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Philosophy of artificial intelligence :: Can machines think? :: The Turing test

• Varol Akman & Patrick Blackburn (2000). Editorial: Alan Turing and artificial intelligence.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Department of Computer Engineering, Bilkent University, 06533 Ankara, Turkey E-mail: akman@cs.bilkent.edu.tr; http://www.cs.bilkent.edu.tr/∼akman..
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/377438.html
  http://portal.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=595992
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00001058/00/intro.ps
  http://www.cs.bilkent.edu.tr/~akman/jour-papers/jolli/jolli2000.pdf
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:1058
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/jlli/2000/00000009/00000004/00269485
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/rm454307n5h9k066/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=269485&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/RM454307N5H9K066.pdf
  
• John Barresi (1987). Prospects for the cyberiad: Certain limits on human self-knowledge in the cybernetic age.   (More)
• Ned Block (1981). Psychologism and behaviorism.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Let psychologism be the doctrine that whether behavior is intelligent behavior depends on the character of the internal information processing that produces it. More specifically, I mean psychologism to involve the doctrine that two systems could have actual and potential behavior _typical_ of familiar intelligent beings, that the two systems could be exactly alike in their actual and potential behavior, and in their behavioral dispositions and capacities and counterfactual behavioral properties (i.e., what behaviors, behavioral dispositions, and behavioral capacities they would have exhibited had their stimuli differed)--the two systems could be alike in all these ways, yet there could be a difference in the information processing that mediates their stimuli and responses that determines that one is not at all intelligent while the other is fully intelligent
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/faculty/block/papers/Psychologism.pdf
  http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/faculty/block/papers/Psychologism.htm
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8108(198101)90:1<5:PAB>2.0.CO;2-J
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8108(198101)90:1<5:PAB>2.0.CO;2-J
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2184371.pdf
  
• Selmer Bringsjord (2000). Animals, zombanimals, and the total Turing test: The essence of artificial intelligence.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://portal.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=595843.595993
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/bringsjord00animals.html
  http://www.rpi.edu/~faheyj2/SB/SELPAP/ZOMBANIMALS/zombanimals2.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/jlli/2000/00000009/00000004/00269486
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=269486&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/TV852P4283211235.pdf
  
• Selmer Bringsjord, P. Bello & David Ferrucci (2001). Creativity, the Turing test, and the (better) Lovelace test.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract:   The Turing Test (TT) is claimed by many to be a way to test for the presence, in computers, of such ``deep'' phenomena as thought and consciousness. Unfortunately, attempts to build computational systems able to pass TT (or at least restricted versions of this test) have devolved into shallow symbol manipulation designed to, by hook or by crook, trick. The human creators of such systems know all too well that they have merely tried to fool those people who interact with their systems into believing that these systems really have minds. And the problem is fundamental: the structure of the TT is such as to cultivate tricksters. A better test is one that insists on a certain restrictive epistemic relation between an artificial agent (or system) A, its output o, and the human architect H of A – a relation which, roughly speaking, obtains when H cannot account for how A produced o. We call this test the ``Lovelace Test'' in honor of Lady Lovelace, who believed that only when computers originate things should they be believed to have minds
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://portal.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=596904
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/bringsjord00creativity.html
  http://www.rpi.edu/~faheyj2/SB/SELPAP/DARTMOUTH/lt3.pdf
  http://www.phys.uni.torun.pl/ftp/incoming/duch/Turing/Turing-Lovlace-test.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/mind/2001/00000011/00000001/00319539
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/content/nrvl130w46xj6g22/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/nrvl130w46xj6g22/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=319539&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/NRVL130W46XJ6G22.pdf
  
