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2. Intentionality (Intentionality on PhilPapers)

• Propositional Attitudes [177]
• The Language of Thought [16]
• The Intentional Stance [17]
• Eliminativism about Propositional Attitudes [13]
• Propositional Attitudes, Misc [14]
• Content Internalism and Externalism [240]
• Is Content in the Head? [19]
• Social Externalism [21]
• Externalism and Psychological Explanation [17]
• Externalism and Mental Causation [4]
• Externalism and the Theory of Vision [3]
• Externalism and Computation [2]
• Externalism and Self-Knowledge [79]
• Narrow Content [22]
• The Extended Mind [32]
• Content Internalism and Externalism, Misc [22]
• Naturalizing Mental Content [118]
• Information-Based Accounts of Mental Content [24]
• Asymmetric-Dependence Accounts of Mental Content [7]
• Causal Accounts of Mental Content, Misc [3]
• Teleological Accounts of Mental Content [22]
• Inferentialist Accounts of Meaning and Content [19]
• Interpretivist Accounts of Meaning and Content [10]
• Naturalizing Mental Content, Misc [21]
• The Nature of Contents [190]
• Fregean and Russellian Contents [0]
• Indexical Contents [1]
• Intentional Objects [6]
• Object-Dependent Contents [0]
• Two-Dimensionalism about Content [7]
• The Nature of Contents, Misc [1]
• Aspects of Intentionality [97]
• Naturalism and Intentionality [7]
• Kripkenstein on Meaning [11]
• Rule-Following [15]
• Normativity of Meaning and Content [13]
• Meaning Holism [21]
• Explanatory Role of Content [12]
• Collective Intentionality [18]
• Aspects of Intentionality, Misc [0]
• Representation [135]
• The Concept of Representation [0]
• Varieties of Representation [0]
• Theories of Representation [0]
• Skepticism about Representations [0]
• Representation, Misc [0]
• Concepts [115]
• Perception-Based Theories of Concepts [0]
• Inferential Theories of Concepts [0]
• Prototype and Exemplar Theories of Concepts [0]
• Theory-Based Theories of Concepts [1]
• Atomist Theories of Concepts [0]
• Theories of Concepts, Misc [0]
• Conceptual Change [3]
• Concept Possession [0]
• Ontology of Concepts [0]
• Recognitional Concepts [0]
• Concepts, Misc [0]
• Intentionality, Misc [13]

Propositional Attitudes

• David Landy (2005). Inside doubt: On the non-identity of the theory of mind and propositional attitude psychology.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Eliminative materialism is a popular view of the mind which holds that propositional attitudes, the typical units of our traditional understanding, are unsupported by modern connectionist psychology and neuroscience, and consequently that propositional attitudes are a poor scientific postulate, and do not exist. Since our traditional folk psychology employs propositional attitudes, the usual argument runs, it too represents a poor theory, and may in the future be replaced by a more successful neurologically grounded theory, resulting in a drastic improvement in our interpersonal relationships. I contend that these eliminativist arguments typically run together two distinct capacities: the folk psychological mechanisms which we use to understand one another, and scientific and philosophical guesses about the structure of those understandings. Both capacities are ontologically committed and therefore empirical. However, the commitments whose prospects look so dismal to the eliminativist, in particular the causal and logical image of propositional attitudes, belong to the guesses, and not necessarily to the underlying mechanisms. It is the commitments of traditional philosophical perspectives about the operation of our folk psychology which are contradicted by?new evidence and modeling methods in connectionist psychology. Our actual folk psychology was not clearly committed to causal, sentential propositional attitudes, and thus is not directly threatened by connectionist psychology
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/f4m04131105x8rx4/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/F4M04131105X8RX4.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/mind/2005/00000015/F0020003/00009004
  

The Language of Thought

• Louise M. Antony (ms). What are you thinking? Character and content in the language of thought.   (More)
• Murat Aydede (1995). Connectionism and the language of thought.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Fodor and Pylyshyn's (F&P) critique of connectionism has posed a challenge to connectionists: Adequately explain such nomological regularities as systematicity and productivity without postulating a "language of thought'' (LOT). Some connectionists declined to meet the challenge on the basis that the alleged regularities are somehow spurious. Some, like Smolensky, however, took the challenge very seriously, and attempted to meet it by developing models that are supposed to be non-classical
• Murat Aydede (1997). Language of thought: The connectionist contribution.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract:   Fodor and Pylyshyn's critique of connectionism has posed a challenge to connectionists: Adequately explain such nomological regularities as systematicity and productivity without postulating a "language of thought" (LOT). Some connectionists like Smolensky took the challenge very seriously, and attempted to meet it by developing models that were supposed to be non-classical. At the core of these attempts lies the claim that connectionist models can provide a representational system with a combinatorial syntax and processes sensitive to syntactic structure. They are not implementation models because, it is claimed, the way they obtain syntax and structure sensitivity is not "concatenative," hence "radically different" from the way classicists handle them. In this paper, I offer an analysis of what it is to physically satisfy/realize a formal system. In this context, I examine the minimal truth-conditions of LOT Hypothesis. From my analysis it will follow that concatenative realization of formal systems is irrelevant to LOTH since the very notion of LOT is indifferent to such an implementation level issue as concatenation. I will conclude that to the extent to which they can explain the law-like cognitive regularities, a certain class of connectionist models proposed as radical alternatives to the classical LOT paradigm will in fact turn out to be LOT models, even though new and potentially very exciting ones
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/content/v8365g5vp26x7x75/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/v8365g5vp26x7x75/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=115552&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/V8365G5VP26X7X75.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/mind/1997/00000007/00000001/00115552
  
• Murat Aydede (online). The language of thought hypothesis.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: 1 *Common Sense Conception of Beliefs and Other Propositional Attitudes 2 What is the Language of Thought Hypothesis? 3 Status of LOTH 4 Scope of LOTH 5 *Natural Language as Mentalese? 6 *Nativism and LOTH 7 Naturalism and LOTH
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/353/0/LOTH.SEP.html
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:353
  http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/language-thought/
  
• Ansgar Beckermann (1994). Can there be a language of thought?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: 1. Cognitive sciences in a broad sense are simply all those sciences which concern themselves with the analysis and explanation of cognitive capacities and achievements. If one speaks of _cognitive science_ in the singular, however, usually something more is meant. Cognitive science is not only characterized by a specific object of research, but also through a particular kind of explanatory paradigm, i.e. the information processing paradigm. Stillings _et. al. _for example begin their book _Cognitive Science _as follows:

  Cognitive scientists view the human mind as a complex system that receives, stores,
  retrieves, transforms, and transmits information. (Stillings 1987: 1)

  The information processing paradigm however, leads directly to the paradigm of symbol processing, because a system can, as it seems, only receive, store and process information if it has at its disposal a system of internal representations or _symbols_, i.e. an internal language in which this information is encoded. At least this appears to be an idea which suggests itself and which Peter Hacker expresses as follows
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.uni-bielefeld.de/(de)/philosophie/personen/beckermann/lot_we.pdf
  
• Ben Blumson (online). Mental maps.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: It’s often hypothesized that the structure of mental representation is map-like rather than language-like. The possibility arises as a counterexample to the argument from the best explanation of productivity and systematicity for the Language of Thought Hypothesis – the hypothesis that mental structure is language-like. In this paper, I argue that the Map Hypothesis does not undermine the argument, because it is not in fact a genuine alternative to the Language of Thought Hypothesis
• David J. Chalmers (1999). Is there synonymy in Ockham's mental language.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: William of Ockham's semantic theory was founded on the idea that thought takes place in a language not unlike the languages in which spoken and written communication occur. This mental language was held to have a number of features in common with everyday languages. For example, mental language has simple terms, not unlike words, out of which complex expressions can be constructed. As with words, each of these terms has some meaning, or signification; in fact Ockham held that the signification of everyday words derives precisely from the signification of mental terms. Furthermore, the meaning of a mental expression depends directly on the meaning of its constituent terms, as is the case with expressions in more familiar languages
• Martin Davies (1991). Concepts, connectionism, and the language of thought.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The aim of this paper is to demonstrate a _prima facie_ tension between our commonsense conception of ourselves as thinkers and the connectionist programme for modelling cognitive processes. The language of thought hypothesis plays a pivotal role. The connectionist paradigm is opposed to the language of thought; and there is an argument for the language of thought that draws on features of the commonsense scheme of thoughts, concepts, and inference. Most of the paper (Sections 3-7) is taken up with the argument for the language of thought hypothesis. The argument for an opposition between connectionism and the language of thought comes towards the end (Section 8), along with some discussion of the potential eliminativist consequences (Sections 9 and
• Martin Davies (1998). Language, thought, and the language of thought (aunty's own argument revisited).   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In this chapter, I shall be examining an argument for the language of thought hypothesis
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=NUtObnV0zJsC&oi=fnd&pg=PA226&dq=Language,+thought,+and+the+language+of+thought+(Aunty's+own+argument+revisited)+Davies&ots=nrCXm2Kpxn&sig=2SU9WXQfS_axxEsQ3WbiCd2BRRI
  
• Richard DeWitt (1995). Vagueness, semantics, and the language of thought.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/volume1/psyche-93-1-1-vagueness-1-dewitt.html
  
• Jerry A. Fodor (1987). Why there still has to be a language of thought.   (More)
• Kent Johnson (2004). On the systematicity of the language of thought.   (More)
• Edouard Machery (2005). You don't know how you think: Introspection and language of thought.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: recent cognitive theories into two antagonistic groups. Sententialists claim that we think in some language, while advocates of non-linguistic views of cognition deny this claim. The Introspective Argument for Sententialism is one of the most appealing arguments for sententialism. In substance, it claims that the introspective fact of inner speech provides strong evidence that our thoughts are linguistic. This article challenges this argument. I claim that the Introspective Argument for Sententialism confuses the content of our thoughts with their vehicles: while sententialism is a thesis about the vehicles of our thoughts, inner speech sentences are the content of auditory or articulatory images. The rebuttal of the introspective argument for sententialism is shown to have a general significance in cognitive science: introspection does not tell us how we think. The problem The introspective argument for sententialism The argument for the blindness of introspection thesis Objections and replies Conclusion
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://hal.ccsd.cnrs.fr/docs/00/05/35/20/PDF/ijn_00000446_00.pdf
  http://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/docs/00/05/35/20/PDF/ijn_00000446_00.pdf
  http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/docs/00/05/35/20/PDF/ijn_00000446_00.pdf
  http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00001954/01/BJPS_Instrospection.pdf
  http://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/documents/disk0/00/00/04/46/ijn_00000446_00/ijn_00000446_00.pdf
  http://bjps.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/full/56/3/469?ijkey=uDjjrRt1XJAIbaF&keytype=ref
  http://bjps.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/56/3/469?ijkey=0W190KJ1t6SNyL6&keytype=ref
  http://bjps.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/56/3/469
  http://bjps.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/56/3/469
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/oup/phisci/2005/00000056/00000003/art00469
  
• Robert D. Rupert (2001). Coining terms in the language of thought: Innateness, emergence, and the lot of Cummins's argument against the causal theory of mental content.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Robert Cummins argues that any causal theory of mental content (CT) founders on an established fact of human psychology: that theory mediates sensory detection. He concludes,
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-362X(200110)98:10<499:CTITLO>2.0.CO;2-Y
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3649467.pdf
  
• Susan Schneider (forthcoming). The nature of primitive symbols in the language of thought.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This paper provides a theory of the nature of symbols in the language of thought (LOT). My discussion consists in three parts. In part one, I provide three arguments for the individuation of primitive symbols in terms of total computational role. The first of these arguments claims that Classicism requires that primitive symbols be typed in this manner; no other theory of typing will suffice. The second argument contends that without this manner of symbol individuation, there will be computational processes that fail to supervene on syntax, together with the rules of composition and the computational algorithms. The third argument says that cognitive science needs a natural kind that is typed by total computational role. Otherwise, either cognitive science will be incomplete, or its laws will have counterexamples. Then, part two defends this view from a criticism, offered by both Jerry Fodor and Jesse Prinz, who respond to my view with the charge that because the types themselves are individuated
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.sas.upenn.edu/~sls/documents/SchneiderNatureSymbolsMindLang.doc
  http://www.sas.upenn.edu/~sls/documents/SchneiderNatureSymbolsMindLang-1-2.pdf
  
• Brent Silby (online). Revealing the language of thought.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.geocities.com/brent_silby/RevealLanguageOfThought.html
  

The Intentional Stance

• Kristin Andrews (2000). Our understanding of other minds: Theory of mind and the intentional stance.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/2000/00000007/00000007/1030
  
• William P. Bechtel (1985). Realism, instrumentalism, and the intentional stance.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.leaonline.com/doi/pdfplus/10.1207/s15516709cog0904_5
  http://www.cogsci.rpi.edu/CSJarchive/1985v09/i04/p0473p0497/MAIN.PDF
  
• David Beisecker (2002). Dennett and the Quest for real meaning: In defense of a myth.   (More)
• Lisa Bortolotti (2003). Inconsistency and interpretation.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: 1. Introduction In this paper my purpose is to examine whether the case of inconsistent believers can offer a reason to object to theories of belief ascription that rely on a rationality constraint. I shall first illustrate how the possibility of inconsistent believers might be a challenge for the rationality constraint and then assess Davidson's influential reply to that challenge
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/./ftinterface~content=a782535487~fulltext=713240930
  http://www.informaworld.com/index/782535487.pdf
  
• Daniel C. Dennett (1971). Intentional systems.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-362X(19710225)68:4<87:IS>2.0.CO;2-8
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2025382.pdf
  
• Daniel C. Dennett (1991). Real patterns.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Are there really beliefs? Or are we learning (from neuroscience and psychology, presumably) that, strictly speaking, beliefs are figments of our imagination, items in a superceded ontology? Philosophers generally regard such ontological questions as admitting just two possible answers: either beliefs exist or they don't. There is no such state as quasi-existence; there are no stable doctrines of semi-realism. Beliefs must either be vindicated along with the viruses or banished along with the banshees. A bracing conviction prevails, then, to the effect that when it comes to beliefs (and other mental items) one must be either a realist or an eliminative materialist
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-362X(199101)88:1<27:RP>2.0.CO;2-2
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-362X(199101)88:1<27:RP>2.0.CO;2-2
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2027085.pdf
  
• Daniel C. Dennett (1990). The interpretation of texts, people and other artifacts.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: I want to explore four different exercises of interpretation: (1) the interpretation of texts (or hermeneutics), (2) the interpretation of people (otherwise known as "attribution" psychology, or cognitive or intentional psychology), (3) the interpretation of other artifacts (which I shall call artifact hermeneutics), (4) the interpretation of organism design in evolutionary biology--the controversial interpretive activity known as adaptationism
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/259/0/intrptxt.htm
  http://cogprints.org/259/00/intrptxt.htm
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000259/
  http://cogprints.soton.ac.uk/documents/disk0/00/00/02/59/
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000259/00/intrptxt.htm
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:259
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8205(199023)50<177:TIOTPA>2.0.CO;2-I
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8205(199023)50<177:TIOTPA>2.0.CO;2-I
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2108038.pdf
  
• Jerry A. Fodor & Ernest Lepore (1993). Is intentional ascription intrinsically normative?   (More)
• Reese M. Heitner (2000). Is design relative or real? Dennett on intentional relativism and physical realism.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.csa.com/partners/viewrecord.php?requester=gs&collection=TRD&recid=500801CI
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/n044802161230121/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=258826&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/N044802161230121.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/mind/2000/00000010/00000002/00258826
  
• David Joslin (2006). Real realization: Dennett's real patterns versus Putnam's ubiquitous automata.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/92571m7x71n87541/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/92571M7X71N87541.pdf
  
• Ruth G. Millikan (2000). Reading mother nature's mind.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: I try to focus our differences by examining the relation between what Dennett has termed "the intentional stance" and "the design stance." Dennett takes the intentional stance to be more basic than the design stance. Ultimately it is through the eyes of the intentional stance that both human and natural design are interpreted, hence there is always a degree of interpretive freedom in reading the mind, the purposes, both of Nature and of her children. The reason, or at least a reason, is that intentional interpretation is holistic, hence indeterminate, for the kinds of reasons given by Davidson and Quine. In contrast, I take the design stance to be more basic than the intentional stance. Intentional attributions express our best guesses about the locations of effects of certain kinds of natural design. And although there is often indeterminacy, ambiguity, or vagueness concerning what it is that natural selection (or learning) has selected for, these indeterminacies and vaguenesses are local, not holistic. There is reason to suppose that the better portion of Nature's purposes and the intentional states of her children are determinate in content within quite closely defined limits. I propose to defend this position as well as I can, so as to call from Dennett his own views on precisely where our paths separate (if they really do)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=jDwFYqcMEScC&oi=fnd&pg=PA55&dq=Reading+mother+nature's+mind+Millikan&ots=QFBQrlOKn3&sig=MCbeTEB5r1Z2sYdBmKqpZBe8kkc
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=jDwFYqcMEScC&oi=fnd&pg=PA55&dq=Reading+mother+nature's+mind+Millikan&ots=QFBRpkROn1&sig=C4eBoZAlYahCSed_wCNBwGQSYLA
  
• Ajit Narayanan (1996). The intentional stance and the imitation game.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/narayanan96intentional.html
  
• Huw Price (1995). Psychology in perspective.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: [email: huw@extro.su.oz.au] If recent literature is to be our guide, the main place of philosophy in the study of the mind would seem to be to determine the place of psychology in the study of the world. One distinctive kind of answer to this question begins by noting the central role of intentionality in psychology, and goes on to argue that this sets psychology apart from the natural sciences. Sometimes to be thus set apart is to be exiled, or rejected, but more often it is a protective move, intended to show that psychology is properly insulated from the reductionist demands of natural science. I am interested here in the general issue as to how this move to insulate intentional psychology should best be characterised-how to make sense of the idea that there can be a legitimate enterprise of this kind. I shall concentrate on what is perhaps the best known version of such a view, that of Daniel Dennett. I think that my conclusions apply to other versions as well, but Dennett provides a particularly accessible example
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.usyd.edu.au/time/price//preprints/psych.rtf
  http://www.usyd.edu.au/time/price//preprints/psych.html
  
