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1. Philosophy of Consciousness (Philosophy of Consciousness on PhilPapers)

• Philosophy of Consciousness, Miscellaneous [94]
• Philosophy of Consciousness, General Works [26]
• The Concept of Consciousness [40]
• Philosophy of Consciousness, Misc [28]
• Explaining Consciousness? [110]
• What is it Like? [11]
• Subjectivity and Objectivity [11]
• The Explanatory Gap [29]
• `Hard' and `Easy' Problems [34]
• Cognitive Closure [6]
• Conceptual Analysis and A Priori Entailment [9]
• Explaining Consciousness, Misc [10]
• Consciousness and Materialism [207]
• The Knowledge Argument [50]
• Zombies and the Conceivability Argument [75]
• Kripke's Modal Argument [5]
• Arguments from Disembodiment [5]
• Other Anti-Materialist Arguments [7]
• Consciousness and Materialism, Misc [5]
• Mind-Body Problem, General [27]
• Specific Views on Consciousness [252]
• Higher-Order Thought Approaches [52]
• Self-Representational Approaches [19]
• Dennett's Functionalism [28]
• Searle's Biological Naturalism [4]
• Functionalism about Consciousness [4]
• Eliminativism about Consciousness [4]
• Dualism about Consciousness [8]
• Panpsychism [26]
• Russellian Monism [7]
• Neutral Monism [8]
• Idealism [5]
• Specific Views on Consciousness, Misc [0]
• Consciousness and Content [178]
• Consciousness and Intentionality [27]
• Representationalism [86]
• Phenomenal Intentionality [12]
• Conscious Thought [4]
• Internalism and Externalism about Experience [12]
• Phenomenal Concepts [27]
• Consciousness and Content, Misc [8]
• Aspects of Consciousness [1458]
• Self-Consciousness [64]
• The Unity of Consciousness [45]
• Homogeneity of Consciousness [6]
• Knowledge of Consciousness [19]
• The Function of Consciousness [24]
• Temporal Consciousness [25]
• Consciousness of Action [15]
• Unconscious States [6]
• Collective Consciousness [0]
• Aspects of Consciousness, Misc [0]
• Qualia [100]
• Qualia, Misc [15]
• Qualia and Materialism [6]
• Eliminativism about Qualia [8]
• The Inverted Spectrum [26]
• Absent Qualia [5]
• Functionalism and Qualia [6]

Philosophy of Consciousness, Miscellaneous

Philosophy of Consciousness, General Works

• Ned Block (forthcoming). Consciousness.   (More)
• Ned Block (2003). Philosophical issues about consciousness.   (More)
• David J. Chalmers (2003). Consciousness and its place in nature.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://consc.net/papers/nature.html
  http://www.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/papers/nature.html
  
• David J. Chalmers (1999). Precis of The Conscious Mind.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/papers/precis.html
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8205(199906)59:2<435:POTCM>2.0.CO;2-7
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2653680.pdf
  
• Paul M. Churchland & Patricia S. Churchland (2003). Recent work on consciousness: Philosophical, theoretical, and empirical.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=9195661&dopt=Citation
  
• Daniel C. Dennett (2001). Consciousness: How much is that in real money?   (More)
• Rocco J. Gennaro (online). Consciousness.   (More)
• Susan L. Hurley (online). Precis of Consciousness in Action.   (More)
• Timo Jarvilehto (online). New directions for consciousness research?   (More)
• Uriah Kriegel (2006). Theories of consciousness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2006.00008.x
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2005.00008.x
  
• Eric Lormand (1996). Consciousness.   (More)
• Eric Lormand (online). Steps toward a science of consciousness?   (More)
• Thomas Metzinger (1985). The problem of consciousness.   (More)
• Marvin L. Minsky (2006). Consciousness.   (More)
• Junichi Murata (1997). Consciousness and the mind-body problem.   (More)
• David Papineau (2003). Theories of consciousness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.kcl.ac.uk/ip/davidpapineau/Staff/Papineau/OnlinePapers/theoriescon.html
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=8AHDK62jPSgC&oi=fnd&pg=PA353&dq=Theories+of+consciousness+Papineau&ots=fHEaKTECak&sig=1fnfgWLj6fGeOQOlVv3FzvGf_AM
  
• William E. Seager (2007). A brief history of the philosophical problem of consciousness.   (More)
• John R. Searle (2000). Consciousness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://redwood.berkeley.edu/bruno/mindmachine/searle.pdf
  http://pages.pomona.edu/~rt004747/lgcs11read/Searle00.pdf
  http://www.linguistics.pomona.edu/thornton/lgcs11read/Searle00.pdf
  http://www.linguistics.pomona.edu/lcs11fall04/readings/Searle00.pdf
  http://nutr.annualreviews.org/doi/pdf/10.1146/annurev.neuro.23.1.557
  http://arjournals.annualreviews.org/doi/pdf/10.1146/annurev.neuro.23.1.557
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=10845075&dopt=Citation
  
• John R. Searle (1987). Consciousness and the philosophers.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.cs.colorado.edu/~mozer/courses/3702/readings/Searle1997.pdf
  
• John R. Searle (1993). The problem of consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The most important scientific discovery of the present era will come when someone -- or some group -- discovers the answer to the following question: How exactly do neurobiological processes in the brain cause consciousness? This is the most important question facing us in the biological sciences, yet it is frequently evaded, and frequently misunderstood when not evaded. In order to clear the way for an understanding of this problem. I am going to begin to answer four questions: 1. What is consciousness? 2. What is the relation of consciousness to the brain? 3. What are some of the features that an empirical theory of consciousness should try to explain? 4. What are some common mistakes to avoid?
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogsci.soton.ac.uk/~harnad/Papers/Py104/searle.prob.html
  http://www.engadin.nl/bibliotheek/bibliotheek/download_files/Searle Consciousness.pdf
  http://hq.sk/~mandos/fmfi-uk/Informatika/Uvod Do Umelej Inteligencie/clanky/probcons.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=8319513&dopt=Citation
  
• Maxine Sheets-Johnstone (1998). Consciousness: A natural history.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/1998/00000005/00000003/844
  
• Charles Siewert (2000). Precis of The Significance of Consciousness.   (More)
• Keith Sutherland (1998). The mirror of consciousness.   (More)
• Robert van Gulick (online). Consciousness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2004/entries/consciousness/
  
• Max Velmans (2001). A natural account of phenomenal consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Physicalists commonly argue that conscious experiences are nothing more than states of the brain, and that conscious qualia are observer-independent, physical properties of the external world. Although this assumes the 'mantle of science,' it routinely ignores the findings of science, for example in sensory physiology, perception, psychophysics, neuropsychology and comparative psychology. Consequently, although physicalism aims to naturalise consciousness, it gives an unnatural account of it. It is possible, however, to develop a natural, nonreductive, reflexive model of how consciousness relates to the brain and the physical world. This paper introduces such a model and how it construes the nature of conscious experience. Within this model the physical world as perceived (the phenomenal world) is viewed as part of conscious experience not apart from it. While in everyday life we treat this phenomenal world as if it is the "physical world", it is really just one biologically useful representation of what the world is like that may differ in many respects from the world described by physics. How the world as perceived relates to the world as described by physics can be investigated by normal science (e.g. through the study of sensory physiology, psychophysics and so on). This model of consciousness appears to be consistent with both third-person evidence of how the brain works and with first-person evidence of what it is like to have a given experience. According to the reflexive model, conscious experiences are really how they seem
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00001813/
  http://cogprints.org/1813/0/Natural_account_of_CS.htm
  http://cogprints.org/1813/00/Natural_account_of_CS.htm
  http://cogprints.soton.ac.uk/documents/disk0/00/00/18/13/
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00001813/00/Natural_account_of_CS.htm
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:1813
  http://cogprints.soton.ac.uk/documents/disk0/00/00/18/13/cog00001813-00/Natural_account_of_CS.htm
  
• Josh Weisberg (2007). The Problem of Consciousness: Mental Appearance and Mental Reality.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: of (from Philosophy Dissertations Online)

The Concept of Consciousness

• Michael V. Antony (ms). Are our concepts "conscious state" and "conscious creature" vague?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: are sharp rather than vague, that they can have no borderline cases. On the other hand, many who take conscious states to be identical to, or realized by, complex physical states are committed to the vagueness of those concepts. In the paper I argue that conscious state and conscious creature are sharp by presenting four necessary conditions for conceiving borderline cases in general, and showing that some of those conditions cannot be met with conscious state. I conclude that conscious state is sharp, and the conclusion is then extended to conscious creature. The paper ends with a brief discussion of some implications
• Michael V. Antony (2006). Consciousness and vagueness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Abstract. An argument is offered for this conditional: If our current concept conscious state is sharp rather than vague, and also correct (at least in respect of its sharpness), then common versions of familiar metaphysical theories of consciousness are false--?namely versions of the identity theory, functionalism, and dualism that appeal to complex physical or functional properties in identification, realization, or correlation. Reasons are also given for taking seriously the claim that our current concept conscious state is sharp. The paper ends by surveying the theoretical options left open by the concept's sharpness and the truth of the conditional argued for in the paper
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/w40887115462k765/fulltext.pdf
  
• Michael V. Antony (2002). Concepts of consciousness, kinds of consciousness, meanings of 'consciousness'.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/9h7c816bx1u6603t/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=388549&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/9H7C816BX1U6603T.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/phil/2002/00000109/00000001/00388549
  
• Michael V. Antony (2001). Conceiving simple experiences.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: That consciousness is composed of simple or basic elements that combine to form complex experiences is an idea with a long history. This idea is approached through an examination of our
• Michael V. Antony (2001). Is 'consciousness' ambiguous?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Some alleged senses of the term are access consciousness, phenomenal consciousness, state consciousness, creature consciousness, introspective consciousness, self consciousness, to name a few. In the paper I argue for two points. First, there are few if any good reasons for thinking that such alleged senses are genuine:
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/2001/00000008/00000002/1074
  
• Michael V. Antony (1999). Outline of a general methodology for consciousness research.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In spite of the enormous interdisciplinary interest in consciousness these days, sorely lacking are general methodologies in terms of which individual research efforts across disciplines can be seen as contributing to a common end
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://lgxserve.ciseca.uniba.it/lei/mind/texts/t0000005.htm
  
• Rodrigo Becerra (2004). Homonymous mistakes with ontological aspirations: The persisting problem with the word 'consciousness'.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ifs.csic.es/sorites/Issue_15/becerra.htm
  http://www.ifs.csic.es/sorites/Issue_15/sorites15.pdf#page=13
  
• Mark H. Bickhard (2005). Consciousness and reflective consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: An interactive process model of the nature of representation intrinsically accounts for multiple emergent properties of consciousness, such as being a contentful experiential flow, from a situated and embodied point of view. A crucial characteristic of this model is that content is an internally related property of interactive process, rather than an externally related property as in all other contemporary models. Externally related content requires an interpreter, yielding the familiar regress of interpreters, along with a host of additional fatal problems. Further properties of consciousness, such as differentiated qualities of experience, including qualia, emerge with conscious reflection. In particular, qualia are not constituents or direct properties of consciousness per se. Assuming that they are so is a common and ultimately disastrous misconstrual of the problems of consciousness
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.lehigh.edu/~mhb0/Consc.Weber.24May03.pdf
  http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/./ftinterface~content=a713997471~fulltext=713240930
  http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/index/J3K07H45847V6505.pdf
  http://www.informaworld.com/index/J3K07H45847V6505.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/routledg/cphp/2005/00000018/00000002/art00004
  
• Ned Block (1997). Author's response.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The distinction between phenomenal (P) and access (A) consciousness arises from the battle between biological and computational approaches to the mind. If P = A, the computationalists are right; but if not, the biological nature of P yields its scientific nature
• David J. Chalmers (1997). Availability: The cognitive basis of experience?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: [[This was written as a commentary on Ned Block 's paper "On A Confusion about a Function of Consciousness" . It appeared in _Behavioral_ _and Brain Sciences_ 20:148-9, 1997, and also in the collection _The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates_ (MIT Press, 1997) edited by Block, Flanagan, and Guzeldere. ]]
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/papers/availability.html
  http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=1&fid=29360&jid=BBS&volumeId=20&issueId=01&aid=29359
  http://www.journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0140525X97240057
  
• Austen Clark (2001). Phenomenal consciousness so-called.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: "Consciousness" is a multiply ambiguous word, and if our goal is to explain perceptual consciousness we had better be clear about which of the many senses of the word we are endorsing when we sign on to the project. I describe some of the relatively standard distinctions made in the philosophical literature about different meanings of the word "conscious". Then I consider some of the arguments of David Chalmers and of Ned Block that states of "phenomenal consciousness" pose special and intractable problems for the scientific understanding of perception. I argue that many of these problems are introduced by obscurities in the term itself, and propose a distinction between epistemic and non-epistemic senses of the term "phenomenal consciousness". That distinction helps explain why phenomenal consciousness seems so mysterious to so many people. States of "phenomenal consciousness" are not states of one, elemental (and inexplicable) kind; they are a ragtag lot, of differing levels of complexity, corralled under one heading by a regrettable ambiguity in our terminology
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://selfpace.uconn.edu/paper/ClarkAusPCtall.pdf
  
• Daniel C. Dennett (2001). Consciousness: How much is that in real money?   (More)
• Ronald B. de Sousa (2002). Twelve varieties of subjectivity.   (More)
• Alvin Goldman (1993). Consciousness, folk psychology, and cognitive science.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This paper supports the basic integrity of the folk psychological conception of consciousness and its importance in cognitive theorizing. Section 1 critically examines some proposed definitions of consciousness, and argues that the folk- psychological notion of phenomenal consciousness is not captured by various functional-relational definitions. Section 2 rebuts the arguments of several writers who challenge the very existence of phenomenal consciousness, or the coherence or tenability of the folk-psychological notion of awareness. Section 3 defends a significant role for phenomenal consciousness in the execution of a certain cognitive task, viz., classification of one's own mental states. Execution of this task, which is part of folk psychologizing, is taken as a datum in scientific psychology. It is then argued (on theoretical grounds) that the most promising sort of scientific model of the self-ascription of mental states is one that posits the kinds of phenomenal properties invoked by folk psychology. Cognitive science and neuroscience can of course refine and improve upon the folk understanding of consciousness, awareness, and mental states generally. But the folk-psychological constructs should not be jettisoned; they have a role to play in cognitive theorizing
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://coglit.ecs.soton.ac.uk/~harnad/Papers/Py104/goldman.consc.html
  
• T. Hamanaka (1997). The concept of consciousness in the history of neuropsychiatry.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://hpy.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/8/31/361.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=11619583&dopt=Citation
  
• Gilbert Harman (online). What is cognitive access?   (More)
• Benj Hellie (2007). Factive phenomenal characters.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This paper expands on the discussion in the first section of 'Beyond phenomenal naivete'. Let Phenomenal Naivete be understood as the doctrine that some phenomenal characters of veridical experiences are factive properties concerning the external world. Here I present in detail a phenomenological case for Phenomenal Naivete and an argument from hallucination against it. I believe that these arguments show the concept of phenomenal character to be defective, overdetermined by its metaphysical and epistemological commitments together with the world. This does not establish a gappish eliminativism, but a gluttish pluralism, on which there are many imperfect deservers of the name 'phenomenal character'. Different projects in the philosophy of mind -- phenomenology, philosophy of conscious, metaphysics and epistemology of perception -- are concerned with different deservers of the name.
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1520-8583.2007.00128.x
  
• Boris Hennig (2007). Cartesian conscientia.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/./ftinterface~content=a780365723~fulltext=713240930
  http://prod.informaworld.com/smpp/content~content=a780365723~db=all~jumptype=rss
  http://www.informaworld.com/index/780365723.pdf
  
• Ted Honderich (1998). Consciousness as existence.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.homepages.ucl.ac.uk/~uctytho/ted4.htm
  
• Ted Honderich (2004). Consciousness as existence, devout physicalism, spiritualism.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Consider three answers to the question of what it actually is for you to be aware of the room you are in. (1) It is for the room in a way to exist. (2) It is for there to be only physical activity in your head, however additionally described. (3) It is for there to be non-spatial facts somehow in your head. The first theory, unlike the other two, satisfies five criteria for an adequate account of consciousness itself. The criteria have to do with the seeming nature of this consciousness, and with subjectivity, reality including non-abstractness, mind-body causation, and the differences between perceptual, reflective and affective consciousness. The theory of consciousness as existence is not open to the objection having to do with a deluded brain in a vat. The theory, as any theory of consciousness needs to, explains its own degree of failure in characterizing consciousness. It releases neuroscience and cognitive science from nervousness about consciousness, and leaves all of consciousness a subject for science. The theory is a reconstruction of our conception of consciousness. It may be that we should carry forward several theories of consciousness. But they will have to be compared in terms of truth to the five criteria for an adequate theory
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.mindmatter.de/mmpdf/honderich.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/mm/2004/00000002/00000001/art00005
  
• Ted Honderich (2003). Perceptual, reflective, and affective consciousness as existence.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This is a further improved version of a paper previously called `Reflective and Affective Consciousness'. It is better now -- more or less comprehensible if still imperfect. It is the fourth in a series of papers, and continues the idea that consciousness needs to be analysed not in any of the boring ways: by way of the plain or 17th Century materialism that is still with us in new packages, or immaterialism, or dualistic identity theory, or functionalism and cognitive science with philosophical ambition. (For argued surveys of these, and a particular allegiance now abandoned in favour of Consciousness as Existence, go to Mind Brain Connection and Mind and Brain Explanation .) Consciousness needs to be analysed, rather, mainly in terms of things existing outside of heads. The final draft of the paper will eventually turn up in the annual proceedings of The Royal Institute of Philosophy, a volume under the title Minds and Persons edited by Anthony O'Hear. At the end of the paper here there is a summary of it -- in fact the handout for a lecture
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=pS2ia_fLVSQC&oi=fnd&pg=PA1&ots=pBk4ATPUuW&sig=Hd_aHPmB4nEBfg-x-jrwcl84X_E
  
• Daniel D. Hutto (2001). Consciousness and Conceptual Schema.   (More)
• William James (1904). Does "consciousness" exist?   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0160-9335(19040901)1:18<477:D`E>2.0.CO;2-M
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0160-9335(19040901)1:18<477:D`E>2.0.CO;2-M
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2011942.pdf
  
