explaining subjectivity. (More)
- Peter Carruthers (online). Reply to Seager. (More)
- David Rosenthal (2005). The higher-order model of consciousness. (Abstract & more)
- Peter Carruthers (2005). Why the question of animal consciousness might not matter very much. (Abstract & more)
- David J. Cole (online). Sense and sentience. (Abstract & more)
- Rebecca Copenhaver (ms). Reid on consciousness: HOP, HOT or FOR? (More)
- Barry F. Dainton (2004). Higher-order consciousness and phenomenal space: Reply to Meehan. (Abstract & more)
- Paula Droege (online). Consciousness, higher-order theories of. (More)
- Rocco J. Gennaro (2000). Fiction, pleasurable tragedy, and the HOT theory of consciousness. (Abstract & more)
- Rocco J. Gennaro (2004). Higher-order thoughts, animal consciousness, and misrepresentation: A reply to Carruthers and Levine. (More)
- Rocco J. Gennaro (2004). Higher-order theories of consciousness: An overview. (More)
- Rocco J. Gennaro (2002). Jean-Paul Sartre and the HOT theory of consciousness. (More)
- Rocco J. Gennaro (2003). Papineau on the actualist HOT theory of consciousness. (Abstract & more)
- Rocco J. Gennaro (2005). The HOT theory of consciousness: Between a rock and a hard place. (Abstract & more)
- Valerie Gray Hardcastle (2004). HOT theories of consciousness: More sad tales of philosophical intuitions gone astray. (More)
- Benj Hellie (2007). Higher-order intentionalism and higher-order acquaintance. (Abstract & more)
- Pierre Jacob (1996). State consciousness revisited. (More)
- Uriah Kriegel (2007). A cross-order integration hypothesis for the neural correlate of consciousness. (Abstract & more)
- Uriah Kriegel (2003). Consciousness, higher-order content, and the individuation of vehicles. (Abstract & more)
- Caleb Liang & Timothy Lane (2008). Higher-Order Thought and the Problem of Radical Confabulation. (More)
- Hakwan Lau (ms). A higher order bayesian decision theory of consciousness. (Abstract & more)
- JeeLoo Liu (2006). Review of Peter Carruthers, Consciousness: Essays From a Higher-Order Perspective. (More)
- Robert W. Lurz (2000). A defense of first-order representationalist theories of mental-state consciousness. (More)
- Robert W. Lurz (2003). Neither hot nor cold: An alternative account of consciousness. (More)
- William G. Lycan (1999). A response to Carruthers' Natural Theories of Consciousness. (Abstract & more)
- William G. Lycan (2001). A simple argument for a higher-order representation theory of consciousness. (More)
- William G. Lycan (1995). Consciousness as internal monitoring. (Abstract & more)
- William G. Lycan & Z. Ryder (2003). The loneliness of the long-distance truck-driver. (More)
- William G. Lycan (2004). The superiority of Hop to HOT. (More)
- Pete Mandik (2009). Beware of the unicorn: Consciousness as being represented and other things that don't exist. (Abstract & more)
- Jennifer Matey (2006). Two HOTS to handle: The concept of state consciousness in the higher-order thought theory of consciousness. (Abstract & more)
- Gregory Minissale (2009). Enacting Higher Order Thoughts: Velazquez and Las Meninas. (Abstract & more)
- Mark Pharoah (ms). Enhancing dispositional higher-order thought theory. (Abstract & more)
- William S. Robinson (2004). A few thoughts too many? (More)
- William S. Robinson (1999). A theory of phenomenal consciousness? (More)
- Edmund T. Rolls (2004). A higher order syntactic thought (HOST) theory of consciousness. (More)
- David M. Rosenthal (1997). Apperception, sensation, and dissociability. (Abstract & more)
- David Rosenthal, Commentaries. (Abstract & more)
- David M. Rosenthal, Consciousness (. (Abstract & more)
- David Rosenthal (web). Concepts and definitions of consciousness. (Abstract & more)
- David M. Rosenthal (2002). Consciousness and higher-order thought. (Abstract & more)
- David Rosenthal (ms). Consciousness and intrinsic higher-order content. (Abstract & more)
- David M. Rosenthal (2000). Consciousness, content, and metacognitive judgments. (Abstract & more)
- David M. Rosenthal (2000). Consciousness, interpretation, and consciousness. (More)
- David Rosenthal (2010). Expressing one's mind. (Abstract & more)
- David M. Rosenthal (2002). How many kinds of consciousness? (More)
- David Rosenthal & Josh Weisberg (online). Higher-order theories of consciousness. (More)
- David M. Rosenthal (2000). Metacognition and higher-order thoughts. (Abstract & more)
- David M. Rosenthal (1995). Multiple drafts and the facts of the matter. (More)
- David M. Rosenthal (1997). Phenomenal consciousness and what it's like. (Abstract & more)
- David Rosenthal (online). Reflections on five questions: Autobiographical and disciplinary. (Abstract & more)
- David Rosenthal (online). “Replies to Galen Strawson and Ned Block. (Abstract & more)
- David M. Rosenthal (1994). State consciousness and transitive consciousness. (More)
- David M. Rosenthal (2004). Subjective character and reflexive content. (Abstract & more)
- David Rosenthal (online). The mind and its expression. (Abstract & more)
- David Rosenthal, V. consciousness, interpretation, and higher-order-thought. (Abstract & more)
- David Rosenthal (2004). Varieties of higher-order theory. (More)
- Eric Saidel (1999). Consciousness without awareness? (More)
