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3. Perception (Perception on PhilPapers)

• The Nature of Perceptual Experience [54]
• Sense-Datum Theories [13]
• Adverbialism and Qualia Theories [3]
• Intentionalist Theories of Perception [6]
• Belief Theories of Perception [0]
• Naive and Direct Realism [13]
• Disjunctivism [12]
• The Nature of Perceptual Experience, Misc [7]
• Aspects of Perception [37]
• Illusion and Hallucination [7]
• Transparency [16]
• Perceptual Reports [1]
• Sensation and Perception [5]
• Aspects of Perception, Misc [0]
• Philosophy of Perception, General [7]
• The Perceptual Relation [24]
• The Causal Theory of Perception [5]
• Direct and Indirect Perception [6]
• The Objects of Perception [7]
• The Perceptual Relation, Misc [6]
• The Contents of Perception [92]
• Conceptual and Nonconceptual Content [35]
• Color Experience [16]
• Spatial Experience [13]
• The Experience of Objects [12]
• The Experience of High-Level Properties [6]
• The Contents of Perception, Misc [10]
• Sensory Modalities [56]
• Distinguishing the Senses [9]
• Vision [10]
• Other Sensory Modalities [3]
• Molyneux's Problem [6]
• Sensory Modalities, Misc [2]
• Science of Perception [296]
• Modularity and Cognitive Penetrability [8]
• Ecological Approaches to Perception [7]
• Construction and Inference in Perception [4]
• Perception and Neuroscience [5]
• Psychophysics [5]
• Gestalt Theory [5]
• Science of Perception, Misc [0]
• Perception and the Mind [126]
• Perception and Thought [4]
• Perception and Action [45]
• Perception and Reference [5]
• Perception and Phenomenology [6]
• Perception and the Mind, Misc [0]
• Perceptual Knowledge [67]
• Dogmatism about Perception [0]
• Epistemic and Non-epistemic Perception [1]
• Perceptual Justification [0]
• Perception and Knowledge, Misc [1]
• Perception and Skepticism [1]
• The Given [8]
• Perceptual Qualities [213]
• Color [88]

• Sound [11]
• Primary and Secondary Qualities [2]
• Perceptual Qualities, Misc [2]
• Discriminability [10]
• Color [88]

The Nature of Perceptual Experience

Sense-Datum Theories

• Audre Jean Brokes (2000). The argument from illusion reconsidered.   (More)
• Andrew Chrucky (online). The alleged fallacy of the sense-datum inference.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Sense-data, if they exist, could conceivably provide foundations for empirical knowledge. Those who are opposed to empirical foundationalism are therefore also prone to reject sense-data and arguments for their existence, e.g., Rorty, Bonjour; while foundationalists are prone to accept the existence of sense-data, e.g., Russell, Ayer, Broad, Price, Lewis. An exception to this is the position of Roderick Chisholm who accepts empirical foundationalism but rejects the existence of sense-data
• Philippe Chuard & Richard Corry (ms). Looks non-transitive!   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Suppose you are presented with three red objects. You are then asked to take a careful look at each possible pair of objects, and to decide whether or not their members look chromatically the same. You carry out the instructions thoroughly, and the following propositions sum up the results of your empirical investigation:

  i. red object #1 looks the same in colour as red object #2.

  ii. red object #2 looks the same in colour as red object #3
• Paul Coates (online). Sense-data.   (More)
• Eugen Fischer (2005). Austin on sense-data: Ordinary language analysis as 'therapy'.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The construction and analysis of arguments supposedly are a philosopher's main business, the demonstration of truth or refutation of falsehood his principal aim. In Sense and Sensibilia, J.L. Austin does something entirely different: He discusses the sense-datum doctrine of perception, with the aim not of refuting it but of 'dissolving' the 'philosophical worry' it induces in its champions. To this end, he 'exposes' their 'concealed motives', without addressing their stated reasons. The paper explains where and why this at first sight outrageous aim and approach are perfectly sensible, how exactly Austin proceeds, and how his approach can be taken further. This shows Austin to be a pioneer of the currently much discussed notion of philosophy as therapy, reveals a subtle and unfamiliar use of linguistic analysis that is not open to the standard objections to ordinary language philosophy, and yields a novel and forceful treatment of the sense-datum doctrine
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/rodopi/gps/2006/00000070/00000001/art00004
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com//content/rodopi/gps/2006/00000070/00000001/art00004
  
• Benj Hellie (2007). That which makes the sensation of blue a mental fact: Moore on phenomenal relationism.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: I interpret the anti-idealist manoeuverings of the second half of Moore's 'The refutation of idealism', material as widely cited for its discussion of 'transparency' and 'diaphanousness' as it is deeply obscure. The centerpiece of these manoeuverings is a phenomenological argument for a relational view of perceptual phenomenal character, on which, roughly, 'that which makes the sensation of blue a mental fact' is a non-intentional relation of conscious awareness, a view close to the opposite of the most characteristic contemporary view going under the transparency rubric. The discussion of transparency and diaphanousness is a sidelight, its principal purpose to shore up the main line of argumentation against criticism; in those passages all Moore argues is that the relation of conscious awareness is not transparent, while acknowledging that it can seem to be.
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/full/10.1111/j.1468-0378.2007.00253.x
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1468-0378.2007.00274.x
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-0378.2007.00274.x
  
• David R. Hilbert (2004). Hallucination, sense-data and direct realism.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/x3m578hm43772833/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=5143507&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/X3M578HM43772833.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/phil/2004/00000120/F0030001/05143507
  
• Michael Huemer (online). Sense-data.   (More)
• Uriah Kriegel (2004). Trope theory and the metaphysics of appearances.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The concept of appearance has had the historical misfortune of being associated with a Kantian or idealist program in metaphysics. Within this program, appearances are treated as "internal objects" that are immaterial and exert no causal powers over the physical world. However, there is a more mundane and innocuous notion of appearance, in which to say that x appears to y is just to say that y perceives x. In this more mundane sense of the term, an appearance is a perceived object ? qua perceived. In this paper, I try and develop an account of the metaphysic of appearances in this more mundane sense. The account is developed within the framework of Trope Theory. After defining the notion of a "phenomenal trope," I construe appearances as special bundles of phenomenal tropes. I then use this account to develop an approach to the thorny issue of appearance individuation
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://uriahkriegel.com/downloads/Appearances.pdf
  
• Michael G. F. Martin (ms). Austin's Sense and Sensibilia revisited.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: When John Langshaw Austin died in ???? he had published only seven papers, together with a translation into English of Frege
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.homepages.ucl.ac.uk/~uctymfm/Background Readings/Austin Sense and Sensibilia Revisited.pdf
  
• Michael W. Martin (2000). Beyond dispute: Sense-data, intentionality, and the mind-body problem.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.homepages.ucl.ac.uk/~uctymfm/Background Readings/beyond dispute.pdf
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=BrbWKLYa7SoC&oi=fnd&pg=PA195&dq=Beyond+dispute+Martin&ots=4V5y_Z2-cR&sig=M3Trb82bqxE3qieGoT6War4-980
  
• G. E. Moore (1903). The refutation of idealism.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://fair-use.org/mind/1903/10/the-refutation-of-idealism
  http://www.lawrence.edu/fast/ryckmant/THE REFUTATION OF IDEALISM.pdf
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0026-4423(190310)2:12:48<433:TROI>2.0.CO;2-1
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0026-4423(190310)2:12:48<433:TROI>2.0.CO;2-1
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2248251.pdf
  
• Patrick Spät (2008). Questioning idealism.   (More)

Adverbialism and Qualia Theories

• Panayot K. Butchvarov (1980). Adverbial theories of consciousness.   (More)
• Ted Honderich (1992). Seeing qualia and positing the world.   (More)
• Alan Thomas (2003). An adverbial theory of consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This paper develops an adverbial theory of consciousness. Adverbialism is described and endorsed and defended from its near rival, an identity thesis in which conscious mental states are those that the mental subject self-knows immediately that he or she is "in". The paper develops an account of globally supported self-ascription to embed this neo-Brentanian view of experiencing consciously within a more general account of the relation between consciousness and self-knowledge. Following O'Shaughnessy, person level consciousness is explained as a feature of the bundle of mental capacities characteristic of persons: person level consciousness involves a capacity holism. Drawing on Kant, it is argued that if a person is in a mental state intentionally directed to an object then such a subject can "self token" such knowledge. The content of that self-knoweldge supervenes on the possession of a global set of capacities, and this capacity for self-ascription depends on the fact that our experience has a perspectival character with, as it were, nothing at the vanishing point of this perspective. The fact that one can attach the cogito to any one of one's representation shows a truth about the unity of the conscious life of a person that cannot be stated and this capacity is distinguished from self-conscious thinking about oneself. This approach is contrasted to Shoemaker's functionalist treatment of the self-tokening of conscious states and of "self-blindness". It is argued that to be fully consistent, Shoemaker has to abandon the claim that introspectionism is guilty of a self-scanning model or rational control as he seems committed to that model too
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.logical-operator.com/Adverbialtheory.pdf
  http://eprints.assc.caltech.edu/100/01/Adverbialtheory.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/r313388753k5440t/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=5144699&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/R313388753K5440T.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/phen/2003/00000002/00000003/05144699
  http://phonline.org/paper.php?keynum=733
  

Intentionalist Theories of Perception

• John B. Dilworth (2007). Representationalism and indeterminate perceptual content.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Representationalists currently cannot explain counter-examples that involve _indeterminate _perceptual content, but a _double content_ (DC) view is more promising. Four related cases of perceptual imprecision are used to outline the DC view, which also applies to imprecise photographic content. Next, inadequacies in the more standard single content (SC) view are demonstrated. The results are then generalized so as to apply to the content of any kinds of non-conventional representation. The paper continues with evidence that a DC account provides a moderate rather than extreme realist account of perception, and it concludes with an initial analysis of the failure of nomic covariance accounts of information in indeterminacy cases
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/b08794103873435m/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/B08794103873435M.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/phen/2007/00000006/00000003/00009050
  
• Kathrin Gluer (ms). Perception and justification.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: 1. Introduction When it comes to perception, representationalism is all the rage. Representationalism is a claim about the phenomenal character of perceptual experiences: According to representationalism, phenomenal character is fully determined by the representational content of perceptual experiences (cf. Tye 2002, 45). In other words, phenomenal character, what it is like, for instance, to have an experience as of something red, is either supervenient upon or identical with that experience
• Benj Hellie (ms). Visual form, attention, and binocularity.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This somewhat odd paper argues against a representational view of visual experience using an intricate "inversion" type thought experiment involving double vision: two subjects could represent external space in the same way while differing phenomenally due to different "spread" in their double images. The spatial structure of the visual field is explained not by representation of external space but functionally, in terms of the possible locations of an attentional spotlight. I'm fond of the ideas in this paper but doubt I'll be returning to it soon.
• Adam Pautz (2007). Intentionalism and perceptual presence.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: H. H. Price (1932) held that experience is essentially presentational. According to Price, when one has an experience of a tomato, nothing can be more certain than that there is something of which one is aware. Price claimed that the same applies to hallucination. In general, whenever one has a visual experience, there is something of which one is aware, according to Price. Call this thesis Item-Awareness
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1520-8583.2007.00134.x
  
