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Science of consciousness :: Consciousness and science, misc :: Consciousness and science, foundations

• Bernard Baars (1994). A thoroughly empirical approach to consciousness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/volume1/psyche-94-1-6-contrastive-1-baars.html
  
• Michel Bitbol (2002). Science as if situation mattered.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract:   When he formulated the program of neurophenomenology, Francisco Varela suggested a balanced methodological dissolution of the hard problem of consciousness. I show that his dissolution is a paradigm which imposes itself onto seemingly opposite views, including materialist approaches. I also point out that Varela's revolutionary epistemological ideas are gaining wider acceptance as a side effect of a recent controversy between hermeneutists and eliminativists. Finally, I emphasize a structural parallel between the science of consciousness and the distinctive features of quantum mechanics. This parallel, together with the former convergences, point towards the common origin of the main puzzles of both quantum mechanics and the philosophy of mind: neglect of the constitutive blindspot of objective knowledge
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00000889/00/Science_situation_2.doc
  http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/documents/disk0/00/00/08/89/index.html
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=5094058&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/q771536x32818308/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/Q771536X32818308.pdf
  
• Ned Block (2001). Paradox and cross purposes in recent work on consciousness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://web.gc.cuny.edu/cogsci/private/block-cognition.pdf
  http://cogsci.bme.hu/DoCS/oktatas/kurzusok/jegyzetek/Pleh_Csaba/GRAD/Bevezetes_a_kognitiv_tudomanyba/DOC/block.pdf
  http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/faculty/block/papers/Elsevier.html
  http://cogsci.bme.hu/DoCS/oktatas/kurzusok/jegyzetek/Pleh_Csaba/UGRAD/Bevezetes_a_kognitiv_tudomanyba/DOC/block.pdf
  http://eric.ed.gov/ERICWebPortal/recordDetail?accno=EJ628447
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=11164028&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/00100277/2001/00000079/00000001/art00129
  
• David Chalmers (2004). How can we construct a science of consciousness?   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://consc.net/papers/scicon.html
  http://consc.net/papers/scicon.pdf
  http://eprints.assc.caltech.edu/archive/00000028/
  http://eprints.assc.caltech.edu/28/01/scicon.pdf
  
• Daniel Dennett (2001). Are we explaining consciousness yet?   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://eric.ed.gov/ERICWebPortal/recordDetail?accno=EJ628448
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=11164029&dopt=Abstract
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=11164029&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/00100277/2001/00000079/00000001/art00130
  
• M. Gell-Mann (2001). Consciousness, reduction, and emergence: Some remarks.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.annalsnyas.org/cgi/content/abstract/929/1/41
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/sites/entrez?db=pubmed&uid=11349428&cmd=showdetailview&indexed=google
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=11349428&dopt=Citation
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1749-6632.2001.tb05705.x
  
• Susan Greenfield (2002). Mind, brain and consciousness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://bjp.rcpsych.org/cgi/content/full/181/2/91
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=12151275&dopt=Citation
  
• Piet Hut (1999). Exploring actuality through experiment and experience.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.sns.ias.edu/~piet/publ/TucsonIII/tucsonIII.ps
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/395825.html
  http://www.ids.ias.edu/~piet/publ/TucsonIII/tucsonIII.ps
  http://www.sns.ias.edu/~piet/publ/TucsonIII/tucsonIII.html
  
• Robert Jahn & Brenda Dunne (1997). Science of the subjective.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.scientificexploration.org/jse/articles/jahn1/1.html
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/247369.html
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/jahn97science.html
  http://www.princeton.edu/~pear/pdfs/1997-JSE-SOS.pdf
  http://www.scientificexploration.org/jse/abstracts/v11n2a7.php
  
• J. Scott Jordan & Dawn McBride (2007). Stable instabilities in the study of consciousness: A potentially integrative prologue?   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/2007/00000014/F0020001/art00001
  
• Brian Josephson & Beverly Rubik (1992). The challenge of consciousness research.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://necsi.org:8100/Redirect/www.tcm.phy.cam.ac.uk/~bdj10/mm/articles/athens.pdf
  http://www.tcm.phy.cam.ac.uk/~bdj10/mm/articles/athens.txt
  http://www.tcm.phy.cam.ac.uk/~bdj10/mm/articles/athens.pdf
  
• George Mandler (2005). The consciousness continuum: From "qualia" to "free will".   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://repositories.cdlib.org/postprints/1064/
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=15856288&dopt=Citation
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/UM5XG6X87015H243.pdf
  
• Bjorn Merker (ms). The common denominator of conscious states: Implications for the biology of consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In order to distinguish the conscious state itself from its aspects and contents we need an answer to the question "if there is something it is like to be conscious, what is it?" A succinct answer to this question is provided in the form of a common denominator of all conscious states. This characterization of the conscious state has implications for the systematic study of consciousness through its bearing on a number of concrete issues connected with the nature of consciousness and its relation to the biology of brains and their evolution. These are discussed with a view to delineating the characteristics of consciousness, suggesting the primary functional role of consciousness in the total economy of brain functions, and exploring the tractability of the problem of consciousness from the standpoint of ordinary science. 1997
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:179
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000179/
  
• Jacob Needleman (1993). Inner empiricism as a way to a science of consciousness.   (More)
• David Papineau (2003). Could there be a science of consciousness?   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/1533-6077.00012/enhanceda
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1533-6077.00012
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/1533-6077.00012/enhancedabs/
  
• A. C. Scott (1998). Reductionism revisited.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://math.arizona.edu/~acs/RedRev.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/2004/00000011/00000002/art00004
  
• John Searle (1998). How to study consciousness scientifically.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.journals.royalsoc.ac.uk/index/80DGKFNCCLBQBVR6.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=9651553&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=9854266&dopt=Citation
  http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=1692422
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0962-8436(19981129)353:1377<1935:HTSCS>2.0.CO;2-4
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/01650173/1998/00000026/00000002/art00047
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/rsl/rtb/1998/00000353/00001377/art00015
  
• Max Velmans (1999). Intersubjective science.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The study of consciousness in modern science is hampered by deeply ingrained, dualist presuppositions about the nature of consciousness. In particular, conscious experiences are thought to be private and subjective, contrasting with physical phenomena which are public and objective. In the present article, I argue that all observed phenomena are, in a sense, private to a given observer, although there are some events to which there is public access. Phenomena can be objective in the sense of intersubjective, investigators can be objective in the sense of truthful or dispassionate, and procedures can be objective in being well-specified, but observed phenomena cannot be objective in the sense of being observer-free. Phenomena are only repeatable in the sense that they are judged by a community of observers to be tokens of the same type. Stripped of its dualist trappings the empirical method becomes if you carry out these procedures you will observe or experience these results - which applies as much to a science of consciousness as it does to physics
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/387/0/intsci.html
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000387/index.html
  http://cogprints.org/387/00/intsci.html
  

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