• Andrew Clifton (ms). Blind man's bluff and the Turing test.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: It seems plausible that under the conditions of the Turing test, congenitally blind people could nevertheless, with sufficient preparation, successfully represent themselves to remotely located interrogators as sighted. Having never experienced normal visual sensations, the successful blind player can prevail in this test only by playing a 'lying game'—imitating the phenomenological claims of sighted people, in the absence of the qualitative visual experiences to which such statements purportedly refer. This suggests that a computer or robot might pass the Turing test in the same way, in the absence not only of visual experience, but qualitative consciousness in general. Hence, the standard Turing test does not provide a valid criterion for the presence of consciousness. A 'sensorimetric' version of the Turing test fares no better, for the apparent correlations we observe between cognitive functions and qualitative conscious experiences seems to be contingent, not necessary. We must therefore define consciousness not in terms of its causes and effects, but rather, in terms of the distinctive properties of its content, such as its possession of qualitative character and apparent intrinsic value—the property which confers upon consciousness its moral significance. As a means of determining whether or nor a machine is conscious, in this sense, an alternative to the standard Turing test is proposed
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/3480/01/Blind_mans_bluff_and_the_Turing_test.pdf
  
• B. Jack Copeland (2000). The Turing test.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract:   Turing''s test has been much misunderstood. Recently unpublished material by Turing casts fresh light on his thinking and dispels a number of philosophical myths concerning the Turing test. Properly understood, the Turing test withstands objections that are popularly believed to be fatal
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=5BJaXSedqfIC&oi=fnd&pg=PA519&ots=rzjaTOxdpq&sig=slbbZKdPbjoJsVO44CwfWr3oSMo
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=ECj6fuEMdp0C&oi=fnd&pg=PA519&ots=blQICrgbeX&sig=4woWcfbL_fO5zip_aVT89VSM390
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/mind/2000/00000010/00000004/00319531
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/content/w103433h4g273841/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/w103433h4g273841/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=319531&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/W103433H4G273841.pdf
  
• Bruce Edmonds (2000). The constructability of artificial intelligence (as defined by the Turing test).   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The Turing Test (TT), as originally specified, centres on theability to perform a social role. The TT can be seen as a test of anability to enter into normal human social dynamics. In this light itseems unlikely that such an entity can be wholly designed in anoff-line mode; rather a considerable period of training insitu would be required. The argument that since we can pass the TT,and our cognitive processes might be implemented as a Turing Machine(TM), that consequently a TM that could pass the TT could be built, isattacked on the grounds that not all TMs are constructible in a plannedway. This observation points towards the importance of developmentalprocesses that use random elements (e.g., evolution), but in these casesit becomes problematic to call the result artificial. This hasimplications for the means by which intelligent agents could bedeveloped
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/u121t003r65q802w/fulltext.pdf
  
• Gerald Erion (2001). The cartesian test for automatism.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract:   In Part V of his Discourse on the Method, Descartes introduces a test for distinguishing people from machines that is similar to the one proposed much later by Alan Turing. The Cartesian test combines two distinct elements that Keith Gunderson has labeled the language test and the action test. Though traditional interpretation holds that the action test attempts to determine whether an agent is acting upon principles, I argue that the action test is best understood as a test of common sense. I also maintain that this interpretation yields a stronger test than Turing's, and that contemporary artificial intelligence should consider using it as a guide for future research
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=ECj6fuEMdp0C&oi=fnd&pg=RA4-PA241&ots=blQICrghbY&sig=dV16mfWZM_Qoj6YrtNA26fR1IZk
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=5BJaXSedqfIC&oi=fnd&pg=RA5-PA241&ots=rzjaTOxjmr&sig=MTJT29H2X-bBW0rfBOaTIEju52o
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/mind/2001/00000011/00000001/00319541
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/content/h814j04926567527/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/h814j04926567527/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/H814J04926567527.pdf
  
