1. Philosophy of Consciousness (Philosophy of Consciousness on PhilPapers)
Philosophy of Consciousness, Miscellaneous
Philosophy of Consciousness, General Works
The Concept of Consciousness
- Michael V. Antony (ms). Are our concepts "conscious state" and "conscious creature" vague? (Abstract & more)
- Michael V. Antony (2006). Consciousness and vagueness. (Abstract & more)
- Michael V. Antony (2002). Concepts of consciousness, kinds of consciousness, meanings of 'consciousness'. (More)
- Michael V. Antony (2001). Conceiving simple experiences. (Abstract & more)
- Michael V. Antony (2001). Is 'consciousness' ambiguous? (Abstract & more)
- Michael V. Antony (1999). Outline of a general methodology for consciousness research. (Abstract & more)
- Rodrigo Becerra (2004). Homonymous mistakes with ontological aspirations: The persisting problem with the word 'consciousness'. (More)
- Mark H. Bickhard (2005). Consciousness and reflective consciousness. (Abstract & more)
- Ned Block (1997). Author's response. (Abstract & more)
- David J. Chalmers (1997). Availability: The cognitive basis of experience? (Abstract & more)
- Austen Clark (2001). Phenomenal consciousness so-called. (Abstract & more)
- Daniel C. Dennett (2001). Consciousness: How much is that in real money? (More)
- Ronald B. de Sousa (2002). Twelve varieties of subjectivity. (More)
- Alvin Goldman (1993). Consciousness, folk psychology, and cognitive science. (Abstract & more)
- T. Hamanaka (1997). The concept of consciousness in the history of neuropsychiatry. (More)
- Gilbert Harman (online). What is cognitive access? (More)
- Benj Hellie (2007). Factive phenomenal characters. (Abstract & more)
- Boris Hennig (2007). Cartesian conscientia. (More)
- Ted Honderich (1998). Consciousness as existence. (More)
- Ted Honderich (2004). Consciousness as existence, devout physicalism, spiritualism. (Abstract & more)
- Ted Honderich (2003). Perceptual, reflective, and affective consciousness as existence. (Abstract & more)
- Daniel D. Hutto (2001). Consciousness and Conceptual Schema. (More)
- William James (1904). Does "consciousness" exist? (More)
- Joshua Knobe & Jesse J. Prinz (2008). Intuitions about consciousness: Experimental studies. (Abstract & more)
- Uriah Kriegel (2006). Consciousness: Phenomenal consciousness, access consciousness, and scientific practice. (Abstract & more)
- Eric Lormand (1996). Nonphenomenal consciousness. (Abstract & more)
- William G. Lycan (online). The plurality of consciousness. (Abstract & more)
- Neil Campbell Manson (2002). Epistemic consciousness. (More)
- Thomas Natsoulas (1999). The concept of consciousness: The general state meaning. (More)
- Thomas Natsoulas (1996). The sciousness hypothesis: Part I. (More)
- Gualtiero Piccinini (2007). The ontology of creature consciousness: A challenge for philosophy. (More)
- Charles Ripley (1984). Sperry's concept of consciousness. (More)
- David Rosenthal (web). Concepts and definitions of consciousness. (Abstract & more)
- David Rosenthal (2001). Consciousness and sensation: Philosophical aspects. (Abstract & more)
- David M. Rosenthal (2002). How many kinds of consciousness? (More)
- David M. Rosenthal (1997). Phenomenal consciousness and what it's like. (Abstract & more)
- David M. Rosenthal (1994). State consciousness and transitive consciousness. (More)
- Aaron Sloman (ms). What is it like to be a rock? (Abstract & more)
- Mario Vaneechoutte (2000). Experience, awareness, and consciousness: Suggestions for definitions as offered by an evolutionary approach. (Abstract & more)
- Max Velmans (ms). Defining consciousness. (Abstract & more)
Philosophy of Consciousness, Misc
Explaining Consciousness?
What is it Like?