• Joshua Knobe & Jesse J. Prinz (2008). Intuitions about consciousness: Experimental studies.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: When people are trying to determine whether an entity is capable of having certain kinds of mental states, they can proceed either by thinking about the entity from a *functional* standpoint or by thinking about the entity from a *physical* standpoint. We conducted a series of studies to determine how each of these standpoints impact people’s mental state ascriptions. The results point to a striking asymmetry. It appears that ascriptions of states involving phenomenal consciousness are sensitive to physical factors in a way that ascriptions of other states are not
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.unc.edu/~knobe/consciousness.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/y16u07u7775l2312/fulltext.pdf
  
• Uriah Kriegel (2006). Consciousness: Phenomenal consciousness, access consciousness, and scientific practice.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Key Terms: Phenomenal consciousness, access consciousness, qualitative character, subjective character, intransitive self-consciousness, disposition, categorical basis, subliminal perception, blindsight
• Eric Lormand (1996). Nonphenomenal consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: There is not a uniform kind of consciousness common to all conscious mental states: beliefs, emotions, perceptual experiences, pains, moods, verbal thoughts, and so on. Instead, we need a distinction between phenomenal and nonphenomenal consciousness. As if consciousness simpliciter were not mysterious enough, philosophers have recently focused their worries on phenomenal (or qualitative) consciousness, the kind that explains or constitutes there being "something it
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0029-4624(199606)30:2<242:NC>2.0.CO;2-Z
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0029-4624(199606)30:2<242:NC>2.0.CO;2-Z
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2216295.pdf
  
• William G. Lycan (online). The plurality of consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: My topics are consciousness. The plural is deliberate. Both in philosophy and in psychology,
• Neil Campbell Manson (2002). Epistemic consciousness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0039368102000250
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/searching/Expand?pub=infobike://els/00393681/2002/00000033/00000003/art00025&unc=
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/00393681/2002/00000033/00000003/art00025
  
• Thomas Natsoulas (1999). The concept of consciousness: The general state meaning.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/1468-5914.00091
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1468-5914.00091
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/jtsb/1999/00000029/00000001/art00004
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/jtsb/1999/00000029/00000001/art00091
  http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/119067279/PDFSTART
  
• Thomas Natsoulas (1996). The sciousness hypothesis: Part I.   (More)
• Gualtiero Piccinini (2007). The ontology of creature consciousness: A challenge for philosophy.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.umsl.edu/~piccininig/Data From Introspective Reports.pdf
  http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=1&fid=1007828&jid=BBS&volumeId=30&issueId=01&aid=1007824
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/sites/entrez?db=pubmed&uid=17475074&cmd=showdetailview&indexed=google
  http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=1007824
  http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0140525X07001100
  
• Charles Ripley (1984). Sperry's concept of consciousness.   (More)
• David Rosenthal (web). Concepts and definitions of consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: in Encyclopedia of Consciousness, ed. William P. Banks, Amsterdam: Elsevier, forthcoming in 2009
• David Rosenthal (2001). Consciousness and sensation: Philosophical aspects.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: consciousness. Such unconscious processing always

  Cambridge, UK

  tends to re?ect habitual or strong responses. From this
• David M. Rosenthal (2002). How many kinds of consciousness?   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=12470629&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/sites/entrez?db=pubmed&uid=12470629&cmd=showdetailview&indexed=google
  http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S105381000200017X
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/ap/cc/2002/00000011/00000004/art00017
  
• David M. Rosenthal (1997). Phenomenal consciousness and what it's like.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: be realized. Whatever gets access to phenomenal awareness (to consciousness and P-consciousness are almost always present or P-consciousness as described by Block) is represented within this absent together.
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=1&fid=29560&jid=BBS&volumeId=20&issueId=01&aid=29559
  http://www.journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0140525X9731005X
  
• David M. Rosenthal (1994). State consciousness and transitive consciousness.   (More)
• Aaron Sloman (ms). What is it like to be a rock?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This paper aims to replace deep sounding unanswerable, time-wasting pseudo- questions which are often posed in the context of attacking some version of the strong AI thesis, with deep, discovery-driving, real questions about the nature and content of internal states of intelligent agents of various kinds. In particular the question
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~axs/misc/rock/rock/
  http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~axs/misc/like_to_be_a_rock/rock.pdf
  http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~axs/misc/like_to_be_a_rock/rock.html
  http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/cogaff/misc/like_to_be_a_rock/rock.pdf
  
• Mario Vaneechoutte (2000). Experience, awareness, and consciousness: Suggestions for definitions as offered by an evolutionary approach.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: An evolutionary point of view is proposed to make more appropriate distinctions between experience, awareness and consciousness. Experience can be defined as a characteristic linked closely to specific pattern matching, a characteristic already apparent at the molecular level at least. Awareness can be regarded as the special experience of one or more central, final modules in the animal neuronal brain. Awareness is what experience is to animals.Finally, consciousness could be defined as reflexive awareness. The ability for reflexive awareness is distinctly different from animal and human awareness and depends upon the availability of a separate frame of reference, as provided by symbolic language. As such, words have made reflexive awareness
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/m1p4672r4wht3110/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=322218&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/M1P4672R4WHT3110.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/foda/2000/00000005/00000004/00322218
  
• Max Velmans (ms). Defining consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The following extracts with connecting comments suggest a departure point for a definitions of consciousness that preserves its everyday phenomenology while allowing an understanding of what consciousness is to deepen as scientific investigation proceeds. I argue that current definitions are often theory-driven rather than following the contours of ordinary experience. Consequently they are sometimes too broad, sometimes too narrow, and sometimes not definitions of phenomenal consciousness at all. As an alternative, an ecologically valid, reflexive approach to consciousness is suggested that is consistent with science and with common sense
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/395/00/Definingconsciousness.html
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000395/00/Definingconsciousness.html
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:395
  

Philosophy of Consciousness, Misc

• Alex Byrne, David Hilbert & Susanna Siegel (online). Do we see more than we can access?   (More)
• Peter Carruthers (2001). Who is blind to blindsight?   (More)
• David J. Chalmers (1997). Response to Searle.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In my book _The Conscious Mind_ , I deny a number of claims that John Searle finds "obvious", and I make some claims that he finds "absurd". But if the mind/body problem has taught us anything, it is that nothing about consciousness is obvious, and that one person's obvious truth is another person's absurdity. So instead of throwing around this sort of language, it is best to examine the claims themselves and the arguments that I give for them, to see whether Searle says anything of substance that touches them
• Daniel C. Dennett (2005). Two steps closer on consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: For a solid quarter century Paul Churchland and I have been wheeling around in the space of work on consciousness, and though from up close it may appear that we =ve been rather vehemently opposed to each other =s position, from the bird =s eye view, we are moving in a rather tight spiral within the universe of contested views, both staunch materialists, interested in the same phenomena and the same empirical theories of those phenomena, but differing only over where the main chance lies for progress
• Fred Dretske (2001). First person warrant: Comments on Siewert's The Significance of Consciousness.   (More)
• Richard M. Gale (online). William James on the misery and glory of consciousness.   (More)
• Brie Gertler (2001). The relationship between phenomenality and intentionality: Comments on Siewert's The Significance of Consciousness.   (More)
• George Graham & Terence E. Horgan (1998). Sensations and grain processes.   (More)
• Susan L. Hurley (online). Is there a substantive disagreement here? Reply to Chemero and Cordeiro.   (More)
• Susan L. Hurley (online). The space of reasons vs. the space of inference: Reply to Noe.   (More)
• Robert E. Kirk (2002). Thinking about Papineau's Thinking About Consciousness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://lgxserve.ciseca.uniba.it/lei/mind/forums/004_0002.htm
  
• Joseph Levine (2001). Phenomenal consciousness and the first-person.   (More)
• Paul M. Livingston (2002). Experience and structure: Philosophical history and the problem of consciousness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/2002/00000009/00000003/1260
  
• Kirk A. Ludwig (2002). Phenomenal consciousness and intentionality: Comments on The Significance of Consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: _The Significance of Consciousness_ . Princeton: Princeton University Press. $42.50 hbk. x + 374pp. ISBN: 0691027242. ABSTRACT: I discuss three issues about the relation of phenomenal consciousness, in the sense Siewert isolates, to
• Robert W. Lurz (2001). Taking the first-person approach: Two worries for Siewert's sense of 'consciousness'.   (More)
• William G. Lycan (2001). Have we neglected phenomenal consciousness?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Charles Siewert's _The Significance of Consciousness_ contends that most philosophers and psychologists who have written about "consciousness" have neglected a crucial type or aspect that Siewert calls "phenomenal consciousness" and tries carefully to define. The present article argues that some philosophers, at least, have not neglected phenomenal consciousness and have offered tenable theories of it
• Andrew Melnuk (2002). Papineau on the intuition of distinctness.   (More)
• Thomas Nagel (1993). The mind wins.   (More)
• Dana K. Nelkin (2001). Phenomenal consciousness and intentionality.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Siewert identifies a special kind of conscious experience, phenomenal consciousness, that is the sort of consciousness missing in a variety of cases of blindsight. He then argues that phenomenal consciousness has been neglected by students of consciousness when it should not be. According to Siewert, the neglect is based at least in part on two false assumptions: (i) phenomenal features are not intentional and (ii) phenomenal character is restricted to sensory experience. By identifying an essential tension in Siewert's characterization of phenomenal consciousness, I argue that his case for denying (i) and (ii) is at best incomplete
• Alva Noe (ms). Perception, action, and nonconceptual content.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: profile deforms as we move about it. As perceivers we are masters of the patterns of sensorimotor contingency that shape our perceptual interaction with the world. We expect changes in such things as apparent size, shape and color to occur as we actively explore the environment. In encountering perspective-dependent changes of this sort, we learn how things are quite apart form our particular perspective. Our possession of these skills is constitutive of our ability to see (and generally to perceive). This is confirmed by the fact that we can disrupt a person
• David Papineau (2003). Reply to Kirk and Melnyk.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: I am lucky to have two such penetrating commentators as Robert Kirk and Andrew Melnyk. It is also fortunate that they come at me from different directions, and so cover different aspects of my book. Robert Kirk has doubts about the overall structure of my enterprise, and in particular about my central commitment to a distinctive species of phenomenal concepts. Andrew Melnyk, by contrast, offers no objections to my general brand of materialism. Instead he focuses specifically on my discussion of the anti-materialist 'intuition of distinctness', raising questions about my attempt to explain this intuition away, and offering alternative suggestions of his own
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://lgxserve.ciseca.uniba.it/lei/mind/forums/004_0004.htm
  
• Philip Robbins (2008). Consciousness and the social mind.   (More)
• William E. Seager (2001). Consciousness, value and functionalism.   (More)
• Charles Siewert (2004). Replies.   (More)
• Par Sundstrom (2006). Review of Papineau's Thinking About Consciousness.   (More)
• Pär Sundström (2005). Wittgenstein, consciousness, and the mind.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ifs.csic.es/sorites/Issue_16/sundstro.htm
  http://www.umu.se/philos/personal/Sundstrom/Whemsida.pdf
  http://www.umu.se/philos/personal/Sundstrom/Wittgenstein.pdf
  http://www.ifs.csic.es/sorites/Issue_16/sorites16.pdf#page=8
  
• Alan Thomas (1997). Kant, McDowell and the theory of consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This paper examines some of the central arguments of John McDowell's Mind and World, particularly his treatment of the Kantian themes of the spontaneity of thought and of the nature of self-consciousness. It is argued that in so far as McDowell departs from Kant, his position becomes less plausible in three respects. First, the space of reason is identified with the space of responsible and critical freedom in a way that runs together issues about synthesis below the level of concepts and at the level of complete judgements. This leads to the unwarranted exclusion of animal minds from the space of reasons. Second, McDowell draws no essential distinction between apperception and inner sense, a distinction which is important to a defensible Kantian view and to the very idea of a sui generis transcendental knowledge of the mind that is consistent with Kant's critical principles. McDowell does not take into account some of Kant's developed arguments about the inherently reflective nature of consciousness which is interpreted as an adverbial theory of the nature of conscious experience, a mode of being in a mental state (so neither an intrinsic nor extrinsic property of it). Third, McDowell endorses a standard treatment of Kant's approach to the mind in which a merely formal account of mind needs to be anchored outside consciousness on the physical body. The arguments for this conclusion, both in Mind and World and in related work by Bermudez and Hurley, is shown to be very inconclusive as a criticism of Kant. The capacity to self-ascribe thoughts that are already conscious shows, but does not say, a truth about the unity of our conscious experience that does not require further anchoring on a physical body; at that stage of the Critique Kant is describing conditions for conscious experience in general, not the conscious experience of spatio-temporally located makers of judgements. The alleged lacuna in Kant's arguments is no lacuna at all
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.logical-operator.com/EJP Paper.pdf
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/1468-0378.00041
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1468-0378.00041
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/ejop/1997/00000005/00000003/art00004
  
• D. Gene Witmer (2001). Experience, appearance, and hidden features.   (More)

Explaining Consciousness?

What is it Like?

• Torin Alter (2002). Nagel on imagination and physicalism.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In "What is it Like to be a Bat?" Thomas Nagel argues that we cannot imagine what it is like to be a bat or presently understand how physicalism might be true. Both arguments have been seriously misunderstood. I defend them against various objections, point out a problem with the argument against physicalism, and show how the problem can be solved
• David Beisecker (2005). Phenomenal consciousness, sense impressions, and the logic of 'what it's like'.   (More)
• Susan J. Blackmore (2003). What is it like to be...?   (More)
• Laurence A. BonJour (ms). What is it like to be human (instead of a bat).   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: My purpose in this paper is to discuss and defend an objection to physicalist or materialist accounts of the mind
• P. M. S. Hacker (2002). Is there anything it is like to be a bat?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The concept of consciousness has been the source of much philosophical, cognitive scientific and neuroscientific discussion for the past two decades. Many scientists, as well as philosophers, argue that at the moment we are almost completely in the dark about the nature of consciousness. Stuart Sutherland, in a much quoted remark, wrote that
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=1&fid=102154&jid=PHI&volumeId=77&issueId=02&aid=102153
  http://www.journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0031819102000220
  http://journals.cambridge.org/article_S0031819102000220
  
• Benj Hellie (2007). 'There's something it's like' and the structure of consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: I discuss the meaning of 'There's something e is like', in the context of a reply to Eric Lormand's 'The explanatory stopgap'. I argue that Lormand is wrong to think it has a specially perceptual meaning. Rather, it has one of at least four candidate meanings: (a) e is some way as regards its subject; (b) e is some way and e's being that way is in the possession of its subject; (c) e is some way in the awareness of its subject; (d) e's subject is the "experiencer" of e. I provide additional argumentation for the view in this paper that in the context, 'like this' functions as a predicate variable.
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://philreview.dukejournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/3/441
  
• Eric Lormand (2004). The explanatory stopgap.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Is there an explanatory gap between raw feels and raw material? Some philosophers argue, and many other people believe, that scientific explanations of conscious experience cannot be as satisfying as typical scientific explanations elsewhere, even in our wildest dreams. The underlying philosophical claims are
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8108(200407)113:3<303:TES>2.0.CO;2-K
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/4147973.pdf
  http://philreview.dukejournals.org/cgi/content/citation/113/3/303
  http://philreview.dukejournals.org/cgi/reprint/113/3/303.pdf
  http://philreview.dukejournals.org/cgi/reprint/113/3/303
  
• Luca Malatesti (2004). Knowing what it is like and knowing how.   (More)
• Jeffrey A. Medina (2002). What it's like and why: Subjective qualia explained as objective phenomena.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Notably spurred into the philosophical forefront by Thomas Nagel's 'What Is It Like To Be a Bat?' decades ago, and since maintained by a number of advocates of dualism since that critical publication, is the assertion that our inability to know 'what it's like' to be someone or something else is inexplicable given physicalism. Contrary to this well-known and central objection, I find that a consistent and exhaustive physicalism is readily conceivable. I develop one such theory and demonstrate that not only is it consistent with the private and varied nature of subjective experience, it, in fact, entails it
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/2649/01/medina_subj.html
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00002649/
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:2649
  
• Yujin Nagasawa (2003). Thomas versus Thomas: A new approach to Nagel's bat argument.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.philosophy.bham.ac.uk/staff/nagasawa_Thomas.pdf
  http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/./ftinterface~content=a713788647~fulltext=713240930
  http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/./content~content=a713788647~db=all~order=page
  
• Thomas Nagel (1974). What is it like to be a bat?   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.clarku.edu/students/philosophyclub/docs/nagel.pdf
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=iBpGvhKP670C&oi=fnd&pg=PA422&ots=MWAubYxhoe&sig=E-uyaFC1mwRViC_Vzd1yV_YkfNY
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=iBpGvhKP670C&oi=fnd&pg=PA422&ots=MWAw9ZBnmg&sig=-hnhK-NYKovY7izgiOdIZGgtwi4
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=iBpGvhKP670C&oi=fnd&pg=PA422&ots=MWAsdXtlic&sig=I0vTcuOty-ay321R8Chyazc0Wv8
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=iBpGvhKP670C&oi=fnd&pg=PA422&ots=MVJw9Ztljk&sig=3hJuRqj_SsLgAIksFx5iJHDNPHU
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=iBpGvhKP670C&oi=fnd&pg=PA422&ots=MWAxh-Ahle&sig=Jn45gyNQkfQO0iW-AZv3qTcg458
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=iBpGvhKP670C&oi=fnd&pg=PA422&ots=MWAxb-wlog&sig=ZaPLuowxn31jMNfxpOidMniWgGM
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=iBpGvhKP670C&oi=fnd&pg=PA422&ots=MVJwe0xlkd&sig=cRzA3p8Fyz06dPKUfeqO_kOimmU
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=iBpGvhKP670C&oi=fnd&pg=PA422&ots=MWAt9Xyglj&sig=tfHw81xAKrWjWzI0mVWUhkqh7gk
  http://www.artboy.info/teach/reference/bat/ThomasNagel.pdf
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=iBpGvhKP670C&oi=fnd&pg=PA422&ots=MWAwf_wmlk&sig=l06X1Mqe7LPm-K_TMNXbyDbmZ7I
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=iBpGvhKP670C&oi=fnd&pg=PA422&ots=MWAtfXCnmd&sig=toEe1io-gDMt8nW8a2h5CmKHMX8
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=iBpGvhKP670C&oi=fnd&pg=PA422&ots=MWAvdZxkok&sig=QsnNG__LP8r9RIWni64e_eZJDeU
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=fGLRPNiWS5MC&oi=fnd&pg=PA186&ots=023TSBEVKQ&sig=FiTx9VnPHNUriSOswDvWeN5Awpg
  

