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2. Intentionality (Intentionality on PhilPapers)

• Propositional Attitudes [73]
• The Language of Thought [25]
• The Intentional Stance [20]
• Eliminativism about Propositional Attitudes [13]
• Propositional Attitudes, Misc [14]
• Content Internalism and Externalism [260]
• Is Content in the Head? [22]
• Social Externalism [24]
• Externalism and Psychological Explanation [18]
• Externalism and Mental Causation [5]
• Externalism and the Theory of Vision [3]
• Externalism and Computation [2]
• Externalism and Self-Knowledge [82]
• Narrow Content [28]
• The Extended Mind [49]
• Content Internalism and Externalism, Misc [27]
• Naturalizing Mental Content [151]
• Information-Based Accounts of Mental Content [24]
• Asymmetric-Dependence Accounts of Mental Content [7]
• Causal Accounts of Mental Content, Misc [6]
• Teleological Accounts of Mental Content [44]
• Inferentialist Accounts of Meaning and Content [26]
• Interpretivist Accounts of Meaning and Content [17]
• Naturalizing Mental Content, Misc [26]
• The Nature of Contents [28]
• Fregean and Russellian Contents [0]
• Indexical Contents [8]
• Intentional Objects [6]
• Object-Dependent Contents [2]
• Two-Dimensionalism about Content [8]
• The Nature of Contents, Misc [4]
• Aspects of Intentionality [140]
• Naturalism and Intentionality [10]
• Kripkenstein on Meaning [13]
• Rule-Following [30]
• Normativity of Meaning and Content [29]
• Meaning Holism [26]
• Explanatory Role of Content [12]
• Collective Intentionality [19]
• Aspects of Intentionality, Misc [1]
• Representation [45]
• The Concept of Representation [0]
• Varieties of Representation [0]
• Theories of Representation [0]
• Skepticism about Representations [0]
• Representation, Misc [1]
• Concepts [97]
• Perception-Based Theories of Concepts [0]
• Inferential Theories of Concepts [3]
• Prototype and Exemplar Theories of Concepts [0]
• Theory-Based Theories of Concepts [1]
• Atomist Theories of Concepts [1]
• Theories of Concepts, Misc [1]
• Conceptual Change [11]
• Concept Possession [0]
• Ontology of Concepts [0]
• Recognitional Concepts [0]
• Concepts, Misc [3]
• Intentionality, Misc [21]

• Herman Cappelen & Ernie Lepore (1997). On an alleged connection between indirect speech and the theory of meaning.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: A semantic theory T for a language L should assign content to utterances of sentences of L. One common assumption is that T will assign p to some S of L just in case in uttering S a speaker A says that p. We will argue that this assumption is mistaken
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1468-0017.00049
  
• Julien A. Deonna & Klaus R. Scherer (2010). The Case of the Disappearing Intentional Object: Constraints on a Definition of Emotion.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Taking our lead from Solomon’s emphasis on the importance of the intentional object of emotion, we review the history of repeated attempts to make this object disappear. We adduce evidence suggesting that in the case of James and Schachter, the intentional object got lost unintentionally. By contrast, modern constructivists (in particular Barrett) seem quite determined to deny the centrality of the intentional object in accounting for the occurrence of emotions. Griffiths, however, downplays the role objects have in emotion noting that these do not qualify as intentional. We argue that these disappearing acts, deliberate or not, generate fruitless debate and add little to the advancement of our understanding of emotion as an adaptive mechanism to cope with events that are relevant to an organism’s life.
• Paul Katsafanas (forthcoming). Activity and Passivity in Reflective Agency.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Lately, a number of philosophers have argued that agents can be more and less active in the production of their own actions. Some actions—principally reflective, deliberative ones—are said to involve agential activity; other actions—principally unreflective, non-deliberative ones—are said to be brought about in a more passive fashion. In this essay, I critique these claims. I show that philosophers employing the notion of agential activity have relied on one or more of the following claims, which have not been clearly distinguished in the literature: (1) that choice causes action, (2) that motives do not determine choice, and (3) that reflective deliberation suspends the effects of motives. These claims are closely related, and are often conflated in the literature. However, I argue that they are importantly distinct. I explicate and assess each of these claims, arguing that while there are precisifications of the first and second claims that render them true, there are philosophical arguments and results from empirical psychology indicating that the third claim is false. Moreover, I argue that the third claim is the crucial one; its truth is necessary in order to support the idea that reflective agency is paradigmatically active. As a result, the traditional accounts of agential activity must be rejected. I close by suggesting a new model of agential activity.
• Bertrand Russell (1910). Knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description.   (More)
• Nigel J. T. Thomas (online). Attitude and image, or, what will simulation theory let us eliminate?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Stich & Ravenscroft (1994) have argued that (contrary to most people's initial assumptions) a simulation account of folk psychology may be consistent with eliminative materialism, but they fail to bring out the full complexity or the potential significance of the relationship. Contemporary eliminativism (particularly in the Churchland version) makes two major claims: the first is a rejection of the orthodox assumption that realistically construed propositional attitudes are fundamental to human cognition; the second is the suggestion that with the advancement of scientific understanding of the mind it will be possible to entirely eliminate the mentalistic and intentional from our ontology, thus dissolving the mind-body problem. The first claim (which has been argued in detail) supplies the principal grounds for accepting the second, much more ambitious and significant, claim. Robert Gordon's (1995, 1996, 2000) radical simulation theory of "folk psychology", proposed initially (Gordon, 1986) as an alternative to "theory theory" accounts of self and interpersonal understanding, but subsequently developing into a quite general challenge to symbolic computational accounts of mind, is not merely consistent with, but actually provides considerable additional support for, the first eliminativist claim. However, although radical simulationism has no use for reified propositional attitudes, it relies on another family of mentalistic and intentional notions, including perspective taking, "seeing as", pretending, imagery, and, most centrally, imagination. It is thus inconsistent with eliminativist metaphysical ambitions. Nevertheless, from this perspective the mind-body problem is transformed. Its solution no longer depends on accounting directly for the intentionality of the attitudes, but rather on accounting for the intentionality of imagination. Although standard accounts of imagination derive its intentionality from that of the attitudes, the recently proposed "perceptual activity" theory of imagery and imagination (Thomas, 1999) can provide a direct account of the intentionality of imagination that is consistent with physicalism..
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://Attitude and image, or, What will simulation theory let us eliminate?
  
• Ralph Wedgwood (2009). The normativity of the intentional.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Many philosophers have claimed that the intentional is normative. (This claim is the analogue, within the philosophy of mind, of the claim that is often made within the philosophy of language, that meaning is normative.) But what exactly does this claim mean? And what reason is there for believing it? In this paper, I shall first try to clarify the content of the claim that the intentional is normative. Then I shall examine a number of the arguments that philosophers have advanced for this claim (and for the parallel claim that meaning is normative). As we shall see, many of these arguments are unsuccessful. However, I shall close by giving a sketch of what may be a successful argument for this claim
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://users.ox.ac.uk/~mert1230/normativityofintentional.a4.pdf
  http://users.ox.ac.uk/~mert1230/normativityofintentional.ltr.pdf
  

Propositional Attitudes

• David Landy (2005). Inside doubt: On the non-identity of the theory of mind and propositional attitude psychology.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Eliminative materialism is a popular view of the mind which holds that propositional attitudes, the typical units of our traditional understanding, are unsupported by modern connectionist psychology and neuroscience, and consequently that propositional attitudes are a poor scientific postulate, and do not exist. Since our traditional folk psychology employs propositional attitudes, the usual argument runs, it too represents a poor theory, and may in the future be replaced by a more successful neurologically grounded theory, resulting in a drastic improvement in our interpersonal relationships. I contend that these eliminativist arguments typically run together two distinct capacities: the folk psychological mechanisms which we use to understand one another, and scientific and philosophical guesses about the structure of those understandings. Both capacities are ontologically committed and therefore empirical. However, the commitments whose prospects look so dismal to the eliminativist, in particular the causal and logical image of propositional attitudes, belong to the guesses, and not necessarily to the underlying mechanisms. It is the commitments of traditional philosophical perspectives about the operation of our folk psychology which are contradicted by?new evidence and modeling methods in connectionist psychology. Our actual folk psychology was not clearly committed to causal, sentential propositional attitudes, and thus is not directly threatened by connectionist psychology
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/f4m04131105x8rx4/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/F4M04131105X8RX4.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/mind/2005/00000015/F0020003/00009004
  

The Language of Thought

• Louise M. Antony (ms). What are you thinking? Character and content in the language of thought.   (More)
• Murat Aydede (1995). Connectionism and the language of thought.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Fodor and Pylyshyn's (F&P) critique of connectionism has posed a challenge to connectionists: Adequately explain such nomological regularities as systematicity and productivity without postulating a "language of thought'' (LOT). Some connectionists declined to meet the challenge on the basis that the alleged regularities are somehow spurious. Some, like Smolensky, however, took the challenge very seriously, and attempted to meet it by developing models that are supposed to be non-classical
• Murat Aydede (1997). Language of thought: The connectionist contribution.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract:   Fodor and Pylyshyn's critique of connectionism has posed a challenge to connectionists: Adequately explain such nomological regularities as systematicity and productivity without postulating a "language of thought" (LOT). Some connectionists like Smolensky took the challenge very seriously, and attempted to meet it by developing models that were supposed to be non-classical. At the core of these attempts lies the claim that connectionist models can provide a representational system with a combinatorial syntax and processes sensitive to syntactic structure. They are not implementation models because, it is claimed, the way they obtain syntax and structure sensitivity is not "concatenative," hence "radically different" from the way classicists handle them. In this paper, I offer an analysis of what it is to physically satisfy/realize a formal system. In this context, I examine the minimal truth-conditions of LOT Hypothesis. From my analysis it will follow that concatenative realization of formal systems is irrelevant to LOTH since the very notion of LOT is indifferent to such an implementation level issue as concatenation. I will conclude that to the extent to which they can explain the law-like cognitive regularities, a certain class of connectionist models proposed as radical alternatives to the classical LOT paradigm will in fact turn out to be LOT models, even though new and potentially very exciting ones
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/content/v8365g5vp26x7x75/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/v8365g5vp26x7x75/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=115552&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/V8365G5VP26X7X75.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/mind/1997/00000007/00000001/00115552
  
• Murat Aydede (online). The language of thought hypothesis.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: 1 *Common Sense Conception of Beliefs and Other Propositional Attitudes 2 What is the Language of Thought Hypothesis? 3 Status of LOTH 4 Scope of LOTH 5 *Natural Language as Mentalese? 6 *Nativism and LOTH 7 Naturalism and LOTH
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/353/0/LOTH.SEP.html
  http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/language-thought/
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:353
  http://web.clas.ufl.edu/users/maydede/LOTH.SEP.html
  
• Murat Aydede (ms). Language of thought hypothesis: State of the art.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The Language of Thought Hypothesis (LOTH) is an empirical thesis about thought and thinking. For their explication, it postulates a physically realized system of representations that have a combinatorial syntax (and semantics) such that operations on representations are causally sensitive only to the syntactic properties of representations. According to LOTH, thought is, roughly, the tokening of a representation that has a syntactic (constituent) structure with an appropriate semantics. Thinking thus consists in syntactic operations defined over representations. Most of the arguments for LOTH derive their strength from their ability to explain certain empirical phenomena like productivity, systematicity of thought and thinking
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://web.clas.ufl.edu/users/maydede/LOTH.SEP.html
  
• Ansgar Beckermann (1994). Can there be a language of thought?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: 1. Cognitive sciences in a broad sense are simply all those sciences which concern themselves with the analysis and explanation of cognitive capacities and achievements. If one speaks of _cognitive science_ in the singular, however, usually something more is meant. Cognitive science is not only characterized by a specific object of research, but also through a particular kind of explanatory paradigm, i.e. the information processing paradigm. Stillings _et. al. _for example begin their book _Cognitive Science _as follows: <blockquote> Cognitive scientists view the human mind as a complex system that receives, stores,<br> retrieves, transforms, and transmits information. (Stillings 1987: 1) </blockquote> The information processing paradigm however, leads directly to the paradigm of symbol processing, because a system can, as it seems, only receive, store and process information if it has at its disposal a system of internal representations or _symbols_, i.e. an internal language in which this information is encoded. At least this appears to be an idea which suggests itself and which Peter Hacker expresses as follows
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.uni-bielefeld.de/(de)/philosophie/personen/beckermann/lot_we.pdf
  
• Ben Blumson (online). Mental maps.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: It’s often hypothesized that the structure of mental representation is map-like rather than language-like. The possibility arises as a counterexample to the argument from the best explanation of productivity and systematicity for the Language of Thought Hypothesis – the hypothesis that mental structure is language-like. In this paper, I argue that the Map Hypothesis does not undermine the argument, because it is not in fact a genuine alternative to the Language of Thought Hypothesis
• David J. Chalmers (1999). Is there synonymy in Ockham's mental language.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: William of Ockham's semantic theory was founded on the idea that thought takes place in a language not unlike the languages in which spoken and written communication occur. This mental language was held to have a number of features in common with everyday languages. For example, mental language has simple terms, not unlike words, out of which complex expressions can be constructed. As with words, each of these terms has some meaning, or signification; in fact Ockham held that the signification of everyday words derives precisely from the signification of mental terms. Furthermore, the meaning of a mental expression depends directly on the meaning of its constituent terms, as is the case with expressions in more familiar languages
• Martin Davies (1991). Concepts, connectionism, and the language of thought.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The aim of this paper is to demonstrate a _prima facie_ tension between our commonsense conception of ourselves as thinkers and the connectionist programme for modelling cognitive processes. The language of thought hypothesis plays a pivotal role. The connectionist paradigm is opposed to the language of thought; and there is an argument for the language of thought that draws on features of the commonsense scheme of thoughts, concepts, and inference. Most of the paper (Sections 3-7) is taken up with the argument for the language of thought hypothesis. The argument for an opposition between connectionism and the language of thought comes towards the end (Section 8), along with some discussion of the potential eliminativist consequences (Sections 9 and
• Martin Davies (1998). Language, thought, and the language of thought (aunty's own argument revisited).   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In this chapter, I shall be examining an argument for the language of thought hypothesis
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=NUtObnV0zJsC&oi=fnd&pg=PA226&dq=Language,+thought,+and+the+language+of+thought+(Aunty's+own+argument+revisited)+Davies&ots=nrCXm2Kpxn&sig=2SU9WXQfS_axxEsQ3WbiCd2BRRI
  
• Richard DeWitt (1995). Vagueness, semantics, and the language of thought.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/volume1/psyche-93-1-1-vagueness-1-dewitt.html
  
• Jerry A. Fodor (1987). Why there still has to be a language of thought.   (More)
• Kent Johnson (2004). On the systematicity of the language of thought.   (More)
• Joseph Levine (1988). Demonstrating in mentalese.   (More)
• Edouard Machery (2005). You don't know how you think: Introspection and language of thought.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: recent cognitive theories into two antagonistic groups. Sententialists claim that we think in some language, while advocates of non-linguistic views of cognition deny this claim. The Introspective Argument for Sententialism is one of the most appealing arguments for sententialism. In substance, it claims that the introspective fact of inner speech provides strong evidence that our thoughts are linguistic. This article challenges this argument. I claim that the Introspective Argument for Sententialism confuses the content of our thoughts with their vehicles: while sententialism is a thesis about the vehicles of our thoughts, inner speech sentences are the content of auditory or articulatory images. The rebuttal of the introspective argument for sententialism is shown to have a general significance in cognitive science: introspection does not tell us how we think. The problem The introspective argument for sententialism The argument for the blindness of introspection thesis Objections and replies Conclusion
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://hal.ccsd.cnrs.fr/docs/00/05/35/20/PDF/ijn_00000446_00.pdf
  http://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/docs/00/05/35/20/PDF/ijn_00000446_00.pdf
  http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/docs/00/05/35/20/PDF/ijn_00000446_00.pdf
  http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00001954/01/BJPS_Instrospection.pdf
  http://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/documents/disk0/00/00/04/46/ijn_00000446_00/ijn_00000446_00.pdf
  http://bjps.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/full/56/3/469?ijkey=uDjjrRt1XJAIbaF&keytype=ref
  http://bjps.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/56/3/469?ijkey=0W190KJ1t6SNyL6&keytype=ref
  http://bjps.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/56/3/469
  http://bjps.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/56/3/469
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/oup/phisci/2005/00000056/00000003/art00469
  
• Michael Rescorla (2009). Cognitive maps and the language of thought.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Fodor advocates a view of cognitive processes as computations defined over the language of thought (or Mentalese). Even among those who endorse Mentalese, considerable controversy surrounds its representational format. What semantically relevant structure should scientific psychology attribute to Mentalese symbols? Researchers commonly emphasize logical structure, akin to that displayed by predicate calculus sentences. To counteract this tendency, I discuss computational models of navigation drawn from probabilistic robotics. These models involve computations defined over cognitive maps, which have geometric rather than logical structure. They thereby demonstrate the possibility of rational cognitive processes in an exclusively non-logical representational medium. Furthermore, they offer much promise for the empirical study of animal navigation.
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://bjps.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/60/2/377
  
• Bradley Rives, Review of LOT 2: The language of thought revisited.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: It has been over thirty years since the publication of Jerry Fodor’s landmark book The Language of Thought (LOT 1). In LOT 2: The Language of Thought Revisited, Fodor provides an update on his thoughts concerning a range of topics that have been the focus of his work in the intervening decades. The Representational Theory of Mind (RTM), the central thesis of LOT 1, remains intact in LOT 2: mental states are relations between organisms and syntactically-structured mental representations, and mental processes are computations defined over such representations. The differences between LOT 1 and LOT 2 are mostly differences of focus. Whereas LOT 1 had a number of targets—e.g. reductionism, behaviorism, empiricism, and operationalism—LOT 2 identifies “pragmatism” as the main enemy of the “Cartesian” kind of mentalism Fodor favors (pp. 11-12). Moreover, unlike LOT 1, a main aim of LOT 2 is to defend a theory of concepts that is atomistic and referentialist: lexical concepts lack structure, and their meaning is determined by their relation to the world and not by their relations to other concepts (pp. 16-20). In addition to new discussions of concepts and content, LOT 2 treats us to Fodor’s latest thoughts on compositionality, computationalism, nativism, nonconceptual content, and the causal theory of reference. Although those familiar with Fodor’s work over the last thirty years will find its main conclusions unsurprising, LOT 2 is nevertheless an exciting, breezily written book that’s full of stimulating arguments and (in standard Fodor style) immensely interesting digressions. In the Introduction, Fodor bundles together a number of distinct doctrines under “pragmatism”—e.g., that “knowing how is the paradigm cognitive state and it is prior to knowing that in the order of intentional explanation” (p. 10), and that “the distinctive function of the mind is guiding action” (p. 13). But it’s clear by Chapter 2 that his main target is “concept pragmatism,” according to which concepts are individuated by their inferential properties. Fodor’s “Cartesianism,” in contrast, has it that none of the epistemic properties of concepts are constitutive..
• Robert D. Rupert (2001). Coining terms in the language of thought: Innateness, emergence, and the lot of Cummins's argument against the causal theory of mental content.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Robert Cummins argues that any causal theory of mental content (CT) founders on an established fact of human psychology: that theory mediates sensory detection. He concludes,
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-362X(200110)98:10<499:CTITLO>2.0.CO;2-Y
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3649467.pdf
  
• Susan Schneider (2009). Lot, ctm, and the elephant in the room.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: According to the language of thought (LOT) approach and the related computational theory of mind (CTM), thinking is the processing of symbols in an inner mental language that is distinct from any public language. Herein, I explore a deep problem at the heart of the LOT/CTM program—it has yet to provide a plausible conception of a mental symbol
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.sas.upenn.edu/~sls/SchneiderLOTSynthesesent.rtf
  http://www.sas.upenn.edu/~sls/documents/SchneiderSyntheseLOT.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/f9312g2m003630r0/fulltext.pdf
  
• Susan Schneider, The central system as a computational engine.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The Language of Thought program has a suicidal edge. Jerry Fodor, of all people, has argued that although LOT will likely succeed in explaining modular processes, it will fail to explain the central system, a subsystem in the brain in which information from the different sense modalities is integrated, conscious deliberation occurs, and behavior is planned. A fundamental characteristic of the central system is that it is “informationally unencapsulated” -- its operations can draw from information from any cognitive domain. The domain general nature of the central system is key to human reasoning; our ability to connect apparently unrelated concepts enables the creativity and flexibility of human thought, as does our ability to integrate material across sensory divides. The central system is the holy grail of cognitive science: understanding higher cognitive function is crucial to grasping how humans reach their highest intellectual achievements. But according to Fodor, the founding father of the LOT program and the related Computational Theory of Mind (CTM), the holy grail is out of reach: the central system is likely to be non-computational (Fodor 1983, 2000, 2008). Cognitive scientists working on higher cognitive function should abandon their efforts. Research should be limited to the modules, which for Fodor rest at the sensory periphery (2000).1 Cognitive scientists who work in the symbol processing tradition outside of philosophy would reject this pessimism, but ironically, within philosophy itself, this pessimistic streak has been very influential, most likely because it comes from the most well-known proponent of LOT and CTM. Indeed, pessimism about centrality has become assimilated into the mainstream conception of LOT. (Herein, I refer to a LOT that appeals to pessimism about centrality as the “standard LOT”). I imagine this makes the standard LOT unattractive to those philosophers with a more optimistic approach to what cognitive science can achieve..
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.sas.upenn.edu/~sls/documents/TheCentralSystemasaComputationalEngine-June09.doc
  http://www.sas.upenn.edu/~sls/documents/TheCentralSystemasaComputationalEngine-June09-1.pdf
  http://www.sas.upenn.edu/~sls/documents/TheCentralSystemasaComputationalEngine-June09_000.doc
  http://www.sas.upenn.edu/~sls/documents/TheCentralSystemasaComputationalEngine-Oct09.doc
  http://www.sas.upenn.edu/~sls/documents/CentralSystemasaComputationalEngine-Nov09.doc
  http://www.sas.upenn.edu/~sls/documents/Schneider-CentralSystem09.pdf
  
• Susan Schneider (2009). The language of thought.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: According to the language of thought (or
• Susan Schneider (forthcoming). The nature of primitive symbols in the language of thought.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This paper provides a theory of the nature of symbols in the language of thought (LOT). My discussion consists in three parts. In part one, I provide three arguments for the individuation of primitive symbols in terms of total computational role. The first of these arguments claims that Classicism requires that primitive symbols be typed in this manner; no other theory of typing will suffice. The second argument contends that without this manner of symbol individuation, there will be computational processes that fail to supervene on syntax, together with the rules of composition and the computational algorithms. The third argument says that cognitive science needs a natural kind that is typed by total computational role. Otherwise, either cognitive science will be incomplete, or its laws will have counterexamples. Then, part two defends this view from a criticism, offered by both Jerry Fodor and Jesse Prinz, who respond to my view with the charge that because the types themselves are individuated
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.sas.upenn.edu/~sls/documents/SchneiderNatureSymbolsMindLang.doc
  http://www.sas.upenn.edu/~sls/documents/SchneiderNatureSymbolsMindLang-1-2.pdf
  http://www.sas.upenn.edu/~sls/documents/Schneider-MindLangSymbols.pdf
  
• Brent Silby (ms). Revealing the language of thought.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.scribd.com/doc/3033742/Revealing-the-Language-of-Thought-by-Brent-Silby
  
• Daniel Weiskopf (ms). A critical review of Jerry A. Fodor's the mind doesn't work that way.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The “New Synthesis” in cognitive science is committed to the computational theory of mind (CTM), massive modularity, nativism, and adaptationism. In The mind doesn’t work that way, Jerry Fodor argues that CTM has problems explaining abductive or global inference, but that the New Synthesis offers no solution, since massive modularity is in fact incompatible with global cognitive processes. I argue that it is not clear how global human mentation is, so whether CTM is imperiled is an open question. Massive modularity also lacks some of the invidious commitments Fodor ascribes to it. Furthermore, Fodor’s anti-adaptationist arguments are in tension with his nativism about the contents of modular systems. The New Synthesis thus has points worth preserving
• Mark Wilson (2009). Review of Jerry A. Fodor, Lot 2: The Language of Thought Revisited.   (More)

The Intentional Stance

• Kristin Andrews (2000). Our understanding of other minds: Theory of mind and the intentional stance.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/2000/00000007/00000007/1030
  
• William P. Bechtel (1985). Realism, instrumentalism, and the intentional stance.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.leaonline.com/doi/pdfplus/10.1207/s15516709cog0904_5
  http://www.cogsci.rpi.edu/CSJarchive/1985v09/i04/p0473p0497/MAIN.PDF
  
• David Beisecker (2002). Dennett and the Quest for real meaning: In defense of a myth.   (More)
• Lisa Bortolotti (2003). Inconsistency and interpretation.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In this paper my purpose is to examine whether the case of inconsistent believers can offer a reason to object to theories of belief ascription that rely on a rationality constraint. I shall first illustrate how the possibility of inconsistent believers might be a challenge for the rationality constraint and then assess Davidson's influential reply to that challenge.
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/./ftinterface~content=a782535487~fulltext=713240930
  http://www.informaworld.com/index/782535487.pdf
  
• Daniel C. Dennett (1971). Intentional systems.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-362X(19710225)68:4<87:IS>2.0.CO;2-8
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2025382.pdf
  
• Daniel C. Dennett (1991). Real patterns.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Are there really beliefs? Or are we learning (from neuroscience and psychology, presumably) that, strictly speaking, beliefs are figments of our imagination, items in a superceded ontology? Philosophers generally regard such ontological questions as admitting just two possible answers: either beliefs exist or they don't. There is no such state as quasi-existence; there are no stable doctrines of semi-realism. Beliefs must either be vindicated along with the viruses or banished along with the banshees. A bracing conviction prevails, then, to the effect that when it comes to beliefs (and other mental items) one must be either a realist or an eliminative materialist
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-362X(199101)88:1<27:RP>2.0.CO;2-2
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-362X(199101)88:1<27:RP>2.0.CO;2-2
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2027085.pdf
  
• Daniel C. Dennett (1990). The interpretation of texts, people and other artifacts.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: I want to explore four different exercises of interpretation: (1) the interpretation of texts (or hermeneutics), (2) the interpretation of people (otherwise known as "attribution" psychology, or cognitive or intentional psychology), (3) the interpretation of other artifacts (which I shall call artifact hermeneutics), (4) the interpretation of organism design in evolutionary biology--the controversial interpretive activity known as adaptationism
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/259/0/intrptxt.htm
  http://cogprints.org/259/00/intrptxt.htm
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000259/
  http://cogprints.soton.ac.uk/documents/disk0/00/00/02/59/
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000259/00/intrptxt.htm
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:259
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8205(199023)50<177:TIOTPA>2.0.CO;2-I
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8205(199023)50<177:TIOTPA>2.0.CO;2-I
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2108038.pdf
  
• Jerry A. Fodor & Ernest Lepore (1993). Is intentional ascription intrinsically normative?   (More)
• Richard Griffin (ms). The intentional stance: Developmental and neurocognitive perspectives.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Nowhere in the psychological sciences has the philosophy of mind had more influence than on the child development literature generally referred to as children’s ‘theory of mind.’ Developmental journals may seem to be an unlikely place to find Brentano, Frege, and Dennett alongside descriptions of referential opacity and the principle of substitutivity, but it is not at all uncommon in this literature. While the many problems and complexities of the propositional attitude literature are still hotly debated by philosophers, and often ill understood by scientists working in this area, a great deal of empirical progress has already been made. We have Dan Dennett to thank for this extraordinary dialogue between these disciplines
• Reese M. Heitner (2000). Is design relative or real? Dennett on intentional relativism and physical realism.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.csa.com/partners/viewrecord.php?requester=gs&collection=TRD&recid=500801CI
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/n044802161230121/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=258826&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/N044802161230121.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/mind/2000/00000010/00000002/00258826
  
• David Joslin (2006). Real realization: Dennett's real patterns versus Putnam's ubiquitous automata.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/92571m7x71n87541/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/92571M7X71N87541.pdf
  
• Angus Menuge (2003). A critique of Dennett's evolutionary account of intentionality.   (More)
• Ruth G. Millikan (2000). Reading mother nature's mind.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: I try to focus our differences by examining the relation between what Dennett has termed "the intentional stance" and "the design stance." Dennett takes the intentional stance to be more basic than the design stance. Ultimately it is through the eyes of the intentional stance that both human and natural design are interpreted, hence there is always a degree of interpretive freedom in reading the mind, the purposes, both of Nature and of her children. The reason, or at least a reason, is that intentional interpretation is holistic, hence indeterminate, for the kinds of reasons given by Davidson and Quine. In contrast, I take the design stance to be more basic than the intentional stance. Intentional attributions express our best guesses about the locations of effects of certain kinds of natural design. And although there is often indeterminacy, ambiguity, or vagueness concerning what it is that natural selection (or learning) has selected for, these indeterminacies and vaguenesses are local, not holistic. There is reason to suppose that the better portion of Nature's purposes and the intentional states of her children are determinate in content within quite closely defined limits. I propose to defend this position as well as I can, so as to call from Dennett his own views on precisely where our paths separate (if they really do)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=jDwFYqcMEScC&oi=fnd&pg=PA55&dq=Reading+mother+nature's+mind+Millikan&ots=QFBQrlOKn3&sig=MCbeTEB5r1Z2sYdBmKqpZBe8kkc
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=jDwFYqcMEScC&oi=fnd&pg=PA55&dq=Reading+mother+nature's+mind+Millikan&ots=QFBRpkROn1&sig=C4eBoZAlYahCSed_wCNBwGQSYLA
  
• Ajit Narayanan (1996). The intentional stance and the imitation game.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/narayanan96intentional.html
  
• Huw Price (1995). Psychology in perspective.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: [email: huw@extro.su.oz.au] If recent literature is to be our guide, the main place of philosophy in the study of the mind would seem to be to determine the place of psychology in the study of the world. One distinctive kind of answer to this question begins by noting the central role of intentionality in psychology, and goes on to argue that this sets psychology apart from the natural sciences. Sometimes to be thus set apart is to be exiled, or rejected, but more often it is a protective move, intended to show that psychology is properly insulated from the reductionist demands of natural science. I am interested here in the general issue as to how this move to insulate intentional psychology should best be characterised-how to make sense of the idea that there can be a legitimate enterprise of this kind. I shall concentrate on what is perhaps the best known version of such a view, that of Daniel Dennett. I think that my conclusions apply to other versions as well, but Dennett provides a particularly accessible example
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.usyd.edu.au/time/price//preprints/psych.rtf
  http://www.usyd.edu.au/time/price//preprints/psych.html
  
• Lynne Rudder Baker (1989). Instrumental intentionality.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8248(198906)56:2<303:II>2.0.CO;2-H
  http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/resolve?id=doi:10.1086/289489
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8248(198906)56:2<303:II>2.0.CO;2-H
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/187876.pdf
  
• William E. Seager (2000). Real patterns and surface metaphysics.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Naturalism is supposed to be a Good Thing. So good in fact that everybody wants to be a naturalist, no matter what their views might be1. Thus there is some confusion about what, exactly, naturalism is. In what follows, I am going to be pretty much, though not exclusively, concerned with the topics of intentionality and consciousness, which only deepens the confusion for these are two areas
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=jDwFYqcMEScC&oi=fnd&pg=PA95&dq=Real+patterns+and+surface+metaphysics+Seager&ots=QFBQrlPKo-&sig=rAZEMPyVzaF8RhlRIe3fuwmxZc8
  
• Vesa Talvitie (2003). Repressed contents reconsidered: Repressed contents and Dennett's intentional stance approach.   (More)
• Christopher D. Viger (2000). Where do Dennett's stances stand? Explaining our kinds of minds.   (More)
• Marcel Weber, Behavioral traits, the intentional stance, and biological functions.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: It has been claimed that the intentional stance is necessary to individuate behavioral traits. This thesis, while clearly false, points to two interesting sets of problems concerning biological explanations of behavior: The first is a general in the philosophy of science: the theory-ladenness of observation. The second problem concerns the principles of trait individuation, which is a general problem in philosophy of biology. After discussing some alternatives, I show that one way of individuating the behavioral traits of an organism is by a special use of the concept of biological function, as understood in an enriched causal role (not selected effect) sense. On this view, a behavioral trait is essentially a special kind of regularity, namely a regularity that is produced by some regulatory mechanism. Regulatory mechanisms always require goal states, which can only be provided by functional considerations. As an example from actual (as opposed to folk) science, I examine the case of social behavior in nematodes. I show that the attempt to explain this phenomenon actually transformed it. This supports the view that scientific explanation does not explain an explanandum phenomenon that is given prior to the explanation; rather, the explanandum is changed by the explanation. This means that there could be a plurality of stances that have some heuristic value initially, but which will be abandoned in favor of a functional characterization eventually

Eliminativism about Propositional Attitudes

• Radu J. Bogdan (1988). Mental attitudes and common sense psychology: The case against elimination.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Aside from brute force, there are several philosophically respectable ways of eliminating the mental. In recent years the most popular elimination strategy has been directed against our common sense or folk psychological understanding of the mental. The strategy goes by the name of eliminative materialism (or eliminativism, in short). The motivation behind this strategy seems to be the following. If common sense psychology can be construed as the principled theory of the mental, whose vocabulary and principles implicitly define what counts as mental, then eliminating the theory is eliminating its subject matter. If the theory is shown to be false, then its subject matter does not exist. If, in other words, common sense psychology can be shown to describe and explain nothing real in human cognition, then the mental itself is a fiction
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0029-4624(198809)22:3<369:MAACSP>2.0.CO;2-D
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0029-4624(198809)22:3<369:MAACSP>2.0.CO;2-D
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2215709.pdf
  
• Paul M. Churchland (1981). Eliminative materialism and the propositional attitudes.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://roderik.net/eleminative_materialism_and_the_propistional_attitudes_referaat.pdf
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=xhIb7VjTqQ4C&oi=fnd&pg=PA42&ots=Hpgp9YRNqZ&sig=eJdXbqbW5t_vo350wilSUd0_lz8
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=k9SWKieq6-gC&oi=fnd&pg=PA42&ots=p8s2lR0v1t&sig=RHtr3OySoLXzFSDMj10f5P3V9m8
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=k9SWKieq6-gC&oi=fnd&pg=PA42&ots=p8s3nS_D3w&sig=OwOsHWYNvyiZEcuOda7V0nBWbXs
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=xhIb7VjTqQ4C&oi=fnd&pg=PA42&ots=Hpgo7XTFoW&sig=MFxsa6zCml4Ey1eCIQKm9HMwzOs
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-362X(198102)78:2<67:EMATPA>2.0.CO;2-8
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-362X(198102)78:2<67:EMATPA>2.0.CO;2-8
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2025900.pdf
  
• John J. Haldane (1988). Understanding folk.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=7KU-NskafwEC&oi=fnd&pg=PA263&ots=jY36MaKFsR&sig=1TbQyeHOm8XxZGjpKhjnZCkGRRk
  
• David K. Henderson & Terence E. Horgan (2004). What does it take to be a true believer?: Against the opulent ideology of eliminative materialism.   (More)
• Frank Jackson & Philip Pettit (1990). In defense of folk psychology.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: It turned out that there was no phlogiston, no caloric fluid, and no luminiferous ether. Might it turn out that there are no beliefs and desires? Patricia and Paul Churchland say yes} We say no. In part one we give our positive argument for the existence of beliefs and desires
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=o5srjXzIE_EC&oi=fnd&pg=PA13&ots=hMe_h0qj7j&sig=e-DTh2d__f1NONy2tZE3XhHOE-Q
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/m40hm4h677j5060j/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/M40HM4H677J5060J.pdf
  
• William G. Lycan (2005). A particularly compelling refutation of eliminative materialism.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The 1960s saw heated discussion of Eliminative Materialism in regard to sensations and their phenomenal features. Thus directed, Eliminative Materialism is materialism or physicalism plus the distinctive and truly radical thesis that there have never occurred any sensations; no one has ever experienced a sensation. This view attracted few adherents(!), though to this day some philosophers are Eliminativists with respect to various alleged phenomenal features of sensations
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=m5pxXK-lTtkC&oi=fnd&pg=PA197&dq=A+particularly+compelling+refutation+of+eliminative+materialism+Lycan&ots=d50rE4oMDi&sig=Aq4a3zO2JqofZwbBbI17TA0SU-U
  
• Herman Philipse (1998). Shifting position?   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8205(199812)58:4<885:SP>2.0.CO;2-G
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2653730.pdf
  
• Herman Philipse (1997). The end of plasticity.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Paul Churchland has become famous for holding three controversial and interrelated doctrines which he put forward in early papers and in his first book. Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind (1979): eliminative materialism, the doctrine of the plasticity of perception, and a general network theory of language. In his latest book, The Engine of Reason, the Seat of the Soul (1995), Churchland aims to make some results of connectionist neuroscience available to the general public and explores the philosophical and social consequences that neuroscience is likely to have. I argue that these results of neuroscience refute the three doctrines that Churchland advocated in his earlier works. Yet youthful dreams do not die easily and Churchland is reluctant to relinquish his early views
  Additional links for this entry:
  https://dspace.library.uu.nl:8443/handle/1874/6802?mode=simple
  http://igitur-archive.library.uu.nl/ph/2005-0622-184535/UUindex.html
  http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/./ftinterface~content=a902026013~fulltext=713240930
  
• Michael M. Pitman (2003). Eliminative materialism and the integrity of science.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ajol.info/viewarticle.php?id=16774&jid=211
  http://www.ajol.info/viewarticle.php?id=16774&jid=211&layout=abstract
  
• Teed Rockwell, Beyond eliminative materialism: Some unnoticed implications of Paul Churchland's pragmatic pluralism.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Paul Churchland's epistemology contains a tension between two positions, which I will call pragmatic pluralism and eliminative materialism. Pragmatic pluralism became predominant as Churchland's epistemology became more neurocomputationally inspired, which saved him from the skepticism implicit in certain passages of the theory of reduction he outlined in Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind. However, once he replaces eliminativism with a neurologically inspired pragmatic pluralism, Churchland 1) cannot claim that folk psychology might be a false theory, in any significant sense 2) cannot claim that the concepts of Folk psychology might be empty of extension and lack reference. 3) cannot sustain Churchland's criticism of Dennett's "intentional stance" . 4) cannot claim to be a form of scientific realism, in the sense of believing that what science describes is somehow realer that what other conceptual systems describe
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/379/0/BeyondEM.html
  http://cogprints.org/379/00/BeyondEM.html
  http://www.california.com/~mcmf/beyondem.html
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000379/00/BeyondEM.html
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:379
  
• A. Rosenberg (1991). How is eliminative materialism possible?   (More)
• Stephen P. Stich (1996). Deconstructing the mind.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Over the last two decades, debates over the viability of commonsense psychology have been center stage in both cognitive science and the philosophy of mind. Eliminativists have argued that advances in cognitive science and neuroscience will ultimately justify a rejection of our "folk" theory of the mind, and of its ontology. In the first half of this book Stich, who was at one time a leading advocate of eliminativism, maintains that even if the sciences develop in the ways that eliminativists foresee, none of the arguments for ontological elimination are tenable. Rather than being resolved by science, he contends, these ontological disputes will be settled by a pragmatic process in which social and political considerations have a major role to play. In later chapters, Stich argues that the widespread worry about "naturalizing" psychological properties is deeply confused, since there is no plausible account of what naturalizing requires on which the failure of the naturalization project would lead to eliminativism. He also offers a detailed analysis of the many different notions of folk psychology to be found in philosophy and psychology, and argues that simulation theory, which purports to be an alternative to folk psychology, is not supported by recent experimental findings
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&se=gglsc&d=24264184
  http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/courses/consciousness97/papers/stich.html
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=hbcsiGdZ0V0C&oi=fnd&pg=PA3&ots=g4paASjopW&sig=3pdNae-SMCd8Vz1nRKlJE_Pg9Ck
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=hbcsiGdZ0V0C&oi=fnd&pg=PA3&ots=g4odCLhqgV&sig=5gmeXMWVhMI5N79AYF4mYvKUSS0
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/oso/533330/1999
  
• William W. Tait (2002). The myth of the mind.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Of course, I do not mean by the title of this paper to deny the existence of something called
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://home.uchicago.edu/~wwtx/mythofthemind.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/7g4mal8ffqbqg6vr/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/7G4MAL8FFQBQG6VR.pdf
  

