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Science of consciousness :: Consciousness and physics

• The interpretation of quantum mechanics [3]
• Quantum mechanisms of consciousness [3]
• Consciousness and physics, misc [3]

The interpretation of quantum mechanics

See also: Quantum mechanisms of consciousness, Consciousness and physics, misc, Interactionism.

• Jeremy Butterfield (1998). Quantum curiosities of psychophysics.   (More)
• Alex Byrne & N. Hall (1999). Chalmers on consciousness and quantum mechanics.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8248(199909)66:3<370:COCAQM>2.0.CO;2-O
  http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/resolve?id=doi:10.1086/392693
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8248(199909)66:3<370:COCAQM>2.0.CO;2-O
  
• Alex Byrne & David Hilbert (2003). Color realism redux.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Our reply is in three parts. The first part concerns some foundational issues in the debate about color realism. The second part addresses the many objections to the version of physicalism about color ("productance physicalism") defended in the target article. The third part discusses the leading alternative approaches and theories endorsed by the commentators
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://tigger.uic.edu/~hilbert/papers/ColorRealismRedux.html
  http://web.mit.edu/abyrne/www/colorrealismredux.html
  http://web.mit.edu/abyrne/www/colorrealismredux.html
  http://www.journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0140525X03540018
  
• Alex Byrne & David Hilbert (1997). Glossary of color science.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Anomaloscope An instrument used for detecting anomalies of color vision. The test subject adjusts the ratio of two monochromatic lights to form a match with a third monochromatic light. The most common form of this procedure involves a Rayleigh match: a match between a mixture of monochromatic green and red lights, and a monochromatic yellow light. Normal subjects will choose a matching ratio of red to green light that falls within a fairly narrow range of values. Subjects with anomalous color vision will choose a ratio of red to green that falls outside this range, and red-green dichromats will accept any ratio of red to green as forming a match
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.uic.edu/~hilbert/Glossary.html
  
• Alex Byrne (2005). Is snow white?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: CURRENT ISSUE table of contents FEATURES new democracy forum new fiction forum poetry fiction film archives ABOUT US masthead mission rave reviews contests writers’ guidelines internships advertising SERVICES bookstore locator literary links subscribe
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.bostonreview.net/BR30.2/byrne.html
  
• Austen Clark (1998). Color perception (in 3000 words).   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: A neighbor who strikes it rich evokes both admiration and envy, and a similar mix of emotions must be aroused in many neighborhoods of cognitive science when the residents look at the results of research in color perception. It provides what is probably the most widely acknowledged success story of any domain of scientific psychology: the success, against all expectation, of the opponent process theory of color perception. Initially proposed by a Ewald Hering, a nineteenth century physiologist, it drew its inspiration from the existence of opposing muscle groups. Hering thought that analogous opposing processes could explain some aspects of color perception, but the resulting theory was more complicated and less intuitive than that proposed by the great Hermann von Helmholtz. Helmholtz carried his day, but in the long run Hering turned out to be right
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ucc.uconn.edu/~wwwphil/ccompan.html
  
• Jonathan Cohen (2007). A relationalist's guide to error about color perception.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Color relationalism is the view that colors are constituted in terms of relations to perceiving subjects. Among its explanatory virtues, relation- alism provides a satisfying treatment of cases of perceptual variation. But it can seem that relationalists lack resources for saying that a representa- tion of x’s color is erroneous. Surely, though, a theory of color that makes errors of color perception impossible cannot be correct. In this paper I’ll argue that, initial appearances notwithstanding, relationalism contains the resources to account for errors of color perception. I’ll conclude that worries about making room for error are worries the relationalist can meet
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2007.00650.x
  
• Jonathan Cohen (2003). Barry Stroud, the Quest for reality: Subjectivism and the metaphysics of colour.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In The Quest for Reality: Subjectivism and the Metaphysics of Colour [Stroud, 2000], Barry Stroud carries out an ambitious attack on various forms of irrealism and subjectivism about color. The views he targets - those that would deny a place in objective reality to the colors - have a venerable history in philosophy. Versions of them have been defended by Galileo, Descartes, Boyle, Locke, and Hume; more recently, forms of these positions have been articulated by Williams, Smart, Mackie, Ryle, and Hardin, among others. Stroud's aim is to argue not only that these writers fail to make their cases, but that no conceivable argument could ever convince us that colors are not a part of objective reality
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://aardvark.ucsd.edu/color/stroud.html
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/nous/2003/00000037/00000003/art00007
  