Subjectivity and Objectivity

• Ronald L. Chrisley (2001). A view from anywhere: Prospects for an objective understanding of consciousness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.cogs.susx.ac.uk/users/ronc/nagel.ps
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/chrisley98view.html
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=CCX1NhhpQNQC&oi=fnd&pg=PA3&ots=1BEcKyf309&sig=KrkVdWRv8wsujMhpKbnYbQBRGgM
  
• Daniel C. Dennett (1988). Review of Fodor, Psychosemantics.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In Word and Object, Quine acknowledged the "practical indispensability" in daily life of the intentional idioms of belief and desire but disparaged such talk as an "essentially dramatic idiom" rather than something from which real science could be made in any straightforward way.Endnote 1 Many who agree on little else have agreed with Quine about this, and have gone on to suggest one or another indirect way for science to accommodate folk psychology: Sellars, Davidson, Putnam, Rorty, Stich, the Churchlands, Schiffer and myself, to name a few. This fainthearted consensus is all wrong, according to Fodor, whose new book is a vigorous--even frantic--defense of what he calls Intentional Realism: beliefs and desires are real, causally involved, determinately contentful states. "We have no reason to doubt," Fodor says, "that it is possible to have a scientific psychology that vindicates commonsense belief/desire explanation." (p.16)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/253/0/fodor.htm
  http://cogprints.org/253/00/fodor.htm
  http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/fodor.htm
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000253/
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000253/00/fodor.htm
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:253
  
• Rom Harre (1999). Nagel's challenge and the mind-body problem.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://journals.cambridge.org/download.php?file=/PHI/PHI74_02/S0031819199000285a.pdf&code=a40eba0e7560f0c1968140bc4db80943
  
• Pete Mandik (2000). Chapter 1: Subjective and Objective Judgments.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Many philosophical issues concern questions of objectivity and subjectivity. Of these questions, there are two kinds. The first considers whether something is objective or subjective; the second what it _means_ for something to be objective or subjective
• Pete Mandik (2001). Mental representation and the subjectivity of consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Many have urged that the biggest obstacles to a physicalistic understanding of consciousness are the problems raised in connection with the subjectivity of consciousness. These problems are most acutely expressed in consideration of the knowledge argument against physicalism. I develop a novel account of the subjectivity of consciousness by explicating the ways in which mental representations may be perspectival. Crucial features of my account involve analogies between the representations involved in sensory experience and the ways in which pictorial representations exhibit perspectives or points of view. I argue that the resultant account of subjectivity provides a basis for the strongest response physicalists can give to the knowledge argument
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/mandik01mental.html
  http://www.petemandik.com/philosophy/papers/repsubj.pdf
  http://testweb.wpunj.edu/cohss/philosophy/FACULTY/mandik/papers/mrsc.PDF
  http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/./ftinterface~content=a713690498~fulltext=713240930
  http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/index/7F2MCHYKXHKAJ5LG.pdf
  http://www.informaworld.com/index/7F2MCHYKXHKAJ5LG.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/routledg/cphp/2001/00000014/00000002/art00003
  
• Pete Mandik (forthcoming). The Neural Accomplishment of Objectivity.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Philosophical tradition contains two major lines of thought concerning the relative difficulty of the notions of objectivity and subjectivity. One tradition, which we might characterize as
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://testweb.wpunj.edu/cohss/philosophy/FACULTY/mandik/papers/nao.pdf
  
• Pete Mandik (forthcoming). The neurophilosophy of subjectivity.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The so-called subjectivity of conscious experience is central to much recent work in the philosophy of mind. Subjectivity is the alleged property of consciousness whereby one can know what it is like to have certain conscious states only if one has undergone such states oneself. I review neurophilosophical work on consciousness and concepts pertinent to this claim and argue that subjectivity eliminativism is at least as well supported, if not more supported, than subjectivity reductionism
• Ron McClamrock (1992). Irreducibility and subjectivity.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: ...the problem of...how cognition...is possible at all...can never be answered on the basis of a prior knowledge of the transcendent [i.e. the external, spatio-temporal, empirical]...no matter whence the knowledge or the judgments are borrowed, not even if they are taken from the exact sciences.... It will not do to draw conclusions from existences of which one knows but which one cannot "see". "Seeing" does not lend itself to demonstration or deduction. [Husserl 1964a, pp. 2-3]
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/tx03234k78335152/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/TX03234K78335152.pdf
  
• Thomas Metzinger (2004). The subjectivity of subjective experience: A representationalist analysis of the first-person perspective.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Before one can even begin to model consciousness and what exactly it means that it is a subjective phenomenon one needs a theory about what a first-person perspective really is. This theory has to be conceptually convincing, empirically plausible and, most of all, open to new developments. The chosen conceptual framework must be able to accommodate scientific progress. Its ba- sic assumptions have to be plastic as it were, so that new details and empirical data can continuously be fed into the theoretical model as it grows and becomes more refined. This paper makes an attempt at sketching the outlines of such a theory, offering a representationalist analysis of the phenomenal first-person perspective. Three phenomenal target properties are centrally relevant:
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://sammelpunkt.philo.at:8080/archive/00000267/
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/metzinger00subjectivity.html
  http://sammelpunkt.philo.at:8080/archive/00000267/01/2000c.pdf
  http://lgxserver.uniba.it/lei/ai/networks/04/metzinger_engl.pdf
  http://lgxserve.ciseca.uniba.it/lei/ai/networks/04/metzinger_engl.pdf
  http://www.philosophie.uni-mainz.de/metzinger/publikationen/2000c.pdf
  http://cogprints.org/1358/00/The_Subjectivity_of_Subjective_Experience.pdf
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?id=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:1358
  http://www.jsmf.org/meetings/2003/nov/The Subjectivity of Subjective Experience.pdf
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:1358
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00001358/00/The_Subjectivity_of_Subjective_Experience.pdf
  http://www.philosophie.uni-mainz.de/metzinger/publikationen/The Subjectivity of Subjective Experience Revised Version networks 2004.pdf
  
• Ana Pasztor (1998). Subjective experience divided and conquered.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.cs.fiu.edu/~pasztora/candc/div8.ps
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/pasztor98subjective.html
  http://www.cs.fiu.edu/~pasztora/candc/c&c-abstract.pdf
  http://www.cs.fiu.edu/scspage/professor/Pasztor/philosophy/subjective.html
  
• Pär Sundström (2002). Nagel's case against physicalism.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://ej.lib.cbs.dk/index.php/sats/article/viewArticle/392
  

The Explanatory Gap

• Ansgar Beckermann (2000). The perennial problem of the reductive explainability of phenomenal consciousness: C. D. broad on the explanatory gap.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: At the start of the 20th century the question of whether life could be explained in purely me- chanical terms was as hotly debated as the mind-body problem is today. Two factions opposed each other: Biological mechanists claimed that the properties characteristic of living organisms (metabolism, perception, goal-directed behavior, procreation, morphogenesis) could be ex- plained mechanistically, in the way the behavior of a clock can be explained by the properties and the arrangement of its cogs, springs, and weights. Substantial vitalists, on the other hand, maintained that the explanation envisaged by the mechanists was impossible and that one had to postulate a special nonphysical substance in order to explain life
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.uni-bielefeld.de/(de)/philosophie/personen/beckermann/broad_ew.pdf
  http://www.uni-bielefeld.de/(en)/philosophie/personen/beckermann/broad_ew.pdf
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=2XWXfmDYTRIC&oi=fnd&pg=PA41&ots=Y7iTrSU1rF&sig=syguWsmufnr9lXK_AOR9Wcm8aNE
  
• David Bengtsson (2003). The nature of explanation in a theory of consciousness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.lucs.lu.se/ftp/pub/LUCS_Studies/LUCS106.pdf
  http://asip.lucs.lu.se/ftp/pub/LUCS_Studies/LUCS106.pdf
  http://asip.lucs.lu.se/Abstracts/LUCS_Studies/LUCS106.html
  
• Ned Block & Robert Stalnaker (1999). Conceptual analysis, dualism, and the explanatory gap.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The explanatory gap . Consciousness is a mystery. No one has ever given an account, even a highly speculative, hypothetical, and incomplete account of how a physical thing could have phenomenal states. (Nagel, 1974, Levine, 1983) Suppose that consciousness is identical to a property of the brain, say activity in the pyramidal cells of layer 5 of the cortex involving reverberatory circuits from cortical layer 6 to the thalamus and back to layers 4 and 6,as Crick and Koch have suggested for visual consciousness. (See Crick (1994).) Still, that identity itself calls out for explanation! Proponents of an explanatory gap disagree about whether the gap is permanent. Some (e.g. Nagel, 1974) say that we are like the scientifically naive person who is told that matter = energy, but does not have the concepts required to make sense of the idea. If we can acquire these concepts, the gap is closable. Others say the gap is uncloseable because of our cognitive limitations. (McGinn, 1991) Still others say that the gap is a consequence of the fundamental nature of consciousness
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8108(199901)108:1<1:CADATE>2.0.CO;2-T
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8108(199901)108:1<1:CADATE>2.0.CO;2-T
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2998259.pdf
  
• Alex Byrne (online). Tye on color and the explanatory gap.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: It will not have escaped notice that the defendant in this afternoon
• Peter Carruthers (2004). Reductive explanation and the "explanatory gap".   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Can phenomenal consciousness be given a reductive natural explanation? Exponents of an
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.philosophy.umd.edu/Faculty/pcarruthers/Reductive-explanation.htm
  
• David J. Chalmers (2006). Phenomenal concepts and the explanatory gap.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Confronted with the apparent explanatory gap between physical processes and consciousness, there are many possible reactions. Some deny that any explanatory gap exists at all. Some hold that there is an explanatory gap for now, but that it will eventually be closed. Some hold that the explanatory gap corresponds to an ontological gap in nature
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://consc.net/papers/pceg.html
  
• Austen Clark (online). I am Joe's explanatory gap.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: _tableau_ can be given a full and satisfying explanation, while others cannot. We can explain in a full and satisfying way why the water in the mug is identical with H2O, why its liquidity is identical with a state of its molecular bonds, and why its heat is identical with its molecules being in motion. But we cannot explain in the same way why the neural processes which Joe undergoes when he looks at the mug are such as to make the mug look green, and not red. The latter explanations have gaps
• Tim Crane (online). Cosmic hermeneutics vs emergence: The challenge of the explanatory gap.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This paper is a defence of Terence Horgan’s claim that any genuinely physicalist position must distinguish itself from (what has been traditionally known as) emergentism. I argue that physicalism is necessarily reductive in character -- it must either give a reductive account of apparently non-physical entities, or a reductive explanation of why there are non-physical entities. I argue that many recent ‘nonreductive’ physicalists do not do this, and that because of this they cannot adequately distinguish their view from emergentism. The conclusion is that this is the real challenge posed by Joseph Levine’s ‘explanatory gap’ argument: if physicalists cannot close the explanatory gap in Levine’s preferred way, they must find some other way to do it. Otherwise their view is indistinguishable from emergentism
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://web.mac.com/cranetim/Tims_website/Online_papers_files/Explanatory gap.pdf
  
• Esa Diaz-Leon (online). Can phenomenal concepts explain the explanatory gap?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: One of the most important arguments against physicalism is the so-called conceivability argument. Intuitively, this argument claims that since certain statements concerning the separation of the physical and the phenomenal are conceivable, they are possible. This inference from conceivability to possibility has been challenged in numerous ways. One of these ways is the so-called phenomenal concept strategy, which has become one of the main strategies against the conceivability argument. David Chalmers says it “is perhaps the most attractive option for a physicalist to take in responding to the problem of consciousness”.2 Certainly, in the recent years, a multitude of proposals of that sort have been proposed and developed.3 However, Chalmers (2006) has recently argued that no version of the phenomenal concept strategy can succeed. In what follows, I will examine his argument for that conclusion, and I will argue that it is not sound. I will conclude that he has not posed any serious problem for the phenomenal concept strategy to succeed..
• Brie Gertler (2001). The explanatory gap is not an illusion: A reply to Michael Tye.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The claim that there is an explanatory gap between physical and phenomenal properties is perhaps the leading current challenge to materialist views about the mind. Tye tries to block this challenge, not by providing an explanation to bridge the gap but by denying that phenomenalphysical identities introduce an explanatory gap. Since an explanatory gap exists only if there is something unexplained that needs explaining, and something needs explaining only if it can be explained (whether or not it lies within the power of human-beings to explain it), there is no gap. (Tye ????, p. ???) Tyes strategy differs crucially from the claim that identities never stand in need of explanation because they constitute ultimate explanations; for he allows that identities such as water = H?O are explainable. Unlike WATER and H?O, which are descriptive concepts, phenomenal concepts are perspectival and hence irreducible to descriptive concepts, according to Tye. The fact that something picked out by a perspectival concept is identical to something picked out by a non-perspectival concept cannot be explained.1 So, he concludes, phenomenalphysical identities need not be explained
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/110/439/689
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3093652.pdf
  
• Franz-Peter Griesmaier (2003). On explaining phenomenal consciousness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/index/L0AMV10XPF60V2HJ.pdf
  http://www.informaworld.com/index/L0AMV10XPF60V2HJ.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/tandf/teta/2003/00000015/00000002/art00008
  
• Gilbert Harman (online). Explaining an explanatory gap.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Discussions of the mind-body problem often refer to an
• C. L. Hardin (1992). Physiology, phenomenology, and Spinoza's true colors.   (More)
• Stevan Harnad (1994). Why and how we are not zombies.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: A robot that is functionally indistinguishable from us may or may not be a mindless Zombie. There will never be any way to know, yet its functional principles will be as close as we can ever get to explaining the mind
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/1601/00/harnad95.zombies.html
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00001601/
  http://cogprints.soton.ac.uk/documents/disk0/00/00/16/01/
  http://eprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/3347/01/harnad95.zombies.html
  http://cogsci.soton.ac.uk/harnad/Papers/Harnad/harnad95.zombies.html
  http://cogsci.soton.ac.uk/~harnad/Papers/Harnad/harnad95.zombies.html
  http://www.ecs.soton.ac.uk/~harnad/Papers/Harnad/harnad95.zombies.html
  http://eprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00003347/01/harnad95.zombies.html
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00001601/00/harnad95.zombies.html
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?id=oai:eprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk:3347
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:1601
  
• Valerie Gray Hardcastle (1997). Why science is important for philosophy.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Levine (1997) claims that Locating Consciousness (1995) does not seriously address the problem of the explanatory gap; instead it merely provides lots of data. Here I argue that, contrary to the intuitions of some philosophers, the best remedy for our gaps in explanation and understanding is in fact through empirical investigation
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://psycprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000544/01/psyc.97.8.08.locating-consciousness.5.hardcastle.xml
  
• Ted Honderich (2000). Consciousness and inner tubes.   (More)
• J. P. Kline (1998). Another opening in the explanatory gap.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/10538100/1998/00000007/00000002/art90344
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/ap/cc/1998/00000007/00000002/art00344
  
• Joseph Levine (1983). Materialism and qualia: The explanatory gap.   (More)
• J. M. Musacchio (2002). Dissolving the explanatory gap: Neurobiological differences between phenomenal and propositional knowledge.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The explanatory gap and theknowledge argument are rooted in the conflationof propositional and phenomenal knowledge. Thebasic knowledge argument is based on theconsideration that ``physical information'' aboutthe nervous system is unable to provide theknowledge of a ``color experience'' (Jackson,1982). The implication is that physicalism isincomplete or false because it leaves somethingunexplained. The problem with Jackson'sargument is that physical information has theform of highly symbolic propositional knowledgewhereas phenomenal knowledge consists in innateneurophysiological processes. In addition totheir fundamental epistemological differences,clinical, anatomical, pathological and brainimaging studies demonstrate that phenomenal andpropositional knowledge are fundamentallydifferent neurobiological processes. Propositional knowledge is phylogeneticallynew, highly symbolic, culturally acquired,exclusively human and expressible in differentnatural and artificial languages. By contrast,phenomenal knowledge (i.e.: knowingwhat-it-is-like to see a color) consists inqualitative experiences and phenomenal conceptsthat provide an internal, language-independentreference to the properties of objects and theneeds of the organism. Language andpropositional knowledge are exclusively humanattributes implemented in specific regions ofthe dominant hemisphere. This contrastssharply with the phylogenicallysensory areas that are common to animals andhumans, which implement qualitativeexperiences. Experiences are hard-wiredneurobiological processes that can neither betransmitted nor re-created through thesymbolism of propositions. Thus, I concludethat the fallacy in the explanatory gap and inthe knowledge argument is a fallacy ofequivocation that results from ignoringfundamental neurobiological differences betweenphenomenal and propositional knowledge
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/l8403wt023670q48/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=459118&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/L8403WT023670Q48.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/bram/2002/00000003/00000003/00459118
  
• Yujin Nagasawa (web). Formulating the explanatory gap.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The American Philosophical Association Newsletter on Philosophy and Computers. Harman
• Ram Neta (2004). Skepticism, abductivism, and the explanatory gap.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=QfAK39JN4tAC&oi=fnd&pg=PA296&ots=NWxVLQcSXv&sig=knMNPCvc5ZQMCNwvOsMCk55t3Lo
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/j.1533-6077.2004.00032.x/abs/
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1533-6077.2004.00032.x
  
• David Papineau (1998). Mind the gap.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: On the first page of The Problem of Consciousness (1991), Colin McGinn asks "How is it possible for conscious states to depend on brain states? How can technicolour phenomenology arise from soggy grey matter?" Many philosophers feel that questions like these pose an unanswerable challenge to physicalism. They argue that there is no way of bridging the "explanatory gap" between the material brain and the lived world of conscious experience (Levine, 1983), and that physicalism about the mind can therefore provide no answer to the "hard problem" of why brains give rise to consciousness (Chalmers, 1996)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.kcl.ac.uk/ip/davidpapineau/Staff/Papineau/OnlinePapers/MindtheGap.html
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0029-4624(1998)32<373:MTG>2.0.CO;2-8
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2676154.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/nous/1998/00000032/A0020s12/art00124
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/nous/1998/00000032/A0120s12/art00124
  
• Thomas W. Polger & Kenneth J. Sufka (ms). Closing the gap on pain.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: A widely accepted theory holds that emotional experiences occur mainly in a part of the human brain called the amygdala. A different theory asserts that color sensation is located in a small subpart of the visual cortex called V4. If these theories are correct, or even approximately correct, then they are remarkable advances toward a scientific explanation of human conscious experience. Yet even understanding the claims of such theories
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://homepages.uc.edu/~polgertw/PolgerSufka-ClosingGapPain.pdf
  
• Thomas W. Polger & Robert B. Skipper (online). Naturalism, explanation, and identity.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.artsci.wustl.edu/~pnp/Papers/polger2004a.pdf
  http://homepages.uc.edu/~polgertw/PolgerSkipper-NEI.pdf
  http://drrob.typepad.com/hpb_etc/files/PolgerSkipper-NEI.pdf
  