Subjectivity and Objectivity
The Explanatory Gap
- Ansgar Beckermann (2000). The perennial problem of the reductive explainability of phenomenal consciousness: C. D. broad on the explanatory gap. (Abstract & more)
- David Bengtsson (2003). The nature of explanation in a theory of consciousness. (More)
- Ned Block & Robert Stalnaker (1999). Conceptual analysis, dualism, and the explanatory gap. (Abstract & more)
- Alex Byrne (online). Tye on color and the explanatory gap. (Abstract & more)
- Peter Carruthers (2004). Reductive explanation and the "explanatory gap". (Abstract & more)
- David J. Chalmers (2006). Phenomenal concepts and the explanatory gap. (Abstract & more)
- Austen Clark (online). I am Joe's explanatory gap. (Abstract & more)
- Tim Crane (online). Cosmic hermeneutics vs emergence: The challenge of the explanatory gap. (Abstract & more)
- Esa Diaz-Leon (online). Can phenomenal concepts explain the explanatory gap? (Abstract & more)
- Brie Gertler (2001). The explanatory gap is not an illusion: A reply to Michael Tye. (Abstract & more)
- Franz-Peter Griesmaier (2003). On explaining phenomenal consciousness. (More)
- Gilbert Harman (online). Explaining an explanatory gap. (Abstract & more)
- C. L. Hardin (1992). Physiology, phenomenology, and Spinoza's true colors. (More)
- Stevan Harnad (1994). Why and how we are not zombies. (Abstract & more)
- Valerie Gray Hardcastle (1997). Why science is important for philosophy. (Abstract & more)
- Ted Honderich (2000). Consciousness and inner tubes. (More)
- J. P. Kline (1998). Another opening in the explanatory gap. (More)
- Joseph Levine (1983). Materialism and qualia: The explanatory gap. (More)
- J. M. Musacchio (2002). Dissolving the explanatory gap: Neurobiological differences between phenomenal and propositional knowledge. (Abstract & more)
- Yujin Nagasawa (web). Formulating the explanatory gap. (Abstract & more)
- Ram Neta (2004). Skepticism, abductivism, and the explanatory gap. (More)
- David Papineau (1998). Mind the gap. (Abstract & more)
- Thomas W. Polger & Kenneth J. Sufka (ms). Closing the gap on pain. (Abstract & more)
- Thomas W. Polger & Robert B. Skipper (online). Naturalism, explanation, and identity. (More)
- Karol Polcyn (2006). Phenomenal consciousness and the explanatory gap. (More)
- Philip Robbins & Anthony I. Jack (2006). The phenomenal stance. (Abstract & more)
- Michael Silberstein (2002). Reductive physicalism and the explanatory gap: A dilemma. (More)
- Par Sundstrom (2007). Colour and consciousness: Untying the metaphysical knot. (More)
- Robert van Gulick (2003). Maps, gaps, and traps. (More)
`Hard' and `Easy' Problems
Cognitive Closure
Conceptual Analysis and A Priori Entailment
Explaining Consciousness, Misc
Consciousness and Materialism
The Knowledge Argument
- Torin Alter (1998). A limited defense of the knowledge argument. (More)
- Torin Alter (2006). Does representationalism undermine the knowledge argument? (Abstract & more)
- Torin Alter (online). The knowledge argument. (Abstract & more)
- Torin Alter (2007). The knowledge argument. (Abstract & more)
- James T. Anderson (online). A simple refutation of the knowledge argument against physicalism. (Abstract & more)
- István Aranyosi (2008). Review of Torin Alter and Sven Walter (eds.) Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge. (More)
- Michael Beaton (2005). What RoboDennett still doesn't know. (Abstract & more)
- Alex Byrne (2006). Review of There's Something About Mary. (More)
- Alex Byrne (2002). Something about Mary. (Abstract & more)
- Yuri Cath (2009). The ability hypothesis and the new knowledge-how. (More)
- David J. Chalmers (2004). Phenomenal concepts and the knowledge argument. (Abstract & more)
- Tim Crane (2003). Subjective facts. (Abstract & more)
- Daniel C. Dennett (1991). "Epiphenomenal" qualia? (More)
- Max Deutsch (ms). Subjective physical facts. (More)
- Brie Gertler (1999). A defense of the knowledge argument. (More)
- Gilbert Harman (1993). Can science understand the mind? (More)
- Benj Hellie (2004). Inexpressible truths and the Allure of the knowledge argument. (Abstract & more)
- Amir Horowitz & Hilla Jacobson-Horowitz (2005). The knowledge argument and higher-order properties. (More)
- Frank Jackson (1982). Epiphenomenal qualia. (More)
- Frank Jackson (2003). Mind and illusion. (More)
- Dunja Jutronic (2004). The knowledge argument--some comments. (More)
- Jesper Kallestrup (2006). Epistemological physicalism and the knowledge argument. (Abstract & more)