• Daniel Dennett (2003). Forestalling a food fight over color.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Byrne and Hilbert provide valuable clarification of the complexities–undreamt of by the layman–that make it hard to answer the question of what color is, and that often lead color scientists to say such remarkable and extravagant things. They emphasize at the outset that their issue is not just how to define the ordinary language term “color”: “The problem of color realism is like the investigation of what humans can digest, not the investigation of the folk category of food.” [ms p4], but then I am puzzled by a tension in the target article regarding the weight they put on our ordinary intuitions about color. The very setting of the issue as a disagreement between “color realists” and “color eliminativists” endows the everyday concept with somewhat more authority than it deserves–comparable to an imaginary debate between biologists who were “food realists” and “food eliminativists”!
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.bbsonline.org/Preprints/Byrne/Commentators/dennett.rtf
  http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/byrnehilbertbbs.htm
  http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0140525X03230181
  http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0140525X03230181
  
• Matthew Donald (2002). Neural unpredictability, the interpretation of quantum theory, and the mind-body problem.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: It has been suggested, on the one hand, that quantum states are just states of knowledge; and, on the other, that quantum theory is merely a theory of correlations. These suggestions are confronted with problems about the nature of psycho-physical parallelism and about how we could define probabilities for our individual future observations given our individual present and previous observations. The complexity of the problems is underlined by arguments that unpredictability in ordinary everyday neural functioning, ultimately stemming from small-scale uncertainties in molecular motions, may overwhelm, by many orders of magnitude, many conventionally recognized sources of observed ``quantum'' uncertainty. Some possible ways of avoiding the problems are considered but found wanting. It is proposed that a complete understanding of the relationship between subjective experience and its physical correlates requires the introduction of mathematical definitions and indeed of new physical laws
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.bss.phy.cam.ac.uk/~mjd1014/nunquit.html
  http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/2002quant.ph..8033D
  http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0208033
  http://www.bss.phy.cam.ac.uk/~mjd1014/nunquita.html
  http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00000716/00/nunquit.pdf
  http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00000716/
  
• S. Klein (1991). The duality of psycho-physics.   (More)
• Gregory Mulhauser (1995). On the end of a quantum-mechanical romance.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.qedcorp.com/pcr/pcr/mulhaus.html
  http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/volume2-1/psyche-95-2-19-decoherence-1-mulhauser.html
  
• Diana Page (1995). Attaching theories of consciousness to Bohmian quantum mechanics.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph?papernum=9507006
  http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/9507006
  
• Diana Page (1996). Sensible quantum mechanics: Are probabilities only in the mind?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Quantum mechanics may be formulated as Sensible Quantum Mechanics (SQM) so that it contains nothing probabilistic except conscious perceptions. Sets of these perceptions can be deterministically realized with measures given by expectation values of positive-operator-valued awareness operators. Ratios of the measures for these sets of perceptions can be interpreted as frequency- type probabilities for many actually existing sets. These probabilities gener- ally cannot be given by the ordinary quantum “probabilities” for a single set of alternatives. Probabilism, or ascribing probabilities to unconscious aspects of the world, may be seen to be an aesthemamorphic myth
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/1996IJMPD...5..583P
  http://arxiv.org/abs/gr-qc/9507024
  http://arXiv.org/pdf/gr-qc/9507024
  
• Don Page (2003). Mindless sensationalism: A quantum framework for consciousness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0108039
  http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/2001quant.ph..8039P
  http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph?papernum=0108039
  