• Karol Polcyn (2006). Phenomenal consciousness and the explanatory gap.   (More)
• Philip Robbins & Anthony I. Jack (2006). The phenomenal stance.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Cognitive science is shamelessly materialistic. It maintains that human beings are nothing more than complex physical systems, ultimately and completely explicable in mechanistic terms. But this conception of humanity does not ?t well with common sense. To think of the creatures we spend much of our day loving, hating, admiring, resenting, comparing ourselves to, trying to understand, blaming, and thanking -- to think of them as mere mechanisms seems at best counterintuitive and unhelpful. More often it may strike us as ludicrous, or even abhorrent. We are
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/yk1782nu45536582/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/YK1782NU45536582.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/phil/2006/00000127/00000001/00001730
  
• Michael Silberstein (2002). Reductive physicalism and the explanatory gap: A dilemma.   (More)
• Par Sundstrom (2007). Colour and consciousness: Untying the metaphysical knot.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/u645h20010108131/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/U645H20010108131.pdf
  
• Robert van Gulick (2003). Maps, gaps, and traps.   (More)

`Hard' and `Easy' Problems

• Torin Alter (forthcoming). The hard problem of consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: As I type these words, cognitive systems in my brain engage in visual and auditory information processing. This processing is accompanied by subjective states of consciousness, such as the auditory experience of hearing the tap-tap-tap of the keyboard and the visual experience of seeing the letters appear on the screen. How does the brain's activity generate such experiences? Why should it be accompanied by conscious experience in the first place? This is the hard problem of consciousness
• Marcus Arvan (1998). Out with Qualia and in with Consciousness: Why the Hard Problem is a Myth.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The subjective features of conscious mental processes--as opposed to their physical causes and effects--cannot be captured by the purified form of thought suitable for dealing with the physical world that underlies appearances." (Nagel, in Dennett, 1991, p. 372)
• Ned Block (2002). The harder problem of consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: consciousness comes about as a result of irritating nervous tissue, is just as unaccountable as the appearance of Djin when Aladdin rubbed his lamp
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.doaj.org/doaj?func=abstract&id=8600&recNo=1&toc=1
  http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/faculty/block/papers/harder.htm
  http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/faculty/block/papers/HarderProblem.pdf
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-362X(200208)99:8<391:THPOC>2.0.CO;2-3
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3655621.pdf
  
• David Brooks (2000). How to solve the hard problem: A predictable inexplicability.   (More)
• David J. Chalmers (1995). Facing up to the problem of consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: To make progress on the problem of consciousness, we have to confront it directly. In this paper, I first isolate the truly hard part of the problem, separating it from more tractable parts and giving an account of why it is so difficult to explain. I critique some recent work that uses reductive methods to address consciousness, and argue that such methods inevitably fail to come to grips with the hardest part of the problem. Once this failure is recognized, the door to further progress is opened. In the second half of the paper, I argue that if we move to a new kind of nonreductive explanation, a naturalistic account of consciousness can be given. I put forward my own candidate for such an account: a nonreductive theory based on principles of structural coherence and organizational invariance, and a double-aspect theory of information
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/316/
  http://consc.net/papers/facing.html
  http://imprint.co.uk/chalmers.html
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/105313.html
  http://www.zynet.co.uk/imprint/chalmers.html
  http://cogprints.org/316/0/consciousness.html
  http://cogprints.org/316/00/consciousness.html
  http://human-nature.com/articles/chalmers.html
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/chalmers94facing.html
  http://www.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/papers/facing.ps
  http://www.blutner.de/philom/consc/chalmers_facing.pdf
  http://cogprints.soton.ac.uk/documents/disk0/00/00/03/16/
  http://www.ceptualinstitute.com/genre/baars/baarschalmers.htm
  http://amor.rz.hu-berlin.de/~h0998dgh/philom/consc/chalmers_facing.pdf
  http://amor.cms.hu-berlin.de/~h0998dgh/philom/consc/chalmers_facing.pdf
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000316/00/consciousness.html
  http://www.cs.colorado.edu/~mozer/courses/3702/readings/Chalmers1995.pdf
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:316
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=fGLRPNiWS5MC&oi=fnd&pg=PA224&ots=023ROBDOPM&sig=Xw_AyIOpX-FvGiVv3wXKIeSFiL4
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=fGLRPNiWS5MC&oi=fnd&pg=PA224&ots=023VQEIPQN&sig=ZFECPU54W0p9ATmCLIGATiyibpA
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=fGLRPNiWS5MC&oi=fnd&pg=PA224&ots=023TSCJULP&sig=x0vf1lMky6blsYkUL6WxHEQQLJc
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=fGLRPNiWS5MC&oi=fnd&pg=PA224&ots=023QMADOMK&sig=8mZomwkQ8fx_sa4VkbfpB97n3XM
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=fGLRPNiWS5MC&oi=fnd&pg=PA224&ots=023RUBISIQ&sig=O8DE2mqPWpkpUKaFS-BpZPSMUpE
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=fGLRPNiWS5MC&oi=fnd&pg=PA224&ots=023QSAHTNN&sig=BtH-9ZxW1XBPYQvB15617xu1gzw
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=fGLRPNiWS5MC&oi=fnd&pg=PA224&ots=023UODJSLO&sig=WKzdbsuVIMqN1qNqgmDdR3mrbd4
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=fGLRPNiWS5MC&oi=fnd&pg=PA224&ots=01cTSvCQOQ&sig=9q-OhlJjhyo0U0WxNSlRp_kivnU
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=fGLRPNiWS5MC&oi=fnd&pg=PA224&ots=01cTQvCWJR&sig=aaILUHrJmxZmg3ApAbBnRV53XAA
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=fGLRPNiWS5MC&oi=fnd&pg=PA224&ots=023PQzIQLJ&sig=o7ztlPajLbS1IuuXWBl5Duoyv8E
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=fGLRPNiWS5MC&oi=fnd&pg=PA224&ots=023TMCGXJJ&sig=51OBngXgHG7ta8rP8ZXgUhbXYE8
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/1995/00000002/00000003/653
  
• David J. Chalmers (1997). Moving forward on the problem of consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This paper is a response to the 26 commentaries on my paper "Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness". First, I respond to deflationary critiques, including those that argue that there is no "hard" problem of consciousness or that it can be accommodated within a materialist framework. Second, I respond to nonreductive critiques, including those that argue that the problems of consciousness are harder than I have suggested, or that my framework for addressing them is flawed. Third, I address positive proposals for addressing the problem of consciousness, including those based in neuroscience and cognitive science, phenomenology, physics, and fundamental psychophysical theories. Reply to: Baars, Bilodeau, Churchland, Clark, Clarke, Crick & Koch, Dennett, Hameroff & Penrose, Hardcastle, Hodgson, Hut & Shepard, Libet, Lowe, MacLennan, McGinn, Mills, O'Hara & Scutt, Price, Robinson, Rosenberg, Seager, Shear, Stapp, Varela, Velmans
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/317/
  http://cogprints.org/317/0/moving.html
  http://www.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/papers/moving.html
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000317/00/moving.html
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:317
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/1997/00000004/00000001/745
  
• David J. Chalmers (1995). The puzzle of conscious experience.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Conscious experience is at once the most familiar thing in the world and the most mysterious. There is nothing we know about more directly than consciousness, but it is extraordinarily hard to reconcile it with everything else we know. Why does it exist? What does it do? How could it possibly arise from neural processes in the brain? These questions are among the most intriguing in all of science
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/papers/puzzle.html
  http://philosophyfaculty.ucsd.edu/faculty/rarneson/Courses/chalmersphil1.pdf
  http://amor.rz.hu-berlin.de/~h0998dgh/color/The Puzzle of Conscious Experience.htm
  http://www.sciamdigital.com/gsp_qpdf.cfm?ISSUEID_CHAR=4E3B6963-3358-4EBE-9524-A7CFD3F328A&ARTICLEID_CHAR=7D19731A-1116-4FE8-9448-F88868253C7
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=8525350&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=pubmed&list_uids=8525350&dopt=Citation
  http://philosophy.ucsd.edu/faculty/rarneson/Courses/chalmersphil1.pdf
  
• David J. Chalmers (1998). The problems of consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This paper is an edited transcription of a talk at the 1997 Montreal symposium on "Consciousness at the Frontiers of Neuroscience". There's not much here that isn't said elsewhere, e.g. in "Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness" and "How Can We Construct a Science of Consciousness?"]]
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/papers/montreal.html
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=9709814&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/sites/entrez?db=pubmed&uid=9709814&cmd=showdetailview&indexed=google
  
• Axel Cleeremans (1998). The other hard problem: How to bridge the gap between subsymbolic and symbolic cognition.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The constructivist notion that features are purely functional is incompatible with the classical computational metaphor of mind. I suggest that the discontent expressed by Schyns, Goldstone and Thibaut about fixed-features theories of categorization reflects the growing impact of connectionism, and show how their perspective is similar to recent research on implicit learning, consciousness, and development. A hard problem remains, however: How to bridge the gap between subsymbolic and symbolic cognition
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://srsc.ulb.ac.be/axcWWW/papers/BBS-schyns98.html
  http://srsc.ulb.ac.be/axcwww/papers/pdf/98-C-on-SGT.pdf
  http://srsc.ulb.ac.be/axcWWW/papers/pdf/98-C-on-SGT.pdf
  http://srsc.ulb.ac.be/axcWWW/papers/pdf/98-C-on-SGT.pdf
  http://srsc-mac1.ulb.ac.be/axcWWW/papers/pdf/98-C-on-SGT.pdf
  http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=1&fid=30266&jid=BBS&volumeId=21&issueId=01&aid=30265
  http://www.journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0140525X98290108
  
• Daniel C. Dennett (2003). Explaining the "magic" of consciousness.   (More)
• Daniel C. Dennett (1996). Facing backwards on the problem of consciousness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://human-nature.com/articles/dennett.html
  http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/chalmers.htm
  http://www.zynet.co.uk/imprint/online/HP_dennett.html
  
• Mr Shan Gao (ms). Quantum, consciousness and panpsychism: A solution to the hard problem.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: We analyze the results and implications of the combination of quantum and consciousness in terms of the recent QSC analysis. The quantum effect of consciousness is first explored. We show that the consciousness of the observer can help to distinguish the nonorthogonal states under some condition, while the usual physical measuring device without consciousness can't. The result indicates that the causal efficacies of consciousness do exist when considering the basic quantum process. Based on this conclusion, we demonstrate that consciousness is not reducible or emergent, but a new fundamental property of matter. This provides a quantum basis for panpsychism. Furthermore, we argue that the conscious process is one kind of quantum computation process based on the analysis of consciousness time and combination problem. It is shown that a unified theory of matter and consciousness should include two parts: one is the complete quantum evolution of matter state, which includes the definite nonlinear evolution element introduced by consciousness, and the other is the psychophysical principle or corresponding principle between conscious content and matter state. Lastly, some experimental suggestions are presented to confirm the theoretical analysis of the paper
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/3489/1/qcp.pdf
  http://cogprints.org/3489/01/qcp.pdf
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00003489/
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:3489
  
• Jeffrey A. Gray (1998). Creeping up on the hard question of consciousness.   (More)
• Stevan Harnad (2000). Correlation vs. causality: How/why the mind-body problem is hard.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The Mind/Body Problem (M/BP) is about causation not correlation. And its solution (if there is one) will require a mechanism in which the mental component somehow manages to play a causal role of its own, rather than just supervening superflously on other, nonmental components that look, for all the world, as if they can do the full causal job perfectly well without it. Correlations confirm that M does indeed "supervene" on B, but causality is needed to show how/why M is not supererogatory; and that's the hard part
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://eprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00002602/
  http://cogprints.org/1617/0/harnad00.mind.humphrey.html
  http://cogprints.org/1617/00/harnad00.mind.humphrey.html
  http://cogprints.soton.ac.uk/documents/disk0/00/00/16/17/
  http://cogsci.soton.ac.uk/~harnad/Papers/Harnad/harnad00.mind.humphrey.html
  http://www.ecs.soton.ac.uk/~harnad/Papers/Harnad/harnad00.mind.humphrey.html
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00001617/00/harnad00.mind.humphrey.html
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?id=oai:eprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk:2602
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:1617
  
• Stevan Harnad (2001). Explaining the mind: Problems, problems.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Three of the books under review are about consciousness, one is about meaning, and one is about language, but the topics are inter-related, as we shall see. The reader may find it surprising to learn that it has lately become fashionable in cognitive science to call the problem of consciousness the "hard problem," and the problems of meaning and language (and brain function and behavior) the "easy problems." Everything is relative. The "easy problems" may be easier than the "hard one," but that certainly does not make them any easier than most other scientific problems
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/1623/00/bookrev.htm
  http://eprints.resist.ecs.soton.ac.uk/5943/
  http://cogsci.soton.ac.uk/~harnad/Tp/bookrev.htm
  http://www.ecs.soton.ac.uk/~harnad/Tp/bookrev.htm
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00001623/
  http://cogprints.soton.ac.uk/documents/disk0/00/00/16/23/
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?id=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:1623
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:1623
  
• Greg P. Hodes (2005). What would it "be like" to solve the hard problem?: Cognition, consciousness, and qualia zombies.   (More)
• Jakob Hohwy (2004). Evidence, explanation, and experience: On the harder problem of consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Creatures that have different physical realizations than human beings may or may not be conscious. Ned Block’s ‘harder problem of consciousness’ is that naturalistic phenomenal realists have no conception of a rational ground for belief that they have or have not discovered consciousness in such a creature. Drawing on the notion of inference to the best explanation, it appears the arguments to these conclusions beg the question and ignore that explanation may be a guide to discovery. Thus, best explanation can both validate an interpretation of the evidence and lead to the discovery of consciousness.
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/faculty/block/papers/Hohwy.pdf
  
• Daniel D. Hutto (2006). Turning hard problems on their heads.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Much of the dif?culty in assessing theories of consciousness stems from their advo- cates not supplying adequate or convincing characterisations of the phenomenon (or data) they hope to explain. Yet, to make any reasonable assessment this is precisely what is required, for it is not as if our
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/p7w7185087067kh1/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/P7W7185087067KH1.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/phen/2006/00000005/00000001/00009013
  
• Peter Lloyd (online). Berkeley revisited: The hard problem considered easy.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The philosophical mind-body problem, which Chalmers has named the 'Hard Problem', concerns the nature of the mind and the body. Physicalist approaches have been explored intensively in recent years but have brought us no consensual solution. Dualistic approaches have also been scrutinised since Descartes, but without consensual success. Mentalism has received little attention, yet it offers an elegantly simple solution to the hard problem
• Bruce J. MacLennan (1996). The elements of consciousness and their neurodynamical correlates.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/50979.html
  ftp://cs.utk.edu/pub/maclennan/JCS2/JCS2.html
  http://www.cs.utk.edu/~mclennan/anon-ftp/JCS2/JCS2.html
  
• Pete Mandik (ms). An epistemological theory of consciousness?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This article tackles problems concerning the reduction of phenomenal consciousness to brain processes that arise in consideration of specifically epistemological properties that have been attributed to conscious experiences. In particular, various defenders of dualism and epiphenomenalism have argued for their positions by assuming special epistemic access to phenomenal consciousness. Many physicalists have reacted to such arguments by denying the epistemological premises. My aim in this paper is to take a different approach in opposing dualism and argue that when we correctly examine both the phenomenology and neural correlates of phenomenal consciousness we will see that granting the epistemological premises of special access are the best hope for a scientific study of consciousness. I argue that essential features of consciousness involve both their knowability by the subject of experience as well as their egocentricity, that is, their knowability by the subject as belonging to the subject. I articulate a neuroscientifically informed theory of phenomenal consciousness
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.petemandik.com/philosophy/papers/epistemconsc.pdf
  http://testweb.wpunj.edu/cohss/philosophy/FACULTY/mandik/papers/etc.pdf
  
• J. McFadden (2002). The conscious electromagnetic information (cemi) field theory: The hard problem made easy?   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/2002/00000009/00000008/1298
  
• Brian P. McLaughlin (2003). A naturalist-phenomenal realist response to Block's harder problem.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: widely held commitments: to phenomenal realism and to naturalism. Phenomenal realism is the view that (a) we are phenomenally consciousness, and that (b) there is no a priori or armchair sufficient condition for phenomenal consciousness that can be stated (non- circularly) in nonphenomenal terms (p.392).^1,2 Block points out that while phenomenal realists reject
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://philosophy.rutgers.edu/FACSTAFF/BIOS/PAPERS/mclaughlin-harder_problem.pdf
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/1533-6077.00011
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1533-6077.00011
  
• Mark Pharoah (ms). 'Thing-in-itself' - Exploring the relationship between phenomenal experience and the phenomenon of consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: If one were to provide a reductive explanation of phenomenal experience one would explain why there could be a phenomenal experience that identifies itself as an individual that possesses ‘consciousness’. Although not a requirement of reduction, such an explanation would be consistent with our understanding of evolution and, consequently, explain the physical origins and purpose of phenomenal experience. However, this explanation would not explain why a particular conscious individual identifies itself as itself rather than any other individual - Why is ‘my’ consciousness ‘mine’ (materially, or otherwise, irrespective of experiential detail and content) rather than anyone else? What is consciousness outside of phenomenal experience and phenomenal conceptualization? In this paper, I argue that the indeterminacy of quantum mechanics makes it a suitable candidate for exploring the answers to these questions.
• Thomas W. Polger & Owen J. Flanagan (online). Explaining the evolution of consciousness: The other hard problem.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Recently some philosophers interested in consciousness have begun to turn their attention to the question of what evolutionary advantages, if any, being conscious might confer on an organism. The issue has been pressed in recent dicussions involving David Chalmers, Todd Moody, Owen Flanagan and Thomas Polger, Daniel Dennett, and others. The purpose of this essay is to consider some of the problems that face anyone who wants to give an evolutionary explanation of consciousness. We begin by framing the problem in the context of some current debates. Then we
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://oz.uc.edu/~polgertw/Polger-Rethinking.pdf
  http://homepages.uc.edu/~polgertw/Polger-SSPP1997.pdf
  http://homepages.uc.edu/~polgertw/Polger-Rethinking.pdf
  
• Teed Rockwell (ms). The hard problem is dead: Long live the hard problem.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: I have assumed that consciousness exists, and that to redefine the problem as that of explaining how certain cognitive and behavioral functions are performed is unacceptable. . . .Like many people (materialists and dualists alike), I find this premise obvious, although I can no more "prove" it than I can prove that I am conscious. . . .there is no denying that such arguments - on either side - ultimately come down to a bedrock of intuition at some point. (Chalmers undated)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://users.california.com/~mcmf/hardproblem.html
  