• Luciano Floridi (2005). Consciousness, agents and the knowledge game.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This paper has three goals. The first is to introduce the “knowledge game”, a new, simple and yet powerful tool for analysing some intriguing philosophical questions. The second is to apply the knowledge game as an informative test to discriminate between conscious (human) and conscious-less agents (zombies and robots), depending on which version of the game they can win. And the third is to use a version of the knowledge game to provide an answer to Dretske’s question “how do you know you are not a zombie?”
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00002546/
  http://philosophyofinformation.net/pdf/caatkg.pdf
  http://www.wolfson.ox.ac.uk/~floridi/pdf/caatkg.pdf
  http://www.philosophyofinformation.net/pdf/caatkg.pdf
  http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00002546/01/caatkg.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/mind/2005/00000015/F0020003/00009005
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/f52pq39812453221/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/F52PQ39812453221.pdf
  
• Robert French (1996). The inverted Turing test: How a mindless program could pass it.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This commentary attempts to show that the inverted Turing Test (Watt 1996) could be simulated by a standard Turing test and, most importantly, claims that a very simple program with no intelligence whatsoever could be written that would pass the inverted Turing test. For this reason, the inverted Turing test in its present form must be rejected
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.u-bourgogne.fr/LEAD/people/french/invturing.pdf
  
• Robert French (2000). The Turing test: The first fifty years.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The Turing Test, originally proposed as a simple operational definition of intelligence, has now been with us for exactly half a century. It is safe to say that no other single article in computer science, and few other articles in science in general, have generated so much discussion. The present article chronicles the comments and controversy surrounding Turing’s classic article from its publication to the present. The changing perception of the Turing Test over the last fifty years has paralleled the changing attitudes in the scientific community towards artificial intelligence: from the unbridled optimism of 1960’s to the current realization of the immense difficulties that still lie ahead. I conclude with the prediction that the Turing Test will remain important, not only as a landmark in the history of the development of intelligent machines, but also with real relevance to future generations of people living in a world in which the cognitive capacities of machines will be vastly greater than they are now
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/french00turing.html
  http://srsc.ulb.ac.be/cogsci/papers/TICS-French_turing.pdf
  http://www.u-bourgogne.fr/LEAD/people/french/TICS_turing.pdf
  http://www.phil.canterbury.ac.nz/tom_bestor/e-texts/French, Robert - The Turing Test -The First Fifty Years (2000) TICS_turing.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=10689346&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/13646613/2000/00000004/00000003/art01453
  
• Robert French (2000). Peeking behind the screen: The unsuspected power of the standard Turing test.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: No computer that had not experienced the world as we humans had could pass a rigorously administered standard Turing Test. We show that the use of “subcognitive” questions allows the standard Turing Test to indirectly probe the human subcognitive associative concept network built up over a lifetime of experience with the world. Not only can this probing reveal differences in cognitive abilities, but crucially, even differences in _physical aspects_ of the candidates can be detected. Consequently, it is unnecessary to propose even harder versions of the Test in which all physical and behavioral aspects of the two candidates had to be indistinguishable before allowing the machine to pass the Test. Any machine that passed the “simpler” symbols- in/symbols-out test as originally proposed by Turing would be intelligent. The problem is that, even in its original form, the Turing Test is already too hard and too anthropocentric for any machine that was not a physical, social, and behavioral carbon copy of ourselves to actually pass it. Consequently, the Turing Test, even in its standard version, is not a reasonable test for general machine intelligence. There is no need for an even stronger version of the Test
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/french00peeking.html
  http://www.u-bourgogne.fr/LEAD/people/french/peeking.pdf
  http://www.phil.canterbury.ac.nz/tom_bestor/e-texts/French, Robert - Peeking behind the screen (2000) peeking.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/tandf/teta/2000/00000012/00000003/art00006
  http://www.informaworld.com/index/24PHYLU4NX08NHQF.pdf
  