• Osvaldo Pessoa (online). What is an essentially quantum mechanical effect?   (More)
• Peter Ross (online). Reference fixing as a strategy for fitting color in the physical world.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: I propose a strategy for a metaphysical reduction of perceived color, that is, an identification of perceived color with properties characterizable in non-qualitative terms. According to this strategy, a description of visual experience of color, which incorporates a description of the appearance of color, is taken as a reference-fixing description. This strategy both gives a primary epistemic role to color appearance and avoids rendering color as metaphysically mysterious. I’ll also argue that given this strategy, disjunctive physicalism is the best account of perceived color
• Eric Rubenstein (online). Color.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Philosophy has long struggled to understand the nature of color. The central role color plays in our lives, in visual experience, in art, as a metaphor for emotions, has made it an obvious candidate for philosophical reflection. Understanding the nature of color, however, has proved a daunting task, despite the numerous fields that contribute to the project. Even knowing how to start can be difficult. Is color to be understood as an objective part of reality, a property of objects with a status similar to shape and size? Or is color more like pain, to be found only in experience and so somehow subjective? Or is color more like what some have said about time--that it seems real until we reflect enough, where we come ultimately to dismiss it as mere illusion? If color is more like shape and size, can we give a scientific account of it? Various strategies exist for this option--taking the color of an object to be just a complicated texture of that object, one that reflects certain wavelengths. Or perhaps color is merely a disposition to cause experiences in us, as salt has a disposition to dissolve. On the other hand, if color is more like pain, and found only in subjective experience, what is the nature of color experience? How, for instance, does an experience of red differ from an experience of blue, or from an experience of pain for that matter? Finally, if color is mere illusion, how do we continue to be so taken in by that illusion and how can something unreal seem so real and important to us?
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.iep.utm.edu/c/color.htm
  
• Henry Stapp (2005). Quantum interactive dualism - an alternative to materialism.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: _René Descartes proposed an interactive dualism that posits an interaction between the_ _mind of a human being and some of the matter located in his or her brain. Isaac Newton_ _subsequently formulated a physical theory based exclusively on the material/physical_ _part of Descartes’ ontology. Newton’s theory enforced the principle of the causal closure_ _of the physical, and the classical physics that grew out of it enforces this same principle._ _This classical theory purports to give, in principle, a complete deterministic account of the_ _physically described properties of nature, expressed exclusively in terms of these_ _physically described properties themselves. Orthodox contemporary physical theory_ _violates this principle in two separate ways. First, it injects random elements into the_ _dynamics. Second, it allows, and also requires, abrupt probing actions that disrupt the_ _mechanistically described evolution of the physically described systems. These probing_ _actions are called Process 1 interventions by von Neumann. They are psycho-physical_ _events. Neither the content nor the timing of these events is determined either by any_ _known law, or by the afore-mentioned random elements. Orthodox quantum mechanics_ _considers these events to be instigated by choices made by conscious agents. In von_ _Neumann’s formulation of quantum theory each such intervention acts upon the state of_ _the brain of some conscious agent. Thus orthodox von Neumann contemporary physics_ _posits an interactive dualism similar to that of Descartes. But in this quantum version the_ _effects of the conscious choices upon our brains are controlled, in part, by the known_ _basic rules of quantum physics. This theoretically specified mind-brain connection allows_ _many basic psychological and neuropsychological findings associated with the apparent_ _physical effectiveness of our conscious volitional efforts to be explained in a causal and_ _practically useful way..
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.osti.gov/energycitations/product.biblio.jsp?osti_id=889633
  http://www-physics.lbl.gov/~stapp/QID.doc
  http://repositories.cdlib.org/lbnl/LBNL-59905
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/2005/00000012/00000011/art00003
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/zygo/2006/00000041/00000003/art00009
  
• Henry Stapp (2006). Quantum interactive dualism, II: The Libet and Einstein-podolsky-Rosen causal anomalies.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: b>: Replacing faulty nineteenth century physics by its orthodox quantum successor converts the earlier materialist conception of nature to a structure that does not enforce the principle of the causal closure of the physical. The quantum laws possess causal gaps, and these gaps are filled in actual scientific practice by inputs from our streams of consciousness. The form of the quantum laws permits and suggests the existence of an underlying reality that is built not on substances, but on psychophysical events, and on objective tendencies for these events to occur. These events constitute intrinsic mind-brain connections. They are fundamental links between brain processes described in physical terms and events in our streams of consciousness. This quantum ontology confers upon our conscious intentions the causal efficacy assigned to them in actual scientific practice, and creates a substance- free interactive dualism. This putative quantum ontology has previously been shown to have impressive explanatory power in both psychology and neuroscience. Here it is used to reconcile the existence of physically efficacious conscious free will with causal anomalies of both the Libet and Einstein-Rosen-Podolsky types
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/42U403437L5208K5.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/erke/2006/00000065/00000001/00009017
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/42u403437l5208k5/fulltext.pdf
  
• Henry Stapp (2007). Quantum mechanical theories of consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Quantum mechanical theories of consciousness are contrasted to classical ones. A key difference is that the quantum laws are fundamentally psychophysical and provide an explanation of the causal effect of conscious effort on neural processes, while the laws of classical physics, being purely physical, cannot. The quantum approach provides causal explanations, deduced from the laws of physics, of correlations found in psychology and in neuropsychology
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.osti.gov/energycitations/product.biblio.jsp?osti_id=878524
  http://www-physics.lbl.gov/~stapp/Blackwell.pdf
  