• Henry P. Stapp (1997). Science of consciousness and the hard problem.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Quantum theory can be regarded as a rationally coherent theory of the interaction of mind and matter and it allows our conscious thoughts to play a causally e cacious and necessary role in brain dynamics It therefore provides a natural basis created by scientists for the science of consciousness As an illustration it is explained how the interaction of brain and consciousness can speed up brain processing and thereby enhance the survival prospects of conscious organisms as compared to similar organisms that lack consciousness As a second illustration it is explained how within the quantum framework the consciously experi enced I directs the actions of a human being It is concluded that contemporary science already has an adequate framework for incorporat ing causally e cacious experiential events into the physical universe in a manner that puts the neural correlates of consciousness into the theory in a well de ned way explains in principle how the e ects of consciousness per se can enhance the survival prospects of organisms that possess it allows this survival e ect to feed into phylogenetic de velopment and explains how the consciously experienced I can direct human behaviour..
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www-physics.lbl.gov/~stapp/38621.txt
  https://www.osti.gov/dublincore/gpo/product.biblio.jsp?osti_id=269006
  http://www.csa.com/partners/viewrecord.php?requester=gs&collection=TRD&recid=N9711596AH
  
• Henry P. Stapp (1995). The hard problem: A quantum approach.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/156538.html
  http://www-physics.lbl.gov/~stapp/37163new.ps
  http://www-physics.lbl.gov/~stapp/37163new.txt
  http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/1995quant.ph..5023S
  
• Nigel J. T. Thomas (2001). Color realism: Toward a solution to the "hard problem".   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This article was written as a commentary on a target article by Peter W. Ross entitled "The Location Problem for Color Subjectivism" [Consciousness and Cognition 10(1), 42-58 (2001)], and is published together with it, and with other commentaries and Ross's reply. If you or your library have the necessary subscription you can get PDF versions of the target article, all the commentaries, and Ross's reply to the commentaries here. However, I do not think that it is by any means essential for you to have read Ross's piece in order to understand this one. Ross defends a view called "color physicalism" or color realism that holds (simplifying somewhat) that colors are real physical properties (in typical cases, spectral reflectances of object surfaces). This is in opposition to what is probably a more widely held "subjectivist" view of color, holding that color qualities really exist only in the mind. In my commentary I suggest that a realist view of qualitative properties, such as Ross's, together with a direct, active view of perception, and a concept of "extended mind" (Clark & Chalmers, 1998) may provide the materials for a real solution to the notorious hard problem of consciousness. I sketch this solution in outline. - N.J.T.T
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/5020/
  http://eprints.assc.caltech.edu/318/
  http://cogprints.org/3749/1/colreal.htm
  http://cogprints.org/5020/1/colreal.htm
  http://cogprints.org/3749/01/colreal.htm
  http://www.imagery-imagination.com/col-real.pdf
  http://www.imagery-imagination.com/col-real.htm
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00003749/01/colreal.htm
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=11273636&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/sites/entrez?db=pubmed&uid=11273636&cmd=showdetailview&indexed=google
  http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S1053810000904847
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/10538100/2001/00000010/00000001/art90484
  
• Prof Max Velmans (2008). How to separate conceptual issues from empirical ones in the study of consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Modern consciousness studies are in a healthy state, with many progressive empirical programmes in cognitive science, neuroscience, and related sciences, using relatively conventional third-person research methods. However not all the problems of consciousness can be resolved in this way. These problems may be grouped into problems that require empirical advance, those that require theoretical advance, and those that require a re-examination of some of our pre-theoretical assumptions. I give examples of these, and focus on two problems — what consciousness is, and what consciousness does — that requires all three. In this, careful attention to conscious phenomenology and finding an appropriate way to relate first-person evidence to third-person evidence appears to be central to progress. But we may also need to re-examine what we take to be ‘‘natural facts’’ about the world, and how we can know them. The same appears to be true for a trans-cultural understanding of consciousness that combines classical Indian phenomenological methods with the third-person methods of Western science.
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/5380/1/Conceptual_vs_emprical_issues.pdf
  
• Max Velmans (1995). The relation of consciousness to the material world.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Many of the arguments about how to address the hard versus the easy questions of consciousness put by Chalmers (1995) are similar to ones I have developed in Velmans (1991a,b; 1993a). This includes the multiplicity of mind/body problems, the limits of functional explanation, the need for a nonreductionist approach, and the notion that consciousness may be related to neural/physical representation via a dual-aspect theory of information. But there are also differences. Unlike Chalmers I argue for the use of neutral information processing language for functional accounts rather than the term "awareness." I do not agree that functional equivalence cannot be extricated from phenomenal equivalence, and suggest a hypothetical experiment for doing so - using a cortical implant for blindsight. I argue that not all information has phenomenal accompaniments, and introduce a different form of dual-aspect theory involving "psychological complementarity." I also suggest that the hard problem posed by "qualia" has its origin in a misdescription of everyday experience implicit in dualism
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/246/0/velman11.html
  http://cogprints.org/246/00/velman11.html
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000246/
  http://cogprints.soton.ac.uk/documents/disk0/00/00/02/46/
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000246/00/velman11.html
  http://cogprints.soton.ac.uk/documents/disk0/00/00/02/46/cog00000246-00/velman11.html
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:246
  
• Richard Warner (1996). Facing ourselves: Incorrigibility and the mind-body problem.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/1996/00000003/00000003/709
  
• Ken Wilber (online). The hard problem and integral psychology.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Although far from unanimous, there seems to be a general consensus that neither mind nor brain can be reduced without remainder to the other. This essay argues that indeed both mind and brain need to be included in a nonreductionistic way in any genuinely integral theory of consciousness. In order to facilitate such integration, this essay presents the results of an extensive cross-cultural literature search on the "mind" side of the equation, suggesting that the mental phenomena that need to be considered in any integral theory include developmental levels or waves of consciousness, developmental lines or streams of consciousness, states of consciousness, and the self (or self-system). A "master template" of these various phenomena, culled from over one-hundred psychological systems East and West, is presented. It is suggested that this master template represents a general summary of the "mind" side of the brain-mind integration. The essay concludes with reflections on the "hard problem," or how the mind-side can be integrated with the brain-side to generate a more integral theory of consciousness
• Wayne Wright (2007). Explanation and the hard problem.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This paper argues that the form of explanation at issue in the hard problem of consciousness is scientifically irrelevant, despite appearances to the contrary. In particular, it is argued that the
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.mindstuff.net/ExplanHardProb_WTW.doc
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/0434452x17nt11p3/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/w186042338744821/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/0434452X17NT11P3.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/W186042338744821.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/phil/2007/00000132/00000002/00002220
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/phil/2007/00000134/00000003/00009089
  

Cognitive Closure

• Sophie R. Allen (online). A space oddity: McGinn on consciousness and space.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/2006/00000013/00000004/art00005
  
• Anthony L. Brueckner & E. Beroukhim (2003). McGinn on consciousness and the mind-body problem.   (More)
• David de Leon (1995). The limits of thought and the mind-body problem.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This paper gives an account of Colin McGinn's essay: "Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem?". McGinn's answer to his own essay title is that the problem is forever beyond us due to the particular nature of our cognitive abilities.The present author offers a number of criticisms of the arguments which support this conclusion
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/367/00/LUCS42.pdf
  http://www.lucs.lu.se/ftp/pub/LUCS_Studies/LUCS42.pdf
  http://www.lucs.lu.se/Abstracts/LUCS_Studies/LUCS42.html
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000367/00/LUCS42.pdf
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:367
  http://lu-research.lub.lu.se/php/gateway.php?who=lr&method=getfile&file=archive/00009266/
  
• Marc F. Krellenstein (1995). Unsolvable problems, visual imagery, and explanatory satisfaction.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: It has been suggested that certain problems may be unsolvable because of the mind's cognitive structure, but we may wonder what problems, and exactly why. The ultimate origin of the universe and the mind-body problem seem to be two such problems. As to why, Colin McGinn has argued that the mind-body problem is unsolvable because any theoretical concepts about the brain will be observation-based and unable to connect to unobservable subjective experience. McGinn's argument suggests a requirement of imagability -- an observation basis -- for physical causal explanation that cannot be met for either of these problems. Acausal descriptions may be possible but not the causal analyses that provide the greatest explanatory satisfaction, a psychological phenomenon that seems tied to the strength of the underlying observation basis but is affected by other factors as well
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/1957/0/temp.txt
  http://cogprints.org/1957/00/temp.txt
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00001957/
  http://cogprints.soton.ac.uk/documents/disk0/00/00/19/57/
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:1957
  
• Colin McGinn (1995). Consciousness and space.   (More)
• Colin McGinn (2003). What constitutes the mind-body problem.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1533-6077.00010
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/oso/870087/2004/00000001/00000001/art00002
  http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/120710655/PDFSTART
  

Conceptual Analysis and A Priori Entailment

• Ned Block & Robert Stalnaker (1999). Conceptual analysis, dualism, and the explanatory gap.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The explanatory gap . Consciousness is a mystery. No one has ever given an account, even a highly speculative, hypothetical, and incomplete account of how a physical thing could have phenomenal states. (Nagel, 1974, Levine, 1983) Suppose that consciousness is identical to a property of the brain, say activity in the pyramidal cells of layer 5 of the cortex involving reverberatory circuits from cortical layer 6 to the thalamus and back to layers 4 and 6,as Crick and Koch have suggested for visual consciousness. (See Crick (1994).) Still, that identity itself calls out for explanation! Proponents of an explanatory gap disagree about whether the gap is permanent. Some (e.g. Nagel, 1974) say that we are like the scientifically naive person who is told that matter = energy, but does not have the concepts required to make sense of the idea. If we can acquire these concepts, the gap is closable. Others say the gap is uncloseable because of our cognitive limitations. (McGinn, 1991) Still others say that the gap is a consequence of the fundamental nature of consciousness
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8108(199901)108:1<1:CADATE>2.0.CO;2-T
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8108(199901)108:1<1:CADATE>2.0.CO;2-T
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2998259.pdf
  
• Peter Carruthers (2004). Reductive explanation and the "explanatory gap".   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Can phenomenal consciousness be given a reductive natural explanation? Exponents of an
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.philosophy.umd.edu/Faculty/pcarruthers/Reductive-explanation.htm
  
• David J. Chalmers & Frank Jackson (2001). Conceptual analysis and reductive explanation.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Is conceptual analysis required for reductive explanation? If there is no a priori entailment from microphysical truths to phenomenal truths, does reductive explanation of the phenomenal fail? We say yes (Chalmers 1996; Jackson 1994, 1998). Ned Block and Robert Stalnaker say no (Block and Stalnaker 1999)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://consc.net/papers/analysis.html
  http://www.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/papers/analysis.html
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8108(200107)110:3<315:CAARE>2.0.CO;2-Y
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8108(200107)110:3<315:CAARE>2.0.CO;2-Y
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2693648.pdf
  http://philreview.dukejournals.org/cgi/content/citation/110/3/315
  http://philreview.dukejournals.org/cgi/reprint/110/3/315
  
• Tim Crane (online). Cosmic hermeneutics vs emergence: The challenge of the explanatory gap.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This paper is a defence of Terence Horgan’s claim that any genuinely physicalist position must distinguish itself from (what has been traditionally known as) emergentism. I argue that physicalism is necessarily reductive in character -- it must either give a reductive account of apparently non-physical entities, or a reductive explanation of why there are non-physical entities. I argue that many recent ‘nonreductive’ physicalists do not do this, and that because of this they cannot adequately distinguish their view from emergentism. The conclusion is that this is the real challenge posed by Joseph Levine’s ‘explanatory gap’ argument: if physicalists cannot close the explanatory gap in Levine’s preferred way, they must find some other way to do it. Otherwise their view is indistinguishable from emergentism
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://web.mac.com/cranetim/Tims_website/Online_papers_files/Explanatory gap.pdf
  
• Brie Gertler (2002). Explanatory reduction, conceptual analysis, and conceivability arguments about the mind.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The current stand-off between reductionists and anti-reductionists about the mental has sparked a long-overdue reexamination of key issues in philosophi- cal methodology.1 The resulting debate promises to advance our understand- ing of how empirical discoveries bear on the numerous philosophical problems which involve the analysis or reduction of kinds. The parties to this debate disagree about how, and to what extent, conceptual facts contribute to justify- ing explanatory reductions
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/1468-0068.00359
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1468-0068.00359
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/nous/2002/00000036/00000001/art00359
  
• Frank Jackson (2003). From H2O to water: The relevance to A Priori passage.   (More)
• Frank Jackson (2005). The Case for a Priori Physicalism.   (More)
• William G. Lycan (online). Serious metaphysics: Frank Jackson's defense of conceptual analysis.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: According to Stich and Weinberg (2001, p. 637), Frank Jackson
• Thomas W. Polger (2008). H2O, 'water', and transparent reduction.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Do facts about water have a priori, transparent, reductive explanations in terms of microphysics? Ned Block and Robert Stalnaker hold that they do not. David Chalmers and Frank Jackson hold that they do. In this paper I argue that Chalmers
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/n237pk00h2825166/fulltext.pdf
  

Explaining Consciousness, Misc

• Andrew Brook (2005). Making consciousness safe for neuroscience.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=ZS0eo39XOs8C&oi=fnd&pg=PA397&ots=mEvk0HqwLv&sig=-cVT4mFAkI52dc3K2fIIGS_dGVc
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=bpjAkBrkmu4C&oi=fnd&pg=RA1-PA397&ots=JljQlxL2Wv&sig=i_Srpcus4H70uo65_ebF6OR3pjo
  
• Patricia S. Churchland (1998). What Should We Expect From a Theory of Consciousness?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Within the domain of philosophy, it is not unusual to hear the claim that most questions about the nature of consciousness are essentially and absolutely beyond the scope of science, no matter how science may develop in the twenty-first century. Some things, it is pointed out, we shall never _ever_ understand, and consciousness is one of them (Vendler 1994, Swinburne 1994, McGinn 1989, Nagel 1994, Warner 1994). One line of reasoning assumes that consciousness is the manifestation of a distinctly nonphysical thing, and hence has no physical properties that might be explored by techniques suitable to physical things. Dualism, as this view is known, is still to be found among those within the tradition of Kant and Hegel, as well as among some with religious convictions. Surprisingly, however, strenuous foot-dragging is evident even among philosophers of a materialist conviction. Indeed, one might say that it is the philosophical fashion of the 90's to pronounce consciousness unexplainable, and to find the explanatory aspirations of neurobiology to be faintly comic if not rather pitiful. The very word, "reductionism" has come to be used more or less synonymously with "benighted-scientism-run-amok", where scientistm apparently means "applying scientific techniques to domains where they are inapplicable." McGinn, perhaps the most unblushing of the naysayers, insists that we cannot expect even to make any headway on the problem. (p. 114) Ironically perhaps, here we are at a conference in honor of Dr. Herbert Jasper who was a great pioneer in moving neuroscience forward on this problem, and where results will be presented allegedly _showing_ additional progress on the problem. Because I am quite optimistic about future scientific progress on the nature of consciousness, my aim here, as a philosopher, is to address the most popular and influential of the skeptical arguments, and to explain why I find them unconvincing. Thus the overall form of the paper is negative, in the sense that I want to show why a set of naysaying arguments fail..
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=pubmed&list_uids=9709815&dopt=citation
  
• Austen Clark (online). How to respond to philosophers on raw feels.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: I address this talk to anyone who believes in the possibility of an informative empirical science about sensory qualities. Potentially this is a large audience. By "sensory quality" I mean those qualities manifest in various sensory experiences: color, taste, smell, touch, pain, and so on. We should include sensory modalities humans do not share, such as electro-reception in fish, echolocation in bats, or the skylight compass in birds. Those pursuing empirical science about this large domain might pursue it in the halls of experimental psychology, psycho-physics, psychometrics, psycho-physiology, sensory physiology, neuroscience, neuro-biology, comparative psychology, neuro-anatomy, and so on and on. These days even molecular genetics has kicked in with some notable recent contributions to the sequencing of genes for photopigments and for olfactory receptors. But to all those investigators in all those halls I bring bad news. Your discipline is _a priori_ impossible. Philosophers whom you do not know have uncovered _a priori_ proofs that empirical investigation which proceeds along the lines currently underway, or which will proceed along lines that are currently _imaginable_, does not, will not, and cannot explain the sensory qualities of experience. Or at least so they say. You might as well give up now
• Nicholas Humphrey (2002). Thinking about feeling.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/2045/0/CompanionEssay.htm
  http://cogprints.org/2045/00/CompanionEssay.htm
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00002045/
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00002045/00/CompanionEssay.htm
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:2045
  
• Georgi Lazarov (online). Materialism and the problem of consciousness: The aesthesionomic approach.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00003161/
  http://cogprints.org/3161/1/The_Aesthesionomic_Approach.htm
  http://cogprints.org/3161/01/The_Aesthesionomic_Approach.htm
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00003161/01/The_Aesthesionomic_Approach.htm
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:3161
  
• Barbara Montero (2004). Consciousness is puzzling but not paradoxical.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2004.tb00392.x
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/ips/ppr/2004/00000069/00000001/art00011
  http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/119921434/PDFSTART
  
• Todd C. Moody (2003). Consciousness and complexity.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.doaj.org/abstract?id=120218&toc=y
  http://www.doaj.org/doaj?func=abstract&id=120218
  http://www.iscid.org/boards/ubb-get_topic-f-10-t-000065.html
  http://www.iscid.org/boards/ubb-get_topic-f-24-t-000005.html
  http://www.doaj.org/doaj?func=abstract&id=120218&recNo=4&toc=1
  http://www.iscid.org/papers/Moody_ConsciousnessComplexity_103103.pdf
  http://www.doaj.org/abstract?id=120218&year=2003&volume=2&issue=3&toc=y
  
• James R. Mensch (2000). An objective phenomenology: Husserl sees colors.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: David Chalmers expresses a general consensus when he writes that
• Vadim V. Vasilyev (2006). Brain and consciousness: Exits from the labyrinth.   (More)
• Max Velmans (2007). The co-evolution of matter and consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Theories about the evolution of consciousness relate in an intimate way to theories about the distribution of consciousness, which range from the view that only human beings are conscious to the view that all matter is in some sense conscious. Broadly speaking, such theories can be classified into discontinuity theories and continuity theories. Discontinuity theories propose that consciousness emerged only when material forms reached a given stage of evolution, but propose different criteria for the stage at which this occurred. Continuity theories argue that in some primal form, consciousness always accompanies matter and as matter evolved in form and complexity consciousness co-evolved, for example into the forms that we now recognise in human beings. Given our limited knowledge of the necessary and sufficient conditions for the presence of human consciousness in human brains, all options remain open. On balance however continuity theory appears to be more elegant than discontinuity theory.
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/6104/1/Evolution_of_consciousness_web.pdf
  