- William E. Seager (2004). A cold look at HOT theory. (More)
- William E. Seager (online). Dispositions and consciousness. (More)
- William E. Seager (ms). On dispositional HOT theories of consciousness. (Abstract & more)
- Lawrence A. Shapiro (1999). Saving the phenomenal. (More)
- Josh Weisberg (1999). Active, thin, and HOT: An actualist response to Carruthers' dispositionalist HOT view. (Abstract & more)
- Josh Weisberg (2008). Same old, same old: The same-order representational theory of consciousness and the division of phenomenal labor. (Abstract & more)
- Josh Weisberg (2001). The appearance of unity: A higher-order interpretation of the unity of consciousness. (Abstract & more)
- Wayne Wright (2005). Distracted drivers and unattended experience. (Abstract & more)
Self-Representational Theories of Consciousness
Dennett's Functionalism
Searle's Biological Naturalism
Functionalism about Consciousness
Eliminativism about Consciousness
Dualism about Consciousness
Panpsychism
Russellian Monism
Neutral Monism
Specific Views on Consciousness, Misc
Consciousness and Content
Consciousness and Intentionality
Representationalism
- Frederick R. Adams & Laura A. Dietrich (2004). Swampman's revenge: Squabbles among the representationalists. (Abstract & more)
- Torin Alter (2006). Does representationalism undermine the knowledge argument? (Abstract & more)
- Torin Alter (2006). Does synesthesia undermine representationalism? (Abstract & more)
- Murat Aydede (2001). Naturalism, introspection, and direct realism about pain. (Abstract & more)
- Kent Bach (1997). Engineering the mind (review of Dretske 1995, Naturalizing the Mind). (More)
- Kent Bach (ms). Engineering the mind. (Abstract & more)
- David Bain (2003). Intentionalism and pain. (Abstract & more)
- Andrew R. Bailey (2005). What is it like to see a bat? A critique of Dretske's representationalist theory of qualia. (More)
- Ansgar Beckermann (1995). Visual information processing and phenomenal consciousness. (Abstract & more)
- Ned Block (2005). Bodily sensations as an obstacle for representationism. (Abstract & more)
- Ned Block (1998). Is experiencing just representing? (Abstract & more)
- Ned Block (2003). Mental paint. (Abstract & more)
- Ned Block (1999). Sexism, ageism, racism, and the nature of consciousness. (Abstract & more)
- David Bourget (2010). Consciousness is underived intentionality. (Abstract & more)
- David Bourget (2010). The representational theory of consciousness. (Abstract & more)
- Bill Brewer (2006). Perception and content. (Abstract & more)
- Andrew Brook & Paul Raymont (2006). The representational base of consciousness. (Abstract & more)
- Tyler Burge (2003). Qualia and intentional content: Reply to Block. (More)
- Alex Byrne (online). Don't PANIC: Tye's intentionalist theory of consciousness. (Abstract & more)
- Alex Byrne (2001). Intentionalism defended. (More)
- Alex Byrne & Michael Tye (2006). Qualia ain't in the head. (Abstract & more)
- Alex Byrne (online). Tye on color and the explanatory gap. (Abstract & more)
- David J. Chalmers (2004). The representational character of experience. (Abstract & more)
- David J. Cole (online). Dretske on naturalizing the mind. (More)
- Tim Crane (2007). Intentionalism. (Abstract & more)
- Tim Crane (2003). The intentional structure of consciousness. (Abstract & more)
- John B. Dilworth (2007). Representationalism and indeterminate perceptual content. (Abstract & more)
- Fabian Dorsch, Transparency and imagining seeing. (Abstract & more)
- Paula Droege (ms). Second sense: A theory of sensory consciousness. (More)
- Guven Guzeldere & Murat Aydede (2000). On the relation between phenomenal and representational properties. (Abstract & more)
- Guven Guzeldere & Murat Aydede (1997). On the relation between phenomenal and representational properties. (Abstract & more)
- Benj Hellie (2002). Consciousness and representationalism. (More)
- Benj Hellie (2009). Representationalism. (More)
- Christopher S. Hill (2006). Harman on self referential thoughts. (Abstract & more)
- James Hopkins (ms). Representation of the inner and the concept of mind. (Abstract & more)
- Michael Jacovides (ms). Do experiences represent? (More)
- Frank Jackson (2004). Representation and experience. (More)
- Frank Jackson (ms). Some reflections on representationalism. (More)
- Zoltán Jakab (2006). Metameric surfaces: The ultimate case against color physicalism and representational theories of phenomenal consciousness. (More)
- Mark Eli Kalderon (forthcoming). Color Illusion. (Abstract & more)
- Matthew Kennedy (2009). Heirs of nothing: The implications of transparency. (Abstract & more)
- Amy Kind (2007). Restrictions on representationalism. (Abstract & more)
- Amy Kind (2003). What's so transparent about transparency? (Abstract & more)
- Uriah Kriegel (2002). Phenomenal content. (More)
- Uriah Kriegel (2002). PANIC theory and the prospects for a representational theory of phenomenal consciousness. (Abstract & more)
- Dorothy LeGrand (2005). Transparently oneself: Commentary on Metzinger's Being No-One. (Abstract & more)
- Joseph Levine (2003). Experience and representation. (More)
- Joseph Levine (2008). Secondary Qualities: Where Consciousness and Intentionality Meet. (More)