• Henry Stapp (online). The causal role of consciousness in the quantum brain.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Science is basically about correlations between conscious human experiences: that is what makes it both useful and testable in the realm of our expanding human knowledge. Explicit recognition of this understanding lies at the core of the formulation of quantum theory that was originally developed during the twenties by its founders
• Henry Stapp (1998). The evolution of consciousness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/81876.html
  http://www.csa.com/partners/viewrecord.php?requester=gs&collection=TRD&recid=N9730037AH
  http://www-physics.lbl.gov/~stapp/39241.ps
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/stapp96evolution.html
  
• Henry Stapp (online). "The observer" in physics and neuroscience.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Neuroscience is an important component of the scientific attack on the problem of consciousness. However, most neuroscientists, viewing our discussions, see only conflict and discord, and no reason why quantum theory has any great relevance the dynamics of the conscious brain. It is therefore worthwhile, in this first plenary talk of the 2003 Tucson conference on “Quantum Approaches to the Understanding of Consciousness,” to focus on the central issue, which is the crucial role of “The Observer,” and specifically, “The Mind of The Observer” in contemporary physical theory. I shall therefore review here this radical departure of present-day basic physics from the principles of classical physics, and then spell out some of its ramifications for neuroscience
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www-physics.lbl.gov/~stapp/Tucson2003.pdf
  
• Henry Stapp (1995). Why classical mechanics cannot accommodate consciousness but quantum mechanics can.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/1995quant.ph..2012S
  http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/volume2-1/psyche-95-2-05-qm_stapp-1-stapp.html
  http://psyche.csse.monash.edu.au/v2/psyche-2-05-stapp.html
  http://www.citebase.org/cgi-bin/fulltext?format=application/pdf&identifier=oai:arXiv.org:quant-ph/9502012
  http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/9502012
  http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/v2/psyche-2-05-stapp.html
  http://kh.bu.edu/qcl/pdf/stapp__h19950505011b.pdf
  

Quantum mechanisms of consciousness

See also: The interpretation of quantum mechanics, Consciousness and physics, misc, Godelian arguments.

• Harald Atmanspacher (2004). Quantum theory and consciousness: An overview with selected examples.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/S102602260440106X
  http://www.igpp.de/english/tda/pdf/prigoddns.pdf
  http://www.hindawi.com/GetPDF.aspx?pii=S102602260440106X
  
• Friedrich Beck & John Eccles (1992). Quantum aspects of brain activity and the role of consciousness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.pnas.org/cgi/content/abstract/89/23/11357
  http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/1992PNAS...8911357B
  http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=50549
  http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=50549&tools=bot
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=1333607&dopt=Citation
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0027-8424(19921201)89:23<11357:QAOBAA>2.0.CO;2-5
  
• Erhard Bieberich (online). In search of a neuronal substrate of the human mind: New concepts from "topological neurochemistry".   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Neurochemistry is a powerful discipline of modern neuroscience based on a description of neuronal function in terms of molecular reaction and interaction. This study aims at a neurochemical approach to the "hard" philosophical mind-body problem: the search for the neuronal correlate of consciousness. The scattered pattern of remote areas in the human brain simultaneously busy with the computation of single perceptions has left us with the unanswered questions why, where, and how the neuronal activity gives rise to a unified conscious observation of the outer world in a space inside of the human brain. In this study, conscious perception of temporally and spatially distinct events by an inner observer, the self, is treated as a topological problem demanding for a correlation of the self with a particular orchestration of neuronal or neurochemical activity triggered by action potentials. According to a novel concept of "topological neurochemistry" it is assumed that three features of the human brain are necessary in order to generate consciousness: 1) A network of neurons with dendritic branching structure and re-entry signaling of action potentials. 2)A macromolecular lattice structure as part of the neuron which is excitable or modulated by action potentials. 3) A spatial superposition of action potentials which underlies conscious perception but reveals not necessarily the same topology as the space perceived in consciousness. Several molecular models for the generation of consciousness and the self will be discussed, and a new concept, the "fractal approach", will be introduced. Mathematical theory and experimental methods for investigation of human consciousness will be presented
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:80
  http://cogprints.soton.ac.uk/documents/disk0/00/00/00/80/index.html
  http://cogprints.org/80/00/TOPO2.htm
  http://cogprints.org/80/0/TOPO2.htm
  