• Robert French (1990). Subcognition and the limits of the Turing test.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://philosophy.wisc.edu/Shapiro/Phil554/PAPERS/French.pdf
  http://www.phil.canterbury.ac.nz/tom_bestor/e-texts/French, Robert - Subcognition and the Limits of the Turing Test (1990) turing.pdf
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0026-4423(199001)2:99:393<53:SATLOT>2.0.CO;2-E
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0026-4423(199001)2:99:393<53:SATLOT>2.0.CO;2-E
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2254890.pdf
  
• Stevan Harnad & Itiel Dror (2006). Distributed cognition: Cognizing, autonomy and the Turing test.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Some of the papers in this special issue distribute cognition between what is going on inside individual cognizers' heads and their outside worlds; others distribute cognition among different individual cognizers. Turing's criterion for cognition was individual, autonomous input/output capacity. It is not clear that distributed cognition could pass the Turing Test
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/4840/04/discintro.rtf
  http://cogprints.org/4840/03/discintro.pdf
  http://cogprints.org/4840/02/discintro.html
  http://eprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/12368/02/discintro.pdf
  http://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=2196285
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/jbp/pc/2006/00000014/00000002/art00002
  
• Stevan Harnad (1995). Does mind piggyback on robotic and symbolic capacity?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Cognitive science is a form of "reverse engineering" (as Dennett has dubbed it). We are trying to explain the mind by building (or explaining the functional principles of) systems that have minds. A "Turing" hierarchy of empirical constraints can be applied to this task, from t1, toy models that capture only an arbitrary fragment of our performance capacity, to T2, the standard "pen-pal" Turing Test (total symbolic capacity), to T3, the Total Turing Test (total symbolic plus robotic capacity), to T4 (T3 plus internal [neuromolecular] indistinguishability). All scientific theories are underdetermined by data. What is the right level of empirical constraint for cognitive theory? I will argue that T2 is underconstrained (because of the Symbol Grounding Problem and Searle's Chinese Room Argument) and that T4 is overconstrained (because we don't know what neural data, if any, are relevant). T3 is the level at which we solve the "other minds" problem in everyday life, the one at which evolution operates (the Blind Watchmaker is no mind-reader either) and the one at which symbol systems can be grounded in the robotic capacity to name and manipulate the objects their symbols are about. I will illustrate this with a toy model for an important component of T3 -- categorization -- using neural nets that learn category invariance by "warping" similarity space the way it is warped in human categorical perception: within-category similarities are amplified and between-category similarities are attenuated. This analog "shape" constraint is the grounding inherited by the arbitrarily shaped symbol that names the category and by all the symbol combinations it enters into. No matter how tightly one constrains any such model, however, it will always be more underdetermined than normal scientific and engineering theory. This will remain the ineliminable legacy of the mind/body problem
• Stevan Harnad (1994). Levels of functional equivalence in reverse bioengineering: The Darwinian Turing test for artificial life.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Both Artificial Life and Artificial Mind are branches of what Dennett has called "reverse engineering": Ordinary engineering attempts to build systems to meet certain functional specifications, reverse bioengineering attempts to understand how systems that have already been built by the Blind Watchmaker work. Computational modelling (virtual life) can capture the formal principles of life, perhaps predict and explain it completely, but it can no more be alive than a virtual forest fire can be hot. In itself, a computational model is just an ungrounded symbol system; no matter how closely it matches the properties of what is being modelled, it matches them only formally, with the mediation of an interpretation. Synthetic life is not open to this objection, but it is still an open question how close a functional equivalence is needed in order to capture life. Close enough to fool the Blind Watchmaker is probably close enough, but would that require molecular indistinguishability, and if so, do we really need to go that far?
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://eprints.resist.ecs.soton.ac.uk/3363/
  http://portal.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=188445
  http://cogprints.org/1591/00/harnad94.artlife2.html
  http://cogprints.soton.ac.uk/documents/disk0/00/00/15/91/
  http://mitpress.mit.edu/catalog/item/default.asp?ttype=6&tid=40
  https://mitpress.mit.edu/catalog/item/default.asp?ttype=6&tid=40
  http://cogsci.soton.ac.uk/~harnad/Papers/Harnad/harnad94.artlife2.html
  http://www.ecs.soton.ac.uk/~harnad/Papers/Harnad/harnad94.artlife2.html
  http://eprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00003363/02/harnad94.artlife2.html
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00001591/00/harnad94.artlife2.html
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:1591
  
