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Philosophy of artificial intelligence :: Can machines think? :: The Chinese room

• Kristin Andrews (online). On predicting behavior.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: I argue that the behavior of other agents is insufficiently described in current debates as a dichotomy between tacit theory (attributing beliefs and desires to predict behavior) and simulation theory (imagining what one would do in similar circumstances in order to predict behavior). I introduce two questions about the foundation and development of our ability both to attribute belief and to simulate it. I then propose that there is one additional method used to predict behavior, namely, an inductive strategy
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Mind/MindAndr.htm
  
• Hanoch Ben-Yami (1993). A note on the chinese room.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract:   Searle's Chinese Room was supposed to prove that computers can't understand: the man in the room, following, like a computer, syntactical rules alone, though indistinguishable from a genuine Chinese speaker, doesn't understand a word. But such a room is impossible: the man won't be able to respond correctly to questions like What is the time?, even though such an ability is indispensable for a genuine Chinese speaker. Several ways to provide the room with the required ability are considered, and it is concluded that for each of these the room will have understanding. Hence, Searle's argument is invalid
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/K1NX461746N57467.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/k1nx461746n57467/fulltext.pdf
  
• Selmer Bringsjord & Ron Noel (2003). Real robots and the missing thought-experiment in the chinese room dialectic.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.phil.canterbury.ac.nz/tom_bestor/e-texts/Bringsjord, Real robots (2001) searlebook1.pdf
  http://www.phil.canterbury.ac.nz/tom_bestor/e-texts/bringjord, searlebook1.pdf
  http://kryten.mm.rpi.edu/searlebook1.pdf
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/380566.html
  
• Steven Ravett Brown (2000). Peirce and formalization of thought: The chinese room argument.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Whether human thinking can be formalized and whether machines can think in a human sense are questions that have been addressed by both Peirce and Searle. Peirce came to roughly the same conclusion as Searle, that the digital computer would not be able to perform human thinking or possess human understanding. However, his rationale and Searle's differ on several important points. Searle approaches the problem from the standpoint of traditional analytic philosophy, where the strict separation of syntax and semantics renders understanding impossible for a purely syntactical device. Peirce disagreed with that analysis, but argued that the computer would only be able to achieve algorithmic thinking, which he considered the simplest type. Although their approaches were radically dissimilar, their conclusions were not. I will compare and analyze the arguments of both Peirce and Searle on this issue, and outline some implications of their conclusions for the field of Artificial Intelligence
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/1002/0/Peirce_Paper.html
  http://cogprints.org/1002/00/Peirce_Paper.html
  http://cogprints.org/1002/
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00001002/
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:1002
  http://cogprints.soton.ac.uk/documents/disk0/00/00/10/02/
  
• David Chalmers (1992). Subsymbolic computation and the chinese room.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: More than a decade ago, philosopher John Searle started a long-running controversy with his paper “Minds, Brains, and Programs” (Searle, 1980a), an attack on the ambitious claims of artificial intelligence (AI). With his now famous _Chinese Room_ argument, Searle claimed to show that despite the best efforts of AI researchers, a computer could never recreate such vital properties of human mentality as intentionality, subjectivity, and understanding. The AI research program is based on the underlying assumption that all important aspects of human cognition may in principle be captured in a computational model. This assumption stems from the belief that beyond a certain level, implementational details are irrelevant to cognition. According to this belief, neurons, and biological wetware in general, have no preferred status as the substrate for a mind. As it happens, the best examples of minds we have at present have arisen from a carbon-based substrate, but this is due to constraints of evolution and possibly historical accidents, rather than to an absolute metaphysical necessity. As a result of this belief, many cognitive scientists have chosen to focus not on the biological substrate of the mind, but instead on the abstract causal structure_ _that the mind embodies (at an appropriate level of abstraction). The view that it is abstract causal structure that is essential to mentality has been an implicit assumption of the AI research program since Turing (1950), but was first articulated explicitly, in various forms, by Putnam (1960), Armstrong (1970) and Lewis (1970), and has become known as _functionalism_. From here, it is a very short step to _computationalism_, the view that computational structure is what is important in capturing the essence of mentality. This step follows from a belief that any abstract causal structure can be captured computationally: a belief made plausible by the Church–Turing Thesis, which articulates the power
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/53863.html
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/chalmers92subsymbolic.html
  http://consc.net/papers/subsymbolic.pdf
  
