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  1. Individualism, behavior, and Marr's theory of vision.Wayne Wright - manuscript
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  2. Reconsidering perceptual content.William T. Wojtach - 2009 - Philosophy of Science 76 (1):22-43.
    An important class of teleological theories cannot explain the representational content of visual states because they fail to address the relationship between the world, projected retinal stimuli, and perception. A different approach for achieving a naturalized theory of visual content is offered that rejects the traditional internalism/externalism debate in favor of what is termed “empirical externalism.” This position maintains that, while teleological considerations can underwrite a broad understanding of representation, the content of visual representation can only be determined empirically according (...)
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  3. Content individuation in Marr's theory of vision.Basileios Kroustallis - 2006 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 27 (1):57-71.
    The debate concerning the individuating role of the external environment in propositional content has turned to Marr’s computational theory of vision for either verification or disproof. Although not all the relevant arguments concerning the determining role of environmental constraints that Marr invokes in his visual account may succeed, the paper argues that Marr divides his computational explanation into two parts, the information processing “what” and the constraint introducing “why” aspect. It is the second part where separate claims concerning the necessity (...)
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  4. Chomsky and Egan on computational theories of vision.Arnold Silverberg - 2006 - Minds and Machines 16 (4):495-524.
  5. Individualism, twin scenarios and visual content.M. J. Cain - 2000 - Philosophical Psychology 13 (4):441-463.
    In this paper I address an important question concerning the nature of visual content: are the contents of human visual states and experiences exhaustively fixed or determined (in the non-causal sense) by our intrinsic physical properties? The individualist answers this question affirmatively. I will argue that such an answer is mistaken. A common anti-individualist or externalist tactic is to attempt to construct a twin scenario involving humanoid duplicates who are embedded in environments that diverge in such a way that it (...)
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  6. A clearer vision.Lawrence A. Shapiro - 1997 - Philosophy of Science 64 (1):131-53.
    Frances Egan argues that the states of computational theories of vision are individuated individualistically and, as far as the theory is concerned, are not intentional. Her argument depends on equating the goals and explanatory strategies of computational psychology with those of its algorithmic level. However, closer inspection of computational psychology reveals that the computational level plays an essential role in explaining visual processes and that explanations at this level are nonindividualistic and intentional. In conclusion, I sketch an account of content (...)
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  7. Junk Representations.Lawrence A. Shapiro - 1997 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (3):345-361.
    Many philosophers and psychologists who approach the issue of representation from a computational or measurement theoretical perspective end up having to deny the possibility of junk representations—representations present in an organism's head but that enter into no psychological processes or produce no behaviour. However, I argue, a more functional perspective makes the possibility of junk representations intuitively quite plausible—so much so that we may wish to question those views of representation that preclude the possibility of junk representations. I explore some (...)
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  8. Perception.Kathleen Akins (ed.) - 1996 - Oxford University Press.
  9. Content, computation, and individualism in vision theory.Keith Butler - 1996 - Analysis 56 (3):146-54.
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  10. Individualism and Marr’s Computational Theory of Vision.Keith Butler - 1996 - Mind and Language 11 (4):313-37.
    A great deal of philosophical work has addressed the question of whether Man’s computational theory of early vision is individualistic. Burge and Davies have argued that, according to Marr’s theory, visual states are individuated non-individualistically. Segal has denied that Marr’s theory has these non-individualistic implications. More recently, Shapiro has argued that the entire debate has been misguided. I argue that Shapiro is mistaken in a fairly deep way, attention to which allows us to raise and clarify several important issues involved (...)
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  11. Intentionality and the theory of vision.Frances Egan - 1996 - In Kathleen Akins (ed.), Perception. Oxford University Press.
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  12. Success-orientation and individualism in the theory of vision.Sarah Patterson - 1996 - In Kathleen Akins (ed.), Perception. Oxford University Press. pp. 5--248.
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  13. Supervenience and computational explanation in vision theory.Peter Morton - 1993 - Philosophy of Science 60 (1):86-99.
    According to Marr's theory of vision, computational processes of early vision rely for their success on certain "natural constraints" in the physical environment. I examine the implications of this feature of Marr's theory for the question whether psychological states supervene on neural states. It is reasonable to hold that Marr's theory is nonindividualistic in that, given the role of natural constraints, distinct computational theories of the same neural processes may be justified in different environments. But to avoid trivializing computational explanations, (...)
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  14. Content, Kinds, and Individualism in Marr’s Theory of Vision.Lawrence A. Shapiro - 1993 - Philosophical Review 102 (4):489-513.
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  15. Individualism, computation, and perceptual content.Frances Egan - 1992 - Mind 101 (403):443-59.
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  16. Individualism and perceptual content.Martin Davies - 1991 - Mind 100 (399):461-84.
  17. Externalism and Marr's theory of vision.Robert M. Francescotti - 1991 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 42 (June):227-38.
    According to one brand of 'externalism', cognitive theories should individuate mental content 'widely'--that is, partly in terms of environmental features. David Marr's theory of vision is often cited in support of this view. Many philosophers (most notably, Tyler Burge) regard it as a prime example of a fruitful cognitive theory that widely individuates the representations it posits. I argue that, contrary to popular belief, Marr's theory does not presuppose an externalist view of mental content.
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  18. Defence of a reasonable individualism.Gabriel Segal - 1991 - Mind 100 (399):485-94.
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  19. Seeing What is not There.Gabriel Segal - 1989 - Philosophical Review 98 (2):189.
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  20. Marr’s Computational Theory of Vision.Patricia Kitcher - 1988 - Philosophy of Science 55 (March):1-24.
    David Marr's theory of vision has been widely cited by philosophers and psychologists. I have three projects in this paper. First, I try to offer a perspicuous characterization of Marr's theory. Next, I consider the implications of Marr's work for some currently popular philosophies of psychology, specifically, the "hegemony of neurophysiology view", the theories of Jerry Fodor, Daniel Dennett, and Stephen Stich, and the view that perception is permeated by belief. In the last section, I consider what the phenomenon of (...)
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  21. Individualism and psychology.Tyler Burge - 1986 - Philosophical Review 95 (January):3-45.