- Dan Lloyd (1997). Consciousness and its discontents. (More)
- Dan Lloyd (1991). Leaping to conclusions: Connectionism, consciousness, and the computational mind. (More)
- Robert W. Lurz (2000). A defense of first-order representationalist theories of mental-state consciousness. (More)
- William G. Lycan (online). Representational theories of consciousness. (Abstract & more)
- William G. Lycan (2001). Response to Polger and Flanagan. (More)
- Fiona Macpherson (2006). Ambiguous figures and the content of experience. (Abstract & more)
- Fiona Macpherson (2005). Colour inversion problems for representationalism. (Abstract & more)
- Fiona Macpherson (2003). Novel colours and the content of experience. (Abstract & more)
- Fiona Macpherson (1999). Perfect pitch and the content of experience. (More)
- Fiona Macpherson (2000). Representational Theories of Phenomenal Character. (More)
- Pete Mandik (2009). Beware of the unicorn: Consciousness as being represented and other things that don't exist. (Abstract & more)
- Pete Mandik (1999). Qualia, space, and control. (Abstract & more)
- Eric Marcus (2006). Intentionalism and the imaginability of the inverted spectrum. (Abstract & more)
- J. Barry Maund (online). Tye on phenomenal character and color. (More)
- Thomas Metzinger (2004). The subjectivity of subjective experience: A representationalist analysis of the first-person perspective. (Abstract & more)
- Sofia Miguens (2002). Qualia or non epistemic perception: D. Dennett's and F. Dretske's representational theories of consciousness. (More)
- Karen Neander (1998). The division of phenomenal labor: A problem for representationalist theories of consciousness. (More)
- Bernhard Nickel (2006). Against intentionalism. (Abstract & more)
- Paul Noordhof (2001). In pain. (Abstract & more)
- John O'Dea (2008). Transparency and the unity of experience. (Abstract & more)
- John O'Dea (forthcoming). A Proprioceptive Account of the Senses. (Abstract & more)
- Elisabeth Pacherie (1999). Qualia and representations. (More)
- Adam Pautz (2006). Sensory awareness is not a wide physical relation: An empirical argument against externalist intentionalism. (More)
- Ian Phillips (2005). Experience and Intentional Content. (Abstract & more)
- Thomas W. Polger & Owen J. Flanagan (2001). A decade of teleofunctionalism: Lycan's consciousness and consciousness and experience. (More)
- Yasser Pouresmail (ms). A Representational Account of the Ineffability of Consciousness. (More)
- Yasser Pouresmail (ms). Phombie and the Transparency Thesis. (Abstract & more)
- Simon Prosser (forthcoming). The two-dimensional content of consciousness. (Abstract & more)
- Paul Raymont (online). Some experienced qualities belong to the experience. (Abstract & more)
- Dan Ryder (ms). The autonomic nervous system and Dretske on phenomenal consciousness. (More)
- Susanna Schellenberg (2010). The Particularity and Phenomenology of Perceptual Experience. (Abstract & more)
- William E. Seager & David Bourget (2007). Representationalism about consciousness. (Abstract & more)
- William E. Seager (online). Some awkwardness in poised content? (More)
- Sydney Shoemaker, Content, character and color I: Against standard representationalism. (Abstract & more)
- Sydney Shoemaker, Content, character, and color II: A better kind of representationalism. (Abstract & more)
- Jeff Speaks (forthcoming). Spectrum inversion without a difference in representation is impossible. (Abstract & more)
- Daniel Stoljar (2007). Consequences of intentionalism. (Abstract & more)
- Daniel Stoljar (2004). The argument from diaphanousness. (Abstract & more)
- Brad J. Thompson (2006). Color constancy and Russellian representationalism. (Abstract & more)
- Nigel Thomas, Consciousness, color, and content. (Abstract & more)
- Brad J. Thompson (2008). Representationalism and the conceivability of inverted spectra. (Abstract & more)
- Amie Thomasson (2008). Phenomenal consciousness and the phenomenal world. (Abstract & more)
- Brad J. Thompson (2008). Representationalism and the argument from hallucination. (Abstract & more)
- Brad J. Thompson (2007). Shoemaker on phenomenal content. (Abstract & more)
- Brad J. Thompson (2010). The spatial content of experience. (More)
- Michael Tye (1998). Inverted earth, swampman, and representationalism. (More)
- Michael Tye (online). Phenomenal character and color - reply to Maund. (More)
- Michael Tye (online). Precis of Color, Content, and Consciousness. (More)
- Michael Tye (2002). Representationalism and the transparency of experience. (Abstract & more)
- Michael Tye (online). To PANIC or not to PANIC? -Reply to Byrne. (More)
- Michael Tye (1994). What what it's like is really like. (More)
- Michael Tye (2007). Intentionalism and the argument from no common content. (Abstract & more)
- Wayne Wright (2003). Projectivist representationalism and color. (Abstract & more)
- Wayne Wu (forthcoming). What is Conscious Attention? (Abstract & more)
- Dan Zahavi & Josef Parnas (2002). Phenomenal consciousness and self-awareness: A phenomenological critique of representational theory. (More)
Phenomenal Intentionality
Conscious Thought
Internalism and Externalism about Experience
Phenomenal Concepts