• Adam Pautz (2006). Sensory awareness is not a wide physical relation: An empirical argument against externalist intentionalism.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  https://webspace.utexas.edu/arp424/www/nous.pdf?uniq=o3o0eq
  http://philrsss.anu.edu.au/people-defaults/adamp/papers/sensory_awareness_not_wide.pdf
  http://philrsss.anu.edu.au/people-defaults/adamp/papers/abridged_pautz_sensoryawarenessnotwide.pdf
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.0029-4624.2006.00607.x
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/nous/2006/00000040/00000002/art00001
  
• Ian Phillips (2005). Experience and Intentional Content.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Strong or Pure Intentionalism is the claim that the phenomenal character of any perceptual experience can be exhaustively characterized solely by reference to its Intentional content. Strong or Pure Anti -Intentionalism is the claim that the phenomenal character of any perceptual experience can be exhaustively characterized solely by reference to its non-Intentional properties

Belief Theories of Perception

Naive and Direct Realism

• Bill Brewer (2004). Realism and the nature of perceptual experience.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Realism concerning a given domain of things is the view that the things in that domain exist, and are as they are, quite independently of anyone
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=QfAK39JN4tAC&oi=fnd&pg=PA61&ots=NWxYQM6YXt&sig=FmXSNtp0tOtclKxhn-Al2MZuwuk
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/j.1533-6077.2004.00020.x/full/
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1533-6077.2004.00020.x
  
• J. Dokic (2000). Perception as openness to the facts.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/docs/00/05/32/80/PDF/ijn_00000108_00.pdf
  http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/docs/00/05/32/80/PDF/ijn_00000108_00.pdf
  http://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/documents/disk0/00/00/01/08/ijn_00000108_00/ijn_00000108_00.pdf
  
• Benj Hellie (2006). Beyond phenomenal naivete.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The naive realist takes a veridical visual experience to be an immediate relation to external entities. Is this how such an experience is phenomenally, by its phenomenal character? Only if there can be phenomenal error, since a hallucinatory experience phenomenally matching such a veridical experience would then be phenomenally but not in fact such a relation. Fortunately, such phenomenal error can be avoided: the phenomenal character of a visual experience involves immediate awareness of a sort of picture of external entities, as on a representative theory of perception. The attraction of naive realism results from an erroneous projection of the immediacy of the subject's awareness of this picture onto the external entities pictured.
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://quod.lib.umich.edu/p/phimp/images/3521354.0006.002.pdf
  
• Benj Hellie (2007). Factive phenomenal characters.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This paper expands on the discussion in the first section of 'Beyond phenomenal naivete'. Let Phenomenal Naivete be understood as the doctrine that some phenomenal characters of veridical experiences are factive properties concerning the external world. Here I present in detail a phenomenological case for Phenomenal Naivete and an argument from hallucination against it. I believe that these arguments show the concept of phenomenal character to be defective, overdetermined by its metaphysical and epistemological commitments together with the world. This does not establish a gappish eliminativism, but a gluttish pluralism, on which there are many imperfect deservers of the name 'phenomenal character'. Different projects in the philosophy of mind -- phenomenology, philosophy of conscious, metaphysics and epistemology of perception -- are concerned with different deservers of the name.
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1520-8583.2007.00128.x
  
• Paul Hoffman (2002). Direct realism, intentionality, and the objective being of ideas.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: My aim is to arrive at a better understanding of the distinction between direct realism and representationalism by offering a critical analysis of Steven Nadler
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/1468-0114.00141
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1468-0114.00141
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/papq/2002/00000083/00000002/art00145
  
• Pierre le Morvan (2004). Arguments against direct realism and how to counter them.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Since the demise of the Sense-Datum independent objects or events to be objects Theory and Phenomenalism in the last cenof perception; however, unlike Direct Retury, Direct Realism in the philosophy of alists, Indirect Realists take this percepperception has enjoyed a resurgence of tion to be indirect by involving a prior popularity.1 Curiously, however, although awareness of some tertium quid between there have been attempts in the literature the mind and external objects or events.3 to refute some of the arguments against Idealists and Phenomenalists agree with Direct Realism, there has been, as of yet, the Indirect Realists
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.tcnj.edu/~lemorvan/APR_Proof.pdf
  
• David Macarthur (2003). McDowell, scepticism, and the 'veil of perception'.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: McDowell has argued that external world scepticism is a pressing problem only in so far as we accept, on the basis of the argument from illusion, the claim that perceiving that p and hallucinating that p involve a highest common factor
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/./ftinterface~content=a713659630~fulltext=713240930
  http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/index/R6UQL9YKVWPUWNLW.pdf
  http://www.informaworld.com/index/713659630.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/routledg/ajphil/2003/00000081/00000002/art00175
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/routledg/ajphil/2003/00000081/00000002/art00002
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/oup/ajphil/2003/00000081/00000002/art00175
  
• David Macarthur (2004). Putnam's natural realism and the question of a perceptual interface.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In his Dewey Lectures,1 Hilary Putnam argues that contemporary philosophy cannot solve nor see its way past the traditional problem of how language or thought hooks on to
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/./ftinterface~content=a713948718~fulltext=713240930
  http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/index/KYM4R5B8X3HJNY77.pdf
  http://www.informaworld.com/index/713948718.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/routledg/rpex/2004/00000007/00000002/art00005
  
• Ian Phillips (2005). Experience and Intentional Content.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Strong or Pure Intentionalism is the claim that the phenomenal character of any perceptual experience can be exhaustively characterized solely by reference to its Intentional content. Strong or Pure Anti -Intentionalism is the claim that the phenomenal character of any perceptual experience can be exhaustively characterized solely by reference to its non-Intentional properties
• Paul M. Pietroski (1996). Experiencing the facts (critical notice of mcdowell).   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Paul Pietroski, McGill University The general topic of_ Mind and World_, the written version of John McDowell's 1991 John Locke Lectures, is how `concepts mediate the relation between minds and the world'. And one of the main aims is `to suggest that Kant should still have a central place in our discussion of the way thought bears on reality' (1).1 In particular, McDowell urges us to adopt a thesis that he finds in Kant, or perhaps in Strawson's Kant: the content of experience is conceptualized; _what_ we experience is always the kind of thing that we could also believe. When an agent has a veridical experience, she `takes in, for instance sees, _that things are thus and so_' (9). McDowell's argument for this thesis is indirect, but potentially powerful. He discusses a tension concerning the roles of experience and conceptual capacities in thought, and he claims that the only adequate resolution involves granting that experiences have conceptualized content. The tension, elaborated below, can be expressed roughly as follows: judgments must be somehow constrained by features of the external environment, else judgments would be utterly divorced from the world they purport to be about; yet our judgments must be somehow free of external control, else we could give no sense to the idea that we are responsible for our judgments
• John R. Shook (2003). The direct contextual realism theory of perception.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_speculative_philosophy/v017/17.4shook.html
  
• Susanna Siegel (2006). Direct realism and perceptual consciousness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://people.fas.harvard.edu/~ssiegel/papers/drpc.pdf
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2006.tb00623.x
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/ips/ppr/2006/00000073/00000002/art00006
  
• Dan Zahavi (2004). Natural realism, anti-reductionism, and intentionality: The 'phenomenology' of Hilary Putnam.   (More)

Disjunctivism

• Bill Brewer (2008). How to account for illusion.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The question how to account for illusion has had a prominent role in shaping theories of perception throughout the history of philosophy. Prevailing philosophical wisdom today has it that phenomena of illusion force us to choose between the following two options. First, reject altogether the early modern empiricist idea that the core subjective character of perceptual experience is to be given simply by citing the object presented in that experience. Instead we must characterize perceptual experience entirely in terms of its representational content. Second, retain the early modern idea that the core subjective character of experience is simply constituted by the identity of its direct objects, but admit that these must be mind-dependent entities, distinct from the mind-independent physical objects we all know and love. I argue here that the early modern empiricists had an indispensable insight. The idea that the core subjective character of perceptual experience is to be given simply by citing the object presented in that experience is more fundamental than any appeal to perceptual content, and can account for illusion, and indeed hallucination, without resorting to the problematic postulation of any such mind-dependent objects.
• Juan Comesana (2005). Justified vs. warranted perceptual belief: Resisting disjunctivism.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: I argue that one reason for being a disjunctivist advanced by McDowell (having to do with the indefeasibility of perceptual knowledge) fails because it ignores the distinction between justification and warrant.
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://philosophy.wisc.edu/comesana/Disjunctivism.pdf
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2005.tb00453.x
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/ips/ppr/2005/00000071/00000002/art00005
  
• Michael G. F. Martin (2006). On being alienated.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.homepages.ucl.ac.uk/~uctymfm/Background Readings/oba1.pdf
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=paqmMMfP8t0C&oi=fnd&pg=PA354&ots=_nu_zktyAN&sig=kk0Ck3ocusFMFTazoErLekuc5Rk
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=WUW3sLZ9tIAC&oi=fnd&pg=PA354&ots=I-3FnJw7jx&sig=pPkgPzg4BAKsnX2adwwHcuIc7P0
  
• Michael G. F. Martin (2004). The limits of self-awareness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/j67n647645555622/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/J67N647645555622.pdf
  
• John McDowell (2008). The disjunctive conception of experience as material for a transcendental argument.   (More)
• Alan Millar (2008). Perceptual-recognitional abilities and perceptual knowledge.   (More)
• Ram Neta (2008). In defense of disjunctivism.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://philosophy.unc.edu/netapub/In Defense of Disjunctivism.pdf
  http://www.unc.edu/depts/phildept/netapub/In Defense of Disjunctivism.pdf
  
• Duncan Pritchard (2006). McDowellian neo-mooreanism.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.philosophy-dev.stir.ac.uk/staff/duncan-pritchard/documents/McDowellianMooreanism.pdf
  
• Susanna Siegel (2004). Indiscriminability and the phenomenal.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/xp05760765436763/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/XP05760765436763.pdf
  
• Susanna Siegel (online). The dog and the zombie.   (More)
• Susanna Siegel (2008). The Epistemic Conception of Hallucination.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Early formulations of disjunctivism about perception refused to give any positive account of the nature of hallucination, beyond the uncontroversial fact that they can in some sense seem to the same to the subject as veridical perceptions. Recently, some disjunctivists have attempt to account for hallucination in purely epistemic terms, by developing detailed account of what it is for a hallucinaton to be indiscriminable from a veridical perception. In this paper I argue that the prospects for purely epistemic treatments of hallucinations are dim, and that this undermines the case for disjunctivism
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~ssiegel/papers/mseph.html
  
• Crispin Wright (2008). Comment on John McDowell's "The disjunctive conception of experience as material for a transcendental argument".   (More)

The Nature of Perceptual Experience, Misc

• Tim Crane (online). The problem of perception.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/perception-problem/
  http://hrcak.srce.hr/index.php?show=clanak_download&id_clanak_jezik=3888
  http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2005/entries/perception-problem/
  
• George Djukic & Vladimir B. Popescu (2003). A critique of Langsam's The Theory of Appearing Defended.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In this paper we consider, and reject, Harold Langsams defenceof the Theory of Appearing, in this journal (1997), in the faceof three standard arguments against it. These arguments are:the argument from hallucination; the argument from the samecause-same effect principle; and the argument from perceptualtime-gap
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=5107444&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/L632W67347H636K1.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/phil/2003/00000112/00000001/05107444
  