Propositional Attitudes, Misc

• Lynne Rudder Baker (2002). Attitudes in action: A causal account.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This article aims to vindicate the commonsensical view that what we think affects what we do. In order to show that mental properties like believing, desiring and intending are causally explanatory, I propose a nonreductive, materialistic account that identifies beliefs and desires by their content, and that shows how differences in the contents of beliefs and desires can make causal differences in what we do
• George Bealer (1998). Propositions.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Recent work in philosophy of language has raised significant problems for the traditional theory of propositions, engendering serious skepticism about its general workability. These problems are, I believe, tied to fundamental misconceptions about how the theory should be developed. The goal of this paper is to show how to develop the traditional theory in a way which solves the problems and puts this skepticism to rest. The problems fall into two groups. The first has to do with reductionism, specifically attempts to reduce propositions to extensional entities-either extensional functions or sets. The second group concerns problems of fine grained content-both traditional 'Cicero'/'Tully' puzzles and recent variations on them which confront scientific essentialism. After characterizing the problems, I outline a non-reductionist approach-the algebraic approach-which avoids the problems associated with reductionism. I then go on to show how the theory can incorporate non-Platonic (as well as Platonic) modes of presentation. When these are implemented nondescriptively, they yield the sort of fine-grained distinctions which have been eluding us. The paper closes by applying the theory to a cluster of remaining puzzles, including a pair of new puzzles facing scientific essentialism
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://pantheon.yale.edu/~gb275/Propositions.pdf
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0026-4423(199801)2:107:425<1:P>2.0.CO;2-0
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0026-4423(199801)2:107:425<1:P>2.0.CO;2-0
  http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/107/425/1
  http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/107/425/1
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2659805.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/oup/mind/1998/00000107/00000425/art00001
  
• Hanoch Ben-Yami (1997). Against characterizing mental states as propositional attitudes.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1467-9213.00049
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2956474.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/phiq/1997/00000047/00000186/art00007
  
• Jonathan Bennett (1991). Analysis without noise.   (More)
• Austen Clark (1994). Beliefs and desires incorporated.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Suppose we admit for the sake of argument that "folk" explanations of human behavior--explanations in terms of beliefs and desires--sometimes succeed. They sometimes enable us to understand and predict patterns of motion that otherwise would remain unintelligible and unanticipated. Is the only explanation for such success that folk psychology is a viable proto-scientific theory of human psychology? I shall describe an analysis which yields a negative answer to that question. It was suggested by an observation and an analogy, both of which may initially seem remote from the topic at hand
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-362X(199408)91:8<404:BADI>2.0.CO;2-1
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-362X(199408)91:8<404:BADI>2.0.CO;2-1
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2941082.pdf
  
• Mitchell S. Green (1999). Attitude ascription's affinity to measurement.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The relation between two systems of attitude ascription that capture all the empirically significant aspects of an agents thought and speech may be analogous to that between two systems of magnitude ascription that are equivalent relative to a transformation of scale. If so, just as an objects weighing eight pounds doesnt relate that object to the number eight (for a different but equally good scale would use a different number), similarly an agents believing that P need not relate her to P (for a different but equally adequate interpretive scheme could use a different proposition). In either case the only reality picked out by any system of ascription is what is common to all equivalent rivals. By emphasizing some contrasts between decision theory and belief-desire psychology, it is argued that if attitude ascription is appropriately analogous to measurement then not only is being related to a proposition an artifact of the system of representation chosen, so are belief and desire
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.people.virginia.edu/~msg6m/pama.pdf
  http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/./ftinterface~content=a713770403~fulltext=713240930
  http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/index/MEAQ7F7V6C9X8N9J.pdf
  http://www.informaworld.com/index/MEAQ7F7V6C9X8N9J.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/routledg/riph/1999/00000007/00000003/art00003
  
• Pamela Hieronymi (2006). Controlling attitudes.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: I hope to show that, although belief is subject to two quite robust forms of agency, "believing at will" is impossible; one cannot believe in the way one ordinarily acts. Further, the same is true of intention: although intention is subject to two quite robust forms of agency, the features of belief that render believing less than voluntary are present for intention, as well. It turns out, perhaps surprisingly, that you can no more intend at will than believe at will
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-0114.2006.00247.x
  http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/118728598/PDFSTART
  
• Henry Jackman (online). Truth, rationality, and humanity.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: When we interpret someone in terms of their beliefs and desires, we are doing something other than merely describing them, but it is far from clear what this something else is. As Dennett puts it, while there is a growing consensus about the "not-purely-descriptive nature of intentional attribution," there remains considerable disagreement over which norms govern the play of this "dramatic interpretation game." This paper will discuss three candidates for specifying the content of these norms, truth, rationality and humanity. It will argue that while truth has frequently been taken to be the least plausible candidate, once the regulative rather than constitutive status of these norms are recognized, it turns out to be the best one. It will then close with a discussion of the 'indirect' role that rationality constraints can still be seen to play in a theory of belief
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.yorku.ca/hjackman/papers/TRH.pdf
  
• Reinhard Muskens (1993). Propositional Attitudes.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Verbs such as know, believe, hope, fear, regret and desire are commonly taken to express an attitude that one may bear towards a proposition and are therefore called verbs of propositional attitude. Thus in (1) below the agent Cathy is reported to have a certain attitude
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/muskens93propositional.html
  http://let.uvt.nl/general/people/rmuskens/pubs/propatt.pdf
  
• Michael W. Pelczar (2007). Forms and objects of thought.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: It is generally assumed that if it is possible to believe that p without believing that q, then there is some difference between the object of the thought that p and the object of the thought that q. This assumption is challenged in the present paper, opening the way to an account of epistemic opacity that improves on existing accounts, not least because it casts doubt on various arguments that attempt to derive startling ontological conclusions from seemingly innocent epistemic premises
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/120223p37w05271n/fulltext.pdf
  
• John Perry (1986). Circumstantial attitudes and benevolent cognition.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: From: _Language, Mind and Logic_, edited by Jeremy Butter?eld. 123
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www-csli.stanford.edu/~jperry//PHILPAPERS/circumstantial.pdf
  http://www-csli.stanford.edu/users/john/PHILPAPERS/circumstantial.pdf
  
• Ian Pratt (1993). Analysis and the attitudes.   (More)
• Francois Recanati (2000). Opacity and the attitudes.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/ijn_00000180/en/
  http://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/documents/disk0/00/00/01/80/ijn_00000180_00/ijn_00000180_00.rtf
  
• Philip Robbins (2004). To structure, or not to structure?   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/v51436477j773q50/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=5117430&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/V51436477J773Q50.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/synt/2004/00000139/00000001/05117430
  

Content Internalism and Externalism

Is Content in the Head?

• Robert E. Cummins (1991). Methodological reflections on belief.   (More)
• Katalin Farkas (2003). Does twin earth rest on a mistake?   (More)
• Katalin Farkas (2003). What is externalism?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The content of the externalist thesis about the mind depends crucially on how we define the distinction between the internal and the external. According to the usual understanding, the boundary between the internal and the external is the skull or the skin of the subject. In this paper I argue that the usual understanding is inadequate, and that only the new understanding of the external/internal distinction I suggest helps us to understand the issue of the compatibility of externalism and privileged access
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=5114404&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/XR39311N2T61WG02.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/phil/2003/00000112/00000003/05114404
  
• Justin C. Fisher (2007). Why nothing mental is just in the head.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Mental internalists hold that an individuals mental features at a given time supervene upon what is in that individuals head at that time. While many people reject mental internalism about content and justification, mental internalism is commonly accepted regarding such other mental features as rationality, emotion-types, propositional-attitude-types, moral character, and phenomenology. I construct a counter-example to mental internalism regarding all these features. My counter-example involves two creatures: a human and an alien from Pulse World. These creatures environments, behavioral dispositions and histories are such that it is intuitively clear that they are mentally quite different, even while they are, for a moment, exactly alike with respect to whats in their heads. I offer positive reasons for thinking that the case I describe is indeed possible. I then consider ways in which mental internalists might attempt to account for this case, but conclude that the only plausible option is to reject mental internalism and to adopt a particular externalist alternative a history-oriented version of teleo-functionalism
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2007.00649.x
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/nous/2007/00000041/00000002/art00009
  
• Juliet Floyd (2005). Putnam's 'the meaning of meaning': Externalism in historical context.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=HHNrzP0kQYEC&oi=fnd&pg=PA17&ots=pD_aK8lR0H&sig=9pKMBI-I02mW5VBaqEIQ5flzJb8
  
• Bryan Frances (ms). A philosophically inexpensive introduction to twin-earth.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: I say that it’s philosophically inexpensive because I think it is more convincing than any other Twin-Earth thought experiment in that it sidesteps many of the standard objections to the usual thought experiments. I also briefly discuss narrow contents and give an analysis of Putnam’s original argument
• Bryan Frances (online). Twin earth thought experiments.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Suppose that you had always had a physical twin, Chris, who on a different planet went through life having physical characteristics, sensory experiences, utterances, and brain processes exactly the same as yours in every physical and sensory respect. Chris
• Mitchell S. Green (2000). The status of supposition.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: According to many forms of Externalism now popular in the Philosophy of Mind, the contents of our thoughts depend in part upon our physical or social milieu.1 These forms of Externalism leave unchallenged the thesis that the ~non-factive! attitudes we bear towards these contents are independent of physical or social milieu. This paper challenges that thesis. It is argued here that publicly forwarding a content as a supposition for the sake of argument is, under conditions not themselves guaranteeing the existence of that state, sufficient for occupancy of the intentional state of supposing that content. Because a saying may literally create an intentional state, whether one is in such a state does not depend solely upon how things are within one’s skin. Rather, even leaving content fixed, the attitude borne toward that content depends in part upon what norms are in force in one’s milieu
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/0029-4624.00216
  
• Daniel Z. Korman (2006). What externalists should say about dry earth.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Dry earth seems to its inhabitants (our intrinsic duplicates) just as earth seems to us, that is, it seems to them as though there are rivers and lakes and a clear, odorless liquid flowing from their faucets. But, in fact, this is an illusion; there is no such liquid anywhere on the planet. I address two objections to externalism concerning the nature of the concept that is expressed by the word 'water' in the mouths of the inhabitants of dry earth. Gabriel Segal presents a dilemma for the externalist concerning the application conditions of the concept, and Paul Boghossian presents a dilemma for the externalist concerning the complexity of the concept. I show that, in both cases, the externalist may occupy the horn of his choice without departing from either the letter or spirit of externalism
• Joe Lau (online). Externalism about mental content.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Externalism with regard to mental content says that in order to have certain types of intentional mental states (e.g. beliefs), it is necessary to be related to the environment in the right way
• Peter Ludlow (2003). Externalism, logical form, and linguistic intentions.   (More)
• Kirk A. Ludwig (1993). Externalism, naturalism, and method.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=1533-6077(1993)4<250:ENAM>2.0.CO;2-B
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=1533-6077(1993)4<250:ENAM>2.0.CO;2-B
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/1522844.pdf
  
• Michael McGlone (forthcoming). Putnam on What Isn't in the Head.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’” Putnam argues, among other things, that “‘meanings’ just ain’t in the head”. Putnam’s central arguments in favor of this conclusion are unsound. The arguments in question are the famous intra‐world Twin Earth arguments, given on pages 223‐ 227 of the article in question.
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/g3103542832602p7/fulltext.pdf
  
• Jennifer Mundale & William P. Bechtel (online). Multiple realizability revisited.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The claim of the multiple realizability of mental states by brain states has been a major feature of the dominant philosophy of mind of the late 20th century. The claim is usually motivated by evidence that mental states are multiply realized, both within humans and between humans and other species. We challenge this contention by focusing on how neuroscientists differentiate brain areas. The fact that they rely centrally on psychological measures in mapping the brain and do so in a comparative fashion undercuts the likelihood that, at least within organic life forms, we are likely to find cases of multiply realized psychological functions
• Michael Pelczar (forthcoming). Content internalism about indexical thought.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Properly understood, content internalism is the thesis that any difference between the representational contents of two individuals' mental states reduces to a difference in those individuals' intrinsic properties. Some of the strongest arguments against internalism turn on the possibility for two "doppelgangers" –- perfect physical and phenomenal duplicates -– to differ with respect to the contents of those of their mental states that they can express using terms such as "I," "here," and "now." In this paper, I grant the stated possibility, but deny that it poses any threat to internalism. Despite their similarities, doppelgangers differ in some of their intrinsic properties, and it is to such intrinsic differences that differences of indexical content reduce.
• Hilary Putnam (1975). The meaning of 'meaning'.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=Q2W0y3NF3OwC&oi=fnd&pg=PA3&dq=The+meaning+of+'meaning'+Putnam&ots=4S-zIsMB7H&sig=r5lLHU4I80039oLNPYtb0cJmHFk
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=Q2W0y3NF3OwC&oi=fnd&pg=PA3&dq=The+meaning+of+'meaning'+Putnam&ots=4S-AKtLDcH&sig=zGWDJ_uKtm6vqJ2ifmStXrU7lz8
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=Q2W0y3NF3OwC&oi=fnd&pg=PA3&dq=The+meaning+of+'meaning'+Putnam&ots=4S-xEqNA5I&sig=eMnnp4F_uXzdRgtZXJc9LG9a4_w
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=Q2W0y3NF3OwC&oi=fnd&pg=PA3&dq=+The+meaning+of+'meaning'+Putnam&ots=4R8AHvMC6L&sig=l0CMfvrlOyXBlP6A8dIcf-xc00U
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=Q2W0y3NF3OwC&oi=fnd&pg=PA3&dq=The+meaning+of+'meaning'+Putnam&ots=4S-AEsQC5D&sig=mG-ZCtj3rJniriIyK9tBNuEZ7QM
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=Q2W0y3NF3OwC&oi=fnd&pg=PA3&dq=The+meaning+of+'meaning'+Putnam&ots=4S-xKqSy8H&sig=nrfzXwkUU2YQGI7pCHSSnWO7m-w
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=Q2W0y3NF3OwC&oi=fnd&pg=PA3&dq=The+meaning+of+'meaning'+Putnam&ots=4S-BMuPz4I&sig=Y1w7uV5Joi6fNuQ5eDwFfnLXA-U
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=Q2W0y3NF3OwC&oi=fnd&pg=PA3&dq=+The+meaning+of+'meaning'+Putnam&ots=4R8AErSC4H&sig=lg5ft6I9d-INpCItWgvwPvtOaBc
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=Q2W0y3NF3OwC&oi=fnd&pg=PA3&dq=The+meaning+of+'meaning'+Putnam&ots=4S-yGrMC6F&sig=udP9z8weNmRnlJH-nBGE5SZBWrU
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=Q2W0y3NF3OwC&oi=fnd&pg=PA3&dq=The+meaning+of+'meaning'+Putnam&ots=4R8AJvNBcH&sig=5aLaRp0ZlkytqZ-fE-JCkgZ6VB0
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=Q2W0y3NF3OwC&oi=fnd&pg=PA3&dq=The+meaning+of+'meaning'+Putnam&ots=4S-yMrRF9J&sig=MBnPT9Cb2y13RWc3PvCyOwFS5Ig
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=Q2W0y3NF3OwC&oi=fnd&pg=PA3&dq=The+meaning+of+'meaning'+Putnam&ots=4S-CIuSB8E&sig=jVU5vGzH1WGDyhZAs6rVxmLXjak
  
• Howard M. Robinson (2003). Some externalist strategies and their problems.   (More)
• Alex Rosenberg (2001). On multiple realization: Comments and criticism and the special sciences.   (More)
• Lawrence A. Shapiro (2005). Can psychology be a unified science?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Jaegwon Kim has argued that if psychological kinds are multiply realizable then no single psychological theory can describe regularities ranging over psychological states. Instead, psychology must be fractured, with human psychology covering states realized in the human way, martian psychology covering states realized in the martian way, and so on. I show that even if one accepts the principles that motivate Kim
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://philosophy.wisc.edu/shapiro/PSAsubmission.pdf
  http://philosophy.wisc.edu/shapiro/HomePage/PSAsubmission.htm
  http://philosophy.wisc.edu/shapiro/HomePage/PSAsubmission.pdf
  http://philosophy.wisc.edu/shapiro/HomePage/PSAsubmission.htm
  http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/resolve?id=doi:10.1086/508952
  http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/resolve?PHOS720536PDF
  
• Jaap van Brakel (2005). On the inventors of XYZ.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In this paper I try to make as much sense aspossible of, first, the extensive philosophicalliterature concerned with the status of `Wateris H2O' and, second, the implications ofPutnam's invention of Twin Earth, anotherpossible world stipulated to be just like Earth, except that water is XYZ, notH2O
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/m4x672301927781l/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=5267016&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/M4X672301927781L.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/foch/2005/00000007/00000001/05267016
  
• Asa Maria Wikforss (2005). Naming natural kinds.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This paper discusses whether it can be known a priori that a particular term, such as water, is a natural kind term, and how this problem relates to Putnams claim that natural kind terms require an externalist semantics. Two conceptions of natural kind terms are contrasted: The first holds that whether water is a natural kind term depends on its a priori knowable semantic features. The second
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/p6w65x777v328642/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=5147013&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/P6W65X777V328642.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/synt/2005/00000145/00000001/00007013
  
• Robert A. Wilson (2002). Individualism.   (More)

Social Externalism

• Jason Bridges (2006). Davidson's transcendental externalism.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: One of the chief aims of Donald Davidson
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2006.tb00619.x
  http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/118586891/PDFSTART
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/ips/ppr/2006/00000073/00000002/art00002
  
• John M. Collins (2006). Temporal externalism, natural kind terms, and scientifically ignorant communities.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ajol.info/viewarticle.php?jid=190&id=28209&layout=abstract
  
• Barry Loewer (2009). Why is there anything except physics?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In the course of defending his view of the relation between the special sciences and physics from Jaegwon Kim’s objections Jerry Fodor asks “So then, why is there anything except physics?” By which he seems to mean to ask if physics is fundamental and complete in its domain how can there be autonomous special science laws. Fodor wavers between epistemological and metaphysical understandings of the autonomy of the special sciences. In my paper I draw out the metaphysical construal of his view and argue that while in a sense it answers Fodor’s question it is immensely implausible
• Ruth G. Millikan (1999). Historical kinds and the "special sciences".   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/h75k4074305x1028/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/H75K4074305X1028.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/phil/1999/00000095/00000001/00207186
  
• Mitchell S. Green (2000). The status of supposition.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: According to many forms of Externalism now popular in the Philosophy of Mind, the contents of our thoughts depend in part upon our physical or social milieu.1 These forms of Externalism leave unchallenged the thesis that the ~non-factive! attitudes we bear towards these contents are independent of physical or social milieu. This paper challenges that thesis. It is argued here that publicly forwarding a content as a supposition for the sake of argument is, under conditions not themselves guaranteeing the existence of that state, sufficient for occupancy of the intentional state of supposing that content. Because a saying may literally create an intentional state, whether one is in such a state does not depend solely upon how things are within one’s skin. Rather, even leaving content fixed, the attitude borne toward that content depends in part upon what norms are in force in one’s milieu
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/0029-4624.00216
  
• John Haugeland (2004). Social cartesianism.   (More)
• Henry Jackman (2000). Deference and self-knowledge.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: It has become increasingly popular to suggest that non-individualistic theories of content undermine our purported a priori knowledge of such contents because they entail that we lack the ability to distinguish our thoughts from alternative thoughts with different contents. However, problems relating to such knowledge of 'comparative' content tell just as much against individualism as non-individualism. Indeed, the problems presented by individualistic theories of content for self-knowledge are at least, if not more, serious than those presented by non-individualistic theories. Consequently, considerations of self-knowledge give one no reason to embrace individualism. If anything, they give one reason to reject it
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.yorku.ca/hjackman/papers/def-and-sk.pdf
  
• Henry Jackman (1998). Individualism and interpretation.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: 'Interpretational' accounts of meaning are frequently treated as incompatible with accounts stressing language's 'social' character. However, this paper argues that one can reconcile interpretational and social accounts by distinguishing "methodological" from "ascriptional" individualism. While methodological individualism requires only that the meaning of one's terms ultimately be grounded in facts about oneself, ascriptional individualism requires that the meaning of one's terms be independent of how others use theirs. Interpretational accounts are committed only to methodological individualism, while arguments for languages social character are best understood as attacks on ascriptional individualism. As a result, one can recognize language's social character and still be an interpretationalist
• Henry Jackman (1996). Semantic Norms and Temporal Externalism.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: There has frequently been taken to be a tension, if not an incompatibility, between "externalist" theories of content (which allow the make-up of one's physical environment and the linguistic usage of one's community to contribute to the contents of one's thoughts and utterances) and the "methodologically individualist" intuition that whatever contributes to the content of one's thoughts and utterances must ultimately be grounded in facts about one's own attitudes and behavior. In this dissertation I argue that one can underwrite such externalist theories within a methodologically individualistic framework by understanding semantic norms in terms of the need to reach, for each of one's terms, a type of "equilibrium." Each speaker's commitment to making her _own_ beliefs and applications consistent allows one to incorporate these 'external' factors into the contents of their thoughts and utterances in a way that remains methodologically individualistic. Methodologically individualistic accounts are typically taken to be unable to incorporate 'external' factors such as the world's physical make-up or communal usage because of arguments suggesting that the individual's own beliefs and usage underdetermine or even misidentify what, according to externalist accounts, they mean by their terms. These arguments, however, only seem plausible if one presupposes a comparatively impoverished conception of the individual's beliefs. The beliefs a speaker associates with a given term extend far beyond the handful of sentences they would produce if asked to list such beliefs. In particular, speakers have an implicit, but rich, understanding of their language, their world, and the relation between them. Speakers typically understand languages as shared temporally extended practices about which they can be, both individually and collectively, mistaken. Once this conception of language is taken into account, the ascriptions which purportedly forced 'non-individualistic' conceptions of content upon us (particularly ascriptions which seemed to tie what we meant to social use rather than our own beliefs) turn out to be ultimately grounded in the individual's own beliefs. Indeed, our self-conception does much more than merely underwrite 'non-individualistic' ascriptions..
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://webspace.utexas.edu/deverj/personal/test/semanticnorms.pdf
  
• Henry Jackman (2005). Temporal externalism and our ordinary linguistic practices.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Temporal externalists argue that ascriptions of thought and utterance content can legitimately re?ect contingent conceptual developments that are only settled after the time of utterance. While the view has been criticized for failing to accord with our
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-0114.2005.00232.x
  
• Henry Jackman (2006). Temporal externalism, constitutive norms, and theories of vagueness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Our concept of truth is governed by two principles. The
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.yorku.ca/hjackman/papers/CNV.pdf
  
• Henry Jackman (2005). Temporal externalism, deference, and our ordinary linguistic practice.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Temporal externalists argue that ascriptions of thought and utterance content can legitimately reflect contingent conceptual developments that are only settled after the time of utterance. While the view has been criticized for failing to accord with our
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.yorku.ca/hjackman/papers/TE&OLP.pdf
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-0114.2005.00232.x
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/papq/2005/00000086/00000003/art00005
  
• Henry Jackman (1999). We live forwards but understand backwards: Linguistic practices and future behavior.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Ascriptions of content are sensitive not only to our physical and social environment, but also to unforeseeable developments in the subsequent usage of our terms. This paper argues that the problems that may seem to come from endorsing such 'temporally sensitive' ascriptions either already follow from accepting the socially and historically sensitive ascriptions Burge and Kripke appeal to, or disappear when the view is developed in detail. If one accepts that one's society's past and current usage contributes to what one's terms mean, there is little reason not to let its future usage to do so as well
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.yorku.ca/hjackman/papers/T-ext.pdf
  http://www.yorku.ca/hjackman/papers/t-ext.html
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1468-0114.00078
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/papq/1999/00000080/00000002/art00003
  
• Jeeloo Liu (2002). Physical externalism and social externalism: Are they really compatible?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Putnam and Burge have been viewed as launching a joint attack on individualism, the view that the content of one's psychological state is determined by what is in the head . Putnam argues that meanings are not in the head while Burge argues that beliefs are not in the head either, and both have come up with convincing arguments against individualism. It is generally conceived that Putnam's view is a version of physical externalism, which argues that factors in the physical environment play a role in determining the meanings of natural kind terms. Burge, on the other hand, is regarded as following up Putnam's argument to bring in factors in the social environment for the determination of belief. Burge's view has been commonly referred to as 'social externalism.' The general consensus in the field is that physical externalism and social externalism are compatible views. Furthermore, both Putnam and Burge seem to endorse each other’s position for the most part. In this paper, however, I shall argue against this general view to show that the two theories are deep down incompatible
• Kirk A. Ludwig (ms). The myth of social content.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Social externalism is the view that the contents of a person's propositional attitudes are logically determined at least in part by her linguistic community's standards for the use of her words. If social externalism is correct, its importance can hardly be overemphasized. The traditional Cartesian view of psychological states as essentially first personal and non-relational in character, which has shaped much theorizing about the nature of psychological explanation, would be shown to be deeply flawed
• Christian Onof & Leslie Marsh (2008). Introduction to the special issue “perspectives on social cognition”.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: No longer is sociality the preserve of the social sciences, or ‘‘culture’’ the preserve of the humanities or anthropology. By the same token, cognition is no longer the sole preserve of the cognitive sciences. Social cognition (SC) or, sociocognition if you like, is thus a kaleidoscope of research projects that has seen exponential growth over the past 30 or so years.
• Michael McKinsey (1993). Curing folk psychology of arthritis.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Tyler Burge's (1979) famous thought experiment concerning 'arthritis' is commonly assumed to show that all ascriptions of content to beliefs and other attitudes are dependent for their truth upon facts about the agent's social and linguistic environment. It is also commonly claimed that Burge's argument shows that Putnam's (1975) result regarding natural kind terms applies to all general terms whatever, and hence shows that all such terms have wide meanings.1 But I wish to show here, first, that neither Burge's initial thought experiment nor a second type of example that Burge describes supports either of these conclusions. Second, I will identify the proper conclusion to draw from Burge's discussion and show that this conclusion does not really pose a serious problem for individualism about the mental. And finally, I will argue that Burge's discussion does not in fact provide a conclusive reason for believing its proper conclusion
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/M1W49825V7173XW7.pdf
  
• Ruth G. Millikan (2003). In defense of public language.   (More)
• Peter Pagin (2006). Intersubjective externalism.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: in T. Marvan (ed) What Determines Content? The Internalism/Externalism Dispute, Cambridge Scholar Press, Newcastle upon Tyne, 39-54, 2006
• David Pitt (ms). The Burgean intuitions.   (More)
• Sarah Sawyer (2003). Conceptual errors and social externalism.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://eprints.sussex.ac.uk/1588/01/Conceptual_Errors_and_Social_Externalism_Final.pdf
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1467-9213.00311
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/phiq/2003/00000053/00000211/art00008
  
• Asa Maria Wikforss (2004). Externalism and incomplete understanding.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.0031-8094.2004.00352.x
  
• Asa Maria Wikforss (2001). Social externalism and conceptual errors.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Ever since Putnam and Burge launched their respective attacks on individualist accounts of meaning the individualist has felt squeezed for space.1 Very little maneuvering room, it seems, is left for the philosopher who wants to deny that meaning and mental content depend on the speaker's social environment. One option, popular amongst individualists, is to grant that reference is socially determined but argue that there is nevertheless a notion of meaning or content that can be understood individualistically. That is, the individualist can opt for a
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/j.0031-8094.2001.00225.x/abs/
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8094(200104)51:203<217:SEACE>2.0.CO;2-1
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8094(200104)51:203<217:SEACE>2.0.CO;2-1
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.0031-8094.2001.00225.x
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2660569.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/phiq/2001/00000051/00000203/art00006
  
• Andrew Woodfield (1998). Social externalism and conceptual diversity.   (More)

Externalism and Psychological Explanation

• David J. Buller (1997). Individualism and evolutionary psychology (or: In defense of "narrow" functions).   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Millikan and Wilson argue, for different reasons, that the essential reference to the environment in adaptationist explanations of behavior makes (psychological) individualism inconsistent with evolutionary psychology. I show that their arguments are based on misinterpretations of the role of reference to the environment in such explanations. By exploring these misinterpretations, I develop an account of explanation in evolutionary psychology that is fully consistent with individualism. This does not, however, constitute a full-fledged defense of individualism, since evolutionary psychology is only one explanatory paradigm among many in psychology
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/328/00/indy&ep.htm
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000328/
  http://cogprints.soton.ac.uk/documents/disk0/00/00/03/28/
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000328/00/indy&ep.htm
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:328
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8248(199703)64:1<74:IAEP(I>2.0.CO;2-N
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8248(199703)64:1<74:IAEP(I>2.0.CO;2-N
  http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/resolve?id=doi:10.1086/392536
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/188370.pdf
  
• David J. Buller (1992). "Narrow"-mindedness breeds inaction.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000329/
  
• Tyler Burge (1986). Individualism and psychology.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8108(198601)95:1<3:IAP>2.0.CO;2-L
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8108(198601)95:1<3:IAP>2.0.CO;2-L
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2185131.pdf
  
• Tyler Burge (1982). Two thought experiments reviewed.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.projecteuclid.org/DPubS/Repository/1.0/Disseminate?handle=euclid.ndjfl/1093870087&view=body&content-type=pdf_1
  
• Jerry A. Fodor (1982). Cognitive science and the twin-earth problem.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.projecteuclid.org/DPubS/Repository/1.0/Disseminate?handle=euclid.ndjfl/1093883623&view=body&content-type=pdf_1
  
• Pierre Jacob (online). Belief attribution and rationality: A dilemma for Jerry Fodor.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/documents/disk0/00/00/03/60/index.html
  http://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/documents/disk0/00/00/03/60/ijn_00000360_00/ijn_00000360_00.htm
  
• Pierre Jacob (2002). Can mental content explain behavior?   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/ijn_00000280/en/
  http://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/documents/disk0/00/00/02/80/ijn_00000280_00/ijn_00000280_00.htm
  
• Michael Losonsky (1995). Emdedded systems vs. individualism.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract:   The dispute between individualism and anti-individualism is about the individuation of psychological states, and individualism, on some accounts, is committed to the claim that psychological subjects together with their environments do not constitute integrated computational systems. Hence on this view the computational states that explain psychological states in computational accounts of mind will not involve the subject''s natural and social environment. Moreover, the explanation of a system''s interaction with the environment is, on this view, not the primary goal of computational theorizing. Recent work in computational developmental psychology (by A. Karmiloff-Smith and J. Rutkowska) as well as artificial agents or embedded artificial systems (by L.P. Kaelbling, among others) casts doubt on these claims. In these computational models, the environment does not just trigger and sustain input for computational operations, but some computational operations actually involve environmental structures
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/l0hl738085561524/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/L0HL738085561524.pdf
  
• Ron McClamrock (1991). Methodological individualism considered as a constitutive principle of scientific inquiry.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The issue of methodological solipsism in the philosophy of mind and psychology has received enormous attention and discussion in the decade since the appearance Jerry Fodor's "Methodological Solipsism" [Fodor 1980]. But most of this discussion has focused on the consideration of the now infamous "Twin Earth" type examples and the problems they present for Fodor's notion of "narrow content". I think there is deeper and more general moral to be found in this issue, particularly in light of Fodor's more recent defense of his view in Psychosemantics [Fodor 1987]. Underlying this discussion are questions about the nature and plausibility of the claim that scientific explanation should observe a constraint of methodological individualism . My goal in what follows is to bring out this more general problem in Fodor's "internalist" account of the mental
• Karen Neander (ms). The narrow and the normative.   (More)
• Katarzyna Paprzycka (2002). False consciousness of intentional psychology.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: According to explanatory individualism, every action must be explained in terms of an agent's desire. According to explanatory nonindividualism, we sometimes act on our desires, but it is also possible for us to act on others' desires without acting on desires of our own. While explanatory nonindividualism has guided the thinking of many social scientists, it is considered to be incoherent by most philosophers of mind who insist that actions must be explained ultimately in terms of some desire of the agent. In the first part of the paper, I show that some powerful arguments designed to demonstrate the incoherence of explanatory nonindividualism fail. In the second part of the paper, I offer a nonindividualist explanation of the apparent obviousness of belief-desire psychology. I argue that there are two levels of the intelligibility of our actions. On the more fundamental (explanatory) level, the question "Why did the agent do something?" admits a variety of folk-psychological categories. But there is another (formation-of-self) level, at which the same question admits only of answers that ultimately appeal only to the agent's own desires. Explanatory individualism results from the confusion of the two levels
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/./ftinterface~content=a713690569~fulltext=713240930
  http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/index/JEMJLF93TFKTCQNQ.pdf
  http://www.informaworld.com/index/JEMJLF93TFKTCQNQ.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/routledg/cphp/2002/00000015/00000003/art00003
  
• John Perry (1998). Broadening the mind.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www-csli.stanford.edu/~jperry//PHILPAPERS/elm.pdf
  http://www-csli.stanford.edu/users/john/PHILPAPERS/elm.pdf
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8205(199803)58:1<223:BTM>2.0.CO;2-I
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8205(199803)58:1<223:BTM>2.0.CO;2-I
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2653644.pdf
  
• Bradley Rives (2009). Concept cartesianism, concept pragmatism, and Frege cases.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This paper concerns the dialectal role of Frege Cases in the debate between Concept Cartesians and Concept Pragmatists. I take as a starting point Christopher Peacocke’s argument that, unlike Cartesianism, his ‘Fregean’ Pragmatism can account for facts about the rationality and epistemic status of certain judgments. I argue that since this argument presupposes that the rationality of thoughts turn on their content, it is thus question-begging against Cartesians, who claim that issues about rationality turn on the form, not the content, of thoughts. I then consider Jerry Fodor’s argument that ‘modes of presentation’ are not identical with Fregean senses, and argue that explanatory considerations should leads us to reject his ‘syntactic’ treatment of Frege cases. Rejecting the Cartesian treatment of Frege cases, however, is not tantamount to accepting Peacocke’s claim that reasons and rationality are central to the individuation of concepts. For I argue that we can steer a middle course between Fodor’s Cartesianism and Peacocke’s Pragmatism, and adopt a form of Pragmatism that is constrained by Fregean considerations, but at the same time denies that concepts are constitutively tied to reasons and rationality
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/qg48778p14463402/fulltext.pdf
  
• Mark Rowlands (1995). Against methodological solipsism: The ecological approach.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This paper argues that an ecological approach to psychology of the sort advanced by J. J. Gibson provides a coherent and powerful alternative to the computational, information-processing, paradigm. The paper argues for two principles. Firstly, one cannot begin to understand what internal information processing an organism must accomplish until one understands what information is available to the organism in its environment. Secondly, an organism can process information by acting on or manipulating physical structures in its environment. An attempt is made to show how these principles can be extended to cognition as a whole. It is suggested that these principles may have a foundation in evolutionary biology
• Sarah Sawyer (2006). The role of object-dependent content in psychological explanation.   (More)
• Stephen P. Stich (1978). Autonomous psychology and the belief/desire thesis.   (More)
• J. Wallace & H. E. Mason (1990). On some thought experiments about mind and meaning.   (More)
• Robert A. Wilson (2004). Recent work on individualism in the social, behavioural, and biological sciences.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The social, behavioral, and a good chunk of the biological sciences concern the nature of individual agency, where our paradigm for an individual is a human being. Theories of economic behavior, of mental function and dysfunction, and of ontogenetic development, for example, are theories of how such individuals act, and of what internal and external factors are determinative of that action. Such theories construe individuals in distinctive ways
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/rnr0798115309k31/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/RNR0798115309K31.pdf
  

Externalism and Mental Causation

• Anthony B. Dardis (2002). Individualism and the new logical connections argument.   (More)
• Wim de Muijnck (2002). Causation by relational properties.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In discussions on mental causation and externalism, it is often assumed that extrinsic, or relational, properties cannot have causal efficacy. In this paper I argue that this assumption is based on a category mistake, in that causal efficacy (dependence among events or states of affairs) is confused with causal influence (persistence of and interaction among objects). I then argue that relational properties are indeed causally efficacious, which I explain with the help of Dretske's notion of a 'structuring cause'
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=skEGFPOVZ4cC&oi=fnd&pg=PA123&ots=TBdxr9PIB0&sig=w0YckxSDth1wWXv4VcGw-_G7VDQ
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/rodopi/gps/2003/00000065/00000001/art00007
  
• Kirk A. Ludwig (1993). Causal relevance and thought content.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8094(199407)44:176<334:CRATC>2.0.CO;2-6
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8094(199407)44:176<334:CRATC>2.0.CO;2-6
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2219613.pdf
  
• David Robb & John Heil (online). Mental Causation.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Worries about mental causation are prominent in contemporary discussions of the mind and human agency. Originally, the problem of mental causation was that of understanding how a mental substance (thought to be immaterial) could interact with a material substance, a body. Most philosophers nowadays repudiate immaterial minds, but the problem of mental causation has not gone away. Instead, focus has shifted to mental properties. How could mental properties be causally relevant to bodily behavior? How could something mental qua mental cause what it does? After looking at the traditional Problem of Interaction, we survey various versions of the property-based problem and look at proposed solutions to them.
• Nicholas Shea (2003). Does externalism entail the anomalism of the mental?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In ‘Mental Events’ Donald Davidson argued for the anomalism of the mental on the basis of the operation of incompatible constitutive principles in the mental and physical domains. Many years later, he has suggested that externalism provides further support for the anomalism of the mental. I examine the basis for that claim. The answer to the question in the title will be a qualified ‘Yes’. That is an important result in the metaphysics of mind and an interesting consequence of externalism
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/1467-9213.00306
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1467-9213.00306
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/phiq/2003/00000053/00000211/art00003
  

Externalism and the Theory of Vision

• Tyler Burge (1986). Individualism and psychology.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8108(198601)95:1<3:IAP>2.0.CO;2-L
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8108(198601)95:1<3:IAP>2.0.CO;2-L
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2185131.pdf
  
• Sarah Patterson (1996). Success-orientation and individualism in the theory of vision.   (More)
• Arnold Silverberg (2006). Chomsky and Egan on computational theories of vision.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Noam Chomsky and Frances Egan argue that David Marr
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/e649774142n0n580/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/E649774142N0N580.pdf
  

Externalism and Computation

• Hilla Jacobson-Horowitz (2004). Syntax, semantics, and intentional aspects.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ajol.info/viewarticle.php?jid=190&id=18564&layout=abstract
  http://www.ajol.info/viewarticle.php?id=18564&jid=190&layout=abstract
  
• Susan Schneider (2005). Direct reference, psychological explanation, and Frege cases.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In this essay I defend a theory of psychological explanation that is based on the joint commitment to direct reference and computationalism. I offer a new solution to the problem of Frege Cases. Frege Cases involve agents who are unaware that certain expressions corefer (e.g. that 'Cicero' and 'Tully' corefer), where such knowledge is relevant to the success of their behavior, leading to cases in which the agents fail to behave as the intentional laws predict. It is generally agreed that Frege Cases are a major problem, if not the major problem, that this sort of theory faces. In this essay, I hope to show that the theory can surmount the Frege Cases
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.0268-1064.2005.00294.x
  

Externalism and Self-Knowledge

• Dorit Bar-On (2004). Externalism and self-knowledge: Content, use, and expression.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Suppose, as I stare at a glass in front of me, I say or think: There
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/j.0029-4624.2004.00477.x/abs/
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.0029-4624.2004.00477.x
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/nous/2004/00000038/00000003/art00003
  
• Helen Beebee (2002). Transfer of warrant, begging the question, and semantic externalism.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8094(200107)51:204<356:TOWBTQ>2.0.CO;2-U
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8094(200107)51:204<356:TOWBTQ>2.0.CO;2-U
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1467-9213.00234
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3542694.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/phiq/2001/00000051/00000204/art00005
  
• Paul A. Boghossian (1994). The transparency of mental content.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/about/terms.html. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=1520-8583(1994)8<33:TTOMC>2.0.CO;2-X
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=1520-8583(1994)8<33:TTOMC>2.0.CO;2-X
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2214162.pdf
  
• Paul A. Boghossian (1997). What the externalist can know A Priori.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Controversy continues to attach to the question whether an externalism about mental content is compatible with a traditional doctrine of privileged self-knowledge. By an externalism about mental content, I mean the view that what concepts our thoughts involve may depend not only on facts that are internal to us, but on facts about our environment. It is worth emphasizing, if only because it is still occasionally misperceived, that this thesis is supposed to apply at the level of sense and not merely at that of reference: what concepts we think in terms of -- and not just what they happen to pick out -- is said by the externalist to depend upon environmental facts. By a traditional doctrine of privileged self-knowledge, I mean the view that we are able to know, without the benefit of empirical investigation, what our thoughts are in our own case. Suppose I entertain a thought that I would express with the sentence `Water is wet'. According to the traditional doctrine, I can know without empirical investigation (a) that I am entertaining a thought; (b) that it has a particular conceptual content, and (c) that its content is that water is wet
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=1533-6077(1998)9<197:WTECK">2.0.CO;2-U
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/1467-9264.00011/abs/
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1467-9264.00011
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/1522971.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/oso/17388/2000/00000001/00000001/art00010
  
