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Science of consciousness :: First-person approaches :: Introspection

• William Adams (online). Introspectionism reconsidered.   (More)
• Murat Aydede & D. Price (2005). The experimental use of introspection in the scientific study of pain and its integration with third-person methodologies: The experiential-phenomenological approach.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Understanding the nature of pain depends, at least partly, on recognizing its subjectivity (thus, its first-person epistemology). This in turn requires using a first-person experiential method in addition to third-person experimental approaches to study it. This paper is an attempt to spell out what the former approach is and how it can be integrated with the latter. We start our discussion by examining some foundational issues raised by the use of introspection. We argue that such a first-person method in the scientific study of pain (as in the study of any experience) is in fact indispensable by demonstrating that it has in fact been consistently used in conjunction with conventional third-person methodologies, and this for good reasons. We show that, contrary to what appears to be a widespread opinion, there is absolutely no reason to think that the use of such a first-person approach is scientifically and methodologically suspect. We distinguish between two uses of introspective methods in scientific experiments: one draws on the subjects’ introspective reports where any investigator has equal and objective access. The other is where the investigator becomes a subject of his own study and draws on the introspection of his own experiences. We give examples using and/or approximating both strategies that include studies of second pain summation and its relationship to neural activities, and brain imaging- psychophysical studies wherein sensory and affective qualities of pain are correlated with cerebral cortical activity. We explain what we call the experiential or phenomenological approach that has its origins in the work of Price and Barrell (1980). This approach capitalizes on the scientific prospects and benefits of using the introspection of the investigator. We distinguish between its vertical and horizontal applications. Finally, we conclude that integrating such an approach to standard third-person methodologies can only help us in having a fuller understanding of pain and of conscious experience in general..
• Gary Hatfield (2005). Introspective evidence in psychology.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In Scientific Evidence: Philosophical Theories & Applications, ed. by Peter Achinstein (Baltimore: Johns Hopkine University Press, 2005), 259–86. Key words: introspection, psychology of perception, Wundt, Gestalt Psychology
• Anthony Jack & Andreas Roepstorff (2002). Introspection and cognitive brain mapping: From stimulus-response to script-report.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=12140083&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/13646613/2002/00000006/00000008/art01941
  
• Petter Johansson, Lars Hall, Sverker Sikstrom & Andreas Olsson (2005). Failure to detect mismatches between intention and outcome in a simple decision task.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/2005Sci...310..116J
  http://www.csa.com/partners/viewrecord.php?requester=gs&collection=TRD&recid=2006071644990SO
  http://www.lucs.lu.se/People/petter.johansson/Papers/Johansson et al [2005] Failure to detect mismatches
  http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/abstract/310/5745/116
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/sites/entrez?db=pubmed&uid=16210542&cmd=showdetailview&indexed=google
  
• James Moore & Patrick Haggard (2006). Commentary on How Something Can Be Said About Telling More Than We Can Know: On Choice Blindness and Introspection.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=17071108&dopt=Citation
  
• Yutaka Nakamura & R. Chapman (2002). Measuring pain: An introspective look at introspection.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://academic.evergreen.edu/curricular/scc/ArticlesForFallProjects/CausalModelingSubjectiveReports.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=12470624&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/ap/cc/2002/00000011/00000004/art00019
  
• Gualtiero Piccinini (online). Mind gauging: Introspection as a public epistemic resource.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Introspection used to be excluded from science because it isn’t public--for any question about mental states, only the person whose states are in question can answer by introspecting. However, we often use introspective reports to gauge each other’s minds, and contemporary psychologists generate data from them. I argue that some uses of introspection are as public as any scientific method
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00000497/00/Publicityofintrospection_phil-sci.doc
  