• Jeffrey Galko (2004). Ontology and perception.   (More)
• Garc (1999). Searle on perception.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://sammelpunkt.philo.at:8080/archive/00001207/01/carpintero.pdf
  
• Michael G. F. Martin (2003). Sensible appearances.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.homepages.ucl.ac.uk/~uctymfm/Background Readings/sensible appearances.pdf
  
• Michael G. F. Martin (1998). Setting things before the mind.   (More)
• Charles S. Travis (2005). The face of perception.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=HHNrzP0kQYEC&oi=fnd&pg=PA53&ots=pD_bR1lRZF&sig=p9_02hoF56u6e5QFENXEbftBfKQ
  

Aspects of Perception

Illusion and Hallucination

• Bill Brewer (2008). How to account for illusion.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The question how to account for illusion has had a prominent role in shaping theories of perception throughout the history of philosophy. Prevailing philosophical wisdom today has it that phenomena of illusion force us to choose between the following two options. First, reject altogether the early modern empiricist idea that the core subjective character of perceptual experience is to be given simply by citing the object presented in that experience. Instead we must characterize perceptual experience entirely in terms of its representational content. Second, retain the early modern idea that the core subjective character of experience is simply constituted by the identity of its direct objects, but admit that these must be mind-dependent entities, distinct from the mind-independent physical objects we all know and love. I argue here that the early modern empiricists had an indispensable insight. The idea that the core subjective character of perceptual experience is to be given simply by citing the object presented in that experience is more fundamental than any appeal to perceptual content, and can account for illusion, and indeed hallucination, without resorting to the problematic postulation of any such mind-dependent objects.
• Jason W. Brown (2004). The illusory and the real.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This contribution explores the psychological basis of illusion and the feeling of what is real in relation to a process theory (microgenesis) of mind/brain states. The varieties of illusion and the alterations in the feeling of realness are illustrated in cases of clinical pathology, as well as in everyday life. The basis of illusion does not rest in a comparison of appearance to reality nor in the relation of image to object, since these are antecedent and consequent phases in the same mental state. The study of pathological illusions and hallucinations shows that the feeling of realness in an object depends on its coherence within and across perceptual modalities. Illusion is shown to be not the taking of the phenomenal for the real, but the overlooking of the real in the phenomenal, since all things exist, i.e. are real, as categories of intrinsic relations in the unique mode of their conception. Finally, the implications of the account are discussed in relation to moral conduct, self-realization, acceptance, and the will to enjoy a world of 'brain-born' mental phenomena
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/mm/2004/00000002/00000001/art00003
  
• York H. Gunther (2001). Content, illusion, partition.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Philosophers of mind have recently sought to establish a theoret- ical use for nonconceptual content. Although there is disagreement about what nonconceptual content is supposed to be, this much is clear. A state with nonconceptual content is mental. Hence, while one may deny that refrigerators and messy rooms have conceptual capacities, their states, as physical and not mental, do not have nonconceptual content. A state with nonconceptual content is also intentional, which is to say that it represents a feature of the world for a subject. It may be tempting to think of qualitative states as having nonconceptual content since they can be experienced by indi- viduals independently of their possession of the requisite concepts, e.g. someone could experience pains, itches or tingles without possessing the concept pain, itch or tingle. But on such a view, one would have to assume that qualitative states are representational since mental states cannot be candidates for nonconceptuality unless they have intentional properties.2
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=254434&PDF=1
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=254434&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/J7172022QP642685.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/phil/2001/00000102/00000002/00254434
  
• David R. Hilbert (2004). Hallucination, sense-data and direct realism.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/x3m578hm43772833/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=5143507&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/X3M578HM43772833.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/phil/2004/00000120/F0030001/05143507
  
• Ian Phillips (online). Illusion and content.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: How should the Na¨ıve Realist who eschews representational percep- tual content account for illusions? Bill Brewer has recently proposed that illusions should be treated solely in terms of post-experiential misjudgement
• Susanna Siegel (2008). The Epistemic Conception of Hallucination.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Early formulations of disjunctivism about perception refused to give any positive account of the nature of hallucination, beyond the uncontroversial fact that they can in some sense seem to the same to the subject as veridical perceptions. Recently, some disjunctivists have attempt to account for hallucination in purely epistemic terms, by developing detailed account of what it is for a hallucinaton to be indiscriminable from a veridical perception. In this paper I argue that the prospects for purely epistemic treatments of hallucinations are dim, and that this undermines the case for disjunctivism
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~ssiegel/papers/mseph.html
  
• Brad J. Thompson (2008). Representationalism and the argument from hallucination.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Phenomenal character is determined by representational content, which both hallucinatory and veridical experiences can share. But in the case of veridical experience, unlike hallucination, the external objects of experience literally have the properties one is aware of in experience. The representationalist can accept the common factor assumption without having to introduce sensory intermediaries between the mind and the world, thus securing a form of direct realism
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/121384124/PDFSTART
  

Transparency

• J. Edwards (1998). The simple theory of colour and the transparency of sense experience.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/oso/17388/2000/00000001/00000001/art00014
  
• Rocco J. Gennaro (2007). Representationalism, peripheral awareness, and the transparency of experience.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: It is an interesting and somewhat curious fact that two claims based on phenomenological observation are at the heart of contemporary defenses of some forms of representationalism. Representationalism is, generally, the view that pheneomenal consciousness can be explained in terms of the intentional features of experience. More precisely, a representationalist will typically hold that the phenomenal properties of experience (that is, the “qualia” or “phenomenal character” or “what it is like of experience”) can be explained in terms of the experiences’ representational properties. The first phenomenological assertion is that, in addition to our frequent focused (or attentional) awareness of outer objects, we also have peripheral (or inattentional) conscious experience at the “edges” of consciousness. It is often said that some kind of peripheral conscious awareness accompanies our focal consciousness. Indeed, it seems reasonable to suppose that conscious awareness is broader than those aspects of conscious experience to which one is paying conscious attention. The second claim is that there is what has been called the “transparency of experience;” namely, that when we try to introspect, say, our visual experiences we “look through them” only to find the outer objects of those experiences. I say that it is a ‘curious fact’ because many representationalists are motivated by a desire to reduce consciousness to intentionality without any reference to phenomenal terms, or at least to render consciousness explicable in naturalistic terms. This desire is often accompanied by a decided third-person

  1

  approach to consciousness and sometimes even a disdain for introspective or phenomenological methods
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://eprints.assc.caltech.edu/archive/00000218/
  http://eprints.assc.caltech.edu/218/01/repperiph.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/c628645863404p3q/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/c628645863404p3q.pdf
  
• Benj Hellie (2007). That which makes the sensation of blue a mental fact: Moore on phenomenal relationism.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: I interpret the anti-idealist manoeuverings of the second half of Moore's 'The refutation of idealism', material as widely cited for its discussion of 'transparency' and 'diaphanousness' as it is deeply obscure. The centerpiece of these manoeuverings is a phenomenological argument for a relational view of perceptual phenomenal character, on which, roughly, 'that which makes the sensation of blue a mental fact' is a non-intentional relation of conscious awareness, a view close to the opposite of the most characteristic contemporary view going under the transparency rubric. The discussion of transparency and diaphanousness is a sidelight, its principal purpose to shore up the main line of argumentation against criticism; in those passages all Moore argues is that the relation of conscious awareness is not transparent, while acknowledging that it can seem to be.
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/full/10.1111/j.1468-0378.2007.00253.x
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1468-0378.2007.00274.x
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-0378.2007.00274.x
  
• Amy Kind (2003). What's so transparent about transparency?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Intuitions about the transparency of experience have recently begun to play a key role in the debate about qualia. Specifically, such intuitions have been used by representationalists to support their view that the phenomenal character of our experience can be wholly explained in terms of its intentional content.[i] But what exactly does it mean to say that experience is transparent? In my view, recent discussions of transparency leave matters considerably murkier than one would like. As I will suggest, there is reason to believe that experience is not transparent in the way that representationalism requires. Although there is a sense in which experience can be said to be transparent, transparency in this sense does not give us any particular motivation for representationalism—or at least, not the pure or strong representationalism that it is usually invoked to support
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://phil-rlst.claremontmckenna.edu/akind/Transparency.doc
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/q220810l8k517482/fulltext.pdf
  
• Joseph Levine (2006). Color and color experience: Colors as ways of appearing.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In this paper I argue that color is a relational feature of the distal objects of perception, a way of appearing. I begin by outlining three constraints any theory of color should satisfy: (i) physicalism about the non-mental world, (ii) consistency with what is known from color science, and (iii) transparency about color experience. Traditional positions on the ontological status of color, such as physicalist reduction of color to spectral re?ectance, subjectivism, dispositional- ism, and primitivism, fail, I claim, to meet all three constraints. By treating color as a relational property, a way of appearing, the three constraints can be met. However, serious problems for this view emerge when considering the relation between illusory color experiences (particularly hallucinations) and veridical color experiences. I do not propose a solution to these problems
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1746-8361.2006.01056.x
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/dltc/2006/00000060/00000003/art00004
  
• Pierre Livet (2005). What is transparency?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Opacity, in Metzinger’s sense, is access to processed information _as_ processed, while transparency is only access to the _content _of our phenomenal states. I suspect that transparency conflates different notions. First I show that every conscious experience has a “transparent” core (involving intentionality, directedness and assumption of existence, insensitivity to some unconscious process). Anyway, to be sensitive to earlier processing steps does not imply to take the representation “as modeled by our simulator”. There are other ways of being sensitive to this processing experience: experience of gaps in perceptive synthesis, experience of incompleteness, queerness of experience, phenomenal incoherence, searching consciousness. Many of them implies only to put in abeyance incoherence or incompleteness (to be laterally aware of a conflict without dealing with it), or even to put this abeyance into abeyance (not to take into account the absence of solution). But if the conflict becomes serious, we revise our assumption, and this requires the assumption that the conflict is about existing things. The self has a peculiar property here. Even when I revise one aspect of my self, I have to presuppose a self, in the sense that I put in abeyance other revisions of this presupposed self. Self is not a simulation, even if we have only this peculiar access to it.
• Eric Lormand (2005). Phenomenal impressions.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=paqmMMfP8t0C&oi=fnd&pg=PA316&ots=_ol-wcvxAO&sig=w2fuz0p42C7KYUpUZgCqnay8MFM
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=WUW3sLZ9tIAC&oi=fnd&pg=PA316&ots=I0WGkBy6jy&sig=yEW2j3v7f6YumQj3VovotWnfvSQ
  
• Pete Mandik (2006). The introspectibility of brain states as such.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Is the Introspection Thesis true? It certainly isn’t obvious. Introspection is the faculty by which each of us has access to his or her own mental states. Even if we were to suppose that mental states are identical to brain states, it doesn’t follow immediately from this supposition that we can introspect our mental states as brain states. This point is analogous to the following. It doesn’t follow immediately from the mere fact that some distant object is identical to a horse that we can perceive it as a horse. Further, it isn’t obvious that any amount of education would suffice to make some distant speck on the horizon seem like a horse. It may very well be the case that no matter how well we know that some distant speck is a horse; as long as we are sufficiently distant from it we will only be able to see it as a speck. Analogously then, it may very well be the case that no matter how well we know that our mental states are brain states, we will only be able to introspect them as irreducibly mental
• Michael G. F. Martin (2002). The transparency of experience.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.homepages.ucl.ac.uk/~uctymfm/Background Readings/transparency of experience.pdf
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/1468-0017.00205/abs/
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1468-0017.00205
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/mila/2002/00000017/00000004/art00205
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/mila/2002/00000017/00000004/art00002
  