- William G. Lycan (2003). Perspectival representation and the knowledge argument. (Abstract & more)
- Luca Malatesti (2004). The Knowledge Argument. (More)
- Yujin Nagasawa (2002). The knowledge argument against dualism. (Abstract & more)
- Dennis Nicholson (ms). Solving the mind-body problem - the real significance of the knowledge argument. (Abstract & more)
- Martine Nida-Rumelin (online). The knowledge argument. (More)
- Knut Nordby (1990). Vision in a complete achromat: A personal account. (More)
- Michael W. Pelczar (2005). Enlightening the fully informed. (Abstract & more)
- Michael Pelczar (forthcoming). The knowledge argument, the open question argument, and the moral problem. (Abstract & more)
- Derk Pereboom (1994). Bats, brain scientists, and the limitations of introspection. (More)
- John Perry (2001). Time, consciousness and the knowledge argument. (More)
- Philip Pettit (2004). Motion blindness and the knowledge argument. (Abstract & more)
- Jesse J. Prinz (ms). Mental maintenance: A response to the knowledge argument. (More)
- Diana Raffman (2005). Even zombies can be surprised: A reply to Graham and Horgan. (More)
- Paul Raymont (1999). The know-how response to Jackson's knowledge argument. (Abstract & more)
- Howard M. Robinson (1993). Dennett on the knowledge argument. (More)
- John R. Skoyles (ms). The case of Milton: A counter-example to Chalmers' case of Mary. (Abstract & more)
- Robert Stalnaker (ms). Knowing where we are, and what it is like. (More)
- Fredrik Stjernberg (online). Not so epiphenomenal qualia. (More)
- Daniel Stoljar & Yujin Nagasawa (2003). Introduction to There's Something About Mary. (Abstract & more)
- Nigel J. T. Thomas (online). Mary doesn't know science: On misconceiving a science of consciousness. (Abstract & more)
- Evan Thompson (1992). Novel colors. (More)
- David L. Thompson (online). On naturalizing intentionality. (Abstract & more)
- Michael Tye (2000). Knowing what it is like: The ability hypothesis and the knowledge argument. (More)
- Robert van Gulick (forthcoming). Jackson's change of mind: Representationalism, a priorism, and the knowledge argument. (More)
- Robert van Gulick (2004). So many ways of saying no to Mary. (More)
- Tillmann Vierkant (2002). Zombie Mary and the blue banana. On the compatibility of the 'knowledge argument' with the argument from modality. (More)
- Sven Walter (2002). Terry, Terry, quite contrary. (Abstract & more)
- Jessica M. Wilson (2002). Review of Perry's Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness. (Abstract & more)
Zombies and the Conceivability Argument
- Torin Alter (online). Garrett on causal essentialism and zombies. (More)
- Torin Alter (2007). Imagining subjective absence: Marcus on zombies. (Abstract & more)
- Istvan A. Aranyosi (2005). Chalmers' zombie argument. (More)
- István Aranyosi (ms). Powers and the mind-body problem. (Abstract & more)
- Murat Aydede & Guven Guzeldere (2001). Consciousness, conceivability arguments, and perspectivalism: The dialectics of the debate. (More)
- Andrew R. Bailey (ms). Physicalism and the preposterousness of zombies. (More)
- Andrew R. Bailey (ms). The unsoundness of arguments from conceivability. (Abstract & more)
- Andrew R. Bailey (ms). Zombies support biological theories of consciousness. (More)
- Katalin Balog (ms). Acquaintance and the mind-body problem. (Abstract & more)
- George Bealer (2002). Modal epistemology and the rationalist renaissance. (Abstract & more)
- George Bealer (1987). The philosophical limits of scientific essentialism. (Abstract & more)
- Karen Bennett (online). Zombies everywhere! (More)
- Peter Bokulich (ms). Putting zombies to rest: The role of dynamics in reduction. (Abstract & more)
- Selmer Bringsjord (1995). In defense of impenetrable zombies. (More)
- Selmer Bringsjord (1999). The zombie attack on the computational conception of mind. (More)
- David J. Chalmers (2002). Does conceivability entail possibility? (Abstract & more)
- David J. Chalmers (2004). Imagination, indexicality, and intensions. (Abstract & more)
- David J. Chalmers (manuscript). Mind and modality. (Abstract & more)
- David J. Chalmers (1999). Materialism and the metaphysics of modality. (Abstract & more)
- David J. Chalmers (1996). Naturalistic dualism. (More)
- David J. Chalmers (1993). Self-ascription without qualia: A case-study. (Abstract & more)
- David J. Chalmers (forthcoming). The two-dimensional argument against materialism. (Abstract & more)
- Daniel C. Dennett (1995). The unimagined preposterousness of zombies. (Abstract & more)