• Stevan Harnad (1991). Other bodies, other minds: A machine incarnation of an old philosophical problem.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract:   Any attempt to explain the mind by building machines with minds must confront the other-minds problem: How can we tell whether any body other than our own has a mind when the only way to know is by being the other body? In practice we all use some form of Turing Test: If it can do everything a body with a mind can do such that we can't tell them apart, we have no basis for doubting it has a mind. But what is everything a body with a mind can do? Turing's original pen-pal version of the Turing Test (the TT) only tested linguistic capacity, but Searle has shown that a mindless symbol-manipulator could pass the TT undetected. The Total Turing Test (TTT) calls instead for all of our linguistic and robotic capacities; immune to Searle's argument, it suggests how to ground a symbol manipulating system in the capacity to pick out the objects its symbols refer to. No Turing Test, however, can guarantee that a body has a mind. Worse, nothing in the explanation of its successful performance requires a model to have a mind at all. Minds are hence very different from the unobservables of physics (e.g., superstrings); and Turing Testing, though essential for machine-modeling the mind, can really only yield an explanation of the body
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://eprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00003379/
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00001578/
  http://portal.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=103493.103530
  http://cogprints.org/1578/0/harnad91.otherminds.html
  http://cogprints.org/1578/00/harnad91.otherminds.html
  http://cogprints.soton.ac.uk/documents/disk0/00/00/15/78/
  http://eprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00003379/01/harnad91.otherminds.html
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00001578/00/harnad91.otherminds.html
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?id=oai:eprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk:3379
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:1578
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/t5733025r3t44248/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/T5733025R3T44248.pdf
  
• Stevan Harnad (2004). The Annotation Game: On Turing (1950) on Computing, Machinery, and Intelligence.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This quote/commented critique of Turing's classical paper suggests that Turing meant -- or should have meant -- the robotic version of the Turing Test (and not just the email version). Moreover, any dynamic system (that we design and understand) can be a candidate, not just a computational one. Turing also dismisses the other-minds problem and the mind/body problem too quickly. They are at the heart of both the problem he is addressing and the solution he is proposing
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://eprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/12954/
  http://cogprints.org/3322/02/turing.pdf
  http://eprints.resist.ecs.soton.ac.uk/7741/
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00003322/
  http://consc.net/cgi/go.fcgi?id=HARTAG&free=1&u=http://eprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00007741/01/turing.html
  http://cogprints.org/3322/01/turing.html
  http://www.ecs.soton.ac.uk/~harnad/Temp/turing.doc
  http://www.ecs.soton.ac.uk/~harnad/Temp/turing.html
  http://eprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00007741/01/turing.html
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00003322/01/turing.html
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?id=oai:eprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk:7741
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:eprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk:7741
  
• Stevan Harnad (2006). The annotation game: On Turing (1950) on computing, machinery, and intelligence.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This quote/commented critique of Turing's classical paper suggests that Turing meant -- or should have meant -- the robotic version of the Turing Test (and not just the email version). Moreover, any dynamic system (that we design and understand) can be a candidate, not just a computational one. Turing also dismisses the other-minds problem and the mind/body problem too quickly. They are at the heart of both the problem he is addressing and the solution he is proposing
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://eprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/12954/
  http://cogprints.org/3322/1/turing.html
  http://cogprints.org/3322/02/turing.pdf
  http://eprints.resist.ecs.soton.ac.uk/7741/
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00003322/
  http://consc.net/cgi/go.fcgi?id=HARTAG&free=1&u=http://eprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00007741/01/turing.html
  http://cogprints.org/3322/01/turing.html
  http://www.ecs.soton.ac.uk/~harnad/Temp/turing.doc
  http://www.ecs.soton.ac.uk/~harnad/Temp/turing.html
  http://eprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00007741/01/turing.html
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00003322/01/turing.html
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?id=oai:eprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk:7741
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:eprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk:7741
  