• Paul Churchland & Patricia Churchland (1990). Could a machine think?   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=2294584&dopt=Citation
  
• David Cole (1991). Artificial intelligence and personal identity.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract:   Considerations of personal identity bear on John Searle's Chinese Room argument, and on the opposed position that a computer itself could really understand a natural language. In this paper I develop the notion of a virtual person, modelled on the concept of virtual machines familiar in computer science. I show how Searle's argument, and J. Maloney's attempt to defend it, fail. I conclude that Searle is correct in holding that no digital machine could understand language, but wrong in holding that artificial minds are impossible: minds and persons are not the same as the machines, biological or electronic, that realize them
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/T130331427116747.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/t130331427116747/fulltext.pdf
  
• B. Jack Copeland (1993). The curious case of the chinese gym.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract:   Searle has recently used two adaptations of his Chinese room argument in an attack on connectionism. I show that these new forms of the argument are fallacious. First I give an exposition of and rebuttal to the original Chinese room argument, and then a brief introduction to the essentials of connectionism
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.cs.usfca.edu/www.AlanTuring.net/turing_archive/pages/pub/chincym/chincym.pdf
  http://home.swipnet.se/drofe/chincym.pdf
  http://www.phil.canterbury.ac.nz/jack_copeland/pub/chincym.pdf
  http://www.alanturing.net/turing_archive/pages/pub/chincym/chincym.pdf
  http://www.phil.canterbury.ac.nz/personal_pages/jack_copeland/pub/chincym.pdf
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/388877.html
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/ut111604435042jn/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/UT111604435042JN.pdf
  
• Dr Louis Cutrona, Jr (ms). Zombies in Searle's chinese room: Putting the Turing test to bed.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Searle's discussions over the years 1980-2004 of the implications of his Chinese Room Gedanken experiment are frustrating because they proceed from a correct assertion: (1) Instantiating a computer program is never by itself a sufficient condition of intentionality; and an incorrect assertion: (2) The explanation of how the brain produces intentionality cannot be that it does it by instantiating a computer program. In this article, I describe how to construct a Gedanken zombie Chinese Room program that will pass the Turing test and at the same time unambiguously demonstrates the correctness of (1). I then describe how to construct a Gedanken Chinese brain program that will pass the Turing test, has a mind, and understands Chinese, thus demonstrating that (2) is incorrect. Searle's instantiation of this program can and does produce intentionality. Searle's longstanding ignorance of Chinese is simply irrelevant and always has been. I propose a truce and a plan for further exploration
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/4636/01/TR-05-002.pdf
  
• Robert Damper (2004). The chinese room argument--dead but not yet buried.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://eprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/9561/
  http://eprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/9561/01/damper.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/2004/00000011/F0020005/art00010
  
• Stevan Harnad (1990). Lost in the hermeneutical hall of mirrors.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Critique of Computationalism as merely projecting hermeneutics (i.e., meaning originating from the mind of an external interpreter) onto otherwise intrinsically meaningless symbols. Projecting an interpretation onto a symbol system results in its being reflected back, in a spuriously self-confirming way
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/1577/0/harnad90.dyer.crit.html
  http://www.ecs.soton.ac.uk/~harnad/Papers/Harnad/harnad90.dyer.crit.html
  