• David Bourget (2004). Quantum leaps in philosophy of mind.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This paper criticizes Henry Stapp's quantum mechanical theory of consciousness and free will on a number of fronts, technical and philosophical
• John Eccles (1986). Do mental events cause neural events analogously to the probability fields of quantum mechanics?   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/1986RSPSB.227..411E
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0080-4649(19860522)227:1249<411:DMECNE>2.0.CO;2-G
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=2873576&dopt=Citation
  
• Brian Flanagan (2003). Are perceptual fields quantum fields?   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.portalppgci.marilia.unesp.br/reic/viewarticle.php?id=14
  
• Mr Shan Gao (ms). Quantum, consciousness and panpsychism: A solution to the hard problem.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: We analyze the results and implications of the combination of quantum and consciousness in terms of the recent QSC analysis. The quantum effect of consciousness is first explored. We show that the consciousness of the observer can help to distinguish the nonorthogonal states under some condition, while the usual physical measuring device without consciousness can't. The result indicates that the causal efficacies of consciousness do exist when considering the basic quantum process. Based on this conclusion, we demonstrate that consciousness is not reducible or emergent, but a new fundamental property of matter. This provides a quantum basis for panpsychism. Furthermore, we argue that the conscious process is one kind of quantum computation process based on the analysis of consciousness time and combination problem. It is shown that a unified theory of matter and consciousness should include two parts: one is the complete quantum evolution of matter state, which includes the definite nonlinear evolution element introduced by consciousness, and the other is the psychophysical principle or corresponding principle between conscious content and matter state. Lastly, some experimental suggestions are presented to confirm the theoretical analysis of the paper
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/3489/01/qcp.pdf
  http://cogprints.org/3489/1/qcp.pdf
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00003489/
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:3489
  
• Shan Gao (2003). A possible quantum basis of panpsychism.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: We show that consciousness may violate the basic quantum principle, according to which the nonorthogonal quantum states can't be distinguished. This implies that the physical world is not causally closed without consciousness, and consciousness is a fundamental property of matter, thus provides a possible quantum basis for panpsychism
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/3064/1/qpan.pdf
  http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00000467/
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:3064
  
• Danko Georgiev (ms). Falsifications of Hameroff-Penrose orch OR model of consciousness and novel avenues for development of quantum mind theory.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In this paper we try to make a clear distinction between quantum mysticism and quantum mind theory. Quackery always accompanies science especially in controversial and still under development areas and since the quantum mind theory is a science youngster it must clearly demarcate itself from the great stuff of pseudo-science currently patronized by the term "quantum mind". Quantum theory has attracted a big deal of attention and opened new avenues for building up a physical theory of mind because its principles and experimental foundations are as strange as the phenomenon of consciousness itself. Yet, the unwarranted recourse to paranormal phenomena as supporting the quantum mind theory plus the extremely bad biological mismodeling of brain physiology lead to great scepticism about the viability of the approach. We give as an example the Hameroff-Penrose Orch OR model with a list of twenty four problems not being repaired for a whole decade after the birth of the model in 1996. In the exposition we have tried not only to pesent critique of the spotted flaws, but to provide novel possibilities towards creation of neuroscientific quantum model of mind that incorporates all the available data from the basic disciplines (biochemistry, cell physiology, etc.) up to the clinical observations (neurology, neurosurgery, molecular psychiatry, etc.). Thus in a concise fashion we outline what can be done scientifically to improve the Q-mind theory and start a research programme (in Lakatos sense) that is independent on the particular flaws in some of the existing Q-mind models
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00003049/02/OOR.ps
  
• Danko Georgiev (2003). On the dynamic timescale of mind-brain interaction.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In neurophysiology it is widely assumed that our mind operates in millisecond timescale. This view might be wrong, because if consciousness is quantum coherent phenomenon at the level of protein assemblies, then its dynamic timescale can be picosecond one
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/4463/01/tucson_2003.ppt
  http://cogprints.org/4463
  http://cogprints.org/4463/02/tucson_2003.pdf
  
• Gordon Globus (1996). Quantum consciousness is cybernetic.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/volume2-1/psyche-96-2-21-cybernetic-1-globus.html
  