Consciousness and Materialism

The Knowledge Argument

• Torin Alter (1998). A limited defense of the knowledge argument.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/u837510838223657/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/U837510838223657.pdf
  
• Torin Alter (2006). Does representationalism undermine the knowledge argument?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The knowledge argument aims to refute physicalism, the view that the world is entirely physical. The argument first establishes the existence of facts (or truths or information) about consciousness that are not a priori deducible from the complete physical truth, and then infers the falsity of physicalism from this lack of deducibility. Frank Jackson (1982, 1986) gave the argument its classic formulation. But now he rejects the argument (Jackson 1998b, 2003, chapter 3 of this volume). On his view, it relies on a false conception of sensory experience, which should be replaced with representationalism (also known as intentionalism), the view that phenomenal states are just representational states. And he argues that mental representation is physically explicable
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/oso/pcapk/2007/00000001/00000001/art00005
  
• Torin Alter (online). The knowledge argument.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Frank Jackson first presented the Knowledge Argument (henceforth KA) in "Epiphenomenal Qualia" 1982). The KA is an argument against physicalism, the doctrine that (very roughly put) everything is physical. The general thrust of the KA is that physicalism errs by misconstruing or denying the existence of the subjective features of experience. Physicalists have given numerous responses, and the debate continues about whether the KA ultimately succeeds in refuting any or all forms of physicalism. Jackson himself has recently
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.as.ua.edu/philos/talter/The Knowledge Argument.pdf
  http://www.as.ua.edu/philos/talter/Overview of the knowledge argument.pdf
  
• Torin Alter (2007). The knowledge argument.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The knowledge argument aims to refute physicalism, the doctrine that the world is entirely physical. Physicalism (also known as materialism) is widely accepted in contemporary philosophy. But some doubt that phenomenal consciousness
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.as.ua.edu/philos/talter/Overview of the knowledge argument.pdf
  
• James T. Anderson (online). A simple refutation of the knowledge argument against physicalism.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: One of the most persuasive objections to the identity thesis
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://home.sandiego.edu/~janderso/research/Knowledge.html
  http://home.sandiego.edu/~janderso/research/KnowledgeAb.html
  
• István Aranyosi (2008). Review of Torin Alter and Sven Walter (eds.) Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge.   (More)
• Michael Beaton (2005). What RoboDennett still doesn't know.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The explicit aim of Daniel Dennett’s new paper ‘What RoboMary Knows’ is to show that Mary (the hypothetical colour-blind neuroscientist) will necessarily be able to come to know what it is like to see in colour, if she fully understands all the physical facts about colour vision. I believe we can establish that Dennett’s line of reasoning is flawed, but the flaw is not as simple as an equivocation on ‘knows’. Rather, it goes to the heart of functionalism and hinges on whether or not Dennett is correct to claim that there is ‘no fact of the matter’ about what subjective experience consists in.
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.cogs.susx.ac.uk/users/mjsb20/robodennett/RoboDennett.pdf
  http://www.informatics.sussex.ac.uk/users/mjsb20/robodennett/RoboDennett.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/2005/00000012/00000012/art00001
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/latest
  
• Alex Byrne (2006). Review of There's Something About Mary.   (More)
• Alex Byrne (2002). Something about Mary.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Jackson's black-and-white Mary teaches us that the propositional content of perception cannot be fully expressed in language
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://mit.edu/abyrne/www/SomethingAboutMary.pdf
  http://web.mit.edu/abyrne/www/SomethingAboutMary.pdf
  http://pellenes-shoshonensis.mit.edu/abyrne/www/SomethingAboutMary.pdf
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=yBiNGPmAd04C&oi=fnd&pg=PA123&ots=WeseODhlSZ&sig=pxUvnxNuWn5xt3cnEBixP_t1M4E
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com//content/rodopi/gps/2002/00000063/00000001/art00008
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/rodopi/gps/2002/00000063/00000001/art00008
  
• Yuri Cath (2009). The ability hypothesis and the new knowledge-how.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/121680921/PDFSTART
  
• David J. Chalmers (2004). Phenomenal concepts and the knowledge argument.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: *[[This paper is largely based on material in other papers. The first three sections and the appendix are drawn with minor modifications from Chalmers 2002c (which explores issues about phenomenal concepts and beliefs in much more depth, mostly independently of questions about materialism). The main ideas of the last three sections are drawn from Chalmers 1996, 1999, and 2002a, although with considerable revision and elaboration. ]]
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/papers/knowledge.html
  
• Tim Crane (2003). Subjective facts.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: An important theme running through D.H. Mellor’s work is his realism, or as I shall call it, his objectivism: the idea that reality as such is how it is, regardless of the way we represent it, and that philosophical error often arises from confusing aspects of our subjective representation of the world with aspects of the world itself. Thus central to Mellor’s work on time has been the claim that the temporal A-series (previously called ‘tense’) is unreal while the B-series (the series of ‘dates’) is real. The A-series is something which is a product of our representation of the world, but not a feature of reality itself. And in other, less central, areas of his work, this kind of theme has been repeated: ‘Objective decision making’ (1980) argues that the right way to understand decision theory is as a theory of what is the objectively correct decision, the one that will actually as a matter of fact achieve your intended goal, rather than the one that is justified purely in terms of what you believe, regardless of whether the belief is true or false. ‘I and now’ (1989) argues against a substantial subjective conception of the self, using analogies between subjective and objective ways of thinking about time and subjective and objective ways of thinking about the self. And in the paper which shall be the focus of my attention here, ‘Nothing like experience’ (1992), Mellor..
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.bbkphilsoc.org.uk/archive/geocities/CranePoster.pdf
  http://web.mac.com/cranetim/Tims_website/Online_papers_files/Subjective Facts.pdf
  
• Daniel C. Dennett (1991). "Epiphenomenal" qualia?   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=HYyubHBrVUcC&oi=fnd&pg=PA59&dq=Epiphenomenal+qualia?+Dennett&ots=_SC4gtaABe&sig=QIrGmW189oiqFb-UIuJCUXr4fsg
  
• Max Deutsch (ms). Subjective physical facts.   (More)
• Brie Gertler (1999). A defense of the knowledge argument.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/gj2x7p0681887317/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/GJ2X7P0681887317.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/phil/1999/00000093/00000003/00143970
  
• Gilbert Harman (1993). Can science understand the mind?   (More)
• Benj Hellie (2004). Inexpressible truths and the Allure of the knowledge argument.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: I argue on linguistic grounds that when Mary comes to know what it's like to see a red thing, she comes to know a certain inexpressible truth about the character of her own experience. This affords a "no concept" reply to the knowledge argument. The reason the Knowledge Argument has proven so intractable may be that we believe that an inexpressible concept and an expressible concept cannot have the same referent.
• Amir Horowitz & Hilla Jacobson-Horowitz (2005). The knowledge argument and higher-order properties.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/j.1467-9329.2005.00270.x/abs/
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-9329.2005.00270.x
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/rati/2005/00000018/00000001/art00004
  http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/118648334/PDFSTART
  
• Frank Jackson (1982). Epiphenomenal qualia.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=fGLRPNiWS5MC&oi=fnd&pg=PA102&ots=023VQEFWPK&sig=6qMuMHnr_ttGQrtaqv-Nt4WmjoQ
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=fGLRPNiWS5MC&oi=fnd&pg=PA102&ots=023UUEDOLN&sig=d4nP0qjmyhHk28iBFlCsFl-Wa-Q
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8094(198204)32:127<127:EQ>2.0.CO;2-5
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8094(198204)32:127<127:EQ>2.0.CO;2-5
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2960077.pdf
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=fGLRPNiWS5MC&oi=fnd&pg=PA102&ots=023PQzFWLR&sig=fy0pAVtuLqXO3ggeZq7_jqgPTns
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=fGLRPNiWS5MC&oi=fnd&pg=PA102&ots=023SQBHRLK&sig=lpLBA75S5ZNh7nRMzwXaTu9ivhw
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=fGLRPNiWS5MC&oi=fnd&pg=PA102&ots=023ROAJROK&sig=CcwbkADsnucEzfU7Z9mCzNEYSlM
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=fGLRPNiWS5MC&oi=fnd&pg=PA102&ots=01cTMBEPKN&sig=nrqGrDr6BtBhIMYeNlT1uDsK6Qs
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=fGLRPNiWS5MC&oi=fnd&pg=PA102&ots=023VQEFTQN&sig=uXnKXoN7jyiZ2QHF-PfypYY9Rv8
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=fGLRPNiWS5MC&oi=fnd&pg=PA102&ots=023UUECWPJ&sig=RJi-St-b9kx018y6yResxfK4OoM
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=fGLRPNiWS5MC&oi=fnd&pg=PA102&ots=023QSAEOLR&sig=bCap_SwkCsP8FLlFAX4sdGQhYLg
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=fGLRPNiWS5MC&oi=fnd&pg=PA102&ots=023RUBEUNN&sig=6tQZIpZHouebGy9fctdarZbQivw
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=fGLRPNiWS5MC&oi=fnd&pg=PA102&ots=023UODHTOP&sig=zWAe4dwHZXfaFEM358lrTKkVSiI
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=fGLRPNiWS5MC&oi=fnd&pg=PA102&ots=01cTPEIONQ&sig=NEvPcMVl5uYMTylMlfuR9yPcrLo
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=fGLRPNiWS5MC&oi=fnd&pg=PA102&ots=023TSCHROO&sig=ZIpzWdtTaIUmTTyUvSPA2DqIcV4
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=fGLRPNiWS5MC&oi=fnd&pg=PA102&ots=023TMCDUQO&sig=EoFnSapBQFa9qwebq724B8Ijoag
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=fGLRPNiWS5MC&oi=fnd&pg=PA102&ots=023QMzJQIK&sig=wU_mBShayo_GQugf6FOY2AnJ5Y4
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=fGLRPNiWS5MC&oi=fnd&pg=PA102&ots=01cTREJTNQ&sig=4glbZFmhSDrS05egUFkwQxDeQ_g
  
• Frank Jackson (2003). Mind and illusion.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/courses/consciousness/papers/jackson.pdf
  
• Dunja Jutronic (2004). The knowledge argument--some comments.   (More)
• Jesper Kallestrup (2006). Epistemological physicalism and the knowledge argument.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This paper offers a new solution to the knowledge argument. Both a priori and a posteriori physicalists reject the claim that Mary does not know all the facts, but they do so for different reasons. While the former think that Mary gains no new knowledge of any fact, the latter think that Mary gains new knowledge of an old fact. This paper argues that on a broad understanding of what counts as physical, it is consistent with physicalism that Mary does not know all the physical facts, and that on a narrow understanding, it is consistent with physicalism that Mary knows all the physical facts, but not all the facts. Either way, Mary gains new knowledge of a new fact that is not non-physical. The resultant view
• William G. Lycan (2003). Perspectival representation and the knowledge argument.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Someday there will be no more articles written about the
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=8AHDK62jPSgC&oi=fnd&pg=PA384&dq=Perspectival+representation+and+the+knowledge+argument+Lycan&ots=fHEaMRGFdm&sig=KlOaW53DD8Mbz4hBlMS1Tcz1mmc
  
• Luca Malatesti (2004). The Knowledge Argument.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  https://dspace.stir.ac.uk/dspace/bitstream/1893/22/1/Malatesti_Thesis_Complete.pdf
  
• Yujin Nagasawa (2002). The knowledge argument against dualism.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Paul Churchland argues that Frank Jackson
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://philrsss.anu.edu.au/~yujin/2KADualism.pdf
  http://www.cappe.edu.au/people/nagayu/2KADualism.pdf
  http://www.newdualism.org/papers/Y.Nagasawa/2KADualism.pdf
  http://www.philosophy.bham.ac.uk/pdf/Nagasawa/KADualism.pdf
  http://www.philosophy.bham.ac.uk/staff/nagasawa_KADualism.pdf
  
• Dennis Nicholson (ms). Solving the mind-body problem - the real significance of the knowledge argument.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The Knowledge Argument is misconstructed. Knowing that it is 'just obvious' that Mary will learn something new on leaving her black and white room, we nevertheless assume she can acquire a complete knowledge of the physical inside it ' thereby predetermining the outcome of the thought experiment in favour of a refutation of physicalism. If we reformulate the argument to leave the question of what she can learn in the room open, it becomes clear, not only that physicalism can survive the Knowledge Argument, but also that there is only one perspective on the relationship between qualia and the physical that will permit it to do so. If physicalism is true, this perspective must be the correct view of the qualia-physical relationship ' the solution to the mind-body problem, a conclusion supported by its ability to resolve a number of associated difficulties, including Kripke's problem for proposed identities and Chalmers' Hard Problem
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/2951/2/karealsig0webfp.htm
  http://cogprints.org/2951/02/karealsig0webfp.htm
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00002951/
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00002951/02/karealsig0webfp.htm
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:2951
  
• Martine Nida-Rumelin (online). The knowledge argument.   (More)
• Knut Nordby (1990). Vision in a complete achromat: A personal account.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/misc/achromat.html
  
• Michael W. Pelczar (2005). Enlightening the fully informed.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This paper develops a response to the knowledge argument against physicalism. The response is both austere, in that it does not concede the existence of non-physical information (much less non-physical facts), and natural, in that it acknowledges the alethic character of phenomenal knowledge and learning. I argue that such a response has all the advantages and none of the disadvantages of existing objections to the knowledge argument. Throughout, the goal is to develop a response that is polemically effective in addition to theoretically sound
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.fas.nus.edu.sg/philo/pelczar/PHIL252.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/b200724171424160/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/B200724171424160.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/phil/2005/00000126/00000001/00007794
  
• Michael Pelczar (forthcoming). The knowledge argument, the open question argument, and the moral problem.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Someone who knew everything about the worlds physical nature could, apparently, suffer from ignorance about various aspects of conscious experience. Someone who knew everything about the world's physical and mental nature could, apparently, suffer from moral ignorance. Does it follow that there are ways the world is, over and above the way it is physically or psychophysically? This paper defends a negative answer, based on a distinction between knowing the fact that p and knowing that p. This distinction is made intelligible by reference to criterial connections between the possession of moral or phenomenal knowledge, and the satisfaction of cognitively neutral conditions of desire and experiential history. The existence of such connections in the moral case makes for an efficient dissolution of the so-called moral problem.
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/41787n7w458492k7/fulltext.pdf
  
• Derk Pereboom (1994). Bats, brain scientists, and the limitations of introspection.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8205(199406)54:2<315:BBSATL>2.0.CO;2-W
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2108491.pdf
  
• John Perry (2001). Time, consciousness and the knowledge argument.   (More)
• Philip Pettit (2004). Motion blindness and the knowledge argument.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In a now famous thought experiment, Frank jackson asked us t0 imagine an omniscient scientist, Mary, who is coniincd in a black-and-white room and then released into the world 0f color (jackson 1982; jackson 1986; cf. Braddon—Mitch<-:11 and Jackson 1996). Assuming that she is omniscicnt in respect of all physical facts—roughiy, all the facts available to physics and all the facts that they in turn Hx or determine-physicalism would suggest that there is no new fact Mary can discover after emancipation; physicalism holds that all facts are physical in the relevant sense (for a fuller statement scc Pettit 1993; jackson 1998). Yet we cannot help but feel that coming out of that room would be an occasion of dramatic enlightenment and, in particular, an occasion for learning facts to do with how red or yellow or blue 100ks or, as it is usually said, with what it is like t0 sec red or yellow or blue. Many in the black-and—whit<—: room knew all the physical facts about the world, where these may be taken to include three sorts of color facts: objcctual facts, as to what surface colors different objects have, assuming as I shall do throughout—that colors are properties of objects; intentional facts, as to which colors different objects 0r apparent objects are represented as having in the subjc-:ct’s experience, rightly or wrongly; and nonintentional facts, about what such color experiences are like in their effects on subiccts—wh<—:ther they are comforting, or arousing, or whatever. But, according to the argument, Mary didn’t know how any color looks or, equivalently, what color experience is like in itself, not just in its effects O1'1 subjects. This particular nonintentional fact about the quality of color c-zxpc-2ri<—:ncc-—this phenomenal fact, as it is often describcd—she did not..
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.princeton.edu/~ppettit/papers/motion_blindness.pdf
  
• Jesse J. Prinz (ms). Mental maintenance: A response to the knowledge argument.   (More)
• Diana Raffman (2005). Even zombies can be surprised: A reply to Graham and Horgan.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/t13447103052kp36/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/T13447103052KP36.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/phil/2005/00000122/00000002/00009462
  
• Paul Raymont (1999). The know-how response to Jackson's knowledge argument.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: I defend Frank Jackson's knowledge argument against physicalism in the philosophy of mind from a criticism that has been advanced by Laurence Nemirow and David Lewis. According to their criticism, what Mary lacked when she was in her black and white room was a set of abilities; she did not know how to recognize or imagine certain types of experience from a first-person perspective. Her subsequent discovery of what it is like to experience redness amounts to no more than her acquisition of these abilities. The physicalist can admit this, since it does not commit one to the view that there are any facts of which Mary was ignorant (in spite of her exhaustive knowledge of truths about the physical world). I argue against this view, on the grounds that the knowledge of what an experience is like cannot be equated with the possession of any set of abilities
• Howard M. Robinson (1993). Dennett on the knowledge argument.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0003-2638(199307)53:3<174:DOTKA>2.0.CO;2-E
  
• John R. Skoyles (ms). The case of Milton: A counter-example to Chalmers' case of Mary.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Chalmers' hard problem confuses within and without-system information. This can be seen in his case of Mary. This neurophysiologist of colour vision raised in a black and white room in an age of a completed neuroscience in spite of her knowing everything about colour vision lacks colour experience. I demonstrate with a counter-example involving Milton, an economist in an age of completed economics, that Chalmers mixes up scientific accountability and accessibility of information processing. There is a profound conceptual difference between the external understanding of information processing in the brain and the internal understanding that participates in it -- as can be illustrated in Aristotles' illusion
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000375/
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000375/00/chalmers.htm
  
• Robert Stalnaker (ms). Knowing where we are, and what it is like.   (More)
• Fredrik Stjernberg (online). Not so epiphenomenal qualia.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.lucs.lu.se/spinning/categories/language/Stjernberg/Stjernberg.pdf
  http://asip.lucs.lu.se/spinning/categories/language/Stjernberg/Stjernberg.pdf
  