• Thomas Metzinger (2003). Phenomenal transparency and cognitive self-reference.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.philosophie.uni-mainz.de/metzinger/publikationen/Phenomenal_transparency_PCS2003.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/m07w5tt6882l81v8/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=5151925&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/M07W5TT6882L81V8.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/phen/2003/00000002/00000004/05151925
  
• Paul Raymont (online). Some experienced qualities belong to the experience.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In this paper, a criticism of representationalist views of consciousness is developed. These views are often supported by an appeal to a transparency thesis about conscious states, according to which an experience does not itself possess the qualities of which it makes one conscious. The experience makes one conscious of these qualities by representing them, not by instantiating them. Against this, it is argued that some of the properties of which one is conscious are had by the conscious state itself. Only by adopting this view can we account for certain perceptual incompatibilities, such as the fact that one cannot see a stick as being both bent and not bent. This sort of experience is impossible because it would require that an experience have, and not just represent, incompatible features
• Daniel Stoljar (2004). The argument from diaphanousness.   (More)
• Michael Tye (2002). Representationalism and the transparency of experience.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Representationalism is a thesis about the phenomenal character of experiences, about their immediate subjective ‘feel’.1 At a minimum, the thesis is one of supervenience: necessarily, experiences that are alike in their representational contents are alike in their phenomenal character. So understood, the thesis is silent on the nature of phenomenal character. Strong or pure representationalism goes further. It aims to tell us what phenomenal character is. According to the theory developed in Tye 1995, phenomenal character is one and the same as representational content that meets certain further conditions. One very important motivation for this theory is the so-called ? transparency of experience.? The purpose of this paper is to elucidate the appeal to transparency more carefully than has been done hithertofore, to make some remarks about the introspective awareness of experience in light of this appeal, and to consider one problem case for transparency at some length, that of blurry vision. Along the way, I shall also address some of the remarks Stephen Leeds makes in his essay on transparency
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1468-0068.00365
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/nous/2002/00000036/00000001/art00365
  
• Josh Weisberg (2006). Consciousness constrained: A commentary on being no one.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: ABSTRCT: In this commentary, I criticize Metzinger's interdisciplinary approach to fixing the explanandum of a theory of consciousness and I offer a commonsense alternative in its place. I then re-evaluate Metzinger's multi-faceted working concept of consciousness, and argue for a shift away from the notion of "global availability" and towards the notio ns of "perspectivalness" and "transparency." This serves to highlight the role of Metzinger's "phenomenal model of the intentionality relation" (PMIR) in explaining consciousness, and it helps to locate Metzinger's theory in relation to other naturalistic theories of
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://psyche.csse.monash.edu.au/symposia/metzinger/Weisberg.pdf
  http://www.joshweisberg.com/Consciousness Constrained, Josh Weisberg CUNY.pdf
  
• Josh Weisberg (2005). Consciousness constrained: Commentary on Metzinger.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: ABSTRCT: In this commentary, I criticize Metzinger's interdisciplinary approach to fixing the explanandum of a theory of consciousness and I offer a commonsense alternative in its place. I then re-evaluate Metzinger's multi-faceted working concept of consciousness, and argue for a shift away from the notion of "global availability" and towards the notio ns of "perspectivalness" and "transparency." This serves to highlight the role of Metzinger's "phenomenal model of the intentionality relation" (PMIR) in explaining consciousness, and it helps to locate Metzinger's theory in relation to other naturalistic theories of
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://psyche.csse.monash.edu.au/symposia/metzinger/Weisberg.pdf
  http://www.joshweisberg.com/Consciousness Constrained, Josh Weisberg CUNY.pdf
  
• Kenneth Williford (ms). The logic of phenomenal transparency.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ceps.com.tw/ec/ecjnlarticleView.aspx?atliid=1000417&issueiid=58567&jnliid=3226
  

Perceptual Reports

• Reinhard Muskens (1993). Perception Verbs.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The semantics of a sentence containing a perception verb such as see or hear depends to a high degree on the exact syntactic form of the perception verb’s complement. Let us compare sentence (1), where the complement is tenseless, with (2), where the complement is a tensed clause
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/muskens93perception.html
  http://let.uvt.nl/general/people/rmuskens/pubs/percepverbs.pdf
  

Sensation and Perception

• Austen Clark (2007). Sensory and perceptual consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Asked on the Dick Cavett show about her former Stalinist comrade Lillian Hellman, Mary McCarthy replied, "Every word she says is a lie, including 'and' and 'the'." The language used to describe sensory and perceptual consciousness is worthy of about the same level of trust. One must adapt oneself to the fact that every ordinary word used to describe this domain is ambiguous; that different theoreticians use the same words in very different ways; and that every speaker naturally thinks that his or her usage is, of course, the correct one. Notice that we have already partially vindicated Mary McCarthy: even the word "the" cannot always be trusted
• Casey O'Callaghan (forthcoming). Perception.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: To appear in the Cambridge Handbook to Cognitive Science, eds. Ramsey and Frankish
• Christopher Peacocke (online). Sensational properties: Theses to accept and theses to reject.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The subjective properties of an experience are those which specify what having the experience is like for its subject. The sensational properties of an experience are those of its subjective properties that it does not possess in virtue of features of the way the experience represents the world as being (its representational content). Perhaps no topic in the philosophy of mind has been more vigorously debated in the past quarter-century than whether there are any sensational properties, so conceived. The existence or otherwise of sensational properties is pivotal in assessing functionalism, representationalism, and many other conceptions of mental states and the nature of our ability to think about them. Instead of engaging in extended sentence- by-sentence dissection of these many discussions, I hope that the theses I formulate will, taken together, comprise a positive conception of sensational properties that can be drawn upon in assessing those debates. My main aim is to articulate that conception
• Jesse J. Prinz (2006). Beyond appearances: The content of sensation and perception.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: There seems to be a large gulf between percepts and concepts. In particular, con- cepts seem to be capable of representing things that percepts cannot. We can conceive of things that would be impossible to perceive. (The converse may also seem true, but I will leave that to one side.) In one respect, this is trivially right. We can conceive of things that we cannot encounter, such as unicorns. We cannot literally perceive unicorns, even if we occasionally
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=paqmMMfP8t0C&oi=fnd&pg=PA434&ots=_ol_BkrzBN&sig=zfUzmJ1ACP__8z5Fzqg5RZFXkqY
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=WUW3sLZ9tIAC&oi=fnd&pg=PA434&ots=I0WFpJu8kx&sig=0I74OWnDgtjtHBs7bm62OoUx5Wk
  
• Teed Rockwell (2001). Experience and sensation: Sellars and Dewey on the non-cognitive aspects of mental life.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Sellars and Dewey each isolated and critiqued different aspects of the atomistic epistemology of the logical positivists: Dewey labeled his target "Sensationalistic Empiricism", and Sellars labeled his "the Myth of the Given." The main theme of this paper will be the similarity and differences in their responses to this kind of philosophy, and how both responses can be clarified and strengthened by considering recent discoveries in Cognitive Neuroscience. What we have recently learned about neural architecture accounts for a distinction between knowledge and experience that is a recurrent theme in both Sellars and Dewey. Dewey, however, made a sharper break from the positivists by seeing all experience as shaped by skills and abilities which were designed to acheive certain goals and were colored by emotions. The connectionist architecture used in Cognitive Neuroscience supports this view, as does the psychological research of J.J. Gibson. Once we consider the ways in which connectionist cognitive abilities differ from linguistic ones, Sellars' distinction between thoughts and sensations, and Dewey's distinction between knowledge and experience, can both be plausibly accounted for
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://users.california.com/~mcmf/sellarsdewey.html
  

Aspects of Perception, Misc

Philosophy of Perception, General

• Austen Clark (1994). Contemporary problems in the philosophy of perception.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Imagine, if you will, that the entire community of investigators interested in the problems of perception all lived together in the same town. Some continual shuffling of neighbors would be inevitable, and there might be occasional episodes of mass relocation and energetic bulldozing, but after a while the residents would probably settle down and find themselves living in districts defined roughly by disciplinary boundaries. The experimental psychologists would occupy the newer part of town, laced with superhighways, workshops and factories, machines and measuring instruments, computers and overhead display units. But the town also has an Old City, marked by the complete absence of highways and factories, where the streets are lined with ancient hovels. There are, to be sure, some colossal palaces and museums in this part of town, breathtaking monuments to the grandeur of past centuries, but the current residents lack the inclination to construct such buildings, and many of the old palaces have been boarded up and condemned as unfit for human habitation. The somewhat scraggly and irascible inhabitants of this district have few viable economic enterprises, and no free markets, but rather organize themselves in units resembling nothing so much as medieval guilds. Congratulations. You have stumbled into the neighborhood where the philosophers live
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://selfpace.uconn.edu/paper/ClarkAusCrane.pdf
  
• Austen Clark (2003). Perception, philosophical issues about.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: the philosophical regions. I will identify three: three obvious zones of The first and third of these kinds of problem are studied almost tectonic conflict within contemporary cognitive approaches to exclusively within departments of philosophy. Applied to perception
• Mark Johnston (ms). The manifest: Chapter.   (More)
• Michael G. F. Martin (ms). Uncovering Appearances, chapter four.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.homepages.ucl.ac.uk/~uctymfm/Chapters/Uncovering Appearances Chapter One.pdf
  http://www.homepages.ucl.ac.uk/~uctymfm/Chapters/Uncovering Appearances Chapter Four.pdf
  http://www.homepages.ucl.ac.uk/~uctymfm/Chapters/Uncovering Appearances Chapter Three.pdf
  
• Casey O'Callaghan (forthcoming). Perception.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: To appear in the Cambridge Handbook to Cognitive Science, eds. Ramsey and Frankish
• Evan Thompson, Alva Noë & Luiz Pessoa (1999). Perceptual completion: A case study in phenomenology and cognitive science.   (More)
• Thomas A. Wilson (1985). Russell's later theory of perception.   (More)