• Donald Price & Murat Aydede (2005). The experimental use of introspection in the scientific study of pain.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Understanding the nature of pain depends, at least partly, on recognizing its subjectivity (thus, its first-person epistemology). This in turn requires using a first-person experiential method in addition to third-person experimental approaches to study it. This paper is an attempt to spell out what the former approach is and how it can be integrated with the latter. We start our discussion by examining some foundational issues raised by the use of introspection. We argue that such a first-person method in the scientific study of pain (as in the study of any experience) is in fact indispensable by demonstrating that it has in fact been consistently used in conjunction with conventional third-person methodologies, and this for good reasons. We show that, contrary to what appears to be a widespread opinion, there is absolutely no reason to think that the use of such a first-person approach is scientifically and methodologically suspect. We distinguish between two uses of introspective methods in scientific experiments: one draws on the subjects’ introspective reports where any investigator has equal and objective access. The other is where the investigator becomes a subject of his own study and draws on the introspection of his own experiences. We give examples using and/or approximating both strategies that include studies of second pain summation and its relationship to neural activities, and brain imaging- psychophysical studies wherein sensory and affective qualities of pain are correlated with cerebral cortical activity. We explain what we call the experiential or phenomenological approach that has its origins in the work of Price and Barrell (1980). This approach capitalizes on the scientific prospects and benefits of using the introspection of the investigator. We distinguish between its vertical and horizontal applications. Finally, we conclude that integrating such an approach to standard third-person methodologies can only help us in having a fuller understanding of pain and of conscious experience in general..
• Donald Price & Murat Aydede (2005). The experimental use of introspection in the scientific study of pain and its integration with third-person methodologies: The experiential-phenomenological approach.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Understanding the nature of pain depends, at least partly, on recognizing its subjectivity (thus, its first-person epistemology). This in turn requires using a first-person experiential method in addition to third-person experimental approaches to study it. This paper is an attempt to spell out what the former approach is and how it can be integrated with the latter. We start our discussion by examining some foundational issues raised by the use of introspection. We argue that such a first-person method in the scientific study of pain (as in the study of any experience) is in fact indispensable by demonstrating that it has in fact been consistently used in conjunction with conventional third-person methodologies, and this for good reasons. We show that, contrary to what appears to be a widespread opinion, there is absolutely no reason to think that the use of such a first-person approach is scientifically and methodologically suspect. We distinguish between two uses of introspective methods in scientific experiments: one draws on the subjects’ introspective reports where any investigator has equal and objective access. The other is where the investigator becomes a subject of his own study and draws on the introspection of his own experiences. We give examples using and/or approximating both strategies that include studies of second pain summation and its relationship to neural activities, and brain imaging- psychophysical studies wherein sensory and affective qualities of pain are correlated with cerebral cortical activity. We explain what we call the experiential or phenomenological approach that has its origins in the work of Price and Barrell (1980). This approach capitalizes on the scientific prospects and benefits of using the introspection of the investigator. We distinguish between its vertical and horizontal applications. Finally, we conclude that integrating such an approach to standard third-person methodologies can only help us in having a fuller understanding of pain and of conscious experience in general..
• Philip Robbins (2004). Knowing me, knowing you: Theory of mind and the machinery of introspection.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/2004/00000011/F0020007/art00009
  
• Eric Schwitzgebel (2005). Difference tone training: A demonstration adapted from Titchener's experimental psychology.   (More)
• Eric Schwitzgebel (2004). Introspective training apprehensively defended: Reflections on Titchener's lab manual.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.faculty.ucr.edu/~eschwitz/SchwitzPapers/IntrospTrain030221.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/2004/00000011/F0020007/art00005
  
• Eric Schwitzgebel (2004). Introspective training: Reflections on Titchener's lab manual.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.faculty.ucr.edu/~eschwitz/SchwitzPapers/IntrospTrain030221.pdf
  http://www.faculty.ucr.edu/~eschwitz/SchwitzPapers/IntrospTrain030124.pdf
  
• Eric Schwitzgebel (ms). The unreliability of naive introspection.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: We are prone to gross error, even in favorable circumstances of extended reflection, about our own ongoing conscious experience, our current phenomenology. Even in this apparently privileged domain, our self-knowledge is faulty and untrustworthy. Examples highlighted in this paper include: emotional experience, peripheral vision, and the phenomenology of thought. Philosophical foundationalism supposing that we infer an external world from secure knowledge of our own consciousness is almost exactly backward
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00002965/01/Schwitzgebel060921.doc
  http://www.faculty.ucr.edu/~eschwitz/SchwitzPapers/Naive050617.pdf
  http://www.faculty.ucr.edu/~eschwitz/SchwitzPapers/Naive021111.pdf
  http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00002965/
  
• Edward Bradford Titchener (1912). The schema of introspection.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-9556(191210)23:4<485:TSOI>2.0.CO;2-U
  
• Margaret Washburn (1921). Introspection as an objective method.   (More)
• Timothy Wilson (2003). Knowing when to ask: Introspection and the adaptive unconscious.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/2003/00000010/F0020009/art00010
  

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