• Daniel Stoljar & Yujin Nagasawa (2003). Introduction to There's Something About Mary.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Mary is confined to a black-and-white room, is educated through black-and-white books and through lectures relayed on black-and white television. In this way she learns everything there is to know about the physical nature of the world. She knows all the physical facts about us and our environment, in a wide sense of 'physical' which includes everything in completed physics, chemistry, and neurophysiology, and all there is to know about the causal and relational facts consequent upon all this, including of course functional roles. If physicalism is true, she knows all there is to know. For to suppose otherwise is to suppose that there is more to know than every physical fact, and that is just what physicalis..
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://philrsss.anu.edu.au/~dstoljar/onlinepapers/There's Something about Mary.Intro.pdf
  
• Nigel J. T. Thomas (online). Mary doesn't know science: On misconceiving a science of consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The so called "Knowledge Argument" of Frank Jackson (1982, 1986) ¹ claims to show that there is something about the human mind that must inevitably escape the grasp of physical science: "There are truths about . . . people ( . . . ) which escape the physicalist story" (Jackson, 1986). In effect, materialism is false, and science, as opposed to metaphysics, cannot hope to attain to an understanding of consciousness
• Evan Thompson (1992). Novel colors.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://individual.utoronto.ca/evant/Novelcolours.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/v377v06152244243/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/V377V06152244243.pdf
  
• David L. Thompson (online). On naturalizing intentionality.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Outline by Section: INTRODUCTION HUSSERL'S TRANSCENDENTAL POSITION Brentano's Notion of Intentionality Frege's Notion of Sinn Husserl's Transcendental Position Intentional Relations are not Causal. Realism is Wrong, Objects must be Meaningful Psychological States are Empirical. Meanings cannot be In-Themselves, but always for an Ego SEARLE'S THEORY OF INTENTIONALITY CONFRONTATION OF SEARLE'S THEORY WITH THE FOUR THESES Searle Intentionalizes or Trivializes Causation Searle is still a Realist Visual Experience is a Thing-In-Itself Intentional States Presented as Stopping Points CONCLUSION
• Michael Tye (2000). Knowing what it is like: The ability hypothesis and the knowledge argument.   (More)
• Robert van Gulick (forthcoming). Jackson's change of mind: Representationalism, a priorism, and the knowledge argument.   (More)
• Robert van Gulick (2004). So many ways of saying no to Mary.   (More)
• Tillmann Vierkant (2002). Zombie Mary and the blue banana. On the compatibility of the 'knowledge argument' with the argument from modality.   (More)
• Sven Walter (2002). Terry, Terry, quite contrary.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In 'Jackson on physical information and qualia'(1984) Terry Horgan defended physicalism against Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument by raising what later has been called the 'mode of presentation reply'- arguingthatthe Knowledge Argumentis fallacious because itsubtly equivocates on two different readings of 'physical information'. In 'Mary, Mary, quite contrary' (2000) however, George Graham and Terry Horgan maintain that none of the replies against Jackson has yet been successful, not even Horgan's own 1984 rejoinder.Tosubstantiate their claim, they present an allegedly improved version of the Knowledge Argument, the 'Mary Mary Argument' whose default moral is property-dualism. In section 1, I will set the scene by making some clarifying remarks regarding Jackson's original argument. In section 2, I will consider several objections to the most promising physicalist rejoinder to the Knowledge Argument, the mode of presentation reply. In section 3 I will discuss the Mary Mary Argument and propose the indexical account of consciousness that, as it happens, is based on Horgan's own 1984 account as a possible solution. Finally,in section 4, I will argue that to the extent that the Mary Mary Argument exceeds the force of Jackson's original challenge it coincides with Joe Levine's Explanatory Gap Argument
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com//content/rodopi/gps/2002/00000063/00000001/art00007
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/rodopi/gps/2002/00000063/00000001/art00007
  
• Jessica M. Wilson (2002). Review of Perry's Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Perry, in this lucid, deep, and entertaining book (based on his 1999 Jean Nicod lectures), supposes that type-identity physicalism is antecedently plausible, and that rejecting this thesis requires good reason (this is

Zombies and the Conceivability Argument

• Torin Alter (online). Garrett on causal essentialism and zombies.   (More)
• Torin Alter (2007). Imagining subjective absence: Marcus on zombies.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Many philosophers accept the conceivability of zombies: creatures that lack consciousness but are physically and functionally identical to conscious human beings. Many also believe that the conceivability of zombies supports their metaphysical possibility. And most agree that if zombies are metaphysically possible, then physicalism is false. So, the claim that zombies are conceivable may have considerable significance.¹
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.as.ua.edu/philos/talter/Imagining Subjective Absence.pdf
  
• Istvan A. Aranyosi (2005). Chalmers' zombie argument.   (More)
• István Aranyosi (ms). Powers and the mind-body problem.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The most discussed arguments for mental-physical property dualism in recent years have been the so-called conceivability arguments. Recently, the most sophisticated champion of such arguments has been David Chalmers. His recipe for such an argument goes like this.¹ Take two actual truths, P and Q, such that most of us have the intuition that
• Murat Aydede & Guven Guzeldere (2001). Consciousness, conceivability arguments, and perspectivalism: The dialectics of the debate.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.philosophy.ubc.ca/faculty/aydede/dialectics.pdf
  
• Andrew R. Bailey (ms). Physicalism and the preposterousness of zombies.   (More)
• Andrew R. Bailey (ms). The unsoundness of arguments from conceivability.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: It is widely suspected that arguments from conceivability, at least in some of their more notorious instances, are unsound. However, the reasons for the failure of conceivability arguments are less well agreed upon, and it remains unclear how to distinguish between sound and unsound instances of the form. In this paper I provide an analysis of the form of arguments from conceivability, and use this analysis to diagnose a systematic weakness in the argument form which reveals all its instances to be, roughly, either uninformative or unsound. I illustrate this conclusion through a consideration of David Chalmers
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.uoguelph.ca/~abailey/papers/The Unsoundness of Arguments from Conceivability.pdf
  
• Andrew R. Bailey (ms). Zombies support biological theories of consciousness.   (More)
• Katalin Balog (ms). Acquaintance and the mind-body problem.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In this paper I begin to develop an account of the acquaintance that each of us has with our own conscious states and processes. The account is a speculative proposal about human mental architecture and specifically about the nature of the concepts via which we think in first personish ways about our qualia. In a certain sense my account is neutral between physicalist and dualist accounts of consciousness. As will be clear, a dualist could adopt the account I will offer while maintaining that qualia themselves are non-physical properties. In this case the non-physical nature of qualia may play no role in accounting for the features of acquaintance. But although the account could be used by a dualist, its existence provides enormous support for physicalism. In particular it provides the makings of a positive refutation (i.e., a refutation by construction) of the conceivability arguments and the Mary argument for dualism.
• George Bealer (2002). Modal epistemology and the rationalist renaissance.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The paper begins with a clarification of the notions of intuition (and, in particular, modal intuition), modal error, conceivability, metaphysical possibility, and epistemic possibility. It is argued that two-dimensionalism is the wrong framework for modal epistemology and that a certain nonreductionist approach to the theory of concepts and propositions is required instead. Finally, there is an examination of moderate rationalism
• George Bealer (1987). The philosophical limits of scientific essentialism.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Scientific essentialism is the view that some necessities (e.g., water = H2O) can be known only with the aid of empirical science. The thesis of the paper is that scientific essentialism does not extend to the central questions of philosophy and that these questions can be answered a priori. The argument is that the evidence required for the defense of scientific essentialism (e.g., twin earth intuitions) is reliable only if the intuitions required by philosophy to answer its central questions is also reliable. Included is an outline of a modal reliabilist theory of basic evidence and a concept-possession account of the reliability of a priori intuition
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=1520-8583(1987)1<289:TPLOSE>2.0.CO;2-Z
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=1520-8583(1987)1<289:TPLOSE>2.0.CO;2-Z
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2214149.pdf
  
• Karen Bennett (online). Zombies everywhere!   (More)
• Peter Bokulich (ms). Putting zombies to rest: The role of dynamics in reduction.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: I argue that property dualism is not supported by the purported logical possibility of qualitative zombies. Chalmers
• Selmer Bringsjord (1995). In defense of impenetrable zombies.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/bringsjord95defense.html
  http://www.rpi.edu/~brings/SELPAP/zombies.jcs/zombies.jcs.html
  
• Selmer Bringsjord (1999). The zombie attack on the computational conception of mind.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.rpi.edu/~brings/SELPAP/zombies.ppr.pdf
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/bringsjord97zombie.html
  http://www.phil.canterbury.ac.nz/tom_bestor/e-texts/Bringsjord,zombies.ppr.pdf
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8205(199903)59:1<41:TZAOTC>2.0.CO;2-F
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8205(199903)59:1<41:TZAOTC>2.0.CO;2-F
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2653457.pdf
  
• David J. Chalmers (2002). Does conceivability entail possibility?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: There is a long tradition in philosophy of using a priori methods to draw conclusions about what is possible and what is necessary, and often in turn to draw conclusions about matters of substantive metaphysics. Arguments like this typically have three steps: first an epistemic claim (about what can be known or conceived), from there to a modal claim (about what is possible or necessary), and from there to a metaphysical claim (about the nature of things in the world)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/papers/conceivability.html
  
• David J. Chalmers (2004). Imagination, indexicality, and intensions.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: John Perry's book Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness is a lucid and engaging defense of a physicalist view of consciousness against various anti-physicalist arguments. In what follows, I will address Perry's responses to the three main anti-physicalist arguments he discusses: the zombie argument (focusing on imagination), the knowledge argument (focusing on indexicals), and the modal argument (focusing on intensions)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/papers/perry.html
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2004.tb00334.x
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/ips/ppr/2004/00000068/00000001/art00011
  http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/119921373/PDFSTART
  
• David J. Chalmers (manuscript). Mind and modality.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: What follows are compressed versions of three lectures on the subject of "Mind and Modality", given at Princeton University the week of October 12-16, 1998. The first two form a series; the third stands alone to some extent. All are philosophically technical, and probably of interest mainly to philosophers. I hope that they make sense, at least to those familiar with my book _The Conscious Mind_ . Lecture 1 recapitulates some of the material in the book in a somewhat different form, and adds some further material on conditionals and on Kripke. Note that section has a more or less definitive formalization of the anti-materialist argument from the book (lots of people have asked for this). Lecture 2 pushes deeper into the heart of modality, further investigating the conceivability/possibility relationship and the epistemology of modality (with some material on the scrutability of truth in general), and arguing for a sort of modal rationalism. Lecture 3 gives an analysis of the content of beliefs about experiences, and applies this to a number of epistemological issues, including incorrigibility and the dialectic on "The Myth of the Given"
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/papers/mm.html
  
• David J. Chalmers (1999). Materialism and the metaphysics of modality.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This appeared in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59:473-93, as a response to four papers in a symposium on my book The Conscious Mind . Most of it should be comprehensible without having read the papers in question. This paper is for an audience of philosophers and so is relatively technical. It will probably also help to have read some of the book. (There is a corresponding precis of the book, written for the symposium.) The papers I'm responding to are: Chris Hill & Brian McLaughlin, There are fewer things in reality than are dreamt of in Chalmers' philosophy Brian Loar, David Chalmers' The Conscious Mind Sydney Shoemaker, On David Chalmers' The Conscious Mind Stephen Yablo, Concepts and consciousness Contents
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/papers/modality.html
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8205(199906)59:2<473:MATMOM>2.0.CO;2-Q
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2653685.pdf
  
• David J. Chalmers (1996). Naturalistic dualism.   (More)
• David J. Chalmers (1993). Self-ascription without qualia: A case-study.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In Section 5 of his interesting article, Goldman suggests that the consideration of imaginary cases can be valuable in the analysis of our psychological concepts. In particular, he argues that we can imagine a system that is isomorphic to us under any functional description, but which lacks qualitative mental states, such as pains and color sensations. Whether or not such a being is empirically possible, it certainly seems to be logically possible, or conceptually coherent. Goldman argues from this possibility to the conclusion that our concepts of qualitative mental states cannot be analyzed entirely in functional terms
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/papers/goldman.html
  http://larskaos.squarespace.com/storage/actacon/black-sorcery/baggrundsmateriale om zombier og voodoo.pdf
  
• David J. Chalmers (forthcoming). The two-dimensional argument against materialism.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: A number of popular arguments for dualism start from a premise about an epistemic gap between physical truths about truths about consciousness, and infer an ontological gap between physical processes and consciousness. Arguments of this sort include the conceivability argument, the knowledge argument, the explanatory-gap argument, and the property dualism argument. Such arguments are often resisted on the grounds that epistemic premises do not entail ontological conclusion. My view is that one can legitimately infer ontological conclusions from epistemic premises, if one is very careful about how one reasons. To do so, the best way is to reason first from epistemic premises to modal conclusions (about necessity and possibility), and from there to ontological conclusions. Here, the crucial issue is the link between the epistemic and modal domains. How can one reason from theses about what is knowable or conceivable to theses about what is necessary or possible? To bridge the epistemic and modal domains, the framework of two-dimensional semantics can play a central role. I have used this framework in earlier work (Chalmers 1996) to mount an argument against materialism. Here, I want to revisit the argument, laying it out in a more explicit and careful form, and responding to a number of objections. In what follows I will concentrate mostly on the conceivability argument. I think that very similar considerations apply to the other arguments mentioned above, however. In the final section of the paper, I show how this analysis might yield a unified treatment of a number of anti-materialist arguments
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://phonline.org/paper.php?keynum=686
  
• Daniel C. Dennett (1995). The unimagined preposterousness of zombies.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Knock-down refutations are rare in philosophy, and unambiguous self-refutations are even rarer, for obvious reasons, but sometimes we get lucky. Sometimes philosophers clutch an insupportable hypothesis to their bosoms and run headlong over the cliff edge. Then, like cartoon characters, they hang there in mid-air, until they notice what they have done and gravity takes over. Just such a boon is the philosophers' concept of a zombie, a strangely attractive notion that sums up, in one leaden lump, almost everything that I think is wrong with current thinking about consciousness. Philosophers ought to have dropped the zombie like a hot potato, but since they persist in their embrace, this gives me a golden opportunity to focus attention on the most seductive error in current thinking
• Daniel C. Dennett (2001). The zombic hunch: Extinction of an intuition?   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.brianfelsen.com/resourcepapers/zombic.rtf
  http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/courses/consciousness/papers/DD-zombie.html
  
• Esa Diaz-Leon (2008). Defending the phenomenal concept strategy.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: One of the main strategies against conceivability arguments is the so-called phenomenal concept strategy, which aims to explain the epistemic gap between physical and phenomenal truths in terms of the special features of phenomenal concepts. Daniel Stoljar has recently argued that the phenomenal concept strategy has failed to provide a successful explanation of this epistemic gap. In this paper my aim is to defend the phenomenal concept strategy from his criticisms. I argue that Stoljar has misrepresented the resources of the strategy, which can indeed accomplish the required explanatory task, once it is properly understood
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/./ftinterface~content=a795250731~fulltext=713240930
  
• Eric Dietrich & Anthony S. Gillies (2001). Consciousness and the limits of our imaginations.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/n8278506l281t513/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=260563&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/N8278506L281T513.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/synt/2001/00000126/00000003/00260563
  
• Eric Dietrich (1998). It only seems as if zombies are logically possible, or how consciousness hides the truth of materialism: A critical review of The Conscious Mind.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/wm8263u77162q5tv/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/WM8263U77162Q5TV.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/mind/1998/00000008/00000003/00180267
  
• Heimir Geirsson (2005). Conceivability and defeasible modal justification.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This paper advances the thesis that we can justifiably believe philosophically interesting possibility statements. The first part of the paper critically discusses van Inwagens skeptical arguments while at the same time laying some of the foundation for a positive view. The second part of the paper advances a view of conceivability in terms of imaginability, where imaginging can be propositional, pictorial, or a combination of the two, and argues that conceivability can, and often does, provide us with justified beliefs of what is metaphysically possible. The notion of scenarios is developed, as is an account of how filling out scenarios can uncover a defeater or, in many cases, strengthen the justification for the relevant possibility statement
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/n41460740nq8318n/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/N41460740NQ8318N.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/phil/2005/00000122/00000003/00006522
  
• Brie Gertler (2002). Explanatory reduction, conceptual analysis, and conceivability arguments about the mind.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The current stand-off between reductionists and anti-reductionists about the mental has sparked a long-overdue reexamination of key issues in philosophi- cal methodology.1 The resulting debate promises to advance our understand- ing of how empirical discoveries bear on the numerous philosophical problems which involve the analysis or reduction of kinds. The parties to this debate disagree about how, and to what extent, conceptual facts contribute to justify- ing explanatory reductions
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/1468-0068.00359
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1468-0068.00359
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/nous/2002/00000036/00000001/art00359
  
• Stevan Harnad (1994). Why and how we are not zombies.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: A robot that is functionally indistinguishable from us may or may not be a mindless Zombie. There will never be any way to know, yet its functional principles will be as close as we can ever get to explaining the mind
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/1601/00/harnad95.zombies.html
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00001601/
  http://cogprints.soton.ac.uk/documents/disk0/00/00/16/01/
  http://eprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/3347/01/harnad95.zombies.html
  http://cogsci.soton.ac.uk/harnad/Papers/Harnad/harnad95.zombies.html
  http://cogsci.soton.ac.uk/~harnad/Papers/Harnad/harnad95.zombies.html
  http://www.ecs.soton.ac.uk/~harnad/Papers/Harnad/harnad95.zombies.html
  http://eprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00003347/01/harnad95.zombies.html
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00001601/00/harnad95.zombies.html
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?id=oai:eprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk:3347
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:1601
  
• Larry Hauser (online). Revenge of the zombies.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Zombies recently conjured by Searle and others threaten civilized (i.e., materialistic) philosophy of mind and scientific psychology as we know it. Humanoid beings that behave like us and may share our functional organizations and even, perhaps, our neurophysiological makeups without qualetative conscious experiences, zombies seem to meet every materialist condition for thought on offer and yet -- the wonted intuitions go -- are still disqualefied (disqualified for lack of qualia) from being thinking things. I have a plan. Other zombies -- good (qualia eating) zombies -- can battle their evil (behavior eating) cousins to a standoff. Perhaps even defeat them. Familiar zombies and supersmart zombies resist disqualefication, making the world safe, again, for materialism. Behavioristic materialism. Alas for functionalism, good zombies still eat programs. Alas for identity theory, all zombies -- every B movie fan knows -- eat brains
• Ivan Havel (1999). Living in conceivable worlds.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Certain cognitive and philosophical aspects of the concept of conceivability with intended or established diversion from (putative) reality are discussed. The “coherence gap problem” arises when certain fragments of the real world are replaced with imaginary situations while most details are (intentionally or not) ignored. Another issue, “the spectator problem”, concerns the participation of the conceiver himself in the world conceived. Three different examples of conceivability are used to illustrate our points, namely thought experiments in physics, a hypothetical world devoid of consciousness (zombie world), and virtual reality
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=201839&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/T71J3757537056R2.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/foda/1998/00000003/00000002/00201839
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/t71j3757537056r2/fulltext.pdf
  
