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Abstract: How things look (or sound, taste, smell, etc.) plays two important roles in the epistemology of perception.1 First, our perceptual beliefs are episte- mically justified, at least in part, in virtue of how things look. Second, whether a given belief is a perceptual belief, as opposed to, say, an infer- ential belief, is also at least partly a matter of how things look. Together, these yield an epistemically significant sense of �looks�. A standard view is that ��how things look��, in this epistemically significant sense, is a matter of one�s present perceptual phenomenology, of what nondoxastic experiential state one is in. On this standard view, these experiential states (a) determine which of my beliefs are perceptual beliefs and (b) are centrally involved in justifying these beliefs
Abstract: For example, suppose you believe squirrels can live an extremely long time, like parrots and tortoises. You think to yourself, �The oldest mammal in this town is probably a squirrel.� Contrast that case to:
(2b) believing some animal you see�an animal that happens to be the oldest mammal in town�to be a squirrel
I said there�s a philosophically important di?erence between the (a) examples and the (b) examples. In fact these examples illustrate more than one di?erence. Let�s try to disentangle the di?erent di?erences