• Bill Brewer (2000). Externalism and A Priori knowledge of empirical facts.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: I want to discuss the possibility of combining a so-called
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/oso/67523/2000/00000001/00000001/art00017
  
• Bill Brewer (2004). Self-knowledge and externalism.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: I want to discuss the possibility of combining a so-called
• J. Brown (2003). The reductio argument and transmission of warrant.   (More)
• Anthony L. Brueckner (2004). McKinsey redux?   (More)
• Anthony L. Brueckner (1999). Transcendental arguments from content externalism.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=JnCPaM0KeG8C&oi=fnd&pg=PA229&ots=Nx4bk8WRSf&sig=WFXw5ZvKqKSSB72vO200Rl1YAVo
  
• Anthony L. Brueckner (1999). Two recent approaches to self-knowledge.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0029-4624(1999)33<251:TRATS>2.0.CO;2-C
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/0029-4624.33.s13.12
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2676105.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/nous/1999/00000013/A00300s1/art00180
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/nous/1999/00000033/A013s013/art00012
  
• Anthony L. Brueckner (2003). Two transcendental arguments concerning self-knowledge.   (More)
• Andrew Cullison (2007). Privileged access, externalism, and ways of believing.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: By exploiting a concept called ways of believing, I offer a plausible reformulation of the doctrine of privileged access. This reformulation will provide us with a defense of compatibilism, the view that content externalism and privileged access are compatible.
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/b087376511363126/fulltext.pdf
  
• Martin Davies (2000). Externalism, architecturalism, and epistemic warrant.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This paper addresses a problem about epistemic warrant. The problem is posed by philosophical arguments for externalism about the contents of thoughts, and similarly by philosophical arguments for architecturalism about thinking, when these arguments are put together with a thesis of first person authority. In each case, first personal knowledge about our thoughts plus the kind of knowledge that is provided by a philosophical argument seem, together, to open an unacceptably ‘non-empirical’ route to knowledge of empirical facts. Furthermore, this unwelcome prospect of transferring a ‘non-empirical’ warrant from premises about our own mental states and about philosophical theory to a conclusion about external environment or internal architecture seems to depend upon little more than the possibility of knowledge by inference. (The use of the scare-quoted term ‘non-empirical’ is explained a couple of paragraphs further on.)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/oso/17388/2000/00000001/00000001/art00012
  
• Martin Davies (2000). Externalism and armchair knowledge.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: [I]f you could know a priori that you are in a given mental state, and your being in that state conceptually or logically implies the existence of external objects, then you could know a priori that the external world exists. Since you obviously _can
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/oso/67523/2000/00000001/00000001/art00016
  
• Martin Davies (2003). Externalism, self-knowledge and transmission of warrant.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Externalism about some mental property, M, is the thesis that whether a person (or other physical being) has M depends, not only on conditions inside the person
• Martin Davies (2003). The problem of armchair knowledge.   (More)
• Fred Dretske (2003). Externalism and self-knowledge.   (More)
• Gary Ebbs (2003). A puzzle about doubt.   (More)
• J. Edwards (1998). The simple theory of colour and the transparency of sense experience.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/oso/17388/2000/00000001/00000001/art00014
  
• Jonathan Ellis (2007). Content externalism and phenomenal character: A new worry about privileged access.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: A central question in contemporary epistemology concerns whether content externalism threatens a common doctrine about privileged access. If the contents of a subject
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://fortytwo.ucsc.edu/~jellis/SelfKnowledgeAbstract.htm
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/9675155563768212/fulltext.pdf
  
• Katalin Farkas (2003). What is externalism?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The content of the externalist thesis about the mind depends crucially on how we define the distinction between the internal and the external. According to the usual understanding, the boundary between the internal and the external is the skull or the skin of the subject. In this paper I argue that the usual understanding is inadequate, and that only the new understanding of the external/internal distinction I suggest helps us to understand the issue of the compatibility of externalism and privileged access
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=5114404&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/XR39311N2T61WG02.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/phil/2003/00000112/00000003/05114404
  
• Jordi Fernandez (2004). Externalism and self-knowledge: A puzzle in two dimensions.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.0966-8373.2004.00197.x
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/ejop/2004/00000012/00000001/art00002
  
• Andr Gallois (1994). Deflationary self-knowledge.   (More)
• Brie Gertler (2004). We can't know a priori that H2O exists. But can we know a priori that water does?   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.0003-2638.2004.00459.x
  
• John Gibbons (2001). Externalism and knowledge of the attitudes.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8094(200101)51:202<13:EAKOTA>2.0.CO;2-I
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8094(200101)51:202<13:EAKOTA>2.0.CO;2-I
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/1467-9213.00211
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1467-9213.00211
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2660518.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/phiq/2001/00000051/00000202/art00002
  
• Sanford C. Goldberg (2003). Anti-individualism, conceptual omniscience, and skepticism.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Given anti-individualism, a subjectmight have a priori (non-empirical)knowledge that she herself is thinking thatp, have complete and exhaustiveexplicational knowledge of all of the conceptscomposing the content that p, and yetstill need empirical information (e.g.regarding her embedding conditions and history)prior to being in a position to apply herexhaustive conceptual knowledge in aknowledgeable way to the thought that p. This result should be welcomed byanti-individualists: it squares with everythingthat compatibilist-minded anti-individualistshave said regarding e.g. the compatibility ofanti-individualism and basic self-knowledge;and more importantly it contains the crux of aresponse to McKinsey-style arguments againstanti-individualism
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/lw16173322454u25/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=5139899&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/LW16173322454U25.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/phil/2003/00000116/00000001/05139899
  
• Sanford C. Goldberg (2007). Anti-individualism, content preservation, and discursive justification.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Most explorations of the epistemic implications of Semantic Anti- Individualism (SAI) focus on issues of self-knowledge (first-person au- thority) and/or external-world skepticism. Less explored has been SAIs implications forthe epistemology of reasoning. In this paperI argue that SAI has some nontrivial implications on this score. I bring these out by reflecting on a problem first raised by Boghossian (1992). Whereas Boghos- sians main interest was in establishing the incompatibility of SAI and the a priority of logical abilities (Boghossian 1992: 22), I argue that Boghossians argument is better interpreted as pointing to SAIs implications for the na- ture of discursive justification
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2007.00643.x
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/nous/2007/00000041/00000002/art00003
  
• Sanford C. Goldberg (2006). Brown on self-knowledge and discriminability.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In her recent book Anti-Individualism and Knowledge, Jessica Brown has presented a novel answer to the self-knowledge achievement problem facing the proponent of anti-individualism. She argues that her answer is to be preferred to the traditional answer (based on Burge, 1988a). Here I present three objections to the claim that her proposed answer is to be preferred. The significance of these objections lies in what they tell us about the nature of the sort of knowledge that is in dispute. Perhaps the most important lesson I draw from this discussion is that, given the nature of knowledge of one's own thoughts, discriminability (from relevant alternatives) is not a condition on knowledge as such
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-0114.2006.00261.x?ai=2l8&mi=85vxf&af=R
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-0114.2006.00261.x
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/papq/2006/00000087/00000003/art00002
  
• Sanford C. Goldberg (2002). Do anti-individualistic construals of propositional attitudes capture the agent's conception?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Burge 1986 presents an argument for anti-individualism about the proposi- tional attitudes. On the assumption that such attitudes are
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1468-0068.t01-1-00403
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/nous/2002/00000036/00000004/art00403
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/nous/2002/00000036/00000004/art00004
  
• Sanford C. Goldberg (2000). Externalism and authoritative knowledge of content: A new incompatibilist strategy.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: A typical strategy of those who seek to show that externalism is compatible with authoritative knowledge of content is to show that externalism does nothing to undermine the claim that all thinkers can at any time form correct and justi?ed self-ascriptive judgements concerning their occurrent thoughts. In reaction, most incompat- ibilists have assumed the burden of denying that externalism is compatible with this claim about self-ascription. Here I suggest another way to attack the compatibilist strategy. I aim to show that forming a justi?ed true self-ascriptive judgement about one
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/mt277m670g227t02/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=190144&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/MT277M670G227T02.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/phil/2000/00000100/00000001/00190144
  
• Sanford C. Goldberg (1997). Self-ascription, self-knowledge, and the memory argument.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: is tendentious. (Throughout this paper I shall refer to this claim as
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/1467-8284.00078/abs/
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1467-8284.00078
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/anal/1997/00000057/00000255/art00078
  
• Sanford C. Goldberg (2005). The dialectical context of Boghossian's memory argument.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Externalism1 is the thesis that some propositional attitudes depend for their individuation on features of the thinker’s (social and/or physical) environment. The doctrine of self-knowledge of thoughts is the thesis that for all thinkers S and occurrent thoughts that p, S has authoritative and non-empirical knowledge of her thought that p. A much-discussed question in the literature is whether these two doctrines are compatible. In this paper I attempt to respond to one argument for an incompatibilist conclusion, Boghossian’s 1989 ‘Memory Argument.’
• Sanford C. Goldberg (1999). The psychology and epistemology of self-knowledge.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/r128657034g5656p/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=200268&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/R128657034G5656P.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/synt/1999/00000118/00000002/00200268
  
• Sanford C. Goldberg (1999). The relevance of discriminatory knowledge of content.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 80:2, 136-56 (June 1999)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1468-0114.00077?prevSearch=fulltextfield:(burge+memory)
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1468-0114.00077
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/papq/1999/00000080/00000002/art00077
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/papq/1999/00000080/00000002/art00002
  
• Sanford C. Goldberg (2003). What do you know when you know your own thoughts?   (More)
• John Greco (2004). Externalism and skepticism.   (More)
• Lisa L. Hall (1998). The self-knowledge that externalists leave out.   (More)
• Jussi Haukioja (2006). Semantic externalism and A Priori self-knowledge.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The argument known as the 'McKinsey Recipe' tries to establish the incompatibility of semantic externalism (about natural kind concepts in particular) and _a priori _self- knowledge about thoughts and concepts by deriving from the conjunction of these theses an absurd conclusion, such as that we could know _a priori _that water exists. One reply to this argument is to distinguish two different readings of 'natural kind concept': (i) a concept which _in fact _denotes a natural kind, and (ii) a concept which _aims_ to denote a natural kind. Paul Boghossian has argued, using a _Dry Earth _scenario, that this response fails, claiming that the externalist cannot make sense of a concept aiming, but failing, to denote a natural kind. In this paper I argue that Boghossian's argument is flawed. Borrowing machinery from two-dimensional semantics, using the notion of 'considering a possible world as actual', I claim that we can give a determinate answer to Boghossian's question: which concept would 'water' express on Dry Earth?
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-9329.2006.00318.x
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/rati/2006/00000019/00000002/art00004
  
• Henry Jackman (2000). Deference and self-knowledge.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: It has become increasingly popular to suggest that non-individualistic theories of content undermine our purported a priori knowledge of such contents because they entail that we lack the ability to distinguish our thoughts from alternative thoughts with different contents. However, problems relating to such knowledge of 'comparative' content tell just as much against individualism as non-individualism. Indeed, the problems presented by individualistic theories of content for self-knowledge are at least, if not more, serious than those presented by non-individualistic theories. Consequently, considerations of self-knowledge give one no reason to embrace individualism. If anything, they give one reason to reject it
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.yorku.ca/hjackman/papers/def-and-sk.pdf
  
• Pierre Jacob (2004). Do we know how we know our own minds yet?   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/ijn_00000352/en/
  http://pierrejacob.hautetfort.com/files/self_ext.pdf
  
• Henry Jackman (web). Incompatibility arguments and semantic self-knowledge.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: There has been much discussion recently of what has been labeled the
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.yorku.ca/hjackman/papers/Incompatibility.pdf
  
• Pierre Jacob (ms). Is self-knowledge compatible with externalism?   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/docs/00/05/32/38/HTML/
  http://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/documents/disk0/00/00/00/43/ijn_00000043_00/ijn_00000043_00.htm
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/M2467LG425724043.pdf
  
• Matthew Kennedy (forthcoming). Naive Realism, Privileged Access, and Epistemic Safety.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Working from a naïve-realist perspective, I examine first-person knowledge of one’s perceptual experience. I outline a naive-realist theory of how subjects acquire knowledge of the nature of their experiences, and I argue that naive realism is compatible with moderate, substantial forms of first-person privileged access. A more general moral of my paper is that treating “success” states like seeing as genuine mental states does not break up the dynamics that many philosophers expect from the phenomenon of knowledge of the mind.
• Klaas (2002). Externalism, Memory, and Self-Knowledge.   (More)
• Daniel Z. Korman (2006). What externalists should say about dry earth.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Dry earth seems to its inhabitants (our intrinsic duplicates) just as earth seems to us, that is, it seems to them as though there are rivers and lakes and a clear, odorless liquid flowing from their faucets. But, in fact, this is an illusion; there is no such liquid anywhere on the planet. I address two objections to externalism concerning the nature of the concept that is expressed by the word 'water' in the mouths of the inhabitants of dry earth. Gabriel Segal presents a dilemma for the externalist concerning the application conditions of the concept, and Paul Boghossian presents a dilemma for the externalist concerning the complexity of the concept. I show that, in both cases, the externalist may occupy the horn of his choice without departing from either the letter or spirit of externalism
• Daniel Z. Korman (2006). What Externalists Should Say About Dry Earth.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Dry earth seems to its inhabitants (our intrinsic duplicates) just as earth seems to us, that is, it seems to them as though there are rivers and lakes and a clear, odorless liquid flowing from their faucets. But, in fact, this is an illusion; there is no such liquid anywhere on the planet. I address two objections to externalism concerning the nature of the concept that is expressed by the word ‘water’ in the mouths of the inhabitants of dry earth. Gabriel Segal presents a dilemma for the externalist concering the application conditions of the concept, and Paul Boghossian presents a dilemma for the externalist concerning the complexity of the concept. I show that, in both cases, the externalist may occupy the horn of his choice without departing from either the letter or spirit of externalism.
• Klaas J. Kraay (2002). Externalism, memory, and self-knowledge.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Externalism holds that the individuation of mental content depends on factors external to the subject. This doctrine appears to undermine both the claim that there is a priori self-knowledge, and the view that individuals have privileged access to their thoughts. Tyler Burge’s influential inclusion theory of self-knowledge purports to reconcile externalism with authoritative self-knowledge. I first consider Paul Boghossian’s claim that the inclusion theory is internally inconsistent. I reject one line of response to this charge, but I endorse another. I next suggest, however, that the inclusion theory has little explanatory value
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/pp7alq1al44qjtuj/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=380317&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/PP7ALQ1AL44QJTUJ.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/erke/2002/00000056/00000003/00380317
  http://www.ryerson.ca/%7Ekraay/Documents/Externalism.pdf
  
• William S. Larkin (ms). Burge on our privileged access to the external world.   (More)
• William S. Larkin (ms). Concepts and introspection: An externalist defense of inner sense.   (More)
• William S. Larkin (online). Comments on Pryor's “externalism about content and McKinsey-style reasoning”.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: I. Pryor on McKinsey:

  A. Pryor’s Version of McKinsey-style Reasoning
  1. Given authoritative self-knowledge, I can usually tell the contents of my own thoughts just by introspection.
  So
  I can know the following claim on the basis of reflection alone:

  McK-1: I am thinking a thought with the content _water puts out fires_
• William S. Larkin (2000). Content skepticism.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Skeptical theses in general claim that we cannot know what we think we know. Content skepticism in particular claims that we cannot know the contents of our own occurrent thoughtsat least not in the way we think we can. I argue that an externalist account of content does engender a mild form of content skepticism but that the condition is no real cause for concern. Content externalism forces us to reevaluate some of our assumptions about introspective knowledge, but it is compatible with privileged access and the distinctive epistemic character of introspective judgments
• William S. Larkin (online). Content skepticism and reliable self-knowledge.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Sub-Thesis 1: We should be contingent reliabilists to avoid the threat of an unacceptably strong content skeptical thesis posed by content externalism and the possibility of twin thoughts. The predominant strategy for resisting this threat has been to rely on the claim that introspective self-attributions are immune to brute error; but this claim is problematic from a naturalistic standpoint
• William S. Larkin (online). Twin earth, dry earth, and knowing the width of Water.   (More)
• William S. Larkin (online). Twin earth, dry earth, and brains in vats.   (More)
• Willian Larkin (ms). The non-apriority of concept width.   (More)
• Peter Ludlow (1999). First-person authority and memory.   (More)
• C. Macdonald (1998). Externalism and authoritative self-knowledge.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Externalism in the philosophy of mind has been thought by many to pose a serious threat to the claim that subjects are in general authoritative with regard to certain of their own intentional states.¹ In a series of papers, Tyler Burge (1985_a_, 1985_b_, 1988, 1996) has argued that the distinctive entitlement or right that subjects have to self- knowledge in certain cases is compatible with externalism, since that entitlement is environmentally neutral, neutral with respect to the issue of the individuation dependence of subjects' intentional states on factors beyond their bodies. His reason is that whereas externalism—the view that certain intentional states of persons are individuation-dependent on objects and/or phenomena external to their bodies—is a metaphysical thesis, authoritative self-knowledge is an epistemological matter. This being so, there is no reason to suppose that the two need conflict with one another
• Luca Malatesti (ms). Externalism and the knowledge of mental states.   (More)
• Gregory McCulloch (1999). Content externalism and cartesian scepticism: A reply to Brueckner.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=W2Lr89ALdPQC&oi=fnd&pg=PA251&ots=_Q2NkRhJVC&sig=1W-MAdJkCkXyFB0AHDDXPIa0pNw
  
• Michael McKinsey (2002). Forms of externalism and privileged access.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/118944438/PDFSTART
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1468-0068.36.s16.8
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/nous/2002/00000036/A0160s16/art00391
  
• Michael McKinsey (2003). Transmission of warrant and closure of apriority.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In my 1991 paper, AAnti-Individualism and Privileged Access,@ I argued that externalism in the philosophy of mind is incompatible with the thesis that we have privileged , nonempirical access to the contents of our own thoughts.¹ One of the most interesting responses to my argument has been that of Martin Davies (1998, 2000, and Chapter _ above) and Crispin Wright (2000 and Chapter _ above), who describe several types of cases to show that warrant for a premise does not always transmit to a known deductive consequence of that premise, and who contend that this fact under-mines my argument for incompatibilism. I will try to show here that the Davies/Wright point about transmission of warrant does not adversely affect my argument
• Brian P. McLaughlin (2003). McKinsey's challenge, warrant transmission, and skepticism.   (More)
• Yujin Nagasawa (2002). Externalism and the memory argument.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://phonline.org/paper.php?keynum=206
  http://www.cappe.edu.au/people/nagayu/3Memory.pdf
  http://www.philosophy.bham.ac.uk/pdf/Nagasawa/Memory.pdf
  http://www.philosophy.bham.ac.uk/staff/nagasawa_Memory.pdf
  http://www.ptr.bham.ac.uk/staff/docs/nagasawa_externalism.pdf
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1746-8361.2002.tb00249.x
  http://www.yujinnagasawa.com/resources/memory.pdf
  
• Paul Noordhof (2004). Outsmarting the McKinsey-brown argument?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Externalists about mental content are supposed to face the following dilemma. Either they must give up the claim that we have privileged access to our own mental states or they must allow that we have privileged access to the world. The dilemma is posed in its most precise form through the McKinsey-Brown argument (McKinsey 1991; Brown 1995). Over the years since it was ?rst published in 1991, our understanding of the precise character of the premisses which constitute the argument has been re?ned. It is based on three claims (where A partially serves to characterise the content of some belief state for which Externalism is true and E is some proposition about the external world)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/j.0003-2638.2004.00460.x/enhancedabs/
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.0003-2638.2004.00460.x
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/anal/2004/00000064/00000281/art00009
  
• Susana Nuccetelli (2003). Knowing that one knows what one is talking about.   (More)
• David J. Owens & Brian P. McLaughlin (2000). Self-knowledge, externalism and scepticism: II--David Owens, scepticisms: Descartes and Hume.   (More)
• Ian Phillips (online). Reflections on externalism and self-knowledge.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In the mid-nineties a large number of philosophers (most famously, Michael McKinsey, Jessica Brown and Paul Boghossian) raised and discussed a certain form of challenge to externalism. In Boghossian
• Duncan Pritchard & Jesper Kallestrup (2004). An argument for the inconsistency of content externalism and epistemic internalism.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Whereas a number of recent articles have focussed upon whether the thesis of content externalism is compatible with a certain sort of knowledge that is gained via first-person authority,1 far less attention has been given to the relationship that this thesis bears to the possession of knowledge in general and, in particular, its relation to internalist and externalist epistemologies. Nevertheless, although very few actual arguments have been presented to this end, there does seem to be a shared suspicion that content externalism must be incompatible with epistemic internalism. In a recent and influential paper, however, James Chase has challenged this conventional wisdom by offering a subtle defence of the view that content externalism and epistemic internalism are, in fact, compatible after all.2 Our aim here is twofold. First, to show that Chase is only able to achieve this result because he focuses upon the internalist conception of justification, rather than knowledge. Second, to formulate one prima facie argument which shows that an internalist conception of knowledge is incompatible with an externalist conception of content, an argument which, moreover, is not touched by Chase
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.philosophy-dev.stir.ac.uk/staff/duncan-pritchard/documents/ContEpistExtPhilosophia.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/1412251270wxn712/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/1412251270WXN712.pdf
  
• Duncan Pritchard (2003). McDowell on reasons, externalism and scepticism.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: At the very least, externalists about content will accept something like the following claim
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.philosophy-dev.stir.ac.uk/staff/duncan-pritchard/documents/McDowellonScepticismFINAL.pdf
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1468-0378.00187
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/ejop/2003/00000011/00000003/art00002
  
• James Pryor (web). Externalism about content and McKinsey-style reasoning.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: (revisions posted 12/5/2006) to appear in Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology, ed. by Sanford Goldberg (to be published by Oxford in 2006 or 2007) Michael McKinsey formulated an argument that raises a puzzle about the relation between externalism about content and our introspective awareness of content. The puzzle goes like this: it seems like I can know the contents of my thoughts by introspection alone; but philosophical reflection tells me that the contents of those thoughts are externalist, and so I couldn
• Klaus Puhl (1994). Davidson on intentional content and self-knowledge.   (More)
• Diana Raffman (1998). First-person authority and the internal reality of beliefs.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/oso/17388/2000/00000001/00000001/art00013
  
• Sarah Sawyer (2004). Absences, presences, and sufficient conditions.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.0003-2638.2004.00509.x
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/anal/2004/00000064/00000284/art00011
  
• Sarah Sawyer (1998). Privileged access to the world.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.unl.edu/philosop/people/faculty/sawyer/PrivilAccespaper.pdf
  http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/./ftinterface~content=a739205756~fulltext=713240930
  http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/index/W774848528107U98.pdf
  http://www.informaworld.com/index/W774848528107U98.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/routledg/ajphil/1998/00000076/00000004/art00001
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/tandf/tajp/1998/00000076/00000004/art00001
  
• Sarah Sawyer (2003). Sufficient absences.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1467-8284.00422
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/anal/2003/00000063/00000279/art00008
  
• Andrew F. Smith (2003). Semantic externalism, authoritative self-knowledge, and adaptation to slow switching.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: I here argue against the viability of Peter Ludlow’s modified version of Paul Boghossian’s argument for the incompatibility of semantic externalism and authoritative self-knowledge. Ludlow contends that slow switching is not merely actual but is, moreover, prevalent; it can occur whenever we shift between localized linguistic communities. It is therefore quite possible, he maintains, that we undergo unwitting shifts in our mental content on a regular basis. However, there is good reason to accept as plausible that despite their prevalence we are in fact able to readily adapt to such switches, as well as to the shifts in mental content that accompany them. The prevalence of slow switching between linguistic communities does not then necessarily entail incompatibility after all
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://transactionpub.metapress.com/index/871350P3124860J7.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/871350P3124860J7.pdf
  
• David Sosa (1996). Representing Thoughts and Language.   (More)
• Daniel Whiting, Fregean sense and anti-individualism.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The definitive version of this article is published in Philosophical Books 48.3 July 2007 pp. 233-240 by Blackwell Publishing, and is available at www.blackwell-synergy.com
• Asa Maria Wikforss (online). Self-knowledge and knowledge of content.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/canadian_journal_of_philosophy/v038/38.3.wikforss.pdf
  
• C. Wright (2000). Cogency and question-begging: Some reflections on McKinsey's paradox and Putnam's proof.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/0029-4624.34.s1.17/abs/
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/0029-4624.34.s1.17
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/nous/2000/00000034/A00100s1/art00239
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/nous/2000/00000034/A00101s1/art00017
  
• C. Wright (2003). Some reflections on the acquisition of warrant by inference.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/~arche/pages/papers/Nuccetelli final.pdf
  http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/academic/philosophy/arche/pages/papers/Nuccetelli final.pdf
  
• Stephen Yablo (1998). Self-knowledge and semantic luck.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=1533-6077(1998)9<219:S&SL>2.0.CO;2-A
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=1533-6077(1998)9<219:S&SL>2.0.CO;2-A
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/1522973.pdf
  

Narrow Content

• Louise M. Antony (ms). What are you thinking? Character and content in the language of thought.   (More)
• Murat Aydede (1997). Has Fodor really changed his mind on narrow content?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: ABSTRACT. In his latest book, The Elm and the Expert (1994), Fodor notoriously rejects the notion of narrow content as superfluous. He envisions a scientific intentional psychology that adverts only to broad content properties in its explanations. I argue that Fodor's change in view is only apparent and that his previous position (1985-1991) is extensionally equivalent to his "new" position (1994). I show that, despite what he says narrow content is for in his (1994), Fodor himself has previously never appealed to the notion of narrow content in explaining Frege cases and cases involving the so-called deferential concepts. And for good reason: his notion of narrow content (1985-91) couldn't explain them. The only apparent change concerns his treatment of Twin Earth cases. However, I argue that the notion of broad content that his purely informational semantics delivers is, in some interesting sense, equivalent to the mapping notion of narrow content he officially gave up. For his pure informational semantics fails to avoid assigning disjunctive content to twins, since nomic covariations take care not only actual but also counterfactual contexts into account. I show that none of the attempts made by Fodor to block this consequence of his theory works. The present notion of broad content he now operates with is therefore in a position to take over all the important jobs that his previous notion of narrow content could do
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-0017.1997.tb00082.x
  http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/119154914/PDFSTART
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1468-0017.00056
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/mila/1997/00000012/00000003/art00056
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/mila/1997/00000012/00000003/art00056
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/mila/1997/00000012/F0020003/art00010
  
• Kent Bach (1996). Content: Wide vs. narrow.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: narrow content as a function from context to wide content.)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://userwww.sfsu.edu/~kbach/widenarr.html
  
• Ned Block (1995). Ruritania revisited.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=1533-6077(1995)6<171:RR>2.0.CO;2-F
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=1533-6077(1995)6<171:RR>2.0.CO;2-F
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/1523040.pdf
  
• David M. Braun (2002). Cognitive significance, attitude ascriptions, and ways of believing propositions.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ling.rochester.edu/~braun/Papers/cogsig.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/ab2auf89b269d9kj/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=403549&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/AB2AUF89B269D9KJ.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/phil/2002/00000108/F0020001/00403549
  
• Joao Branquinho (1999). The problem of cognitive dynamics.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This paper is devoted to an examination of some aspects of the central issue of Cognitive Dynamics, the issue about the conditions under which intentional mental states may persist over time. I discuss two main sorts of approach to the topic: the directly referential approach, which I take as best represented in David Kaplan?s views, and the neo-Fregean approach, which I take as best represented in Gareth Evans?s views. The upshot of my discussion is twofold. On the one hand, I argue that both Kaplan?s account and Evans?s account are on the whole defective (for different sorts of reason, of course); even though there are features of each of those views which seem to me to be along the right lines. On the other, and in spite of that, I claim that a broadly Fregean theory is still to be preferred since by positing semantically efficacious modes of presentation it is clearly better equipped to deal adequately with some important phenomena in the area. In particular, I argue that the notion of a memory-based demonstrative mode of presentation of an object (a spatio-temporal particular, a region in space, a period of time, etc.) turns out to be indispensable for the purpose of accounting for the persistence of an important range of mental states with propositional content over time
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/401/00/Cog.htm
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000401/
  http://cogprints.soton.ac.uk/documents/disk0/00/00/04/01/
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000401/00/Cog.htm
  http://cogprints.soton.ac.uk/documents/disk0/00/00/04/01/index.html
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:401
  
• Curtis Brown (1993). Belief states and narrow content.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-0017.1993.tb00290.x
  http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/119302062/PDFSTART
  
• Berit Brogaard, Centered worlds and the content of perception: Short version.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: 0. Relativistic Content In standard semantics, propositional content, whether it be the content of utterances or mental states, has a truth-value relative only to a possible world. For example, the content of my utterance of ‘Jim is sitting now’ is true just in case Jim is sitting at the time of utterance in the actual world, and the content of my belief that Alice will give a talk tomorrow is true just in case Alice will give a talk on the day following the occurrence of my belief state in the actual world. Let us call propositional content which has a truth-value relative only to a possible world ‘non-relativistic content’. Non-relativistic content can be treated as either structured or unstructured. On the unstructured-content view, non-relativistic content is a set of possible worlds and bears the truth-value true just in case the actual world is a member of that set. For example, the content of my utterance of ‘Jim is working now’ at time t is the set of worlds in which Jim is working at t, and this content is true just in case the actual world is among those worlds. On the structured-content view, non-relativistic content is a set or conglomeration of properties and/or objects, where properties are features which objects possess regardless of who considers or observes them and regardless of when they are being considered or observed. Such properties are said to be (or represent) functions from possible worlds to extensions. Relative to a possible world they determine a set of objects instantiating the property. For example, relative to the actual world the property of being human determines the set of actual humans. Not all content is non-relativistic. Let us say that propositional content is relativistic just in case it possesses a truth-value only relative to a centered world. A centered world is a possible world in which an individual and a time are marked, where the marked individual..
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://brogaardb.googlepages.com/TheContentofPerception.pdf
  http://brogaardb.googlepages.com/CenteredWorldsandtheContentofPercept.pdf
  http://sites.google.com/site/brogaardb/CenteredWorldsandtheContentofPercept.pdf
  
• David J. Chalmers (2002). The components of content.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: [[This paper appears in my anthology _Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings_ (Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 608-633. It is a heavily revised version of a paper first written in 1994 and revised in 1995. Sections 1, 7, 8, and 10 are similar to the old version, but the other sections are quite different. Because the old version has been widely cited, I have made it available (in its 1995 version) at http://consc.net/papers/content95.html
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/321/
  http://consc.net/papers/content.pdf
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/393071.html
  http://cogprints.org/321/0/content.html
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/chalmers95components.html
  http://www.cogsci.indiana.edu/pub/chalmers.content.ps
  http://www.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/papers/content.html
  http://cogprints.soton.ac.uk/documents/disk0/00/00/03/21/
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000321/00/content.html
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:321
  
• David Chalmers (manuscript). The components of content (1995 version).   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: (1) Is content in the head? I believe that water is wet. My twin on Twin Earth, which is just like Earth except that H2O is replaced by the superficially identical XYZ, does not. His thoughts concern not water but twin water: I believe that water is wet, but he believes that twin water is wet. It follows that that what a subject believes is not wholly determined by the internal state of the believer. Nevertheless, the cognitive similarities between me and my twin are striking. Is there some wholly internal aspect of content that we might share?
• David J. Chalmers (2003). The nature of narrow content.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: A content of a subject's mental state is narrow when it is determined by the subject's intrinsic properties: that is, when any possible intrinsic duplicate of the subject has a corresponding mental state with the same content. A content of a subject's mental state is..
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/papers/narrow.html
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/servlet/useragent?func=synergy&synergyAction=showEnhancedAbstract&doi=10.1111/1533-6077.00004
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/1533-6077.00004/enhancedabs/
  http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/120710664/PDFSTART
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1533-6077.00004
  
• Bryan Frances (ms). A philosophically inexpensive introduction to twin-earth.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: I say that it’s philosophically inexpensive because I think it is more convincing than any other Twin-Earth thought experiment in that it sidesteps many of the standard objections to the usual thought experiments. I also briefly discuss narrow contents and give an analysis of Putnam’s original argument
• Ulrike Haas-Spohn (1999). Anti-individualism and cognitive semantics.   (More)
• Ulrike Haas-Spohn (1994). Hidden Indexicality and Subjective Meaning.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www2.sfs.nphil.uni-tuebingen.de/Alumni/Dissertationen/ullidiss/en_index.html
  
• David Hunter, Gabriel Segal, a slim book about narrow content(mit press, 2000), 177 pp.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The Mind-Body problem is the problem of saying how a person’s mental states and events relate to his bodily ones. How does Oscar’s believing that water is cold relate to the states of his body? Is it itself a bodily state, perhaps a state of his brain or nervous system? If not, does it nonetheless depend on such states? Or is his believing that water is cold independent of his bodily states? And, crucially, what are the notions of dependence and independence at issue here?
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.philosophy.ryerson.ca/dhunter/my%20publications/A%20slim%20book%20about%20narrow%20content.pdf
  
• Frank Jackson (2003). Narrow content and representation--or twin earth revisited.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Intentional states represent. Belief represents how we take things to be; desire represents how we would like things to be; and so on. To represent is to make a division among possibilities; it is to divide the possibilities into those that are consistent with how things are being represented to be and those that are not. I will call the possibilities consistent with how some intentional state represents things to be, its content. There is no suggestion that this is the only legitimate notion of content, but for anyone who takes seriously the representational nature of intentional states, it must be one legitimate and central notion of content. To discover that DNA has a double helix structure is to make a selection from the various possible structures
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.latrobe.edu.au/philosophy/staff/Narrow content.pdf
  http://phil.arts.cuhk.edu.hk/~phidept/jackson/FJ Narrow content.pdf
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0065-972X(200311)77:2<55:NCAROT>2.0.CO;2-Q
  
• Frank Jackson & Philip Pettit (1993). Some content is narrow.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: ONE way t0 defend narrow content is to produce a sentence 0f the form ‘S believes that P’, and show that this sentence is true 0f S if and 0nly if it is true 0f any duplicate from the skin in, any doppclgangcr, of S. N0toriously, this is hard to d0. Twin Earth examples are pervasivc.1 Another way to defend narrow content; is t0 show that Only 2. narrow notion can play thc causal explanatory r01c we require 0f contcnt in 2. properly scicntiicm psychology 0r cognitive science. Notoriously, this is hard t0 d0. The considerations—mcthod010gicaI solipsism, the principle 0f autonomy, 0r what:cvcr—invokcd to show that a broad notion 0f content cannot..
• Uriah Kriegel (2008). Real narrow content.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The purpose of the present paper is to develop and defend an account of narrow content that would neutralize the commonplace charge that narrow content
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-0017.2008.00345.x
  http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/120085768/PDFSTART
  
• Uriah Kriegel & Terry Horgan (forthcoming). The Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: We review some of the work already done around the notion of phenomenal intentionality and propose a way of turning this body of work into a self-conscious research program for understanding intentionality.
• Joe Lau (ms). Three motivations for narrow content.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In everyday life, we typically explain what people do by attributing mental states such as beliefs and desires. Such mental states belong to a class of mental states that are _intentional_, mental states that have content. Hoping that Johnny will win, and believing that Johnny will win are of course rather different mental states that can lead to very different behaviour. But they are similar in that they both have the same content : what is being hoped for and believed is the very same thing. According to the thesis of externalism that has been defended most notably by Hilary Putnam and Tyler Burge, not all of the contents of our mental states are determined by our intrinsic properties. Instead, the contents of our beliefs and desires are often determined in part by our relations to the environment. They are, so to speak, "wide" contents that are "not in our heads." Although externalism is accepted by most philosophers, many have argued that mental states with wide contents must also have a kind of content wholly determined by the intrinsic properties of the individuals who are in those states. This kind of content is called "narrow content". The aim of this paper is to distinguish between three rather different motivations for postulating narrow content. I argue that, given a certain conception of narrow content that I shall explain below, none of these three motivations succeed in establishing the existence of narrow content
• Ernest LePore & Barry M. Loewer (1989). Dual aspect semantics.   (More)
• Kirk A. Ludwig (1996). Singular thought and the cartesian theory of mind.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: (1) Content properties are nonrelational, that is, having a content property does not entail the existence of any contingent object not identical with the thinker or a part of the thinker.2 (2) We have noninferential knowledge of our conscious thoughts, that is, for any of our..
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://web.clas.ufl.edu/users/kludwig/web/users/kludwig/Abstracts/Abstract for Singular Thought and the Cartesian Theory of Mind.htm
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0029-4624(199612)30:4<434:STATCT>2.0.CO;2-D
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0029-4624(199612)30:4<434:STATCT>2.0.CO;2-D
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2216113.pdf
  
• Lynne Rudder Baker (1987). Content by courtesy.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-362X(198704)84:4<197:CBC>2.0.CO;2-X
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-362X(198704)84:4<197:CBC>2.0.CO;2-X
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2027158.pdf
  
• Gabriel Segal (online). Cognitive content and propositional attitude attributions.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Tyler Burge (Burge (1979)) has developed a very influential line of anti-individualistic thought. He argued that the cognitive content of a person
• Gabriel Segal (2007). Cognitive content and propositional attitude attributions.   (More)
• Alberto Voltolini, Holistic narrow content?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: 1. In the course of his philosophical development, Jerry Fodor has indicated two sorts of non-broad (i.e., non-truthconditional) content of mental representations, namely content of mental state types opaquely taxonomized (de dicto content: DDC) and narrow content (NC) qua mapping function from contexts (of thought) to broad contents. According to the former conceptualization, mental state tokens which are truth-conditionally identical may be such that they cannot both truthfully ascribed to one and the same subject at the same time, for they differ in their respective DDC. In Fodor's own example, Oedipus' thoughts that he will marry Jocasta and that he will marry Mum are truth-conditionally identical, but different as far their DDC is concerned; one cannot indeed truthfully ascribe both thoughts to him simultaneously1. According to the latter conceptualization instead, mental state tokens of molecularly identical twins placed in different environments (such as Earth and Twin-Earth) are such that, although they differ in their truth-conditions, they share the same NC2. For instance, these twins respectively think that water quenches thirst and that twater (a liquid similar to water but its chemical composition) quenches thirst. Although these thoughts thus differ in broad content, they have the same NC: had the Twin-Earthling twin been brought up on Earth rather than on Twin-Earth where he actually lives, he would have thought that water quenches thirst rather than that twater quenches thirst3. According to Fodor's picture, both concepts are invoked for the purpose of psychology in order to account for one and the same thing, namely subjects' behavior. On the one hand, difference in behavior of a subject whose thought-tokens have the same truth-conditions may be ascribed to difference in the DDC of these tokens4. On the other hand, identity in behavior between two molecularly identical subjects whose thought-tokens have different truth-conditions is explained in terms of the NC- identity of these tokens5..
• Alberto Voltolini (1997). Is narrow content the same as content of mental state types opaquely taxonomized?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Jerry Fodor now holds (1990) that the content of mental state types opaquely taxonomized (de dicto content: DDC) is determined by the 'orthographical' syntax + the computational/functional role of such states. Mental states whose tokens are both orthographically and truth-conditionally identical may be different with regard to the computational/functional role played by their respective representational cores. This make them tantamount to different contentful states, i.e. states with different DDCs, insofar as they are opaquely taxonomized. Indeed they cannot both be truthfully ascribed to a single subject at the same time. Some years ago (1987), Fodor postulated a notion of mental content which also went beyond that of a mental state's truth-conditions. States whose tokens differ in their truth-conditions, or broad content, might, he claimed, still share a narrow content (NC), which was causally responsible for the shared behavior of the subjects of these states. For instance, two molecularly identical individuals, living in environments in all respects the same, except for the chemical substance of the phenomenically indistinguishable liquids filling their respective lakes and rivers, would behave similarly when having truth-conditionally different thoughts regarding those liquids. According to Fodor, this sameness of behavior was causally dependent on the sameness of the NC of the two individuals' truth-conditionally different thoughts. Now, this way of individuating mental states is still of interest for semantics. Indeed, NC allows one contextually to fix the broad content of a mental state token. Echoing Kaplan's notion of character,1 Fodor explained NC as a function that mapped contexts (of thought) onto broad contents. NC was thus invoked by Fodor mainly in order to account for sameness of intentional behavior. But DDC also plays a role in explaining intentional behavior, precisely by explaining why a subject whose thought-tokens have identical truthconditions may behave differently..
• Timothy Williamson (1998). The broadness of the mental: Some logical issues.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0029-4624(1998)32<389:TBOTMS>2.0.CO;2-Q
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2676155.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/nous/1998/00000032/A0020s12/art00125
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/nous/1998/00000032/A0120s12/art00125
  