• Lynne Rudder Baker (1989). Instrumental intentionality.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8248(198906)56:2<303:II>2.0.CO;2-H
  http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/resolve?id=doi:10.1086/289489
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8248(198906)56:2<303:II>2.0.CO;2-H
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/187876.pdf
  
• William E. Seager (2000). Real patterns and surface metaphysics.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Naturalism is supposed to be a Good Thing. So good in fact that everybody wants to be a naturalist, no matter what their views might be1. Thus there is some confusion about what, exactly, naturalism is. In what follows, I am going to be pretty much, though not exclusively, concerned with the topics of intentionality and consciousness, which only deepens the confusion for these are two areas
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=jDwFYqcMEScC&oi=fnd&pg=PA95&dq=Real+patterns+and+surface+metaphysics+Seager&ots=QFBQrlPKo-&sig=rAZEMPyVzaF8RhlRIe3fuwmxZc8
  
• Vesa Talvitie (2003). Repressed contents reconsidered: Repressed contents and Dennett's intentional stance approach.   (More)
• Christopher D. Viger (2000). Where do Dennett's stances stand? Explaining our kinds of minds.   (More)

Eliminativism about Propositional Attitudes

• Radu J. Bogdan (1988). Mental attitudes and common sense psychology: The case against elimination.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Aside from brute force, there are several philosophically respectable ways of eliminating the mental. In recent years the most popular elimination strategy has been directed against our common sense or folk psychological understanding of the mental. The strategy goes by the name of eliminative materialism (or eliminativism, in short). The motivation behind this strategy seems to be the following. If common sense psychology can be construed as the principled theory of the mental, whose vocabulary and principles implicitly define what counts as mental, then eliminating the theory is eliminating its subject matter. If the theory is shown to be false, then its subject matter does not exist. If, in other words, common sense psychology can be shown to describe and explain nothing real in human cognition, then the mental itself is a fiction
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0029-4624(198809)22:3<369:MAACSP>2.0.CO;2-D
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0029-4624(198809)22:3<369:MAACSP>2.0.CO;2-D
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2215709.pdf
  
• Paul M. Churchland (1981). Eliminative materialism and the propositional attitudes.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://roderik.net/eleminative_materialism_and_the_propistional_attitudes_referaat.pdf
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=xhIb7VjTqQ4C&oi=fnd&pg=PA42&ots=Hpgp9YRNqZ&sig=eJdXbqbW5t_vo350wilSUd0_lz8
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=k9SWKieq6-gC&oi=fnd&pg=PA42&ots=p8s2lR0v1t&sig=RHtr3OySoLXzFSDMj10f5P3V9m8
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=k9SWKieq6-gC&oi=fnd&pg=PA42&ots=p8s3nS_D3w&sig=OwOsHWYNvyiZEcuOda7V0nBWbXs
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=xhIb7VjTqQ4C&oi=fnd&pg=PA42&ots=Hpgo7XTFoW&sig=MFxsa6zCml4Ey1eCIQKm9HMwzOs
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-362X(198102)78:2<67:EMATPA>2.0.CO;2-8
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-362X(198102)78:2<67:EMATPA>2.0.CO;2-8
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2025900.pdf
  
• John J. Haldane (1988). Understanding folk.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=7KU-NskafwEC&oi=fnd&pg=PA263&ots=jY36MaKFsR&sig=1TbQyeHOm8XxZGjpKhjnZCkGRRk
  
• David K. Henderson & Terence E. Horgan (2004). What does it take to be a true believer?: Against the opulent ideology of eliminative materialism.   (More)
• Frank Jackson & Philip Pettit (1990). In defense of folk psychology.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: It turned out that there was no phlogiston, no caloric fluid, and no luminiferous ether. Might it turn out that there are no beliefs and desires? Patricia and Paul Churchland say yes} We say no. In part one we give our positive argument for the existence of beliefs and desires
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/m40hm4h677j5060j/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/M40HM4H677J5060J.pdf
  http://www.princeton.edu/~ppettit/papers/1990/In Defense of Folk Psychology.pdf
  
• William G. Lycan (2005). A particularly compelling refutation of eliminative materialism.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The 1960s saw heated discussion of Eliminative Materialism in regard to sensations and their phenomenal features. Thus directed, Eliminative Materialism is materialism or physicalism plus the distinctive and truly radical thesis that there have never occurred any sensations; no one has ever experienced a sensation. This view attracted few adherents(!), though to this day some philosophers are Eliminativists with respect to various alleged phenomenal features of sensations
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=m5pxXK-lTtkC&oi=fnd&pg=PA197&dq=A+particularly+compelling+refutation+of+eliminative+materialism+Lycan&ots=d50rE4oMDi&sig=Aq4a3zO2JqofZwbBbI17TA0SU-U
  
• Herman Philipse (1998). Shifting position?   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8205(199812)58:4<885:SP>2.0.CO;2-G
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2653730.pdf
  
• Herman Philipse (1997). The end of plasticity.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Paul Churchland has become famous for holding three controversial and interrelated doctrines which he put forward in early papers and in his first book. Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind (1979): eliminative materialism, the doctrine of the plasticity of perception, and a general network theory of language. In his latest book, The Engine of Reason, the Seat of the Soul (1995), Churchland aims to make some results of connectionist neuroscience available to the general public and explores the philosophical and social consequences that neuroscience is likely to have. I argue that these results of neuroscience refute the three doctrines that Churchland advocated in his earlier works. Yet youthful dreams do not die easily and Churchland is reluctant to relinquish his early views
  Additional links for this entry:
  https://dspace.library.uu.nl:8443/handle/1874/6802?mode=simple
  http://igitur-archive.library.uu.nl/ph/2005-0622-184535/UUindex.html
  http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/./ftinterface~content=a902026013~fulltext=713240930
  
• Michael M. Pitman (2003). Eliminative materialism and the integrity of science.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ajol.info/viewarticle.php?id=16774&jid=211
  http://www.ajol.info/viewarticle.php?id=16774&jid=211&layout=abstract
  
• Teed Rockwell (1995). Beyond eliminative materialism: Some unnoticed implications of Paul Churchland's pragmatic pluralism.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Paul Churchland's epistemology contains a tension between two positions, which I will call pragmatic pluralism and eliminative materialism. Pragmatic pluralism became predominant as Churchland's epistemology became more neurocomputationally inspired, which saved him from the skepticism implicit in certain passages of the theory of reduction he outlined in Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind. However, once he replaces eliminativism with a neurologically inspired pragmatic pluralism, Churchland 1) cannot claim that folk psychology might be a false theory, in any significant sense 2) cannot claim that the concepts of Folk psychology might be empty of extension and lack reference. 3) cannot sustain Churchland's criticism of Dennett's "intentional stance" . 4) cannot claim to be a form of scientific realism, in the sense of believing that what science describes is somehow realer that what other conceptual systems describe
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/379/0/BeyondEM.html
  http://cogprints.org/379/00/BeyondEM.html
  http://www.california.com/~mcmf/beyondem.html
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000379/00/BeyondEM.html
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:379
  
• A. Rosenberg (1991). How is eliminative materialism possible?   (More)
• Stephen P. Stich (1996). Deconstructing the mind.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Over the last two decades, debates over the viability of commonsense psychology have been center stage in both cognitive science and the philosophy of mind. Eliminativists have argued that advances in cognitive science and neuroscience will ultimately justify a rejection of our "folk" theory of the mind, and of its ontology. In the first half of this book Stich, who was at one time a leading advocate of eliminativism, maintains that even if the sciences develop in the ways that eliminativists foresee, none of the arguments for ontological elimination are tenable. Rather than being resolved by science, he contends, these ontological disputes will be settled by a pragmatic process in which social and political considerations have a major role to play. In later chapters, Stich argues that the widespread worry about "naturalizing" psychological properties is deeply confused, since there is no plausible account of what naturalizing requires on which the failure of the naturalization project would lead to eliminativism. He also offers a detailed analysis of the many different notions of folk psychology to be found in philosophy and psychology, and argues that simulation theory, which purports to be an alternative to folk psychology, is not supported by recent experimental findings
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&se=gglsc&d=24264184
  http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/courses/consciousness97/papers/stich.html
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=hbcsiGdZ0V0C&oi=fnd&pg=PA3&ots=g4paASjopW&sig=3pdNae-SMCd8Vz1nRKlJE_Pg9Ck
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=hbcsiGdZ0V0C&oi=fnd&pg=PA3&ots=g4odCLhqgV&sig=5gmeXMWVhMI5N79AYF4mYvKUSS0
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/oso/533330/1999
  
• William W. Tait (2002). The myth of the mind.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Of course, I do not mean by the title of this paper to deny the existence of something called
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://home.uchicago.edu/~wwtx/mythofthemind.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/7g4mal8ffqbqg6vr/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/7G4MAL8FFQBQG6VR.pdf
  

Propositional Attitudes, Misc

• Lynne Rudder Baker (2002). Attitudes in action: A causal account.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This article aims to vindicate the commonsensical view that what we think affects what we do. In order to show that mental properties like believing, desiring and intending are causally explanatory, I propose a nonreductive, materialistic account that identifies beliefs and desires by their content, and that shows how differences in the contents of beliefs and desires can make causal differences in what we do
• George Bealer (1998). Propositions.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Recent work in philosophy of language has raised significant problems for the traditional theory of propositions, engendering serious skepticism about its general workability. These problems are, I believe, tied to fundamental misconceptions about how the theory should be developed. The goal of this paper is to show how to develop the traditional theory in a way which solves the problems and puts this skepticism to rest. The problems fall into two groups. The first has to do with reductionism, specifically attempts to reduce propositions to extensional entities-either extensional functions or sets. The second group concerns problems of fine grained content-both traditional 'Cicero'/'Tully' puzzles and recent variations on them which confront scientific essentialism. After characterizing the problems, I outline a non-reductionist approach-the algebraic approach-which avoids the problems associated with reductionism. I then go on to show how the theory can incorporate non-Platonic (as well as Platonic) modes of presentation. When these are implemented nondescriptively, they yield the sort of fine-grained distinctions which have been eluding us. The paper closes by applying the theory to a cluster of remaining puzzles, including a pair of new puzzles facing scientific essentialism
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://pantheon.yale.edu/~gb275/Propositions.pdf
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0026-4423(199801)2:107:425<1:P>2.0.CO;2-0
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0026-4423(199801)2:107:425<1:P>2.0.CO;2-0
  http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/107/425/1
  http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/107/425/1
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2659805.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/oup/mind/1998/00000107/00000425/art00001
  
• Hanoch Ben-Yami (1997). Against characterizing mental states as propositional attitudes.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8094(199701)47:186<84:ACMSAP>2.0.CO;2-T
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1467-9213.00049
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2956474.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/phiq/1997/00000047/00000186/art00007
  
• Jonathan Bennett (1991). Analysis without noise.   (More)
• Austen Clark (1994). Beliefs and desires incorporated.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Suppose we admit for the sake of argument that "folk" explanations of human behavior--explanations in terms of beliefs and desires--sometimes succeed. They sometimes enable us to understand and predict patterns of motion that otherwise would remain unintelligible and unanticipated. Is the only explanation for such success that folk psychology is a viable proto-scientific theory of human psychology? I shall describe an analysis which yields a negative answer to that question. It was suggested by an observation and an analogy, both of which may initially seem remote from the topic at hand
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-362X(199408)91:8<404:BADI>2.0.CO;2-1
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-362X(199408)91:8<404:BADI>2.0.CO;2-1
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2941082.pdf
  
• Mitchell S. Green (1999). Attitude ascription's affinity to measurement.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The relation between two systems of attitude ascription that capture all the empirically significant aspects of an agents thought and speech may be analogous to that between two systems of magnitude ascription that are equivalent relative to a transformation of scale. If so, just as an objects weighing eight pounds doesnt relate that object to the number eight (for a different but equally good scale would use a different number), similarly an agents believing that P need not relate her to P (for a different but equally adequate interpretive scheme could use a different proposition). In either case the only reality picked out by any system of ascription is what is common to all equivalent rivals. By emphasizing some contrasts between decision theory and belief-desire psychology, it is argued that if attitude ascription is appropriately analogous to measurement then not only is being related to a proposition an artifact of the system of representation chosen, so are belief and desire
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.people.virginia.edu/~msg6m/pama.pdf
  http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/./ftinterface~content=a713770403~fulltext=713240930
  http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/index/MEAQ7F7V6C9X8N9J.pdf
  http://www.informaworld.com/index/MEAQ7F7V6C9X8N9J.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/routledg/riph/1999/00000007/00000003/art00003
  
• Pamela Hieronymi (2006). Controlling attitudes.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: I hope to show that, although belief is subject to two quite robust forms of agency, "believing at will" is impossible; one cannot believe in the way one ordinarily acts. Further, the same is true of intention: although intention is subject to two quite robust forms of agency, the features of belief that render believing less than voluntary are present for intention, as well. It turns out, perhaps surprisingly, that you can no more intend at will than believe at will
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-0114.2006.00247.x
  http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/118728598/PDFSTART
  
• Henry Jackman (online). Truth, rationality, and humanity.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: When we interpret someone in terms of their beliefs and desires, we are doing something other than merely describing them, but it is far from clear what this something else is. As Dennett puts it, while there is a growing consensus about the "not-purely-descriptive nature of intentional attribution," there remains considerable disagreement over which norms govern the play of this "dramatic interpretation game." This paper will discuss three candidates for specifying the content of these norms, truth, rationality and humanity. It will argue that while truth has frequently been taken to be the least plausible candidate, once the regulative rather than constitutive status of these norms are recognized, it turns out to be the best one. It will then close with a discussion of the 'indirect' role that rationality constraints can still be seen to play in a theory of belief
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.yorku.ca/hjackman/papers/TRH.pdf
  
• Reinhard Muskens (1993). Propositional Attitudes.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Verbs such as know, believe, hope, fear, regret and desire are commonly taken to express an attitude that one may bear towards a proposition and are therefore called verbs of propositional attitude. Thus in (1) below the agent Cathy is reported to have a certain attitude
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/muskens93propositional.html
  http://let.uvt.nl/general/people/rmuskens/pubs/propatt.pdf
  
• Michael W. Pelczar (2007). Forms and objects of thought.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: It is generally assumed that if it is possible to believe that p without believing that q, then there is some difference between the object of the thought that p and the object of the thought that q. This assumption is challenged in the present paper, opening the way to an account of epistemic opacity that improves on existing accounts, not least because it casts doubt on various arguments that attempt to derive startling ontological conclusions from seemingly innocent epistemic premises
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/120223p37w05271n/fulltext.pdf
  
• John Perry (1986). Circumstantial attitudes and benevolent cognition.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: From: _Language, Mind and Logic_, edited by Jeremy Butter?eld. 123
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www-csli.stanford.edu/~jperry//PHILPAPERS/circumstantial.pdf
  http://www-csli.stanford.edu/users/john/PHILPAPERS/circumstantial.pdf
  
• Ian Pratt (1993). Analysis and the attitudes.   (More)
• Francois Recanati (2000). Opacity and the attitudes.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/ijn_00000180/en/
  http://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/documents/disk0/00/00/01/80/ijn_00000180_00/ijn_00000180_00.rtf
  
• Philip Robbins (2004). To structure, or not to structure?   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/v51436477j773q50/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=5117430&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/V51436477J773Q50.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/synt/2004/00000139/00000001/05117430
  

Content Internalism and Externalism

Is Content in the Head?