The Perceptual Relation

The Causal Theory of Perception

• John B. Dilworth (2005). A reflexive, dispositional approach to perception.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This paper will investigate the basic question of the nature of perception, as theoretically approached from a purely naturalistic standpoint. An adequate theory must not only have clear application to a world full of pre-existing biological examples of perception of all kinds, from unicellular perception to conscious human perception, but it must also satisfy a series of theoretical or philosophical constraints, as enumerated and discussed in Section 1 below. A perceptual theory invoking _reflexive dispositions_--that is, dispositions directed toward the very same worldly perceived objects or properties that caused them--will be defended as one legitimate such naturalistic theory
• John B. Dilworth (2004). Naturalized perception without information.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The outlines of a novel, fully naturalistic theory of perception are provided, that can explain perception of an object X by organism Z in terms of reflexive causality. On the reflexive view proposed, organism Z perceives object or property X just in case X causes Z to acquire causal dispositions reflexively directed back upon X itself. This broadly functionalist theory is potentially capable of explaining both perceptual representation and perceptual content in purely causal terms, making no use of informational concepts. However, such a reflexive, naturalistic causal theory must compete with well entrenched, supposedly equally naturalistic theories of perception that are based on some concept of information, so the paper also includes some basic logical, naturalistic and explanatory criticisms of such informational views
• John B. Dilworth (2005). Perceptual causality problems reflexively resolved.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Causal theories of perception typically have problems in explaining deviant causal chains. They also have difficulty with other unusual putative cases of perception involving prosthetic aids, defective perception, scientifically extended cases of perception, and so on. But I show how a more adequate reflexive causal theory, in which objects or properties X cause a perceiver to acquire X-related dispositions toward that very same item X, can provide a plausible and principled perceptual explanation of all of these kinds of cases. A critical discussion of David Lewis's perceptual descriptivist views is also provided, including a defense of the logical possibility of systematic misperception or perceptual error for a perceiver, in spite of its empirical improbability
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/1kxkvx3xd374g23p/fulltext.pdf
  http://transactionpub.metapress.com/index/1KXKVX3XD374G23P.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/1KXKVX3XD374G23P.pdf
  
• John B. Dilworth (2005). The reflexive theory of perception.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://homepages.wmich.edu/~dilworth/The_Reflexive_Theory_of_Perception.pdf
  
• No (2003). Causation and perception: The puzzle unravelled.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/1467-8284.00017
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1467-8284.00017
  

Direct and Indirect Perception

• Tony Chemero (forthcoming). Information and direct perception: A new approach.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Since the 1970s, Michael Turvey, Robert Shaw, and William Mace have worked on the formulation of a philosophically-sound and empirically-tractable version of James Gibson
• John B. Dilworth (2005). The perception of representational content.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: How can it be true that one sees a lake when looking at a picture of a lake, since one's gaze is directed upon a flat dry surface covered in paint? An adequate contemporary explanation cannot avoid taking a theoretical stand on some fundamental cognitive science issues concerning the nature of perception, of pictorial content, and of perceptual reference to items that, strictly speaking, have no physical existence. A solution is proposed that invokes a broadly functionalist, naturalistic theory of perception, plus a double content analysis of perceptual interpretation, which permits non-supervenient, culturally autonomous modes of reference to be generated and artistically exploited even in a purely physical world. In addition, a functionalist concept of broad or 'spread' reference replaces the traditional precise intentional concept of reference, which previously made reference to non-existent items theoretically intractable
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://bjaesthetics.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/full/45/4/388?ijkey=HzJtjHZFUOUWP8j&keytype=ref
  http://bjaesthetics.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/45/4/388
  http://bjaesthetics.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/45/4/388
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/oup/aesthj/2005/00000045/00000004/art00388
  
• William C. Fish (2004). The direct/indirect distinction in contemporary philosophy of perception.   (More)
• No (2002). Direct perception.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: experiences are qualitatively indistinguishable, experience by engaging in a constructive process then you are aware of one and the same thing of inference or conjecture. A perception, in the when you see a red tomato and hallucinate a red phrase of Helmholtz, is an `unconscious inference'. tomato. Hence, when you see a red tomato, you are Empirical research on perception focuses on under- aware not of a tomato but of a tomato-like sense standing the mechanisms, neural and psycho- datum. logical, that make up the brain's ability to perform 00170005 That perception is in this way indirect appears to
• No (2002). On what we see.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/1468-0114.t01-1-00140/abs/
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1468-0114.t01-1-00140
  
• S. Ullman (1980). Against direct perception.   (More)

The Objects of Perception

• Marc Alspector-Kelly (2004). Seeing the unobservable: Van Fraassen and the limits of experience.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/content/g510817412644p75/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/g510817412644p75/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=5127598&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/G510817412644P75.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/synt/2004/00000140/00000003/05127598
  
• Radu J. Bogdan (1986). The Objects of Perception.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Our perceptions, beliefs, thoughts and memories have objects. They are about or of things and properties around us. I perceive her, have beliefs about her, think of her and have memories of her. How are we to construe this aboutness (or ofness) of our cognitive states?' There are four major choices on the philosophical market. There is an interaction approach which says that the object of cognition is fixed by and understood in terms of what cognizers physically and sensorily interact with - or, alternatively, in terms of what the information delivered by such interaction is about. There is the satisfactional approach which says that the object of a cognitive state is whatever satisfies the representation constitutive of that state. There is also a hybrid approach which requires both physical/sensory interaction and representational satisfaction in the fixation of the object of cognition. And there is, finally, the direct acquaintance approach which says that only an immediate cognitive contact with things and properties can establish them as objects of cognition. The latter, as far as I can tell, goes the way perception goes, so only the remaining three approaches look like serious contenders
• Bill Brewer (2007). Perception and its objects.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Physical objects are such things as stones, tables, trees, people and other animals: the persisting macroscopic constituents of the world we live in. (1) therefore expresses a commonsense commitment to physical realism: the persisting macroscopic constituents of the world we live in exist, and are as they are, quite independently of anyone
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/y681h56t37847676/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/Y681H56T37847676.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/phil/2007/00000132/00000001/00009051
  http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/philosophy/staff/brewer/po_apa_ps.pdf
  
• John B. Dilworth (2006). A reflexive dispositional analysis of mechanistic perception.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract:   The field of machine perception is based on standard informational and computational approaches to perception. But naturalistic informational theories are widely regarded as being inadequate, while purely syntactic computational approaches give no account of perceptual content. Thus there is a significant need for a novel, purely naturalistic perceptual theory not based on informational or computational concepts, which could provide a new paradigm for mechanistic perception. Now specifically evolutionary naturalistic approaches to perception have been—perhaps surprisingly—almost completely neglected for this purpose. Arguably perceptual mechanisms enhance evolutionary fitness by facilitating sensorily mediated causal interactions between an organism Z and items X in its environment. A ‘reflexive’ theory of perception of this kind is outlined, according to which an organism Z perceives an item X just in case X causes a sensory organ zi of Z to cause Z to acquire a disposition toward the very same item X that caused the perception. The rest of the paper shows how an intuitively plausible account of mechanistic perception can be developed and defended in terms of the reflexive theory. Also, a compatibilist option is provided for those who wish to preserve a distinct informational concept of perception
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://homepages.wmich.edu/~dilworth/A_Reflexive_Dispositional_Analysis_of_Mechanistic_Perception.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/r47658w526155q2j/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/R47658W526155Q2J.pdf
  
• Ram Neta (2007). Contextualism and a puzzle about seeing.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Contextualist solutions to skeptical puzzles have recently been subjected to various criticisms. In this paper, I will defend contextualism against an objection prominently pressed by Stanley 2000. According to Stanley, contextualism in epistemology advances an empirically implausible hypothesis about the semantics of knowledge ascriptions in natural language. It is empirically implausible because it attributes to knowledge ascriptions a kind of semantic context-sensitivity that is wholly unlike any well- established type of semantic context-sensitivity in natural language
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.unc.edu/depts/phildept/Contextualism and a Puzzle about Seeing.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/qp68708843542513/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/QP68708843542513.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/phil/2007/00000134/00000001/00009021
  
• Casey O'Callaghan (2007). Echoes.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Echo experiences are illusory experiences of ordinary primary sounds. Just as there is no new object that we see at the surface of a mirror, there is no new sound that we hear at a reflecting surface. The sound that we hear as an echo just is the original primary sound, though its perception involves illusions of place, time, and qualities. The case of echoes need not force us to adopt a conception according to which sounds are persisting object-like particulars that travel through space.
• Roy Sorenson (2006). The disappearing act.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/118607448/PDFSTART
  

The Perceptual Relation, Misc

• Tim Crane (2006). Is there a perceptual relation?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: P.F. Strawson argued that ‘mature sensible experience (in general) presents itself as … an immediate consciousness of the existence of things outside us’ (1979: 97). He began his defence of this very natural idea by asking how someone might typically give a description of their current visual experience, and offered this example of such a description: ‘I see the red light of the setting sun filtering through the black and thickly clustered branches of the elms; I see the dappled deer grazing in groups on the vivid green grass…’ (1979: 97). In other words, in describing experience, we tend to describe the objects of experience – the things which we experience – and the ways they are when we are experiencing them. Some go further. According to Heidegger
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=WUW3sLZ9tIAC&oi=fnd&pg=PA126&ots=I0WFoJC5kp&sig=7fm5JVRwTNXmjIJZwSmJZGHOF9A
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=paqmMMfP8t0C&oi=fnd&pg=PA126&ots=_ol_AkzwBF&sig=5TzGaBNG_eCcPjXZ4HyUknK0fWE
  http://web.mac.com/cranetim/Tims_website/Online_papers_files/Perceptual relation.pdf
  
• Elisabeth Pacherie (1995). Do we see with microscopes?   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/docs/00/05/33/66/PDF/ijn_00000240_00.pdf
  http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/docs/00/05/33/66/PDF/ijn_00000240_00.pdf
  http://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/documents/disk0/00/00/02/40/ijn_00000240_00/ijn_00000240_00.pdf
  
• Dimitris Platchias (2004). The veil of perception and contextual relativism.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ifs.csic.es/sorites/Issue_15/sorites15.pdf#page=78
  
• Susanna Siegel (2006). How does phenomenology constrain object-seeing?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Perception provides a form of contact with the world and the other people in it. For example, we can learn that Franco is sitting in his chair by seeing Franco; we can learn that his hair is gray by seeing the colour of his hair. Such perception enables us to understand primitive forms of language, such as demonstrative expressions
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~ssiegel/papers/franco-nov.html
  http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/./ftinterface~content=a758270037~fulltext=713240930
  http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/index/V1VV074862660453.pdf
  http://www.informaworld.com/index/758270037.pdf
  
• Susanna Siegel (2002). The role of perception in demonstrative reference.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Siegel defends "Limited Intentionism", a theory of what secures the semantic reference of uses of bare demonstratives ("this", "that" and their plurals). According to Limited Intentionism, demonstrative reference is fixed by perceptually anchored intentions on the part of the speaker
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.doaj.org/abstract?id=8642&toc=y
  http://www.doaj.org/doaj?func=abstract&id=8642
  http://quod.lib.umich.edu/p/phimp/images/3521354.0002.001.pdf
  http://www.doaj.org/abstract?id=8642&year=2002&volume=2&issue=1
  http://www.umich.edu/~philos/Imprint/frameset.html?002001+21+pdf
  
• Roy A. Sorensen (1999). Seeing intersecting eclipses.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-362X(199901)96:1<25:SIE>2.0.CO;2-#
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-362X(199901)96:1<25:SIE>2.0.CO;2-#
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2564647.pdf
  

