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Science of consciousness :: States of consciousness :: Hypnosis and consciousness

• A. Alexander, A. Andrew, Kallio Sakari & Revonsuo Antti (2007). Hypnosis induces a changed composition of brain oscillations in EEG: A case study.   (More)
• Ned Block (2002). Behaviorism revisited.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: O'Regan and Noe declare that the qualitative character of experience is constituted by the nature of the sensorimotor contingencies at play when we perceive. Sensorimotor contingencies are a highly restricted set of input-output relations. The restriction excludes contingencies that don’t essentially involve perceptual systems. Of course if the ‘sensory’ in ‘sensorimotor’ were to be understood mentalistically, the thesis would not be of much interest, so I assume that these contingencies are to be understood non-mentalistically. Contrary to their view, experience is a matter of what mediates between input and output, not input-output relations all by themselves. However, instead of mounting a head-on collision with their view, I think it will be more useful to consider a consequence of their view that admits of obvious counterexamples. The consequence consists of two claims: (1) any two systems that share that highly restricted set of input-output relations are therefor experientially the same and (2) conversely, any two systems that share experience must share these sensorimotor contingencies. Once stated, the view is so clearly wrong that my ascription of it to them might be challenged. At least it is a consequence of a major strand in their view. Perhaps this will be an opportunity for them to disassociate themselves from it. I will limit myself to (1)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/faculty/block/papers/BehaviorismRevisited.htm
  http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0140525X01270113
  http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0140525X01270113
  
• Axel Cleeremans & Erik Myin (1999). A short review of Consciousness in Action by Susan Hurley.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Consider Susan Hurley's depiction of mainstream views of the mind: "The mind is a kind of sandwich, and cognition is the filling" (p. 401). This particular sandwich (with perception as the bottom loaf and action as the top loaf) tastes foul to Hurley, who devotes most of "Consciousness in Action" to a systematic and sometimes extraordinarily detailed critique of what has otherwise been dubbed "classical" models of the mind. This critique then provides the basis for her alternative proposal, in which perception, action and environment are deeply intertwined
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/325301.html
  http://srsc.ulb.ac.be/axcwww/papers/pdf/99-Hurley.pdf
  http://srsc-mac1.ulb.ac.be/axcWWW/papers/pdf/99-Hurley.pdf
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/325301.html
  http://homepages.vub.ac.be/~emyin/Hurley.html
  http://srsc-mac1.ulb.ac.be/axcWWW/papers/pdf/99-Hurley.pdf
  http://srsc.ulb.ac.be/axcwww/papers/pdf/99-Hurley.pdf
  
• Fingelkurts, A. Andrew, A. Alexander, Kallio Sakari & Revonsuo Antti (2007). Cortex functional connectivity as a neurophysiological correlate of hypnosis: An EEG case study.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.bm-science.com/team/art44.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=17208259&dopt=Citation
  http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0028393206004313
  
• Shaun Gallagher (2005). Review of Alva noë's Action in Perception.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In Action in Perception, Alva Noë provides a persuasive account of the “enactive” approach to perception, according to which perception is not simply based on the processing of sensory information, or on the construction of internal representations, but is fundamentally shaped by the motor possibilities of the perceiving body. As John Dewey put it in 1896, in his essay, “The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology”
• Susan Hurley (2007). Neural dominance, neural deference, and sensorimotor dynamics.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Why is neural activity in a particular area expressed as experience of red rather than green, or as visual experience rather than auditory? Indeed, why does it have any conscious expression at all? These familiar questions indicate the explanatory gap between neural activity and ‘what it’s like’-- qualities of conscious experience. The comparative explanatory gaps, intermodal and intramodal, can be separated from the absolute explanatory gap and associated zombie issues--why does neural activity have any conscious expression at all?. Here I focus on comparative gaps: why is neural activity in a given area expressed as this type of experience rather than that type of experience?
• Sakari Kallio & Antti Revonsuo (2003). Hypnotic phenomena and altered states of consciousness: A multilevel framework of description and explanation.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.his.se/upload/14731/Kallio_Revonsuo_AST.pdf
  http://doi.wiley.com/10.1002/ch.273
  
• Pierre Rainville, Rrrobert Hofbauer, M. Catherine Bushnell, Gary Duncan & Donald Price (2002). Hypnosis modulates activity in brain structures involved in the regulation of consciousness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://jocn.mitpress.org/cgi/content/abstract/14/6/887
  http://portal.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1162570
  http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/089892902760191117?cookieSet=1&journalCode=jocn
  http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/089892902760191117
  http://hypnosisandsuggestion.org/articles/Rainville2002.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/mitpress/jcn/2002/00000014/00000006/art00011
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=12191456&dopt=Citation
  

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