• Stuart Hameroff (2006). Consciousness, neurobiology and quantum mechanics: The case for a connection.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Consciousness involves phenomenal experience, self-awareness, feelings, choices, control of actions, a model of the world, etc. But what _is_ _it?_ Is consciousness something specific, or merely a byproduct of information processing? Whatever it is, consciousness is a multi-faceted puzzle. Despite enormous strides in behavioral and brain science, essential features of consciousness continue to elude explanation. Unresolved problems include: 1) Neural correlates of conscious perception apparently occur too late—150 to 500 milliseconds (msec) after impingement on our sense organs—to have causal efficacy in seemingly conscious perceptions and willful actions, often initiated or completed within 100 msec after sensory impingement. For example in the
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.quantumconsciousness.org/springer.htm
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/x2h1p444w0t4321v.pdf
  
• Stuart Hameroff & A. C. Scott (1998). A sonoran afternoon: A dialogue on quantum mechanics and consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: _Sonoran Desert, Stuart Hameroff and Alwyn Scott awoke from their_ _siestas to take margaritas in the shade of a ramada. On a nearby_ _table, a tape recorder had accidentally been left on and the following_ _is an unedited transcript of their conversation._
• Stuart Hameroff & Roger Penrose (1996). Conscious events as orchestrated space-time selections.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/1996/00000003/00000001/679
  
• Stuart Hameroff (2001). Consciousness, the brain, and space-time geometry.   (More)
• Stuart Hameroff (online). Consciousness, Whitehead and quantum computation in the brain: Panprotopsychism meets the physics of fundamental spacetime geometry.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: _dualism_ (consciousness lies outside knowable science), _emergence_ (consciousness arises as a novel property from complex computational dynamics in the brain), and some form of _panpsychism_, _pan-protopsychism, or pan-experientialism_ (essential features or precursors of consciousness are fundamental components of reality which are accessed by brain processes). In addition to 1) the problem of subjective experience, other related enigmatic features of consciousness persist, defying technological and philosophical inroads. These include 2) the “binding problem”—how disparate brain activities give rise to a unified sense of “self” or unified conscious content. Temporal synchrony—brain-wide coherence of neural membrane electrical activities—is often assumed to accomplish binding, but _what_ is being synchronized? What is being coherently bound? Another enigmatic feature is 3) the transition from pre-conscious processes to consciousness itself. Most neuroscientists agree that consciousness is the “tip of an iceberg”, that the vast majority of brain activities is
• Stuart Hameroff (1998). "Funda-mentality": Is the conscious mind subtly linked to a basic level of the universe?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Age-old battle lines over the puzzling nature of mental experience are shaping a modern resurgence in the study of consciousness. On one side are the long-dominant "physicalists" who view consciousness as an emergent property of the brain's neural networks. On the alternative, rebellious side are those who see a necessary added ingredient: proto-conscious experience intrinsic to reality, perhaps understandable through modern physics (panpsychists, pan-experientialists, "funda-mentalists"). It is argued here that the physicalist premise alone is unable to solve completely the difficult issues of consciousness and that to do so will require supplemental panpsychist/pan-experiential philosophy expressed in modern physics. In one scheme proto-conscious experience is a basic property of physical reality accessible to a quantum process associated with brain activity. The proposed process is Roger Penrose's "objective reduction" (OR), a self-organizing "collapse" of the quantum wave function related to instability at the most basic level of space-time geometry. In the Penrose- Hameroff model of "orchestrated objective reduction" (Orch OR), OR quantum computation occurs in cytoskeletal microtubules within the brain's neurons. The basic thesis is that consciousness involves brain activities coupled to a self-organizing ripples in fundamental reality
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/369/0/tics.html
  http://www.quantumconsciousness.org/penrose-hameroff/Fundamentality.html
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:369
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/13646613/1998/00000002/00000004/art01157
  
• Stuart Hameroff (1998). More neural than thou (reply to churchland).   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In "Brainshy: Non-neural theories of conscious experience," (this volume) Patricia Churchland considers three "non-neural" approaches to the puzzle of consciousness: 1) Chalmers' fundamental information, 2) Searle's "intrinsic" property of brain, and 3) Penrose-Hameroff quantum phenomena in microtubules. In rejecting these ideas, Churchland flies the flag of "neuralism." She claims that conscious experience will be totally and completely explained by the dynamical complexity of properties at the level of neurons and neural networks. As far as consciousness goes, neural network firing patterns triggered by axon-to-dendrite synaptic chemical transmissions are the fundamental correlates of consciousness. There is no need to look elsewhere
• Stuart Hameroff & Roger Penrose (1996). Orchestrated reduction of quantum coherence in brain microtubules: A model for consciousness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://portal.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=228877
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/03784754/1996/00000040/00000003/art80476
  