The Extended Mind

• Frederick R. Adams & Kenneth Aizawa (ms). Andy Clark on intrinsic content and extended cognition.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This is a plausible reading of what Clark and Chalmers had in mind at the time, but it is not the radical claim at stake in the extended cognition debate.[1] It is a familiar functionalist view of cognition and the mind that it can be realized in a wide range of distinct material bases. Thus, for many species of functionalism about cognition and the mind, it follows that they can be realized in extracranial substrates.[2] And, in truth, even some non-functionalist views of cognition apparently allow for the possibility that cognition extends into the external world.[3] So, the (logical, conceptual, or nomological) possibility of extended cognition seems to us not the kind of radical view the advocates of this view have often implied. This is not, of course, to assess or pass judgment on the truth of these possibilities; it is only to note that they are not what most agitates people about the hypothesis of extended cognition. Framing the radical extended cognition hypothesis is a more delicate matter than framing the modal extended cognition hypothesis, but something like the following is in the ballpark. The radical extended cognition hypothesis maintains that, in many mundane cases of tool use, human cognitive processes extend into the tools. The principal reason this hypothesis is so delicate is that there remains much room for dispute about what constitutes a
• Frederick R. Adams & Kenneth Aizawa (forthcoming). Challenges to active externalism.   (More)
• Frederick R. Adams & Kenneth Aizawa (2005). Defending non-derived content.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://personal.centenary.edu/~kaizawa/Defending Nonderived Content (Blind).doc
  
• Frederick R. Adams & Kenneth Aizawa (forthcoming). Defending the Bounds of cognition.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: That about sums up what is wrong with Clark
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.centenary.edu/attachments/philosophy/aizawa/publications/defendingtheboundsofcognition.doc
  http://stage.centenary.edu/attachments/philosophy/aizawa/publications/defendingtheboundsofcognition.doc
  
• Fred Adams & Ken Aizawa (forthcoming). Why the mind is still in the head.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Philosophical interest in situated cognition has been focused most intensely on the claim that human cognitive processes extend from the brain into the tools humans use. As we see it, this radical hypothesis is sustained by two kinds of mistakes, confusing coupling relations with constitutive relations and an inattention to the mark of the cognitive. Here we wish to draw attention to these mistakes and show just how pervasive they are. That is, for all that the radical philosophers have said, the mind is still in the head
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://personal.centenary.edu/~kaizawa/Murat Paper.doc
  
• Kenneth Aizawa (ms). Clark's conditions on extended cognition are too strong.   (More)
• Ken Aizawa (ms). Clark missed the mark: Andy Clark on intrinsic content and extended cognition.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This is a plausible reading of what Clark and Chalmers had in mind at the time, but it is not the radical claim at stake in the extended cognition debate.[1] It is a familiar functionalist view of cognition and the mind that it can be realized in a wide range of distinct material bases. Thus, for many species of functionalism about cognition and the mind, it follows that they can be realized in extracranial substrates.[2] And, in truth, even some non-functionalist views of cognition apparently allow for the possibility that cognition extends into the external world.[3] So, the (logical, conceptual, or nomological) possibility of extended cognition seems to us not the kind of radical view the advocates of this view have often implied. This is not, of course, to assess or pass judgment on the truth of these possibilities; it is only to note that they are not what most agitates people about the hypothesis of extended cognition. Framing the radical extended cognition hypothesis is a more delicate matter than framing the modal extended cognition hypothesis, but something like the following is in the ballpark. The radical extended cognition hypothesis maintains that, in many mundane cases of tool use, human cognitive processes extend into the tools. The principal reason this hypothesis is so delicate is that there remains much room for dispute about what constitutes a “mundane” case of tool use, such as keeping a notebook at hand at all times, versus an exotic case of tool use, such as having a computer memory chip implanted in one’s brain. Clark never in so many words defends the idea that there are actual cases of extended cognition. Rather, his tacit commitment must be inferred from such things as his proposal that the brain is made to use tools, so we should view tools as part of the mind (Cf., Clark, 2005, p. 8ff.)
• Ken Aizawa (ms). Defending the Bounds of cognition.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: That about sums up what is wrong with Clark’s extended mind hypothesis. Clark apparently thinks that the nature of the processes internal to a pencil, Rolodex, computer, cell phone, piece of string, or whatever, has nothing to do with whether that thing carries out cognitive processing.[1] Rather, what matters is how the thing interacts with a cognitive agent; the thing has to be coupled to a cognitive agent in a particular kind of way. Clark (20??) gives three conditions that constitute a rough or partial specification of the kind of coupling required
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.centenary.edu/attachments/philosophy/aizawa/publications/defendingtheboundsofcognition.doc
  
• Lynne Rudder Baker (2009). Persons and the extended-mind thesis.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The extended-mind thesis (EM) is the claim that mentality need not be situated just in the brain, or even within the boundaries of the skin. Some versions take "extended selves" be to relatively transitory couplings of biological organisms and external resources. First, I show how EM can be seen as an extension of traditional views of mind. Then, after voicing a couple of qualms about EM, I reject EM in favor of a more modest hypothesis that recognizes enduring subjects of experience and agents with integrated bodies. Nonetheless, my modest hypothesis allows subpersonal states to have nonbiological parts that play essential roles in cognitive processing. I present empirical warrant for this modest hypothesis and show how it leaves room for science and religion to coexist
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/122572787/PDFSTART
  
• John Campbell (1993). The role of physical objects in spatial thinking.   (More)
• J. Case (2004). Offloading memory to the environment: A quantitative example.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/v38705833611179g/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/V38705833611179G.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/mind/2004/00000014/00000003/05267380
  
• Anthony Chemero (2007). Asking what's inside the head: Neurophilosophy meets the extended mind.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In their historical overview of cognitive science, Bechtel, Abraham- son and Graham (1999) describe the field as expanding in focus be- ginning in the mid-1980s. The field had spent the previous 25 years on internalist, high-level GOFAI (“good old fashioned artificial intelli- gence” [Haugeland 1985]), and was finally moving “outwards into the environment and downards into the brain” (Bechtel et al, 1999, p.75). One important force behind the downward movement was Patricia Churchland’s Neurophilosophy (1986). This book began a movement bearing its name, one that truly came of age in 1999 when Kath- leen Akins won a million-dollar fellowship to begin the McDonnell Project in Philosophy and the Neurosciences. The McDonnell Project put neurophilosophy at the forefront of philosophy of mind and cogni- tive science, yielding proliferating articles, conferences, special journal issues and books. In two major new books, neurophilosophers Patricia Churchland (2002) and John Bickle (2003) clearly feel this newfound prominence: Churchland mocks those who do not apply findings in neuroscience to philosophical problems as “no-brainers”; Bickle mocks anyone with traditional philosophical concerns, including “naturalistic philosophers of mind” and other neurophilosophers
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://edisk.fandm.edu/tony.chemero/papers/bickchurchrev.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/m812557162027h08/fulltext.pdf
  
• Tony Chemero & Michael Silberstein, Defending extended cognition.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In this talk, we defend extended cognition against several criticisms. We argue that extended cognition does not derive from armchair theorizing and that it neither ignores the results of the neural sciences, nor minimizes the importance of the brain in the production of intelligent behavior. We also argue that explanatory success in the cognitive sciences does not depend on localist or reductionist methodologies; part of our argument for this is a defense of what might be called ‘holistic science’
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00003204/01/defendingextendedmindv3.doc
  http://edisk.fandm.edu/tony.chemero/papers/cogsci08pub.pdf
  
• Zoe Drayson & Andy Clark (forthcoming). Augmentation, Agency, and the Spreading of the Mental State.   (More)
• Andy Clark (2006). Memento's revenge: The extended mind, extended.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In the movie, Memento, the hero, Leonard, suffers from a form of anterograde amnesia that results in an inability to lay down new memories. Nonetheless, he sets out on a quest to find his wife
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.cogsci.msu.edu/DSS/2004-2005/Clark/The Extended Mind.pdf
  http://www.philosophy.ed.ac.uk/staff/clark/pubs/Mementosrevenge2.pdf
  
• Andy Clark (2001). Reasons, robots and the extended mind.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: A suitable project for the new Millenium is to radically reconfigure our image of human rationality. Such a project is already underway, within the Cognitive Sciences, under the umbrellas of work in Situated Cognition, Distributed and De-centralized Cogition, Real-world Robotics and Artificial Life1. Such approaches, however, are often criticized for giving certain aspects of rationality too wide a berth. They focus their attention on on such superficially poor cousins as
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.cogs.indiana.edu/andy/mlrre.pdf
  http://www.cse.unsw.edu.au/~tiinam/clark.pdf
  http://www.era.lib.ed.ac.uk/handle/1842/1313?mode=simple
  http://www.philosophy.ed.ac.uk/staff/clark/pubs/mlrre.pdf
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/1468-0017.00162
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1468-0017.00162
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/mila/2001/00000016/F0020002/art00162
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/mila/2001/00000015/00000002/art00162
  
• Andy Clark & David J. Chalmers (1998). The extended mind.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Where does the mind stop and the rest of the world begin? The question invites two standard replies. Some accept the demarcations of skin and skull, and say that what is outside the body is outside the mind. Others are impressed by arguments suggesting that the meaning of our words "just ain't in the head", and hold that this externalism about meaning carries over into an externalism about mind. We propose to pursue a third position. We advocate a very different sort of externalism: an _active externalism_ , based on the active role of the environment in driving cognitive processes
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://consc.net/papers/extended.html
  http://cogprints.org/320/0/extended.html
  http://www.era.lib.ed.ac.uk/handle/1842/1312
  http://www.cogs.indiana.edu/andy/TheExtendedMind.pdf
  http://www.lps.uci.edu/~johnsonk/philpsych/readings/clark.pdf
  http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/courses/concepts/clark.html
  http://philosophy.wisc.edu/shapiro/Phil951/TheExtendedMind.pdf
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000320/00/extended.html
  http://www.philosophy.ed.ac.uk/staff/clark/pubs/TheExtendedMind.pdf
  http://wexler.free.fr/library/files/clark (1998) the extended mind.pdf
  http://philosophy.wisc.edu/shapiro/Phil554/PAPERS/THE EXTENDED MIND.htm
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:320
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1467-8284.00096
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/anal/1998/00000058/00000257/art00096
  
• Terry Dartnall (2005). Does the world Leak into the mind? Active externalism, "internalism", and epistemology.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.leaonline.com/doi/abs/10.1207/s15516709cog2901_6
  http://www.leaonline.com/doi/pdfplus/10.1207/s15516709cog2901_6
  http://www98.griffith.edu.au/dspace/publisherurilogger?itemId=4248&uri=http://www.leaonline.com/doi/abs/10.1207/s15516709cog2901_6
  
• Jerry Fodor (2009). Where is my mind?   (More)
• Joseph S. Fulda (ms). "The extended mind"--extended.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: We review the argument made by Clark and Chalmers in _Analysis_ for a limited externalism and extend their argument from declarative knowledge to procedural knowledge
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/1093/0/EXTENDED.pdf
  http://cogprints.org/363/0/EXTENDED.html
  
• Alva Noë (2006). Experience without the head.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Some cognitive states — e.g. states of thinking, calculating, navigating — may be partially external because, at least sometimes, these states depend on the use of symbols and artifacts that are outside the body. Maps, signs, writing implements may sometimes be as inextricably bound up with the workings of cognition as neural structures or internally realized symbols (if there are any). According to what Clark and Chalmers [1998] call active externalism, the environment can drive and so partially constitute cognitive processes. Where does the mind stop and the rest of the world begin? If active externalism is right, then the boundary cannot be drawn at the skull. The mind reaches – or at least can reach --- beyond the limits of the body out into the world
• Brie Gertler (2007). Overextending the mind?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract:      Clark and Chalmers argue that the mind is extended – that is, its boundary lies beyond the skin. In this essay, I will criticize this conclusion. However, I will also defend some of the more controversial elements of Clark and Chalmers's argument. I reject their conclusion because I think that their argument shows that a seemingly innocuous assumption, about internal states and processes, is flawed. My goal is not to conclusively refute Clark and Chalmers's conclusion. My aim is only to reveal the best alternative for those who remain skeptical about the existence – or, perhaps, even the possibility – of extended minds
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=999712
  
• C. Gershenson (ms). Where is the problem of “where is the mind?”?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: We propose that the discussions about “where the mind is” depend directly on the metaphysical preconception and definition of “mind”. If we see the mind from one perspective (individualist), it will be only in the brain, and if we see it from another (active externalist), it will be embedded in the body and extended into the world. The “whereabouts” of the mind depends on our 1 of mind. Therefore, we should not ask if the mind is somewhere, but if it is somehow
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/2620/1/PhilCogSci2%2DMind%2DEssay.pdf
  
• Mitchell S. Green (2000). The status of supposition.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: According to many forms of Externalism now popular in the Philosophy of Mind, the contents of our thoughts depend in part upon our physical or social milieu.1 These forms of Externalism leave unchallenged the thesis that the ~non-factive! attitudes we bear towards these contents are independent of physical or social milieu. This paper challenges that thesis. It is argued here that publicly forwarding a content as a supposition for the sake of argument is, under conditions not themselves guaranteeing the existence of that state, sufficient for occupancy of the intentional state of supposing that content. Because a saying may literally create an intentional state, whether one is in such a state does not depend solely upon how things are within one’s skin. Rather, even leaving content fixed, the attitude borne toward that content depends in part upon what norms are in force in one’s milieu
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/0029-4624.00216
  
• Joseph Heath & Joel Anderson, Procrastination and the extended will.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Less than a decade ago, “rational choice theory” seemed oddly impervious to criticism. Hundreds of books, articles and studies were published every year, attacking the theory from every angle, yet it continued to attract new converts. How times have changed! The “anomalies” that Richard Thaler once blithely cataloged for the Journal of Economic Perspectives are now widely regarded, not as curious deviations from the norm, but as falsifying counterexamples to the entire project of neoclassical economics. The work of experimental game theorists has perhaps been the most influential in showing that people do not maximize expected utility, in any plausible sense of the terms “maximize,” “expected,” or “utility.” The evidence is so overwhelming and incontrovertible that, by the time one gets to the end of a book like Dan Ariely’s Predictably Irrational,1 it begins to feel like piling on. The suggestion is pretty clear: not only are people not as rational as decision and game theorists have traditionally taken them to be, they are not even as rational as they themselves take themselves to be. This conclusion, however, is not self-evident. The standard interpretation of these findings is that people are irrational: their estimation of probabilities is vulnerable to framing effects, their treatment of (equivalent) losses and gains is asymmetric, their choices violate the sure-thing principle, they discount the future hyperbolically, and so on. Indeed, after surveying the experimental findings, one begins to wonder how people manage to get on in their daily lives at all, given the seriousness and ubiquity of these deliberative pathologies. And yet, most people do manage to get on, in some form or another. This in itself suggests an..
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.phil.uu.nl/~joel/research/publications/Procrastination-ExtendedWill%28Heath-Anderson%29Feb2009.pdf
  http://www.phil.uu.nl/%7Ejoel/research/publications/Procrastination-ExtendedWill%28Heath-Anderson%29Feb2009.pdf
  
• Terence M. Horgan & Uriah Kriegel (2008). Phenomenal intentionality meets the extended mind.   (More)
• Susan L. Hurley (1998). Active perception and vehicle externalism.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Certain empirical results suggest a way of challenging two natural and widespread assumptions about the mind. One assumption is about the relations between perception and action. This shows up in the widespread conception of perception and action in terms of input and output, respectively. Perception is conceived as input from world to mind and action is conceived as output from mind to world. The other assumption is about the relations between mind and world. It influences various opposed views about whether the contents of the mind are in principle independent of the outside world
• Susan L. Hurley (2003). Action, the unity of consciousness, and vehicle externalism.   (More)
• Susan L. Hurley (1998). Vehicles, contents, conceptual structure and externalism.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: We all know about the vehicle/content distinction (see Dennett 1991a, Millikan 1991, 1993). We shouldn't confuse properties represented in content with properties of vehicles of content. In particular, we shouldn't confuse the personal and subpersonal levels. The contents of the mental states of subject/agents are at the personal level. Vehicles of content are causally explanatory subpersonal events or processes or states. We shouldn't suppose that the properties of vehicles must be projected into what they represent for subject/agents, or vice versa. This would be to confuse the personal and subpersonal levels
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/710/00/Vccse.html
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000710/
  http://www.warwick.ac.uk/staff/S.L.Hurley/papers/vccse.pdf
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000710/00/Vccse.html
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:710
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1467-8284.00095
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/anal/1998/00000058/00000257/art00095
  
• David Kirsh & P. Maglio (1995). On distinguishing epistemic from pragmatic action.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: We present data and argument to show that in Tetris - a real-time interactive video game - certain cognitive and perceptual problems are more quickly, easily, and reliably solved by performing actions in the world rather than by performing computational actions in the head alone. We have found that some translations and rotations are best understood as using the world to improve cognition. These actions are not used to implement a plan, or to implement a reaction; they are used to change the world in order to simplify the problem-solving task. Thus, we distinguish pragmatic actions ñ actions performed to bring one physically closer to a goal - from epistemic actions - actions performed to uncover information that is hidden or hard to compute mentally. To illustrate the need for epistemic actions, we first develop a standard information-processing model of Tetris-cognition, and show that it cannot explain performance data from human players of the game - even when we relax the assumption of fully sequential processing. Standard models disregard many actions taken by players because they appear unmotivated or superfluous. However, we describe many such actions that are actually taken by players that are far from superfluous, and that play valuable roles in improving human performance. We argue that traditional accounts are limited because they regard action as having a single function: to change the world. By recognizing a second function of action - an epistemic function - we can explain many of the actions that a traditional model cannot. Although, our argument is supported by numerous examples specifically from Tetris, we outline how the one category of epistemic action can be incorporated into theories of action more generally.
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://adrenaline.ucsd.edu/kirsh/articles/cogscijournal/DistinguishingEpi_prag.pdf
  http://www.leaonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1207/s15516709cog1804_1
  http://www.cogsci.rpi.edu/CSJarchive/1994v18/i04/p0513p0549/MAIN.PDF
  http://www.leaonline.com/doi/abs/10.1207/s15516709cog1804_1
  http://www.leaonline.com/doi/pdfplus/10.1207/s15516709cog1804_1
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/302981.html
  
• Leslie Marsh (2005). Review Essay: Andy Clark's Natural-Born Cyborgs: Minds, Technologies, and the Future of Human Intelligence_.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The notion of the cyborg has exercised the popular imagination for almost two hundred years. In very general terms the idea that a living entity can be a hybrid of both organic matter and mechanical parts, and for all intents and purposes be seamlessly functional and self-regulating, was prefigured in literary works such as Shelly
  s Frankenstein (1816/18) and Samuel Butler
  s Erewhon (1872). This notion of hybridism has been a staple theme of 20th century science fiction writing, television programmes and the cinema. For the most part, these works trade on a deep sense of unease we have about our personal identity – how could some non-organic matter to which I have so little conscious access count as a bona fide part of me? Cognitive scientist and philosopher, Andy Clark, picks up this general theme and presents an empirical and philosophical case for the following inextricably linked theses.
• Leslie Marsh & Christian Onof (2008). Stigmergic epistemology, stigmergic cognition.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: To know is to cognize, to cognize is to be a culturally bounded, rationality-bounded and environmentally located agent. Knowledge and cognition are thus dual aspects of human sociality. If social epistemology has the formation, acquisition, mediation, transmission and dissemination of knowledge in complex communities of knowers as its subject matter, then its third party character is essentially stigmergic. In its most generic formulation, stigmergy is the phenomenon of indirect communication mediated by modifications of the environment. Extending this notion one might conceive of social stigmergy as the extra-cranial analog of an artifcial neural network providing epistemic structure. This paper recommends a stigmergic framework for social epistemology to account for the supposed tension between individual action, wants and beliefs and the social corpora. We also propose that the so-called "extended mind" thesis offers the requisite stigmergic cognitive analog to stigmergic knowledge. Stigmergy as a theory of interaction within complex systems theory is illustrated through an example that runs on a particle swarm optimization algorithm.
• Richard Menary (2007). Writing As Thinking.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In this paper I aim to show that the creation and manipulation of written vehicles is part of our cognitive processing and, therefore, that writing transforms our cognitive abilities. I do this from the perspective of cognitive integration: completing a complex cognitive, or mental, task is enabled by a co-ordinated interaction between neural processes, bodily processes and manipulating written sentences. In section one I introduce Harris’ criticisms of ways in which writing has been said to restructure thought (Goody 1968; McLuhan 1962, 1964; Ong 1982). This will give us a preliminary idea about possible pitfalls for a cognitive integrationist account. The second section outlines, firstly, how integrated cognitive systems function. Secondly, the model is applied to a hybrid mental act where writing allows us to complete complex cognitive tasks. The final section outlines the sense in which, following Harris, there is “a more realistic picture of how writing restructures thought” [Harris, R., 1989. How does writing restructure thought? Language and Communication 9 (2/3) 99–106] that is concealed by the ‘romantic fantasies’ of theorists such as the above. This picture is one of writing providing an autoglottic space in which a new form of theoretical thinking becomes prevalent. The cognitive integrationist understands this in terms of the nature of the written vehicles and how we manipulate them.
• Gerard O'Brien (1998). The mind: Embodied, embedded, but not extended.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This commentry focuses on the one major ecumenical theme propounded in Andy Clark's Being There that I find difficult to accept; this is Clark's advocacy, especially in the third and final part of the book, of the extended nature of the embedded, embodied mind
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/1451/00/Commentary_on_Clark_Being_There.pdf
  http://www.arts.adelaide.edu.au/humanities/philosophy/publications/Commentary_on_Clark_Being_There.pdf
  
• Mitch Parsell (2006). The cognitive cost of extending an evolutionary mind into the environment.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Clark and Chalmers (1998) have argued that mental states can be extended outside an organism
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=16628462&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/sites/entrez?db=pubmed&uid=16628462&cmd=showdetailview&indexed=google
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/W5656M501R410G26.pdf
  
• Robert D. Rupert (ms). Keeping HEC in CHEC.   (More)
• Robert D. Rupert (web). Representation in extended cognitive systems: Does the scaffolding of language extend the mind?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: forthcoming in R. Menary (ed.), The Extended Mind
• Robert D. Rupert (ms). Systems, Functions, and Intrinsic Natures: On Adams and Aizawa's The Bounds of Cognition.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Review essay contrasting Adams and Aizawa's approach to cognition with a functionalist, systems-based view.
• Larry Shapiro (web). Functionalism and mental boundaries.   (More)
• Mark Sprevak, Extended cognition and functionalism.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Andy Clark and David Chalmers claim that cognitive processes can and do extend outside the head.1 Call this the “hypothesis of extended cognition” (HEC). HEC has been strongly criticised by Fred Adams, Ken Aizawa and Robert Rupert.2 In this paper I argue for two claims. First, HEC is a harder target than Rupert, Adams and Aizawa have supposed. A widely-held view about the nature of the mind, functionalism—a view to which Rupert, Adams and Aizawa appear to subscribe— entails HEC. Either HEC is true, or functionalism is false. The relationship between functionalism and HEC goes beyond support for the relatively uncontroversial claim that it is logically or nomologically possible for cognition to extend (the “can” part of HEC); functionalism entails that cognitive processes do extend in the actual world. Second, I argue that the version of HEC entailed by functionalism is more radical than the version that Clark and Chalmers suggest. I argue that it is so radical as to form a counterexample to functionalism. If functionalism is modified to prevent these consequences, then HEC falls victim to Rupert, Adams and Aizawa’s original criticism. An advocate of HEC has two choices: (1) accept functionalism and radical HEC; (2) give up HEC entirely. Clark and Chalmers’ intermediate position of a modest form of HEC is unsustainable. The argument of this paper, although initially appearing to support Clark and Chalmers, ultimately argues against their position. The price of HEC is rampant expansion of the mind into the world, and the implausibility of such expansion is indicative of deep-seated problems with functionalism. The argument of this paper consequently speaks to wider issues than just the status of HEC. The reasons for..
• Kim Sterelny (2004). Externalism, epistemic artefacts and the extended mind.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: A common picture of evolution by natural selection sees it as a process through which organisms change so that they become better adapted to their environment. However, agents do not merely respond to the challenges their environments pose. They modify their environments, filtering and transforming the action of the environment on their bodies A beaver, in making a dam, engineers a stream, increasing both the size of its safe refuge and reducing its seasonal variability. Beavers, like many other animals, are ecological engineers. They act to modify the physical challenges posed by their environment. Nests, burrows and other shelters reduce the impacts of adverse weather and of other agents. Animal also modify their exposure to biological risks. Hygienic behaviour reduces the impact of disease. Intensive grooming; moving to new roosts; using a
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.vuw.ac.nz/phil/staff/documents/sterelny-papers/artefacts.pdf
  
• John Sutton (2006). Exograms and interdisciplinarity: History, the extended mind and the civilizing process.   (More)
• John Sutton (2006). Introduction: Memory, embodied cognition, and the extended mind.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: I introduce the seven papers in this special issue, by Andy Clark, J
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.phil.mq.edu.au/staff/jsutton/Sutton_PP_Intro.pdf
  http://www.journals.royalsoc.ac.uk/index/1312Q202H7808RT3.pdf
  http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/./ftinterface~content=a747697835~fulltext=713240930
  http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/index/P30W444011537529.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/P816529H7705H410.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/R727516236873154.pdf
  
• Daniel A. Weiskopf (2008). Patrolling the mind's boundaries.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Defenders of the extended mind thesis say that it is possible that some of our mental states may be constituted, in part, by states of the extra-bodily environment. Often they also add that such extended mentation is a commonplace phenomenon. I argue that extended mentation, while not impossible, is either nonexistent or far from widespread. Genuine beliefs as they occur in normal biologically embodied systems are informationally integrated with each other, and sensitive to changes in the person
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/c51u231h7v4ju770/fulltext.pdf
  
• Michael Wheeler, In defense of extended functionalism.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: According to the extended cognition hypothesis (henceforth ExC), there are conditions under which thinking and thoughts (or more precisely, the material vehicles that realize thinking and thoughts) are spatially distributed over brain, body and world, in such a way that the external (beyond-the-skin) factors concerned are rightly accorded fully-paid-up cognitive status.1 According to functionalism in the philosophy of mind, “what makes something a mental state of a particular type does not depend on its internal constitution, but rather on the way it functions, or the role it plays, in the system of which it is a part” (Levin 2008). The respective fates of these two positions may not be independent of each other. The claim that ExC is in some way a form of, dependent on, entailed by, or at least commonly played out in terms of, functionalism is now pretty much part of the received view of things (see, e.g., Adams and Aizawa 2008; Clark and Chalmers 1998; Clark 2005, 2008, this volume a, b, forthcoming; Menary 2007; Rupert 2004; Sprevak manuscript; Wheeler forthcoming). Thus ExC might be mandated by the existence of functionally specified cognitive systems whose boundaries are located partly outside the skin. This is the position that Andy Clark has recently dubbed extended functionalism (Clark 2008, forthcoming; see also Wheeler forthcoming)
• Michael Wheeler (ms). Minds, things, and materiality.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In a rich and thought-provoking paper, Lambros Malafouris argues that taking material culture seriously means to be ‘systematically concerned with figuring out the causal efficacy of materiality in the enactment and constitution of a cognitive system or operation’ (Malafouris 2004, 55). As I understand this view, there are really two intertwined claims to be established. The first is that the things beyond the skin that make up material culture (in other words, the physical objects and artefacts in which cultural networks and systems of human social relations are realized) may be essential to the enactment of, and be partly constitutive of, certain cognitive systems or operations. The consequence of establishing this claim is supposed to be that we have a mandate to recast the boundaries of the mind so as to include, as proper parts of the mind, things located beyond the skin. Thus, in talking about the contribution of the world to cognition, Malafouris (2004, 58) concludes that ‘what we have traditionally construed as an active or passive but always clearly separated external stimulus for setting a cognitive mechanism into motion, may be after all a continuous part of the machinery itself; at least ex hypothesi’. This is the position that, in philosophical circles, is known increasingly as the extended mind hypothesis (Clark & Chalmers 1998; Menary forthcoming). Henceforth I shall refer to this hypothesis as EM. A stock example will help bring the idea into view. Rumelhart et al. (1986) note that most of us solve difficult multiplication problems by using ‘pen and paper’ as an external resource. This environmental prop enables us to transform a difficult cognitive problem into a set of simpler ones, and to temporarily store the results of certain intermediate calculations. For the fan of EM, the distributed combination of this external resource and certain inner psychological processes constitutes a cognitive system in its own right
• Robert A. Wilson (2005). Collective memory, group minds, and the extended mind thesis.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ualberta.ca/~philosop/faculty/wilson/collectmem.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/K37446N775180100.pdf
  
• Robert A. Wilson (2010). Meaning making and the mind of the externalist.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This paper attempts to do two things. First, it recounts the problem of intentionality, as it has typically been conceptualized, and argues that it needs to be reconceptualized in light of the radical form of externalism most commonly referred to as the extended mind thesis. Second, it provides an explicit, novel argument for that thesis, what I call the argument from meaning making, and offers some defense of that argument. This second task occupies the core of the paper, and in completing it I distinguish _active _ _cognition_ from _cyborg fantasy arguments_ for externalism, and develop the analogy between the extended mind thesis in the cognitive sciences and developmental systems theory in developmental biology. The rethinking of the problem of intentionality on offer leads not so much to a solution as to a dissolution of that problem, as traditionally conceived
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ualberta.ca/~philosop/faculty/wilson/meaningmaking.pdf
  
• John Yates (ms). The Many Bubble Interpretation, externalism, the extended mind of David Chalmers and Andy Clark, and the work of Alva Noe in connection with Experimental Philosophy and Dreamwork.   (More)

Content Internalism and Externalism, Misc

• Jessica Brown (2003). Externalism and the Fregean tradition.   (More)
• Susan Brower-Toland (2007). Intuition, Externalism, and Direct Reference in Ockham.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In this paper I challenge recent externalist interpretations of Ockham’s theory of intuitive cognition. I begin by distinguishing two distinct theses that defenders of the externalist interpretation typically attribute to Ockham: a ‘direct reference thesis’, according to which intuitive cognitions are states that lack all internal, descriptive content; and a ‘causal thesis’, according to which intuitive states are wholly determined by causal connections they bear to singular objects. I then argue that neither can be plausibly credited to Ockham. In particular, I claim that the causal thesis doesn’t square with Ockham’s account of supernaturally produced intuition and that the direct reference thesis sits uneasily with Ockham’s characterization of the intentional structure of intuitive states.
• John Campbell (1987). Is sense transparent?   (More)
• Andrew Carpenter (1998). Davidson's externalism and the unintelligibility of massive error.   (More)
• Bryan Frances (2007). Externalism, physicalism, statues, and hunks.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Content externalism is the dominant view in the philosophy of mind. Content essentialism, the thesis that thought tokens have their contents essentially, is also popular. And many externalists are supporters of such essentialism. However, endorsing the conjunction of those views either (i) commits one to a counterintuitive view of the underlying physical nature of thought tokens or (ii) commits one to a slightly different but still counterintuitive view of the relation of thought tokens to physical tokens as well as a rejection of realist physicalism. In this essay I reveal the problem and articulate and adjudicate among the possible solutions. I will end up rejecting content essentialism
• Brie Gertler (2007). Content externalism and the epistemic conception of the self.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Our fundamental conception of the self seems to be, broadly speaking, epistemic: selves are things that have thoughts, undergo experiences, and possess reasons for action and belief. In this paper, I evaluate the consequences of this epistemic conception for the widespread view that properties like thinking that arthritis is painful are relational features of the self
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://people.virginia.edu/~bg8y/Xm&theSelf.doc
  http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1007361
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1533-6077.2007.00121.x
  http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/120710746/PDFSTART
  
• Brie Gertler (2009). Review of Katalin Farkas, The Subject's Point of View.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: A few decades ago, in the wake of influential arguments by Putnam and Burge, prevailing opinion among philosophers shifted from internalism to externalism about thought contents. While there was always a vocal minority opposed to externalism, internalist opposition has grown markedly in the past several years. This book represents a major advance in the internalist campaign. Farkas’ ambitious agenda is to advance a strongly internalist account of the mental. She makes impressive strides towards achieving this goal. Along the way, she presents important new arguments on a number of topics, including: how best to understand the ‘twin’ cases used in debates about content, the alleged incompatibility of content externalism and privileged access, and the prospects for defending Frege’s claim that sense determines reference
• John Gregg (online). Language and meaning.   (More)
• H (2007). Externalism and a posteriori semantics.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: It is widely held that the meaning of certain types of terms, such as natural kind terms, is individuated externalistically, in terms of the individual
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/f7546421h6624466/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/F7546421H6624466.pdf
  
• Henry Jackman (2005). Intuitions and semantic theory.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: While engaged in the analysis of topics such as the nature of knowledge, meaning, or justice, analytic philosophers have traditionally relied extensively on their own intuitions about when the relevant terms can, and can't, be correctly applied. Consequently, if intuitions about possible cases turned out not to be a reliable tool for the proper analysis of philosophically central concepts, then a radical reworking of philosophy's (or at least analytic philosophy's) methodology would seem to be in order. It is thus not surprising that the increasingly critical scrutiny that intuitions have received of late has produced what has been referred to as a "crisis" in analytic philosophy. This paper will argue, however, that at least those criticisms that stem from recent work on semantic externalism are not as serious as their proponents have claimed. Indeed, this paper will argue while the conceptual intuitions (and the analyses that result from them) will have to be recognized as fallible, they still have a prima facie claim to correctness. A naturalistic and externalistic account of concepts thus merely requires that the methodology of conceptual analysis be reinterpreted (from a 'Platonic' to a 'constructive' model) rather than given up
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/j.1467-9973.2005.00374.x
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-9973.2005.00374.x
  http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/118646789/PDFSTART
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/meta/2005/00000036/00000003/art00007
  
• Daniel Z. Korman (2006). What externalists should say about dry earth.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Dry earth seems to its inhabitants (our intrinsic duplicates) just as earth seems to us, that is, it seems to them as though there are rivers and lakes and a clear, odorless liquid flowing from their faucets. But, in fact, this is an illusion; there is no such liquid anywhere on the planet. I address two objections to externalism concerning the nature of the concept that is expressed by the word 'water' in the mouths of the inhabitants of dry earth. Gabriel Segal presents a dilemma for the externalist concerning the application conditions of the concept, and Paul Boghossian presents a dilemma for the externalist concerning the complexity of the concept. I show that, in both cases, the externalist may occupy the horn of his choice without departing from either the letter or spirit of externalism
• Daniel Z. Korman (2006). What Externalists Should Say About Dry Earth.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Dry earth seems to its inhabitants (our intrinsic duplicates) just as earth seems to us, that is, it seems to them as though there are rivers and lakes and a clear, odorless liquid flowing from their faucets. But, in fact, this is an illusion; there is no such liquid anywhere on the planet. I address two objections to externalism concerning the nature of the concept that is expressed by the word ‘water’ in the mouths of the inhabitants of dry earth. Gabriel Segal presents a dilemma for the externalist concering the application conditions of the concept, and Paul Boghossian presents a dilemma for the externalist concerning the complexity of the concept. I show that, in both cases, the externalist may occupy the horn of his choice without departing from either the letter or spirit of externalism.
• William S. Larkin (online). Content and metacognition.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: C. Theses: 1. Content Externalism strictly implies the possibility of acquiring a new concept as the result of an unwitting switch of environments. 2. This intuitively compels us to accept the possibility of someone possessing a concept without being aware that she does. 3. This possibility strictly favors causal models of meta-cognition over constitution models. 4. The possibility of possessing a concept unawares suggests that the contents of metacognitive
• B. J. C. Madison (2009). On the Compatibility of Epistemic Internalism and Content Externalism.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In this paper I consider a recent argument of Timothy Williamson’s that epistemic internalism and content externalism are indeed incompatible, and since he takes content externalism to be above reproach, so much the worse for epistemic internalism. However, I argue that epistemic internalism, properly understood, remains substantially unaffected no matter which view of content turns out to be correct. What is key to the New Evil Genius thought experiment is that, given everything of which the inhabitants are consciously aware, the two worlds are subjectively indistinguishable for them, which is what matters on internalist accounts of epistemic justification. I argue that even if a standard moral of the New Evil Genius intuition is untenable due to considerations arising from content externalism, the case can be understood as supporting epistemic internalism in a way that is wholly compatible with content externalism. In short, epistemic internalism is committed to sameness of justificatory status between subjectively indistinguishable counterparts, not sameness of content of their justifiers.
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/p728856004224887/fulltext.pdf
  
• Helge Malmgren (online). The "internal/external" metaphor in the philosophy of mind.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The being of the _cogitatio,_ or to be more exact, of the knowledge-phenomenon itself, cannot
  be questioned, and it is free from the riddle of transcendence. /.../ It is also obvious, that the
  _cogitationes_ represent a sphere of absolute immanent givens, in which sense we also interpret
  immanence. In the seeing [Schauen] of the pure phenomenon, the object is not outside the
  knowledge, outside consciousness, and at the same time it is given in the sense of the absolute
  self-givenness of a purely seen object."
• Ruth G. Millikan (2004). Existence proof for a viable externalism.   (More)
• Ruth G. Millikan (1997). On cognitive luck: Externalism in an evolutionary frame.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: "Paleontologists like to say that to a first approximation, all species are extinct (ninety- nine percent is the usual estimate). The organisms we see around us are distant cousins, not great grandparents; they are a few scattered twig-tips of an enormous tree whose branches and trunk are no longer with us." (p. 343-44). The historical life bush consists mainly in dead ends
• Derk Pereboom (1995). Conceptual structure and the individuation of content.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Current attempts to understand psychological content divide into two families of views. According to externalist accounts such as those advanced by Tyler Burge and Ruth Millikan, psychological content does not supervene on the physical features of the individual subject, but is fixed partially by the nature of the world external to her.¹ In the rival functional role theories developed by Ned Block and Brian Loar, content does supervene on the physical features of the individual, and is, in addition, determined solely by the role it plays in the causal network of an individual's sensations, behavior, and mental states.² Over the past fifteen years, criticism of these two types of views has often focussed on their capacity to individuate content in an acceptable way, and both seem to be deficient in this respect
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=1520-8583(1995)9<401:CSATIO>2.0.CO;2-3
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=1520-8583(1995)9<401:CSATIO>2.0.CO;2-3
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2214228.pdf
  
• Gabriel Segal (2004). Reference, causal powers, externalist intuitions, and unicorns.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In this chapter, I will compare and contrast singular concepts with what I call
• Alberto Voltolini (online). Internalism and externalism.   (More)
• Alberto Voltolini (2005). On the metaphysics of internalism and externalism.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In this paper, I explore the consequences of the thesis that externalism and internalism are (possibly, but as we will see not necessarily, opposite) metaphysical doctrines on the individuation conditions of a thought. If I am right, this thesis primarily entails that at least some naturalist positions on the ontology of the mind, namely the reductionistic ones, are hardly compatible with both externalism and a version of internalism so conceived, namely relational internalism. Indeed, according to both externalism and relational internalism, intentionality constitutes (or at least grounds) the relational content property providing the individuation conditions of a thought, as a relation to an outer or to an inner object respectively. Yet since intentionality turns out to be a modal, hence a nonnatural, property, both externalism and relational internalism deny to thoughts at least token-identity with physical states. Finally, I will give some support to the idea that externalism and internalism must be interpreted as doctrines on the individuation conditions of a thought
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.cei.unimo.it/personale/voltolini/internalism_externalism.pdf
  
• Ralph Wedgwood (2006). The internal and external components of cognition.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Timothy Williamson has presented several arguments that seek to cast doubt on the idea that cognition can be factorized into internal and external components. In the first section of this paper, I attempt to evaluate these arguments. My conclusion will be that these arguments establish several highly important points, but in the end these arguments fail to cast any doubt either on the idea that cognitive science should be largely concerned with internal mental processes, or on the idea that cognition can be analysed in terms of the existence of a suitable connection between internal and external components. I shall present an argument for the conclusion that cognition involves certain causal processes that are entirely internal
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://users.ox.ac.uk/~mert1230/cognition.a4.pdf
  http://users.ox.ac.uk/~mert1230/cognition.ltr.pdf
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=OR-ApDfUMUkC&oi=fnd&pg=RA1-PT251&ots=LNjDUBT9sG&sig=FXQabA0NNHD6iQspcW88TprzzLc
  