• Stevan Harnad (1989). Minds, machines and Searle.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Searle's celebrated Chinese Room Argument has shaken the foundations of Artificial Intelligence. Many refutations have been attempted, but none seem convincing. This paper is an attempt to sort out explicitly the assumptions and the logical, methodological and empirical points of disagreement. Searle is shown to have underestimated some features of computer modeling, but the heart of the issue turns out to be an empirical question about the scope and limits of the purely symbolic (computational) model of the mind. Nonsymbolic modeling turns out to be immune to the Chinese Room Argument. The issues discussed include the Total Turing Test, modularity, neural modeling, robotics, causality and the symbol-grounding problem
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogsci.soton.ac.uk/harnad/Papers/Harnad/harnad89.searle.html
  http://cogsci.soton.ac.uk/~harnad/Papers/Harnad/harnad00.searle.html
  http://cogprints.soton.ac.uk/documents/disk0/00/00/15/73/
  http://www.csa.com/partners/viewrecord.php?requester=gs&collection=TRD&recid=2229271CI
  http://cogprints.org/1573/0/harnad89.searle.html
  http://cogprints.org/1573/00/harnad89.searle.html
  http://web.comlab.ox.ac.uk/oucl/research/areas/ieg/e-library/sources/harnad89_searle.pdf
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:1573
  http://eprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00005942/01/harnad00.searle.html
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/harnad89minds.html
  http://cogsci.soton.ac.uk/harnad/Papers/Harnad/harnad89.searle.html
  http://web.comlab.ox.ac.uk/oucl/research/areas/ieg/e-library/sources/harnad89_searle.pdf
  http://eprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/1891/01/harnad89.searle.html
  http://eprints.resist.ecs.soton.ac.uk/1891/
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:1573
  http://eprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/1891/01/harnad89.searle.html
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00001622/00/harnad00.searle.html
  http://www.ecs.soton.ac.uk/~harnad/Papers/Harnad/harnad89.searle.html
  http://eprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/1891/
  http://eprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/5942/01/harnad00.searle.html
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00001573/
  http://cogprints.soton.ac.uk/documents/disk0/00/00/15/73/
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00001573/00/harnad89.searle.html
  http://www.ecs.soton.ac.uk/~harnad/Papers/Harnad/harnad00.searle.html
  http://cogprints.org/1573/
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00001622/
  http://www.cogsci.soton.ac.uk/harnad/Papers/Harnad/harnad89.searle.html
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00001573/00/harnad89.searle.html
  http://cogsci.soton.ac.uk/~harnad/Papers/Harnad/harnad89.searle.html
  http://cogprints.org/1573/
  http://www.informaworld.com/index/777580727.pdf
  
• Stevan Harnad (2003). Minds, machines, and Searle 2: What's right and wrong about the chinese room argument.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: When in 1979 Zenon Pylyshyn, associate editor of Behavioral and Brain Sciences (BBS, a peer commentary journal which I edit) informed me that he had secured a paper by John Searle with the unprepossessing title of [XXXX], I cannot say that I was especially impressed; nor did a quick reading of the brief manuscript -- which seemed to be yet another tedious "Granny Objection"[1] about why/how we are not computers -- do anything to upgrade that impression
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://eprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00005942/01/harnad00.searle.html
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00001622/00/harnad00.searle.html
  http://eprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/5942/01/harnad00.searle.html
  http://www.ecs.soton.ac.uk/~harnad/Papers/Harnad/harnad00.searle.html
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00001622/
  http://www.ecs.soton.ac.uk/%7Eharnad/Papers/Harnad/harnad00.searle.html
  
• Stevan Harnad (2001). Rights and wrongs of Searle's chinese room argument.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: "in an academic generation a little overaddicted to "politesse," it may be worth saying that violent destruction is not necessarily worthless and futile. Even though it leaves doubt about the right road for London, it helps if someone rips up, however violently, a
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://eprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/5942/01/harnad00.searle.html
  http://www.ecs.soton.ac.uk/~harnad/Papers/Harnad/harnad00.searle.html
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00001622/
  
• Stevan Harnad (2001). What's wrong and right about Searle's chinese room argument?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Searle's Chinese Room Argument showed a fatal flaw in computationalism (the idea that mental states are just computational states) and helped usher in the era of situated robotics and symbol grounding (although Searle himself thought neuroscience was the only correct way to understand the mind)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/4023/01/searlbook.htm
  http://cogprints.org/1622/
  http://cogprints.soton.ac.uk/documents/disk0/00/00/16/22/
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:1622
  http://cogprints.org/1622/00/harnad00.searle.html
  http://cogprints.org/4023/1/searlbook.htm
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?id=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:1622
  