• Stevan Harnad (1992). The Turing test is not a trick.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: It is important to understand that the Turing Test (TT) is not, nor was it intended to be, a trick; how well one can fool someone is not a measure of scientific progress. The TT is an empirical criterion: It sets AI's empirical goal to be to generate human-scale performance capacity. This goal will be met when the candidate's performance is totally indistinguishable from a human's. Until then, the TT simply represents what it is that AI must endeavor eventually to accomplish scientifically
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://eprints.resist.ecs.soton.ac.uk/3373/
  http://cogprints.org/1584/00/harnad92.turing.html
  http://portal.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=141420.141422
  http://cogprints.soton.ac.uk/documents/disk0/00/00/15/84/
  http://www.ecs.soton.ac.uk/~harnad/Papers/Harnad/harnad92.turing.html
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?id=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:1584
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:1584
  
• Larry Hauser (2001). Look who's moving the goal posts now.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract:   The abject failure of Turing's first prediction (of computer success in playing the Imitation Game) confirms the aptness of the Imitation Game test as a test of human level intelligence. It especially belies fears that the test is too easy. At the same time, this failure disconfirms expectations that human level artificial intelligence will be forthcoming any time soon. On the other hand, the success of Turing's second prediction (that acknowledgment of computer thought processes would become commonplace) in practice amply confirms the thought that computers think in some manner and are possessed of some level of intelligence already. This lends ever-growing support to the hypothesis that computers will think at a human level eventually, despite the abject failure of Turing's first prediction
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/mind/2001/00000011/00000001/00319542
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/p14045502315u372/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=319542&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/P14045502315U372.pdf
  
• Larry Hauser (1993). Reaping the whirlwind: Reply to Harnad's Other Bodies, Other Minds.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract:   Harnad''s proposed robotic upgrade of Turing''s Test (TT), from a test of linguistic capacity alone to a Total Turing Test (TTT) of linguisticand sensorimotor capacity, conflicts with his claim that no behavioral test provides even probable warrant for attributions of thought because there is no evidence of consciousness besides private experience. Intuitive, scientific, and philosophical considerations Harnad offers in favor of his proposed upgrade are unconvincing. I agree with Harnad that distinguishing real from as if thought on the basis of (presence or lack of) consciousness (thus rejecting Turing (behavioral) testing as sufficient warrant for mental attribution)has the skeptical consequence Harnad accepts — there is in factno evidence for me that anyone else but me has a mind. I disagree with hisacceptance of it! It would be better to give up the neo-Cartesian faith in private conscious experience underlying Harnad''s allegiance to Searle''s controversial Chinese Room Experiment than give up all claim to know others think. It would be better to allow that (passing) Turing''s Test evidences — evenstrongly evidences — thought
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://members.aol.com/lshauser/harnad3.html
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000241/00/reaping.html
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:241
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/h727v843532tp041/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/H727V843532TP041.pdf
  
• Jose Hernandez-Orallo (2000). Beyond the Turing test.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The main factor of intelligence is defined as the ability tocomprehend, formalising this ability with the help of new constructsbased on descriptional complexity. The result is a comprehension test,or C-test, which is exclusively defined in computational terms. Due toits absolute and non-anthropomorphic character, it is equally applicableto both humans and non-humans. Moreover, it correlates with classicalpsychometric tests, thus establishing the first firm connection betweeninformation theoretical notions and traditional IQ tests. The TuringTest is compared with the C-test and the combination of the two isquestioned. In consequence, the idea of using the Turing Test as apractical test of intelligence should be surpassed, and substituted bycomputational and factorial tests of different cognitive abilities, amuch more useful approach for artificial intelligence progress and formany other intriguing questions that present themselves beyond theTuring Test
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://portal.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=595843.595997
  http://www.dsic.upv.es/~jorallo/escrits/TT-JHdez.ps.gz
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/hernandez-orallo99beyond.html
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/jlli/2000/00000009/00000004/00269489
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/h271n6173ll3773x/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=269489&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/H271N6173LL3773X.pdf
  