• Asa Maria Wikforss (2006). Content Externalism and Fregean Sense.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Can externalist concepts really capture an individual
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://people.su.se/%7Ewikforss/frege.pdf
  
• Asa Maria Wikforss & Soren Haggqvist (web). Externalism and a posteriori semantics.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: We have become accustomed to the idea that meaning is determined externalistically, that the meaning of certain types of terms, for example natural kind terms, depends on facts about the external environment.1 Recently, however, a more radical thesis has emerged, a thesis we shall dub
• Timothy Williamson (2006). Can cognition be factorized into internal and external components?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: 0. Platitudinously, cognitive science is the science of cognition. Cognition is usually defined as something like the process of acquiring, retaining and applying knowledge. To a first approximation, therefore, cognitive science is the science of knowing. Knowing is a relation between the knower and the known. Typically, although not always, what is known involves the environment external to the knower. Thus knowing typically involves a relation between the agent and the external environment. It is not internal to the agent, for the internal may be the same whether or not it is related to the external in a way that constitutes knowing. Cognition enables agents to achieve their goals by adjusting their actions appropriately to the environment. Such adjustment requires what is internal to the agent to be in some sense in line with what is external; that matching depends on both internal and external sides. Thus if cognitive science were restricted to what is internal to the agent, it would lose sight of its primary object of study. Although cognition depends on both the internal and the external, one can try to analyse it into internal and external factors. Call a state S narrow if and only if whether an agent is in S at a time t depends only on the total internal qualitative state of S at t, so that if one agent in one possible situation is internally an exact duplicate of another agent..
• Robert A. Wilson (2002). Individualism.   (More)
• Timothy Williamson (2004). Sosa on abilities, concepts, and externalism.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: A kind of intellectual project characteristic of Ernest Sosa is to resolve an apparently flat-out dispute by showing that it is not after all a zero-sum game. His irenic goal is to do justice to both sides and give each of them most of what it wants. In his subtle paper ‘Abilities, Concepts, and Externalism’ he applies this strategy to the dispute between internalism and externalism in the philosophy of mind. It is a pleasure to engage in discussion with a philosopher of Sosa’s fair-mindedness and analytical skills

Naturalizing Mental Content

• Pete Mandik (2010). Swamp Mary's revenge: Deviant phenomenal knowledge and physicalism.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Deviant phenomenal knowledge is knowing what it’s like to have experiences of, e.g., red without actually having had experiences of red. Such a knower is a deviant. Some physicalists have argued and some anti-physicalists have denied that the possibility of deviants undermines anti-physicalism and the Knowledge Argument. The current paper presents new arguments defending the deviant-based attacks on anti-physicalism. Central to my arguments are considerations concerning the psychosemantic underpinnings of deviant phenomenal knowledge. I argue that physicalists are in a superior position to account for the conditions in virtue of which states of deviants constitute representations of phenomenal facts
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/l07pw010561jx1m5/fulltext.pdf
  

Information-Based Accounts of Mental Content

• Frederick R. Adams (2003). The informational turn in philosophy.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/content/j6l8530k657u8650/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/j6l8530k657u8650/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=5142080&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/J6L8530K657U8650.pdf
  
• Jon Barwise (1986). Information and circumstance.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.projecteuclid.org/Dienst/UI/1.0/Display/euclid.ndjfl/1093636678
  
• Radu J. Bogdan (1988). Information and semantic cognition: An ontological account.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Information is the fuel of cognition. At its most basic level, information is a matter of structures interacting under laws. The notion of information thus reflects the (relational) fact that a structure is created by the impact of another structure. The impacted structure is an encoding, in some concrete form, of the interaction with the impacting structure. Information is, essentially, the structural trace in some system of an interaction with another system; it is also, as a consequence, the structural fuel which drives the impacted system's subsequent processes and behavior. Information takes various forms because the world has many levels of compositional and functional complexity, under different constraints. The key constraints that matter in the understanding of information are natural patterns of organization, or types, and systematic correlations among types, or laws. These level- sensitive constraints, in the form of types and laws, shape the very form in which information is tokened in some structure, that is, the very form in which it is encoded. As a result, the information-producing interactions bring about different sorts of structures, with various sorts of causal effects and functions, whence so many ways in which information is coded and utilized
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-0017.1988.tb00136.x
  
• Radu J. Bogdan (1987). Mind, content and information.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: What is it that one thinks or believes when one thinks or believes something? A mental formula? A sentence in some natural language? Its truth conditions? Or perhaps an abstract proposition? The current story of content is fairly ecumenical. It says that a number of aspects, some mental, other semantic, go into our understanding of content. Yet the current story is incomplete. It leaves out a very important aspect of content, one which I call incremental information. It is information in a specific format, information as a limited or local increment, structured by a number of underlying parameters. It is in the form of such increments that information drives cognition and behavior. This is why, perhaps of all aspects of content, it is incremental information which matters most when we want to understand cognitive attitudes and performances. This in turn must have an impact on our philosophical notions of content, propositional attitudes, inference, justification and knowledge
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/p107202818r62286/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/P107202818R62286.pdf
  
• Jason Bridges (2006). Does informational semantics commit euthyphro's fallacy.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In this paper, I argue that informational semantics, the most well-known and worked-out naturalistic account of intentional content, conflicts with a fundamental psychological principle about the conditions of belief-formation. Since this principle is an important premise in the argument for informational semantics, the upshot is that the view is self-contradictory??indeed, it turns out to be guilty of a sophisticated version of the fallacy famously committed by Euthyphro in the eponymous Platonic dialogue. Criticisms of naturalistic accounts of content typically proceed piecemeal by narrowly constructed counterexamples, but I argue that the current result is more robust. It affects a broad family of accounts, and provokes a wider doubt about the possibility of successful execution of the naturalistic project
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://home.uchicago.edu/~bridges/papers/Bridges--Does Informational Semantics Commit Euthyphro's Fallacy.pdf
  http://home.uchicago.edu/~bridges/papers/Bridges--Does Informational Semantics Commit Euthyphro's Fallacy, pre-print version.pdf
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2006.00622.x?ai=2l6&mi=85vxf&af=R
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2006.00622.x
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/nous/2006/00000040/00000003/art00005
  
• Anthony Chemero (2003). Information for perception and information processing.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://portal.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=947737.947763
  http://edisk.fandm.edu/tony.chemero/papers/infoandinfo.pdf
  http://www.cse.buffalo.edu/~rapaport/Papers/Papers.by.Others/mm.chemero.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/content/j862682860127888/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/j862682860127888/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=5142087&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/J862682860127888.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/mind/2003/00000013/00000004/05142087
  
• Jonathan Cohen (2006). An objective counterfactual theory of information.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: We offer a novel theory of information that differs from traditional accounts in two respects: (i) it explains information in terms of counterfactuals rather than conditional probabilities, and (ii) it does not make essential reference to doxastic states of subjects, and consequently allows for the sort of objective, reductive explanations of various notions in epistemology and philosophy of mind that many have wanted from an account of information
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/./ftinterface~content=a758270032~fulltext=713240930
  http://www.informaworld.com/index/758270032.pdf
  
• Jonathan Cohen (2002). Information and content.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Mental states differ from most other entities in the world in having semantic or intentional properties: they have meanings, they are about other things, they have satisfaction- or truth-conditions, they have representational content. Mental states are not the only entities that have intentional properties - so do linguistic expressions, some paintings, and so on; but many follow Grice, 1957 ] in supposing that we could understand the intentional properties of these other entities as derived from the intentional properties of mental states (viz., the mental states of their producers). Of course, accepting this supposition leaves us with a puzzle about how the non-derivative bearers of intentional properties (mental states) could have these properties. In particular, intentional properties seem to some to be especially difficult to reconcile with a robust commitment to ontological naturalism - the view that the natural properties, events, and individuals are the only properties, events, and individuals that exist. Fodor puts this intuition nicely in this oft-quoted passage:

  I suppose that sooner or later the physicists will complete the catalogue they've been compiling of the
  ultimate and irreducible properties of things. When they do, the likes of _spin_, _charm_, and _charge_ will perhaps
  appear upon their list. But _aboutness_ surely won't; intentionality simply doesn't go that deep.... If aboutness is
  real, it must be really something else ([ Fodor, 1987 ], 97).

  Some philosophers have reacted to this clash by giving up one of the two views generating the tension. For example, Churchland, 1981 ] opts for intentional irrealism in order to save ontological naturalism, while
• David J. Cole (ms). Natural language and natural meaning.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In Book II of the _Essay_, at the beginning of his discussion of language in Chapter II ("Of the Signification of Words"), John Locke writes that we humans have a variety of thoughts which might profit others, but that unfortunately these thoughts lie invisible and hidden from others. And so we use language to communicate these thoughts. As a result, "words, in their primary or immediate signification,stand for nothing but _the ideas in the mind of him that uses them_
• Luciano Floridi (2005). Is semantic information meaningful data?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: There is no consensus yet on the definition of semantic information. This paper contributes to the current debate by criticising and revising the Standard Definition of semantic Information (SDI) as meaningful data, in favour of the Dretske-Grice approach: meaningful and well-formed data constitute semantic information only if they also qualify as contingently truthful. After a brief introduction, SDI is criticised for providing necessary but insufficient conditions for the definition of semantic information. SDI is incorrect because truth-values do not supervene on semantic information, and misinformation (that is, false semantic information) is not a type of semantic information, but pseudo-information, that is not semantic information at all. This is shown by arguing that none of the reasons for interpreting misinformation as a type of semantic information is convincing, whilst there are compelling reasons to treat it as pseudo-information. As a consequence, SDI is revised to include a necessary truth-condition. The last section summarises the main results of the paper and indicates some interesting areas of application of the revised definition
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00002536/
  http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00002536/01/iimd.pdf
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2005.tb00531.x
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/ips/ppr/2005/00000070/00000002/art00004
  
• Luciano Floridi (2003). Two approaches to the philosophy of information.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.hi.is/~lobbi/ut1/a_a/tattpi.pdf
  http://portal.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=947737.947756
  http://www.cse.buffalo.edu/~rapaport/Papers/Papers.by.Others/mm.floridi.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/content/g0m77uh8853308u4/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/g0m77uh8853308u4/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=5142079&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/G0M77UH8853308U4.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/mind/2003/00000013/00000004/05142079
  
• Jerry A. Fodor (1986). Information and association.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://projecteuclid.org/Dienst/Repository/1.0/Disseminate/euclid.ndjfl/1093636677/body/pdf
  http://www.projecteuclid.org/DPubS/Repository/1.0/Disseminate?handle=euclid.ndjfl/1093636677&view=body&content-type=pdf_1
  
• M. C. Frank (2004). Against informational atomism.   (More)
• Patrick Grim, P. St Denis & T. Kokalis (2004). Information and meaning: Use-based models in arrays of neural nets.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.cse.buffalo.edu/~rapaport/510/mm-grim-etal.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/x520ur52t8x7746q/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=5142091&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/X520UR52T8X7746Q.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/mind/2004/00000014/00000001/05142091
  
• David R. Hilbert (ms). Content, intention, and explanation.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Naturalistic theories of content and whether or not reason-giving explanations of human behavior are causal explanations have been central topics in recent philosophy of mind. Fred Dretske, in his book Explaining Behavior, attempts to construct a naturalistic theory of the contents of beliefs and desires that gives these mental states an important role in the causation of behavior. Even if Dretske is granted that the theory adequately accounts for individual behaviors the theory still faces problems in offering an adequate account of important features of extended sequences of behavior. Some sequences of behavior exhibit coherence in the sense that the elements of the sequence either contribute to the atttainment of a goal state or only make sense on the supposition that the goal state will be attained. Two ways of attaining coherence are distinguished. In chaining behavior coherence is guaranteed by the fit between the internal structure of the organism and the structure of the external environment. In other cases of coherence chaining is not available as an explanation. It is argued that Dretske
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://tigger.uic.edu/~hilbert/papers/intandcont.pdf
  
• David J. Israel & John Perry (1990). What is information?   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www-csli.stanford.edu/~john/PHILPAPERS/whatisinfo.pdf
  http://www-csli.stanford.edu/users/john/PHILPAPERS/whatisinfo.pdf
  
• Jesper Kallestrup (forthcoming). Review of Physicalism, or Something Near Enough, by Jaegwon Kim.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The debate between the reductive and emergent materialist is still very much a live one. (Antony and Levine 1997; Auyang 2000; Bechtel and Richardson 1992; Block 1997; Boyd 1999; Crane 2001; David 1997; Fodor 1989; Fodor 1997; Kim 1993b; Kim 1994; Kim 1996; Kim 1999; Le Pore and Loewer 1987; Millikan 1999; Pereboom 2002; Rueger 2000; Van Gulick 2001; Yablo 1992). We argue that the best way to settle this debate is to take a step back and consider the metaphysics that is motivated by a careful consideration of some scientific examples. We argue that an account of emergence which bases emergence of a complex whole in the physical organisation of the parts can account for the emergent explicable novelty can be found throughout science. This
• Max Kistler (2000). Source and Channel in the informational theory of mental content.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://max.kistler.free.fr/articles/MK9.pdf
  http://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/ijn_00000032/fr/
  http://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/docs/00/05/32/35/HTML/
  
• Barry M. Loewer (1987). From information to intentionality.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/K67708N68T700052.pdf
  
• Ruth G. Millikan (2001). What has Natural Information to Do with Intentional Representation?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: "According to informational semantics, if it's necessary that a creature can't distinguish Xs from Ys, it follows that the creature can't have a concept that applies to Xs but not Ys." (Jerry Fodor, The Elm and the Expert, p.32)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=iJekyHohFlQC&oi=fnd&pg=PA105&dq=What+has+natural+information+to+do+with+intentional+representation?+Millikan&ots=Gbmp3i65AN&sig=nmaOolClVje4UgqWrE7pp0VPxSQ
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=iJekyHohFlQC&oi=fnd&pg=PA105&dq=What+has+natural+information+to+do+with+intentional+representation?+Millikan&ots=Gbmp3h06CO&sig=Nc0cd_mgxj-UHcbnxHX78X1Jde0
  
• Paul G. Skokowski (1999). Information, belief, and causal role.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www-csli.stanford.edu/~paulsko/papers/IBCRPenultimate.pdf
  
• Donna M. Summerfield & Pat A. Manfredi (1998). Indeterminacy in recent theories of content.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.csa.com/partners/viewrecord.php?requester=gs&collection=TRD&recid=371130CI
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/h323q28t63240108/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/H323Q28T63240108.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/mind/1998/00000008/00000002/00160297
  
• Matthew Usher (2001). A statistical referential theory of content: Using information theory to account for misrepresentation.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.bbk.ac.uk/psyc/staff/academic/musher/documents/ML.pdf
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/1468-0017.00172
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1468-0017.00172
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/mila/2001/00000016/00000003/art00172
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/mila/2001/00000016/00000003/art00005
  
• Corey G. Washington (2002). A conflict between language and atomistic information.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/dlkglkuef033ck9r/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=399589&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/DLKGLKUEF033CK9R.pdf
  

Asymmetric-Dependence Accounts of Mental Content

• Frederick R. Adams (online). Fodor's asymmetrical causal dependency theory of meaning.   (More)
• Mark H. Bickhard (1998). A Process Model of the Emergence of Representation.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Two challenges to the very possibility of emergence are addressed, one metaphysical and one logical. The resolution of the metaphysical challenge requires a shift to a process metaphysics, while the logical challenge highlights normative emergence, and requires a shift to more powerful logical tools -- in particular, that of implicit definition. Within the framework of a process metaphysics, two levels of normative emergence are outlined: that of function and that of representation
• Carl Gillett (2006). Samuel Alexander's emergentism.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Samuel Alexander was one of the foremost philosophical figures of his day and has been argued by John Passmore to be one of ‘fathers’ of Australian philosophy as well as a novel kind of physicalist. Yet Alexander is now relatively neglected, his role in the genesis of Australian philosophy if far from widely accepted and the standard interpretation takes him to be an anti-physicalist. In this paper, I carefully examine these issues and show that Alexander has been badly, although understandably, misjudged by most of his contemporary critics and interpreters. Most importantly, I show that Alexander offers an ingenious, and highly original, version of physicalism at the heart of which is a strikingly different view of the nature of the microphysical properties and associated view of emergent properties. My final conclusion will be that Passmore is correct in his claims both that Alexander is significant as one of the grandfather’s of Australian philosophy and that he provides a novel physicalist position. I will also suggest that Alexander’s emergentism is important for addressing the so-called ‘problem of mental causation’ presently dogging contemporary non-reductive physicalists
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/3215n21p7746r538/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/3215N21P7746R538.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/synt/2006/00000153/00000002/00005470
  
• Joseph Mendola (2003). A dilemma for asymmetric dependence.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Accounts of mental content rooted in asymmetric dependence hold, crudely speaking, that the content of a mental representation is the cause of that representation on which all its other causes depend.1 To speak somewhat less crudely, such accounts, hereafter
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/1468-0068.00437
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1468-0068.00437
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/nous/2003/00000037/00000002/art00003
  
• Steve Palmquist (1992). Unknown.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: At what stage in its development does a foetus become a living human being? When is it proper to refer to a network of pulsating neurons as a
• Lynne Rudder Baker (1989). On a causal theory of content.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=1520-8583(1989)3<165:OACTOC>2.0.CO;2-M
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=1520-8583(1989)3<165:OACTOC>2.0.CO;2-M
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2214267.pdf
  
• Alberto Voltolini (1995). Is meaning without actually existing reference naturalizable?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: As is well known, meaningful expressions denoting no actual entity represent a hard problem for any naturalistically inspired theory of meaning which tries to explain the expression's meaning in terms of the expression's cause. For, since the actual extension of one such expression is ex hypothesi empty, there is no actual candidate for the role of the expression's cause one can plausibly appeal to in order to assign it to the expression as its meaning. Faced with this problem, a naturalizer may be immediately tempted to claim that there are no lexically primitive extensionless expressions. Thus, for any expression whose extension is actually empty she can attempt to paraphrase it away along the well-honoured Russellian path. Although reluctantly, in his A Theory of Content (1990) Jerry Fodor has however argued that a naturalizer can resist the above temptation. Fodor indeed provides another naturalized informational theory of meaning for Mentalese expressions based on the notion of asymmetric dependence between causal relations. This theory is also basically a denotational theory of meaning, for according to it a lexically primitive expression means the entity it denotes. On the basis of this theory, he claims that the problem of the lexically primitive extensionless expressions can be solved while letting them run denotationally. In what follows, however, I will try to cast some doubts on Fodor's solution of the lexically primitive extensionless expressions without at the same time falling back in the Russellian trap. If there are lexically primitive expressions whose extension in the actual world is empty, their meaning can be still accounted for in terms which are both denotational and non-naturalistic. Suffice it that one appeals to the weak Meinongianism contained in the thesis that one can directly refer to possible but unactual entities by means of a suitable fixing-reference description

Causal Accounts of Mental Content, Misc

• Fred Adams & Ken Aizawa, Causal theories of mental content.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Causal theories of mental content attempt to explain how thoughts can be about things. They attempt to explain how one can think about, for example, dogs. These theories begin with the idea that there are mental representations and that thoughts are meaningful in virtue of a causal connection between a mental representation and some part of the world that is represented. In other words, the point of departure for these theories is that thoughts of dogs are about dogs because dogs cause the mental representations of dogs
• Todd Buras (2009). An Argument against Causal Theories of Mental Content.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Some mental states are about themselves. Nothing is a cause of itself. So some mental states are not about their causes; they are about things distinct from their causes. If this argument is sound, it spells trouble for causal theories of mental content—the precise sort of trouble depending on the precise sort of causal theory. This paper shows that the argument is sound (§§1-3), and then spells out the trouble (§4).
• Robert E. Cummins (1997). The LOT of the causal theory of mental content.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: hc thcsis of this paper is that thc causal themy of mental cantent (hcrcaftcr CT) is incompatible with an clcmcntary fact of pcrccptual psychology, namely, that thc detection 0f distal propcrtics generally requires thc mediation of a “the- 0ry.” I shall call this fact thc nontransducibility of distal properties (hcrcaftcr NTDP). The argument proceeds in two stages. Thc burden of stage 0nc is that, taken together, CT and thc language 0f thought hypothesis (hcrcaftcr LOT) arc incompatible with NTDP. The burden of stage two is that acceptance of CT rcquircs acceptance of LOT as well. It follows that CT is incompatiblc with NTDP. I organize things in this way in part bccausc it makcs the argument casicr t0 understand, and in part bccausc thc stage-two thcsis—that CT cntails LOT—has somc independcnt interest and is thcrcforc worth separating from thc rcst 0f thc argument. 1. STAGE ONE; THE CONJUNCTION OF CT AND LOT Is INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE NONTRANSDUCIBILITY OF DISTAL PROPERTIES Let us begin by clarifying some tcrms. By LOT, I mean the hypothesis that thc human schcmc 0f mental rcprcscmation satisfies the following conditions: (1) It has a finite number of semantically primitive expressions individuatcd syntactically
  Additional links for this entry:
  https://netfiles.uiuc.edu/rcummins/www/HomePage/Papers/LOTctmc.pdf
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-362X(199710)94:10<535:TLOTCT>2.0.CO;2-N
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-362X(199710)94:10<535:TLOTCT>2.0.CO;2-N
  http://www.jstor.org/view/0022362x/di010539/01p00357/0
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2564550.pdf
  
• James Franklin, Symbolic connectionism in natural language disambiguation.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: language into these formalisms. However, they make use of only small subsets of knowledge. This article will describe how to..
• Robert D. Rupert (2001). Coining terms in the language of thought: Innateness, emergence, and the lot of Cummins's argument against the causal theory of mental content.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Robert Cummins argues that any causal theory of mental content (CT) founders on an established fact of human psychology: that theory mediates sensory detection. He concludes,
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-362X(200110)98:10<499:CTITLO>2.0.CO;2-Y
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3649467.pdf
  
• Robert Rupert (2008). Causal theories of mental content.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2008.00130.x
  http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/119423024/PDFSTART
  

Teleological Accounts of Mental Content

• Marshall Abrams (2005). Teleosemantics without natural selection.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Ruth Millikan and others advocate theories which attempt to naturalize wide mental content (e.g. beliefs
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/m3qx5n807h1714l0/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=5274298&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/M3QX5N807H1714L0.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/biph/2005/00000020/00000001/00004298
  
• Ruth G. Millikan (2007). An Input Condition for Teleosemantics? Reply to Shea (and Godfrey-Smith).   (More)
• Colin Allen (2001). A tale of two froggies.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: There once was an ugly duckling. Except he wasn’t a duckling at all, and once he realized his error he lived happily ever after. And there you have an early primer from the animal literature on the issue of misrepresentation -- perhaps one of the few on this topic to have a happy ending. Philosophers interested in misrepresentation have turned their attention to a different fairy tale animal: the frog. No one gets kissed in this story and the controversial issue of self-recognition is avoided. There are simply some scientifically established facts about ways to get a frog to stick out its tongue. (Who would want to kiss a frog under those conditions, anyway?) Some frogs, it seems, are fairly indiscriminate about sticking out their tongues. Not just flies, but a whole slew of other things will go down the hatch if propelled at just the right velocity and range through a frog’s visual field, provoking a tongue-flicking response. Fortunately for us all, frogs seem to be a bit more discriminating about whom they will kiss. At first sight, the frog’s tongue-flicking response seems like an ideal starting point for those who wish to promote evolutionary or "teleological" theories of intentional content. The signals passed from the frog’s retina to the frog’s brain were undoubtedly honed by the deaths of untold millions of insects snagged by countless generations of amphibians. Those amphibian ancestors whose eyes generated signals that were more 1 reliable guides to the location of food in the environment did better at propagating their genes, all other things being equal, than their cohorts whose eye to brain signals were less reliable. The teleosemanticist identifies the content of frogs’ intracranial signals in terms of the environmental conditions that historically corresponded to successful tongue-flicking, namely the presence of frog food -- typically flies -- in tongue-flicking range. And their descendants live happily ever after. But this would not be a fairy tale unless there were something to pose a credible threat to this happy ending..
• Michael L. Anderson (ms). Representation, evolution and embodiment.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: As part of the ongoing attempt to fully naturalize the concept of human being--and, more specifically, to re-center it around the notion of agency--this essay discusses an approach to defining the content of representations in terms ultimately derived from their central, evolved function of providing guidance for action. This 'guidance theory' of representation is discussed in the context of, and evaluated with respect to, two other biologically inspired theories of representation: Dan Lloyd's dialectical theory of representation and Ruth Millikan's biosemantics
• Louise M. Antony (1996). Equal Rights for Swamp-persons.   (More)
• Ruth G. Millikan (2009). Biosemantics.   (More)
• Crystal L'Hôte (forthcoming). Biosemantics: an evolutionary theory of thought.   (More)
• Jason Bridges (2006). Teleofunctionalism and psychological explanation.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-0114.2006.00269.x
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/papq/2006/00000087/00000004/art00002
  
• Nicholas Shea (2007). Consumers Need Information: supplementing teleosemantics with an input condition.   (More)
• Joe Cruz (online). On teleosemantics and natural maps (comments on work by Rob Cummins et al.).   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Let me begin by signaling my enthusiasm both for the specific case offered by Cummins et al. against teleosemantics and for the overall framework from which this work derives. If the first approximation of the idea is that there will be material implicit in a representation that can be exploited by a cognitive agent that later acquires the right abilities to extract this material, and if this material looks a great deal like content, then the teleosemanticist will find accommodating it challenging. Moreover, the distinction between representation and indication is intriguing and important, and the discussion of structural transformation and isomorphism is illuminating. While Cummins has been urging these themes for some time now, it seems to me that they have not been sufficiently appreciated in the literature
• Robert E. Cummins, James Blackmon, David Byrd, Alexa Lee & and Martin Roth (2006). Representation and unexploited content.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In this paper, we introduce a novel difficulty for teleosemantics, viz., its inability to account for what we call unexploited content—content a representation has, but which the system that harbors it is currently unable to exploit. In section two, we give a characterization of teleosemantics. Since our critique does not depend on any special details that distinguish the variations in the literature, the characterization is broad, brief and abstract. In section three, we explain what we mean by unexploited content, and argue that any theory of content adequate to ground representationalist theories in cognitive science must allow for it.1 In section four, we show that teleosemantic theories of the sort we identify in section two cannot accommodate unexploited content, and are therefore unacceptable if intended as attempts to ground representationalist cognitive science. Finally, in section five, we speculate that the existence and importance of unexploited content has likely been obscured by a failure to distinguish representation from indication, and by a tendency to think of representation as reference
• Daniel C. Dennett (1988). Evolution, error and intentionality.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Sometimes it takes years of debate for philosophers to discover what it is they really disagree about. Sometimes they talk past each other in long series of books and articles, never guessing at the root disagreement that divides them. But occasionally a day comes when something happens to coax the cat out of the bag. "Aha!" one philosopher exclaims to another, "so that's why you've been disagreeing with me, misunderstanding me, resisting my conclusions, puzzling me all these years!"
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/431/00/evolerr.htm
  http://portal.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=94264
  http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/evolerr.htm
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000431/
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000431/00/evolerr.htm
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:431
  
• Daniel C. Dennett (1993). Evolution, teleology, intentionality.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: No response that was not as long and intricate as the two commentaries combined could do justice to their details, so what follows will satisfy nobody, myself included. I will concentrate on one issue discussed by both commentators: the relationship between evolution and teleological (or intentional) explanation. My response, in its brevity, may have just one virtue: it will confirm some of the hunches (or should I say suspicions) that these and other writers have entertained about my views. For more closely argued defenses of my points, see Dennett 1990a,b,c; 1991a,b
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/275/00/evoltele.htm
  http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/evoltele.htm
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000275/00/evoltele.htm
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:275
  
• Fred Dretske (2001). Norms, history, and the mental.   (More)
• Crawford Elder (forthcoming). Mental Causation, Invariance, and Teleofunctional Content.   (More)
• Crawford L. Elder (1998). What sensory signals are about.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In ‘Of Sensory Systems and the “Aboutness” of Mental States’, Kathleen Akins (1996) argues against what she calls ‘the traditional view’ about sensory systems, according to which they are detectors of features in the environment outside the organism. As an antidote, she considers the case of thermoreception, a system whose sensors send signals about how things stand with themselves and their immediate dermal surround (a ‘narcissistic’ sensory system); and she closes by suggesting that the signals from many sensory systems may not in any familiar sense be about anything at all. Her presentation of the issues, however, overlooks resources available to ‘the traditional view’—or so I shall argue. Akins’s own thumbnail sketch of what is wrong with the traditional view is that it asks, concerning a given sensory system, ‘what is it detecting?’, when we should instead be asking ‘what is it doing?’ (352). Her point is that on the traditional view the function of a sensory system—what it's ‘for’—is to detect or indicate (values of) features of the outside environment. But at least on one version of the traditional view—namely Ruth Millikan’s—this would never be the sole or main proper function of a sensory system. (Akins does not list Millikan as a traditionalist, but Millikan fits squarely Akins’s description of them, since she believes in a naturalistic theory of aboutness and thinks it should begin with the senses.) For Millikan (1989, 1993), the proper function of a sensory system is in the first instance enabling behavioural systems—in the simplest case, motor routines—to perform their proper function. This they do, roughly, by switching on and steering the behavioural routines. Where features of the outside environment come in is as Normal (= assumed-by-the-design) conditions for the successful performance of the sensory system's proper function. That is, the only strategy for switching on and steering that is simple enough for evolution to have hit upon it, and reliable enough for evolution to have liked it, is a strategy which gears the steering to (values of) features of the outside environment. But as soon as one starts fleshing out the details of this story, one notices that they are probably quite different in the case of thermoreception from how they are with ‘distance’ senses such as vision and olfaction--a point which Akins overlooks..
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.philosophy.uconn.edu/department/elder/akins.pdf
  https://web1.uits.uconn.edu:4443/philosophy/department/elder/akins.pdf
  http://digitalcommons.uconn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1003&context=philo_articles
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/1467-8284.00131
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1467-8284.00131
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/anal/1998/00000058/00000004/art00004
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/anal/1998/00000058/00000260/art00131
  
• Crawford L. Elder (1998). What versus how in naturally selected representations.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Empty judgements appear to be about something, and inaccurate judgements to report something. Naturalism tries to explain these appearances without positing non-real objects or states of affairs. Biological naturalism explains that the false and the empty are tokens which fail to perform the function proper to their biological type. But if truth is a biological 'supposed to', we should expect designs that achieve it only often enough. The sensory stimuli which trigger the frog's gulp-launching signal may be a poor guide to the signal's content. Teleosemantics should be anti-verificationist
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0026-4423(199804)2:107:426<349:WVHINS>2.0.CO;2-Z
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0026-4423(199804)2:107:426<349:WVHINS>2.0.CO;2-Z
  http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/107/426/349
  http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/107/426/349
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2659880.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/oup/mind/1998/00000107/00000426/art00349
  http://www.philosophy.uconn.edu/department/elder/wvh.pdf
  
• Berent Enc (2002). Indeterminacy of Function Attributions.   (More)
• Peter Godfrey-Smith (2004). Mental representation, naturalism, and teleosemantics.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The "teleosemantic" program is part of the attempt to give a naturalistic explanation of the semantic properties of mental representations. The aim is to show how the internal states of a wholly physical agent could, as a matter of objective fact, represent the world beyond them. The most popular approach to solving this problem has been to use concepts of physical correlation with some kinship to those employed in information theory (Dretske 1981, 1988; Fodor 1987, 1990). Teleosemantics, which tries to solve the problem using a concept of biological function, arrived in the mid 1980s with ground-breaking works by Millikan (1984) and Papineau (1984, 1987).¹
• Pierre Jacob (2000). Can selection explain content?   (More)
• Richard Joyce (2002). Moral realism and teleosemantics.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In a recent article, William F. Harms (2000) argues in a novel way for a form of moral realism. He does not actually argue that moral realism is true, but rather that if morality is the product of natural selection
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=358503&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/U7K40246163080GG.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/biph/2001/00000016/00000005/00358503
  http://www-personal.usyd.edu.au/~rjoyce/acrobat/joyce_moral.realism.teleosemantics.pdf
  
• Brendan Lalor (1998). Swampman, Etiology, and Content.   (More)
• Graham Macdonald & David Papineau (2006). Introduction: Prospects and problems for teleosemantics.   (More)
• Ruth G. Millikan (2000). Naturalizing intentionality.   (More)
• Ruth G. Millikan (2005). The father, the son, and the daughter: Sellars, Brandom, and Millikan.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/jbp/pc/2005/00000013/00000001/art00005
  
• Ruth G. Millikan (2002). Teleological Theories of mental content.   (More)
• Ruth G. Millikan (2001). What has Natural Information to Do with Intentional Representation?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: "According to informational semantics, if it's necessary that a creature can't distinguish Xs from Ys, it follows that the creature can't have a concept that applies to Xs but not Ys." (Jerry Fodor, The Elm and the Expert, p.32)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=iJekyHohFlQC&oi=fnd&pg=PA105&dq=What+has+natural+information+to+do+with+intentional+representation?+Millikan&ots=Gbmp3i65AN&sig=nmaOolClVje4UgqWrE7pp0VPxSQ
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=iJekyHohFlQC&oi=fnd&pg=PA105&dq=What+has+natural+information+to+do+with+intentional+representation?+Millikan&ots=Gbmp3h06CO&sig=Nc0cd_mgxj-UHcbnxHX78X1Jde0
  
• Karen Neander (2007). Biological Approaches to Mental Representation.   (More)
• Karen Neander (1999). Fitness and the Fate of Unicorns.   (More)
• Karen Neander (2007). Teleological Theories of Mental Content: Can Darwin Solve the Problem of Intentionality?   (More)
• David Papineau (2003). Is representation rife?   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/1467-9329.00210/enhancedabs/
  http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/118834885/PDFSTART
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1467-9329.00210
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/rati/2003/00000016/00000002/art00001
  
• David Papineau (1990). Truth and Teleology.   (More)
• Mark Perlman (2002). Pagan teleology: Adaptational role and the philosophy of mind.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=o23-SrWDAL0C&oi=fnd&pg=RA1-PA263&ots=27RzphXNFd&sig=_tm2Ix3YEV9e5To_CMQlvLjX9oE
  
• P. M. Pietroski (1992). Intentionality and teleological error.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Theories of content purport to explain, among other things, in virtue of what beliefs have the truth conditions they do have. The desire for such a theory has many sources, but prominent among them are two puzzling (and related) facts that are notoriously difficult to explain: beliefs can be false, and there are normative constraints on the formation of beliefs.2 If we knew in virtue of what beliefs had truth conditions, we would be better positioned to explain how it is possible for an agent to believe that which is not the case. Moreover, we do not say merely of such an agent that he believes that p when p is not the case. We say the agent made a mistake, and often criticize him accordingly; we think agents ought not have false beliefs, and that such beliefs should be changed; etc. An adequate theory of content would, presumably, reveal the source of these normative facts about the mental lives of agents. Indeed, it is typically taken to be an adequacy constraint on a theory of content that it help explain the possibility of error and the "normativity" of content. Teleological theories of content promise to do just this
• Mark Rowlands (online). Teleosemantics.   (More)
• Dan Ryder (2006). On thinking of kinds: A neuroscientific perspective.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://homepage.mac.com/ancientportraits/drsite/representingkinds.pdf
  
• Dan Ryder (2004). SINBaD neurosemantics: A theory of mental representation.   (More)
• Itay Shani (2007). Teleonomic Functions and Intrinsic Intentionality: Dretske's Theory as a Test Case.   (More)
• Nicholas Shea (2006). Millikan's contribution to materialist philosophy of mind.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: One of the great outstanding problems in materialist philosophy of mind is the problem of how there can be space in the material world for intentionality. In the 1980s Ruth Millikan formulated a detailed theory according to which representations are physical particulars and their contents are complex relational properties of those particulars which can be specified in terms of respectable properties drawn from the natural sciences. In particular, she relied on the biological concept of the function of a trait, and the existence of historical conditions which enter into an evolutionary explanation of the operation of that trait. The present article is an introduction to this influential theory of intentionality
• Nicholas Shea (forthcoming). Millikan's Isomorphism Requirement.   (More)
• Josefa Toribio (1998). Meaning and other non-biological categories.   (More)
• Karen Neander (online). teleological theories of mental content.   (More)
• Matthew Usher (2004). Comment on Ryder's SINBAD neurosemantics: Is teleofunction isomorphism the way to understand representations?   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.bbk.ac.uk/psyc/staff/academic/musher/documents/06_mila_006.pdf
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/j.1468-0017.2004.00256.x
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-0017.2004.00256.x
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/mila/2004/00000019/00000002/art00006
  
• Denis M. Walsh (2002). Brentano's chestnuts.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=o23-SrWDAL0C&oi=fnd&pg=RA1-PA312&ots=27Rzph_SKf&sig=t8cww5GYFFZwzGF5pbf8XwqpUA8
  

Inferentialist Accounts of Meaning and Content

• Ned Block (1998). Conceptual Role Semantics.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: According to Conceptual Role Semantics ("CRS"), the meaning of a representation is the role of that representation in the cognitive life of the agent, e.g. in perception, thought and decision-making. It is an extension of the well known "use" theory of meaning, according to which the meaning of a word is its use in communication and more generally, in social interaction. CRS supplements external use by including the role of a symbol inside a computer or a brain. The uses appealed to are not just actual, but also counterfactual: not only what effects a thought does have, but what effects it would have had if stimuli or other states had differed. The view has arisen separately in philosophy (where it is sometimes called "inferential," or "functional" role semantics) and in cognitive science (where it is sometimes called "procedural semantics"). The source of the view is Wittgenstein (1953) and Sellars, but the source in contemporary philosophy is a series of papers by Harman (see his 1987) and Field (1977). Other proponents in philosophy have included Block, Horwich, Loar, McGinn and Peacocke (1992). In cognitive science, they include Woods (1981) and Miller and Johnson-Laird (1976). (See references in Block, 1987.)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/faculty/block/papers/ConceptualRoleSemantics.html
  http://cogprints.org/232/0/199712005.html
  
• Robert B. Brandom (1994). Reasoning and representing.   (More)
• Ingo Brigandt (2004). Conceptual role semantics, the theory theory, and conceptual change.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The purpose of the paper is twofold. I first outline a philosophical theory of concepts based on conceptual role semantics. This approach is explicitly intended as a framework for the study and explanation of conceptual change in science. Then I point to the close similarities between this philosophical framework and the theory theory of concepts, suggesting that a convergence between psychological and philosophical approaches to concepts is possible. An underlying theme is to stress that using a non-atomist account of concepts is crucial for the successful study of conceptual development and change
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://phonline.org/paper.php?keynum=930
  http://www.ualberta.ca/~brigandt/SPP_ESPP.pdf
  http://cogprints.org/3576/1/SPP_ESPP_Brigandt.pdf
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00003576/
  http://cogprints.org/3576/01/SPP_ESPP_Brigandt.pdf
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00003576/01/SPP_ESPP_Brigandt.pdf
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?id=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:3576
  
• J. L. Dowell (2006). Making it totally explicit.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ajol.info/viewarticle.php?jid=190&id=28213&layout=abstract
  
• Jerry A. Fodor & Ernest LePore (1991). Why meaning (probably) isn't conceptual role.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: It's an achievement of the last couple of decades that people who work in linguistic semantics and people who work in the philosophy of language have arrived at a friendly, de facto agreement as to their respective job descriptions. The terms of this agreement are that the semanticists do the work and the philosophers do the worrying. The semanticists try to construct actual theories of meaning (or truth theories, or model theories, or whatever) for one or another kind of expression in one or another natural language; for example, they try to figure out how the temperature could be rising compatibly with the substitutivity of identicals. The philosophers, by contrast, keep an eye on the large, foundational issues, such as: what's the relation between sense and denotation; what's the relation between thought and language; whether translation is determinate; and whether life is like a fountain. Every now and then the philosophers and the semanticists are supposed to get together and compare notes on their respective progress. Or lack thereof
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://ruccs.rutgers.edu/pub/papers/WhyMeaning.pdf
  http://ruccs.rutgers.edu/faculty/lepore/WhyMeaning.html
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-0017.1991.tb00260.x
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=1533-6077(1993)3<15:WM(ICR>2.0.CO;2-D
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=1533-6077(1993)3<15:WM(ICR>2.0.CO;2-D
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/1522936.pdf
  