- Daniel C. Dennett (2001). The zombic hunch: Extinction of an intuition? (More)
- Esa Diaz-Leon (2008). Defending the phenomenal concept strategy. (Abstract & more)
- Eric Dietrich & Anthony S. Gillies (2001). Consciousness and the limits of our imaginations. (More)
- Eric Dietrich (1998). It only seems as if zombies are logically possible, or how consciousness hides the truth of materialism: A critical review of The Conscious Mind. (More)
- Heimir Geirsson (2005). Conceivability and defeasible modal justification. (Abstract & more)
- Brie Gertler (2002). Explanatory reduction, conceptual analysis, and conceivability arguments about the mind. (Abstract & more)
- Stevan Harnad (1994). Why and how we are not zombies. (Abstract & more)
- Larry Hauser (online). Revenge of the zombies. (Abstract & more)
- Ivan Havel (1999). Living in conceivable worlds. (Abstract & more)
- Charles Huenemann (2004). The Sage meets the zombie: Spinoza's wise man and Chalmers' The Conscious Mind. (More)
- Mark Johnston (ms). It necessarily ain't so. (More)
- Jesper Kallestrup (2006). Physicalism, conceivability and strong necessities. (More)
- Navin Kartik (2000). In the hands of zombies. (More)
- Mike Kearns (online). Could Daniel Dennett be a zombie? (More)
- Robert E. Kirk (online). Zombies. (More)
- Christof Koch & Francis Crick (2001). On the zombie within. (More)
- Peter Kung (online). Imaginability as a guide to possibility. (More)
- Manfred Kupffer (online). Conceivability and the A Priori. (More)
- Dan Lloyd (online). Twilight of the zombies. (Abstract & more)
- William G. Lycan (2003). Vs. a new a priorist argument for dualism. (Abstract & more)
- Eric Marcus (2004). Why zombies are inconceivable. (Abstract & more)
- Peter Marton (1998). Zombies versus materialists: The battle for conceivability. (More)
- Wallace I. Matson (ms). Logical possibility, laws of nature, and mind in the history of philosophy. (More)
- Chris Mathieson (2000). Reining in Chalmers: On the logical possibility of zombies. (More)
- John McCarthy (1995). Todd Moody's zombies. (Abstract & more)
- Todd C. Moody (1994). Conversations with zombies. (More)
- Thomas Nagel (1998). Conceiving the impossible and the mind-body problem. (Abstract & more)
- Derk Pereboom (web). Consciousness and introspective inaccuracy. (More)
- Matthew Phillips (ms). Why positive and negative conceivability can't save the conceivability-possibility link. (More)
- Karol Polcyn (2006). Conceivability, possibility, and a posteriori necessity: On Chalmers' argument for dualism. (Abstract & more)
- Thomas W. Polger (online). Zombies. (More)
- Thomas W. Polger (2000). Zombies explained. (More)
- Paul Raymore (ms). A materialist response to David Chalmers' The Conscious Mind. (More)
- David M. Rosenthal (1968). Intentionality: A study of the views of Chisholm and Sellars. (Abstract & more)
- David M. Rosenthal & Wilfrid S. Sellars (1972). The Rosenthal-Sellars correspondence on intentionality. (Abstract & more)
- William E. Seager (ms). Are zombies logically possible? -- And why it matters. (Abstract & more)
- Warren Shrader (online). Assessing the case against a posteriori physicalism. (More)
- Jan Sleutels (2006). Greek zombies. (Abstract & more)
- Tamler Sommers (2002). Of zombies, color scientists, and floating iron bars. (Abstract & more)
- Daniel Stoljar (2006). Actors and zombies. (Abstract & more)
- Daniel Stoljar (forthcoming). Review of Perry's Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness. (Abstract & more)
- Daniel Stoljar (2001). The conceivability argument and two conceptions of the physical. (More)
- Daniel Stoljar (2007). Two conceivability arguments compared. (Abstract & more)
- Julia Tanney (2004). On the conceptual, psychological, and moral status of zombies, swamp-beings, and other 'behaviourally indistinguishable' creatures. (More)
- Nigel J. T. Thomas (1998). Zombie killer. (Abstract & more)
- Robert van Gulick (1999). Conceiving beyond our means: The limits of thought experiments. (More)
- Tillmann Vierkant (2002). Zombie Mary and the blue banana. On the compatibility of the 'knowledge argument' with the argument from modality. (More)
- Brian Weatherson (ms). Morality in fiction and consciousness in imagination. (More)
- Stephen Yablo (1999). Concepts and consciousness. (More)
- Stephen Yablo (2002). Coulda, woulda, shoulda. (More)
- Stephen Yablo (online). Illusions of possibility. (More)
- Stephen Yablo (online). Modal rationalism and logical empiricism: Some similarities. (More)
Kripke's Modal Argument
Arguments from Disembodiment