- Torin Alter (2006). On the conditional analysis of phenomenal concepts. (Abstract & more)
- Peter Alward (2004). Is phenomenal pain the primary intension of 'pain'? (Abstract & more)
- Michael V. Antony (2006). Papineau on the vagueness of phenomenal concepts. (More)
- István Aranyosi (ms). Papineau's (in)determinacy problem. (More)
- István Aranyosi (2008). Review of Torin Alter and Sven Walter (eds.) Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge. (More)
- Murat Aydede & Guven Guzeldere (2004). Cognitive architecture, concepts, and introspection: An information-theoretic solution to the problem of phenomenal consciousness. (Abstract & more)
- Katalin Balog (forthcoming). Acquaintance and the mind-body problem. (Abstract & more)
- Katalin Balog (2009). Phenomenal Concepts. (Abstract & more)
- Katalin Balog (forthcoming). In Defense of the Phenomenal Concept Strategy. (Abstract & more)
- Katalin Balog (2008). Review of Torin Alter, Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. (Abstract & more)
- Katalin Balog, Illuminati, zombies and metaphysical gridlock. (Abstract & more)
- Michael Beaton (2009). Qualia and Introspection. (Abstract & more)
- Robert B. Brandom (ms). No experience necessary: Empiricism, noninferential knowledge, and secondary qualities. (More)
- Darragh Byrne (ms). The contents of phenomenal concepts. (Abstract & more)
- Peter Carruthers & Benedicte Veillet (2007). The phenomenal concept strategy. (Abstract & more)
- David J. Chalmers (2004). Phenomenal concepts and the knowledge argument. (Abstract & more)
- David J. Chalmers (2006). Phenomenal concepts and the explanatory gap. (Abstract & more)
- David J. Chalmers (2003). The content and epistemology of phenomenal belief. (Abstract & more)
- Esa Diaz-Leon (online). Can phenomenal concepts explain the explanatory gap? (Abstract & more)
- Esa Diaz-Leon (2008). Defending the phenomenal concept strategy. (Abstract & more)
- Esa Diaz-Leon, The conceivability argument against behaviourism and the phenomenal concept strategy. (Abstract & more)
- Jussi Haukioja (2008). A defence of the conditional analysis of phenomenal concepts. (Abstract & more)
- Jane Heal (ms). Minds, brains, and indexicals. (More)
- Benj Hellie (ms). Peacocke's 'Concepts of conscious states'. (More)
- Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (2001). Deconstructing new wave materialism. (Abstract & more)
- Joshua Knobe & Jesse J. Prinz (2008). Intuitions about consciousness: Experimental studies. (Abstract & more)
- Joseph Levine (2006). Conscious awareness and (self-)representation. (More)
- Pete Mandik (2010). Swamp Mary's revenge: Deviant phenomenal knowledge and physicalism. (Abstract & more)
- Leslie Marsh (2005). Review essay: Dennett's sweet dreams philosophical obstacles to a science of consciousness. (Abstract & more)
- Martine Nida-Rumelin (2006). Grasping phenomenal properties. (Abstract & more)
- Peter Pagin (2000). Sensation terms. (Abstract & more)
- David Papineau (2006). Phenomenal and perceptual concepts. (Abstract & more)
- Jesse Prinz (2007). Mental pointing: Phenomenal knowledge without concepts. (More)
- Diana Raffman (1995). On the persistence of phenomenology. (Abstract & more)
- Daniel Stoljar (2005). Physicalism and phenomenal concepts. (Abstract & more)
- Stephen Yablo (ms). Grokking pain. (More)
Consciousness and Content, Misc
Aspects of Consciousness
Self-Consciousness
- Michael L. Anderson & Donald R. Perlis (2005). The roots of self-awareness. (Abstract & more)
- George Bealer (1997). Self-consciousness. (Abstract & more)
- Ansgar Beckermann (2003). Self-consciousness in cognitive systems. (Abstract & more)
- Jose Luis Bermudez (1999). Precis of The Paradox of Self-Consciousness. (More)
- Jose Luis Bermudez (2002). Sources of self-consciousness: Epistemic and genetic. (More)
- Jose Luis Bermudez (2001). The sources of self-consciousness. (More)
- John Bickle (2003). Empirical evidence for a narrative concept of self. (More)
- Bill Brewer (1992). Self-location and agency. (Abstract & more)
- Klaus Brinkmann (2005). Consciousness, self-consciousness, and the modern self. (More)
- Andrew Brook (ms). Externalism and the varieties of self-awareness. (Abstract & more)
- Andrew Brook (2001). Kant, self-awareness, and self-reference. (More)
- J. Campbell (1995). The body image and self-consciousness. (Abstract & more)
- Daniel C. Dennett (1992). The self as a center of narrative gravity. (Abstract & more)
- Naomi M. Eilan (1995). Consciousness and the self. (More)
- Maite Ezcurdia (2001). Thinking about myself. (More)
- U. Frith & F. Happe (1999). Theory of mind and self-consciousness: What is it like to be autistic? (More)
- Shaun Gallagher & Andrew N. Meltzoff (1996). The earliest sense of self and others: Merleau-ponty and recent developmental studies. (Abstract & more)
- Shaun Gallagher (2000). Ways of knowing the self and the other. (Abstract & more)
- Rocco J. Gennaro (1999). Leibniz on consciousness and self-consciousness. (Abstract & more)
- Gilberto Gomes (1995). Self-awareness and the mind-brain problem. (Abstract & more)
- George Graham (online). Self-consciousness, psychopathology, and realism about self. (More)
- Allan Hobson (2005). Finally some one: Reflections on Thomas Metzinger's Being No One. (Abstract & more)