• David Harrison (1997). Connectionism hits the chinese gym.   (More)
• Larry Hauser (2003). Nixin' goes to china.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The intelligent-seeming deeds of computers are what occasion philosophical debate about artificial intelligence (AI) in the first place. Since evidence of AI is not bad, arguments against seem called for. John Searle's Chinese Room Argument (1980a, 1984, 1990, 1994) is among the most famous and long-running would-be answers to the call. Surprisingly, both the original thought experiment (1980a) and Searle's later would-be formalizations of the embedding argument (1984, 1990) are quite unavailing against AI proper (claims that computers do or someday will think ). Searle lately even styles it a "misunderstanding" (1994, p. 547) to think the argument was ever so directed! The Chinese room is now advertised to target Computationalism (claims that computation is what thought essentially is ) exclusively. Despite its renown, the Chinese Room Argument is totally ineffective even against this target
• Larry Hauser (1993). Searle's Chinese Box: The Chinese Room Argument and Artificial Intelligence.   (More)
• Larry Hauser (1997). Searle's chinese box: Debunking the chinese room argument.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract:   John Searle's Chinese room argument is perhaps the most influential andwidely cited argument against artificial intelligence (AI). Understood astargeting AI proper – claims that computers can think or do think– Searle's argument, despite its rhetorical flash, is logically andscientifically a dud. Advertised as effective against AI proper, theargument, in its main outlines, is an ignoratio elenchi. It musterspersuasive force fallaciously by indirection fostered by equivocaldeployment of the phrase "strong AI" and reinforced by equivocation on thephrase "causal powers" (at least) equal to those of brains." On a morecarefully crafted understanding – understood just to targetmetaphysical identification of thought with computation ("Functionalism"or "Computationalism") and not AI proper the argument is still unsound,though more interestingly so. It's unsound in ways difficult for high church– "someday my prince of an AI program will come" – believersin AI to acknowledge without undermining their high church beliefs. The adhominem bite of Searle's argument against the high church persuasions of somany cognitive scientists, I suggest, largely explains the undeserved reputethis really quite disreputable argument enjoys among them
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://members.aol.com/lshauser2/chinabox.html
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000240/
  http://members.aol.com/wutsamada/disserta.html
  http://www.csa.com/partners/viewrecord.php?requester=gs&collection=TRD&recid=322378CI
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?id=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:240
  http://members.aol.com/lshauser/chiboxab.html
  http://portal.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=596705.596737
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000240/00/199802002.html
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?id=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:240
  http://members.aol.com/wutsamada/contents.html
  http://cogprints.org/240/0/199802002.html
  http://www.csa.com/partners/viewrecord.php?requester=gs&collection=TRD&recid=322378CI
  http://cogprints.soton.ac.uk/documents/disk0/00/00/02/40/
  http://cogprints.org/240/
  http://members.aol.com/lshauser2/chinabox.html
  http://cogprints.org/240/00/199802002.html
  http://members.aol.com/lshauser/chiboxab.html
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/KX8R435770352167.pdf
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=120195&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/KX8R435770352167.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/kx8r435770352167/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=120195&PDF=1
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/mind/1997/00000007/00000002/00120195
  