• Mark Greenberg & Gilbert Harman (2007). Conceptual role semantics.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: CRS says that the meanings of expressions of a language or other symbol system or the contents of mental states are determined and explained by the way symbols are used in thinking. According to CRS one
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.princeton.edu/~harman/Papers/CRS.pdf
  http://repositories.cdlib.org/uclalaw/plltwps/5-16
  http://repositories.cdlib.org/uclalaw/plltwps/5-16/
  http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=800187
  
• Steven Gross (ms). Review of Brandom's Articulating Reasons.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: There is nothing in [the six chapters that make up the body of Articulating Reasons] that will come as a surprise to anyone who has mastered [Making It Explicit]. … I had in mind audiences that had perhaps not so much as dipped into the big book but were curious about its themes and philosophical consequences. (35–36)
• Gilbert Harman (1982). Conceptual role semantics.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.projecteuclid.org/Dienst/UI/1.0/Display/euclid.ndjfl/1093883628
  http://www.projecteuclid.org/DPubS/Repository/1.0/Disseminate?handle=euclid.ndjfl/1093883628&view=body&content-type=pdf_1
  
• Gilbert Harman (1987). (Nonsolipsistic) conceptual role semantics.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/oso/22848/1999/00000001/00000001/art00016
  
• Steven Horst (ms). Goldilocks searches for a conceptual semantics.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This is a relatively breezy version of an exploration of some issues about how to provide a theory of concepts and conceptual semantics. I have also written more conventional versions of some of this material (without the Three Bears motif), though those are set in a broader context.
• Mark Eli Kalderon (2001). Reasoning and representing.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://markelikalderon.com/wp-content/uploads/2006/09/rr.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/u5286534982v0317/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=333698&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/U5286534982V0317.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/phil/2001/00000105/00000002/00333698
  
• Daniel Laurier (2005). Pragmatics, pittsburgh style.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/jbp/pc/2005/00000013/00000001/art00010
  
• Brian Loar (1982). Conceptual role and truth conditions.   (More)
• Barry M. Loewer (1982). The role of 'conceptual role semantics'.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://projecteuclid.org/Dienst/Repository/1.0/Disseminate/euclid.ndjfl/1093870090/body/pdf
  http://www.projecteuclid.org/DPubS/Repository/1.0/Disseminate?handle=euclid.ndjfl/1093870090&view=body&content-type=pdf_1
  
• Mark McCullagh (2005). Inferentialism and singular reference.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Basic to Robert Brandom’s project in Making It Explicit is the demarcation of singular terms according to the structure of their inferential roles---rather than, as is usual, according to the kinds of things they purport to denote. But the demarcational effort founders on the need to distinguish extensional and nonextensional occurrences of expressions in terms of inferential roles; the closest that an inferentialist can come to drawing that distinction is to discern degrees of extensionality, and that is not close enough. The general moral applies as well to “two factor” theories of content: the notion of inferential role lacks the independence from the notion of denotation that many proponents of such theories have attributed to it.
• Mark McCullagh (2005). Motivating inferentialism.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Robert Brandom has supported his inferentialist conception of semantic content by appealing to the claim that it is a necessary condition on having a propositional attitude that one appreciate the inferential relations it stands in. When we see what considerations can be given in support of that claim, however, we see that it doesn’t even motivate an inferentialist semantics. The problem is that that claim about what it takes to have a propositional attitude does nothing to show that its inferential relations are a feature of its content rather than of the relation that the subject stands in to that content---that is, the attitude.
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.uoguelph.ca/~mmcculla/papers/mi.pdf
  
• John McDowell (2005). Motivating inferentialism: Comments on making it explicit (ch. 2).   (More)
• Carlo Penco (forthcoming). Truth, charity and assertion.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In this paper I discuss the relation between truth and assertion, starting from an example by Leonard Linsky which has been used in the debate on definite description by Keith Donnellan and Saul Kripke. To treat the problem of the referential use of definite descriptions we need not only to take into account the contest of utterance, but also the context of reception, or the cognitive context. If the cognitive context is given the right relevance we may even accept the possibility to speak of "pragmatic ambiguity" as Donnellan did. However I will not give a definite answer to the debate between Donnellan and Kripke, but I will try to show that there is a moral to be drawn by the discussion: it is advisable to use truth attribution in a charitable way if we want to entertain conversation with people who have beliefs not necessarily similar to ours.
• Jaroslav Peregrin, Inferentialism and the compositionality of meaning.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Inferentialism, which I am going to present in detail in the following sections, is the view that meanings are, roughly, roles that are acquired by types of sounds and inscriptions in virtue of their being treated according to rules of our language games, roughly in the sense in which wooden pieces acquire certain roles by being treated according the rules of chess. The most important consequences are that (i) a meaning is not an object labeled (stood for, represented ...) by an expression; and that (ii) meaning is normative in the sense that to say that an expression means thus and so is to say that it should be used so and so. The founding father of inferentialism is Brandom (1994; 2000). (However, nothing in this paper hinges on the fact that the version of inferentialism defended here is identical with Brandom's). This position provokes two kinds of objections. First there are general objections towards the very normativity of meaning, which do not target especially inferentialism; these I have addressed elsewhere 1. Besides this, there are objection targeted more specifically at inferentialism. Probably the most discussed specimen of such objections is the objection - repeatedly raised especially by Jerry Fodor and Ernest LePore and others - to the effect that though meanings should be compositional, the compositionality of inferential roles is unattainable. This is the kind of objection I am going to deal with here 2. (Hand in hand with this objection then go various allegations of circularity of inferentialism, which we will also discuss.) To do this, I will exploit the long-standing comparison of language to chess, as it seems particularly helpful for making the inferentialist account of language plausible3. This comparison, to be sure, has its limits beyond which it may become severely misleading; but as long as we keep them in mind, it can serve us very well
• Mark Perlman (1997). The trouble with two-factor conceptual role theories.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.csa.com/partners/viewrecord.php?requester=gs&collection=TRD&recid=316237CI
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/l27w078265k67058/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=135593&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/L27W078265K67058.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/mind/1997/00000007/00000004/00135593
  
• Susanna Schellenberg (2006). Sellarsian perspectives on perception and non-conceptual content.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://rsss.anu.edu.au/~susanna/SchellenbergSellarsPerceptionNonConceptualContent.pdf
  
• Susanna Schellenberg (2000). Begriff, gehalt, folgerung.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://rsss.anu.edu.au/~susanna/SchellenbergBegriffGehaltFolgerung.pdf
  
• Daniel Whiting (online). Conceptual role semantics.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.iep.utm.edu/c/conc-rol.htm
  
• Robert Williams (2008). The price of inscrutability.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.personal.leeds.ac.uk/~phljrgw/wip/thepriceofinscrutability.pdf
  http://www.personal.leeds.ac.uk/~phljrgw/wip/REVISEDvaliditityinscrutabilitycontextshorter.pdf
  http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/121540976/PDFSTART
  
• Daniel J. Whiting (2008). Conservatives and racists: Inferential role semantics and pejoratives.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract:  According to inferential role semantics (IRS), for any given expression to possess a particular meaning one must be disposed to make or, alternatively, acknowledge as correct certain inferential transitions involving it. As Williamson points out, pejoratives such as ‘Boche’ seem to provide a counter-example to IRS. Many speakers are neither disposed to use such expressions nor consider it proper to do so. But it does not follow, as IRS appears to entail, that such speakers do not understand pejoratives or that they lack meaning. In this paper, I examine recent responses to this problem by Boghossian and Brandom and argue that their proposed construal of the kind of inferential rules governing a pejorative such as ‘Boche’ is to be ruled out on the grounds that it is non-conservative. I defend the appeal to conservatism in this instance against criticism and, in doing so, propose an alternative approach to pejoratives on behalf of IRS that resolves the problem Williamson poses
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/t7705336hq756437/fulltext.pdf
  
• Daniel Whiting (2007). Inferentialism, representationalism and derogatory words.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In a recent paper, after outlining various distinguishing features of derogatory words, Jennifer Hornsby suggests that the phenomenon raises serious difficulties for inferentialism. Against Hornsby, I claim that derogatory words do not pose any insuperable problems for inferentialism, so long as it is supplemented with apparatus borrowed from Grice and Hare. Moreover, I argue, derogatory expressions pose difficulties for Hornsby's favoured alternative theory of meaning, representationalism, unless it too is conjoined with a similar Grice/Hare mechanism. So, the upshot of the discussion is that, contra Hornsby, focus on derogatory expressions alone does not provide grounds for deciding between competing theories of meaning, but nevertheless serves to highlight important features that any such theory must acknowledge and incorporate
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/./ftinterface~content=a780387795~fulltext=713240930
  http://www.informaworld.com/index/780387795.pdf
  

Interpretivist Accounts of Meaning and Content

• Kristin Andrews (2002). Interpreting autism: A critique of Davidson on thought and language.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Donald Davidson's account of interpretation purports to be a priori , though I argue that the empirical facts about interpretation, theory of mind, and autism must be considered when examining the merits of Davidson's view. Developmental psychologists have made plausible claims about the existence of some people with autism who use language but who are unable to interpret the minds of others. This empirical claim undermines Davidson's theoretical claims that all speakers must be interpreters of other speakers and that one need not be a speaker in order to be a thinker. The falsity of these theses has consequences for other parts of Davidson's world-view; for example, it undermines his argument against animal thought
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/./ftinterface~content=a713690571~fulltext=713240930
  http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/index/XTGFKTEJAJKD885J.pdf
  http://www.informaworld.com/index/XTGFKTEJAJKD885J.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/routledg/cphp/2002/00000015/00000003/art00005
  http://www.yorku.ca/andrewsk/andrews/PHILO%20PSYCH%20-%20OCR.pdf
  
• Alex Byrne (1998). Interpretivism.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In the writings of Daniel Dennett and Donald Davidson we find something like the following bold conjecture: it is an a priori truth that there is no gap between our best judgements of a subject's beliefs and desires and the truth about the subject's beliefs and desires. Under ideal conditions a subject's belief-box and desire-box become transparent
• H. G. Callaway (1985). Meaning without Analyticity (Reprinted in Callaway, 2008 Meaning without Analyticity).   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In a series of interesting and influential papers on semantics, Hilary Putnam has developed what he calls a “post-verificationist” theory of meaning. As part of this work, and not I think the most important part, Putnam defends a limited version of the analytic-synthetic distinction. In this paper I will survey and evaluate Putnam’s defense of analyticity and explore its relationship to broader concerns in semantics. Putnam’s defense of analyticity ultimately fails, and I want to show here exactly why it fails. However, I will also argue that this very failure helps open the prospect of a new optimism concerning the theory of meaning, a theory of meaning finally liberated from the dead weight of the notions of analyticity and necessary truth. Putnam’s work, in fact, makes valuable contributions to such a theory.
• H. G. Callaway & J. van Brakel (1996). No Need to Speak the same Language? Review of Ramberg, Donald Davidson's Philosophy of Language.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The book is an “introductory” reconstruction of Davidson on interpretation —a claim to be taken with a grain of salt. Writing introductory books has become an idol of the tribe. This is a concise book and reflects much study. It has many virtues along with some flaws. Ramberg assembles themes and puzzles from Davidson into a more or less coherent viewpoint. A special virtue is the innovative treatment of incommensurability and of the relation of Davidson’s work to hermeneutic themes. The weakness comes in a certain unevenness. While generally convincing and well written, the book has low points which may leave the reader confused or unconvinced. Davidson is the hero in this book, and our hero is sometimes over idealized.
• Jerry A. Fodor (1993). Is radical interpretation possible?   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=1520-8583(1994)8<101:IRIP>2.0.CO;2-P
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=1520-8583(1994)8<101:IRIP>2.0.CO;2-P
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2214165.pdf
  
• Jerry A. Fodor & Ernest LePore (1994). Is radical interpretation possible?   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=1520-8583(1994)8<101:IRIP>2.0.CO;2-P
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=1520-8583(1994)8<101:IRIP>2.0.CO;2-P
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2214165.pdf
  
• Gl (2006). Triangulation.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language, ed. E. Lepore/B. Smith, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2006, 1006-1019
• John R. Cook (2009). Is Davidson a Gricean?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In his recent collection of essays, Language, Truth and History (2005), Donald Davidson appears to endorse a philosophy of language which gives primary importance to the notion of the speaker’s communicative intentions, a perspective on language not too dissimilar from that of Paul Grice. If that is right, then this would mark a major shift from the formal semanticist approach articulated and defended by Davidson in his Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (1984). In this paper, I argue that although there are many similarities between these two thinkers, Davidson has not abandoned his earlier views on language
• Henry Jackman (1996). Radical interpretation and the permutation principle.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/k411352477274001/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/K411352477274001.pdf
  
• Uriah Kriegel (forthcoming). Cognitive Phenomenology as the Basis of Unconscious Content.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Since the seventies, it has been customary to assume that intentionality is independent of consciousness. Recently, a number of philosophers have rejected this assumption, claiming intentionality is closely tied to consciousness, inasmuch as non- conscious intentionality in some sense depends upon conscious intentionality. Within this alternative framework, the question arises of how to account for unconscious intentionality, and different authors have offered different accounts. In this paper, I compare and contrast four possible accounts of unconscious intentionality, which I call potentialism, inferentialism, eliminativism, and interpretivism. The first three are the leading accounts in the existing literature, while the fourth is my own proposal, which I argue to be superior. I then argue that an upshot of interpretivism is that all unconscious intentionality is ultimately grounded is a specific kind of cognitive phenomenology.
• Daniel Laurier (2001). Non-conceptually contentful attitudes in interpretation.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ifs.csic.es/sorites/Issue_13/laurier.htm
  http://www.ifs.csic.es/sorites/Issue_13/sorites13.pdf#page=8
  
• B. Ramberg (2004). Naturalizing idealizations: Pragmatism and the interpretivist strategy.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/rodopi/cpm/2004/00000001/00000002/art00001
  
• Barry C. Smith (2006). Davidson, interpretation and first-person constraints on meaning.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: International Journal of Philosophical Studies 0967-2559 (print)/1466-4542 (online) Original Article
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.informaworld.com/index/757927671.pdf
  
• Robert Williams (2008). The price of inscrutability.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.personal.leeds.ac.uk/~phljrgw/wip/thepriceofinscrutability.pdf
  http://www.personal.leeds.ac.uk/~phljrgw/wip/REVISEDvaliditityinscrutabilitycontextshorter.pdf
  http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/121540976/PDFSTART
  
• J. Robert G. Williams (2007). Eligibility and inscrutability.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Inscrutability arguments threaten to reduce interpretationist metasemantic theories to absurdity. Can we find some way to block the arguments? A highly influential proposal in this regard is David Lewis’ ‘eligibility’ response: some theories are better than others, not because they fit the data better, but because they are framed in terms of more natural properties. The purposes of this paper are (1) to outline the nature of the eligibility proposal, making the case that it is not ad hoc, but instead flows naturally from three independently motivated elements; and (2) to show that severe limitations afflict the proposal. In conclusion, I pick out the element of the eligibility response that is responsible for the limitations: future work in this area should therefore concentrate on amending this aspect of the overall theory
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.personal.leeds.ac.uk/~phljrgw/JRGWilliamsPhilRevEligibilityInscrutability.pdf
  http://philreview.dukejournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/3/361
  
• Robert Williams (2008). Gavagai again.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Quine (1960, Word and object. Cambridge, Mass.:MIT Press, ch. 2) claims that there are a variety of equally good schemes for translating or interpreting ordinary talk. ‘Rabbit’ might be taken to divide its reference over rabbits, over temporal slices of rabbits, or undetached parts of rabbits, without significantly affecting which sentences get classified as true and which as false. This is the basis of his famous ‘argument from below’ to the conclusion that there can be no fact of the matter as to how reference is to be divided. Putative counterexamples to Quine’s claim have been put forward in the past (see especially Evans 1975; 1975, Journal of Philosophy, LXXII(13), 343–362. Reprinted in McDowell (Ed.), Gareth Evans: Collected papers. Oxford: Clarendon Press.), and various patches have been suggested (e.g. Wright (1997, The indeterminacy of translation. In C. Wright & B. Hale (Eds.), A companion to the philosophy of language (pp. 397–426). Oxford: Blackwell)). One lacuna in this literature is that one does not find any detailed presentation of what exactly these interpretations are supposed to be. Drawing on contemporary literature on persistence, the present paper sets out detailed semantic treatments for fragments of English, whereby predicates such as ‘rabbit’ divide their reference over four-dimensional continuants (Quine’s rabbits), instantaneous temporal slices of those continuants (Quine’s rabbit-slices) and the simple elements which compose those slices (undetached rabbit parts) respectively. Once we have the systematic interpretations on the table, we can get to work evaluating them
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.personal.leeds.ac.uk/~phljrgw/wip/GavagaiAgain.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/h8g71342118740k6/fulltext.pdf
  
• J. Robert G. Williams (2008). Permutations and Foster problems: Two puzzles or one?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: How are permutation arguments for the inscrutability of reference to be formulated in the context of a Davidsonian truth-theoretic semantics? Davidson (1979) takes these arguments to establish that there are no grounds for favouring a reference scheme that assigns London to “Londres”, rather than one that assigns Sydney to that name. We shall see, however, that it is far from clear whether permutation arguments work when set out in the context of the kind of truth-theoretic semantics which Davidson favours. The principle required to make the argument work allows us to resurrect Foster problems against the Davidsonian position. The Foster problems and the permutation inscrutability problems stand or fall together: they are one puzzle, not two
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.personal.leeds.ac.uk/~phljrgw/wip/Twopuzzlesorone.pdf
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-9329.2007.00387.x
  http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/119395804/PDFSTART
  

Naturalizing Mental Content, Misc

• Kenneth Aizawa & Frederick R. Adams (2005). Defending non-derived content.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://personal.centenary.edu/~kaizawa/Defending Nonderived Content (Blind).doc
  http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/./ftinterface~content=a727334011~fulltext=713240930
  http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/index/J44785163TH56N18.pdf
  http://www.informaworld.com/index/727334011.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/routledg/cphp/2005/00000018/00000006/art00001
  
• Mark Alfano (forthcoming). Nietzsche, naturalism, and the tenacity of the intentional.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche demands that “psychology shall be recognized again as the queen of the sciences.” While one might cast a dubious glance at the “again,” many of Nietzsche’s insights were indeed psychological, and many of his arguments invoke psychological premises. In Genealogy, he criticizes the “English psychologists” for the “inherent psychological absurdity” of their theory of the origin of good and bad, pointing out the implausibility of the claim that the utility of unegoistic actions would be forgotten. Tabling whether this criticism is valid, we see Nietzsche’s methodological naturalism here: moral claims should be grounded in empirical psychological claims. Later in Genealogy, Nietzsche advances his own naturalistic account of the origins of good, bad, and evil. Three cheers for methodological naturalism, but it was not Nietzsche’s innovation, and he did not pioneer its application to morality. The list of moral naturalists who appealed to psychology arguably includes Aristotle, Descartes, Spinoza, Bentham, and Mill, among many others. If Nietzsche’s naturalism is to be worth the candle of contemporary scholarship, it must involve more than the methodological naturalism that predated him by centuries and to which he made no serious contribution. Nietzsche’s key contribution to naturalism is not his adherence to its methodology, but his discovery of certain psychological facts. In particular, he realized that mental states are not ordinary dyadic relations between a subject and an intentional content. Nietzsche discovered the tenacity of intentional states: when an intentional state loses its object (because the subject realizes the object does not exist, because the object is forbidden, or because of something else), a new object replaces the original; the state does not disappear entirely. As Nietzsche puts it Genealogy, “Man would rather will the void than be void of will.” Nietzsche relies on the tenacity thesis in his explanation of the origin of bad conscience: “All instincts that do not discharge themselves outwardly turn inward […. They turn] against [their] possessors.” When hostility towards others becomes impossible, hostility does not disappear; instead, its object is replaced.
• Peter Alward (2009). The inessential quasi-indexical.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: As Perry originally formulated things, the primary casualty of the problem of the essential indexical was the analysis of belief as a two-place relation between a subject and a proposition.1 Strictly speaking, of course, Perry argued that the problem he identified undermined the “doctrine of propositions” which consists of this analysis of belief together with the claims that the truth-values of propositions are independent of contextual parameters (other than worlds) and that propositions are individuated more finely than truth-conditions.2 But he went on to assert that the only adequate solution to the problem involved the rejection of the “propositional-relation” (let‟s call it) analysis of belief.3 The central aim of this paper is to defend a version of the propositional-relation analysis from Perry‟s criticisms
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://people.uleth.ca/~peter.alward/papers/inessential_quasi-indexical.htm
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/l046g72376292x20/fulltext.pdf
  
• Michael L. Anderson & Gregg H. Rosenberg (online). Content and action: The guidance theory of representation.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: b>. The current essay introduces the guidance theory of representation, according to which the content and intentionality of representations can be accounted for in terms of the way they provide guidance for action. The guidance theory offers a way of fixing representational content that gives the causal and evolutionary history of the subject only an indirect (non-necessary) role, and an account of representational error, based on failure of action, that does not rely on any such notions as proper functions, ideal conditions, or normal circumstances. Moreover, because the notion of error is defined in terms of failure of action, the guidance theory meets the
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.agcognition.org/papers/CNA.pdf
  http://www.cs.umd.edu/~anderson/papers/CNA.pdf
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00003953/
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?id=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:3953
  
• Andrew Brook & Robert J. Stainton (1997). Fodor's new theory of content and computation.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=Eq80HtunbIkC&oi=fnd&pg=PA86&ots=xjpvqDo6vs&sig=Ookx_sBmrrPL1DYMA2BfbmzClj4
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=0S3JeDO8I6sC&oi=fnd&pg=PA86&ots=5PBApzOgpi&sig=xj9ShFRT2gIzeTjgpvCObo4yuKw
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-0017.1997.tb00083.x
  http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/119154915/PDFSTART
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1468-0017.00057
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/mila/1997/00000012/F0020003/art00011
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/mila/1997/00000012/00000003/art00057
  
• Todd Buras (2009). An Argument against Causal Theories of Mental Content.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Some mental states are about themselves. Nothing is a cause of itself. So some mental states are not about their causes; they are about things distinct from their causes. If this argument is sound, it spells trouble for causal theories of mental content—the precise sort of trouble depending on the precise sort of causal theory. This paper shows that the argument is sound (§§1-3), and then spells out the trouble (§4).
• Mike Collins (2009). The Nature and Implementation of Representation in Biological Systems.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: I defend a theory of mental representation that satisfies naturalistic constraints. Briefly, we begin by distinguishing (i) what makes something a representation from (ii) given that a thing is a representation, what determines what it represents. Representations are states of biological organisms, so we should expect a unified theoretical framework for explaining both what it is to be a representation as well as what it is to be a heart or a kidney. I follow Millikan in explaining (i) in terms of teleofunction, explicated in terms of natural selection. To explain (ii), we begin by recognizing that representational states do not have content, that is, they are neither true nor false except insofar as they both “point to” or “refer” to something, as well as “say” something regarding whatever it is they are about. To distinguish veridical from false representations, there must be a way for these separate aspects to come apart; hence, we explain (ii) by providing independent theories of what I call f-reference and f-predication (the ‘f’ simply connotes ‘fundamental’, to distinguish these things from their natural language counterparts). Causal theories of representation typically founder on error, or on what Fodor has called the disjunction problem. Resemblance or isomorphism theories typically founder on what I’ve called the non-uniqueness problem, which is that isomorphisms and resemblance are practically unconstrained and so representational content cannot be uniquely determined. These traditional problems provide the motivation for my theory, the structural preservation theory, as follows. F-reference, like reference, is a specific, asymmetric relation, as is causation. F-predication, like predication, is a non-specific relation, as predicates typically apply to many things, just as many relational systems can be isomorphic to any given relational system. Putting these observations together, a promising strategy is to explain f-reference via causal history and f-predication via something like isomorphism between relational systems. This dissertation should be conceptualized as having three parts. After motivating and characterizing the problem in chapter 1, the first part is the negative project, where I review and critique Dretske’s, Fodor’s, and Millikan’s theories in chapters 2-4. Second, I construct my theory about the nature of representation in chapter 5 and defend it from objections in chapter 6. In chapters 7-8, which constitute the third and final part, I address the question of how representation is implemented in biological systems. In chapter 7 I argue that single-cell intracortical recordings taken from awake Macaque monkeys performing a cognitive task provide empirical evidence for structural preservation theory, and in chapter 8 I use the empirical results to illustrate, clarify, and refine the theory.
• Robert E. Cummins (2002). Haugeland on representation and intentionality.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Haugeland doesn’t have what I would call a theory of mental representation. Indeed, it isn’t clear that he believes there is such a thing. But he does have a theory of intentionality and a correlative theory of objectivity, and it is this material that I will be discussing in what follows. It will facilitate the discussion that follows to have at hand some distinctions and accompanying terminology I introduced in Representations, Targets and Attitudes (Cummins, 1996; RTA hereafter). Couching the discussion in these terms will, I hope, help to identify points of agreement and disagreement between Haugaland and myself. In RTA, I distinguished between the target a representation has on a given occasion of its application, and its content. RTA takes representation deployment to be the business of intenders: mechanisms whose business it is to represent some particular class of targets. Thus, on standard stories about speech perception, there is a mechanism (called a parser) whose business it is to represent the phrase structure of the linguistic input currently being processed. When this intender passes a representation R to the consumers of its products, those consumers will take R to be a representation of the phrase structure of the current input. There is no explicit vocabulary to mark the target-content distinction in ordinary language. Expressions like "what I referred to," "what I meant," and the like, are ambiguous. Sometimes they mean targets, sometimes contents. Consider the following dialogue
• Daniel C. Dennett (2001). Intentionality.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Intentionality is _aboutness_. Some things are about other things: a belief can be about icebergs, but an iceberg is not about anything; an idea can be about the number 7, but the number 7 is not about anything; a book or a film can be about Paris, but Paris is not about anything. Philosophers have long been concerned with the analysis of the phenomenon of intentionality, which has seemed to many to be a fundamental feature of mental states and events
• Chris Eliasmith (2000). How Neurons Mean: A Neurocomputational Theory of Representational Content.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Questions concerning the nature of representation and what representations are about have been a staple of Western philosophy since Aristotle. Recently, these same questions have begun to concern neuroscientists, who have developed new techniques and theories for understanding how the locus of neurobiological representation, the brain, operates. My dissertation draws on philosophy and neuroscience to develop a novel theory of representational content
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blutner.de/philom/repres/Eliasmith_How neurons mean.pdf
  http://watarts.uwaterloo.ca/~celiasmi/Papers/Eliasmith.2000.How neurons mean.PhD.pdf
  http://www.arts.uwaterloo.ca/~celiasmi/Papers/Eliasmith.2000.How neurons mean.PhD.pdf
  
• Hartry Field (1994). Deflationist views of meaning and content.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0026-4423(199407)2:103:411<249:DVOMAC>2.0.CO;2-#
  http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/103/411/249.pdf
  http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/103/411/249
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2253740.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/oso/80566/2001/00000001/00000001/art00005
  
• Justin C. Fisher (online). Representational content and the keys to success.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: I consider the question of whether success-linked theories of content
• Don Garrett (2006). Hume's naturalistic theory of representation.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Hume is a naturalist in many different respects and about many different topics; this paper argues that he is also a naturalist about intentionality and representation. It does so in the course of answering four questions about his theory of mental representation: (1) Which perceptions represent? (2) What can perceptions represent? (3) Why do perceptions represent at all? (4) Howdo perceptions represent what they do? It appears that, for Hume, all perceptions except passions can represent; and they can represent bodies, minds, and persons, with their various qualities. In addition, ideas can represent impressions and other ideas. However, he explicitly rejects the view that ideas are inherently representational, and he implicitly adopts a view according to which things (whether mental or non-mental) represent in virtue of playing, through the production of mental effects and dispositions, a significant part of the causal and/or functional role of what they represent. It is in virtue of their particular functional roles that qualitatively identical ideas are capable of representing particulars or general kinds; substances or modes; relations; past, present, or future; and individuals or compounds
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/13974731148146R4.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/synt/2006/00000152/00000003/00009007
  
• Mark Greenberg (2005). A new map of theories of mental content.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://repositories.cdlib.org/uclalaw/plltwps/5-14
  http://repositories.cdlib.org/uclalaw/plltwps/5-14/
  http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=795726
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1533-6077.2005.00068.x
  http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/120710717/PDFSTART
  
• Steven Gross, The nature of semantics: On Jackendoff's arguments.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Jackendoff defends a mentalist approach to semantics that investigates con- ceptual structures in the mind/brain and their interfaces with other structures, including specifically linguistic structures responsible for syntactic and phono- logical competence. He contrasts this approach with one that seeks to charac- terize the intentional relations between expressions and objects in the world. The latter, he argues, cannot be reconciled with mentalism. He objects in par- ticular that intentionality cannot be naturalized and that the relevant notion of object is suspect. I critically discuss these objections, arguing in part that Jackendoff’s position rests on questionable philosophical assumptions
• Henry Jackman (online). Conventionalism, objectivity, and constitution.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: John Haugeland has recently attempted to provide a naturalistic account of intentionality that explains how we can (collectively) misidentify objects in the world in terms of the interplay of two types of 'recognitional' skill. Nevertheless, it is argued here that his inegalitarian conception of the two sorts of skill leaves him with a quasi-conventionalist account of our relation to the world which lacks the more robust sort of objectivity that a more holistic theory could provide
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.yorku.ca/hjackman/papers/Haugeland.pdf
  http://www.yorku.ca/hjackman/papers/haugeland.html
  
• Henry Jackman (1998). James' pragmatic account of intentionality and truth.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: William James presents a preference-sensitive and future-directed notion of truth that has struck many as wildly revisionary. This paper argues that such a reaction usually results from failing to see how his accounts of truth and intentionality are intertwined. James' forward-looking account of intentionality (or "knowing") compares favorably the 'causal' and 'resemblance-driven' accounts that have been popular since his day, and it is only when his remarks about truth are placed in the context of his account of intentionality that they come to seem as plausible as they manifestly did to James
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.yorku.ca/hjackman/papers/James-int-truth.pdf
  http://www.yorku.ca/hjackman/papers/James-int-truth.html
  
• Barry M. Loewer (1997). A guide to naturalizing semantics.   (More)
• Gregg H. Rosenberg & Michael L. Anderson, A brief introduction to the guidance theory of representation.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Recent trends in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science can be fruitfully characterized as part of the ongoing attempt to come to grips with the very idea of homo sapiens--an intelligent, evolved, biological agent--and its signature contribution is the emergence of a philosophical anthropology which, contra Descartes and his thinking thing, instead puts doing at the center of human being. Applying this agency-oriented line of thinking to the problem of representation, this paper introduces the Guidance Theory, according to which the content and intentionality of representations can be accounted for in terms of the way they provide guidance for action. We offer a brief account of the motivation for the theory, and a formal characterization
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/3952/1/CNA_cogsci04.pdf
  http://cogprints.org/3952/01/CNA_cogsci04.pdf
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00003952/
  http://www.cs.umd.edu/~anderson/papers/CNA_cogsci04.pdf
  http://www.cogsci.northwestern.edu/cogsci2004/papers/paper122.pdf
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00003952/01/CNA_cogsci04.pdf
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?id=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:3952
  
• Dan Ryder (2006). On thinking of kinds: A neuroscientific perspective.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://homepage.mac.com/ancientportraits/drsite/representingkinds.pdf
  
• Dan Ryder (2004). SINBaD neurosemantics: A theory of mental representation.   (More)
• Dan Ryder (ms). The brain as a model-making machine.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/660673.html
  http://homepage.mac.com/ancientportraits/drsite/models.pdf
  
• Lawrence A. Shapiro (1997). The nature of nature: Rethinking naturalistic theories of intentionality.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: While there is controversy over which of several naturalistic theories of the mental is most plausible, there is consensus regarding the desideratum of a naturalistically respectable theory. A naturalistic theory of the mental, it is agreed, must explicate representation in nonintentional terms. I argue that this constraint does not get at the heart of what it is to be natural. On the one hand, it fails to provide us with a meaningful distinction between the natural and the unnatural. On the other hand, it unfairly suggests that we withhold judgment on those successes our sciences of the mind have already achieved until a convincing decomposition of the mental is available. I urge a new conception of naturalism that focuses less upon ontological considerations and more upon methodological ones
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/./ftinterface~content=a793922691~fulltext=713240930
  
• Liza Skidelsky (2003). Mental content: Many semantics, one single project.   (More)
• Kenneth A. Taylor (2003). Toward a naturalistic theory of rational intentionality.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This essay some first steps toward the naturalization of what I call rational intentionality or alternatively type II intentionality. By rational or type II intentionality, I mean that full combination of rational powers and content-bearing states that is paradigmatically enjoyed by mature intact human beings. The problem I set myself is to determine the extent to which the only currently extant approach to the naturalization of the intentional that has the singular virtue of not being a non-starter can be aggregated up into an account of rational intentionality. I have in mind a broadly defined family of accounts whose main members are the indicator/information-theoretic approach of Dretske (1988), the asymmetric dependence theory of Jerry Fodor (1987, 1990, 1994) and the teleo-semantics of Ruth Millikan (1984, 1993). Somewhat inaccurately, I will call this family of approaches the information-theoretic family. To be sure, there is only a rough family resemblance among the members of the information-theoretic family. Indeed, several intense quarrels divide the members of that family one from another, but the precise outcome of those internecine struggles is not directly relevant to the aims of this essay.² Taken collectively, the information-theoretic family yields a compelling picture of the place of at least a crude form of intentionality -- what I call frog-like or type I intentionality -- in the natural order. Though frog-like or type I intentionality is, I think, a genuine species of intentionality, it may subsist in the absence of rational powers. It is that species of intentionality enjoyed by irritable creatures who, following Brandom (1994)
• Matthew Usher (2004). Comment on Ryder's SINBAD neurosemantics: Is teleofunction isomorphism the way to understand representations?   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.bbk.ac.uk/psyc/staff/academic/musher/documents/06_mila_006.pdf
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/j.1468-0017.2004.00256.x
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-0017.2004.00256.x
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/mila/2004/00000019/00000002/art00006
  

The Nature of Contents

Fregean and Russellian Contents

Indexical Contents

• Kent Bach (ms). Content, indexical.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: it is red. What enables this thought to latch onto that particular object? It cannot be how the Ferrari looks, for this could not distinguish one Ferrari from another just like it. In general, how a thought represents something cannot determine which thing it represents. What a singular thought latches onto seems to depend also on features of the context in which the thought occurs. This suggests that its content is essentially indexical, contextually variable much as the content of an utterance like 'I am hungry' depends on who utters it and when (see DEMONSTRATIVES AND INDEXICALS ). The indexical model of singular thought is not limited to thoughts about individuals one perceives, like the Ferrari driving by, but applies also to thoughts about individuals one remembers or has been informed of, like an old bicycle or Christopher Columbus. In each case, a certain contextual relation, based on perception, memory, or communication, connects thought to object
• Andy Egan (ms). De gustibus non disputandum est (at least, not always).   (More)
• Eros Corazza (2004). Essential indexicals and quasi-indicators.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In this paper I shall focus on Castaneda's notion of quasi-indicators and I shall defend the following theses: (i) Essential indexicals (‘I’, ‘here’ and ‘now’) are intrinsically perspectival mechanisms of reference and, as such, they are not reducible to any other mechanism reference...
• Tomis Kapitan (1999). Quasi-indexical attitudes.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Indexicals are inevitably autobiographical, even when we are not talking about ourselves. For example, if you hear me say, "That portrait right there is beautiful," you can surmise not only that I ascribe beauty to an object of my immediate awareness but also something about my spatial relation to it. Again, if I praise you directly within earshot of others by using the words, "You did that very well!," my concern need not be to cause them to think the exact thought I have; they might not be in a position to address you as you and I might not care what they think of your performance. My purpose is to get them to ascribe to me an attitude that I express with a second-person indexical, to convince them that I am an encouraging and supportive person inasmuch as I addressed someone with words of praise. Indexicals are autobiographical not only because they issue from a speaker--all utterances do--but because they reveal something about the speaker's orientation toward and encounter with objects in a way that non-indexical language fails to do. For this reason, care must be taken in reporting indexically-expressed thoughts. Suppose the Chair of my Department informs me, (1)I am upset about the Dean's report. I cannot relate what he said by reiterating his words within indirect discourse, viz., (2)The Chair said that I am upset about the Dean's report. Because 'I' expresses speaker's reference, my assertion of (2) would cause a hearer to misconstrue who is said to be upset.i Alternatively, the sentence, (3)The Chair said that the Chair is upset about the Dean's report
• John Perry (ms). Self-notions.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: ”Self-beliefs” are beliefs of the sort one ordinarily has about oneself, and expresses with the first person. These contrast with the beliefs one has in ”Casta˜neda cases,” in which one has a belief about oneself without knowing it. This paper advances an account of the nature of self-belief. According to this account, self-belief is a special case of interacting with things via notions that serve as repositories for information about objects with certain important relations to the knower, and as motivators for actions the success of which is dependent on the object in that relation to the agent. Identity is such a relation, and ”self-notions” play this special role: they are the repositories for information gained in normally self-informative ways, and the motivators of types of action whose success normally depends on facts about the agent. Self-beliefs involve such self-notions, while the beliefs that one has about oneself in Casta˜neda cases do not
• John Perry (1979). The problem of the essential indexical.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=QOiStM9IBkYC&oi=fnd&pg=PA3&ots=yGP_M9DfXx&sig=kAZLumVvLPjOIvxWTCedwM9nc_4
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=QOiStM9IBkYC&oi=fnd&pg=PA3&ots=yGP-N7DkWw&sig=lmtE-PvpT0rurhp7TrOnau11Nzs
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=QOiStM9IBkYC&oi=fnd&pg=PA3&ots=yGO1ScyfWx&sig=DqDQIPwfB8rAemES7BVY9eKBCiA
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=QOiStM9IBkYC&oi=fnd&pg=PA3&ots=yGO1UazlRA&sig=fFVm8ShKr7-x8ilTe8mQ2zLlEyM
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0029-4624(197903)13:1<3:TPOTEI>2.0.CO;2-F
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0029-4624(197903)13:1<3:TPOTEI>2.0.CO;2-F
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2214792.pdf
  
• Cara Spencer (ms). Is there a problem of the essential indexical?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Some time ago, John Perry argued that the content of an indexical belief, that is, a belief expressible with a sentence containing an indexical or demonstrative, cannot be a proposition. I consider several of his arguments for this view, and show that they can be extended to show that belief expressible with other non-indexical expressions such as natural kind terms and proper names presents the very same problem for the traditional picture. I then suggest that if indexical belief has any special status, this is not because it has a special kind of content, but rather because action is impossible if agents do not have indexical belief
• Cara Spencer (ms). Shared indexical belief.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In this paper, I take issue with the familiar view that the problem of the essential indexical is a merely technical problem, which can be solved through a straightforward revision of the familiar model of belief content. (The familiar model just says that the content of belief is a proposition.) I do not object to these technical fixes, but I think they leave some questions unanswered. Specifically, they deny us an attractive account of what it is for different people to completely agree on their conception of what the world is like, according to which complete agreement consists in having beliefs with the same propositional content, but they do not give us anything to replace it with. Here, I consider whether we can say anything general about the relation between my beliefs and your beliefs (including, of course, our indexical beliefs), when you and I completely agree about what the world is like
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://caraspencer.net/Cara_Spencer/Online_Papers_I_files/index_belief.pdf
  

Intentional Objects

• Ben Blumson (2009). Images, intentionality and inexistence.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: forthcoming in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/122683657/PDFSTART
  
• Tim Crane (2006). Brentano's concept of intentional inexistence.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Franz Brentano’s attempt to distinguish mental from physical phenomena by employing the scholastic concept of intentional inexistence is often cited as reintroducing the concept of intentionality into mainstream philosophical discussion. But Brentano’s own claims about intentional inexistence are much misunderstood. In the second half of the 20th century, analytical philosophers in particular have misread Brentano’s views in misleading ways.1 It is important to correct these misunderstandings if we are to come to a proper assessment of Brentano’s worth as a philosopher and his position in the history of philosophy. Good corrections have been made in the recent analytic literature by David Bell (1990), Dermot Moran (1996), and Barry Smith (1994) among others. But there is also another, more purely philosophical lesson to be learned from the proper understanding of Brentano’s views on this matter. This is that Brentano’s struggles with the concept of intentionality reveal a fundamental division between different ways of thinking about intentionality, an division which Brentano himself does not make fully clear. Making the nature of this division explicit is the aim of this paper
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.dur.ac.uk/richard.clarkson/Brentano's Concept of Intentional Inexistence - Crane.doc
  