• Justin Leiber (2001). Turing and the fragility and insubstantiality of evolutionary explanations: A puzzle about the unity of Alan Turing's work with some larger implications.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: As is well known, Alan Turing drew a line, embodied in the "Turing test," between intellectual and physical abilities, and hence between cognitive and natural sciences. Less familiarly, he proposed that one way to produce a "passer" would be to educate a "child machine," equating the experimenter's improvements in the initial structure of the child machine with genetic mutations, while supposing that the experimenter might achieve improvements more expeditiously than natural selection. On the other hand, in his foundational "On the chemical basis of morphogenesis," Turing insisted that biological explanation clearly confine itself to purely physical and chemical means, eschewing vitalist and teleological talk entirely and hewing to D'Arcy Thompson's line that "evolutionary 'explanations,'" are historical and narrative in character, employing the same intentional and teleological vocabulary we use in doing human history, and hence, while perhaps on occasion of heuristic value, are not part of biology as a natural science. To apply Turing's program to recent issues, the attempt to give foundations to the social and cognitive sciences in the "real science" of evolutionary biology (as opposed to Turing's biology) is neither to give foundations, nor to achieve the unification of the social/cognitive sciences and the natural sciences
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/./ftinterface~content=a713690490~fulltext=713240930
  
• Justin Leiber (2006). Turing's golden: How well Turing's work stands today.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: A. M. Turing has bequeathed us a conceptulary including 'Turing, or Turing-Church, thesis', 'Turing machine', 'universal Turing machine', 'Turing test' and 'Turing structures', plus other unnamed achievements. These include a proof that any formal language adequate to express arithmetic contains undecidable formulas, as well as achievements in computer science, artificial intelligence, mathematics, biology, and cognitive science. Here it is argued that these achievements hang together and have prospered well in the 50 years since Turing's death
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/./ftinterface~content=a741477282~fulltext=713240930
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/routledg/cphp/2006/00000019/00000001/art00003
  http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/index/NGH381WR75272U7R.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/routledg/cphp/latest
  http://www.informaworld.com/index/741477282.pdf
  
• Robert Lockhart (2000). Modularity, cognitive penetrability and the Turing test.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The Turing Test blurs the distinction between a model and irrelevant) instantiation details. Modeling only functional modules is problematic if these are interconnected and cognitively penetrable
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://psycprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000068/
  
• Donald Michie (1993). Turing's test and conscious thought.   (More)
• P. Millar (1973). On the point of the imitation game.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0026-4423(197310)2:82:328<595:OTPOTI>2.0.CO;2-7
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0026-4423(197310)2:82:328<595:OTPOTI>2.0.CO;2-7
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2252214.pdf
  
• James Moor (1978). Explaining computer behavior.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/x313g334823725mv/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/X313G334823725MV.pdf
  