The Contents of Perception

Conceptual and Nonconceptual Content

• William P. Alston (1998). Perception and conception.   (More)
• Jose Luis Bermudez & Fiona Macpherson (1998). Nonconceptual content and the nature of perceptual experience.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: [1] Recent philosophy of mind and epistemology has seen an important and influential trend towards accounting for at least some features of experiences in content-involving terms. It is a contested point whether ascribing content to experiences can account for all the intrinsic properties of experiences, but on many theories of experiences there are close links between the ascription of content and the ways in which experiences are ascribed and typed. The issues here have both epistemological and psychological dimensions. On the one hand, a theory of experiential content has a fundamental role in explaining how knowledge of the world can be acquired through experience. On the other hand, there are important psychological questions about the phenomenology of experiences and the conditions under which content ascriptions are made
• Bill Brewer (2005). Perceptual experience has conceptual content.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: I take it for granted that sense experiential states provide reasons for empirical beliefs; indeed this claim forms the first premise of my central argument for (CC). 1 The subsequent stages of the argument are intended to establish that a person has such a reason for believing something about the way things are in the world around him only if he is in some mental state or other with a conceptual content: a conceptual state. Thus, given that sense experiential states do provide reasons for empirical beliefs, they must have conceptual content
• Alex Byrne (2005). Perception and conceptual content.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://web.mit.edu/abyrne/www/percepandconcepcontent.pdf
  
• Ronald L. Chrisley (1994). Taking embodiment seriously: Nonconceptual content and robotics.   (More)
• Philippe Chuard (2006). Demonstrative concepts without reidentification.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Conceptualist accounts of the representational content of perceptual experiences have it that a subject _S_ can experience no object, property, relation, etc., unless _S_ "i# possesses and "ii# exercises concepts for such object, property, or relation. Perceptual experiences, on such a view, represent the world in a way that is conceptual
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/v312521rj57448m3/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/V312521RJ57448M3.pdf
  
• Philippe Chuard (2007). The Riches of experience.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Suppose you see a red ball. Unless you happen to be in a psychologist
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com//content/imp/jcs/2007/00000014/F0020009/art00002
  
• Andy Clark (ms). Connectionism, nonconceptual content, and representational redescription.   (More)
• Tim Crane (1992). The nonconceptual content of experience.   (More)
• Adrian Cussins (1993). Nonconceptual content and the elimination of misonceived composites.   (More)
• Adrian Cussins (1990). The connectionist construction of concepts.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The character of computational modelling of cognition depends on an underlying theory of representation. Classical cognitive science has exploited the syntax/semantics theory of representation that derives from logic. But this has had the consequence that the kind of psychological explanation supported by classical cognitive science is

  _conceptualist_:

  psychological phenomena are modelled in terms of relations that hold between concepts, and between the sensors/effectors and concepts. This kind of explanation is inappropriate for the Proper Treatment of Connectionism (Smolensky 1988)
• J. Dokic (2001). Shades and concepts.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://hal.ccsd.cnrs.fr/docs/00/05/36/35/PDF/ijn_00000594_00.pdf
  http://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/docs/00/05/36/35/PDF/ijn_00000594_00.pdf
  http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/docs/00/05/36/35/PDF/ijn_00000594_00.pdf
  http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/docs/00/05/32/93/PDF/ijn_00000137_00.PDF
  http://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/documents/disk0/00/00/01/37/ijn_00000137_00/ijn_00000137_00.PDF
  http://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/documents/disk0/00/00/05/94/ijn_00000594_00/ijn_00000594_00.pdf
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/1467-8284.00294/pdf
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1467-8284.00294
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/anal/2001/00000061/00000271/art00004
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/anal/2001/00000061/00000271/art00294
  
• David Forman (2006). Learning and the Necessity of Non-Conceptual Content in Sellars's "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind".   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: For Sellars, the possibility of empirical knowledge presupposes the existence of "sense impressions" in the perceiver, i.e., non-conceptual states of perceptual consciousness. But this role for sense impressions does not implicate Sellars' account in the Myth of the Given: sense impressions do not stand in a justificatory relation to instances of perceptual knowledge; their existence is rather a condition for the possibility of the acquisition of empirical concepts. Sellars suggests that learning empirical concepts presupposes that we can remember certain past facts that we could not conceptualize at the time they obtained. And such memory presupposes, in turn, the existence of certain (past) non-conceptual sensory states that can be conceptualized
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/rodopi/pozs/2007/00000092/00000001/art00006
  
• Hannah Ginsborg (2006). Empirical concepts and the content of experience.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-0378.2006.00230.x
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/ejop/2006/00000014/00000003/art00002
  
• Stella Gonzalez Arnal (2006). Non-articulable content and the realm of reasons.   (More)
• York H. Gunther (2001). Content, illusion, partition.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Philosophers of mind have recently sought to establish a theoret- ical use for nonconceptual content. Although there is disagreement about what nonconceptual content is supposed to be, this much is clear. A state with nonconceptual content is mental. Hence, while one may deny that refrigerators and messy rooms have conceptual capacities, their states, as physical and not mental, do not have nonconceptual content. A state with nonconceptual content is also intentional, which is to say that it represents a feature of the world for a subject. It may be tempting to think of qualitative states as having nonconceptual content since they can be experienced by indi- viduals independently of their possession of the requisite concepts, e.g. someone could experience pains, itches or tingles without possessing the concept pain, itch or tingle. But on such a view, one would have to assume that qualitative states are representational since mental states cannot be candidates for nonconceptuality unless they have intentional properties.2
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=254434&PDF=1
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=254434&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/J7172022QP642685.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/phil/2001/00000102/00000002/00254434
  
• Robert Hanna (2005). Kant and nonconceptual content.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://spot.colorado.edu/~rhanna/kant_and_content.htm
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.0966-8373.2005.00229.x
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/ejop/2005/00000013/00000002/art00004
  
• Richard G. Heck (2007). Are there different kinds of content?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In an earlier paper, "Non-conceptual Content and the 'Space of Reasons'", I distinguished two forms of the view that perceptual content is non-conceptual, which I called the 'state view' and the 'content view'. On the latter, but not the former, perceptual states have a different kind of content than do cognitive states. Many have found it puzzling why anyone would want to make this claim and, indeed, what it might mean. This paper attempts to address these questions
• Richard G. Heck (2000). Nonconceptual content and the space of reasons.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://philreview.dukejournals.org/cgi/content/citation/109/4/483
  http://philreview.dukejournals.org/cgi/reprint/109/4/483
  http://kfddfdfddg
  
• Walter Hopp (forthcoming). Conceptualism and the myth of the given.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/121356096/PDFSTART
  
• Daniel D. Hutto (1998). Nonconceptual content and objectivity.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Aristotle once developed the difference between man and animal in the following way: animals can understand each other by indicating to each other what excites their desire so they can seek it, and what injures them, so they can flee from it. To men alone is logos given as well, so that they can make manifest to each other what is useful and harmful, and therefore what is right and wrong. A profound thesis. -- Gadamer, "Man and Language"
• Frode Kjosavik (2003). Perceptual intimacy and conceptual inadequacy: A Husserlian critique of McDowell's internalism.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.nlh.no/ios/Publikasjoner/s2003/s2003-17.html
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=Z4X9bVYupWMC&oi=fnd&pg=PA49&ots=EgeYVhmZ_b&sig=YNiELV4_RjuakOuTT0pFpwNkY9w
  
• Uriah Kriegel (2004). Perceptual experience, conscious content, and nonconceptual content.   (More)
• Alva Noe (ms). Perception, action, and nonconceptual content.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: profile deforms as we move about it. As perceivers we are masters of the patterns of sensorimotor contingency that shape our perceptual interaction with the world. We expect changes in such things as apparent size, shape and color to occur as we actively explore the environment. In encountering perspective-dependent changes of this sort, we learn how things are quite apart form our particular perspective. Our possession of these skills is constitutive of our ability to see (and generally to perceive). This is confirmed by the fact that we can disrupt a person
• Elisabeth Pacherie (2000). Levels of perceptual content.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/documents/disk0/00/00/02/45/ijn_00000245_00/ijn_00000245_00.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/r878814402m16l50/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/R878814402M16L50.pdf
  
• George S. Pappas (2003). On some philosophical accounts of perception.   (More)
• Ian Phillips (2005). Experience and Intentional Content.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Strong or Pure Intentionalism is the claim that the phenomenal character of any perceptual experience can be exhaustively characterized solely by reference to its Intentional content. Strong or Pure Anti -Intentionalism is the claim that the phenomenal character of any perceptual experience can be exhaustively characterized solely by reference to its non-Intentional properties
• Zenon W. Pylyshyn (ms). Visual indexes and nonconceptual reference.   (More)
• Susanna Schellenberg (2006). Sellarsian perspectives on perception and non-conceptual content.   (More)
• Robert Stalnaker (2003). What might nonconceptual content be?   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=1533-6077(1998)9<339:WMNCB>2.0.CO;2-X
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=1533-6077(1998)9<339:WMNCB>2.0.CO;2-X
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/1522983.pdf
  
• Josefa Toribio (2002). Perceptual experience and its contents.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.cogs.susx.ac.uk/research/paics/e-int/archives/2001-04-27.html
  
• Michael Tye (2006). Nonconceptual content, richness, and fineness of grain.   (More)
• Michael Tye (2005). On the nonconceptual content of experience.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: I suppose that substantive philosophical theses are much like second marriages. The philo- sophical thesis I wish to discuss in this paper is the thesis that experiences have nonconceptual content. I shall not attempt to argue that _all_ experiences have nonconceptual content nor that the only contents experiences have are nonconceptual. Instead, I want to ? esh out the thesis of nonconceptual content for experience in more detail than has been offered hithertofore and to provide a variety of motivations for the view
• Mark A. Wrathall (2005). Non-rational grounds and non-conceptual content.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://hrcak.srce.hr/index.php?show=clanak_download&id_clanak_jezik=3891
  
• Wayne Wright (2003). McDowell, demonstrative concepts, and nonconceptual representational content.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In giving an account of the content of perceptual experience, several authors, including Fred Dretske, Gareth Evans, Christopher Peacocke, and Michael Tye, have employed the notion of nonconceptual representational content.[1]
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://disputatio.com/articles/014-3.pdf
  http://www.mindstuff.net/mcddemonconc.html
  http://www.mindstuff.net/McDDemonConcWTW.doc
  http://www.mindstuff.net/McDDemonConcWTW.PDF
  http://www.mindstuff.net/McDDemonConcWTW.PDF
  

Color Experience

• David R. Hilbert & Alex Byrne (web). How do things look to the color blind?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: forthcoming in Color Ontology and Color Science, ed. J. Cohen and M. Matthen (MIT)
• David J. Chalmers (2006). Perception and the fall from Eden.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In the Garden of Eden, we had unmediated contact with the world. We were directly acquainted with objects in the world and with their properties. Objects were simply presented to us without causal mediation, and properties were revealed to us in their true intrinsic glory
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://consc.net/papers/eden.html
  http://www.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/papers/eden.html
  