• Larry Hauser (online). Searle's chinese room argument.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: John Searle's 1980a) thought experiment and associated 1984a) argument is one of the best known and widely credited counters to claims of artificial intelligence (AI), i.e., to claims that computers _do_ or at least _can_ (roughly, someday will) think. According to Searle's original presentation, the argument is based on two truths: _brains cause minds_ , and _syntax doesn't suffice_ _for semantics_ . Its target, Searle dubs "strong AI": "according to strong AI," according to Searle, "the computer is not merely a tool in the study of the mind, rather the appropriately programmed computer really _is_ a mind in the sense that computers given the right programs can be literally said to _understand_ and have other cognitive states" 1980a, p. 417). Searle contrasts "strong AI" to "weak AI". According to weak AI, according to Searle, computers just
• Larry Hauser (online). The chinese room argument.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: _The Chinese room argument_ - John Searle's (1980a) thought experiment and associated (1984) derivation - is one of the best known and widely credited counters to claims of artificial intelligence (AI), i.e., to claims that computers _do_ or at least _can_ (someday might) think. According to Searle's original presentation, the argument is based on two truths: _brains cause minds_ , and _syntax doesn't_ _suffice for semantics_ . Its target, Searle dubs "strong AI": "according to strong AI," according to Searle, "the computer is not merely a tool in the study of the mind, rather the appropriately programmed computer really _is_ a mind in the sense that computers given the right programs can be literally said to _understand_ and have other cognitive states" (1980a, p. 417). Searle contrasts "strong AI" to "weak AI". According to weak AI, according to Searle, computers just
• Patrick Hayes, Stevan Harnad, Donald Perlis & Ned Block (1992). Virtual symposium on virtual mind.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract:   When certain formal symbol systems (e.g., computer programs) are implemented as dynamic physical symbol systems (e.g., when they are run on a computer) their activity can be interpreted at higher levels (e.g., binary code can be interpreted as LISP, LISP code can be interpreted as English, and English can be interpreted as a meaninguful conversation). These higher levels of interpretability are called ‘virtual’ systems. If such a virtual system is interpretable as if it had a mind, is such a ‘virtual mind’ real? This is the question addressed in this ‘virtual’ symposium, originally conducted electronically among four cognitive scientists. Donald Perlis, a computer scientist, argues that according to the computationalist thesis, virtual minds are real and hence Searle's Chinese Room Argument fails, because if Searle memorized and executed a program that could pass the Turing Test in Chinese he would have a second, virtual, Chinese-understanding mind of which he was unaware (as in multiple personality). Stevan Harnad, a psychologist, argues that Searle's Argument is valid, virtual minds are just hermeneutic overinterpretations, and symbols must be grounded in the real world of objects, not just the virtual world of interpretations. Computer scientist Patrick Hayes argues that Searle's Argument fails, but because Searle does not really implement the program: a real implementation must not be homuncular but mindless and mechanical, like a computer. Only then can it give rise to a mind at the virtual level. Philosopher Ned Block suggests that there is no reason a mindful implementation would not be a real one
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?id=oai:eprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk:3371
  http://cogprints.org/1585/00/harnad92.virtualmind.html
  http://eprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00003371/
  http://cogprints.soton.ac.uk/documents/disk0/00/00/15/85/
  http://eprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00003371/02/harnad92.virtualmind.html
  http://eprints.resist.ecs.soton.ac.uk/3371/
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:1585
  http://www.ecs.soton.ac.uk/~harnad/Papers/Harnad/harnad92.virtualmind.html
  http://cogprints.org/1585/0/harnad92.virtualmind.html
  http://eprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00003371/
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00001585/00/harnad92.virtualmind.html
  http://cogsci.soton.ac.uk/harnad/Papers/Harnad/harnad92.virtualmind.html
  http://cogprints.org/1585/00/harnad92.virtualmind.html
  http://cogsci.soton.ac.uk/harnad/Papers/Harnad/harnad92.virtualmind.html
  http://cogsci.soton.ac.uk/~harnad/Papers/Harnad/harnad92.virtualmind.html
  http://cogprints.soton.ac.uk/documents/disk0/00/00/15/85/
  http://www.ecs.soton.ac.uk/~harnad/Papers/Harnad/harnad92.virtualmind.html
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:1585
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00001585/00/harnad92.virtualmind.html
  http://cogsci.soton.ac.uk/~harnad/Papers/Harnad/harnad92.virtualmind.html
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/G2063372459WW766.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/g2063372459ww766/fulltext.pdf
  
• C. Kaernbach (2005). No virtual mind in the chinese room.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.psychologie.uni-kiel.de/emotion/team/kaernbach/publications/2005_kae_jcs.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/2005/00000012/00000011/art00002
  