- Susan L. Hurley (1998). Nonconceptual self-consciousness and agency: Perspective and access. (More)
- Susan L. Hurley (1998). Self-consciousness, spontaneity, and the myth of the giving. (Abstract & more)
- Glenn Carruthers (2009). Is the body schema sufficient for the sense of embodiment? An alternative to de Vignmont's model. (Abstract & more)
- Tomis Kapitan (2006). Indexicality and self-awareness. (Abstract & more)
- Tomis Kapitan (1999). The ubiquity of self-awareness. (Abstract & more)
- Patricia S. Kitcher (2005). Two normative roles for self-consciousness. (More)
- Uriah Kriegel (2004). Consciousness and self-consciousness. (Abstract & more)
- Uriah Kriegel (online). Self-consciousness. (More)
- Steven W. Laycock (2002). Consciousness it/self. (More)
- Dorothy LeGrand (2005). Transparently oneself: Commentary on Metzinger's Being No-One. (Abstract & more)
- John McCarthy (ms). Notes on self-awareness. (More)
- Monica Meijsing (2006). Being ourselves and knowing ourselves: An adverbial account of mental representations. (Abstract & more)
- Monica Meijsing (2000). Self-consciousness and the body. (Abstract & more)
- Christophe Menant (ms). Evolution and mirror neurons. An introduction to the nature of self-consciousness (2005). (Abstract & more)
- Christophe Menant, Evolution of representations and intersubjectivity as sources of the self. An introduction to the nature of self-consciousness (2006). (Abstract & more)
- Christophe Menant (ms). Evolution of representations. From basic life to self-representation and self-consciousness (2006). (Abstract & more)
- Thomas Metzinger (2003). Phenomenal transparency and cognitive self-reference. (More)
- Thomas Metzinger (2005). Precis: Being No-One. (Abstract & more)
- Thomas Metzinger (2006). Reply to ghin: Self-sustainment on the level of global availability. (Abstract & more)
- Thomas Metzinger (online). Self models. (More)
- Thomas Metzinger (2000). The subjectivity of subjective experience: A representationist analysis of the first-person perspective. (Abstract & more)
- Gregory Minissale (2009). Enacting Higher Order Thoughts: Velazquez and Las Meninas. (Abstract & more)
- Gregory R. Mulhauser (online). What is self-awareness? (More)
- Shaun Nichols & Stephen P. Stich (2003). Reading one's own mind: A cognitive theory of self-awareness. (More)
- Alva Noe (2002). Is perspectival self-consciousness nonconceptual? (More)
- Lucy F. O'Brien (1996). Solipsism and self-reference. (Abstract & more)
- John Perry (1998). Myself and "I". (More)
- Nicholas P. Power (2001). The origins of self-consciousness. (More)
- Jo Proust (2000). Awareness of agency: Three levels of analysis. (More)
- Jo Proust (2003). Thinking of oneself as the same. (More)
- Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl (2005). The limits of representationalism: A phenomenological critique of Thomas Metzinger's self-model theory. (More)
- David M. Rosenthal (2004). Being conscious of ourselves. (More)
- Lynne Rudder Baker (2003). The difference that self-consciousness makes. (More)
- Oliver Sacks, Jonathan Cole & Ian Waterman (2000). On the immunity principle: A view from a robot. (Abstract & more)
- Galen Strawson (2000). The phenomenology and ontology of the self. (More)
- Tim Thornton (2003). Psychopathology and two kinds of narrative accounts of the self. (More)
- Alan Thomas (online). Reconciling conscious absorption and the ubiquity of self-awareness. (Abstract & more)
- Amie L. Thomasson (2006). Self-awareness and self-knowledge. (Abstract & more)
- Motomi Toichi, Yoko Kamio, Takashi Okada, Morimitsu Sakihama, Eric A. Youngstrom, Robert L. Findling & Kokichi Yamamoto (2002). A lack of self-consciousness in autism. (More)
- Josh Weisberg (2003). Being all that we can be: Review of Metzinger's Being No-One. (More)
- Josh Weisberg (2006). Consciousness constrained: A commentary on being no one. (Abstract & more)
- Josh Weisberg (2005). Consciousness constrained: Commentary on Metzinger. (Abstract & more)
- Dan Zahavi & Josef Parnas (2002). Phenomenal consciousness and self-awareness: A phenomenological critique of representational theory. (More)
- Dan Zahavi (2000). Self and consciousness. (More)
The Unity of Consciousness
- Kent Bach (1988). Critical notice. (Abstract & more)
- Timothy J. Bayne (2001). Co-consciousness: Review of Barry Dainton's Stream of Consciousness. (More)
- Tim Bayne (2007). Hypnosis and the unity of consciousness. (Abstract & more)
- Timothy J. Bayne (2004). Self-consciousness and the unity of consciousness. (Abstract & more)
- Timothy J. Bayne (2000). The unity of consciousness: Clarification and defence. (More)
- Tim Bayne, The unity of consciousness: A cartography. (Abstract & more)
- Timothy J. Bayne & David J. Chalmers (2003). What is the unity of consciousness? (Abstract & more)
- Andrew Brook (2000). The unity of consciousness. (More)
- Andrew Brook (2002). Unified consciousness and the self. (More)
- Andrew Brook (1998). Unified consciousness and the self. (Abstract & more)
- Andrew Brook (1997). Unity of consciousness and other mental unities. (Abstract & more)
- Barry F. Dainton (2004). Higher-order consciousness and phenomenal space: Reply to Meehan. (Abstract & more)