• Paul M. Churchland (2005). Chimerical colors: Some phenomenological predictions from cognitive neuroscience.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The Hurvich-Jameson (H-J) opponent-process network offers a familiar account of the empirical structure of the phenomenological color space for humans, an account with a number of predictive and explanatory virtues. Its successes form the bulk of the existing reasons for suggesting a strict identity between our various color sensations on the one hand, and our various coding vectors across the color-opponent neurons in our primary visual pathways on the other. But anti-reductionists standardly complain that the systematic parallels discovered by the H-J network are just empirical correspondences, constructed post facto, with no predictive or explanatory purchase on the intrinsic characters of qualia proper. The present paper disputes that complaint, by illustrating that the H-J model yields some novel and unappreciated predictions, and some novel and unappreciated explanations, concerning the qualitative characters of a considerable variety of color sensations possible for human experience, color sensations that normal people have almost certainly never had before, color sensations whose accurate descriptions in ordinary language appear semantically ill-formed or even self-contradictory. Specifically, these "impossible" color sensations are activation-vectors (across our opponent-process neurons) that lie inside the space of neuronally possible activation-vectors, but outside the central 'color spindle' that confines the familiar range of sensations for possible objective colors. These extra-spindle chimerical-color sensations correspond to no reflective color that you will ever see objectively displayed on a physical object. But the H-J model both predicts their existence and explains their highly anomalous qualitative characters in some detail. It also suggests how to produce these rogue sensations by a simple procedure made available in the latter half of this paper. The relevant color plates will allow you to savor these sensations for yourself
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=bpjAkBrkmu4C&oi=fnd&pg=PA309&ots=JljTspK-Zz&sig=bPi-xVEVBkAvYyvHEx5l3S0Zl54
  http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/./ftinterface~content=a727182509~fulltext=713240930
  http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/index/L803131023766655.pdf
  http://www.informaworld.com/index/727182509.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/routledg/cphp/2005/00000018/00000005/art00001
  
• Justin C. Fisher (online). Color representations as hash values.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The goal of this paper is to answer the following question: When we have mental states that represent certain things as being colored, what properties are our mental states representing these things as having?
• Zoltan Jakab (2003). Phenomenal projection.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/v9/psyche-9-04-jakab.html
  
• Zolt Jakab (2006). Revelation and normativity in visual experience.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  https://muse.jhu.edu/demo/canadian_journal_of_philosophy/v036/36.1jakab.html
  http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/canadian_journal_of_philosophy/v036/36.1jakab.pdf
  https://muse.jhu.edu/journals/canadian_journal_of_philosophy/v036/36.1jakab.html
  
• Mark Eli Kalderon (2008). Metamerism, constancy, and knowing which.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: When Norm perceives a red tomato in his garden, Norm perceives the tomato and its sensible qualities
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://markelikalderon.com/wp-content/uploads/2007/02/metamerism.pdf
  http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/117/468/935
  
• Mark Eli Kalderon (online). The multiply qualitative.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://markelikalderon.com/wp-content/uploads/2007/02/selectionproblem.pdf
  
• Joseph Levine (2006). Color and color experience: Colors as ways of appearing.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In this paper I argue that color is a relational feature of the distal objects of perception, a way of appearing. I begin by outlining three constraints any theory of color should satisfy: (i) physicalism about the non-mental world, (ii) consistency with what is known from color science, and (iii) transparency about color experience. Traditional positions on the ontological status of color, such as physicalist reduction of color to spectral re?ectance, subjectivism, dispositional- ism, and primitivism, fail, I claim, to meet all three constraints. By treating color as a relational property, a way of appearing, the three constraints can be met. However, serious problems for this view emerge when considering the relation between illusory color experiences (particularly hallucinations) and veridical color experiences. I do not propose a solution to these problems
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1746-8361.2006.01056.x
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/dltc/2006/00000060/00000003/art00004
  
• Fiona Macpherson (2003). Novel colours and the content of experience.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: I propose a counterexample to naturalistic representational theories of phenomenal character. The counterexample is generated by experiences of novel colours reported by Crane and Piantanida. I consider various replies that a representationalist might make, including whether novel colours could be possible colours of objects and whether one can account for novel colours as one would account for binary colours or colour mixtures. I argue that none of these strategies is successful and therefore that one cannot fully explain the nature of the phenomenal character of perceptual experiences using a naturalistic conception of representation
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.gla.ac.uk/media/media_21949_en.pdf
  http://www.gla.ac.uk/philosophy/Personnel/Fiona/nc.pdf
  http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/archive/00000581/01/macpherson_ppq84.pdf
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/1468-0114.00162/enhancedabs/
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1468-0114.00162
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/papq/2003/00000084/00000001/art00004
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/papq/2003/00000084/00000001/art00162
  
• Adam Pautz (web). Can color structure be explained in terms of color experience?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Hardin argues that Reflectance Physicalism about color fails because it cannot accommodate color structure. David Lewis and others have replied that the Reflectance Physicalist may explain color structure in terms of color experience. I argue that this reply fails
• Sydney Shoemaker (2006). On the way things appear.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=WUW3sLZ9tIAC&oi=fnd&pg=PA461&ots=I0WFpBw5kw&sig=C-dp1CGlSiowuFuHyZR4hXJgcuc
  
• Susanna Siegel (ms). Comments on David Chalmers' "perception and the fall from Eden".   (More)
• Brad J. Thompson (2006). Color constancy and Russellian representationalism.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Representationalism, the view that phenomenal character supervenes on intentional content, has attracted a wide following in recent years. Most representationalists have also endorsed what I call 'standard Russellianism'. According to standard Russellianism, phenomenal content is Russellian in nature, and the properties represented by perceptual experiences are mind-independent physical properties. I argue that standard Russellianism conflicts with the everyday experience of colour constancy. Due to colour constancy, standard Russellianism is unable to simultaneously give a proper account of the phenomenal content of colour experience and do justice to its phenomenology
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://faculty.smu.edu/bthompso/colorconstancy.html
  http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/./ftinterface~content=a743879523~fulltext=713240930
  http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/index/K4L115G818041722.pdf
  http://www.informaworld.com/index/743879523.pdf
  
• Evan Thompson (1995). Colour vision, evolution, and perceptual content.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: b>. Computational models of colour vision assume that the biological function of colour vision is to detect surface reflectance. Some philosophers invoke these models as a basis for 'externalism' about perceptual content (content is distal) and 'objectivism' about colour (colour is surface reflectance). In an earlier article (Thompson et al. 1992), I criticized the 'computational objectivist' position on the basis of comparative colour vision: There are fundmental differences among the colour vision of animals and these differences do not converge on the detection of any single type of environmental property. David R. Hilbert (1992) has recently defended computational objectivism against my 'comparative argument;' his arguments are based on the externalist approach to perceptual content originally developed by Mohan Matthen (1988) and on the computationally inspired theory of the evolutionary basis for trichromacy developed by Roger N. Shepard (1990). The present article provides a reply to Hilbert with extensive criticism of both Matthen's and Shepard's theories. I argue that the biological function of colour vision is not to detect surface reflectance, but to provide a set of perceptual categories that can apply to objects in a stable way in a variety of conditions. Comparative research indicates that both the perceptual categories and the distal stimuli will differ according to the animal and its visual ecology; therefore externalism and objectivism must be rejected
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/j022545851375504/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/J022545851375504.pdf
  
• Wayne Wright (2003). Projectivist representationalism and color.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This paper proposes a subjectivist approach to color within the framework of an externalist form of representationalism about phenomenal consciousness. Motivations are presented for accepting both representationalism and color subjectivism, and an argument is offered against the case made by Michael Tye on behalf of the claim that colors are objective, physical properties of objects. In the face of the considerable difficulties associated with finding a workable realist theory of color, the alternative account of color experience set out, projectivist representationalism, claims that the color properties we encounter in experience exist only in the representational contents of our experiences. Color experiences are caused by the physical structure of objects, but objects are never actually colored and color experiences systematically misrepresent objects as colored. However, despite being an error theory of color, projectivist representationalism does not do violence to our everyday use and understanding of color concepts and terms, nor does it undermine the role of color experience in aiding the perceiving subject in navigating through the world
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.mindstuff.net/ProjReprColorDraft.PDF
  http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/./ftinterface~content=a713629985~fulltext=713240930
  http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/index/MVFFBRX8KDQ28W8E.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/routledg/cphp/2003/00000016/00000004/art00003
  

Spatial Experience

• Bill Brewer (1992). Unilateral neglect and the objectivity of spatial representation.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Patients may show a more-or-less complete deviation of the head and eyes towards the right (ipsilesional) side [that is, to the same side of egocentric space as the brain lesion responsible for their disorder]. If addressed by the examiner from the left (contralesional) side [the opposite side to their lesion], patients with severe extrapersonal neglect may fail to respond or may look for the speaker in the right side of the room, turning head and eyes more and more to the right. Frequently these patients will not pick up food from the left half of the plate. Given a crossword puzzle, they may complete only the squares to the right. If walking is not prevented by hemiparesis, neglect patients may lose their bearings, since they do not make use of left sided cues
• Robert Briscoe (2008). Vision, action, and make-perceive.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Abstract:  In this paper, I critically assess the enactive account of visual perception recently defended by Alva Noë (2004). I argue inter alia that the enactive account falsely identifies an object's apparent shape with its 2D perspectival shape; that it mistakenly assimilates visual shape perception and volumetric object recognition; and that it seriously misrepresents the constitutive role of bodily action in visual awareness. I argue further that noticing an object's perspectival shape involves a hybrid experience combining both perceptual and imaginative elements—an act of what I call 'make-perceive'
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://phonline.org/paper.php?keynum=902
  http://cogprints.org/5781/1/VAMP.MS397.pdf
  http://chn.loyno.edu/philosophy/bios/documents/VAMP.MS397.pdf
  http://chn.loyno.edu/philosophy/bios/documents/VAMP.MS397.doc
  http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/121387369/PDFSTART
  
• Quassim Cassam (2005). Space and objective experience.   (More)
• Austen Clark (online). Location, location, location.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Forthcoming in Lana Trick & Don Dedrick (eds.), Cognition, Computation, and Pylyshyn. MIT Press. Presented at the Zenon Pylyshyn Conference (ZenCon), University of Guelph, 1 May 2005
• Rick Grush (1998). Skill and spatial content.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: [1] It is well-known that Evans laid the groundwork for a truly radical and fruitful theory of _content_ -- a theory according to which content is a genus with at least conceptual and nonconceptual varieties as species, and in which nonconceptual content plays a very significant role. It is less well-recognized that Evans was also in the process of working out the details of a truly radical and groundbreaking theory of _representation_, a task he was unfortunately unable to bring to any satisfactory stage of fruition. I am here drawing the distinction between a theory of
• Rick Grush (2000). Self, world and space: The meaning and mechanisms of ego- and allocentric spatial representation.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: b>: The problem of how physical systems, such as brains, come to represent themselves as subjects in an objective world is addressed. I develop an account of the requirements for this ability that draws on and refines work in a philosophical tradition that runs from Kant through Peter Strawson to Gareth Evans. The basic idea is that the ability to represent oneself as a subject in a world whose existence is independent of oneself involves the ability to represent space, and in particular, to represent oneself as one object among others in an objective spatial realm. In parallel, I provide an account of how this ability, and the mechanisms that support it, are realized neurobiologically. This aspect of the article draws on, and refines, work done in the neurobiology and psychology of egocentric and allocentric spatial representation
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/u498k42km1u3230l/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=256895&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/U498K42KM1U3230L.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/bram/2000/00000001/00000001/00256895
  