• Robert E. Cummins (1991). Methodological reflections on belief.   (More)
• Katalin Farkas (2003). Does twin earth rest on a mistake?   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ceeol.com/aspx/getdocument.aspx?logid=5&id=BD15F204-40E0-4F7C-B617-724060A7762C
  
• Katalin Farkas (2008). Phenomenal intentionality without compromise.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In recent years, several philosophers have defended the idea of phenomenal intentionality: the intrinsic directedness of certain conscious mental events which is inseparable from these events’ phenomenal character. On this conception, phenomenology is usually conceived as narrow, that is, as supervening on the internal states of subjects, and hence phenomenal intentionality is a form of narrow intentionality. However, defenders of this idea usually maintain that there is another kind of, externalistic intentionality, which depends on factors external to the subject. We may ask whether this concession to content externalism is obligatory. In this paper, I shall argue that it isn’t. I shall suggest that if one is convinced that narrow phenomenal intentionality is legitimate, there is nothing stopping one from claiming that all intentionality is narrow.
• Katalin Farkas (2006). Semantic internalism and externalism.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Abstract: This paper introduces and analyses the doctrine of externalism about semantic content; discusses the Twin Earth argument for externalism and the assumptions behind it, and examines the question of whether externalism about content is compatible with a privileged knowledge of meanings and mental contents.
• Katalin Farkas (2003). What is externalism?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The content of the externalist thesis about the mind depends crucially on how we define the distinction between the internal and the external. According to the usual understanding, the boundary between the internal and the external is the skull or the skin of the subject. In this paper I argue that the usual understanding is inadequate, and that only the new understanding of the external/internal distinction I suggest helps us to understand the issue of the compatibility of externalism and privileged access
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ceu.hu/phil/farkas/whatis_latestdraft.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/xr39311n2t61wg02/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=5114404&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/XR39311N2T61WG02.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/phil/2003/00000112/00000003/05114404
  
• Justin C. Fisher (2007). Why nothing mental is just in the head.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Mental internalists hold that an individuals mental features at a given time supervene upon what is in that individuals head at that time. While many people reject mental internalism about content and justification, mental internalism is commonly accepted regarding such other mental features as rationality, emotion-types, propositional-attitude-types, moral character, and phenomenology. I construct a counter-example to mental internalism regarding all these features. My counter-example involves two creatures: a human and an alien from Pulse World. These creatures environments, behavioral dispositions and histories are such that it is intuitively clear that they are mentally quite different, even while they are, for a moment, exactly alike with respect to whats in their heads. I offer positive reasons for thinking that the case I describe is indeed possible. I then consider ways in which mental internalists might attempt to account for this case, but conclude that the only plausible option is to reject mental internalism and to adopt a particular externalist alternative a history-oriented version of teleo-functionalism
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2007.00649.x
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/nous/2007/00000041/00000002/art00009
  
• Juliet Floyd (2005). Putnam's 'the meaning of meaning': Externalism in historical context.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=HHNrzP0kQYEC&oi=fnd&pg=PA17&ots=pD_aK8lR0H&sig=9pKMBI-I02mW5VBaqEIQ5flzJb8
  
• Bryan Frances (online). Twin earth thought experiments.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Suppose that you had always had a physical twin, Chris, who on a different planet went through life having physical characteristics, sensory experiences, utterances, and brain processes exactly the same as yours in every physical and sensory respect. Chris
• Joe Lau (online). Externalism about mental content.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Externalism with regard to mental content says that in order to have certain types of intentional mental states (e.g. beliefs), it is necessary to be related to the environment in the right way
• Peter Ludlow (2003). Externalism, logical form, and linguistic intentions.   (More)
• Kirk A. Ludwig (1993). Externalism, naturalism, and method.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=1533-6077(1993)4<250:ENAM>2.0.CO;2-B
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=1533-6077(1993)4<250:ENAM>2.0.CO;2-B
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/1522844.pdf
  
• Jennifer Mundale & William P. Bechtel (online). Multiple realizability revisited.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The claim of the multiple realizability of mental states by brain states has been a major feature of the dominant philosophy of mind of the late 20th century. The claim is usually motivated by evidence that mental states are multiply realized, both within humans and between humans and other species. We challenge this contention by focusing on how neuroscientists differentiate brain areas. The fact that they rely centrally on psychological measures in mapping the brain and do so in a comparative fashion undercuts the likelihood that, at least within organic life forms, we are likely to find cases of multiply realized psychological functions
• Michael Pelczar (forthcoming). Content internalism about indexical thought.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Properly understood, content internalism is the thesis that any difference between the representational contents of two individuals' mental states reduces to a difference in those individuals' intrinsic properties. Some of the strongest arguments against internalism turn on the possibility for two "doppelgangers" –- perfect physical and phenomenal duplicates -– to differ with respect to the contents of those of their mental states that they can express using terms such as "I," "here," and "now." In this paper, I grant the stated possibility, but deny that it poses any threat to internalism. Despite their similarities, doppelgangers differ in some of their intrinsic properties, and it is to such intrinsic differences that differences of indexical content reduce.
• Hilary Putnam (1975). The meaning of 'meaning'.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=Q2W0y3NF3OwC&oi=fnd&pg=PA3&dq=The+meaning+of+'meaning'+Putnam&ots=4S-BGuLB5D&sig=131Z3BoiVKDTJ494tpFBghXUsfM
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=Q2W0y3NF3OwC&oi=fnd&pg=PA3&dq=The+meaning+of+'meaning'+Putnam&ots=4S-yGrMC6F&sig=udP9z8weNmRnlJH-nBGE5SZBWrU
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=Q2W0y3NF3OwC&oi=fnd&pg=PA3&dq=The+meaning+of+'meaning'+Putnam&ots=4R8AJvNBcH&sig=5aLaRp0ZlkytqZ-fE-JCkgZ6VB0
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=Q2W0y3NF3OwC&oi=fnd&pg=PA3&dq=The+meaning+of+'meaning'+Putnam&ots=4S-yMrRF9J&sig=MBnPT9Cb2y13RWc3PvCyOwFS5Ig
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=Q2W0y3NF3OwC&oi=fnd&pg=PA3&dq=The+meaning+of+'meaning'+Putnam&ots=4S-zIsMB7H&sig=r5lLHU4I80039oLNPYtb0cJmHFk
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=Q2W0y3NF3OwC&oi=fnd&pg=PA3&dq=The+meaning+of+'meaning'+Putnam&ots=4S-AKtLDcH&sig=zGWDJ_uKtm6vqJ2ifmStXrU7lz8
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=Q2W0y3NF3OwC&oi=fnd&pg=PA3&dq=The+meaning+of+'meaning'+Putnam&ots=4S-AEsQC5D&sig=mG-ZCtj3rJniriIyK9tBNuEZ7QM
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=Q2W0y3NF3OwC&oi=fnd&pg=PA3&dq=The+meaning+of+'meaning'+Putnam&ots=4S-BMuPz4I&sig=Y1w7uV5Joi6fNuQ5eDwFfnLXA-U
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=Q2W0y3NF3OwC&oi=fnd&pg=PA3&dq=The+meaning+of+'meaning'+Putnam&ots=4S-xEqNA5I&sig=eMnnp4F_uXzdRgtZXJc9LG9a4_w
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=Q2W0y3NF3OwC&oi=fnd&pg=PA3&dq=The+meaning+of+'meaning'+Putnam&ots=4S-xKqSy8H&sig=nrfzXwkUU2YQGI7pCHSSnWO7m-w
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=Q2W0y3NF3OwC&oi=fnd&pg=PA3&dq=The+meaning+of+'meaning'+Putnam&ots=4S-CIuSB8E&sig=jVU5vGzH1WGDyhZAs6rVxmLXjak
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=Q2W0y3NF3OwC&oi=fnd&pg=PA3&dq=+The+meaning+of+'meaning'+Putnam&ots=4R8AHvMC6L&sig=l0CMfvrlOyXBlP6A8dIcf-xc00U
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=Q2W0y3NF3OwC&oi=fnd&pg=PA3&dq=+The+meaning+of+'meaning'+Putnam&ots=4R8AErSC4H&sig=lg5ft6I9d-INpCItWgvwPvtOaBc
  
• Howard M. Robinson (2003). Some externalist strategies and their problems.   (More)
• Alex Rosenberg (2001). On multiple realization: Comments and criticism and the special sciences.   (More)
• Lawrence A. Shapiro (2005). Can psychology be a unified science?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Jaegwon Kim has argued that if psychological kinds are multiply realizable then no single psychological theory can describe regularities ranging over psychological states. Instead, psychology must be fractured, with human psychology covering states realized in the human way, martian psychology covering states realized in the martian way, and so on. I show that even if one accepts the principles that motivate Kim
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://philosophy.wisc.edu/shapiro/PSAsubmission.pdf
  http://philosophy.wisc.edu/shapiro/HomePage/PSAsubmission.htm
  http://philosophy.wisc.edu/shapiro/HomePage/PSAsubmission.pdf
  http://philosophy.wisc.edu/shapiro/HomePage/PSAsubmission.htm
  http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/resolve?id=doi:10.1086/508952
  http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/resolve?PHOS720536PDF
  
• Jaap van Brakel (2005). On the inventors of XYZ.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In this paper I try to make as much sense aspossible of, first, the extensive philosophicalliterature concerned with the status of `Wateris H2O' and, second, the implications ofPutnam's invention of Twin Earth, anotherpossible world stipulated to be just like Earth, except that water is XYZ, notH2O
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/m4x672301927781l/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=5267016&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/M4X672301927781L.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/foch/2005/00000007/00000001/05267016
  
• Asa Maria Wikforss (2005). Naming natural kinds.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This paper discusses whether it can be known a priori that a particular term, such as water, is a natural kind term, and how this problem relates to Putnams claim that natural kind terms require an externalist semantics. Two conceptions of natural kind terms are contrasted: The first holds that whether water is a natural kind term depends on its a priori knowable semantic features. The second
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/p6w65x777v328642/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=5147013&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/P6W65X777V328642.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/synt/2005/00000145/00000001/00007013
  

Social Externalism

• Jason Bridges (2006). Davidson's transcendental externalism.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: One of the chief aims of Donald Davidson
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2006.tb00619.x
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/ips/ppr/2006/00000073/00000002/art00002
  http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/118586891/PDFSTART
  
• John M. Collins (2006). Temporal externalism, natural kind terms, and scientifically ignorant communities.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ajol.info/viewarticle.php?jid=190&id=28209&layout=abstract
  
• Ruth G. Millikan (1999). Historical kinds and the "special sciences".   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/h75k4074305x1028/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/H75K4074305X1028.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/phil/1999/00000095/00000001/00207186
  
• John Haugeland (2004). Social cartesianism.   (More)
• Henry Jackman (2000). Deference and self-knowledge.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: It has become increasingly popular to suggest that non-individualistic theories of content undermine our purported a priori knowledge of such contents because they entail that we lack the ability to distinguish our thoughts from alternative thoughts with different contents. However, problems relating to such knowledge of 'comparative' content tell just as much against individualism as non-individualism. Indeed, the problems presented by individualistic theories of content for self-knowledge are at least, if not more, serious than those presented by non-individualistic theories. Consequently, considerations of self-knowledge give one no reason to embrace individualism. If anything, they give one reason to reject it
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.yorku.ca/hjackman/papers/def-and-sk.pdf
  
• Henry Jackman (1998). Individualism and interpretation.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: 'Interpretational' accounts of meaning are frequently treated as incompatible with accounts stressing language's 'social' character. However, this paper argues that one can reconcile interpretational and social accounts by distinguishing "methodological" from "ascriptional" individualism. While methodological individualism requires only that the meaning of one's terms ultimately be grounded in facts about oneself, ascriptional individualism requires that the meaning of one's terms be independent of how others use theirs. Interpretational accounts are committed only to methodological individualism, while arguments for languages social character are best understood as attacks on ascriptional individualism. As a result, one can recognize language's social character and still be an interpretationalist
• Henry Jackman (1996). Semantic Norms and Temporal Externalism.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: There has frequently been taken to be a tension, if not an incompatibility, between "externalist" theories of content (which allow the make-up of one's physical environment and the linguistic usage of one's community to contribute to the contents of one's thoughts and utterances) and the "methodologically individualist" intuition that whatever contributes to the content of one's thoughts and utterances must ultimately be grounded in facts about one's own attitudes and behavior. In this dissertation I argue that one can underwrite such externalist theories within a methodologically individualistic framework by understanding semantic norms in terms of the need to reach, for each of one's terms, a type of "equilibrium." Each speaker's commitment to making her _own_ beliefs and applications consistent allows one to incorporate these 'external' factors into the contents of their thoughts and utterances in a way that remains methodologically individualistic. Methodologically individualistic accounts are typically taken to be unable to incorporate 'external' factors such as the world's physical make-up or communal usage because of arguments suggesting that the individual's own beliefs and usage underdetermine or even misidentify what, according to externalist accounts, they mean by their terms. These arguments, however, only seem plausible if one presupposes a comparatively impoverished conception of the individual's beliefs. The beliefs a speaker associates with a given term extend far beyond the handful of sentences they would produce if asked to list such beliefs. In particular, speakers have an implicit, but rich, understanding of their language, their world, and the relation between them. Speakers typically understand languages as shared temporally extended practices about which they can be, both individually and collectively, mistaken. Once this conception of language is taken into account, the ascriptions which purportedly forced 'non-individualistic' conceptions of content upon us (particularly ascriptions which seemed to tie what we meant to social use rather than our own beliefs) turn out to be ultimately grounded in the individual's own beliefs. Indeed, our self-conception does much more than merely underwrite 'non-individualistic' ascriptions..
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://webspace.utexas.edu/deverj/personal/test/semanticnorms.pdf
  
• Henry Jackman (2005). Temporal externalism and our ordinary linguistic practices.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Temporal externalists argue that ascriptions of thought and utterance content can legitimately re?ect contingent conceptual developments that are only settled after the time of utterance. While the view has been criticized for failing to accord with our
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-0114.2005.00232.x
  
• Henry Jackman (2006). Temporal externalism, constitutive norms, and theories of vagueness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Our concept of truth is governed by two principles. The
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.yorku.ca/hjackman/papers/CNV.pdf
  
• Henry Jackman (2005). Temporal externalism, deference, and our ordinary linguistic practice.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Temporal externalists argue that ascriptions of thought and utterance content can legitimately reflect contingent conceptual developments that are only settled after the time of utterance. While the view has been criticized for failing to accord with our
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.yorku.ca/hjackman/papers/TE&OLP.pdf
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-0114.2005.00232.x
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/papq/2005/00000086/00000003/art00005
  
• Henry Jackman (1999). We live forwards but understand backwards: Linguistic practices and future behavior.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Ascriptions of content are sensitive not only to our physical and social environment, but also to unforeseeable developments in the subsequent usage of our terms. This paper argues that the problems that may seem to come from endorsing such 'temporally sensitive' ascriptions either already follow from accepting the socially and historically sensitive ascriptions Burge and Kripke appeal to, or disappear when the view is developed in detail. If one accepts that one's society's past and current usage contributes to what one's terms mean, there is little reason not to let its future usage to do so as well
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.yorku.ca/hjackman/papers/T-ext.pdf
  http://www.yorku.ca/hjackman/papers/t-ext.html
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1468-0114.00078
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/papq/1999/00000080/00000002/art00003
  
• Jeeloo Liu (2002). Physical externalism and social externalism: Are they really compatible?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Putnam and Burge have been viewed as launching a joint attack on individualism, the view that the content of one's psychological state is determined by what is in the head . Putnam argues that meanings are not in the head while Burge argues that beliefs are not in the head either, and both have come up with convincing arguments against individualism. It is generally conceived that Putnam's view is a version of physical externalism, which argues that factors in the physical environment play a role in determining the meanings of natural kind terms. Burge, on the other hand, is regarded as following up Putnam's argument to bring in factors in the social environment for the determination of belief. Burge's view has been commonly referred to as 'social externalism.' The general consensus in the field is that physical externalism and social externalism are compatible views. Furthermore, both Putnam and Burge seem to endorse each other’s position for the most part. In this paper, however, I shall argue against this general view to show that the two theories are deep down incompatible
• Kirk A. Ludwig (ms). The myth of social content.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Social externalism is the view that the contents of a person's propositional attitudes are logically determined at least in part by her linguistic community's standards for the use of her words. If social externalism is correct, its importance can hardly be overemphasized. The traditional Cartesian view of psychological states as essentially first personal and non-relational in character, which has shaped much theorizing about the nature of psychological explanation, would be shown to be deeply flawed
• Michael McKinsey (1993). Curing folk psychology of arthritis.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Tyler Burge's (1979) famous thought experiment concerning 'arthritis' is commonly assumed to show that all ascriptions of content to beliefs and other attitudes are dependent for their truth upon facts about the agent's social and linguistic environment. It is also commonly claimed that Burge's argument shows that Putnam's (1975) result regarding natural kind terms applies to all general terms whatever, and hence shows that all such terms have wide meanings.1 But I wish to show here, first, that neither Burge's initial thought experiment nor a second type of example that Burge describes supports either of these conclusions. Second, I will identify the proper conclusion to draw from Burge's discussion and show that this conclusion does not really pose a serious problem for individualism about the mental. And finally, I will argue that Burge's discussion does not in fact provide a conclusive reason for believing its proper conclusion
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/M1W49825V7173XW7.pdf
  
• Ruth G. Millikan (2003). In defense of public language.   (More)
• Peter Pagin (2006). Intersubjective externalism.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: in T. Marvan (ed) What Determines Content? The Internalism/Externalism Dispute, Cambridge Scholar Press, Newcastle upon Tyne, 39-54, 2006
• David Pitt (ms). The Burgean intuitions.   (More)
• Sarah Sawyer (2003). Conceptual errors and social externalism.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://eprints.sussex.ac.uk/1588/01/Conceptual_Errors_and_Social_Externalism_Final.pdf
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1467-9213.00311
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/phiq/2003/00000053/00000211/art00008
  
• Asa Maria Wikforss (2004). Externalism and incomplete understanding.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.0031-8094.2004.00352.x
  
• Asa Maria Wikforss (2001). Social externalism and conceptual errors.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Ever since Putnam and Burge launched their respective attacks on individualist accounts of meaning the individualist has felt squeezed for space.1 Very little maneuvering room, it seems, is left for the philosopher who wants to deny that meaning and mental content depend on the speaker's social environment. One option, popular amongst individualists, is to grant that reference is socially determined but argue that there is nevertheless a notion of meaning or content that can be understood individualistically. That is, the individualist can opt for a
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/j.0031-8094.2001.00225.x/abs/
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8094(200104)51:203<217:SEACE>2.0.CO;2-1
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8094(200104)51:203<217:SEACE>2.0.CO;2-1
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.0031-8094.2001.00225.x
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2660569.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/phiq/2001/00000051/00000203/art00006
  
• Andrew Woodfield (1998). Social externalism and conceptual diversity.   (More)

Externalism and Psychological Explanation

• David J. Buller (1997). Individualism and evolutionary psychology (or: In defense of "narrow" functions).   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Millikan and Wilson argue, for different reasons, that the essential reference to the environment in adaptationist explanations of behavior makes (psychological) individualism inconsistent with evolutionary psychology. I show that their arguments are based on misinterpretations of the role of reference to the environment in such explanations. By exploring these misinterpretations, I develop an account of explanation in evolutionary psychology that is fully consistent with individualism. This does not, however, constitute a full-fledged defense of individualism, since evolutionary psychology is only one explanatory paradigm among many in psychology
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/328/00/indy&ep.htm
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000328/
  http://cogprints.soton.ac.uk/documents/disk0/00/00/03/28/
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000328/00/indy&ep.htm
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:328
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8248(199703)64:1<74:IAEP(I>2.0.CO;2-N
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8248(199703)64:1<74:IAEP(I>2.0.CO;2-N
  http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/resolve?id=doi:10.1086/392536
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/188370.pdf
  
• David J. Buller (1992). "Narrow"-mindedness breeds inaction.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000329/
  
• Tyler Burge (1986). Individualism and psychology.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8108(198601)95:1<3:IAP>2.0.CO;2-L
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8108(198601)95:1<3:IAP>2.0.CO;2-L
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2185131.pdf
  
• Tyler Burge (1982). Two thought experiments reviewed.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.projecteuclid.org/DPubS/Repository/1.0/Disseminate?handle=euclid.ndjfl/1093870087&view=body&content-type=pdf_1
  