- Barry F. Dainton (2004). Precis of Stream of Consciousness. (Abstract & more)
- Barry F. Dainton (2004). Replies to commentators. (More)
- Antti Revonsuo (2003). The contents of phenomenal consciousness: One relation to rule them all and in the unity bind them. (More)
- Barry F. Dainton (2004). Unity and introspectibility: Reply to Gilmore. (Abstract & more)
- Barry F. Dainton (2004). Unity in the void: Reply to Revonsuo. (Abstract & more)
- Ian Deweese-Boyd (online). Self-deception. (Abstract & more)
- Jonathan C. W. Edwards (2005). Is consciousness only a property of individual cells? (Abstract & more)
- Shaun Gallagher (2003). Sync-ing in the stream of experience sync-ing in the stream of experience: Time-consciousness in broad, Husserl, and Dainton. (More)
- Cody S. Gilmore (2003). The introspectibility thesis. (Abstract & more)
- Bret Alan Hughes (online). The functioning hypothesis of consciousness. (More)
- N. Humphrey (2000). One self: A meditation on the unity of consciousness. (Abstract & more)
- Nicholas Humphrey (ms). One self: A meditation on the unity of consciousness. Social research, 67, no. 4, 32-39, 2000. (Abstract & more)
- Susan L. Hurley (2003). Action, the unity of consciousness, and vehicle externalism. (More)
- Claus Janew (2009). Omnipresent Consciousness and Free Will. (Abstract & more)
- Bernard W. Kobes (2005). Review of Michael Tye's Consciousness and Persons. (Abstract & more)
- Eric F. LaRock (2006). Why neural synchrony fails to explain the unity of visual consciousness. (More)
- Douglas B. Meehan (2003). Phenomenal space and the unity of conscious experience. (More)
- Gerard O'Brien & Jonathan Opie (1998). The disunity of consciousness. (More)
- Gerard O'Brien & Jonathan Opie (2003). The multiplicity of consciousness and the emergence of the self. (Abstract & more)
- John O'Dea (2008). Transparency and the unity of experience. (Abstract & more)
- Christopher Pincock (web). Accounting for the unity of experience in Dilthey, Rickert, Bradley and ward. (Abstract & more)
- Antti Revonsuo (1999). Binding and the phenomenal unity of consciousness. (Abstract & more)
- Jay F. Rosenberg (1997). Kantian schemata and the unity of perception. (More)
- Gregg H. Rosenberg (1998). The boundary problem for phenomenal individuals. (More)
- Warren Shrader (2006). The unity of consciousness: Trouble for the materialist or the emergent dualist? (Abstract & more)
- Louis Tinnin (1990). Mental unity, altered states of consciousness, and dissociation. (More)
- Michael Tye (2007). The problem of common sensibles. (Abstract & more)
- Christoph von der Malsburg (1997). The coherence definition of consciousness. (Abstract & more)
- Josh Weisberg (2001). The appearance of unity: A higher-order interpretation of the unity of consciousness. (Abstract & more)
- Semir Zeki (2003). The disunity of consciousness. (More)
Homogeneity of Consciousness
Knowledge of Consciousness
The Function of Consciousness
Temporal Consciousness
- Holly Andersen & Rick Grush (forthcoming). A brief history of time consciousness: Historical precursors to James and Husserl. (More)
- Michael V. Antony (2001). On the temporal boundaries of simple experiences. (Abstract & more)
- Adrian Bardon (2007). Empiricism, Time-Awareness, and Hume's Manners of Disposition. (Abstract & more)
- Jonathan Bennett (2004). Time in human experience. (Abstract & more)
- Jeremy Butterfield (1998). Seeing the present. (More)
- Barry F. Dainton (2004). Precis of Stream of Consciousness. (Abstract & more)
- Barry F. Dainton (2003). Time in experience: Reply to Gallagher. (Abstract & more)
- Daniel C. Dennett (1992). Temporal Anomalies of Consciousness. (Abstract & more)
- Daniel C. Dennett & Marcel Kinsbourne (1992). Time and the observer: The where and when of consciousness in the brain. (Abstract & more)
- Georg Franck (2004). Mental presence and the temporal present. (More)
- Shaun Gallagher (2003). Sync-ing in the stream of experience sync-ing in the stream of experience: Time-consciousness in broad, Husserl, and Dainton. (More)
- Shaun Gallagher (2003). Sync-ing in the stream of experience. (Abstract & more)
- John R. Gregg (online). Time consciousness and the specious present. (Abstract & more)
- Rick Grush (2005). Brain time and phenomenological time. (Abstract & more)
- Rick Grush (2006). How to, and how not to, bridge computational cognitive neuroscience and Husserlian phenomenology of time consciousness. (Abstract & more)
- Stuart R. Hameroff (online). Time, consciousness, and quantum events in fundamental space-time geometry. (Abstract & more)
- Christoph Hoerl (2008). On being stuck in time. (Abstract & more)
- Christoph Hoerl (2009). Time and Tense in Perceptual Experience. (Abstract & more)
- Jenann Ismael (ms). Memory and temporal phenomenology. (More)
- Sean D. Kelly (2005). The puzzle of temporal experience. (Abstract & more)
- Robin Le Poidevin (online). The experience and perception of time. (More)
- Diego L. Rapoport (2009). surmounting the cartesian cut with philosophy, physics, cybernetics and geometry; self.reference, torsion, the klein bottle, multivalued logics and quantum mechanics. (Abstract & more)
