Compiled by David Chalmers (Editor) and David Bourget (Assistant Editor), Australian National University. Part of MindPapers. Suggest an entry.

Javascript Menu by Deluxe-Menu.com
		click here for help on how to search

Search tips

There are three kinds of search you can perform:

All fields

This mode searches for entries containing all the entered words in their title, author, date, comment field, or in any of many other fields showing on MindPapers pages.

Surname

This mode searches for entries containing the text string you entered in their author field. Note that the database does not have first names for all authors, so it is preferable to search only by surnames. If you search for a full name or a name with an initial, enter it in the format used internally by MindPapers, namely the "Lastname, Firstname" or "Lastname, F." format.

Advanced

This mode differs from the all fields mode in two respects. First, some information not publicly available on MindPapers is searched, e.g., abstracts and excerpts gathered by the MindPapers crawler, which are not always accurate but can help broaden one's search. Second, you may prefix any term with a '+' or '-' to narrow the search to entries containing it or not containing it, respectively. Terms which are not prefixed by a '+' are not mandatory. Instead, they are weighed depending on their frequency in order to determine the best search results. You may also search for a literal string composed of several words by putting them in double quotation marks (").

Note that short and / or common words are ignored by the search engine.

Try MindPapers to find published items which are available on a subscription basis.

close help

Science of consciousness :: First-person approaches :: Verbal reports and heterophenomenology

• Miri Albahari (2002). Can heterophenomenology ground a complete science of consciousness?   (More)
• Daniel Dennett (2003). Who's on first? Heterophenomenology explained.   (More)
• R. Hurlburt & C. L. Heavey (2004). To beep or not to beep: Obtaining accurate reports about awareness.   (More)
• Eddy Nahmias (2002). Verbal reports on the contents of consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: how different schools of psychology (introspectionism, behaviorism, cognitive psychology) have treated verbal reports about the contents of consciousness. After examining these differences, I suggest that, with new methods of mapping data about neurobiological states with behavioral data and with verbal reports about conscious experience, we should reconsider some of the introspectionists' goals and methods. I discuss examples from cognitive psychology, including pain researchers' attempts to develop self-reports of pain so that they can be, like other vital signs, reliable indicators of internal states
• Richard Nisbett & Timothy Wilson (1977). Telling more than we can know: Verbal reports on mental processes.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://depts.washington.edu/methods/readings/Nisbett_1977.pdf
  http://psycinfo.apa.org/doi/getuid.cfm?uid=1978-00295-001
  
• Morten Overgaard (2001). The role of phenomenological reports in experiments on consciousness.   (More)
• Gualtiero Piccinini (2003). Data from introspective reports: Upgrading from common sense to science.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Journal of Consciousness Studies, 10.9-10 (2003), pp. 141-156. Argues that when properly understood and handled, introspective reports are a legitimate source of public scientific data
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.umsl.edu/~piccininig/Data From Introspective Reports.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/2003/00000010/F0020009/art00011
  
• Max Velmans (2007). Heterophenomenology vs. critical phenomenology.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Dennett’s heterophenomenology and the critical phenomenology that I outline may be thought of as competing accounts of a cautious approach to phenomenal description and method. One can be critical or cautious about how well or how reliably a subject can communicate his or her subjective experience in experimental settings, without for a moment doubting their existence or claiming them to be something completely different to how they seem. Given this, Dennett’s heterophenomenology with its accompanying “qualia denial” looks like nothing more than an attempt to shore up his counterintuitive, eliminativist philosophy of mind
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/4741
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/K5115485H2247861.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/k5115485h2247861/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/phen/2007/00000006/F0020001/00009033
  

8 displayed