• Jerry A. Fodor (1982). Cognitive science and the twin-earth problem.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.projecteuclid.org/DPubS/Repository/1.0/Disseminate?handle=euclid.ndjfl/1093883623&view=body&content-type=pdf_1
  
• Pierre Jacob (online). Belief attribution and rationality: A dilemma for Jerry Fodor.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/documents/disk0/00/00/03/60/index.html
  http://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/documents/disk0/00/00/03/60/ijn_00000360_00/ijn_00000360_00.htm
  
• Pierre Jacob (2002). Can mental content explain behavior?   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/ijn_00000280/en/
  http://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/documents/disk0/00/00/02/80/ijn_00000280_00/ijn_00000280_00.htm
  
• Michael Losonsky (1995). Emdedded systems vs. individualism.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract:   The dispute between individualism and anti-individualism is about the individuation of psychological states, and individualism, on some accounts, is committed to the claim that psychological subjects together with their environments do not constitute integrated computational systems. Hence on this view the computational states that explain psychological states in computational accounts of mind will not involve the subject''s natural and social environment. Moreover, the explanation of a system''s interaction with the environment is, on this view, not the primary goal of computational theorizing. Recent work in computational developmental psychology (by A. Karmiloff-Smith and J. Rutkowska) as well as artificial agents or embedded artificial systems (by L.P. Kaelbling, among others) casts doubt on these claims. In these computational models, the environment does not just trigger and sustain input for computational operations, but some computational operations actually involve environmental structures
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/L0HL738085561524.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/l0hl738085561524/fulltext.pdf
  
• Ron McClamrock (1991). Methodological individualism considered as a constitutive principle of scientific inquiry.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The issue of methodological solipsism in the philosophy of mind and psychology has received enormous attention and discussion in the decade since the appearance Jerry Fodor's "Methodological Solipsism" [Fodor 1980]. But most of this discussion has focused on the consideration of the now infamous "Twin Earth" type examples and the problems they present for Fodor's notion of "narrow content". I think there is deeper and more general moral to be found in this issue, particularly in light of Fodor's more recent defense of his view in Psychosemantics [Fodor 1987]. Underlying this discussion are questions about the nature and plausibility of the claim that scientific explanation should observe a constraint of methodological individualism . My goal in what follows is to bring out this more general problem in Fodor's "internalist" account of the mental
• Karen Neander (ms). The narrow and the normative.   (More)
• Katarzyna Paprzycka (2002). False consciousness of intentional psychology.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: According to explanatory individualism, every action must be explained in terms of an agent's desire. According to explanatory nonindividualism, we sometimes act on our desires, but it is also possible for us to act on others' desires without acting on desires of our own. While explanatory nonindividualism has guided the thinking of many social scientists, it is considered to be incoherent by most philosophers of mind who insist that actions must be explained ultimately in terms of some desire of the agent. In the first part of the paper, I show that some powerful arguments designed to demonstrate the incoherence of explanatory nonindividualism fail. In the second part of the paper, I offer a nonindividualist explanation of the apparent obviousness of belief-desire psychology. I argue that there are two levels of the intelligibility of our actions. On the more fundamental (explanatory) level, the question "Why did the agent do something?" admits a variety of folk-psychological categories. But there is another (formation-of-self) level, at which the same question admits only of answers that ultimately appeal only to the agent's own desires. Explanatory individualism results from the confusion of the two levels
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/./ftinterface~content=a713690569~fulltext=713240930
  http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/index/JEMJLF93TFKTCQNQ.pdf
  http://www.informaworld.com/index/JEMJLF93TFKTCQNQ.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/routledg/cphp/2002/00000015/00000003/art00003
  
• John Perry (1998). Broadening the mind.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www-csli.stanford.edu/~jperry//PHILPAPERS/elm.pdf
  http://www-csli.stanford.edu/users/john/PHILPAPERS/elm.pdf
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8205(199803)58:1<223:BTM>2.0.CO;2-I
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8205(199803)58:1<223:BTM>2.0.CO;2-I
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2653644.pdf
  
• Mark Rowlands (1995). Against methodological solipsism: The ecological approach.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This paper argues that an ecological approach to psychology of the sort advanced by J. J. Gibson provides a coherent and powerful alternative to the computational, information-processing, paradigm. The paper argues for two principles. Firstly, one cannot begin to understand what internal information processing an organism must accomplish until one understands what information is available to the organism in its environment. Secondly, an organism can process information by acting on or manipulating physical structures in its environment. An attempt is made to show how these principles can be extended to cognition as a whole. It is suggested that these principles may have a foundation in evolutionary biology
• Sarah Sawyer (2006). The role of object-dependent content in psychological explanation.   (More)
• Stephen P. Stich (1978). Autonomous psychology and the belief/desire thesis.   (More)
• J. Wallace & H. E. Mason (1990). On some thought experiments about mind and meaning.   (More)
• Robert A. Wilson (2004). Recent work on individualism in the social, behavioural, and biological sciences.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The social, behavioral, and a good chunk of the biological sciences concern the nature of individual agency, where our paradigm for an individual is a human being. Theories of economic behavior, of mental function and dysfunction, and of ontogenetic development, for example, are theories of how such individuals act, and of what internal and external factors are determinative of that action. Such theories construe individuals in distinctive ways
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/rnr0798115309k31/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/RNR0798115309K31.pdf
  

Externalism and Mental Causation

• Anthony B. Dardis (2002). Individualism and the new logical connections argument.   (More)
• Wim de Muijnck (2002). Causation by relational properties.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In discussions on mental causation and externalism, it is often assumed that extrinsic, or relational, properties cannot have causal efficacy. In this paper I argue that this assumption is based on a category mistake, in that causal efficacy (dependence among events or states of affairs) is confused with causal influence (persistence of and interaction among objects). I then argue that relational properties are indeed causally efficacious, which I explain with the help of Dretske's notion of a 'structuring cause'
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/rodopi/gps/2003/00000065/00000001/art00007
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=skEGFPOVZ4cC&oi=fnd&pg=PA123&ots=TBdxr9PIB0&sig=w0YckxSDth1wWXv4VcGw-_G7VDQ
  
• Kirk A. Ludwig (1993). Causal relevance and thought content.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8094(199407)44:176<334:CRATC>2.0.CO;2-6
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8094(199407)44:176<334:CRATC>2.0.CO;2-6
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2219613.pdf
  
• Nicholas Shea (2003). Does externalism entail the anomalism of the mental?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In ‘Mental Events’ Donald Davidson argued for the anomalism of the mental on the basis of the operation of incompatible constitutive principles in the mental and physical domains. Many years later, he has suggested that externalism provides further support for the anomalism of the mental. I examine the basis for that claim. The answer to the question in the title will be a qualified ‘Yes’. That is an important result in the metaphysics of mind and an interesting consequence of externalism
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/1467-9213.00306
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1467-9213.00306
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/phiq/2003/00000053/00000211/art00003
  

Externalism and the Theory of Vision

• Tyler Burge (1986). Individualism and psychology.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8108(198601)95:1<3:IAP>2.0.CO;2-L
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8108(198601)95:1<3:IAP>2.0.CO;2-L
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2185131.pdf
  
• Sarah A. Patterson (1996). Success-orientation and individualism in the theory of vision.   (More)
• Arnold Silverberg (2006). Chomsky and Egan on computational theories of vision.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Noam Chomsky and Frances Egan argue that David Marr
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/e649774142n0n580/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/E649774142N0N580.pdf
  

Externalism and Computation

• Hilla Jacobson-Horowitz (2004). Syntax, semantics, and intentional aspects.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ajol.info/viewarticle.php?jid=190&id=18564&layout=abstract
  http://www.ajol.info/viewarticle.php?id=18564&jid=190&layout=abstract
  
• Susan Schneider (2005). Direct reference, psychological explanation, and Frege cases.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In this essay I defend a theory of psychological explanation that is based on the joint commitment to direct reference and computationalism. I offer a new solution to the problem of Frege Cases. Frege Cases involve agents who are unaware that certain expressions corefer (e.g. that 'Cicero' and 'Tully' corefer), where such knowledge is relevant to the success of their behavior, leading to cases in which the agents fail to behave as the intentional laws predict. It is generally agreed that Frege Cases are a major problem, if not the major problem, that this sort of theory faces. In this essay, I hope to show that the theory can surmount the Frege Cases
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.0268-1064.2005.00294.x
  

Externalism and Self-Knowledge

• Dorit Bar-On (2004). Externalism and self-knowledge: Content, use, and expression.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Suppose, as I stare at a glass in front of me, I say or think: There
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/j.0029-4624.2004.00477.x/abs/
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.0029-4624.2004.00477.x
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/nous/2004/00000038/00000003/art00003
  
• Helen Beebee (2002). Transfer of warrant, begging the question, and semantic externalism.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8094(200107)51:204<356:TOWBTQ>2.0.CO;2-U
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8094(200107)51:204<356:TOWBTQ>2.0.CO;2-U
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1467-9213.00234
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3542694.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/phiq/2001/00000051/00000204/art00005
  
• Paul A. Boghossian (1994). The transparency of mental content.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/about/terms.html. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=1520-8583(1994)8<33:TTOMC>2.0.CO;2-X
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=1520-8583(1994)8<33:TTOMC>2.0.CO;2-X
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2214162.pdf
  
• Paul A. Boghossian (1997). What the externalist can know A Priori.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Controversy continues to attach to the question whether an externalism about mental content is compatible with a traditional doctrine of privileged self-knowledge. By an externalism about mental content, I mean the view that what concepts our thoughts involve may depend not only on facts that are internal to us, but on facts about our environment. It is worth emphasizing, if only because it is still occasionally misperceived, that this thesis is supposed to apply at the level of sense and not merely at that of reference: what concepts we think in terms of -- and not just what they happen to pick out -- is said by the externalist to depend upon environmental facts. By a traditional doctrine of privileged self-knowledge, I mean the view that we are able to know, without the benefit of empirical investigation, what our thoughts are in our own case. Suppose I entertain a thought that I would express with the sentence `Water is wet'. According to the traditional doctrine, I can know without empirical investigation (a) that I am entertaining a thought; (b) that it has a particular conceptual content, and (c) that its content is that water is wet
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=1533-6077(1998)9<197:WTECK">2.0.CO;2-U
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/1467-9264.00011/abs/
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1467-9264.00011
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/1522971.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/oso/17388/2000/00000001/00000001/art00010
  
• Bill Brewer (2000). Externalism and A Priori knowledge of empirical facts.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: I want to discuss the possibility of combining a so-called
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/oso/67523/2000/00000001/00000001/art00017
  
• Bill Brewer (2004). Self-knowledge and externalism.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: I want to discuss the possibility of combining a so-called
• J. Brown (2003). The reductio argument and transmission of warrant.   (More)
• Anthony L. Brueckner (2004). McKinsey redux?   (More)
• Anthony L. Brueckner (1999). Transcendental arguments from content externalism.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=JnCPaM0KeG8C&oi=fnd&pg=PA229&ots=Nx4bk8WRSf&sig=WFXw5ZvKqKSSB72vO200Rl1YAVo
  
• Anthony L. Brueckner (1999). Two recent approaches to self-knowledge.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0029-4624(1999)33<251:TRATS>2.0.CO;2-C
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/0029-4624.33.s13.12
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2676105.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/nous/1999/00000013/A00300s1/art00180
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/nous/1999/00000033/A013s013/art00012
  
• Anthony L. Brueckner (2003). Two transcendental arguments concerning self-knowledge.   (More)
• Andrew Cullison (online). Privileged access, externalism, and ways of believing.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: By exploiting a concept called ways of believing, I offer a plausible reformulation of the doctrine of privileged access. This reformulation will provide us with a defense of compatibilism, the view that content externalism and privileged access are compatible
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/b087376511363126/fulltext.pdf
  
• Martin Davies (2000). Externalism, architecturalism, and epistemic warrant.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This paper addresses a problem about epistemic warrant. The problem is posed by philosophical arguments for externalism about the contents of thoughts, and similarly by philosophical arguments for architecturalism about thinking, when these arguments are put together with a thesis of first person authority. In each case, first personal knowledge about our thoughts plus the kind of knowledge that is provided by a philosophical argument seem, together, to open an unacceptably ‘non-empirical’ route to knowledge of empirical facts. Furthermore, this unwelcome prospect of transferring a ‘non-empirical’ warrant from premises about our own mental states and about philosophical theory to a conclusion about external environment or internal architecture seems to depend upon little more than the possibility of knowledge by inference. (The use of the scare-quoted term ‘non-empirical’ is explained a couple of paragraphs further on.)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/oso/17388/2000/00000001/00000001/art00012
  
• Martin Davies (2000). Externalism and armchair knowledge.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: [I]f you could know a priori that you are in a given mental state, and your being in that state conceptually or logically implies the existence of external objects, then you could know a priori that the external world exists. Since you obviously _can
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/oso/67523/2000/00000001/00000001/art00016
  
• Martin Davies (2003). Externalism, self-knowledge and transmission of warrant.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Externalism about some mental property, M, is the thesis that whether a person (or other physical being) has M depends, not only on conditions inside the person
• Martin Davies (2003). The problem of armchair knowledge.   (More)
• Fred Dretske (2003). Externalism and self-knowledge.   (More)
• Gary Ebbs (2003). A puzzle about doubt.   (More)
• J. Edwards (1998). The simple theory of colour and the transparency of sense experience.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/oso/17388/2000/00000001/00000001/art00014
  
• Jonathan Ellis (2007). Content externalism and phenomenal character: A new worry about privileged access.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: A central question in contemporary epistemology concerns whether content externalism threatens a common doctrine about privileged access. If the contents of a subject
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://fortytwo.ucsc.edu/~jellis/SelfKnowledgeAbstract.htm
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/9675155563768212/fulltext.pdf
  
• Katalin Farkas (2006). Semantic internalism and externalism.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Abstract: This paper introduces and analyses the doctrine of externalism about semantic content; discusses the Twin Earth argument for externalism and the assumptions behind it, and examines the question of whether externalism about content is compatible with a privileged knowledge of meanings and mental contents.
• Katalin Farkas (2003). What is externalism?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The content of the externalist thesis about the mind depends crucially on how we define the distinction between the internal and the external. According to the usual understanding, the boundary between the internal and the external is the skull or the skin of the subject. In this paper I argue that the usual understanding is inadequate, and that only the new understanding of the external/internal distinction I suggest helps us to understand the issue of the compatibility of externalism and privileged access
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ceu.hu/phil/farkas/whatis_latestdraft.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/xr39311n2t61wg02/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=5114404&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/XR39311N2T61WG02.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/phil/2003/00000112/00000003/05114404
  
• Jordi Fernandez (2004). Externalism and self-knowledge: A puzzle in two dimensions.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.0966-8373.2004.00197.x
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/ejop/2004/00000012/00000001/art00002
  
• Andr Gallois (1994). Deflationary self-knowledge.   (More)
• Brie Gertler (2004). We can't know a priori that H2O exists. But can we know a priori that water does?   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.0003-2638.2004.00459.x
  
• John Gibbons (2001). Externalism and knowledge of the attitudes.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8094(200101)51:202<13:EAKOTA>2.0.CO;2-I
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8094(200101)51:202<13:EAKOTA>2.0.CO;2-I
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/1467-9213.00211
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1467-9213.00211
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2660518.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/phiq/2001/00000051/00000202/art00002
  
• Sanford C. Goldberg (2003). Anti-individualism, conceptual omniscience, and skepticism.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Given anti-individualism, a subjectmight have a priori (non-empirical)knowledge that she herself is thinking thatp, have complete and exhaustiveexplicational knowledge of all of the conceptscomposing the content that p, and yetstill need empirical information (e.g.regarding her embedding conditions and history)prior to being in a position to apply herexhaustive conceptual knowledge in aknowledgeable way to the thought that p. This result should be welcomed byanti-individualists: it squares with everythingthat compatibilist-minded anti-individualistshave said regarding e.g. the compatibility ofanti-individualism and basic self-knowledge;and more importantly it contains the crux of aresponse to McKinsey-style arguments againstanti-individualism
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/lw16173322454u25/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=5139899&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/LW16173322454U25.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/phil/2003/00000116/00000001/05139899
  
• Sanford C. Goldberg (2007). Anti-individualism, content preservation, and discursive justification.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Most explorations of the epistemic implications of Semantic Anti- Individualism (SAI) focus on issues of self-knowledge (first-person au- thority) and/or external-world skepticism. Less explored has been SAIs implications forthe epistemology of reasoning. In this paperI argue that SAI has some nontrivial implications on this score. I bring these out by reflecting on a problem first raised by Boghossian (1992). Whereas Boghos- sians main interest was in establishing the incompatibility of SAI and the a priority of logical abilities (Boghossian 1992: 22), I argue that Boghossians argument is better interpreted as pointing to SAIs implications for the na- ture of discursive justification
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2007.00643.x
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/nous/2007/00000041/00000002/art00003
  
• Sanford C. Goldberg (2006). Brown on self-knowledge and discriminability.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In her recent book Anti-Individualism and Knowledge, Jessica Brown has presented a novel answer to the self-knowledge achievement problem facing the proponent of anti-individualism. She argues that her answer is to be preferred to the traditional answer (based on Burge, 1988a). Here I present three objections to the claim that her proposed answer is to be preferred. The significance of these objections lies in what they tell us about the nature of the sort of knowledge that is in dispute. Perhaps the most important lesson I draw from this discussion is that, given the nature of knowledge of one's own thoughts, discriminability (from relevant alternatives) is not a condition on knowledge as such
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-0114.2006.00261.x?ai=2l8&mi=85vxf&af=R
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-0114.2006.00261.x
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/papq/2006/00000087/00000003/art00002
  
• Sanford C. Goldberg (2002). Do anti-individualistic construals of propositional attitudes capture the agent's conception?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Burge 1986 presents an argument for anti-individualism about the proposi- tional attitudes. On the assumption that such attitudes are
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1468-0068.t01-1-00403
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/nous/2002/00000036/00000004/art00403
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/nous/2002/00000036/00000004/art00004
  