• Stuart Hameroff (2002). Quantum computation in brain microtubules.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Proposals for quantum computation rely on superposed states implementing multiple computations simultaneously, in parallel, according to quantum linear superposition (e.g., Benioff, 1982; Feynman, 1986; Deutsch, 1985, Deutsch and Josza, 1992). In principle, quantum computation is capable of specific applications beyond the reach of classical computing (e.g., Shor, 1994). A number of technological systems aimed at realizing these proposals have been suggested and are being evaluated as possible substrates for quantum computers (e.g. trapped ions, electron spins, quantum dots, nuclear spins, etc., see Table 1; Bennett, 1995; and Barenco, 1995). The main obstacle to realization of quantum computation is the problem of interfacing to the system (input, output) while also protecting the quantum state from environmental decoherence. If this problem can be overcome, then present day classical computers may evolve to quantum computers
• Stuart Hameroff (online). The brain is both neurocomputer and quantum computer.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: _Figure 1. Dendrites and cell bodies of schematic neurons connected by dendritic-dendritic gap junctions form a laterally connected input_ _layer (“dendritic web”) within a neurocomputational architecture. Dendritic web dynamics are temporally coupled to gamma synchrony_ _EEG, and correspond with integration phases of “integrate and fire” cycles. Axonal firings provide input to, and output from, integration_ _phases (only one input, and three output axons are shown). Cell bodies/soma contain nuclei shown as black circles; microtubule networks_ _pervade the cytoplasm. According to the Orch OR theory, gamma EEG-synchronized integration phases include quantum computations in_ _microtubule networks which culminate with conscious moments. Insert closeup shows a gap junction through which microtubule quantum_ _states entangle among different neurons, enabling macroscopic quantum states in dendritic webs extending throughout cortex and other_ _brain regions._
• Robert Jahn & Brenda Dunne (1986). On the quantum mechanics of consciousness, with application to anomalous phenomena.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.osti.gov/energycitations/product.biblio.jsp?osti_id=6936499
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/VTRR87TG356154R7.pdf
  
• Robert Jahn (1993). The Complementarity of Consciousness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S1550830707000699
  
• Stanley Klein (1995). Is quantum mechanics relevant to understanding consciousness?   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.calculemus.org/MathUniversalis/NS/10/05klein.html
  http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/volume2-1/psyche-95-2-03-shadows-2-klein.html
  http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/v2/psyche-2-03-klein.html
  http://psyche.csse.monash.edu.au/v2/psyche-2-03-klein.html
  
• Kirk Ludwig (1995). Why the difference between quantum and classical mechanics is irrelevant to the mind-body problem.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: I argue that the logical difference between classical and quantum mechanics that Stapp (1995) claims shows quantum mechanics is more amenable to an account of consciousness than is classical mechanics is irrelevant to the problem
• Ulrich Mohrhoff (online). Psychology all the way down.   (More)
• Ulrich Mohrhoff (ms). Quantum mechanics and consciousness: Fact and fiction.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0102047
  
• Roger Penrose (2001). Consciousness, the brain, and spacetime geometry: An addendum: Some new developments on the orch OR model for consciousness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.annalsonline.org/cgi/content/abstract/929/1/105
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=11349419&dopt=Citation
  