• Charles Huenemann (2004). The Sage meets the zombie: Spinoza's wise man and Chalmers' The Conscious Mind.   (More)
• Mark Johnston (ms). It necessarily ain't so.   (More)
• Jesper Kallestrup (2006). Physicalism, conceivability and strong necessities.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/02r087t87k312rl3/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/02R087T87K312RL3.pdf
  
• Navin Kartik (2000). In the hands of zombies.   (More)
• Mike Kearns (online). Could Daniel Dennett be a zombie?   (More)
• Robert E. Kirk (online). Zombies.   (More)
• Christof Koch & Francis Crick (2001). On the zombie within.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/2001Natur.411..893K
  http://www.klab.caltech.edu/~koch/koch-crick-nature-01.pdf
  http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v411/n6840/full/411893a0.html
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=11418835&dopt=Citation
  
• Peter Kung (online). Imaginability as a guide to possibility.   (More)
• Manfred Kupffer (online). Conceivability and the A Priori.   (More)
• Dan Lloyd (online). Twilight of the zombies.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: A philosophical zombie is a being indistinguishable from an ordinary human in every observable respect, but lacking subjective consciousness. Zombiehood implies *linguistic indiscriminability*, the zombie tendency to talk and even do philosophy of mind in language indiscriminable from ordinary discourse. Zombies thus speak *Zombish*, indistinguishable from English but radically distinct in reference for mental terms. The fate of zombies ultimately depends on whether Zombish can be consistently interpreted. If it can be interpreted consistently, then zombies remain possible, but no test could ever reveal whether anyone (oneself included) is speaking Zombish. Any materialist theory of consciousness is therefore already a theory in Zombish, and is equally confirmable in its human language edition (applicable to humans) and its zombie-language edition (applicable to zombies). On the other hand, if Zombish cannot be consistently interpreted, then the zombies described in Zombish are logically impossible. Either way, the search for a materialistic theory of consciousness should be untroubled by the (possible) zombies among us
• William G. Lycan (2003). Vs. a new a priorist argument for dualism.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Back in the late 1950s, a wonderful thing happened to metaphysics
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=X8ixQCd_-l8C&oi=fnd&pg=PA130&ots=raPGPqzQGa&sig=X2Mq33RAldiNZZRo8c6Tu4qKwso
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/1533-6077.00009/abs/
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1533-6077.00009
  http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/120710669/PDFSTART
  
• Eric Marcus (2004). Why zombies are inconceivable.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: I argue that zombies are inconceivable. More precisely, I argue that the conceivability-intuition that is used to demonstrate their possibility has been misconstrued. Thought experiments alleged to feature zombies founder on the fact that, on the one hand, they _must_ involve first-person imagining, and yet, on the other hand, _cannot_. Philosophers who take themselves to have imagined zombies have unwittingly conflated imagining a creature who lacks consciousness with imagining a creature without also imagining the consciousness it may or may not possess
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/./ftinterface~content=a713659880~fulltext=713240930
  http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/index/Q8CU72RTGX10YHM8.pdf
  http://www.informaworld.com/index/713659880.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/routledg/ajphil/2004/00000082/00000003/art00007
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/oup/ajphil/2004/00000082/00000003/art00477
  
• Peter Marton (1998). Zombies versus materialists: The battle for conceivability.   (More)
• Wallace I. Matson (ms). Logical possibility, laws of nature, and mind in the history of philosophy.   (More)
• Chris Mathieson (2000). Reining in Chalmers: On the logical possibility of zombies.   (More)
• John McCarthy (1995). Todd Moody's zombies.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: From the AI point of view, consciousness must be regarded as a collection of interacting processes rather than the unitary object of much philosophical speculation. We ask what kinds of propositions and other entities need to be designed for consciousness to be useful to an animal or a machine. We thereby assert that human consciousness is useful to human functioning and not just and epiphenomenon. Zombies in the sense of Todd Moody's article are merely the victims of Moody's prejudices. To behave like humans, zombies will need what Moody might call pseudo-consciousness, but useful pseudo-consciousness will share all the observable qualities of human consciousness including what the zombie will be able to report. Robots will require a pseudo-consciousness with many of the intellectual qualities of human consciousness but will function successfully with few if any human emotional conscious qualities if that is how we choose to build them
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/426/0/zombie.ps
  http://cogprints.org/426/00/zombie.ps
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/259682.html
  http://www-formal.stanford.edu/jmc/zombie.ps
  http://www-formal.stanford.edu/jmc/zombie.pdf
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/mccarthy97todd.html
  http://www-formal.stanford.edu/jmc/zombie/zombie.html
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:426
  
• Todd C. Moody (1994). Conversations with zombies.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.zynet.co.uk/imprint/moody.html
  http://www.zynet.co.uk/imprint/Moody_zombies.html
  
• Thomas Nagel (1998). Conceiving the impossible and the mind-body problem.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Intuitions based on the first-person perspective can easily mislead us about what is and is not conceivable.1 This point is usually made in support of familiar reductionist positions on the mind-body problem, but I believe it can be detached from that approach. It seems to me that the powerful appearance of contingency in the relation between the functioning of the physical organism and the conscious mind -- an appearance that depends directly or indirectly on the first- person perspective -- must be an illusion. But the denial of this contingency should not take the form of a reductionist account of consciousness of the usual type, whereby the logical gap between the mental and the physical is closed by conceptual analysis -- in effect, by analyzing the mental in terms of the physical (however elaborately this is done -- and I count functionalism as such a theory, along with the topic-neutral causal role analyses of mental concepts from which it descends)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/faculty/nagel/papers/conceiving.pdf
  http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=1&fid=24970&jid=PHI&volumeId=73&issueId=03&aid=24969
  http://www.journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0031819198000035
  http://journals.cambridge.org/article_S0031819198000035
  
• Derk Pereboom (web). Consciousness and introspective inaccuracy.   (More)
• Matthew Phillips (ms). Why positive and negative conceivability can't save the conceivability-possibility link.   (More)
• Karol Polcyn (2006). Conceivability, possibility, and a posteriori necessity: On Chalmers' argument for dualism.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Chalmers argues that zombies are possible and that therefore consciousness does not supervene on physical facts, which shows the falsity of materialism. The crucial step in this argument – that zombies are possible – follows from their conceivability and hence depends on assuming that conceivability implies possibility. But while Chalmers’s defense of this assumption – call it the conceivability principle – is the key part of his argument, it has not been well understood. As I see it, Chalmers’s defense of the conceivability principle comes in his response to the so-called objection from a posteriori necessity. The defense aims at showing that there is no gap between conceivability and possibility since no such gap can be generated by necessary a posteriori truths. I will argue that while Chalmers is right to the extent that there is no gap between conceivability and possibility within the standard Kripkean model of a posteriori necessity, his general conclusion is not justified. This is because the conceivability principle might be inconsistent with a posteriori necessity understood in some non-Kripkean way and Chalmers has not shown that no such alternative understanding of a posteriori necessity is available.
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.diametros.iphils.uj.edu.pl/pdf/diam7polcyn.pdf
  
• Thomas W. Polger (online). Zombies.   (More)
• Thomas W. Polger (2000). Zombies explained.   (More)
• Paul Raymore (ms). A materialist response to David Chalmers' The Conscious Mind.   (More)
• David M. Rosenthal (1968). Intentionality: A study of the views of Chisholm and Sellars.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Edited in hypertext by Andrew Chrucky. Reprinted with the permission of Professor David Rosenthal. Editor's Note: Due to the limitation of current hypertext, the following conventions have been used. In general, if an expression has some mark over it, that mark is placed as a prefix to the expression. All Greek characters (except phi) are rendered by their names. Subscripts are placed in parentheses as concatenated suffixes: thus, e.g., H(2)O is the chemical formula for water. Sellars' dot quotes are expressed by bold periods
• David M. Rosenthal & Wilfrid S. Sellars (1972). The Rosenthal-Sellars correspondence on intentionality.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In response to your kind offer to read through portions of the typescript of my thesis pertaining to your views on intentionality, I am sending you a copy of an introductory section to such a chapter.{1} The enclosed typescript represents a first draft, for which I apologize, but I thought it might be useful to get any comments you might have in at the ground floor, so to speak
• William E. Seager (ms). Are zombies logically possible? -- And why it matters.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: A philosophical zombie is a being physically indistinguishable from an actual or possible human being, inhabiting a possible world where the _physical_ laws are identical to the laws of the actual world, but which completely lacks consciousness. For zombies, all is dark within, and hence they are, at the most fundamental level, utterly different from us. But, given their definition, this singular fact has no direct implications about the kind of motion, or other physical processes, the zombie will undergo within its own world. Under quite standard physicalist assumptions, such as certain assumptions about the 'initial conditions' of the zombie's world and that of the causal closure of the physical
• Warren Shrader (online). Assessing the case against a posteriori physicalism.   (More)
• Jan Sleutels (2006). Greek zombies.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This paper explores the possibility that the human mind underwent substantial changes in recent history. Assuming that consciousness is a substantial trait of the mind, the paper focuses on the suggestion made by Julian Jaynes that the Mycenean Greeks had a "bicameral" mind instead of a conscious one. The suggestion is commonly dismissed as patently absurd, for instance by critics such as Ned Block. A closer examination of the intuitions involved, considered from different theoretical angles (social constructivism, idealism, eliminativism, realism), reveals that the idea of 'Greek zombies' should be taken more seriously than is commonly assumed
  Additional links for this entry:
  https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/handle/1887/8643
  https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/dspace/handle/1887/8643
  http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/./ftinterface~content=a743786468~fulltext=713240930
  http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/index/K7133P7331316346.pdf
  http://www.informaworld.com/index/743786468.pdf
  
• Tamler Sommers (2002). Of zombies, color scientists, and floating iron bars.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: a logically possible world physically identical to ours, in which the positive facts about consciousness do not hold." First, I analyze the move from conceivability to logical possibility. Following George Seddon, I consider the case of a floating iron bar and argue that even this seemingly conceivable event has implicit logical contradictions in its description. I then show that the distinctions Chalmers employs between primary and secondary intensions, and a priori and a posteriori entailment, break down upon close examination-with iron bars and with consciousness it is impossible to know where primary intensions end and secondary intensions begin. I extend this analysis of logical possibility to the famous zombie thought experiment and conclude not that a zombie world is logically _im_possible, but rather that, at present, the question is open. Finally, I show how a similar line of argument may be used to undermine the "Mary the color scientist" thought experiment as well
• Daniel Stoljar (2006). Actors and zombies.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: 1. Much of contemporary philosophy of mind is dominated by the intersection of three topics: physicalism, the conceivability argument, and the necessary a posteriori. I will be concerned here (i) to describe (what I take to be) the consensus view of these topics; (ii) to explain why I think this account is mistaken; and (iii) to briefly sketch an alternative
• Daniel Stoljar (forthcoming). Review of Perry's Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: _the subject matter assumption_ . Perry suggests that the subject matter assumption is false
• Daniel Stoljar (2001). The conceivability argument and two conceptions of the physical.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=368dtpdoBEUC&oi=fnd&pg=PA393&ots=9bFVL9Wy4B&sig=8VXXJTF5pjIOGHSco_Wh8s4hXCo
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/0029-4624.35.s15.18
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/nous/2001/00000035/A00100s1/art00325
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/nous/2001/00000035/A0150s15/art00325
  
• Daniel Stoljar (2007). Two conceivability arguments compared.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The conclusion of this argument (hereafter ZA) entails the falsity of physicalism because, technical details aside, physicalism is or entails the thesis that every psychological truth is entailed by some physical truth. If it is possible that I have a zombie duplicate however, then it is possible that the physical truths are as they are and some psychological truth is different. Hence 3 entails that physicalism is false. The second conceivability argument is one that is almost as famous, though perhaps it is less famous for being a conceivability argument: the perfect actor argument against behaviorism (see, e.g., Putnam 1963, 1975). In a version that is both familiar and relatively clear, it goes like this
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-9264.2007.00210.x
  
• Julia Tanney (2004). On the conceptual, psychological, and moral status of zombies, swamp-beings, and other 'behaviourally indistinguishable' creatures.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/119921431/PDFSTART
  
• Nigel J. T. Thomas (1998). Zombie killer.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Philosopher's zombies are hypothetical beings behaviorally, functionally, and perhaps even physically indistinguishable from normal humans, but who lack our consciousness. Many people seem to be convinced that such zombies are a real conceptual possibility, and that this bare possibility entails that understanding human consciousness must remain forever beyond the reach of science. However, the conceptual entailments of zombiehood have not been sufficiently examined. This brief article shows that any way of understanding the behavior of zombies that does in fact support the suggested entailment, leads to contradictions and absurdities. Zombies are _not_ conceptually possible
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=dliyExsqYGwC&oi=fnd&pg=PA171&dq=Zombie+killer+Thomas&ots=xz3Hidqf_f&sig=pi69RPsSfKQp9QZh0O4mF-6gf6U
  
• Robert van Gulick (1999). Conceiving beyond our means: The limits of thought experiments.   (More)
• Tillmann Vierkant (2002). Zombie Mary and the blue banana. On the compatibility of the 'knowledge argument' with the argument from modality.   (More)
• Brian Weatherson (ms). Morality in fiction and consciousness in imagination.   (More)
• Stephen Yablo (1999). Concepts and consciousness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/courses/consciousness/papers/concon.pdf
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8205(199906)59:2<455:CAC>2.0.CO;2-2
  
• Stephen Yablo (2002). Coulda, woulda, shoulda.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/yablo01coulda.html
  
• Stephen Yablo (online). Illusions of possibility.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://web.mit.edu/afs/athena.mit.edu/user/y/a/yablo/OldFiles/www/illposs.pdf
  http://www.mit.edu/afs/athena.mit.edu/user/y/a/yablo/OldFiles/www/illposs.pdf
  
• Stephen Yablo (online). Modal rationalism and logical empiricism: Some similarities.   (More)

Kripke's Modal Argument

• George Bealer (1994). Mental properties.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: It is argued that, because of scientific essentialism, two currently popular arguments against the mind-body identity thesis -- the multiple-realizability argument and the Nagel-Jackson knowledge argument -- are unsatisfactory as they stand and that their problems are incurable. It is then argued that a refutation of the identity thesis in its full generality can be achieved by weaving together two traditional Cartesian arguments -- the modal argument and the certainty argument. This argument establishes, not just the falsity of the identity thesis, but also the metaphysical possibility of disembodiment
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-362X(199404)91:4<185:MP>2.0.CO;2-6
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-362X(199404)91:4<185:MP>2.0.CO;2-6
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2940770.pdf
  
• George Bealer (2004). The origins of modal error.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Modal intuitions are the primary source of modal knowledge but also of modal error. According to the theory of modal error in this paper, modal intuitions retain their evidential force in spite of their fallibility, and erroneous modal intuitions are in principle identifiable and eliminable by subjecting our intuitions to a priori dialectic. After an inventory of standard sources of modal error, two further sources are examined in detail. The first source - namely, the failure to distinguish between metaphysical possibility and various kinds of epistemic possibility - turns out to be comparatively easy to untangle and poses little threat to intuition-driven philosophical investigation. The second source is the local (i.e., temporary) misunderstanding of one's concepts (as opposed to outright Burgean misunderstanding). This pathology may be understood on analogy with a patient who is given a clean bill of health at his annual check-up, despite his having a cold at the time of the check-up: although the patient's health is locally (temporarily) disrupted, his overall health is sufficiently good to enable him to overcome the cold without external intervention. Even when our understanding of certain pivotal concepts has lapsed locally, our larger body of intuitions is sufficiently reliable to allow us, without intervention, to ferret out the modal errors resulting from this lapse of understanding by means of dialectic and/or a process of a priori reflection. This source of modal error, and our capacity to overcome it, has wide-ranging implications for philosophical method - including, in particular, its promise for disarming skepticism about the classical method of intuition-driven investigation itself. Indeed, it is shown that skeptical accounts of modal error (e.g., the accounts given by Hill, Levin, and several others) are ultimately self-defeating
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://pantheon.yale.edu/~gb275/Modal Error.pdf
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1746-8361.2004.tb00290.x
  
• Alex Byrne (2007). Possibility and imagination.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: forthcoming in Philosophical Perspectives
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1520-8583.2007.00123.x
  
• David Papineau (online). Kripke's proof that we are all intuitive dualists.   (More)
• Thomas W. Polger (online). Kripke and the illusion of contingent identity.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://homepages.uc.edu/~polgertw/Polger-APA1999.pdf
  

Arguments from Disembodiment

• Nicholas Everitt (2000). Substance dualism and disembodied existence.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/nicholas_everitt/dualism.html
  
• Douglas C. Long (1969). Descartes' argument for mind-body dualism.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: [p. 259] After establishing his own existence by the Cogito argument, Descartes inquires into the nature of the self that he claims to know with certainty to exist. He concludes that he is a res cogitans, an unextended entity whose essence is to be conscious. Although a considerable amount of critical effort has been expended in attempts to show how he thought he could move to this important conclusion, his reasoning has remained quite unconvincing. In particular, his critics have insisted, and I think quite rightly, that his claim to be "entirely and absolutely distinct"[i] from his body is not justified by the reasoning which he offers in its support.[ii] Nevertheless, I also believe that the proffered criticisms of Descartes
• Douglas C. Long (1977). Disembodied existence, physicalism, and the mind-body problem.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/m616507x112n8548/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/M616507X112N8548.pdf
  
• Alvin Plantinga (2006). Against materialism.   (More)
• Stephen Yablo (1993). Is conceivability a guide to possibility?   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.mit.edu/~yablo/isconposs.pdf
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/yablo93is.html
  http://web.mit.edu/~yablo/www/isconposs.pdf
  http://web.mit.edu/~yablo/OldFiles/www/isconposs.pdf
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8205(199303)53:1<1:ICAGTP>2.0.CO;2-Y
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8205(199303)53:1<1:ICAGTP>2.0.CO;2-Y