• Sanford C. Goldberg (2000). Externalism and authoritative knowledge of content: A new incompatibilist strategy.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: A typical strategy of those who seek to show that externalism is compatible with authoritative knowledge of content is to show that externalism does nothing to undermine the claim that all thinkers can at any time form correct and justi?ed self-ascriptive judgements concerning their occurrent thoughts. In reaction, most incompat- ibilists have assumed the burden of denying that externalism is compatible with this claim about self-ascription. Here I suggest another way to attack the compatibilist strategy. I aim to show that forming a justi?ed true self-ascriptive judgement about one
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/mt277m670g227t02/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=190144&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/MT277M670G227T02.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/phil/2000/00000100/00000001/00190144
  
• Sanford C. Goldberg (1997). Self-ascription, self-knowledge, and the memory argument.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: is tendentious. (Throughout this paper I shall refer to this claim as
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/1467-8284.00078/abs/
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1467-8284.00078
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/anal/1997/00000057/00000255/art00078
  
• Sanford C. Goldberg (2005). The dialectical context of Boghossian's memory argument.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Externalism1 is the thesis that some propositional attitudes depend for their individuation on features of the thinker’s (social and/or physical) environment. The doctrine of self-knowledge of thoughts is the thesis that for all thinkers S and occurrent thoughts that p, S has authoritative and non-empirical knowledge of her thought that p. A much-discussed question in the literature is whether these two doctrines are compatible. In this paper I attempt to respond to one argument for an incompatibilist conclusion, Boghossian’s 1989 ‘Memory Argument.’
• Sanford C. Goldberg (1999). The psychology and epistemology of self-knowledge.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/r128657034g5656p/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=200268&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/R128657034G5656P.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/synt/1999/00000118/00000002/00200268
  
• Sanford C. Goldberg (1999). The relevance of discriminatory knowledge of content.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 80:2, 136-56 (June 1999)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1468-0114.00077?prevSearch=fulltextfield:(burge+memory)
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1468-0114.00077
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/papq/1999/00000080/00000002/art00077
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/papq/1999/00000080/00000002/art00002
  
• Sanford C. Goldberg (2003). What do you know when you know your own thoughts?   (More)
• John Greco (2004). Externalism and skepticism.   (More)
• Lisa L. Hall (1998). The self-knowledge that externalists leave out.   (More)
• Jussi Haukioja (2006). Semantic externalism and A Priori self-knowledge.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The argument known as the 'McKinsey Recipe' tries to establish the incompatibility of semantic externalism (about natural kind concepts in particular) and _a priori _self- knowledge about thoughts and concepts by deriving from the conjunction of these theses an absurd conclusion, such as that we could know _a priori _that water exists. One reply to this argument is to distinguish two different readings of 'natural kind concept': (i) a concept which _in fact _denotes a natural kind, and (ii) a concept which _aims_ to denote a natural kind. Paul Boghossian has argued, using a _Dry Earth _scenario, that this response fails, claiming that the externalist cannot make sense of a concept aiming, but failing, to denote a natural kind. In this paper I argue that Boghossian's argument is flawed. Borrowing machinery from two-dimensional semantics, using the notion of 'considering a possible world as actual', I claim that we can give a determinate answer to Boghossian's question: which concept would 'water' express on Dry Earth?
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-9329.2006.00318.x
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/rati/2006/00000019/00000002/art00004
  
• Pierre Jacob (2004). Do we know how we know our own minds yet?   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/ijn_00000352/en/
  http://pierrejacob.hautetfort.com/files/self_ext.pdf
  
• Henry Jackman (web). Incompatibility arguments and semantic self-knowledge.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: There has been much discussion recently of what has been labeled the
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.yorku.ca/hjackman/papers/Incompatibility.pdf
  
• Pierre Jacob (ms). Is self-knowledge compatible with externalism?   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/docs/00/05/32/38/HTML/
  http://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/documents/disk0/00/00/00/43/ijn_00000043_00/ijn_00000043_00.htm
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/M2467LG425724043.pdf
  
• Daniel Z. Korman (2006). What externalists should say about dry earth.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Dry earth seems to its inhabitants (our intrinsic duplicates) just as earth seems to us, that is, it seems to them as though there are rivers and lakes and a clear, odorless liquid flowing from their faucets. But, in fact, this is an illusion; there is no such liquid anywhere on the planet. I address two objections to externalism concerning the nature of the concept that is expressed by the word 'water' in the mouths of the inhabitants of dry earth. Gabriel Segal presents a dilemma for the externalist concerning the application conditions of the concept, and Paul Boghossian presents a dilemma for the externalist concerning the complexity of the concept. I show that, in both cases, the externalist may occupy the horn of his choice without departing from either the letter or spirit of externalism
• K. J. Kraay (2002). Externalism, memory, and self-knowledge.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/pp7alq1al44qjtuj/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=380317&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/PP7ALQ1AL44QJTUJ.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/erke/2002/00000056/00000003/00380317
  
• William S. Larkin (ms). Burge on our privileged access to the external world.   (More)
• William S. Larkin (ms). Concepts and introspection: An externalist defense of inner sense.   (More)
• William S. Larkin (online). Comments on Pryor's “externalism about content and McKinsey-style reasoning”.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: I. Pryor on McKinsey:

  A. Pryor’s Version of McKinsey-style Reasoning
  1. Given authoritative self-knowledge, I can usually tell the contents of my own thoughts just by introspection.
  So
  I can know the following claim on the basis of reflection alone:

  McK-1: I am thinking a thought with the content _water puts out fires_
• William S. Larkin (2000). Content skepticism.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Skeptical theses in general claim that we cannot know what we think we know. Content skepticism in particular claims that we cannot know the contents of our own occurrent thoughtsat least not in the way we think we can. I argue that an externalist account of content does engender a mild form of content skepticism but that the condition is no real cause for concern. Content externalism forces us to reevaluate some of our assumptions about introspective knowledge, but it is compatible with privileged access and the distinctive epistemic character of introspective judgments
• William S. Larkin (online). Content skepticism and reliable self-knowledge.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Sub-Thesis 1: We should be contingent reliabilists to avoid the threat of an unacceptably strong content skeptical thesis posed by content externalism and the possibility of twin thoughts. The predominant strategy for resisting this threat has been to rely on the claim that introspective self-attributions are immune to brute error; but this claim is problematic from a naturalistic standpoint
• William S. Larkin (online). Twin earth, dry earth, and knowing the width of Water.   (More)
• William S. Larkin (online). Twin earth, dry earth, and brains in vats.   (More)
• Willian Larkin (ms). The non-apriority of concept width.   (More)
• Peter Ludlow (1999). First-person authority and memory.   (More)
• C. Macdonald (1998). Externalism and authoritative self-knowledge.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Externalism in the philosophy of mind has been thought by many to pose a serious threat to the claim that subjects are in general authoritative with regard to certain of their own intentional states.¹ In a series of papers, Tyler Burge (1985_a_, 1985_b_, 1988, 1996) has argued that the distinctive entitlement or right that subjects have to self- knowledge in certain cases is compatible with externalism, since that entitlement is environmentally neutral, neutral with respect to the issue of the individuation dependence of subjects' intentional states on factors beyond their bodies. His reason is that whereas externalism—the view that certain intentional states of persons are individuation-dependent on objects and/or phenomena external to their bodies—is a metaphysical thesis, authoritative self-knowledge is an epistemological matter. This being so, there is no reason to suppose that the two need conflict with one another
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/oso/17388/2000/00000001/00000001/art00006
  
• Luca Malatesti (ms). Externalism and the knowledge of mental states.   (More)
• Gregory McCulloch (1999). Content externalism and cartesian scepticism: A reply to Brueckner.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=W2Lr89ALdPQC&oi=fnd&pg=PA251&ots=_Q2NkRhJVC&sig=1W-MAdJkCkXyFB0AHDDXPIa0pNw
  
• Michael McKinsey (2002). Forms of externalism and privileged access.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1468-0068.36.s16.8
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/nous/2002/00000036/A0160s16/art00391
  http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/118944438/PDFSTART
  
• Michael McKinsey (2002). On knowing our own minds.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This is an anthology of ?fteen papers concerning various philosophical problems related to the topic of self-knowledge. All but one of the papers were previously unpublished, and all but two are descendants of presentations at a conference on self-knowledge held at the University of St Andrews in 1995. The collection
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1467-9213.00257
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/phiq/2002/00000052/00000206/art00009
  http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/118944516/PDFSTART
  
• Michael McKinsey (2003). Transmission of warrant and closure of apriority.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In my 1991 paper, AAnti-Individualism and Privileged Access,@ I argued that externalism in the philosophy of mind is incompatible with the thesis that we have privileged , nonempirical access to the contents of our own thoughts.¹ One of the most interesting responses to my argument has been that of Martin Davies (1998, 2000, and Chapter _ above) and Crispin Wright (2000 and Chapter _ above), who describe several types of cases to show that warrant for a premise does not always transmit to a known deductive consequence of that premise, and who contend that this fact under-mines my argument for incompatibilism. I will try to show here that the Davies/Wright point about transmission of warrant does not adversely affect my argument
• Brian P. McLaughlin (2003). McKinsey's challenge, warrant transmission, and skepticism.   (More)
• Yujin Nagasawa (2002). Externalism and the memory argument.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://phonline.org/paper.php?keynum=206
  http://www.cappe.edu.au/people/nagayu/3Memory.pdf
  http://www.philosophy.bham.ac.uk/pdf/Nagasawa/Memory.pdf
  http://www.philosophy.bham.ac.uk/staff/nagasawa_Memory.pdf
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1746-8361.2002.tb00249.x
  
• Paul Noordhof (2004). Outsmarting the McKinsey-brown argument?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Externalists about mental content are supposed to face the following dilemma. Either they must give up the claim that we have privileged access to our own mental states or they must allow that we have privileged access to the world. The dilemma is posed in its most precise form through the McKinsey-Brown argument (McKinsey 1991; Brown 1995). Over the years since it was ?rst published in 1991, our understanding of the precise character of the premisses which constitute the argument has been re?ned. It is based on three claims (where A partially serves to characterise the content of some belief state for which Externalism is true and E is some proposition about the external world)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/j.0003-2638.2004.00460.x/enhancedabs/
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.0003-2638.2004.00460.x
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/anal/2004/00000064/00000281/art00009
  
• Susana Nuccetelli (2003). Knowing that one knows what one is talking about.   (More)
• David J. Owens & Brian P. McLaughlin (2000). Self-knowledge, externalism and scepticism: II--David Owens, scepticisms: Descartes and Hume.   (More)
• Ian Phillips (online). Reflections on externalism and self-knowledge.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In the mid-nineties a large number of philosophers (most famously, Michael McKinsey, Jessica Brown and Paul Boghossian) raised and discussed a certain form of challenge to externalism. In Boghossian
• Duncan Pritchard & Jesper Kallestrup (2004). An argument for the inconsistency of content externalism and epistemic internalism.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Whereas a number of recent articles have focussed upon whether the thesis of content externalism is compatible with a certain sort of knowledge that is gained via first-person authority,1 far less attention has been given to the relationship that this thesis bears to the possession of knowledge in general and, in particular, its relation to internalist and externalist epistemologies. Nevertheless, although very few actual arguments have been presented to this end, there does seem to be a shared suspicion that content externalism must be incompatible with epistemic internalism. In a recent and influential paper, however, James Chase has challenged this conventional wisdom by offering a subtle defence of the view that content externalism and epistemic internalism are, in fact, compatible after all.2 Our aim here is twofold. First, to show that Chase is only able to achieve this result because he focuses upon the internalist conception of justification, rather than knowledge. Second, to formulate one prima facie argument which shows that an internalist conception of knowledge is incompatible with an externalist conception of content, an argument which, moreover, is not touched by Chase
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.philosophy-dev.stir.ac.uk/staff/duncan-pritchard/documents/ContEpistExtPhilosophia.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/1412251270wxn712/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/1412251270WXN712.pdf
  
• Duncan Pritchard (2003). McDowell on reasons, externalism and scepticism.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: At the very least, externalists about content will accept something like the following claim
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.philosophy-dev.stir.ac.uk/staff/duncan-pritchard/documents/McDowellonScepticismFINAL.pdf
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1468-0378.00187
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/ejop/2003/00000011/00000003/art00002
  
• James Pryor (web). Externalism about content and McKinsey-style reasoning.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: (revisions posted 12/5/2006) to appear in Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology, ed. by Sanford Goldberg (to be published by Oxford in 2006 or 2007) Michael McKinsey formulated an argument that raises a puzzle about the relation between externalism about content and our introspective awareness of content. The puzzle goes like this: it seems like I can know the contents of my thoughts by introspection alone; but philosophical reflection tells me that the contents of those thoughts are externalist, and so I couldn
• Klaus Puhl (1994). Davidson on intentional content and self-knowledge.   (More)
• Diana Raffman (1998). First-person authority and the internal reality of beliefs.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/oso/17388/2000/00000001/00000001/art00013
  
• Sarah Sawyer (2004). Absences, presences, and sufficient conditions.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.0003-2638.2004.00509.x
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/anal/2004/00000064/00000284/art00011
  
• Sarah Sawyer (1998). Privileged access to the world.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.unl.edu/philosop/people/faculty/sawyer/PrivilAccespaper.pdf
  http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/./ftinterface~content=a739205756~fulltext=713240930
  http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/index/W774848528107U98.pdf
  http://www.informaworld.com/index/W774848528107U98.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/routledg/ajphil/1998/00000076/00000004/art00001
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/tandf/tajp/1998/00000076/00000004/art00001
  
• Sarah Sawyer (2003). Sufficient absences.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1467-8284.00422
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/anal/2003/00000063/00000279/art00008
  
• Andrew F. Smith (2003). Semantic externalism, authoritative self-knowledge, and adaptation to slow switching.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: I here argue against the viability of Peter Ludlow’s modified version of Paul Boghossian’s argument for the incompatibility of semantic externalism and authoritative self-knowledge. Ludlow contends that slow switching is not merely actual but is, moreover, prevalent; it can occur whenever we shift between localized linguistic communities. It is therefore quite possible, he maintains, that we undergo unwitting shifts in our mental content on a regular basis. However, there is good reason to accept as plausible that despite their prevalence we are in fact able to readily adapt to such switches, as well as to the shifts in mental content that accompany them. The prevalence of slow switching between linguistic communities does not then necessarily entail incompatibility after all
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://transactionpub.metapress.com/index/871350P3124860J7.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/871350P3124860J7.pdf
  
• David Sosa (1996). Representing Thoughts and Language.   (More)
• Asa Maria Wikforss (online). Self-knowledge and knowledge of content.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/canadian_journal_of_philosophy/v038/38.3.wikforss.pdf
  
• C. Wright (2000). Cogency and question-begging: Some reflections on McKinsey's paradox and Putnam's proof.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/0029-4624.34.s1.17/abs/
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/0029-4624.34.s1.17
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/nous/2000/00000034/A00100s1/art00239
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/nous/2000/00000034/A00101s1/art00017
  
• C. Wright (2003). Some reflections on the acquisition of warrant by inference.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/~arche/pages/papers/Nuccetelli final.pdf
  http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/academic/philosophy/arche/pages/papers/Nuccetelli final.pdf
  
• Stephen Yablo (1998). Self-knowledge and semantic luck.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=1533-6077(1998)9<219:S&SL>2.0.CO;2-A
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=1533-6077(1998)9<219:S&SL>2.0.CO;2-A
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/1522973.pdf
  

Narrow Content

• Louise M. Antony (ms). What are you thinking? Character and content in the language of thought.   (More)
• Murat Aydede (1997). Has Fodor really changed his mind on narrow content?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: ABSTRACT. In his latest book, The Elm and the Expert (1994), Fodor notoriously rejects the notion of narrow content as superfluous. He envisions a scientific intentional psychology that adverts only to broad content properties in its explanations. I argue that Fodor's change in view is only apparent and that his previous position (1985-1991) is extensionally equivalent to his "new" position (1994). I show that, despite what he says narrow content is for in his (1994), Fodor himself has previously never appealed to the notion of narrow content in explaining Frege cases and cases involving the so-called deferential concepts. And for good reason: his notion of narrow content (1985-91) couldn't explain them. The only apparent change concerns his treatment of Twin Earth cases. However, I argue that the notion of broad content that his purely informational semantics delivers is, in some interesting sense, equivalent to the mapping notion of narrow content he officially gave up. For his pure informational semantics fails to avoid assigning disjunctive content to twins, since nomic covariations take care not only actual but also counterfactual contexts into account. I show that none of the attempts made by Fodor to block this consequence of his theory works. The present notion of broad content he now operates with is therefore in a position to take over all the important jobs that his previous notion of narrow content could do
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-0017.1997.tb00082.x
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1468-0017.00056
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/mila/1997/00000012/00000003/art00056
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/mila/1997/00000012/00000003/art00056
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/mila/1997/00000012/F0020003/art00010
  http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/119154914/PDFSTART
  
• Kent Bach (1996). Content: Wide vs. narrow.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: narrow content as a function from context to wide content.)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://userwww.sfsu.edu/~kbach/widenarr.html
  
• Ned Block (1995). Ruritania revisited.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=1533-6077(1995)6<171:RR>2.0.CO;2-F
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=1533-6077(1995)6<171:RR>2.0.CO;2-F
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/1523040.pdf
  
• David M. Braun (2002). Cognitive significance, attitude ascriptions, and ways of believing propositions.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ling.rochester.edu/~braun/Papers/cogsig.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/ab2auf89b269d9kj/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=403549&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/AB2AUF89B269D9KJ.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/phil/2002/00000108/F0020001/00403549
  
