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Philosophy of artificial intelligence :: Philosophy of connectionism :: Connectionism and eliminativism

• John Bickle (1993). Connectionism, eliminativism, and the semantic view of theories.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract:   Recently some philosophers have urged that connectionist artificial intelligence is (potentially) eliminative for the propositional attitudes of folk psychology. At the same time, however, these philosophers have also insisted that since philosophy of science has failed to provide criteria distinguishing ontologically retentive from eliminative theory changes, the resulting eliminativism is not principled. Application of some resources developed within the semantic view of scientific theories, particularly recent formal work on the theory reduction relation, reveals these philosophers to be wrong in this second contention, yet by and large correct in the first
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/pk525k2222273073/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/PK525K2222273073.pdf
  
• Anthony Chemero (2007). Asking what's inside the head: Neurophilosophy meets the extended mind.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In their historical overview of cognitive science, Bechtel, Abraham- son and Graham (1999) describe the field as expanding in focus be- ginning in the mid-1980s. The field had spent the previous 25 years on internalist, high-level GOFAI (“good old fashioned artificial intelli- gence” [Haugeland 1985]), and was finally moving “outwards into the environment and downards into the brain” (Bechtel et al, 1999, p.75). One important force behind the downward movement was Patricia Churchland’s Neurophilosophy (1986). This book began a movement bearing its name, one that truly came of age in 1999 when Kath- leen Akins won a million-dollar fellowship to begin the McDonnell Project in Philosophy and the Neurosciences. The McDonnell Project put neurophilosophy at the forefront of philosophy of mind and cogni- tive science, yielding proliferating articles, conferences, special journal issues and books. In two major new books, neurophilosophers Patricia Churchland (2002) and John Bickle (2003) clearly feel this newfound prominence: Churchland mocks those who do not apply findings in neuroscience to philosophical problems as “no-brainers”; Bickle mocks anyone with traditional philosophical concerns, including “naturalistic philosophers of mind” and other neurophilosophers
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://edisk.fandm.edu/tony.chemero/papers/bickchurchrev.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/m812557162027h08/fulltext.pdf
  
• M. Forster & Eric Saidel (1994). Connectionism and the fate of folk psychology.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://philosophy.wisc.edu/forster/papers/Connection.pdf
  
• Gerard O'Brien (1991). Is connectionism commonsense?   (More)
• Paul Skokowski (ms). Belief in networks.   (More)
• Stephen Stich & Ted Warfield (1995). Reply to Clark and Smolensky: Do connectionist minds have beliefs?   (More)

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