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Science of consciousness :: First-person approaches :: First-person appoaches, misc

• David Chalmers (1999). First-person methods in the science of consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: As I see it, the science of consciousness is all about relating _third-person data_ - about brain processes, behavior, environmental interaction, and the like - to _first-person data_ about conscious experience. I take it for granted that there are first-person data. It's a manifest fact about our minds that there is something it is like to be us - that we have subjective experiences - and that these subjective experiences are quite different at different times. Our direct knowledge of subjective experiences stems from our first-person access to them. And subjective experiences are arguably the central data that we want a science of consciousness to explain
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://consc.net/papers/firstperson.html
  
• David Chalmers (2004). How can we construct a science of consciousness?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In recent years there has been an explosion of scientific work on consciousness in cognitive neuroscience, psychology, and other fields. It has become possible to think that we are moving toward a genuine scientific understanding of conscious experience. But what is the science of consciousness all about, and what form should such a science take? This chapter gives an overview of the agenda
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://consc.net/papers/scicon.pdf
  http://phonline.org/paper.php?keynum=687
  http://eprints.assc.caltech.edu/archive/00000028/
  http://www.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/papers/scicon.html
  http://eprints.assc.caltech.edu/28/01/scicon.pdf
  
• Tamlin Christensen (2004). Experience-Sampling Procedures: Are They Probes to Autonoetic Awareness?   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://escholarship.bc.edu/dissertations/AAI3103251
  
• Daniel Dennett (ms). The fantasy of first-person science.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: A week ago, I heard James Conant give a talk at Tufts, entitled “Two Varieties of Skepticism” in which he distinguished two oft-confounded questions:

  Descartes: How is it possible for me to tell whether a thought of mine is true or false, perception or dream?

  Kant: How is it possible for something even to _be_ a thought (of mine)? What are the conditions for the possibility of experience (veridical or illusory) at all?
• Anthony Jack & T. Shallice (2001). Introspective physicalism as an approach to the science of consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Most ‘theories of consciousness’ are based on vague speculations about the properties of conscious experience. We aim to provide a more solid basis for a science of consciousness. We argue that a theory of consciousness should provide an account of the very processes that allow us to acquire and use information about our own mental states – the processes underlying introspection. This can be achieved through the construction of information processing models that can account for ‘Type-C’ processes. Type-C processes can be specified experimentally by identifying paradigms in which awareness of the stimulus is necessary for an intentional action. The Shallice (1988b) framework is put forward as providing an initial account of Type-C processes, which can relate perceptual consciousness to consciously performed actions. Further, we suggest that this framework may be refined through the investigation of the functions of prefrontal cortex. The formulation of our approach requires us to consider fundamental conceptual and methodological issues associated with consciousness. The most significant of these issues concerns the scientific use of introspective evidence. We outline and justify a conservative methodological approach to the use of introspective evidence, with attention to the difficulties historically associated with its use in psychology
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.soton.ac.uk/documents/disk0/00/00/12/52/
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/documents/disk0/00/00/12/52/
  http://eric.ed.gov/ERICWebPortal/recordDetail?accno=EJ628446
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:1252
  http://cogprints.org/1252/
  http://cogprints.soton.ac.uk/documents/disk0/00/00/12/52/index.html
  http://cogprints.org/1252/00/introspectivephysicalismpreprint.pdf
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00001252/00/introspectivephysicalismpreprint.pdf
  http://www.nil.wustl.edu/labs/corbetta/personnel/ajack_files/Jack_and_Shallice2001.pdf
  http://cogprints.soton.ac.uk/documents/disk0/00/00/12/52/cog00001252-00/introspectivephysicalismpreprint.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/00100277/2001/00000079/00000001/art00128
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=11164027&dopt=Citation
  
• Anthony Jack & Andreas Roepstorff (2003). Why trust the subject?   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://imprint.co.uk/pdf/Jack_Roepstorff.pdf
  http://www.pet.au.dk/~andreas/pages/Files/jcs-editorial.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/2003/00000010/F0020009/art00002
  
• Steven Lehar (2000). The dimensions of conscious experience: A quantitative phenomenology.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Psychology was originally formulated as the science of the _psyche_, i.e. the subjective side of the mind / brain barrier. However time and again it has been diverted from this objective in the supposed interest of scientific rigor. The Behaviorists proposed to transform psychology to a science of behavior, and today the Neuroreductionists propose to transform it to a science of neurophysiology. In the process they attempt to deny the very existence of conscious experience as valid object of scientific scrutiny. However the subjective conscious experience is a primary source of evidence for the nature of the representation in the brain. I propose a quantitative phenomenolgy to express the dimensions of conscious experience in information theoretic terms. This approach leads to interesting observations of the properties of phenomenal perspective, that clearly reveal the phenomenal world as an internal rather than external entity
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cns-alumni.bu.edu/~slehar/webstuff/consc/consc.html
  
• Paul Livingston (2002). Husserl and Schlick on the logical form of experience.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract:   Over a period of several decades spanning the origin of the Vienna Circle, Schlick repeatedly attacked Husserl''s phenomenological method for its reliance on the ability to intuitively grasp or see essences. Aside from its significance for phenomenologists, the attack illuminates significant and little-explored tensions in the history of analytic philosophy as well. For after coming under the influence of Wittgenstein, Schlick proposed to replace Husserl''s account of the epistemology of propositions describing the overall structure of experience with his own account based on the structure of language rather than on the intuition of essences. I discuss both philosophers'' accounts of the epistemology of propositions describing the structure of experience. For both philosophers, this epistemology was closely related to the general epistemology of logic; nevertheless, neither philosopher had a completely coherent account of it. Comparison of the two approaches shows that perennial and severe theoretical obstacles stand in the way of giving an epistemology of the structure of experience, a central requirement for both philosophers'' theories. Consideration of these obstacles sheds a new light on the reasons for the historically decisive split between the continental and the analytic traditions, as well as on the subsequent development of the analytic tradition away from the structural description of experience
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/x073430q864j7163/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/X073430Q864J7163.pdf
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=389846&PDF=1
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/synt/2002/00000132/00000003/00389846
  
• J. Petranker (2003). Inhabiting conscious experience: Engaged objectivity in the first-person study of consciousness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://imprint.co.uk/jcs_10_12.html
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/2003/00000010/00000012/1393
  
• Gualtiero Piccinini (online). First-person data.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Argues that first-person data are public (contrary to a popular view) and that legitimate first-person data result from a kind of self-measurement
• Vincent Punzo & Emily Miller (2002). Investigating conscious experience through the beeper project.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.leaonline.com/doi/pdfplus/10.1207/S15328023TOP2904_08
  http://leaonline.com/doi/pdfplus/10.1207/S15328023TOP2904_08
  http://www.leaonline.com/doi/abs/10.1207/S15328023TOP2904_08
  http://eric.ed.gov/ERICWebPortal/recordDetail?accno=EJ761449
  
• Francisco Varela & Jonathan Shear (1999). First-person methodologies: What, why, how?   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://imprint.co.uk/view/JCSCHAP.htm
  http://www.imprint.co.uk/pdf/VFW_introduc.pdf
  
• Max Velmans (1994). A reflexive science of consciousness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.soton.ac.uk/documents/disk0/00/00/02/43/
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:243
  http://cogprints.org/243/00/practice.html
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?id=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:243
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=8319514&dopt=Citation
  

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