• Joao Branquinho (1999). The problem of cognitive dynamics.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This paper is devoted to an examination of some aspects of the central issue of Cognitive Dynamics, the issue about the conditions under which intentional mental states may persist over time. I discuss two main sorts of approach to the topic: the directly referential approach, which I take as best represented in David Kaplan?s views, and the neo-Fregean approach, which I take as best represented in Gareth Evans?s views. The upshot of my discussion is twofold. On the one hand, I argue that both Kaplan?s account and Evans?s account are on the whole defective (for different sorts of reason, of course); even though there are features of each of those views which seem to me to be along the right lines. On the other, and in spite of that, I claim that a broadly Fregean theory is still to be preferred since by positing semantically efficacious modes of presentation it is clearly better equipped to deal adequately with some important phenomena in the area. In particular, I argue that the notion of a memory-based demonstrative mode of presentation of an object (a spatio-temporal particular, a region in space, a period of time, etc.) turns out to be indispensable for the purpose of accounting for the persistence of an important range of mental states with propositional content over time
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/401/00/Cog.htm
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000401/
  http://cogprints.soton.ac.uk/documents/disk0/00/00/04/01/
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000401/00/Cog.htm
  http://cogprints.soton.ac.uk/documents/disk0/00/00/04/01/index.html
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:401
  
• Curtis Brown (1993). Belief states and narrow content.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-0017.1993.tb00290.x
  http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/119302062/PDFSTART
  
• David J. Chalmers (2002). The components of content.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: [[This paper appears in my anthology _Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings_ (Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 608-633. It is a heavily revised version of a paper first written in 1994 and revised in 1995. Sections 1, 7, 8, and 10 are similar to the old version, but the other sections are quite different. Because the old version has been widely cited, I have made it available (in its 1995 version) at http://consc.net/papers/content95.html
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/321/
  http://consc.net/papers/content.pdf
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/393071.html
  http://cogprints.org/321/0/content.html
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/chalmers95components.html
  http://www.cogsci.indiana.edu/pub/chalmers.content.ps
  http://www.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/papers/content.html
  http://cogprints.soton.ac.uk/documents/disk0/00/00/03/21/
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000321/00/content.html
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:321
  
• David J. Chalmers (2003). The nature of narrow content.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: A content of a subject's mental state is narrow when it is determined by the subject's intrinsic properties: that is, when any possible intrinsic duplicate of the subject has a corresponding mental state with the same content. A content of a subject's mental state is..
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/papers/narrow.html
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/servlet/useragent?func=synergy&synergyAction=showEnhancedAbstract&doi=10.1111/1533-6077.00004
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/1533-6077.00004/enhancedabs/
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1533-6077.00004
  http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/120710664/PDFSTART
  
• Ulrike Haas-Spohn (1999). Anti-individualism and cognitive semantics.   (More)
• Ulrike Haas-Spohn (1994). Hidden Indexicality and Subjective Meaning.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www2.sfs.nphil.uni-tuebingen.de/Alumni/Dissertationen/ullidiss/en_index.html
  
• Frank Jackson (2003). Narrow content and representation--or twin earth revisited.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Intentional states represent. Belief represents how we take things to be; desire represents how we would like things to be; and so on. To represent is to make a division among possibilities; it is to divide the possibilities into those that are consistent with how things are being represented to be and those that are not. I will call the possibilities consistent with how some intentional state represents things to be, its content. There is no suggestion that this is the only legitimate notion of content, but for anyone who takes seriously the representational nature of intentional states, it must be one legitimate and central notion of content. To discover that DNA has a double helix structure is to make a selection from the various possible structures
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.latrobe.edu.au/philosophy/staff/Narrow content.pdf
  http://phil.arts.cuhk.edu.hk/~phidept/jackson/FJ Narrow content.pdf
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0065-972X(200311)77:2<55:NCAROT>2.0.CO;2-Q
  
• Frank Jackson & Philip Pettit (1993). Some content is narrow.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: ONE way t0 defend narrow content is to produce a sentence 0f the form ‘S believes that P’, and show that this sentence is true 0f S if and 0nly if it is true 0f any duplicate from the skin in, any doppclgangcr, of S. N0toriously, this is hard to d0. Twin Earth examples are pervasivc.1 Another way to defend narrow content; is t0 show that Only 2. narrow notion can play thc causal explanatory r01c we require 0f contcnt in 2. properly scicntiicm psychology 0r cognitive science. Notoriously, this is hard t0 d0. The considerations—mcthod010gicaI solipsism, the principle 0f autonomy, 0r what:cvcr—invokcd to show that a broad notion 0f content cannot..
• Uriah Kriegel (2008). Real narrow content.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The purpose of the present paper is to develop and defend an account of narrow content that would neutralize the commonplace charge that narrow content
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-0017.2008.00345.x
  http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/120085768/PDFSTART
  
• Joe Lau (ms). Three motivations for narrow content.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In everyday life, we typically explain what people do by attributing mental states such as beliefs and desires. Such mental states belong to a class of mental states that are _intentional_, mental states that have content. Hoping that Johnny will win, and believing that Johnny will win are of course rather different mental states that can lead to very different behaviour. But they are similar in that they both have the same content : what is being hoped for and believed is the very same thing. According to the thesis of externalism that has been defended most notably by Hilary Putnam and Tyler Burge, not all of the contents of our mental states are determined by our intrinsic properties. Instead, the contents of our beliefs and desires are often determined in part by our relations to the environment. They are, so to speak, "wide" contents that are "not in our heads." Although externalism is accepted by most philosophers, many have argued that mental states with wide contents must also have a kind of content wholly determined by the intrinsic properties of the individuals who are in those states. This kind of content is called "narrow content". The aim of this paper is to distinguish between three rather different motivations for postulating narrow content. I argue that, given a certain conception of narrow content that I shall explain below, none of these three motivations succeed in establishing the existence of narrow content
• Ernest LePore & Barry M. Loewer (1989). Dual aspect semantics.   (More)
• Kirk A. Ludwig (1996). Singular thought and the cartesian theory of mind.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: (1) Content properties are nonrelational, that is, having a content property does not entail the existence of any contingent object not identical with the thinker or a part of the thinker.2 (2) We have noninferential knowledge of our conscious thoughts, that is, for any of our..
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://web.clas.ufl.edu/users/kludwig/web/users/kludwig/Abstracts/Abstract for Singular Thought and the Cartesian Theory of Mind.htm
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0029-4624(199612)30:4<434:STATCT>2.0.CO;2-D
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0029-4624(199612)30:4<434:STATCT>2.0.CO;2-D
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2216113.pdf
  
• Lynne Rudder Baker (1987). Content by courtesy.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-362X(198704)84:4<197:CBC>2.0.CO;2-X
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-362X(198704)84:4<197:CBC>2.0.CO;2-X
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2027158.pdf
  
• Gabriel Segal (online). Cognitive content and propositional attitude attributions.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Tyler Burge (Burge (1979)) has developed a very influential line of anti-individualistic thought. He argued that the cognitive content of a person
• Gabriel Segal (2007). Cognitive content and propositional attitude attributions.   (More)
• Alberto Voltolini (1997). Is narrow content the same as content of mental state types opaquely taxonomized?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Jerry Fodor now holds (1990) that the content of mental state types opaquely taxonomized (de dicto content: DDC) is determined by the 'orthographical' syntax + the computational/functional role of such states. Mental states whose tokens are both orthographically and truth-conditionally identical may be different with regard to the computational/functional role played by their respective representational cores. This make them tantamount to different contentful states, i.e. states with different DDCs, insofar as they are opaquely taxonomized. Indeed they cannot both be truthfully ascribed to a single subject at the same time. Some years ago (1987), Fodor postulated a notion of mental content which also went beyond that of a mental state's truth-conditions. States whose tokens differ in their truth-conditions, or broad content, might, he claimed, still share a narrow content (NC), which was causally responsible for the shared behavior of the subjects of these states. For instance, two molecularly identical individuals, living in environments in all respects the same, except for the chemical substance of the phenomenically indistinguishable liquids filling their respective lakes and rivers, would behave similarly when having truth-conditionally different thoughts regarding those liquids. According to Fodor, this sameness of behavior was causally dependent on the sameness of the NC of the two individuals' truth-conditionally different thoughts. Now, this way of individuating mental states is still of interest for semantics. Indeed, NC allows one contextually to fix the broad content of a mental state token. Echoing Kaplan's notion of character,1 Fodor explained NC as a function that mapped contexts (of thought) onto broad contents. NC was thus invoked by Fodor mainly in order to account for sameness of intentional behavior. But DDC also plays a role in explaining intentional behavior, precisely by explaining why a subject whose thought-tokens have identical truthconditions may behave differently..
• Timothy Williamson (1998). The broadness of the mental: Some logical issues.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0029-4624(1998)32<389:TBOTMS>2.0.CO;2-Q
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/nous/1998/00000032/A0020s12/art00125
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/nous/1998/00000032/A0120s12/art00125
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2676155.pdf
  

The Extended Mind

• Frederick R. Adams & Kenneth Aizawa (ms). Andy Clark on intrinsic content and extended cognition.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This is a plausible reading of what Clark and Chalmers had in mind at the time, but it is not the radical claim at stake in the extended cognition debate.[1] It is a familiar functionalist view of cognition and the mind that it can be realized in a wide range of distinct material bases. Thus, for many species of functionalism about cognition and the mind, it follows that they can be realized in extracranial substrates.[2] And, in truth, even some non-functionalist views of cognition apparently allow for the possibility that cognition extends into the external world.[3] So, the (logical, conceptual, or nomological) possibility of extended cognition seems to us not the kind of radical view the advocates of this view have often implied. This is not, of course, to assess or pass judgment on the truth of these possibilities; it is only to note that they are not what most agitates people about the hypothesis of extended cognition. Framing the radical extended cognition hypothesis is a more delicate matter than framing the modal extended cognition hypothesis, but something like the following is in the ballpark. The radical extended cognition hypothesis maintains that, in many mundane cases of tool use, human cognitive processes extend into the tools. The principal reason this hypothesis is so delicate is that there remains much room for dispute about what constitutes a
• Frederick R. Adams & Kenneth Aizawa (forthcoming). Challenges to active externalism.   (More)
• Frederick R. Adams & Kenneth Aizawa (2005). Defending non-derived content.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://personal.centenary.edu/~kaizawa/Defending Nonderived Content (Blind).doc
  
• Frederick R. Adams & Kenneth Aizawa (forthcoming). Defending the Bounds of cognition.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: That about sums up what is wrong with Clark
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.centenary.edu/attachments/philosophy/aizawa/publications/defendingtheboundsofcognition.doc
  
• Fred Adams & Ken Aizawa (forthcoming). Why the mind is still in the head.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Philosophical interest in situated cognition has been focused most intensely on the claim that human cognitive processes extend from the brain into the tools humans use. As we see it, this radical hypothesis is sustained by two kinds of mistakes, confusing coupling relations with constitutive relations and an inattention to the mark of the cognitive. Here we wish to draw attention to these mistakes and show just how pervasive they are. That is, for all that the radical philosophers have said, the mind is still in the head
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://personal.centenary.edu/~kaizawa/Murat Paper.doc
  
• Kenneth Aizawa (ms). Clark's conditions on extended cognition are too strong.   (More)
• John Campbell (1993). The role of physical objects in spatial thinking.   (More)
• J. Case (2004). Offloading memory to the environment: A quantitative example.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/v38705833611179g/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/V38705833611179G.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/mind/2004/00000014/00000003/05267380
  
• Anthony Chemero (2007). Asking what's inside the head: Neurophilosophy meets the extended mind.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In their historical overview of cognitive science, Bechtel, Abraham- son and Graham (1999) describe the field as expanding in focus be- ginning in the mid-1980s. The field had spent the previous 25 years on internalist, high-level GOFAI (“good old fashioned artificial intelli- gence” [Haugeland 1985]), and was finally moving “outwards into the environment and downards into the brain” (Bechtel et al, 1999, p.75). One important force behind the downward movement was Patricia Churchland’s Neurophilosophy (1986). This book began a movement bearing its name, one that truly came of age in 1999 when Kath- leen Akins won a million-dollar fellowship to begin the McDonnell Project in Philosophy and the Neurosciences. The McDonnell Project put neurophilosophy at the forefront of philosophy of mind and cogni- tive science, yielding proliferating articles, conferences, special journal issues and books. In two major new books, neurophilosophers Patricia Churchland (2002) and John Bickle (2003) clearly feel this newfound prominence: Churchland mocks those who do not apply findings in neuroscience to philosophical problems as “no-brainers”; Bickle mocks anyone with traditional philosophical concerns, including “naturalistic philosophers of mind” and other neurophilosophers
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://edisk.fandm.edu/tony.chemero/papers/bickchurchrev.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/m812557162027h08/fulltext.pdf
  
• Tony Chemero & Michael Silberstein (ms). Defending extended cognition.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In this talk, we defend extended cognition against several criticisms. We argue that extended cognition does not derive from armchair theorizing and that it neither ignores the results of the neural sciences, nor minimizes the importance of the brain in the production of intelligent behavior. We also argue that explanatory success in the cognitive sciences does not depend on localist or reductionist methodologies; part of our argument for this is a defense of what might be called
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00003204/01/defendingextendedmindv3.doc
  
• Andy Clark (2006). Memento's revenge: The extended mind, extended.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In the movie, Memento, the hero, Leonard, suffers from a form of anterograde amnesia that results in an inability to lay down new memories. Nonetheless, he sets out on a quest to find his wife
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.cogsci.msu.edu/DSS/2004-2005/Clark/The Extended Mind.pdf
  http://www.philosophy.ed.ac.uk/staff/clark/pubs/Mementosrevenge2.pdf
  
• Andy Clark (2001). Reasons, robots and the extended mind.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: A suitable project for the new Millenium is to radically reconfigure our image of human rationality. Such a project is already underway, within the Cognitive Sciences, under the umbrellas of work in Situated Cognition, Distributed and De-centralized Cogition, Real-world Robotics and Artificial Life1. Such approaches, however, are often criticized for giving certain aspects of rationality too wide a berth. They focus their attention on on such superficially poor cousins as
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.cogs.indiana.edu/andy/mlrre.pdf
  http://www.cse.unsw.edu.au/~tiinam/clark.pdf
  http://www.philosophy.ed.ac.uk/staff/clark/pubs/mlrre.pdf
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/1468-0017.00162
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1468-0017.00162
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/mila/2001/00000016/F0020002/art00162
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/mila/2001/00000015/00000002/art00162
  http://www.era.lib.ed.ac.uk/handle/1842/1313?mode=simple
  
• Andy Clark & David J. Chalmers (1998). The extended mind.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Where does the mind stop and the rest of the world begin? The question invites two standard replies. Some accept the demarcations of skin and skull, and say that what is outside the body is outside the mind. Others are impressed by arguments suggesting that the meaning of our words "just ain't in the head", and hold that this externalism about meaning carries over into an externalism about mind. We propose to pursue a third position. We advocate a very different sort of externalism: an _active externalism_ , based on the active role of the environment in driving cognitive processes
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://consc.net/papers/extended.html
  http://cogprints.org/320/0/extended.html
  http://www.cogs.indiana.edu/andy/TheExtendedMind.pdf
  http://www.lps.uci.edu/~johnsonk/philpsych/readings/clark.pdf
  http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/courses/concepts/clark.html
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000320/00/extended.html
  http://www.philosophy.ed.ac.uk/staff/clark/pubs/TheExtendedMind.pdf
  http://wexler.free.fr/library/files/clark (1998) the extended mind.pdf
  http://philosophy.wisc.edu/shapiro/Phil554/PAPERS/THE EXTENDED MIND.htm
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:320
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1467-8284.00096
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/anal/1998/00000058/00000257/art00096
  http://philosophy.wisc.edu/shapiro/Phil951/TheExtendedMind.pdf
  http://www.era.lib.ed.ac.uk/handle/1842/1312
  
• Terry Dartnall (2005). Does the world Leak into the mind? Active externalism, "internalism", and epistemology.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.leaonline.com/doi/abs/10.1207/s15516709cog2901_6
  http://www.leaonline.com/doi/pdfplus/10.1207/s15516709cog2901_6
  http://www98.griffith.edu.au/dspace/publisherurilogger?itemId=4248&uri=http://www.leaonline.com/doi/abs/10.1207/s15516709cog2901_6
  
• Joseph S. Fulda (1998). "The extended mind"- extended.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: We review the argument made by Clark and Chalmers in _Analysis_ for a limited externalism and extend their argument from declarative knowledge to procedural knowledge
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/363/0/EXTENDED.html
  http://cogprints.org/1093/00/EXTENDED.pdf
  http://cogprints.org/363/00/EXTENDED.html
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000363/
  http://portal.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=298972.298994
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:363
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:1093
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/documents/disk0/00/00/03/63/cog00000363-00/EXTENDED.html
  http://www.phil.canterbury.ac.nz/tom_bestor/e-texts/Fulda, Joseph - The Extended Mind - Extended (against Clark and Chalmers).pdf
  http://delivery.acm.org/10.1145/300000/298994/p33-fulda.pdf?key1=298994&key2=5663307711&coll=GUIDE&dl=GUIDE&CFID=20443068&CFTOKEN=96440739
  
• Brie Gertler (2007). Overextending the mind?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract:      Clark and Chalmers argue that the mind is extended – that is, its boundary lies beyond the skin. In this essay, I will criticize this conclusion. However, I will also defend some of the more controversial elements of Clark and Chalmers's argument. I reject their conclusion because I think that their argument shows that a seemingly innocuous assumption, about internal states and processes, is flawed. My goal is not to conclusively refute Clark and Chalmers's conclusion. My aim is only to reveal the best alternative for those who remain skeptical about the existence – or, perhaps, even the possibility – of extended minds
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=999712
  
• Terence M. Horgan & Uriah Kriegel (forthcoming). Phenomenal intentionality meets the extended mind.   (More)
• Susan L. Hurley (1998). Active perception and vehicle externalism.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Certain empirical results suggest a way of challenging two natural and widespread assumptions about the mind. One assumption is about the relations between perception and action. This shows up in the widespread conception of perception and action in terms of input and output, respectively. Perception is conceived as input from world to mind and action is conceived as output from mind to world. The other assumption is about the relations between mind and world. It influences various opposed views about whether the contents of the mind are in principle independent of the outside world
• Susan L. Hurley (2003). Action, the unity of consciousness, and vehicle externalism.   (More)
• Susan L. Hurley (1998). Vehicles, contents, conceptual structure and externalism.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: We all know about the vehicle/content distinction (see Dennett 1991a, Millikan 1991, 1993). We shouldn't confuse properties represented in content with properties of vehicles of content. In particular, we shouldn't confuse the personal and subpersonal levels. The contents of the mental states of subject/agents are at the personal level. Vehicles of content are causally explanatory subpersonal events or processes or states. We shouldn't suppose that the properties of vehicles must be projected into what they represent for subject/agents, or vice versa. This would be to confuse the personal and subpersonal levels
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/710/00/Vccse.html
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000710/
  http://www.warwick.ac.uk/staff/S.L.Hurley/papers/vccse.pdf
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000710/00/Vccse.html
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:710
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1467-8284.00095
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/anal/1998/00000058/00000257/art00095
  