• Roger Penrose & Stuart Hameroff (1996). Orchestrated objective reduction of quantum coherence in brain microtubules: The "orch OR" model for consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Features of consciousness difficult to understand in terms of conventional neuroscience have evoked application of quantum theory, which describes the fundamental behavior of matter and energy. In this paper we propose that aspects of quantum theory (e.g. quantum coherence) and of a newly proposed physical phenomenon of quantum wave function "self-collapse"(objective reduction: OR -Penrose, 1994) are essential for consciousness, and occur in cytoskeletal microtubules and other structures within each of the brain's neurons. The particular characteristics of microtubules suitable for quantum effects include their crystal-like lattice structure, hollow inner core, organization of cell function and capacity for information processing. We envisage that conformational states of microtubule subunits (tubulins) are coupled to internal quantum events, and cooperatively interact (compute) with other tubulins. We further assume that macroscopic coherent superposition of quantum-coupled tubulin conformational states occurs throughout significant brain volumes and provides the global binding essential to consciousness. We equate the emergence of the microtubule quantum coherence with pre-conscious processing which grows (for up to 500 milliseconds) until the mass-energy difference among the separated states of tubulins reaches a threshold related to quantum gravity. According to the arguments for OR put forth in Penrose (1994), superpositioned states each have their own space-time geometries. When the degree of coherent mass-energy difference leads to sufficient separation of space-time geometry, the system must choose and decay (reduce, collapse) to a single universe state. In this way, a transient superposition of slightly differing space-time geometries persists until an abrupt quantum classical reduction occurs. Unlike the random, "subjective reduction"( SR, or R) of standard quantum theory caused by observation or environmental entanglement, the OR we propose in microtubules is a self-collapse and it results in particular patterns of microtubule-tubulin conformational states that regulate neuronal activities including synaptic functions.
• Roger Penrose & Stuart Hameroff (1995). What 'gaps'? Reply to Grush and Churchland.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Grush and Churchland (1995) attempt to address aspects of the proposal that we have been making concerning a possible physical mechanism underlying the phenomenon of consciousness. Unfortunately, they employ arguments that are highly misleading and, in some important respects, factually incorrect. Their article ‘Gaps in Penrose’s Toilings’ is addressed specifically at the writings of one of us (Penrose), but since the particular model they attack is one put forward by both of us (Hameroff and Penrose, 1995; 1996), it is appropriate that we both reply; but since our individual remarks refer to different aspects of their criticism we are commenting on their article separately. The logical arguments discussed by Grush and Churchland, and the related physics are answered in Part l by Penrose, largely by pointing out precisely where these arguments have already been treated in detail in Shadows of the Mind (Penrose, 1994). In Part 2, Hameroff replies to various points on the biological side, showing for example how they have seriously misunderstood what they refer to as ‘physiological evidence’ regarding to effects of the drug colchicine. The reply serves also to discuss aspects of our model ‘orchestrated objective reduction in brain microtubules – Orch OR’ which attempts to deal with the serious problems of consciousness more directly and completely than any previous theory
• Alfredo Pereira (2003). The quantum mind/classical brain problem.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.portalppgci.marilia.unesp.br/reic/include/getdoc.php?id=102&article=15&mode=pdf
  
• A. C. Scott (1996). On quantum theories of the mind.   (More)
• A. C. Scott (2003). On quantum theories of the mind.   (More)
• Gao Shan (2004). Quantum collapse, consciousness and superluminal communication.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The relation between quantum collapse, consciousness and superluminal communication is analyzed. As we know, quantum collapse, if exists, can result in the appearance of quantum nonlocality, and requires the existence of a pre- ferred Lorentz frame. This may permit the realization of quantum superluminal communication (QSC), which will no longer result in the usual causal loop in case of the existence of a preferred Lorentz frame. The possibility of the existence of QSC is further analyzed under the assumption that quantum collapse is a real process. We demonstrate that the combination of quantum collapse and the consciousness of the observer will permit the observer to distinguish nonorthogonal states in principle. This provides a possible way to realize QSC. Some implications of the existence of QSC are briefy discussed
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/J3J72U21K30R286T.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/fopl/2004/00000017/00000002/00486124
  
• Henry Stapp (online). Quantum Approaches to Consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: It is widely accepted that consciousness or, more generally, mental activity is in some way correlated to the behavior of the material brain. Since quantum theory is the most fundamental theory of matter that is currently available, it is a legitimate question to ask whether quantum theory can help us to understand consciousness. Several approaches answering this question affirmatively, proposed in recent decades, will be surveyed. It will be pointed out that they make different epistemological assumptions, refer to different neurophysiological levels of description, and use quantum theory in different ways. For each of the approaches discussed, problematic and promising features will be equally highlighted
• Henry Stapp (1985). Consciousness and values in the quantum universe.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/V0817677WR4H0K56.pdf
  
• Henry Stapp (online). Chance, choice, and consciousness: A causal quantum theory of the mind/brain.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www-physics.lbl.gov/~stapp/37944new.ps
  http://www-physics.lbl.gov/~stapp/37944new.txt
  
• Henry Stapp (1999). On quantum theories of the mind.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://kh.bu.edu/qcl/pdf/stapp__h19971d0f6879.pdf
  http://personal.riverusers.com/~rover/stapp.pdf