• Robert Kentridge (2001). Computation, chaos and non-deterministic symbolic computation: The chinese room problem solved?   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://psycprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000179/
  http://psycprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000179/02/psyc.01.12.050.symbolism-connectionism.17.kentridge
  http://www.ecs.soton.ac.uk/~harnad/Papers/Harnad/harnad93.symb.anal.net.kentridge.html
  http://www.cogsci.ecs.soton.ac.uk/cgi/psyc/newpsy?article=12.050
  http://www.cogsci.ecs.soton.ac.uk/cgi/psyc/newpsy?symbolism-connectionism.17
  http://cogsci.soton.ac.uk/~harnad/Papers/Harnad/harnad93.symb.anal.net.kentridge.html
  
• Diane Law (online). Searle, subsymbolic functionalism, and synthetic intelligence.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.let.rug.nl/~nerbonne/teach/neuro/kleiweg/law.synthetic.ps.gz
  http://nn.cs.utexas.edu/downloads/papers/law.synthetic.ps.gz
  http://odur.let.rug.nl/~nerbonne/teach/neuro/kleiweg/law.synthetic.ps.gz
  http://www.cs.utexas.edu/ftp/pub/neural-nets/papers/law.synthetic.pdf
  http://staticred.net/huco/617/searle-subsymbolic-functionalism-and.pdf
  http://nn.cs.utexas.edu/downloads/papers/law.synthetic.pdf
  http://www.phil.canterbury.ac.nz/tom_bestor/e-texts/Law, Diane - Searle, subsymbolic functionalism and synthetic understanding law.synthetic.ps
  http://www.cs.utexas.edu/users/nn/downloads/papers/law.synthetic.pdf
  http://historical.ncstrl.org/litesite-data/utexas_cs/UT-AI-TR-94-222.ps.Z
  
• Alan Leslie & Brian Scholl (1999). Modularity, development and 'theory of mind'.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Psychologists and philosophers have recently been exploring whether the mechanisms which underlie the acquisition of ‘theory of mind’ (ToM) are best charac- terized as cognitive modules or as developing theories. In this paper, we attempt to clarify what a modular account of ToM entails, and why it is an attractive type of explanation. Intuitions and arguments in this debate often turn on the role of develop- ment: traditional research on ToM focuses on various developmental sequences, whereas cognitive modules are thought to be static and ‘anti-developmental’. We suggest that this mistaken view relies on an overly limited notion of modularity, and we explore how ToM might be grounded in a cognitive module and yet still afford development. Modules must ‘come on-line’, and even fully developed modules may still develop internally, based on their constrained input. We make these points con- crete by focusing on a recent proposal to capture the development of ToM in a module via parameterization
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://ruccs.rutgers.edu/~aleslie/99-Scholl-Leslie-MindLang.pdf
  http://ruccs.rutgers.edu/~aleslie/99-Scholl-Leslie-MindLang.pdf
  http://www.cs.colorado.edu/~ctg/classes/lib/cogsci/scholl.pdf
  http://l3d.cs.colorado.edu/~ctg/classes/lib/cogsci/scholl.pdf
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/1468-0017.00106
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1468-0017.00106?favorite=add
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/mila/1999/00000014/00000001/art00106
  
• John McCarthy (online). John Searle's chinese room argument.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: John Searle begins his (1990) ``Consciousness, Explanatory Inversion and Cognitive Science'' with

  ``Ten years ago in this journal I published an article (Searle, 1980a and 1980b) criticising what I call Strong
  AI, the view that for a system to have mental states it is sufficient for the system to implement the right sort of
  program with right inputs and outputs. Strong AI is rather easy to refute and the basic argument can be
  summarized in one sentence: {it a system, me for example, could implement a program for understanding
  Chinese, for example, without understanding any Chinese at all.} This idea, when developed, became
  known as the Chinese Room Argument.''