• David Kirsh & P. Maglio (1995). On distinguishing epistemic from pragmatic action.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/kirsh94distinguishing.html
  http://www.leaonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1207/s15516709cog1804_1
  http://www.leaonline.com/doi/abs/10.1207/s15516709cog1804_1
  http://www.leaonline.com/doi/pdfplus/10.1207/s15516709cog1804_1
  http://www.cogsci.rpi.edu/CSJarchive/1994v18/i04/p0513p0549/MAIN.PDF
  
• Leslie Marsh (2005). Review Essay: Andy Clark's Natural-Born Cyborgs: Minds, Technologies, and the Future of Human Intelligence_.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The notion of the cyborg has exercised the popular imagination for almost two hundred years. In very general terms the idea that a living entity can be a hybrid of both organic matter and mechanical parts, and for all intents and purposes be seamlessly functional and self-regulating, was prefigured in literary works such as Shelly
  s Frankenstein (1816/18) and Samuel Butler
  s Erewhon (1872). This notion of hybridism has been a staple theme of 20th century science fiction writing, television programmes and the cinema. For the most part, these works trade on a deep sense of unease we have about our personal identity – how could some non-organic matter to which I have so little conscious access count as a bona fide part of me? Cognitive scientist and philosopher, Andy Clark, picks up this general theme and presents an empirical and philosophical case for the following inextricably linked theses.
• Leslie Marsh & Christian Onof (2008). Stigmergic epistemology, stigmergic cognition.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: To know is to cognize, to cognize is to be a culturally bounded, rationality-bounded and environmentally located agent. Knowledge and cognition are thus dual aspects of human sociality. If social epistemology has the formation, acquisition, mediation, transmission and dissemination of knowledge in complex communities of knowers as its subject matter, then its third party character is essentially stigmergic. In its most generic formulation, stigmergy is the phenomenon of indirect communication mediated by modifications of the environment. Extending this notion one might conceive of social stigmergy as the extra-cranial analog of an artifcial neural network providing epistemic structure. This paper recommends a stigmergic framework for social epistemology to account for the supposed tension between individual action, wants and beliefs and the social corpora. We also propose that the so-called "extended mind" thesis offers the requisite stigmergic cognitive analog to stigmergic knowledge. Stigmergy as a theory of interaction within complex systems theory is illustrated through an example that runs on a particle swarm optimization algorithm.
• Gerard O'Brien (1998). The mind: Embodied, embedded, but not extended.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This commentry focuses on the one major ecumenical theme propounded in Andy Clark's Being There that I find difficult to accept; this is Clark's advocacy, especially in the third and final part of the book, of the extended nature of the embedded, embodied mind
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/1451/00/Commentary_on_Clark_Being_There.pdf
  http://www.arts.adelaide.edu.au/humanities/philosophy/publications/Commentary_on_Clark_Being_There.pdf
  
• Mitch Parsell (2006). The cognitive cost of extending an evolutionary mind into the environment.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Clark and Chalmers (1998) have argued that mental states can be extended outside an organism
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=16628462&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/sites/entrez?db=pubmed&uid=16628462&cmd=showdetailview&indexed=google
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/W5656M501R410G26.pdf
  
• Robert D. Rupert (web). Representation in extended cognitive systems: Does the scaffolding of language extend the mind?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: forthcoming in R. Menary (ed.), The Extended Mind
• Larry Shapiro (web). Functionalism and mental boundaries.   (More)
• Kim Sterelny (2004). Externalism, epistemic artefacts and the extended mind.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: A common picture of evolution by natural selection sees it as a process through which organisms change so that they become better adapted to their environment. However, agents do not merely respond to the challenges their environments pose. They modify their environments, filtering and transforming the action of the environment on their bodies A beaver, in making a dam, engineers a stream, increasing both the size of its safe refuge and reducing its seasonal variability. Beavers, like many other animals, are ecological engineers. They act to modify the physical challenges posed by their environment. Nests, burrows and other shelters reduce the impacts of adverse weather and of other agents. Animal also modify their exposure to biological risks. Hygienic behaviour reduces the impact of disease. Intensive grooming; moving to new roosts; using a
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.vuw.ac.nz/phil/staff/documents/sterelny-papers/artefacts.pdf
  
• John Sutton (2006). Introduction: Memory, embodied cognition, and the extended mind.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: I introduce the seven papers in this special issue, by Andy Clark, J
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/index/P30W444011537529.pdf
  http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/./ftinterface~content=a747697835~fulltext=713240930
  http://www.journals.royalsoc.ac.uk/index/1312Q202H7808RT3.pdf
  http://www.phil.mq.edu.au/staff/jsutton/Sutton_PP_Intro.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/P816529H7705H410.pdf
  http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/1960RSPSA.256..145S
  
• Daniel A. Weiskopf (2008). Patrolling the mind's boundaries.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Defenders of the extended mind thesis say that it is possible that some of our mental states may be constituted, in part, by states of the extra-bodily environment. Often they also add that such extended mentation is a commonplace phenomenon. I argue that extended mentation, while not impossible, is either nonexistent or far from widespread. Genuine beliefs as they occur in normal biologically embodied systems are informationally integrated with each other, and sensitive to changes in the person
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://luna.cas.usf.edu/~weiskopf/papers/patrolling-the-boundaries.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/c51u231h7v4ju770/fulltext.pdf
  
• Robert A. Wilson (2005). Collective memory, group minds, and the extended mind thesis.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: nantly as an individual capacity in the cognitive and psychology and the cognitive sciences, with cognitive biological sciences, the social sciences have most com- agents permeating both the biological and social monly construed memory as a collective phenomenon
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ualberta.ca/~philosop/faculty/wilson/collectmem.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/K37446N775180100.pdf
  
• Robert A. Wilson (2005). Meaning making and the mind of the externalist.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This paper attempts to do two things. First, it recounts the problem of intentionality, as it has typically been conceptualized, and argues that it needs to be reconceptualized in light of the radical form of externalism most commonly referred to as the extended mind thesis. Second, it provides an explicit, novel argument for that thesis, what I call the argument from meaning making, and offers some defense of that argument. This second task occupies the core of the paper, and in completing it I distinguish _active _ _cognition_ from _cyborg fantasy arguments_ for externalism, and develop the analogy between the extended mind thesis in the cognitive sciences and developmental systems theory in developmental biology. The rethinking of the problem of intentionality on offer leads not so much to a solution as to a dissolution of that problem, as traditionally conceived
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ualberta.ca/~philosop/faculty/wilson/meaningmaking.pdf
  

Content Internalism and Externalism, Misc

• Jessica Brown (2003). Externalism and the Fregean tradition.   (More)
• John Campbell (1987). Is sense transparent?   (More)
• Andrew Carpenter (1998). Davidson's externalism and the unintelligibility of massive error.   (More)
• Bryan Frances (2007). Externalism, physicalism, statues, and hunks.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Content externalism is the dominant view in the philosophy of mind. Content essentialism, the thesis that thought tokens have their contents essentially, is also popular. And many externalists are supporters of such essentialism. However, endorsing the conjunction of those views either (i) commits one to a counterintuitive view of the underlying physical nature of thought tokens or (ii) commits one to a slightly different but still counterintuitive view of the relation of thought tokens to physical tokens as well as a rejection of realist physicalism. In this essay I reveal the problem and articulate and adjudicate among the possible solutions. I will end up rejecting content essentialism
• Brie Gertler (2007). Content externalism and the epistemic conception of the self.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Our fundamental conception of the self seems to be, broadly speaking, epistemic: selves are things that have thoughts, undergo experiences, and possess reasons for action and belief. In this paper, I evaluate the consequences of this epistemic conception for the widespread view that properties like thinking that arthritis is painful are relational features of the self
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://people.virginia.edu/~bg8y/Xm&theSelf.doc
  http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1007361
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1533-6077.2007.00121.x
  http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/120710746/PDFSTART
  
• John Gregg (online). Language and meaning.   (More)
• H (2007). Externalism and a posteriori semantics.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: It is widely held that the meaning of certain types of terms, such as natural kind terms, is individuated externalistically, in terms of the individual
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/f7546421h6624466/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/F7546421H6624466.pdf
  
• Henry Jackman (2005). Intuitions and semantic theory.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: While engaged in the analysis of topics such as the nature of knowledge, meaning, or justice, analytic philosophers have traditionally relied extensively on their own intuitions about when the relevant terms can, and can't, be correctly applied. Consequently, if intuitions about possible cases turned out not to be a reliable tool for the proper analysis of philosophically central concepts, then a radical reworking of philosophy's (or at least analytic philosophy's) methodology would seem to be in order. It is thus not surprising that the increasingly critical scrutiny that intuitions have received of late has produced what has been referred to as a "crisis" in analytic philosophy. This paper will argue, however, that at least those criticisms that stem from recent work on semantic externalism are not as serious as their proponents have claimed. Indeed, this paper will argue while the conceptual intuitions (and the analyses that result from them) will have to be recognized as fallible, they still have a prima facie claim to correctness. A naturalistic and externalistic account of concepts thus merely requires that the methodology of conceptual analysis be reinterpreted (from a 'Platonic' to a 'constructive' model) rather than given up
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/j.1467-9973.2005.00374.x
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-9973.2005.00374.x
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/meta/2005/00000036/00000003/art00007
  http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/118646789/PDFSTART
  
• William S. Larkin (online). Content and metacognition.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: C. Theses: 1. Content Externalism strictly implies the possibility of acquiring a new concept as the result of an unwitting switch of environments. 2. This intuitively compels us to accept the possibility of someone possessing a concept without being aware that she does. 3. This possibility strictly favors causal models of meta-cognition over constitution models. 4. The possibility of possessing a concept unawares suggests that the contents of metacognitive
• Helge Malmgren (online). The "internal/external" metaphor in the philosophy of mind.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The being of the _cogitatio,_ or to be more exact, of the knowledge-phenomenon itself, cannot
  be questioned, and it is free from the riddle of transcendence. /.../ It is also obvious, that the
  _cogitationes_ represent a sphere of absolute immanent givens, in which sense we also interpret
  immanence. In the seeing [Schauen] of the pure phenomenon, the object is not outside the
  knowledge, outside consciousness, and at the same time it is given in the sense of the absolute
  self-givenness of a purely seen object."
• Ruth G. Millikan (2004). Existence proof for a viable externalism.   (More)
• Ruth G. Millikan (1997). On cognitive luck: Externalism in an evolutionary frame.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: "Paleontologists like to say that to a first approximation, all species are extinct (ninety- nine percent is the usual estimate). The organisms we see around us are distant cousins, not great grandparents; they are a few scattered twig-tips of an enormous tree whose branches and trunk are no longer with us." (p. 343-44). The historical life bush consists mainly in dead ends
• Derk Pereboom (1995). Conceptual structure and the individuation of content.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Current attempts to understand psychological content divide into two families of views. According to externalist accounts such as those advanced by Tyler Burge and Ruth Millikan, psychological content does not supervene on the physical features of the individual subject, but is fixed partially by the nature of the world external to her.¹ In the rival functional role theories developed by Ned Block and Brian Loar, content does supervene on the physical features of the individual, and is, in addition, determined solely by the role it plays in the causal network of an individual's sensations, behavior, and mental states.² Over the past fifteen years, criticism of these two types of views has often focussed on their capacity to individuate content in an acceptable way, and both seem to be deficient in this respect
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=1520-8583(1995)9<401:CSATIO>2.0.CO;2-3
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=1520-8583(1995)9<401:CSATIO>2.0.CO;2-3
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2214228.pdf
  
• Gabriel Segal (2004). Reference, causal powers, externalist intuitions, and unicorns.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In this chapter, I will compare and contrast singular concepts with what I call
• Alberto Voltolini (online). Internalism and externalism.   (More)
• Alberto Voltolini (2005). On the metaphysics of internalism and externalism.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In this paper, I explore the consequences of the thesis that externalism and internalism are (possibly, but as we will see not necessarily, opposite) metaphysical doctrines on the individuation conditions of a thought. If I am right, this thesis primarily entails that at least some naturalist positions on the ontology of the mind, namely the reductionistic ones, are hardly compatible with both externalism and a version of internalism so conceived, namely relational internalism. Indeed, according to both externalism and relational internalism, intentionality constitutes (or at least grounds) the relational content property providing the individuation conditions of a thought, as a relation to an outer or to an inner object respectively. Yet since intentionality turns out to be a modal, hence a nonnatural, property, both externalism and relational internalism deny to thoughts at least token-identity with physical states. Finally, I will give some support to the idea that externalism and internalism must be interpreted as doctrines on the individuation conditions of a thought
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.cei.unimo.it/personale/voltolini/internalism_externalism.pdf
  
• Ralph Wedgwood (2006). The internal and external components of cognition.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Timothy Williamson has presented several arguments that seek to cast doubt on the idea that cognition can be factorized into internal and external components. In the first section of this paper, I attempt to evaluate these arguments. My conclusion will be that these arguments establish several highly important points, but in the end these arguments fail to cast any doubt either on the idea that cognitive science should be largely concerned with internal mental processes, or on the idea that cognition can be analysed in terms of the existence of a suitable connection between internal and external components. I shall present an argument for the conclusion that cognition involves certain causal processes that are entirely internal
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://users.ox.ac.uk/~mert1230/cognition.a4.pdf
  http://users.ox.ac.uk/~mert1230/cognition.ltr.pdf
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=OR-ApDfUMUkC&oi=fnd&pg=RA1-PT251&ots=LNjDUBT9sG&sig=FXQabA0NNHD6iQspcW88TprzzLc
  
• Asa Maria Wikforss (2006). Content Externalism and Fregean Sense.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Can externalist concepts really capture an individual
• Asa Maria Wikforss & Soren Haggqvist (web). Externalism and a posteriori semantics.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: We have become accustomed to the idea that meaning is determined externalistically, that the meaning of certain types of terms, for example natural kind terms, depends on facts about the external environment.1 Recently, however, a more radical thesis has emerged, a thesis we shall dub
• Timothy Williamson (2006). Can cognition be factorized into internal and external components?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: 0. Platitudinously, cognitive science is the science of cognition. Cognition is usually defined as something like the process of acquiring, retaining and applying knowledge. To a first approximation, therefore, cognitive science is the science of knowing. Knowing is a relation between the knower and the known. Typically, although not always, what is known involves the environment external to the knower. Thus knowing typically involves a relation between the agent and the external environment. It is not internal to the agent, for the internal may be the same whether or not it is related to the external in a way that constitutes knowing. Cognition enables agents to achieve their goals by adjusting their actions appropriately to the environment. Such adjustment requires what is internal to the agent to be in some sense in line with what is external; that matching depends on both internal and external sides. Thus if cognitive science were restricted to what is internal to the agent, it would lose sight of its primary object of study. Although cognition depends on both the internal and the external, one can try to analyse it into internal and external factors. Call a state S narrow if and only if whether an agent is in S at a time t depends only on the total internal qualitative state of S at t, so that if one agent in one possible situation is internally an exact duplicate of another agent..
• Robert A. Wilson (1999). Individualism.   (More)
• Timothy Williamson (2004). Sosa on abilities, concepts, and externalism.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: A kind of intellectual project characteristic of Ernest Sosa is to resolve an apparently flat-out dispute by showing that it is not after all a zero-sum game. His irenic goal is to do justice to both sides and give each of them most of what it wants. In his subtle paper ‘Abilities, Concepts, and Externalism’ he applies this strategy to the dispute between internalism and externalism in the philosophy of mind. It is a pleasure to engage in discussion with a philosopher of Sosa’s fair-mindedness and analytical skills

Naturalizing Mental Content

Information-Based Accounts of Mental Content

• Frederick R. Adams (2003). The informational turn in philosophy.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/content/j6l8530k657u8650/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/j6l8530k657u8650/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=5142080&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/J6L8530K657U8650.pdf
  
• Jon Barwise (1986). Information and circumstance.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.projecteuclid.org/Dienst/UI/1.0/Display/euclid.ndjfl/1093636678
  
• Radu J. Bogdan (1988). Information and semantic cognition: An ontological account.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Information is the fuel of cognition. At its most basic level, information is a matter of structures interacting under laws. The notion of information thus reflects the (relational) fact that a structure is created by the impact of another structure. The impacted structure is an encoding, in some concrete form, of the interaction with the impacting structure. Information is, essentially, the structural trace in some system of an interaction with another system; it is also, as a consequence, the structural fuel which drives the impacted system's subsequent processes and behavior. Information takes various forms because the world has many levels of compositional and functional complexity, under different constraints. The key constraints that matter in the understanding of information are natural patterns of organization, or types, and systematic correlations among types, or laws. These level- sensitive constraints, in the form of types and laws, shape the very form in which information is tokened in some structure, that is, the very form in which it is encoded. As a result, the information-producing interactions bring about different sorts of structures, with various sorts of causal effects and functions, whence so many ways in which information is coded and utilized
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-0017.1988.tb00136.x
  
• Radu J. Bogdan (1987). Mind, content and information.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: What is it that one thinks or believes when one thinks or believes something? A mental formula? A sentence in some natural language? Its truth conditions? Or perhaps an abstract proposition? The current story of content is fairly ecumenical. It says that a number of aspects, some mental, other semantic, go into our understanding of content. Yet the current story is incomplete. It leaves out a very important aspect of content, one which I call incremental information. It is information in a specific format, information as a limited or local increment, structured by a number of underlying parameters. It is in the form of such increments that information drives cognition and behavior. This is why, perhaps of all aspects of content, it is incremental information which matters most when we want to understand cognitive attitudes and performances. This in turn must have an impact on our philosophical notions of content, propositional attitudes, inference, justification and knowledge
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/p107202818r62286/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/P107202818R62286.pdf
  