• James Moor (2001). The status and future of the Turing test.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract:   The standard interpretation of the imitation game is defended over the rival gender interpretation though it is noted that Turing himself proposed several variations of his imitation game. The Turing test is then justified as an inductive test not as an operational definition as commonly suggested. Turing's famous prediction about his test being passed at the 70% level is disconfirmed by the results of the Loebner 2000 contest and the absence of any serious Turing test competitors from AI on the horizon. But, reports of the death of the Turing test and AI are premature. AI continues to flourish and the test continues to play an important philosophical role in AI. Intelligence attribution, methodological, and visionary arguments are given in defense of a continuing role for the Turing test. With regard to Turing's predictions one is disconfirmed, one is confirmed, but another is still outstanding
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://consc.net/cgi/go.fcgi?id=MOOTSA&free=0&u=http://www.springerlink.com/index/JU585836X7571202.pdf
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=ECj6fuEMdp0C&oi=fnd&pg=RA3-PA197&ots=blQIDolec0&sig=7Zb746qi1B6hBAlr4ehD3tEmgZc
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=5BJaXSedqfIC&oi=fnd&pg=RA3-PA197&ots=rzjaULCgnv&sig=BtFI0p2CUYyifPgOjuKkYI__bFc
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/mind/2001/00000011/00000001/00319545
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/ju585836x7571202/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=319545&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/JU585836X7571202.pdf
  
• Shaun Nichols & Stephen Stich (1994). Folk psychology.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: For the last 25 years discussions and debates about commonsense psychology (or “folk psychology,” as it is often called) have been center stage in the philosophy of mind. There have been heated disagreements both about what folk psychology is and about how it is related to the scientific understanding of the mind/brain that is emerging in psychology and the neurosciences. In this chapter we will begin by explaining why folk psychology plays such an important role in the philosophy of mind. Doing that will require a quick look at a bit of the history of philosophical discussions about the mind. We’ll then turn our attention to the lively contemporary discussions aimed at clarifying the philosophical role that folk psychology is expected to play and at using findings in the cognitive sciences to get a clearer understanding of the exact nature of folk psychology
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blutner.de/philom/Texte/folkpsych5.pdf
  http://www.blutner.de/NeuralNets/Texts/folkpsych5.pdf
  http://amor.rz.hu-berlin.de/~h0998dgh/philos/Texte/folkpsych5.pdf
  http://amor.cms.hu-berlin.de/~h0998dgh/philos/Texte/folkpsych5.pdf
  http://dingo.sbs.arizona.edu/~snichols/Papers/FolkPsychologyECS.pdf
  http://amor.rz.hu-berlin.de/~h0998dgh/NeuralNets/Texts/folkpsych5.pdf
  http://www.rci.rutgers.edu/~stich/Publications/Papers/FolkPsychology.pdf
  http://www.rci.rutgers.edu/~stich/Publications/Papers/FolkPsychology.pdf
  http://www-personal.umich.edu/~lormand/phil/teach/mmm/readings/Stich - Cognitive Science and the Appeal to Tacit Theory.rtf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=8039374&dopt=Citation
  
• Gualtiero Piccinini (2000). Turing's rules for the imitation game.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract:   In the 1950s, Alan Turing proposed his influential test for machine intelligence, which involved a teletyped dialogue between a human player, a machine, and an interrogator. Two readings of Turing''s rules for the test have been given. According to the standard reading of Turing''s words, the goal of the interrogator was to discover which was the human being and which was the machine, while the goal of the machine was to be indistinguishable from a human being. According to the literal reading, the goal of the machine was to simulate a man imitating a woman, while the interrogator – unaware of the real purpose of the test – was attempting to determine which of the two contestants was the woman and which was the man. The present work offers a study of Turing''s rules for the test in the context of his advocated purpose and his other texts. The conclusion is that there are several independent and mutually reinforcing lines of evidence that support the standard reading, while fitting the literal reading in Turing''s work faces severe interpretative difficulties. So, the controversy over Turing''s rules should be settled in favor of the standard reading
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=5BJaXSedqfIC&oi=fnd&pg=RA1-PA573&ots=rzj9ZTxlot&sig=sOABQfQAHOiAecLsjc4Dkdn0Kko
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=ECj6fuEMdp0C&oi=fnd&pg=RA1-PA573&ots=blQHIwgjd_&sig=k_FvcCrJGK1pHaGSeZX1ciLb8SM
  http://www.ingentaconnec