• Tim Crane (2001). Intentional objects.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Is there, or should there be, any place in contemporary philosophy of mind for the concept of an intentional object? Many philosophers would make short work of this question. In a discussion of what intentional objects are supposed to be, John Searle
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://web.mac.com/cranetim/Tims_website/Online_papers_files/Intentional objects.pdf
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/1467-9329.00168/pdf
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1467-9329.00168
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/rati/2001/00000014/00000004/art00168
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/rati/2001/00000014/00000004/art00003
  
• Uriah Kriegel (2007). Intentional inexistence and phenomenal intentionality.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: How come we can represent Bigfoot even though Bigfoot does not exist, given that representing something involves bearing a relation to it and we cannot bear relations to what does not exist?This is the problem of intentional inexistence. This paper develops a two-step solution to this problem, involving (first) an adverbial account of conscious representation, or phenomenal inten- tionality, and (second) the thesis that all representation derives from conscious representation (all intentionality derives from phenomenal intentionality). The solution is correspondingly two-part: we can consciously represent Bigfoot because consciously representing Bigfoot does not involve bearing a relation to Bigfoot, but rather instantiating a certain non-relational (“adverbial”) property of representing Bigfoot-wise; and we can non-consciously represent Bigfoot because non-consciously representing Bigfoot does not involve bearing a relation to Bigfoot, but rather bearing a relation to conscious representations of Bigfoot
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1520-8583.2007.00129.x
  
• Uriah Kriegel (2008). The dispensability of (merely) intentional objects.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The ontology of (merely) intentional objects is a can of worms. If we can avoid ontological commitment to such entities, we should. In this paper, I offer a strategy for accomplishing that. This is to reject the traditional act-object account of intentionality in favor of an adverbial account. According to adverbialism about intentionality, having a dragon thought is not a matter of bearing the thinking-about relation to dragons, but of engaging in the activity of thinking dragon-wise
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/pt717817t08q60m6/fulltext.pdf
  
• Alberto Voltolini (1991). Objects as intentional and real.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In a recent paper, G. Küng has maintained that in addition to what he considers the three standard theories concerning the relationship between an intentional and a "corresponding" real object, a case might be made for a fourth. According to this new theory, the intentional and the real object are simply one and the same thing, in the sense that should it exist, the intentional object is the real object1. In this paper, I hope to show that Küng is right when he says that this theory is preferable to the others, because of its greater explanatory power and because it avoids the perplexities which those theories give rise to. I hold, however, that the thesis of the identity of the intentional and the real object stands in fundamental need of being completed to make it really convincing. Indeed, an objection to it immediately comes to mind: how is it possible for an intentional object - something apparently mental or subjective - to be identical with a real one, generally considered mindindependent or objective? I think that it is only through an appropriate ontological move that a definite answer to this problem may be provided. In actual fact, Küng attempts to support its version of the theory with a Meinongian ontology, according to which objects as such are beyond being and non-being2. It seems to me, however, that in dealing with the above problem, Küng does not employ such an ontology satisfactorily. But whether this is or not the case, I will hereafter try to show that the thesis of the identity of the intentional and the real object may be retained if we also attempt to outline an anti-realist ontology different from the ultra-realist doctrine of Meinong's - namely, an ontology of objects as basically objects of discourse

Object-Dependent Contents

• Joseph Levine (1988). Demonstrating in mentalese.   (More)
• Teresa Marques (2006). On an Argument of Segal's Against Singular Object-Dependent Thoughts.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This paper discusses and criticizes Segal’s 1989 argument against singular object-dependent thoughts. His argument aims at showing that object-dependent thoughts are explanatorily redundant. My criticism of Segal’s argument has two parts. First, I appeal to common anti-individualist arguments to the effect that Segal’s type of argument only succeeds in establishing that object-dependent thoughts are explanatorily redundant for those aspects of subjects’ behaviour that do not require reference to external objects. Secondly, Segal’s view on singular thoughts is at odds with his view on the semantics of proper names, which favours the singularity and object-dependency of the truth-conditions of sentences in which they occur. In particular, his views are at odds with a position he holds, that truth-conditional semantics can adequately account for all aspects of speakers’ linguistic competence in the use of proper names.
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.disputatio.com/articles/021-2.pdf
  

Two-Dimensionalism about Content

• Berit Brogaard (forthcoming). The missing dimension: Two-dimensional approaches to matters epistemic.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: I. Standard Semantics According to what we might call
• David J. Chalmers (online). Probability and propositions.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: What are the objects of belief? That is, what are the things we believe, when we believe that it is sunny outside and that Nietzsche is dead? Usually these things are taken to be propositions. But the nature of propositions is itself contested. What is a proposition, such that it can serve as an object of belief?
• David J. Chalmers (2002). The components of content.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: [[This paper appears in my anthology _Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings_ (Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 608-633. It is a heavily revised version of a paper first written in 1994 and revised in 1995. Sections 1, 7, 8, and 10 are similar to the old version, but the other sections are quite different. Because the old version has been widely cited, I have made it available (in its 1995 version) at http://consc.net/papers/content95.html
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/321/
  http://consc.net/papers/content.pdf
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/393071.html
  http://cogprints.org/321/0/content.html
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/chalmers95components.html
  http://www.cogsci.indiana.edu/pub/chalmers.content.ps
  http://www.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/papers/content.html
  http://cogprints.soton.ac.uk/documents/disk0/00/00/03/21/
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000321/00/content.html
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:321
  
• David Chalmers (manuscript). The components of content (1995 version).   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: (1) Is content in the head? I believe that water is wet. My twin on Twin Earth, which is just like Earth except that H2O is replaced by the superficially identical XYZ, does not. His thoughts concern not water but twin water: I believe that water is wet, but he believes that twin water is wet. It follows that that what a subject believes is not wholly determined by the internal state of the believer. Nevertheless, the cognitive similarities between me and my twin are striking. Is there some wholly internal aspect of content that we might share?
• David J. Chalmers (2003). The nature of narrow content.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: A content of a subject's mental state is narrow when it is determined by the subject's intrinsic properties: that is, when any possible intrinsic duplicate of the subject has a corresponding mental state with the same content. A content of a subject's mental state is..
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/papers/narrow.html
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/servlet/useragent?func=synergy&synergyAction=showEnhancedAbstract&doi=10.1111/1533-6077.00004
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/1533-6077.00004/enhancedabs/
  http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/120710664/PDFSTART
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1533-6077.00004
  
• Jussi Haukioja (2006). Semantic externalism and A Priori self-knowledge.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The argument known as the 'McKinsey Recipe' tries to establish the incompatibility of semantic externalism (about natural kind concepts in particular) and _a priori _self- knowledge about thoughts and concepts by deriving from the conjunction of these theses an absurd conclusion, such as that we could know _a priori _that water exists. One reply to this argument is to distinguish two different readings of 'natural kind concept': (i) a concept which _in fact _denotes a natural kind, and (ii) a concept which _aims_ to denote a natural kind. Paul Boghossian has argued, using a _Dry Earth _scenario, that this response fails, claiming that the externalist cannot make sense of a concept aiming, but failing, to denote a natural kind. In this paper I argue that Boghossian's argument is flawed. Borrowing machinery from two-dimensional semantics, using the notion of 'considering a possible world as actual', I claim that we can give a determinate answer to Boghossian's question: which concept would 'water' express on Dry Earth?
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-9329.2006.00318.x
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/rati/2006/00000019/00000002/art00004
  
• Simon Prosser (forthcoming). The two-dimensional content of consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In this paper I put forward a representationalist theory of conscious experience based on Robert Stalnaker
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/~sjp7/The two dimensional content of consciousness.pdf
  http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/~sjp7/The two dimensional content of consciousness (draft 1).pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/l45321u169680433/fulltext.pdf
  
• Stephen R. Schiffer (online). Mental content and epistemic two-dimensional semantics.   (More)

The Nature of Contents, Misc

• David Bourget (2010). The representational theory of consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: A satisfactory solution to the problem of consciousness would take the form of a simple yet fully general model which specifies the precise conditions under which any given state of consciousness occurs. Science has uncovered numerous correlations between consciousness and neural activity, but it has not yet come anywhere close to this. We are still looking for the Newtonian laws of consciousness.
  
  One of the main difficulties with consciousness is that we lack a language in which to formulate illuminating generalizations about it. Philosophers and scientists talk about "what it’s like", sensations, feelings, and perceptual states such as seeing and hearing. This language does allow a precise articulation of the internal structures of conscious states and their inter-relations. It is inadequate to capture relations of the kind we are looking for between conscious states and physical states.
  
  In this thesis I refine and defend a theory of consciousness which promises to solve this regimentation problem: the representational theory of consciousness. I argue that the representational theory can solve the regimentation problem and smooth out other important obstacles to a fruitful study of consciousness. I also make a case for the theory independently of its payoffs, and I discuss the leading opposing theories at some length.
• Berit Brogaard, Centered worlds and the content of perception: Short version.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: 0. Relativistic Content In standard semantics, propositional content, whether it be the content of utterances or mental states, has a truth-value relative only to a possible world. For example, the content of my utterance of ‘Jim is sitting now’ is true just in case Jim is sitting at the time of utterance in the actual world, and the content of my belief that Alice will give a talk tomorrow is true just in case Alice will give a talk on the day following the occurrence of my belief state in the actual world. Let us call propositional content which has a truth-value relative only to a possible world ‘non-relativistic content’. Non-relativistic content can be treated as either structured or unstructured. On the unstructured-content view, non-relativistic content is a set of possible worlds and bears the truth-value true just in case the actual world is a member of that set. For example, the content of my utterance of ‘Jim is working now’ at time t is the set of worlds in which Jim is working at t, and this content is true just in case the actual world is among those worlds. On the structured-content view, non-relativistic content is a set or conglomeration of properties and/or objects, where properties are features which objects possess regardless of who considers or observes them and regardless of when they are being considered or observed. Such properties are said to be (or represent) functions from possible worlds to extensions. Relative to a possible world they determine a set of objects instantiating the property. For example, relative to the actual world the property of being human determines the set of actual humans. Not all content is non-relativistic. Let us say that propositional content is relativistic just in case it possesses a truth-value only relative to a centered world. A centered world is a possible world in which an individual and a time are marked, where the marked individual..
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://brogaardb.googlepages.com/TheContentofPerception.pdf
  http://brogaardb.googlepages.com/CenteredWorldsandtheContentofPercept.pdf
  http://sites.google.com/site/brogaardb/CenteredWorldsandtheContentofPercept.pdf
  
• David J. Chalmers (online). Probability and propositions.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: What are the objects of belief? That is, what are the things we believe, when we believe that it is sunny outside and that Nietzsche is dead? Usually these things are taken to be propositions. But the nature of propositions is itself contested. What is a proposition, such that it can serve as an object of belief?
• Peter Lasersohn (2007). Expressives, perspective and presupposition.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: I compare Potts’ use of a ‘‘judge’’ parameter in semantic interpretation with the use of a similar parameter in Lasersohn (2005). The latter technique portrays the content of expressives as constant across speakers, while Pott’s technique does not. The idea that the content of expressives is a kind of presupposition is also briefly defended, and a technical problem in the ‘‘dynamics’’ of Pott’s formalism is pointed out.
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://netfiles.uiuc.edu/lasersoh/www/Papers/potts-comments.pdf
  

Aspects of Intentionality

Naturalism and Intentionality

• Mark Alfano (forthcoming). Nietzsche, naturalism, and the tenacity of the intentional.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche demands that “psychology shall be recognized again as the queen of the sciences.” While one might cast a dubious glance at the “again,” many of Nietzsche’s insights were indeed psychological, and many of his arguments invoke psychological premises. In Genealogy, he criticizes the “English psychologists” for the “inherent psychological absurdity” of their theory of the origin of good and bad, pointing out the implausibility of the claim that the utility of unegoistic actions would be forgotten. Tabling whether this criticism is valid, we see Nietzsche’s methodological naturalism here: moral claims should be grounded in empirical psychological claims. Later in Genealogy, Nietzsche advances his own naturalistic account of the origins of good, bad, and evil. Three cheers for methodological naturalism, but it was not Nietzsche’s innovation, and he did not pioneer its application to morality. The list of moral naturalists who appealed to psychology arguably includes Aristotle, Descartes, Spinoza, Bentham, and Mill, among many others. If Nietzsche’s naturalism is to be worth the candle of contemporary scholarship, it must involve more than the methodological naturalism that predated him by centuries and to which he made no serious contribution. Nietzsche’s key contribution to naturalism is not his adherence to its methodology, but his discovery of certain psychological facts. In particular, he realized that mental states are not ordinary dyadic relations between a subject and an intentional content. Nietzsche discovered the tenacity of intentional states: when an intentional state loses its object (because the subject realizes the object does not exist, because the object is forbidden, or because of something else), a new object replaces the original; the state does not disappear entirely. As Nietzsche puts it Genealogy, “Man would rather will the void than be void of will.” Nietzsche relies on the tenacity thesis in his explanation of the origin of bad conscience: “All instincts that do not discharge themselves outwardly turn inward […. They turn] against [their] possessors.” When hostility towards others becomes impossible, hostility does not disappear; instead, its object is replaced.
• George Bealer (1996). Materialism and the logical structure of intentionality.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: After a brief history of Brentano's thesis of intentionality, it is argued that intentionality presents a serious problem for materialism. First, it is shown that, if no general materialist analysis (or reduction) of intentionality is possible, then intentional phenomena would have in common at least one nonphysical property, namely, their intentionality. A general analysis of intentionality is then suggested. Finally, it is argued that any satisfactory general analysis of intentionality must share with this analysis a feature which entails the existence of a nonphysical "level of organization"
• Ansgar Beckermann (1996). Is there a problem about intentionality?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The crucial point of the mind-body-problem appears to be that mental phenome- na (events, properties, states) seem to have features which at first sight make it impossible to integrate these phenomena into a naturalistic world view, i.e. to identify them with, or to reduce them to, physical phenomena.1 In the contemp- orary discussion, there are mainly two critical features which are important in this context. The first of these is the feature of intentional states, e.g. beliefs and desires, to have a representational or semantic content. The problem of the naturalization of these states I will call the problem of intentionality. The second critical feature is the property of other mental states, e.g. perceptions and sensations, to have a qualitative aspect, i.e. that it is somehow, or feels in a characteristic way, to be in one of those states. The problem of the naturalization of these states is generally called the qualia-problem
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.uni-bielefeld.de/(de)/philosophie/personen/beckermann/pbint_ve.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/g873442613v55449/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/G873442613V55449.pdf
  
• Thomas D. Bontly (2001). Should Intentionality Be Naturalized?   (More)
• Earl Conee (1995). Supervenience and intentionality.   (More)
• Christian Coseru (2009). Naturalism and Intentionality: A Buddhist Epistemological Approach.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In this paper I propose a naturalist account of the Buddhist epistemological discussion of sva- samvitti (“self-awareness,” “self-cognition”) following similar attempts in the domains of phe- nomenology and analytic epistemology. I examine the extent to which recent work in naturalized epistemology and phenomenology, particularly in the areas of perception and inten- tionality could be profitably used in unpacking the implications of the Buddhist epistemological project. I am also concerned with naturalism more generally, and the ways in which spe- cific models such as that of embodied cognition, can benefit from some of the valuable insights of Buddhist epistemology.
• Frances Egan (2003). Naturalistic inquiry: Where does mental representation fit in?   (More)
• Ruth G. Millikan (2000). Naturalizing intentionality.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Brentano was surely mistaken, however, in thinking that bearing a relation to something nonexistent marks only the mental. Given any sort of purpose, it might not get fulfilled, hence might exhibit Brentano's relation, and there are many natural purposes, such as the purpose of one's stomach to digest food or the purpose of one's protective eye blink reflex to keep out the sand, that are not mental, nor derived from anything mental. Nor are stomachs and reflexes "of" or"about" anything. A reply might be, I suppose, that natural purposes are "purposes" only in an analogical sense hence "fail to be fulfilled" only in an analogical way. They bear an analogy to things that have been intentionally designed by purposive minds, hence can fail to accomplish the purposes they analogically have. As such they also have only analogical "intentionality". Such a response begs the question, however, for it assumes that natural purposes are not purposes in the full sense exactly because they are not
• Mark Greenberg (2005). A new map of theories of mental content.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://repositories.cdlib.org/uclalaw/plltwps/5-14
  http://repositories.cdlib.org/uclalaw/plltwps/5-14/
  http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=795726
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1533-6077.2005.00068.x
  http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/120710717/PDFSTART
  
• Stephen P. Stich & Stephen Laurence (1994). Intentionality and naturalism.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: ...the deepest motivation for intentional irrealism derives not from such relatively technical worries about individualism and holism as we
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://ruccs.rutgers.edu/tech_rpt/int-nat9.pdf
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/stich92intentionality.html
  

Rule-Following

• Peter Alward (online). Are functional properties causally potent?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Jaegwon Kim has recently[1] argued that a solution to the exclusion argument against the intelligibility of mental causation is to found if mental properties can be shown to be reducible to physical properties
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ifs.csic.es/sorites/Issue_17/sorites17.pdf#page=51
  http://people.uleth.ca/~peter.alward/papers/FunctionalProperties.htm
  
• Gordon P. Baker & P. M. S. Hacker (1990). Malcolm on language and rules.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8191(199004)65:252<167:MOLAR>2.0.CO;2-7
  
• Lorenzo Bernasconi-Kohn (2006). How not to think about rules and rule following: A response to Stueber.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This article offers a critique of Karsten Stueber’s account of rule following as presented in his article "How to Think about Rules and Rule Following." The task Stueber sets himself is of defending the idea that human practices are bound and guided by rules (both causally and normatively) while avoiding the discredited "cognitive model of rule following." This article argues that Stueber’s proposal is unconvincing because it falls foul of the very problems it sets out to avoid. Stueber’s defense of rules as normative guides is shown to be either circular or burdened with an infinite regress, while his account of rules as causal determinants of our actions is shown to lapse back into the "cognitive model" that he explicitly rejects. Key Words: rules • rule following • norms • causes • social science
• Jason Bridges (online). Rule-following skepticism, properly so called.   (More)
• Cesare Cozzo (ms). Rule-following and the objectivity of proof.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Ideas on meaning, rules and mathematical proofs abound in Wittgenstein’s writings. The undeniable fact that they are present together, sometimes intertwined in the same passage of Philosophical Investigations or Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, does not show, however, that the connection between these ideas is necessary or inextricable. The possibility remains, and ought to be checked, that they can be plausibly and consistently separated. I am going to examine two views detectable in Wittgenstein’s works: one about proofs, the other about meaning and rules. The first is the denial of the objectivity of proof. The second is a conception of meaning stemming from the rule-following considerations. I shall argue that, though Wittgenstein seems to conjoin the two views, they can be, and should be, separated1
• Edward Craig (1997). Meaning and privacy.   (More)
• David H. Finkelstein (2000). Wittgenstein on rules and platonism.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=BHBC3RPtfgwC&oi=fnd&pg=PA53&ots=QydMErUGy1&sig=2XMDnomiNKc3FZjzPqIUCzYtBzQ
  
• Philip Gerrans, Tacit knowledge, rule following and Pierre Bourdieu's philosophy of social science.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Pierre Bourdieu has developed a philosophy of social science, grounded in the phenomenological tradition, which treats knowledge as a practical ability embodied in skilful behaviour, rather than an intellectual capacity for the representation and manipulation of propositional knowledge. He invokes Wittgenstein’s remarks on rule-following as one way of explicating the idea that knowledge is a skill. Bourdieu’s conception of tacit knowledge is a dispositional one, adopted to avoid a perceived dilemma for methodological individualism. That dilemma requires either the explanation of regularities in social behaviour as the result of the tacit representation of procedural rules (‘legalism’) or the self-conscious representation of behavioural goals (‘voluntarism’) by individuals. After explaining the apparent dilemma, I then argue that Wittgenstein’s remarks on rule following actually undermine, rather than support, a dispositional solution. Nonetheless, the philosophy of social science can survive without a dispositional account of knowledge. Such a social science needs, firstly, to embrace one horn of the dilemma, voluntarism, provided that the relevant regularities can be explained as unintended consequences of agents’ self-represented intentions. Secondly, such a social science should treat theorists’ interpretations as unifying generalizations, not hypotheses about the acquisition of tacit knowledge. Finally, where appeal to cognitive psychology can distinguish otherwise equivalent theories in social science, social science should incorporate the data of cognitive psychology concerning tacit mental processes
• Jussi Haukioja (2006). Hindriks on rule-following.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This paper is a reply to Frank Hindriks
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/73m4466166775411/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/73M4466166775411.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/phil/2005/00000126/00000002/00007818
  
• Jussi Haukioja (2005). Is solitary rule-following possible?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The aim of this paper is to discover whether or not a solitary individual, a human being isolated from birth, could become a rule-follower. The argumentation against this possibility rests on the claim that such an isolate could not become aware of a normative standard, with which her actions could agree or disagree. As a consequence, theorists impressed by this argumentation adopt a view on which the normativity of rules arises from corrective practices in which agents engage in a community. However, it has been suggested that an isolated individual could engage in such a practice by herself. Three prospective examples of such cases are considered, and the possibility of solitary rule-following is vindicated. Furthermore, the nature of the goals at which rule-following practices generally aim is clarified
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/160032p108155m43/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/160032P108155M43.pdf
  
• Richard Holton & Huw Price (2003). Ramsey on saying and whistling: A discordant note.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In 'General Propositions and Causality' Ramsey rejects his earlier view that universal generalizations are infinite conjunctions, arguing that they are not genuine propositions at all. We argue that his new position is unstable. The issues about infinity that lead Ramsey to the new view are essentially those underlying Wittgenstein's rule-following considerations. If they show that generalizations are not genuine propositions, they show that there are no genuine propositions. The connection raises interesting historical questions about the direction of influence between Ramsey and Wittgenstein, the origin of the rule-following argument, and the influence of writers such as Brouwer.
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://homepages.ed.ac.uk/~rholton/Ramsey.paper.pdf
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1468-0068.00441
  
• Susan L. Hurley (1998). Wittgenstein on practice and the myth of the giving.   (More)
• Henry Jackman (2003). Foundationalism, coherentism, and rule-following skepticism.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Semantic holists view what one's terms mean as function of all of one's usage. Holists will thus be coherentists about semantic justification: showing that one's usage of a term is semantically justified involves showing how it coheres with the rest of one's usage. Semantic atomists, by contrast, understand semantic justification in a foundationalist fashion. Saul Kripke has, on Wittgenstein's behalf, famously argued for a type of skepticism about meaning and semantic justification. However, Kripke's argument has bite only if one understands semantic justification in foundationalist terms. Consequently, Kripke's arguments lead not to a type of skepticism about meaning, but rather to the conclusion that one should be a coherentist about semantic justification, and thus a holist about semantic facts
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/./ftinterface~content=a713770268~fulltext=713240930
  
• Roderick T. Long, Rule-following, praxeology, and anarchy.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: JEL Classification: B41, B53, B31, B2, P48, A12 Abstract: Wittgenstein’s rule-following paradox has important implications for two aspects of Austrian theory. First, it makes it possible to reconcile the Misesian, Rothbardian, and hermeneutical approaches to methodology; second, it provides a way of defending a stateless legal order against the charge that such an order lacks, yet needs, a final arbiter
• John McDowell (1991). Intentionality and interiority in Wittgenstein: Comment on Crispin Wright.   (More)
• Peter Pagin (2002). Rule-following, compositionality and the normativity of meaning.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: However, if Wittgenstein’s so called rule-following considerations are correct, then this reason for believing in the validity of (C), is mistaken. The conclusion of those considerations is that we must reject the idea that rules are things which determine possible cases of application before those cases are actually encountered and decided by speakers. If this is right, then there is no rule which determines the meanings of new sentences, i.e. before those sentences have actually been used. Therefore, it might seem that (C) is not valid for natural languages
• Diane Proudfoot (2004). The implications of an externalist theory of rule-following behavior for robot cognition.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract:   Given (1) Wittgensteins externalist analysis of the distinction between following a rule and behaving in accordance with a rule, (2) prima facie connections between rule-following and psychological capacities, and (3) pragmatic issues about training, it follows that most, even all, future artificially intelligent computers and robots will not use language, possess concepts, or reason. This argument suggests that AIs traditional aim of building machines with minds, exemplified in current work on cognitive robotics, is in need of substantial revision
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/v3gpx4k76m46705k/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/V3GPX4K76M46705K.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/mind/2004/00000014/00000003/05268464
  
• Rupert Read (2000). What 'there can be no such thing as meaning anything by any word' could possibly mean.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=yo3rqRlDN1gC&oi=fnd&pg=PA74&ots=atROeLPUJ6&sig=cOaG2hG4KFBbPNShRpPm8UnLXy0
  
• Scott Soames (1998). Facts, truth conditions, and the skeptical solution to the rule-following paradox.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0029-4624(1998)32<313:FTCATS>2.0.CO;2-1
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2676152.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/nous/1998/00000032/A0120s12/art00122
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/nous/1998/00000032/A0020s12/art00122
  
• Titus Stahl (2007). Practices, Norms and Recognition.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The problem of the social foundations of normativity can be illuminated by discussing the narrower question whether rule-following is necessarily a social matter. The problems with individualistic theories of rule-following seem to make such a conclusion unavoidable. Social theories of rule-following, however, seem to only push back one level the dilemma of having to choose either an infinite regress of interpretations or a collapse into non-normative descriptions. The most plausible of these models, Haugeland's conformism, can avoid these objections if it is supplemented with an ontologically reasonable concept of the collective attitude of a group. Groups of individuals who are bound to shared norms by recognizing each other as equipped with a standard authority of criticism have the necessary properties for ascribing to those groups such collective attitudes. Given such a weak notion of a collective attitude, there is hope for a plausible collectivist theory of rule-following.
• James Timothy Struck, Law and rule following as arbitrary-excessive rule following and law following as potentially violating too many human rights and freedoms and open to slavery like treatment of persons.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Laws from guardianship, monopoly, corruption, and fraud are open to arbitrariness. Arbitrariness is a normal concern as human rights and freedoms of too many persons are potentially violated. Slave like treatment of many persons would follow if guardianship, monopoly, corruption and fraud laws were applied to all persons. Application of laws can give rise to significant human rights violations and abuses. Laws become discriminatory when applied to many rather than just some persons. Rule following or citation is sometimes described as helpful with regard to evaluating the worth of a scientific article, Justice or judge, but rule following with regard to application of laws can result in discrimination against persons. We look at examples with regard to corruption, monopoly, guardianship and fraud to disclose that application of laws would violate rights of too many
• Barry G. Stroud (1965). Wittgenstein and logical necessity.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=VMGNQZ8JS7QC&oi=fnd&pg=PA289&ots=4vctkQEL5I&sig=bE8dnC_tHS2NWcCjRombytLjgt4
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8108(196510)74:4<504:WALN>2.0.CO;2-9
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8108(196510)74:4<504:WALN>2.0.CO;2-9
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2183126.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/oso/169205/2002/00000001/00000001/art00001
  
• Karsten R. Stueber (2005). How to think about rules and rule following.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This article will discuss the difficulties of providing a plausible account of rule following in the social realm. It will show that the cognitive model of rule following is not suited for this task. Nevertheless, revealing the inadequacy of the cognitive model does not justify the wholesale dismissal of understanding human practices as rule-following practices, as social theorists like Bourdieu or Dreyfus have argued. Instead it will be shown that rule-following behavior is best understood as being based on a set of complex dispositions. In this manner one is able to account for the causal explanatory role of the notion of a rule. Key Words: rules • norms • explanation • Bourdieu • Winch
• Tim Thornton (1997). Intention, rule following and the strategic role of Wright's order of determination test.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: I believe that Wright’s constructivist account of intention is funda- mentally flawed [Wright 1984, 1986, 1987a, 1987b, 1988, 1989a, 1989b, 1991, 1992]. To understand why it fails it is necessary first to locate the account in its broader strategic context. That context is Wright’s response to Wittgenstein’s account of rule following. When so located the diagnosis of the account’s failure is clear. Wright’s account of intention is a species of the interpretative approach to mental content which is explicitly rejected by Wittgenstein
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1467-9205.00035
  
• Saul Traiger (1994). The secret operations of the mind.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://faculty.oxy.edu/traiger/publications/secret.html
  http://www.csa.com/partners/viewrecord.php?requester=gs&collection=TRD&recid=0148101CI
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/g77508ww3145v448/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/G77508WW3145V448.pdf
  
• Daniel Whiting (2007). Defending semantic generalism.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: ‘Particularism’ is a meta-ethical theory resulting from a holistic doctrine in the theory of reasons. According to Jonathan Dancy, the foremost contemporary proponent of particularism, ‘a feature that is a reason in favour of an action in one case may be no reason at all in another, or even a reason against’ (2004: 190). From this, Dancy claims, it follows that the ‘possibility of moral thought and judgement does not depend on the provision of a suitable supply of moral principles’ (2004: 7). This doctrine is of significant interest and import in its own right, and accordingly is the subject of considerable critical attention. The concern of this paper, however, is not meta-ethics but semantics
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-8284.2007.00696.x
  
• Daniel Whiting (forthcoming). Particularly general and generally particular: language, rules and meaning.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Semantic generalists and semantic particularists disagree over the role of rules or principles in linguistic competence and in the determination of linguistic meaning, and hence over the importance of the notions of a rule or of a principle in philosophical accounts of language. In this paper, I have argued that the particularist’s case against generalism is far from decisive and that by moderating the claims she makes on behalf of her thesis the generalist can accommodate many of the considerations that the particularist cites in support of her position.
• Michael Williams (1991). Blind obedience: Rules, community and the individual.   (More)
• Crispin Wright (ms). Rule-following without reasons: Wittgenstein's quietism and the constitutive question.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This is a short, and therefore necessarily very incomplete discussion of one of the great questions of modern philosophy. I return to a station at which an interpretative train of thought of mine came to a halt in a paper written almost 20 years ago, about Wittgenstein and Chomsky,[1] hoping to advance a little bit further down the track. The rule-following passages in the Investigations and Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics in fact raise a number of distinct (though connected) issues about rules, meaning, objectivity, and reasons, whose conflation is encouraged by the standard caption, "the Rule-following Considerations".[2] So, let me begin by explaining my focus here
• Crispin Wright (2007). Rule-following without reasons: Wittgenstein's quietism and the constitutive question.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This is a short, and therefore necessarily very incomplete discussion of one of the great questions of modern philosophy. I return to a station at which an interpretative train of thought of mine came to a halt in a paper written almost 20 years ago, about Wittgenstein and Chomsky,[1] hoping to advance a little bit further down the track. The rule-following passages in the Investigations and Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics in fact raise a number of distinct (though connected) issues about rules, meaning, objectivity, and reasons, whose conflation is encouraged by the standard caption, "the Rule-following Considerations".[2] So, let me begin by explaining my focus here
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-9329.2007.00379.x
  http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/118503347/PDFSTART
  

Explanatory Role of Content

• Jose Luis Bermudez (1995). Syntax, semantics, and levels of explanation.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8094(199507)45:180<361:SSALOE>2.0.CO;2-O
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8094(199507)45:180<361:SSALOE>2.0.CO;2-O
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2219656.pdf
  
• Radu J. Bogdan (1989). Does semantics run the psyche?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: If there is a dogma in the contemporary philosophy of the cognitive mind, it must be the notion that cognition is semantic causation or, differently put, that it is semantics that runs the psyche. This is what the notion of psychosemantics and (often) intentionality are all about. Another dogma, less widespread than the first but almost equally potent, is that common sense psychology is the implicit theory of psychosemantics. The two dogmas are jointly encapsulated in the following axiom. Mental attitudes such as beliefs and desires have essentially semantic contents, or are semantically evaluable. (This is why they are called propositional attitudes.) Mental attitudes have causal powers in virtue of their semantic properties. The content of an attitude has causal powers qua semantic, or more exactly in virtue of its syntactic structure which reflects relevant semantic properties and relations. (Propositions attitudinized cause in virtue of their semantically sensitive syntax.) It is the fact that mental attitudes cause in virtue of being semantic that explains why the cognitive mind is essentially semantic and why common sense psychology is implicitly true of the semantic mind
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8205(198906)49:4<687:DSRTP>2.0.CO;2-0
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8205(198906)49:4<687:DSRTP>2.0.CO;2-0
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2107855.pdf
  
• David M. Braun (2000). Russellianism and psychological generalizations.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: (1) Harry believes that Twain is a writer. (2) Harry believes that Clemens is a writer. I say that this is Russellianism's most notorious consequence because it is so often used to argue against the view: many philosophers think that it is obvious that (1) and (2) can differ in truth value, and so they conclude that Russellianism is false. Let's call this the Substitution Objection to Russellianism
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ling.rochester.edu/~braun/Papers/gen.htm
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/0029-4624.00208
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/0029-4624.00208
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/nous/2000/00000034/00000002/art00208
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/nous/2000/00000034/00000002/art00002
  
• Fred Dretske (1998). Minds, machines, and money: What really explains behavior.   (More)
• Fred Dretske (2004). Psychological vs. biological explanations of behavior.   (More)
• Hartry Field (ms). Remarks on content and its role in explanation.   (More)
• Pierre Jacob (1998). What can the semantic properties of innate representations explain?   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/docs/00/05/32/43/HTML/
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=Ynbk9xKkO88C&oi=fnd&pg=PA175&ots=YbzgMI5arF&sig=0mKeS6D4T1xkGKnnSckxSR5radk
  
• John Perry & David J. Israel (1991). Fodor and psychological explanation.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: [In Meaning in Mind, edited by Barry Loewer and Georges Rey. Oxford: Basil Black- well, 1991, 165
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www-csli.stanford.edu/~john/PHILPAPERS/fodor.pdf
  http://www-csli.stanford.edu/users/john/PHILPAPERS/fodor.pdf
  
• Stephen R. Schiffer (online). An introduction to content and its role in explanation.   (More)
• Julia Tanney (2005). Reason-explanation and the contents of the mind.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: i> This paper takes a close look at the kinds of considerations we use to reach agreement in our ordinary (non-philosophical and non- theoretical) judgments about a person
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.kent.ac.uk/secl/philosophy/articles/tanney/reasonandexplanation.pdf
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-9329.2005.00295.x
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/rati/2005/00000018/00000003/art00008
  
• Josefa Toribio (1991). Causal efficacy, content and levels of explanation.   (More)
• Andrew Ward (2001). The compatibility of psychological naturalism and representationalism.   (More)

Collective Intentionality

• Sara Rachel Chant & Zachary Ernst (2007). Group intentions as equilibria.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In this paper, we offer an analysis of ‘group intentions.’ On our proposal, group intentions should be understood as a state of equilibrium among the beliefs of the members of a group. Although the discussion in this paper is non-technical, the equilibrium concept is drawn from the formal theory of interactive epistemology due to Robert Aumann. The goal of this paper is to provide an analysis of group intentions that is informed by important work in economics and formal epistemology
• Sara Rachel Chant (2007). Unintentional collective action.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In this paper, I examine the manner in which analyses of the action of single agents have been pressed into service for constructing accounts of collective action. Specifically, I argue that the best analogy to collective action is a class of individual action that Carl Ginet has called 'aggregate action.' Furthermore, once we use aggregate action as a model of collective action, then we see that existing accounts of collective action have failed to accommodate an important class of (what I shall call) 'unintentional collective actions.'
• Ronald N. Giere (2004). The problem of agency in scienti?c distributed cognitive systems.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: From the perspective of cognitive science, it is illuminating to think of much contemporary scienti?c research as taking place in distributed cognitive systems. This is particularly true of large-scale experimental and observational systems such as the Hubble Telescope. Clark, Hutchins, Knorr-Cetina, and Latour insist or imply such a move requires expanding our notions of knowledge, mind, and even consciousness. Whether this is correct seems to me not a straightforward factual question. Rather, the issue seems to be how best to develop a theoretical understanding of such systems appropriate to the study of science and technology. I argue that there is no need to attribute to such systems as a whole any form of cognitive agency. We can well understand the importance of such systems while restricting agency to the human components. The implication is that we think of these large-scale distributed cognitive systems not so much as uni?ed wholes, but as hybrid systems including both physical artifacts and ordinary humans
• Todd M. Gureckis & Robert L. Goldstone (2006). Thinking in groups.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cognitrn.psych.indiana.edu/rgoldsto/pdfs/Distributed Cognition.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/jbp/pc/2006/00000014/00000002/art00009
  
• Stevan Harnad (2005). Distributed processes, distributed cognizers and collaborative cognition.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Cognition is thinking; it feels like something to think, and only those who can feel can think. There are also things that thinkers can do. We know neither how thinkers can think nor how they are able do what they can do. We are waiting for cognitive science to discover how. Cognitive science does this by testing hypotheses about what processes can generate what doing (“know-how”) This is called the Turing Test. It cannot test whether a process can generate feeling, hence thinking -- only whether it can generate doing. The processes that generate thinking and know-how are “distributed” within the heads of thinkers, but not across thinkers’ heads. Hence there is no such thing as distributed cognition, only collaborative cognition. Email and the Web have spawned a new form of collaborative cognition that draws upon individual brains’ real-time interactive potential in ways that were not possible in oral, written or print interactions
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/4404/
  http://eprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/10997
  http://eprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/12073/
  http://cogprints.org/4404/1/distribcog.pdf
  http://cogprints.org/4765/03/distribcog.doc
  http://cogprints.org/4404/02/distribcog.doc
  http://cogprints.org/4404/01/distribcog.pdf
  http://cogprints.org/4765/02/distribcog.pdf
  http://cogprints.org/4765/01/distribcog.htm
  http://eprints.resist.ecs.soton.ac.uk/12073/
  http://eprints.resist.ecs.soton.ac.uk/10997/
  http://eprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/10997/01/distribcog.pdf
  http://eprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/12073/03/distribcog.doc
  http://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=1381014
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?id=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:4404
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?id=oai:eprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk:10997
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/jbp/pc/2005/00000013/00000003/art00005
  http://cogprints.org/4404/2/distribcog.doc
  
• Christian List (2003). Distributed cognition: A perspective from social choice theory.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Distributed cognition refers to processes which are (i) cognitive and (ii) distributed across multiple agents or devices rather than performed by a single agent. Distributed cognition has attracted interest in several fields ranging from sociology and law to computer science and the philosophy of science. In this paper, I discuss distributed cognition from a social-choice-theoretic perspective. Drawing on models of judgment aggregation, I address two questions. First, how can we model a group of individuals as a distributed cognitive system? Second, can a group acting as a distributed cognitive system be ‘rational’ and ‘track the truth’ in the outputs it produces? I argue that a group’s performance as a distributed cognitive system depends on its ‘aggregation procedure’ – its mechanism for aggregating the group members’ inputs into collective outputs – and I investigate the properties of an aggregation procedure that matter
• Christian List & Philip Pettit (2006). Group agency and supervenience.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Can groups be rational agents over and above their individual members? We argue that group agents are distinguished by their capacity to mimic the way in which individual agents act and that this capacity must 'supervene' on the group members' contributions. But what is the nature of this supervenience relation? Focusing on group judgments, we argue that, for a group to be rational, its judgment on a particular proposition cannot generally be a function of the members' individual judgments on that proposition. Rather, it must be a function of their individual sets of judgments across many propositions. So, knowing what the group members individually think about some proposition does not generally tell us how the group collectively adjudicates that proposition: the supervenience relation must be 'set-wise', not 'proposition-wise'. Our account preserves the individualistic view that group agency is nothing mysterious, but also suggests that a group agent may hold judgments that are not directly continuous with its members' corresponding individual judgments
• Kirk Ludwig (2007). Collective intentional behavior from the standpoint of semantics.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The mutual dependence of men is so great in all societies that scarce any human action is entirely complete in itself, or is performed without some reference to the actions of others, which are requisite to make it answer fully the intention of the agent
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2007.00652.x
  
• Barton Moffatt & Ronald N. Giere (2003). Distributed cognition: Where the cognitive and the social merge.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Among the many contested boundaries in science studies is that between the cognitive and the social. Here, we are concerned to question this boundary from a perspective within the cognitive sciences based on the notion of distributed cognition. We first present two of many contemporary sources of the notion of distributed cognition, one from the study of artificial neural networks and one from cognitive anthropology. We then proceed to reinterpret two well-known essays by Bruno Latour, ‘Visualization and Cognition: Thinking with Eyes and Hands’ and ‘Circulating Reference: Sampling the Soil in the Amazon Forest’. In both cases we find the cognitive and the social merged in a system of distributed cognition without any appeal to agonistic encounters. For us, results do not come to be regarded as veridical because they are widely accepted; they come to be widely accepted because, in the context of an appropriate distributed cognitive system, their apparent veracity can be made evident to anyone with the capacity to understand the workings of the system
• Pierre Poirier & Guillaume Chicoisne (2006). A framework for thinking about distributed cognition.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/jbp/pc/2006/00000014/00000002/art00003
  