• Jason Bridges (2006). Does informational semantics commit euthyphro's fallacy.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In this paper, I argue that informational semantics, the most well-known and worked-out naturalistic account of intentional content, conflicts with a fundamental psychological principle about the conditions of belief-formation. Since this principle is an important premise in the argument for informational semantics, the upshot is that the view is self-contradictory??indeed, it turns out to be guilty of a sophisticated version of the fallacy famously committed by Euthyphro in the eponymous Platonic dialogue. Criticisms of naturalistic accounts of content typically proceed piecemeal by narrowly constructed counterexamples, but I argue that the current result is more robust. It affects a broad family of accounts, and provokes a wider doubt about the possibility of successful execution of the naturalistic project
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://home.uchicago.edu/~bridges/papers/Bridges--Does Informational Semantics Commit Euthyphro's Fallacy.pdf
  http://home.uchicago.edu/~bridges/papers/Bridges--Does Informational Semantics Commit Euthyphro's Fallacy, pre-print version.pdf
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2006.00622.x?ai=2l6&mi=85vxf&af=R
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2006.00622.x
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/nous/2006/00000040/00000003/art00005
  
• Anthony Chemero (2003). Information for perception and information processing.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://portal.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=947737.947763
  http://edisk.fandm.edu/tony.chemero/papers/infoandinfo.pdf
  http://www.cse.buffalo.edu/~rapaport/Papers/Papers.by.Others/mm.chemero.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/content/j862682860127888/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/j862682860127888/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=5142087&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/J862682860127888.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/mind/2003/00000013/00000004/05142087
  
• Jonathan Cohen (2006). An objective counterfactual theory of information.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: We offer a novel theory of information that differs from traditional accounts in two respects: (i) it explains information in terms of counterfactuals rather than conditional probabilities, and (ii) it does not make essential reference to doxastic states of subjects, and consequently allows for the sort of objective, reductive explanations of various notions in epistemology and philosophy of mind that many have wanted from an account of information
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.philosophy.leeds.ac.uk/Staff/AME/counterfactuals.pdf
  http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/./ftinterface~content=a758270032~fulltext=713240930
  http://www.informaworld.com/index/758270032.pdf
  
• Jonathan Cohen (2002). Information and content.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Mental states differ from most other entities in the world in having semantic or intentional properties: they have meanings, they are about other things, they have satisfaction- or truth-conditions, they have representational content. Mental states are not the only entities that have intentional properties - so do linguistic expressions, some paintings, and so on; but many follow Grice, 1957 ] in supposing that we could understand the intentional properties of these other entities as derived from the intentional properties of mental states (viz., the mental states of their producers). Of course, accepting this supposition leaves us with a puzzle about how the non-derivative bearers of intentional properties (mental states) could have these properties. In particular, intentional properties seem to some to be especially difficult to reconcile with a robust commitment to ontological naturalism - the view that the natural properties, events, and individuals are the only properties, events, and individuals that exist. Fodor puts this intuition nicely in this oft-quoted passage:

  I suppose that sooner or later the physicists will complete the catalogue they've been compiling of the
  ultimate and irreducible properties of things. When they do, the likes of _spin_, _charm_, and _charge_ will perhaps
  appear upon their list. But _aboutness_ surely won't; intentionality simply doesn't go that deep.... If aboutness is
  real, it must be really something else ([ Fodor, 1987 ], 97).

  Some philosophers have reacted to this clash by giving up one of the two views generating the tension. For example, Churchland, 1981 ] opts for intentional irrealism in order to save ontological naturalism, while
• David J. Cole (ms). Natural language and natural meaning.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In Book II of the _Essay_, at the beginning of his discussion of language in Chapter II ("Of the Signification of Words"), John Locke writes that we humans have a variety of thoughts which might profit others, but that unfortunately these thoughts lie invisible and hidden from others. And so we use language to communicate these thoughts. As a result, "words, in their primary or immediate signification,stand for nothing but _the ideas in the mind of him that uses them_
• Luciano Floridi (2005). Is semantic information meaningful data?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: There is no consensus yet on the definition of semantic information. This paper contributes to the current debate by criticising and revising the Standard Definition of semantic Information (SDI) as meaningful data, in favour of the Dretske-Grice approach: meaningful and well-formed data constitute semantic information only if they also qualify as contingently truthful. After a brief introduction, SDI is criticised for providing necessary but insufficient conditions for the definition of semantic information. SDI is incorrect because truth-values do not supervene on semantic information, and misinformation (that is, false semantic information) is not a type of semantic information, but pseudo-information, that is not semantic information at all. This is shown by arguing that none of the reasons for interpreting misinformation as a type of semantic information is convincing, whilst there are compelling reasons to treat it as pseudo-information. As a consequence, SDI is revised to include a necessary truth-condition. The last section summarises the main results of the paper and indicates some interesting areas of application of the revised definition
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00002536/
  http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00002536/01/iimd.pdf
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2005.tb00531.x
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/ips/ppr/2005/00000070/00000002/art00004
  
• Luciano Floridi (2003). Two approaches to the philosophy of information.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.hi.is/~lobbi/ut1/a_a/tattpi.pdf
  http://portal.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=947737.947756
  http://www.cse.buffalo.edu/~rapaport/Papers/Papers.by.Others/mm.floridi.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/content/g0m77uh8853308u4/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/g0m77uh8853308u4/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=5142079&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/G0M77UH8853308U4.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/mind/2003/00000013/00000004/05142079
  
• Jerry A. Fodor (1986). Information and association.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://projecteuclid.org/Dienst/Repository/1.0/Disseminate/euclid.ndjfl/1093636677/body/pdf
  http://www.projecteuclid.org/DPubS/Repository/1.0/Disseminate?handle=euclid.ndjfl/1093636677&view=body&content-type=pdf_1
  
• M. C. Frank (2004). Against informational atomism.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www-leland.stanford.edu/group/dualist/vol10/frank.pdf
  
• Patrick Grim, P. St Denis & T. Kokalis (2004). Information and meaning: Use-based models in arrays of neural nets.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.cse.buffalo.edu/~rapaport/510/mm-grim-etal.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/x520ur52t8x7746q/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=5142091&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/X520UR52T8X7746Q.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/mind/2004/00000014/00000001/05142091
  
• David R. Hilbert (ms). Content, intention, and explanation.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Naturalistic theories of content and whether or not reason-giving explanations of human behavior are causal explanations have been central topics in recent philosophy of mind. Fred Dretske, in his book Explaining Behavior, attempts to construct a naturalistic theory of the contents of beliefs and desires that gives these mental states an important role in the causation of behavior. Even if Dretske is granted that the theory adequately accounts for individual behaviors the theory still faces problems in offering an adequate account of important features of extended sequences of behavior. Some sequences of behavior exhibit coherence in the sense that the elements of the sequence either contribute to the atttainment of a goal state or only make sense on the supposition that the goal state will be attained. Two ways of attaining coherence are distinguished. In chaining behavior coherence is guaranteed by the fit between the internal structure of the organism and the structure of the external environment. In other cases of coherence chaining is not available as an explanation. It is argued that Dretske
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://tigger.uic.edu/~hilbert/papers/intandcont.pdf
  
• David J. Israel & John Perry (1990). What is information?   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www-csli.stanford.edu/~john/PHILPAPERS/whatisinfo.pdf
  http://www-csli.stanford.edu/users/john/PHILPAPERS/whatisinfo.pdf
  
• Jesper Kallestrup (forthcoming). Review of Physicalism, or Something Near Enough, by Jaegwon Kim.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The debate between the reductive and emergent materialist is still very much a live one. (Antony and Levine 1997; Auyang 2000; Bechtel and Richardson 1992; Block 1997; Boyd 1999; Crane 2001; David 1997; Fodor 1989; Fodor 1997; Kim 1993b; Kim 1994; Kim 1996; Kim 1999; Le Pore and Loewer 1987; Millikan 1999; Pereboom 2002; Rueger 2000; Van Gulick 2001; Yablo 1992). We argue that the best way to settle this debate is to take a step back and consider the metaphysics that is motivated by a careful consideration of some scientific examples. We argue that an account of emergence which bases emergence of a complex whole in the physical organisation of the parts can account for the emergent explicable novelty can be found throughout science. This
• Max Kistler (2000). Source and Channel in the informational theory of mental content.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://max.kistler.free.fr/articles/MK9.pdf
  http://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/ijn_00000032/fr/
  http://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/docs/00/05/32/35/HTML/
  
• Barry M. Loewer (1987). From information to intentionality.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/k67708n68t700052/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/K67708N68T700052.pdf
  
• Ruth G. Millikan (2001). What has Natural Information to Do with Intentional Representation?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: "According to informational semantics, if it's necessary that a creature can't distinguish Xs from Ys, it follows that the creature can't have a concept that applies to Xs but not Ys." (Jerry Fodor, The Elm and the Expert, p.32)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=iJekyHohFlQC&oi=fnd&pg=PA105&dq=What+has+natural+information+to+do+with+intentional+representation?+Millikan&ots=Gbmp3h06CO&sig=Nc0cd_mgxj-UHcbnxHX78X1Jde0
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=iJekyHohFlQC&oi=fnd&pg=PA105&dq=What+has+natural+information+to+do+with+intentional+representation?+Millikan&ots=Gbmp3i65AN&sig=nmaOolClVje4UgqWrE7pp0VPxSQ
  
• Paul G. Skokowski (1999). Information, belief, and causal role.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www-csli.stanford.edu/~paulsko/papers/IBCRPenultimate.pdf
  
• Donna M. Summerfield & Pat A. Manfredi (1998). Indeterminacy in recent theories of content.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.csa.com/partners/viewrecord.php?requester=gs&collection=TRD&recid=371130CI
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/h323q28t63240108/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/H323Q28T63240108.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/mind/1998/00000008/00000002/00160297
  
• Matthew Usher (2001). A statistical referential theory of content: Using information theory to account for misrepresentation.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.bbk.ac.uk/psyc/staff/academic/musher/documents/ML.pdf
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/1468-0017.00172
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1468-0017.00172
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/mila/2001/00000016/00000003/art00172
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/mila/2001/00000016/00000003/art00005
  
• Corey G. Washington (2002). A conflict between language and atomistic information.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/dlkglkuef033ck9r/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=399589&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/DLKGLKUEF033CK9R.pdf
  

Asymmetric-Dependence Accounts of Mental Content

• Frederick R. Adams (online). Fodor's asymmetrical causal dependency theory of meaning.   (More)
• Mark H. Bickhard (1998). A Process Model of the Emergence of Representation.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Two challenges to the very possibility of emergence are addressed, one metaphysical and one logical. The resolution of the metaphysical challenge requires a shift to a process metaphysics, while the logical challenge highlights normative emergence, and requires a shift to more powerful logical tools -- in particular, that of implicit definition. Within the framework of a process metaphysics, two levels of normative emergence are outlined: that of function and that of representation
• Carl Gillett (2006). Samuel Alexander's emergentism.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Samuel Alexander was one of the foremost philosophical figures of his day and has been argued by John Passmore to be one of ‘fathers’ of Australian philosophy as well as a novel kind of physicalist. Yet Alexander is now relatively neglected, his role in the genesis of Australian philosophy if far from widely accepted and the standard interpretation takes him to be an anti-physicalist. In this paper, I carefully examine these issues and show that Alexander has been badly, although understandably, misjudged by most of his contemporary critics and interpreters. Most importantly, I show that Alexander offers an ingenious, and highly original, version of physicalism at the heart of which is a strikingly different view of the nature of the microphysical properties and associated view of emergent properties. My final conclusion will be that Passmore is correct in his claims both that Alexander is significant as one of the grandfather’s of Australian philosophy and that he provides a novel physicalist position. I will also suggest that Alexander’s emergentism is important for addressing the so-called ‘problem of mental causation’ presently dogging contemporary non-reductive physicalists
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/3215N21P7746R538.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/synt/2006/00000153/00000002/00005470
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/3215n21p7746r538/fulltext.pdf
  
• Joseph Mendola (2003). A dilemma for asymmetric dependence.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Accounts of mental content rooted in asymmetric dependence hold, crudely speaking, that the content of a mental representation is the cause of that representation on which all its other causes depend.1 To speak somewhat less crudely, such accounts, hereafter
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/1468-0068.00437
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1468-0068.00437
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/nous/2003/00000037/00000002/art00003
  
• Steve Palmquist (1992). Unknown.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: At what stage in its development does a foetus become a living human being? When is it proper to refer to a network of pulsating neurons as a
• Lynne Rudder Baker (1989). On a causal theory of content.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=1520-8583(1989)3<165:OACTOC>2.0.CO;2-M
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=1520-8583(1989)3<165:OACTOC>2.0.CO;2-M
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2214267.pdf
  
• Alberto Voltolini (1995). Is meaning without actually existing reference naturalizable?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: As is well known, meaningful expressions denoting no actual entity represent a hard problem for any naturalistically inspired theory of meaning which tries to explain the expression's meaning in terms of the expression's cause. For, since the actual extension of one such expression is ex hypothesi empty, there is no actual candidate for the role of the expression's cause one can plausibly appeal to in order to assign it to the expression as its meaning. Faced with this problem, a naturalizer may be immediately tempted to claim that there are no lexically primitive extensionless expressions. Thus, for any expression whose extension is actually empty she can attempt to paraphrase it away along the well-honoured Russellian path. Although reluctantly, in his A Theory of Content (1990) Jerry Fodor has however argued that a naturalizer can resist the above temptation. Fodor indeed provides another naturalized informational theory of meaning for Mentalese expressions based on the notion of asymmetric dependence between causal relations. This theory is also basically a denotational theory of meaning, for according to it a lexically primitive expression means the entity it denotes. On the basis of this theory, he claims that the problem of the lexically primitive extensionless expressions can be solved while letting them run denotationally. In what follows, however, I will try to cast some doubts on Fodor's solution of the lexically primitive extensionless expressions without at the same time falling back in the Russellian trap. If there are lexically primitive expressions whose extension in the actual world is empty, their meaning can be still accounted for in terms which are both denotational and non-naturalistic. Suffice it that one appeals to the weak Meinongianism contained in the thesis that one can directly refer to possible but unactual entities by means of a suitable fixing-reference description

Causal Accounts of Mental Content, Misc

• Robert E. Cummins (1997). The LOT of the causal theory of mental content.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: hc thcsis of this paper is that thc causal themy of mental cantent (hcrcaftcr CT) is incompatible with an clcmcntary fact of pcrccptual psychology, namely, that thc detection 0f distal propcrtics generally requires thc mediation of a “the- 0ry.” I shall call this fact thc nontransducibility of distal properties (hcrcaftcr NTDP). The argument proceeds in two stages. Thc burden of stage 0nc is that, taken together, CT and thc language 0f thought hypothesis (hcrcaftcr LOT) arc incompatible with NTDP. The burden of stage two is that acceptance of CT rcquircs acceptance of LOT as well. It follows that CT is incompatiblc with NTDP. I organize things in this way in part bccausc it makcs the argument casicr t0 understand, and in part bccausc thc stage-two thcsis—that CT cntails LOT—has somc independcnt interest and is thcrcforc worth separating from thc rcst 0f thc argument. 1. STAGE ONE; THE CONJUNCTION OF CT AND LOT Is INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE NONTRANSDUCIBILITY OF DISTAL PROPERTIES Let us begin by clarifying some tcrms. By LOT, I mean the hypothesis that thc human schcmc 0f mental rcprcscmation satisfies the following conditions: (1) It has a finite number of semantically primitive expressions individuatcd syntactically
  Additional links for this entry:
  https://netfiles.uiuc.edu/rcummins/www/HomePage/Papers/LOTctmc.pdf
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-362X(199710)94:10<535:TLOTCT>2.0.CO;2-N
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-362X(199710)94:10<535:TLOTCT>2.0.CO;2-N
  http://www.jstor.org/view/0022362x/di010539/01p00357/0
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2564550.pdf
  
• Robert D. Rupert (2001). Coining terms in the language of thought: Innateness, emergence, and the lot of Cummins's argument against the causal theory of mental content.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Robert Cummins argues that any causal theory of mental content (CT) founders on an established fact of human psychology: that theory mediates sensory detection. He concludes,
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-362X(200110)98:10<499:CTITLO>2.0.CO;2-Y
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3649467.pdf
  
• Robert Rupert (2008). Causal theories of mental content.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2008.00130.x
  http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/119423024/PDFSTART
  

Teleological Accounts of Mental Content

• Marshall Abrams (2005). Teleosemantics without natural selection.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Ruth Millikan and others advocate theories which attempt to naturalize wide mental content (e.g. beliefs
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/m3qx5n807h1714l0/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=5274298&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/M3QX5N807H1714L0.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/biph/2005/00000020/00000001/00004298
  
• Louise M. Antony (1996). Equal Rights for Swamp-persons.   (More)
• Jason Bridges (2006). Teleofunctionalism and psychological explanation.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-0114.2006.00269.x
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/papq/2006/00000087/00000004/art00002
  
• Joe Cruz (online). On teleosemantics and natural maps (comments on work by Rob Cummins et al.).   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Let me begin by signaling my enthusiasm both for the specific case offered by Cummins et al. against teleosemantics and for the overall framework from which this work derives. If the first approximation of the idea is that there will be material implicit in a representation that can be exploited by a cognitive agent that later acquires the right abilities to extract this material, and if this material looks a great deal like content, then the teleosemanticist will find accommodating it challenging. Moreover, the distinction between representation and indication is intriguing and important, and the discussion of structural transformation and isomorphism is illuminating. While Cummins has been urging these themes for some time now, it seems to me that they have not been sufficiently appreciated in the literature
• Robert E. Cummins, James Blackmon, David Byrd, Alexa Lee & and Martin Roth (2006).