  The Chinese Room Argument can be refuted in one sentence
• Ruth Millikan (2005). Some reflections on the theory theory - simulation theory discussion.   (More)
• Ethan Mitchell (2008). The real Chinese Room.   (More)
• John Searle (1990). Is the brain's mind a computer program?   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=hQCzOmaGeVYC&oi=fnd&pg=PA264&ots=j6aih-FnAo&sig=S9z08wWdwwt3psKgZPsRfS-1bXE
  
• John Searle (1980). Minds, brains and programs.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: What psychological and philosophical significance should we attach to recent efforts at computer simulations of human cognitive capacities? In answering this question, I find it useful to distinguish what I will call "strong" AI from "weak" or "cautious" AI (artificial intelligence). According to weak AI, the principal value of the computer in the study of the mind is that it gives us a very powerful tool. For example, it enables us to formulate and test hypotheses in a more rigorous and precise fashion. But according to strong AI, the computer is not merely a tool in the study of the mind; rather, the appropriately programmed computer really is a mind, in the sense that computers given the right programs can be literally said to..
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.bbsonline.org/documents/a/00/00/04/84/bbs00000484-00/bbs.searle2.html
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=CEMYUU_HFMAC&oi=fnd&pg=PA201&ots=dMdcPQ709B&sig=IAV-tI3UMUrdII-jhXVCiE5EiNY
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=CEMYUU_HFMAC&oi=fnd&pg=PA201&ots=dLmgQW13bB&sig=e696dd_RJUp-z7nJq_VUVkJ6Vco
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=CEMYUU_HFMAC&oi=fnd&pg=PA201&ots=dMdgLT5-bF&sig=WhrAW9GsnXpijAGLjoTnMSl83U4
  http://members.aol.com/NeoNoetics/MindsBrainsPrograms.html
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=CEMYUU_HFMAC&oi=fnd&pg=PA201&ots=dMdeTS616J&sig=Gup1URzClmw94-tEdiKkRv8oo_E
  http://pami.uwaterloo.ca/tizhoosh/docs/Searle.pdf
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=CEMYUU_HFMAC&oi=fnd&pg=PA201&ots=dMdfPT1-fI&sig=NuhA3CnAPDnsWqo8Ta8-RX2cCEY
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=CEMYUU_HFMAC&oi=fnd&pg=PA201&ots=dLmgLS63cA&sig=lNvUnhfC6Xi8TMG19ynGzF7-UrE
  http://instruct1.cit.cornell.edu/courses/psych102-summer2003/readings/mbp.pdf
  http://www.ifispan.waw.pl/~rpilat/john_searle.pdf
  http://staticred.net/huco/617/searle-minds, brains, and programs.pdf
  http://www.bbsonline.org/Preprints/OldArchive/bbs.searle2.html
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=CEMYUU_HFMAC&oi=fnd&pg=PA201&ots=dMdeNS1ZcF&sig=6EzNiu7H_1bXLA0zJ16b39NuIVQ
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=CEMYUU_HFMAC&oi=fnd&pg=PA201&ots=dMdiPV7_dJ&sig=xzN-ebbJvEML3FULifpKsvbJ4B0
  http://portal.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=42463
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=CEMYUU_HFMAC&oi=fnd&pg=PA201&ots=dLmgOW03aF&sig=v25MYgLHP7PRb5D3u6V0j21p3Os
  http://amor.rz.hu-berlin.de/~h0998dgh/philom/computational_mind/searle_Minds, Brains, and Programs.htm
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=CEMYUU_HFMAC&oi=fnd&pg=PA201&ots=dMdhTV4ZdG&sig=_xvxtHTY2CziSv0BQSRuTeAcVyE
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=CEMYUU_HFMAC&oi=fnd&pg=PA201&ots=dMddRR63eF&sig=LYLLmE8CSwbq9blXRhOQWNiQKBo
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=CEMYUU_HFMAC&oi=fnd&pg=PA201&ots=dMddLR2XfE&sig=hPqWXhv4YdFnGCjtMhQpRctFDz8
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=CEMYUU_HFMAC&oi=fnd&pg=PA201&ots=dMdgRU01eJ&sig=PuxfSwx103nfQfLP8luU4Z-hgSc
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=CEMYUU_HFMAC&oi=fnd&pg=PA201&ots=dMdhNV0_7I&sig=JxSMo440evbsIv2dv4QpEJVAC4A
  
• Aaron Sloman (1986). Did Searle attack strong strong AI or weak strong AI?   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/cogaff/sloman.searle.85.text
  
• Mark Sprevak (online). Algorithms and the chinese room.   (More)

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