• Robert D. Rupert (2005). Minding one's cognitive systems: When does a group of minds constitute a single cognitive unit?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The possibility of group minds or group mental states has been considered by a number of authors addressing issues in social epistemology and related areas (Goldman 2004, Pettit 2003, Gilbert 2004, Hutchins 1995). An appeal to group minds might, in the end, do indispensable explanatory work in the social or cognitive sciences. I am skeptical, though, and this essay lays out some of the reasons for my skepticism. The concerns raised herein constitute challenges to the advocates of group minds (or group mental states), challenges that might be overcome as theoretical and empirical work proceeds. Nevertheless, these hurdles are, I think, genuine and substantive, so much so that my tentative conclusion will not be optimistic. If a group mind is supposed to be a single mental system having two or more minds as proper parts,¹ the prospects for group minds seem dim
• Hans B. Schmid (2003). Can brains in vats think as a team?   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.informaworld.com/index/782638375.pdf
  
• Deborah Tollefsen (online). Collective intentionality.   (More)
• Deborah Perron Tollefsen (2002). Collective intentionality and the social sciences.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In everyday discourse and in the context of social scientific research we often attribute intentional states to groups. Contemporary approaches to group intentionality have either dismissed these attributions as metaphorical or provided an analysis of our attributions in terms of the intentional states of individuals in the group.Insection1, the author argues that these approaches are problematic. In sections 2 and 3, the author defends the view that certain groups are literally intentional agents. In section 4, the author argues that there are significant reasons for social scientists and philosophers of social science to acknowledge the adequacy of macro-level explanations that involve the attribution of intentional states to groups. In section 5, the author considers and responds to some criticisms of the thesis she defends
• Michael Tomasello & Hannes Rakoczy (2003). What makes human cognition unique? From individual to shared to collective intentionality.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://email.eva.mpg.de/~rakoczy/pdf/uniquely_human_M&L.pdf
  http://psych.colorado.edu/~colunga/langprosem/Readings/Tomasello+Rakocszy03.pdf
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1468-0017.00217
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/mila/2003/00000018/00000002/art00001
  
• Raimo Tuomela (online). Collective intentionality and social agents.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In this paper I will discuss a certain philosophical and conceptual program -- that I have called philosophy of social action writ large -- and also show in detail how parts of the program have been, and is currently being carried out. In current philosophical research the philosophy of social action can be understood in a broad sense to encompass such central research topics as action occurring in a social context (this includes multi-agent action); shared we-attitudes (such as we-intention, mutual belief) and other social attitudes expressing collective intentionality and needed for the explication and explanation of social action; social macro-notions, such as actions performed by social groups and properties of social groups such as their goals and beliefs; social practices, and institutions (see e.g. Tuomela, 1995, 2000a, 2001). The theory of social action understood analogously in a broad sense would then involve not only philosophical but all other relevant theorizing about social action. Thus, in this sense, such fields of Artificial Intelligence (AI) as Distributed AI (DAI) and the theory of Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) fall within the scope of the theory of social action. DAI studies the social side of computer systems and includes various well-known areas ranging from human-computer interaction, computer-supported cooperative work, organizational processing, and distributed problem solving to the simulation of social systems
• Raimo Tuomela (1996). Philosophy and distributed artificial intelligence: The case of joint intention.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In current philosophical research the term 'philosophy of social action' can be used - and has been used - in a broad sense to encompass the following central research topics: 1) action occurring in a social context; this includes multi-agent action; 2) joint attitudes (or "we-attitudes" such as joint intention, mutual belief) and other social attitudes needed for the explication and explanation of social action; 3) social macro-notions, such as actions performed by social groups and properties of social groups such as their goals and beliefs; 4) social norms and social institutions (see Tuomela, 1984, 1995). The theory of social action understood analogously in a broad sense would then involve not only philosophical but all other relevant theorizing about social action. Thus, in this sense, such fields of Artificial Intelligence (AI) as Distributed AI (DAI) and the theory of Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) fall within the scope of the theory of social action. DAI studies the social side of computer systems and includes various well-known areas ranging from Human Computer Interaction, Computer-Supported Cooperative Work, Organizational Processing, Distributed Problem Solving to Simulation of Social Systems and Organizations. Even if I am a philosopher with low artificial intelligence I will below try to say something about what the scope of DAI should be taken to be on conceptual and philosophical grounds. (In the later sections of the paper the central notion of joint intention will be the main topic - in order to illustrate how philosophers and DAI-researchers approach this issue.) Let us now consider the relationship between philosophy - especially philosophy of social action - and DAI. Both are concerned with social matters and in this sense seem to have a connection to social science proper. What kinds of questions should these areas of study be concerned with? In principle, ordinary social science should study all aspects of social life (in various societies and cultures), try to describe it and create general theories to explain it.
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.valt.helsinki.fi/staff/tuomela/papers/dai.htm
  
• Jack J. Vromen (2003). Collective intentionality, evolutionary biology and social reality.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The paper aims to clarify and scrutinize Searle"s somewhat puzzling statement that collective intentionality is a biologically primitive phenomenon. It is argued that the statement is not only meant to bring out that "collective intentionality" is not further analyzable in terms of individual intentionality. It also is meant to convey that we have a biologically evolved innate capacity for collective intentionality.The paper points out that Searle"s dedication to a strong notion of collective intentionality considerably delimits the scope of his endeavor. Furthermore, evolutionary theory does not vindicate that an innate capacity for collective intentionality is a necessary precondition for cooperative behavior. 1
  Additional links for this entry:
  https://secure-web.eur.nl/fw/medewerkers/jackvromen/collectiveintentionality.doc
  http://www.reputatiesophetspel.nl/fw/medewerkers/jackvromen/collectiveintentionality.doc
  http://www.masterinmanagement.com/fw/medewerkers/jackvromen/collectiveintentionality.doc
  http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/./ftinterface~content=a782638378~fulltext=713240930
  
• Jiajie Zhang & Vimla L. Patel (2006). Distributed cognition, representation, and affordance.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://acad88.sahs.uth.tmc.edu/research/publications/zhang-patel cognition and pragramatics preprint.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/jbp/pc/2006/00000014/00000002/art00011
  

Aspects of Intentionality, Misc

• Peter King, Mediæval intentionality and pseudo-intentionality.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Wilfrid Sellars, in his essay “Being and Being Known,”1 sets out to explore “the profound truth contained in the Thomistic thesis that the senses in their way and the intellect in its way are informed by the natures of external objects and events” [§1]. Profound truth there may be, but Sellars also finds a profound error in the mediæval treatment of the intentionality of sensing on a par with the intentionality of thinking: There are many reasons for the plausibility of the idea that sense belongs to the intentional order. . . It is primarily due, however, to the fact that sensations have what I shall call a pseudo-intentionality which is easily mistaken for the genuine intentionality of the cognitive order. [§18] Sellars argues that thought is genuinely intentional, for it is (in good linguistic fashion) about the world, whereas sense merely seems to be about the world but in fact is not, although it is systematically correlated with the world—the ‘pseudo-intentionality’ he alludes to here. On Sellars’s reading, the ‘Thomistic’ view gets certain things right that the later Cartesian view gets wrong, such as distinguishing mental acts intrinsically rather than by their ‘content’, but it also gets some things wrong in its own right, notably in its claim that sensing has “genuine intentionality” the way thinking does, and so to take sensing as properly belonging to “the cognitive order” (i. e. to qualify as a kind of knowledge strictly speaking). Sellars is out to right the Thomistic wrongs, beginning with intentionality, where the mistake is easily made. For Sellars has his eye not only on intentionality, but on the consequent claim that episodes of (intentional) sensing play a foundationalist epistemological role, a view he elsewhere famously calls ‘The Myth of the Given’.2 There is no question that Sellars wants to make room for his own brand of social epistemology; his agenda is not historical but systematic. Yet in “Being and Being Known,” Sellars puts his case in historical rather than systematic terms..

Representation

• Mark H. Bickhard (2001). Function, anticipation, representation.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Function emerges in certain kinds of far-from-equilibrium systems. One important kind of function is that of interactive anticipation, an adaptedness to temporal complexity. Interactive anticipation is the locus of the emergence of normative representational content, and, thus, of representation in general: interactive anticipation is the naturalistic core of the evolution of cognition. Higher forms of such anticipation are involved in the subsequent macro-evolutionary sequence of learning, emotions, and reflexive consciousness
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.lehigh.edu/~mhb0/funcanticiprep.html
  http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/2001AIPC..573..459B
  
• Mark H. Bickhard (2000). Information and representation in autonomous agents.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Information and representation are thought to be intimately related. Representation, in fact, is commonly considered to be a special kind of information. It must be a _special_ kind, because otherwise all of the myriad instances of informational relationships in the universe would be representational -- some restrictions must be placed on informational relationships in order to refine the vast set into those that are truly representational. I will argue that information in this general sense is important to genuine agents, but that it is a blind alley with regard to the attempt to understand representation. On the other hand, I will also argue that a different, quite non-standard, form of information is central to genuine representation. First I turn to some of the reasons why information as usually considered is the wrong category for understanding representation; second to an alternative model of representation -- one that is naturally emergent in autonomous agents, and that does involve information, but not in any standard form; and third I return to standard notions of informational relationships and show what they are in fact useful for
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S1389041799000078
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/13890417/2000/00000001/00000002/art00007
  
• Mark H. Bickhard (1998). Levels of representationality.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The dominant assumptions -- throughout contemporary philosophy, psychology, cognitive science, and artificial intelligence -- about the ontology underlying intentionality, and its core of representationality, is that of encodings -- some sort of informational or correspondence or covariation relationship between the represented and its representation that constitutes that representational relationship. There are many disagreements concerning details and implementations, and even some suggestions about claimed alternative ontologies, such as connectionism (though none that escape what I argue is the fundamental flaw in these dominant approaches). One assumption that seems to be held by all, however, usually without explication or defense, is that there is _one_ singular underlying ontology to representationality. In this paper, I argue that there are in fact quite a number of ontologies that manifest representationality -- levels of representationality -- and that _none_ of them are the standard "manipulations of encoded symbols" ontology, nor any other variation on the informational approach to representation. Collectively, these multiple representational ontologies constitute a framework for cognition, whether natural or artificial
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.informaworld.com/index/GVFW3288WBX97XP7.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/tandf/teta/1998/00000010/00000002/art00002
  
• Mark H. Bickhard (2002). Mind as process.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: assumptions about the phenomena of interest with process models. Thus, phlogiston has been replaced by combustion, caloric by random thermal motion, and vital fluid by far- from-equilibrium self-reproducing organizations of process. The most significant exceptions to this historical pattern are found in studies of the mind. Here, substance assumptions are still ubiquitous, ranging from models of representation to those of emotions to personality and psychopathology. Substance assumptions do pernicious damage to our ability to understand such phenomena. In this discussion, I will focus on the problem of representation
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.lehigh.edu/~mhb0/cogs7webreadings/MindasProcess.pdf
  
• Mark H. Bickhard (1993). Representational content in humans and machines.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This article focuses on the problem of representational content. Accounting for representational content is the central issue in contemporary naturalism: it is the major remaining task facing a naturalistic conception of the world. Representational content is also the central barrier to contemporary cognitive science and artificial intelligence: it is not possible to understand representation in animals nor to construct machines with genuine representation given current (lack of) understanding of what representation is. An elaborated critique is offered to current approaches to representation, arguing that the basic underlying approach is, at root, logically incoherent, and, thus, that standard approaches are doomed to failure. An alternative model of representation - interactivism - is presented that avoids or solves the problems facing standard approaches. Interactivism is framed by a version of functionalism, and a naturalization of that functionalism completes an outline of a naturalization of representation and representational content
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.lehigh.edu/~mhb0/repconascii
  http://www.lehigh.edu/~mhb0/repcon.html
  http://www.lehigh.edu/~mhb0/repconpage.html
  http://courses.media.mit.edu/2004spring/mas966/Bickhard 1993.pdf
  http://www.informaworld.com/index/777966101.pdf
  
• Mark H. Bickhard (2003). Some notes on internal and external relations and representation.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Internal relations are those relations that are intrinsic to the nature of one or more of the relata. They are a kind of essential relation, rather than an essential property. For example, an arc of a circle is internally related to the center of that circle in the sense that
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.lehigh.edu/~mhb0/Int.ExtRelations.pdf
  http://benjamins.com/cgi-bin/t_articles.cgi?bookid=C&E 4:1&artid=499026137
  http://www.benjamins.nl/cgi-bin/t_articles.cgi?bookid=C&E 4:1&artid=499026137
  http://www.benjamins.nl/cgi-bin/t_articles.cgi?bookid=C_E_4_1&artid=499026137
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/jbp/ce/2003/00000004/00000001/art00006
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/jbp/ce/2003/00000004/00000001/art00006
  
• Mark H. Bickhard (2004). The dynamic emergence of representation.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: A final version of this paper is in press as: Bickhard, M. H. (in press). The Dynamic Emergence of Representation. In H. Clapin, P. Staines, P. Slezak (Eds.) Representation in Mind: New Approaches to Mental Representation. Praeger
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.lehigh.edu/~mhb0/dynemergrep.html
  http://www.cogs.indiana.edu/cogx/dynemergrep.pdf
  
• Stephen Butterfill (online). Using and understanding maps.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Many philosophers who advocate broadly pragmatist accounts of belief or language treat maps as paradigm examples of representation and they often assume that a pragmatic account of representation is obviously correct for maps (e.g. Dewey, Dretske, Millikan, Putnam and Ramsey). By examining mapping activities and the representational properties of maps in detail, this paper argues that no single notion of representation can fit every map or every mapping activity. This is bad news for pragmatists: if there are maps they can’t cope with, we should question whether they can tell the full story about belief or language
• Noam A. Chomsky (1980). Rules and representations.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=KdYOYJwjFo0C&oi=fnd&pg=PA5&sig=qtNeAs__Z49VuYyK8agT3Ntno-Q
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=4SHikp8tHkQC&oi=fnd&pg=PR7&ots=CENIyZ730_&sig=5ctl5qiA37r9UFhPjM6eChPXO4s
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=4SHikp8tHkQC&oi=fnd&pg=PR7&ots=CFFGzV_02_&sig=KVEV1lXc1oejmiyK9aaNOjFs-u8
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=4SHikp8tHkQC&oi=fnd&pg=PR7&ots=CFFHBW_1Z0&sig=R3fSzNy_ie3iLLW39_4ktJBoolQ
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=4SHikp8tHkQC&oi=fnd&pg=PR7&ots=CENICW-5Y1&sig=YMoWbLmK_W_hh2dWTHm-IzHnmrA
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=AylPUKSWQ5MC&oi=fnd&pg=PR7&ots=JkpmrOjE9z&sig=ZkPNbuFchQ_VK7qRld4YlZLc8wg
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=AylPUKSWQ5MC&oi=fnd&pg=PR7&ots=JkpprQnBbC&sig=1FR-eiy2zphxjncYMD88gPs6HQE
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=AylPUKSWQ5MC&oi=fnd&pg=PR7&ots=JjyprQfE8z&sig=eL9Rr8w4BWJd-BeBAwY8Q0xvCqI
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=AylPUKSWQ5MC&oi=fnd&pg=PR7&ots=JkpqzSkKaA&sig=bVLlw4Y8PNFHYRuno1MPSWEcJBM
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=4SHikp8tHkQC&oi=fnd&pg=PR7&ots=CEOJwZ07-_&sig=NxWnl7UHNk2yEaUCkMzzMHYPN7Q
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=AylPUKSWQ5MC&oi=fnd&pg=PR7&ots=JkppxRhFaF&sig=x6WtIz4x-_ho3PHLcMyPFy-WmsM
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=AylPUKSWQ5MC&oi=fnd&pg=PR7&ots=JkpmxPeCeC&sig=ij4ViBYgtbq0j7ww7vR9d8QjGgQ
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=4SHikp8tHkQC&oi=fnd&pg=PR7&ots=CEOJyZ17YV&sig=VrY7PP5mwY98GRTardq8qrcfwDQ
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=4SHikp8tHkQC&oi=fnd&pg=PR7&ots=CFFKvY14_2&sig=jZzCL7G-6flLju2DrJ2OxssuoOA
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=4SHikp8tHkQC&oi=fnd&pg=PR7&ots=CFFFxU_-3Z&sig=8vxoSvoV5uwGH4zs_4owYtYF3uY
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=4SHikp8tHkQC&oi=fnd&pg=PR7&ots=CFFIxW2611&sig=3_9IMMpDCZBEQhgdDj1oWFofxfU
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=4SHikp8tHkQC&oi=fnd&pg=PR7&ots=CFFHvV250W&sig=CFbx6pQ3cTG20W6uhGrc5_F1egE
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=4SHikp8tHkQC&oi=fnd&pg=PR7&ots=CFFJzX13_1&sig=IBTmbAPgChl-PiyC-fWX3cPoQDE
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=4SHikp8tHkQC&oi=fnd&pg=PR7&ots=CEOJtW-2YX&sig=R7oguDK-Wsv7kI5M_drgMNI5CxY
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=AylPUKSWQ5MC&oi=fnd&pg=PR7&ots=JkplvOeBfB&sig=r6HgLLVS7WVMcVgOT5dB6zpsdKk
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=4SHikp8tHkQC&oi=fnd&pg=PR7&ots=CFFJtW7--_&sig=ads3OGvArRQzrhvIZ6rR21HedJk
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=4SHikp8tHkQC&oi=fnd&pg=PR7&ots=CFFLxZ_6-2&sig=Bdh52H1x7_zrBTMA-fciPcrt-hA
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=AylPUKSWQ5MC&oi=fnd&pg=PR7&ots=JkpntPiHcy&sig=ykzw-BiFtDAO61_gojC55ZajPhU
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=AylPUKSWQ5MC&oi=fnd&pg=PR7&ots=JkpnzQeD9E&sig=fbsKor9dXFnpIXGbiZbtEDhfhOs
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=AylPUKSWQ5MC&oi=fnd&pg=PR7&ots=JkprvTeIbG&sig=lbcyL-iaBn3Lse2UJz0S30A7t24
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=AylPUKSWQ5MC&oi=fnd&pg=PR7&ots=JjypwThJ8x&sig=XedL5vKCA-oY1Sj5prsow7Gt4mo
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=AylPUKSWQ5MC&oi=fnd&pg=PR7&ots=JkpovQiIdF&sig=Jv4tXB51SpccOe0uZc5U_LyJxFQ
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=4SHikp8tHkQC&oi=fnd&pg=PR7&ots=CFFKBY48_Y&sig=F3DCzYzkEPiC-g-p8VW9IOE7u4k
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=4SHikp8tHkQC&oi=fnd&pg=PR7&ots=CEOGvS122-&sig=MjjlXIJp-DJbE4xINOgNdeF6EPs
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=AylPUKSWQ5MC&oi=fnd&pg=PR7&ots=JkpqtShGaG&sig=EYlDX525Eb04NvixUWJWuKLwIMA
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=4SHikp8tHkQC&oi=fnd&pg=PR7&ots=CFFGtU32ZX&sig=C5sxfIaXOziBs4OIQOlElF1SY5M
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=4SHikp8tHkQC&oi=fnd&pg=PR7&ots=CEOFuV23YY&sig=YZGp2q6d-ugjwggEa4Sj2rrL6qg
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=AylPUKSWQ5MC&oi=fnd&pg=PR7&ots=JjypuTgJbC&sig=80nakBSo8l5jmkyz9Ap-Aj03M3E
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=KdYOYJwjFo0C&oi=fnd&pg=PA3-IA2&ots=4-_GKgGI9b&sig=VByL1UmG15ixn6eXqoU2-kvUr_I
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=KdYOYJwjFo0C&oi=fnd&pg=PA3-IA2&ots=4-ZJShDK9g&sig=LOH4vAMSd7GIC1OWsvGb3ByRq7U
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=KdYOYJwjFo0C&oi=fnd&pg=PA3-IA2&ots=4-ZJOkLIdd&sig=nj8cayT09RIdA8oPEytko3zrAB4
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=KdYOYJwjFo0C&oi=fnd&pg=PA3-IA2&ots=4-_HLdFHfe&sig=UUoiSDTu1lAoqgs72rdXtBdxKqk
  
• Wayne D. Christensen (2004). Representation and the meaning of life.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://info.newcastle.edu.au/centre/casrg/publications/Representation-v9a.pdf
  http://www-cms.newcastle.edu.au/centre/casrg/publications/Representation-v9a.pdf
  http://weblearn.newcastle.edu.au/centre/casrg/publications/Representation-v9a.pdf
  
• Andy Clark (2002). Minds, brains and tools.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The selected texts for this discussion were two recent pieces by Dennett (
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.cogs.indiana.edu/andy/MindsBrains.pdf
  https://www.era.lib.ed.ac.uk/handle/1842/1314?mode=simple
  http://www.era.lib.ed.ac.uk/handle/1842/1314?mode=simple
  http://www.philosophy.ed.ac.uk/staff/clark/pubs/MindsBrains.pdf
  
• Robert E. Cummins & Pierre Poirier (2004). Representation and indication.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This paper is about two kinds of mental content and how they are related. We are going to call them representation and indication. We will begin with a rough characterization of each. The differences, and why they matter, will, hopefully, become clearer as the paper proceeds
• Daniel C. Dennett (2001). Things about things.   (More)
• Eric Dietrich & A. Markman (2003). Discrete thoughts: Why cognition must use discrete representations.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/dietrich03discrete.html
  http://www.psy.utexas.edu/psy/faculty/Markman/ML03.pdf
  http://www.psy.utexas.edu/psy/FACULTY/Markman/ML03.pdf
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/1468-0017.00216
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1468-0017.00216
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/mila/2003/00000018/00000001/art00005
  
• John B. Dilworth (2006). Representation as epistemic identification.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In a previous Philo article, it was shown how properties could be ontologically dispensed with via a representational analysis: to be an X is to comprehensively represent all the properties of an X. The current paper extends that representationalist (RT) theory by explaining representation itself in parallel epistemic rather than ontological terms. On this extended RT (ERT) theory, representations of X, as well as the real X, both may be identified as providing information about X, whether partial or comprehensive. But that information does not match ontological, property-based analyses of X, so it is epistemically fundamental–hence supporting a broadly conceptualist rather than nominalist metaphysics
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://homepages.wmich.edu/~dilworth/Representation_as_Epistemic_Identification.pdf
  
• Hubert L. Dreyfus (2002). Intelligence without representation: Merleau-ponty's critique of mental representation.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=5109709&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/X635718608PU1N52.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/phen/2002/00000001/00000004/05109709
  
• Shimon Edelman (1998). Representation is representation of similarities.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Intelligent systems are faced with the problem of securing a principled (ideally, veridical) relationship between the world and its internal representation. I propose a unified approach to visual representation, addressing both the needs of superordinate and basic-level categorization and of identification of specific instances of familiar categories. According to the proposed theory, a shape is represented by its similarity to a number of reference shapes, measured in a high-dimensional space of elementary features. This amounts to embedding the stimulus in a low-dimensional proximal shape space. That space turns out to support representation of distal shape similarities which is veridical in the sense of Shepard's (1968) notion of second-order isomorphism (i.e., correspondence between distal and proximal similarities among shapes, rather than between distal shapes and their proximal representations). Furthermore, a general expression for similarity between two stimuli, based on comparisons to reference shapes, can be used to derive models of perceived similarity ranging from continuous, symmetric, and hierarchical, as in the multidimensional scaling models (Shepard, 1980), to discrete and non-hierarchical, as in the general contrast models (Tversky, 1977; Shepard and Arabie, 1979)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/44953.html
  http://cogprints.org/566/00/199710008.ps
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000566/
  http://historical.ncstrl.org/tr/ps/weizmann_il/CS96-08.ps
  http://kybele.psych.cornell.edu/~edelman/Archive/bbs.ps.Z
  http://www.bbsonline.org/documents/a/00/00/05/64/index.html
  http://www.bbsonline.org/Preprints/OldArchive/bbs.edelman.html
  http://homepage.psy.utexas.edu/homepage/Faculty/Markman/PSY394/Edelman1998.pdf
  http://www.bbsonline.org/documents/a/00/00/05/64/bbs00000564-00/bbs.edelman.html
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:566
  http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=1&fid=29996&jid=BBS&volumeId=21&issueId=04&aid=29995
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=10097019&dopt=Citation
  http://www.journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0140525X98001253
  http://journals.cambridge.org/article_S0140525X98281258
  
• Shimon Edelman (1995). Representation, similarity, and the chorus of prototypes.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/345670.html
  http://cogprints.org/579/00/199711013.ps
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000579/
  http://historical.ncstrl.org/tr/ps/weizmann_il/CS93-10.ps
  http://wisdomarchive.wisdom.weizmann.ac.il:81/archive/00000160/
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000579/00/199711013.ps
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:579
  http://www.csa.com/partners/viewrecord.php?requester=gs&collection=TRD&recid=0175611CI
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/content/m207058506371250/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/m207058506371250/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/M207058506371250.pdf
  
• Shaun Gallagher (2000). Representation and deliberate action.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Dreyfus enlists the aid of Merleau-Ponty in his critique of representationalist theories of cognition. Such theories posit a representational element at some level of cognitive activity. The nature of the representation and how we think of it will depend upon the level at which one claims to find it. If we consider the case of perception, at one extreme it might be claimed that the representation is a conscious one, that is, that the perceiving subject is conscious of a representation, a _Vorstellung_ in the Kantian sense. In this case, it would clearly come between the perceiving subject and the world and in that sense interfere with a direct perception of the world. This sort of representational theory would be equivalent to idealism, and for good phenomenological reasons it is rejected by Merleau-Ponty and Dreyfus. At the other extreme, it is possible to find cognitive scientists talking about representations at the level of brain activity. Neural representations, either firing patterns or the actual "hard wiring" of neuronal connections (as, for example, neural maps in the somatosensory and motor areas responsible for the experience of the subject's own body), in some way enable perception. At this level of description there are various debates about how these mechanisms can be called representational. If the concept of representation involves reference to the perceptual field, in what sense does a neuronal pattern refer? There are also the familiar debates about how such mechanisms actually function, as well as the difficult problem of how such functions actually translate into personal level experience. Before these debates get off the ground, however, Dreyfus wants to steal the ammunition. He denies that there are representations at the level of brain processes
• Ruth G. Millikan (1996). Pushmi-pullyu representations.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: A list of groceries, Professor Anscombe once suggested, might be used as a shopping list, telling what to buy, or it might be used as an inventory list, telling what has been bought (Anscombe 1957). If used as a shopping list, the world is supposed to conform to the representation: if the list does not match what is in the grocery bag, it is what is in the bag that is at fault. But if used as an inventory list, the representation is supposed to conform to the world: if the list does not match what is in the bag, it is the list that is at fault. The first kind of representation, where the world is supposed to conform to the list, can be called "directive"; it represents or directs what is to be done. The second, where the list is supposed to conform to the world, can be called "descriptive"; it represents or describes what is the case. I wish to propose that there exist representations that face both these ways at once. With apologies to Dr. Doolittle, I call them pushmi-pullyu representations or PPRs
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=1520-8583(1995)9<185:PR>2.0.CO;2-7
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2214217.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/oso/1154790/2005/00000001/00000001/art00009
  
• Rick Grush (1997). The architecture of representation.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: b>: In this article I outline, apply, and defend a theory of natural representation. The main consequences of this theory are: i) representational status is a matter of how physical entities are used, and specifically is not a matter of causation, nomic relations with the intentional object, or information; ii) there are genuine (brain-)internal representations; iii) such representations are really representations, and not just farcical pseudo-representations, such as attractors, principal components, state-space partitions, or what-have-you;and iv) the theory allows us to sharply distinguish those complex behaviors which are genuinely cognitive from those which are merely complex and adaptive
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://mind.ucsd.edu/papers/arch/arch.rtf
  http://mind.ucsd.edu/papers/arch/archhtml/arch-text.html
  http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/./ftinterface~content=a793921352~fulltext=713240930
  
• Rick Grush (2004). The emulation theory of representation: Motor control, imagery, and perception.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The emulation theory of representation is developed and explored as a framework that can revealingly synthesize a wide variety of representational functions of the brain. The framework is based on constructs from control theory (forward models) and signal processing (Kalman filters). The idea is that in addition to simply engaging with the body and environment, the brain constructs neural circuits that act as models of the body and environment. During overt sensorimotor engagement, these models are driven by efference copies in parallel with the body and environment, in order to provide expectations of the sensory feedback, and to enhance and process sensory information. These models can also be run off-line in order to produce imagery, estimate outcomes of different actions, and evaluate and develop motor plans. The framework is initially developed within the context of motor control, where it has been shown that inner models running in parallel with the body can reduce the effects of feedback delay problems. The same mechanisms can account for motor imagery as the off-line driving of the emulator via efference copies. The framework is extended to account for visual imagery as the off-line driving of an emulator of the motor-visual loop. I also show how such systems can provide for amodal spatial imagery. Perception, including visual perception, results from such models being used to form expectations of, and to interpret, sensory input. I close by briefly outlining other cognitive functions that might also be synthesized within this framework, including reasoning, theory of mind phenomena, and language. Key Words: efference copies; emulation theory of representation; forward models; Kalman filters; motor control; motor imagery; perception; visual imagery
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://repositories.cdlib.org/postprints/723
  http://aya.technion.ac.il/karniel/CMCC/GrushBBS2003.pdf
  http://mind.ucsd.edu/papers/intro-emulation/intro-em.pdf
  http://vision.technion.ac.il/karniel/CMCC/GrushBBS2003.pdf
  http://www.bbsonline.org/documents/a/00/00/11/90/index.html
  http://www.bbsonline.org/Preprints/Grush/Referees/Grush.pdf
  http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2281&context=postprints
  http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=1&fid=265562&jid=BBS&volumeId=27&issueId=03&aid=265561
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=15736871&dopt=Citation
  http://www.journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0140525X04000093
  
• Gary Hatfield (1989). Computation, representation and content in noncognitive theories of perception.   (More)
• Steven Horst (1992). Notions of 'representation' in philosophy and empirical research.   (More)
• Anne Jaap Jacobson (ms). The uninviting room: Representations without contents.   (More)
• Uriah Kriegel (forthcoming). Personal-level representation.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The current orthodoxy on mental representation can be characterized in terms of three
  central ideas. The first is ontological, the second semantic, and the third methodological. After
  elucidating those, I argue that the emerging picture of mental representation is satisfactory only as
  an account of mental representation at the sub-personal level. It is unsatisfactory, in a principled
  way, as an account of mental representation at the personal level.
• Helge Malmgren (online). The essential connection between representation and learning.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: No doubt, we human beings often think about objects, remember facts and imagine events
• Pete Mandik & Rick Grush (2002). Representational parts.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In this reply we claim that, contra Dreyfus, the kinds of skillful performances Dreyfus discusses _are_ representational. We explain this proposal, and then defend it against an objection to the effect that the representational notion we invoke is a weak one countenancing only some global state of an organism as a representation. According to this objection, such a representation is not a robust, projectible property of an organism, and hence will gain no explana- tory leverage in cognitive scientific explanations. We argue on conceptual and empirical grounds that the representations we have identified are not weak unprojectible global states of organisms, but instead genuinely explanatory representational parts of persons
• Arthur B. Markman & Eric Dietrich (2000). Extending the classical view of representation.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Representation is a central part of models in cognitive science, but recently this idea has come under attack. Researchers advocating perceptual symbol systems, situated action, embodied cognition, and dynamical systems have argued against central assumptions of the classical representational approach to mind. We review the core assumptions of the dominant view of representation and the four suggested alternatives. We argue that representation should remain a core part of cognitive science, but that the insights from these alternative approaches must be incorporated into models of cognitive processing
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://biologie.kappa.ro/Literature/Misc_cogsci/articole/lang_audition/markman00.pdf
  http://bingweb.binghamton.edu/~dietrich/Papers/ComputationlismRep/ExtendgClassicVuOfRep.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=11115761&dopt=Citation
  
• M. Morris (1991). Why there are no mental representations.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/q412706211xq526r/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/Q412706211XQ526R.pdf
  
• Jonathan Opie & Gerard O'Brien (2004). Notes toward a structuralist theory of mental representation.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.personal.ceu.hu/departs/personal/Nenad_Miscevic/RESCUING CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS.doc
  http://www.adelaide.edu.au/philosophy/publications/Notes_toward_a_structuralist_theory_of_MR.pdf
  http://arts.adelaide.edu.au/humanities/philosophy/publications/Notes_toward_a_structuralist_theory_of_MR.pdf
  http://hps.arts.unsw.edu.au/hps_content/staff_homepages/p_slezak_site/Article Links/2004/Slezak_Fodor_Guilty_Passions_2004.doc
  
• David Pitt (2000). Mental Representation.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The notion of a "mental representation" is, arguably, in the first instance a theoretical construct of cognitive science. As such, it is a basic concept of the Computational Theory of Mind, according to which cognitive states and processes are constituted by the occurrence, transformation and storage (in the mind/brain) of information-bearing structures (representations) of one kind or another
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mental-representation
  http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mental-representation/
  http://www.seop.leeds.ac.uk/entries/mental-representation/
  http://www.illc.uva.nl/~seop/entries/mental-representation/
  http://www.science.uva.nl/~seop/entries/mental-representation/
  http://setis.library.usyd.edu.au/stanford/entries/mental-representation/
  
• Karl H. Pribram (1982). Computations and representations.   (More)
• Zenon W. Pylyshyn (online). Rules and representations: Chomsky and representational realism.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: called,_ Cognitive Science_ was to bring back scienti?c realism. This may strike you as a very odd claim, for one does not usually think of science as needing to be talked into scienti?c realism. Science is, after all, the study of reality by the most precise instruments of measurement and
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/pylyshyn88rules.html
  http://ruccs.rutgers.edu/ftp/pub/papers/chomsky.ps
  http://ruccs.rutgers.edu/ftp/pub/papers/chomsky.pdf
  http://cogsci.soton.ac.uk/~harnad/Papers/Py104/Postscript/zenon.rules.ps
  
• Michael Rescorla (forthcoming). Chrysippus's Dog as a Case Study in Non-Linguistic Cognition.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: I critique an ancient argument for the possibility of non-linguistic deductive inference. The argument, attributed to Chrysippus, describes a dog whose behavior supposedly reflects disjunctive syllogistic reasoning. Drawing on contemporary robotics, I urge that we can equally well explain the dog's behavior by citing probabilistic reasoning over cognitive maps. I then critique various experimentally-based arguments from scientific psychology that echo Chrysippus's anecdotal presentation.
• Michael Rescorla (2009). Cognitive maps and the language of thought.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Fodor advocates a view of cognitive processes as computations defined over the language of thought (or Mentalese). Even among those who endorse Mentalese, considerable controversy surrounds its representational format. What semantically relevant structure should scientific psychology attribute to Mentalese symbols? Researchers commonly emphasize logical structure, akin to that displayed by predicate calculus sentences. To counteract this tendency, I discuss computational models of navigation drawn from probabilistic robotics. These models involve computations defined over cognitive maps, which have geometric rather than logical structure. They thereby demonstrate the possibility of rational cognitive processes in an exclusively non-logical representational medium. Furthermore, they offer much promise for the empirical study of animal navigation.
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://bjps.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/60/2/377
  
• Gregg H. Rosenberg & Michael L. Anderson (online). Content and action: The guidance theory of representation.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: b>. The current essay introduces the guidance theory of representation, according to which the content and intentionality of representations can be accounted for in terms of the way they provide guidance for action. We offer a brief account of the biological origins of representation, a formal characterization of the guidance theory, some examples of its use, and show how the guidance theory handles some traditional problem cases for representation: the problems of error and of representation of fictional and abstract entities
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/3953/1/CNA.pdf
  http://www.agcognition.org/papers/CNA.pdf
  http://www.cs.umd.edu/~anderson/papers/CNA.pdf
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00003953/
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00003953/01/CNA.pdf
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?id=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:3953
  
• Peter Slezak (2002). The tripartite model of representation.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Robert Cummins [(1996) Representations, targets and attitudes, Cambridge, MA: Bradford/MIT, p. 1] has characterized the vexed problem of mental representation as "the topic in the philosophy of mind for some time now." This remark is something of an understatement. The same topic was central to the famous controversy between Nicolas Malebranche and Antoine Arnauld in the 17th century and remained central to the entire philosophical tradition of "ideas" in the writings of Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Reid and Kant. However, the scholarly, exegetical literature has almost no overlap with that of contemporary cognitive science. I show that the recurrence of certain deep perplexities about the mind is a systematic and pervasive pattern arising not only throughout history, but also in a number of independent domains today such as debates over visual imagery, symbolic systems and others. Such historical and contemporary convergences suggest that the fundamental issues cannot arise essentially from the theoretical guise they take in any particular case
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/./ftinterface~content=a713690568~fulltext=713240930
  http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/index/N62CA0DMWHB9WY3G.pdf
  http://www.informaworld.com/index/N62CA0DMWHB9WY3G.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/routledg/cphp/2002/00000015/00000003/art00002
  
• Peter Slezak (2004). The world gone wrong? Images, illusions, mistakes and misrepresentations.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In seeking to understand the extraordinary persistence and recalcitrance of the problems of intentionality, it is instructive to focus attention on one particular facet of the issue. The question of misrepresentation has been discussed recently as a puzzling aspect of the overall problem of the semantics of mental representation (Fodor 1984, 1994, Dretske 1994) and I propose to explore this issue as a loose thread which may be pulled to unravel the rest of the tangled ball
• Aaron Sloman (ms). Toward a general theory of representations.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/sloman94towards.html
  http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/cogaff/Aaron.Sloman_towards.th.rep.pdf
  http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~axs/cog_affect/Aaron.Sloman_towards.th.rep.ps.gz
  http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/Aaron.Sloman_towards.th.rep.ps
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=uHZv4jJItOAC&oi=fnd&pg=PA118&ots=iaATOoNrTu&sig=pmlRcnZP1He5IGZPHdUR_zecalk
  
• Nigel J. T. Thomas (online). A non-symbolic theory of conscious content: Imagery and activity.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Until a few years ago, Cognitive Science was firmly wedded to the notion that cognition must be explained in terms of the computational manipulation of internal representations or symbols. Although many people still believe this, the consensus is no longer solid. Whether it is truly threatened by connectionism is, perhaps, controversial, but there are yet more radical approaches that explicitly reject it. Advocates of "embodied" or "situated" approaches to cognition (e.g., Smith, 1991; Varela _et al_ , 1991, Clancey, 1997) argue that thought cannot be understood as entirely internal. Furthermore, it is argued that autonomous robots can be designed to behave more intelligently if representationalist programming techniques are avoided (Brooks, 1991), and that the way our brains control our behavior is better understood in terms of chaos and dynamical systems theory rather than as any sort computation (e.g., Freeman & Skarda, 1990; Van Gelder & Port, 1995; Van Gelder, 1995; Garson, 1996)
• Nigel J. T. Thomas (2005). Mental Imagery, Philosophical Issues About.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: An introduction to the science and philosophy of mental imagery.
• David L. Thompson (ms). What, if anything, is represented? Objects in their worlds.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Up to David L. Thompson's Homepage Outline by Section: I INTRODUCTION II A COLOURED ILLUSTRATION III THE NATURE OF WORLDS #1. Generalization from colour to all perceived #2. Chess as a model world. #3. Worlds depend on supervenience #4. Supervenience #5. Supervenience applied to worlds #6. Five dependencies #6. Interrelationships between the five #7. The enactive approach to transformation #8. The transformation of worlds #9. A world is a condensed history #10. A shared world defined by individuals #11. Summary VI ONTOLOGY #1. Are perceived objects duplicates of physical #2. Are objects in the world real or illusory? #3. Ontological status of worlds and objects #3. Ontological status of worlds and objects V. CONCLUSION ENDNOTES
• Max Velmans (1998). Physical, psychological, and virtual realities.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This chapter examines the similarities and differences between physical, psychological and virtual realities, and challenges some conventional, implicitly dualist assumptions about how these relate to each other. Virtual realities are not easily understood in either dualist or materialist reductive terms, as they exemplify the reflexive nature of perception. The chapter summarises some of the evidence for this reflexive model
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/4761/01/Physical,_psychological_and_virtual_realities.pdf
  

The Concept of Representation

Varieties of Representation

Theories of Representation