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Philosophy of artificial intelligence :: Computation and representation :: Computational semantics

• Varol Akman (1998). Situations and artificial intelligence.   (More)
• Radu Bogdan (1994). By way of means and ends.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This chapter provides the teleological foundations for our analysis of guidance to goal. Its objective is to ground goal-directedness genetically. The basic suggestion is this. Organisms are small things, with few energy resources and puny physical means, battling a ruthless physical and biological nature. How do they manage to survive and multiply? CLEVERLY, BY ORGANIZING
• Daniel Dennett (2003). The Baldwin Effect: A Crane, Not a Skyhook.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In 1991, I included a brief discussion of the Baldwin effect in my account of the evolution of human consciousness, thinking I was introducing to non-specialist readers a little-appreciated, but no longer controversial, wrinkle in orthodox neo-Darwinism. I had thought that Hinton and Nowlan (1987) and Maynard Smith (1987) had shown clearly and succinctly how and why it worked, and restored the neglected concept to grace. Here is how I put it then
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/baldwincranefin.htm
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=yBtRzBilw1MC&oi=fnd&pg=PA69&dq=The+Baldwin+effect+Dennett&ots=2I8w0wd3n_&sig=urmY-aQvjQsgpb_W81dI6SjJvGc
  
• Jerry Fodor (1978). Tom swift and his procedural grandmother.   (More)
• Stevan Harnad (2002). Darwin, Skinner, Turing and the mind.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Darwin differs from Newton and Einstein in that his ideas do not require a complicated or deep mind to understand them, and perhaps did not even require such a mind in order to generate them in the first place. It can be explained to any school-child (as Newtonian mechanics and Einsteinian relativity cannot) that living creatures are just Darwinian survival/reproduction machines. They have whatever structure they have through a combination of chance and its consequences: Chance causes changes in the genetic blueprint from which organisms' bodies are built, and if those changes are more successful in helping their owners survive and reproduce than their predecessors or their rivals, then, by definition, those changes are reproduced, and thereby become more prevalent in succeeding generations: Whatever survives/reproduces better survives/reproduces better. That is the tautological force that shaped us
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/3016/01/darwin.htm
  http://cogprints.org/3016/01/darwin.htm
  http://eprints.resist.ecs.soton.ac.uk/7715/
  http://eprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/7715/01/darwin.htm
  http://www.ecs.soton.ac.uk/~harnad/Temp/darwin.htm
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00003016/
  http://eprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/7715/01/darwin.htm
  http://www.ecs.soton.ac.uk/~harnad/Temp/darwin.htm
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00003016/
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?id=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:3016
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?id=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:3016
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?id=oai:eprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk:7715
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?id=oai:eprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk:7715
  
• Philip Johnson-Laird (1977). Procedural semantics.   (More)
• Drew McDermott (1978). Tarskian semantics, or no notation without denotation.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.leaonline.com/doi/abs/10.1207/s15516709cog0203_5
  http://www.leaonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1207/s15516709cog0203_5
  http://www.leaonline.com/doi/pdfplus/10.1207/s15516709cog0203_5
  
• David Papineau (2006). The cultural origins of cognitive adaptations.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: According to an influential view in contemporary cognitive science, many human cognitive capacities are innate. The primary support for this view comes from ‘poverty of stimulus’ arguments. In general outline, such arguments contrast the meagre informational input to cognitive development with its rich informational output. Consider the ease with which humans acquire languages, become facile at attributing psychological states (‘folk psychology’), gain knowledge of biological kinds (‘folk biology’), or come to understand basic physical processes (‘folk physics’). In all these cases, the evidence available to a growing child is far too thin and noisy for it to be plausible that the underlying principles involved are derived from general learning mechanisms. This only alternative hypothesis seems to be that the child’s grasp of these principles is innate. (Cf. Laurence and Margolis, 2001.)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S1358246105056134
  
• William Rapaport (1995). Understanding understanding: Syntactic semantics and computational cognition.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.cse.buffalo.edu/~rapaport/Papers/understanding.ps
  http://historical.ncstrl.org/litesite-data/suny_buffalo_cs/94-28.ps.Z
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=1520-8583(1995)9<49:UUSSAC>2.0.CO;2-G
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=1520-8583(1995)9<49:UUSSAC>2.0.CO;2-G
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2214212.pdf
  
• B. Smith (1988). On the semantics of clocks.   (More)
• Erkan Tin & Varol Akman (1994). Computational situation theory.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Situation theory has been developed over the last decade and various versions of the theory have been applied to a number of linguistic issues. However, not much work has been done in regard to its computational aspects. In this paper, we review the existing approaches towards `computational situation theory' with considerable emphasis on our own research
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/200/0/sig.ps
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/599996.html
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000200/
  http://portal.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=191604.191608
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/tin94computational.html
  http://www.cs.bilkent.edu.tr/~akman/jour-papers/sigart/sigart1994.pdf
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?id=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:200
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:200
  
• W. Woods (1981). Procedural semantics as a theory of meaning.   (More)

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