- Glen Mazis (1992). Merleau-Ponty and the Backward Flow of Time: The Reversibility of Temporality and the Temporality of Reversibility. (More)
- James Mensch (online). Husserl's account of our consciousness of time. (More)
- Thomas Natsoulas (1993). The stream of consciousness: William James's specious present. (More)
- P. Novak (1996). Buddhist meditation and consciousness of time. (More)
- Michael Pelczar (2010). Must an appearance of succession involve a succession of appearances? (Abstract & more)
- John Perry (2001). Time, consciousness and the knowledge argument. (More)
- Ian Phillips (2009). Experience and time. (Abstract & more)
- Ian Phillips (2010). Perceiving temporal properties. (More)
- Simon Prosser (2007). Could we experience the passage of time? (Abstract & more)
- Stephen E. Robbins (2007). Time, form and the limits of qualia. (More)
- David L. Thompson (online). The phenomenology of internal time-consciousness. (Abstract & more)
- Markos Valaris (2008). Inner sense, self-affection, and temporal consciousness in Kant's critique of pure reason. (Abstract & more)
- Francisco Varela (1999). The specious present: A neurophenomenology of time consciousness. (More)
- Dan Zahavi (2003). Inner time-consciousness and pre-reflective self-awareness. (Abstract & more)
- Dan Zahavi (2004). Time and consciousness in the bernau manuscripts. (Abstract & more)
Consciousness of Action
- Holly Andersen, Causation and the awareness of agency. (Abstract & more)
- Holly Andersen (ms). Two causal mistakes in Wegner's illusion of conscious will. (Abstract & more)
- Timothy J. Bayne (2006). Phenomenology and the feeling of doing: Wegner on the conscious will. (Abstract & more)
- Timothy J. Bayne & Neil Levy (2006). The feeling of doing: Deconstructing the phenomenology of agnecy. (Abstract & more)
- Tim Bayne, The sense of agency. (Abstract & more)
- Peter Carruthers, Action-awareness and the active mind. (Abstract & more)
- Peter Carruthers (2007). The illusion of conscious will. (Abstract & more)
- E. Daprati, N. Franck, N. Georgieff, Joëlle Proust, Elisabeth Pacherie, J. Dalery & Marc Jeannerod (1997). Looking for the agent: An investigation into consciousness of action and self-consciousness in schizophrenic patients. (More)
- Shaun Gallagher (2007). The natural philosophy of agency. (Abstract & more)
- N. Georgieff & Marc Jeannerod (1998). Beyond consciousness of external reality: A ''who'' system for consciousness of action and self-consciousness. (Abstract & more)
- Michael Gill (2008). Variability and moral phenomenology. (Abstract & more)
- Jakob Hohwy (2005). The experience of mental causation. (Abstract & more)
- Susan L. Hurley (1998). Self-consciousness, spontaneity, and the myth of the giving. (Abstract & more)
- Uriah Kriegel (2008). Moral phenomenology: Foundational issues. (Abstract & more)
- Pete Mandik (forthcoming). Control consciousness. (Abstract & more)
- Thomas Metzinger (2006). Conscious volition and mental representation: Toward a more fine-grained analysis. (Abstract & more)
- Albert Newen, Reply to Carruthers. (Abstract & more)
- Elisabeth Pacherie & Tim Bayne (2007). Narrators and Comparators: The Architecture of Agentive Self-awareness. (Abstract & more)
- Elisabeth Pacherie (2007). The Anarchic Hand Syndrome and Utilization Behavior: A Window onto Agentive Self-Awareness. (Abstract & more)
- Elisabeth Pacherie (2008). The Phenomenology of Action: A Conceptual Framework. (Abstract & more)
- Elisabeth Pacherie (2007). The Sense of Control and the Sense of Agency. (Abstract & more)
- Christopher Peacocke (2003). Action: Awareness, ownership, and knowledge. (More)
- David M. Rosenthal (2002). The timing of conscious states. (Abstract & more)
- Par Sundstrom (online). Consciousness and intentionality of action. (More)
- Matthis Synofzik, Gottfried Vosgerau & Albert Newen (2008). I move, therefore I am: A new theoretical framework to investigate agency and ownership. (Abstract & more)
- Max Velmans (2004). Why conscious free will both is and isn't an illusion. (Abstract & more)
- Daniel M. Wegner & T. Wheatley (1999). Apparent mental causation: Sources of the experience of will. (More)
Unconscious States
Collective Consciousness
Aspects of Consciousness, Misc
Qualia
- Robert F. Allen (online). The subject is qualia: Paronyms and temporary identity. (More)
- Jay David Atlas, Qualia, consciousness, and memory: Dennett (2005), Rosenthal (2002), Ledoux (2002), and Libet (2004). (Abstract & more)
- Andrew R. Bailey (2005). What is it like to see a bat? A critique of Dretske's representationalist theory of qualia. (More)
- Michael Beaton (2009). Qualia and Introspection. (Abstract & more)
- Tyler Burge (2003). Qualia and intentional content: Reply to Block. (More)
- Alex Byrne & Michael Tye (2006). Qualia ain't in the head. (Abstract & more)
- Roberto Casati (2003). Qualia domesticated. (More)
- David J. Chalmers (1993). Self-ascription without qualia: A case-study. (Abstract & more)
- David J. Cole (1994). Thought and qualia. (More)
- Mark Crooks (2008). The Churchlands' war on qualia. (Abstract & more)
- David de Leon (ms). The qualities of qualia. (Abstract & more)
- Daniel C. Dennett (1991). "Epiphenomenal" qualia? (More)
- Hans Flohr (1992). Qualia and brain processes. (More)
- Brie Gertler (2006). Consciousness and Qualia Cannot Be Reduced. (More)
- J. Goguen (2004). Musical qualia, context, time and emotion. (More)
- Richard L. Gregory (1996). What do qualia do? (More)
- David Hilbert, Qualia. (Abstract & more)
- Christopher S. Hill (online). Visual awareness and visual qualia. (Abstract & more)
- David Hodgson (2002). Three tricks of consciousness: Qualia, chunking and selection. (Abstract & more)
- Greg P. Hodes (2005). What would it "be like" to solve the hard problem?: Cognition, consciousness, and qualia zombies. (More)
- Ted Honderich (1992). Seeing qualia and positing the world. (More)
- Frank Jackson (1982). Epiphenomenal qualia. (More)
- Amy Kind (2008). How to believe in qualia. (Abstract & more)
- Joseph Levine (1983). Materialism and qualia: The explanatory gap. (More)
- Pete Mandik (1999). Qualia, space, and control. (Abstract & more)
- George Mandler (2005). The consciousness continuum: From "qualia" to "free will". (More)
- Jeffrey A. Medina (2002). What it's like and why: Subjective qualia explained as objective phenomena. (Abstract & more)
- Sofia Miguens (2002). Qualia or non epistemic perception: D. Dennett's and F. Dretske's representational theories of consciousness. (More)
- Ken Mogi (online). Creativity and the neural basis of qualia. (Abstract & more)
- Ken Mogi (1997). Qualia and the brain. (Abstract & more)
- Mr D. M. Nicholson (ms). From a flaw in the knowledge argument to a physicalist account of qualia. (Abstract & more)
- Elisabeth Pacherie (1999). Qualia and representations. (More)
- Vilayanur S. Ramachandran & William Hirstein (1998). Three laws of qualia: What neurology tells us about the biological functions of consciousness. (More)
- Stephen E. Robbins (2007). Time, form and the limits of qualia. (More)
- P. Ross (2001). Qualia and the senses. (More)
- Dan Ryder (online). Explaining the "inhereness" of qualia representationally: Why we seem to have a visual field. (More)
- Paul Schweizer (1994). Intentionality, qualia, and mind/brain identity. (More)
- Gianfranco Soldati & Fabian Dorsch, Conceptual qualia and communication. (Abstract & more)
- Fredrik Stjernberg (online). Not so epiphenomenal qualia. (More)
- Leopold Stubenberg (1996). The place of qualia in the world of science. (More)
Qualia, Misc
Qualia and Materialism
Eliminativism about Qualia
The Inverted Spectrum
- U. Bangert, R. Barnes, L. S. Hounsome, R. Jones, A. T. Blumenau, P. R. Briddon, M. J. Shaw & S. Oberg (2006). Electron energy loss spectroscopic studies of brown diamonds. (More)
- Justin Broackes (2007). Black and white and the inverted spectrum. (More)
- Alex Byrne (online). Gert on the shifted spectrum. (Abstract & more)
- Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert (2006). Hoffman's "proof" of the possibility of spectrum inversion. (Abstract & more)
- Alex Byrne (online). Inverted qualia. (Abstract & more)
- Alex Byrne (1999). Subjectivity is no barrier. (Abstract & more)
- Austen Clark (1985). Spectrum inversion and the color solid. (Abstract & more)
- David J. Cole (ms). Inverted spectrum arguments. (Abstract & more)
- Daniel C. Dennett (1994). Instead of qualia. (Abstract & more)
- Daniel C. Dennett (1999). Swift and enormous. (Abstract & more)
- David R. Hilbert & Mark Eli Kalderon (2000). Color and the inverted spectrum. (Abstract & more)
- Donald D. Hoffman (2006). The scrambling theorem: A simple proof of the logical possibility of spectrum inversion. (More)
- Donald D. Hoffman (2006). The scrambling theorem unscrambled: A response to commentaries. (More)
- Mark Kalderon (ms). Color and the inverted spectrum. (Abstract & more)
- Clayton Littlejohn (2009). On the coherence of inversion. (Abstract & more)
- Fiona Macpherson (2005). Colour inversion problems for representationalism. (Abstract & more)
- Eric Marcus (2006). Intentionalism and the imaginability of the inverted spectrum. (Abstract & more)
- B. J. McKeon & J. F. Morrison (2007). Asymptotic scaling in turbulent pipe flow. (More)
- Gerard O'Brien & Jonathan Opie (1999). Finding a place for experience in the physical-relational structure of the brain. (Abstract & more)
- Stephen Palmer (1999). Color, consciousness, and the isomorphism constraint. (Abstract & more)
- Michael Pelczar (2008). On an argument for functional invariance. (Abstract & more)
- Peter W. Ross (1999). Color science and spectrum inversion: A reply to Nida-Rumelin. (More)
- Peter W. Ross (1999). Color science and spectrum inversion: Further thoughts. (More)
- Sydney Shoemaker (1996). Color, subjective reactions, and qualia. (Abstract & more)
- Jeff Speaks (forthcoming). Spectrum inversion without a difference in representation is impossible. (Abstract & more)
- Robert Stalnaker (1999). Comparing qualia across persons. (More)
- Par Sundstrom (2002). An argument against spectrum inversion. (More)
- Brad J. Thompson (2008). Representationalism and the conceivability of inverted spectra. (Abstract & more)
- Christopher D. Viger (1999). The possibility of subisomorphic experiential differences. (Abstract & more)
- R. Widmer, O. Groning, P. Ruffieux & P. Groning (2006). Low-temperature scanning tunneling spectroscopy on the 5-fold surface of the icosahedral alpdmn quasicrystal. (More)
Absent Qualia
Functionalism and Qualia