• Gary Hatfield (2003). Representation and constraints: The inverse problem and the structure of visual space.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Visual space can be distinguished from physical space. The ?rst is found in visual experi- ence, while the second is de?ned independently of perception. Theorists have wondered about the relation between the two. Some investigators have concluded that visual space is non- Euclidean, and that it does not have a single metric structure. Here it is argued (1) that visual space exhibits contraction in all three dimensions with increasing distance from the observer, (2) that experienced features of this contraction (including the apparent convergence of lines in visual experience that are produced from physically parallel stimuli in ordinary viewing con- ditions) are not the same as would be the experience of a perspective projection onto a fronto- parallel plane, and (3) that such contraction is consistent with size constancy. These properties of visual space are di?erent from those that would be predicted if spatial perception resulted from the successful solution of the inverse problem. They are consistent with the notion that optical constraints have been internalized. More generally, they are also consistent with the notion that visual spatial structures bear a resemblance relation to physical spatial structures. This notion supports a type of representational relation that is distinct from mere causal cor- respondence. The reticence of some philosophers and psychologists to discuss the structure of phenomenal space is diagnosed in terms of the simple materialism and the functionalism of the 1970s and 1980s.
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.nici.kun.nl/~peterh/reprints/actaspecial/hatfield.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=14670704&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/sites/entrez?db=pubmed&uid=14670704&cmd=showdetailview&indexed=google
  http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0001691803000957
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/00016918/2003/00000114/00000003/art00095
  
• Benj Hellie (ms). Visual form, attention, and binocularity.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This somewhat odd paper argues against a representational view of visual experience using an intricate "inversion" type thought experiment involving double vision: two subjects could represent external space in the same way while differing phenomenally due to different "spread" in their double images. The spatial structure of the visual field is explained not by representation of external space but functionally, in terms of the possible locations of an attentional spotlight. I'm fond of the ideas in this paper but doubt I'll be returning to it soon.
• Pete Mandik (2005). Phenomenal consciousness and the allocentric-egocentric interface.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: I propose and defend the Allocentric-Egocentric Interface Theory of Con- sciousness. Mental processes form a hierarchy of mental representations with maxi- mally egocentric (self-centered) representations at the bottom and maximally allocentric (other-centered) representations at the top. Phenomenally conscious states are states that are relatively intermediate in this hierarchy. More speci
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.petemandik.com/philosophy/papers/zif.pdf
  
• Pete Mandik (1999). Qualia, space, and control.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: According to representionalists, qualia-the introspectible properties of sensory experience-are exhausted by the representational contents of experience. Representationalists typically advocate an informational psychosemantics whereby a brain state represents one of its causal antecedents in evolutionarily determined optimal circumstances. I argue that such a psychosemantics may not apply to certain aspects of our experience, namely, our experience of space in vision, hearing, and touch. I offer that these cases can be handled by supplementing informational psychosemantics with a procedural psychosemantics whereby a representation is about its effects instead of its causes. I discuss conceptual and empirical points that favor a procedural representationalism for our experience of space
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/mandik99qualia.html
  http://www.petemandik.com/philosophy/papers/qsc.pdf
  http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/./ftinterface~content=a713690369~fulltext=713240930
  http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/index/JGB66KUYJTG37HVF.pdf
  http://www.informaworld.com/index/JGB66KUYJTG37HVF.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/routledg/cphp/1999/00000012/00000001/art00003
  
• Casey O'Callaghan (forthcoming). Perceiving the locations of sounds.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Frequently, we learn of the locations of things and events in our environment by means of hearing. Hearing, I argue, is a locational mode of perceiving with a robustly spatial nature. I defend three proposals. First, audition furnishes information about the locations of things and events in one's environment because auditory experience itself is spatial. Audition represents space. Second, we hear the locations of things and events by or in hearing locational information about their sounds. Third, we auditorily experience sounds themselves as having relatively stable distal locations. I reject skepticism about spatial audition tracing to Strawson's Individuals, and suggest that spatial audition supports the view that audition and vision share a dimension of perceptual content
• Casey O'Callaghan (ms). The locations of sounds.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: When you hear the sound of a car drive by on the street outside your window, you learn not only whether the car has a hole in its muffler or has squealing brakes. You also learn something about the location of the car because hearing furnishes information about the locations of its objects. By listening, you learn not only about the character of the things and happenings around you, but also about where they are in the surrounding environment. The question I wish to address is this: Do we hear the locations of sounds themselves, or do we merely hear the locations of sound sources—the objects and events that produce sounds? I shall argue that frequently we do hear the locations of sounds themselves, and that this is required in order to hear and learn the locations of sound-producing sources. This feature of auditory experience has consequences for the metaphysics of sounds. If we veridically hear the locations of sounds, then the most prominent conception of sounds is mistaken and we must revise our ontology
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://ocallaghan.rice.edu/research/papers/Locations.pdf
  
• Susanna Schellenberg (2007). Action and self-location in perception.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: I offer an explanation of how subjects are able to perceive the intrinsic spatial properties of objects, given that subjects always perceive from a particular location. The argument proceeds in two steps. First, I argue that a conception of space is necessary to perceive the intrinsic spatial properties of objects. This conception of space is spelled out by showing that perceiving intrinsic properties requires perceiving objects as the kind of things that are perceivable from other locations. Second, I show that having such a conception of space presupposes that a subject represent her location in relation to perceived objects. More precisely the thesis is that a subject represents her location as the location from which she both perceives objects and would act in relation to objects were she to act. So I argue that perception depends on the capacity to know what it would be to act in relation to objects
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/463/603
  http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/116/463/603
  

The Experience of Objects

• Kent Bach (online). Searle against the world: How can experiences find their objects?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Here's an old question in the philosophy of perception: here I am, looking at this pen [I hold up a pen in my hand]. Presumably I really am seeing this pen. Even so, I could be having an experience just like the one I am having without anything being there. So how can the experience I am having really involve direct awareness of the pen? It seems as though the presence of the pen is inessential to the way the experience is
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://userwww.sfsu.edu/~kbach/Searle.html
  
• Austen Clark (2004). Feature-placing and proto-objects.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This paper contrasts three different schemes of reference relevant to understanding systems of perceptual representation: a location-based system dubbed "feature-placing", a system of "visual indices" referring to things called "proto-objects", and the full sortal-based individuation allowed by a natural language. The first three sections summarize some of the key arguments (in Clark, 2000) to the effect that the early, parallel, and pre-attentive registration of sensory features itself constitutes a simple system of nonconceptual mental representation. In particular, feature integration--perceiving something as being both F and G, where F and G are sensible properties registered in distinct parallel streams--requires a referential apparatus. Section V. reviews some grounds for thinking that at these earliest levels this apparatus is location-based: that it has a direct and nonconceptual means of picking out places. Feature-placing is contrasted with a somewhat more sophisticated system that can identify and track four or five "perceptual objects" or "proto-objects", independently of their location, for as long as they remain perceptible. Such a system is found in Zenon Pylyshyn's fascinating work on "visual indices", in Dana Ballard's notion of deictic codes, and in Kahneman, Treisman, and Wolfe's accounts of systems of evanescent representations they call "object files". Perceptual representation is a layered affair, and I argue that it probably includes both feature-placing and proto-objects. Finally, both nonconceptual systems are contrasted with the full-blooded individuation allowed in a natural language
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/courses/representation/papers/Clark.pdf
  http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/courses/representation/papers/Clark_2col.pdf
  http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/./ftinterface~content=a713997456~fulltext=713240930
  http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/index/VRYD00AUKDL45Y03.pdf
  http://www.informaworld.com/index/VRYD00AUKDL45Y03.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/routledg/cphp/2004/00000017/00000004/art00001
  
• Jonathan Cohen (2004). Objects, places, and perception.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In Clark (2000), Austen Clark argues convincingly that a widespread view of perception as a complicated kind of feature-extraction is incomplete. He argues that perception has another crucial representational ingredient: it must also involve the representation of "sensory individuals" that exemplify sensorily extracted features. Moreover, he contends, the best way of understanding sensory individuals takes them to be places in space surrounding the perceiver. In this paper, I'll agree with Clark's case for sensory individuals (
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://repositories.cdlib.org/postprints/646/
  http://aardvark.ucsd.edu/perception/clark.pdf
  http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2229&context=postprints
  http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/./ftinterface~content=a713997454~fulltext=713240930
  http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/index/L9TY67YMP01DNUXL.pdf
  http://www.informaworld.com/index/L9TY67YMP01DNUXL.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/routledg/cphp/2004/00000017/00000004/art00002
  
• Michael G. F. Martin (2002). Particular thoughts and singular thought.   (More)
• Zenon W. Pylyshyn (2001). Connecting vision with the world: Tracking the missing link.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: You might reasonably surmise from the title of this paper that I will be discussing a theory of vision. After all, what is a theory of vision but a theory of how the world is connected to our visual representations? Theories of visual perception universally attempt to give an account of how a proximal stimulus (presumably a pattern impinging on the retina) can lead to a rich representation of a three dimensional world and thence to either the recognition of known objects or to the coordination of actions with visual information. Such theories typically provide an effective (i.e., computable) mapping from a 2D pattern to a representation of a 3D scene, usually in the form of a symbol structure. But such a mapping, though undoubtedly the essential purpose of a theory of vision, leaves at least one serious problem that I intend to discuss here. It is this problem, rather than a theory of vision itself, that is the subject of this talk
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://ruccs.rutgers.edu/pub/papers/lisbon.pdf
  http://ruccs.rutgers.edu/ftp/pub/papers/lisbon.pdf
  http://ruccs.rutgers.edu/ftp/pub/papers/lisbon.pdf
  http://www.perceptionweb.com/abstract.cgi?id=v030786
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=Q-Je_1uJWigC&oi=fnd&pg=PA183&ots=dcNVYE5B0w&sig=fQgyfhp2kSYeKsbK0AbwwMFccdk
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=QJcvqs3lYyoC&oi=fnd&pg=PA183&dq=Connecting+vision+with+the+world+Pylyshyn&ots=ibDldLflzh&sig=O3GYEt9ylq9KNVtoxsJme99Myuk
  
• Zenon W. Pylyshyn (2001). Visual indexes, preconceptual objects, and situated vision.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This paper argues that a theory of situated vision, suited for the dual purposes of object recognition and the control of action, will have to provide something more than a system that constructs a conceptual representation from visual stimuli: it will also need to provide a special kind of direct (preconceptual, unmediated) connection between elements of a visual representation and certain elements in the world. Like natural language demonstratives (such as `this' or `that') this direct connection allows entities to be referred to without being categorized or conceptualized. Several reasons are given for why we need such a preconcep- tual mechanism which individuates and keeps track of several individual objects in the world. One is that early vision must pick out and compute the relation among several individual objects while ignoring their properties. Another is that incrementally computing and updating representations of a dynamic scene requires keeping track of token individuals despite changes in their properties or locations. It is then noted that a mechanism meeting these requirements has already been proposed in order to account for a number of disparate empiri- cal phenomena, including subitizing, search-subset selection and multiple object tracking (Pylyshyn et al., Canadian Journal of Experimental Psychology 48(2) (1994) 260). This mechanism, called a visual index or FINST, is brie
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://ruccs.rutgers.edu/ftp/pub/papers/cognition2001-reprint.pdf
  http://taylor0.biology.ucla.edu/al/resource/reference/pylyshyn.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=pubmed&list_uids=11245842&dopt=citation
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=11245842&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/00100277/2001/00000080/00000001/art00156
  
• Athanassios Raftopoulos (2006). The phenomenal content of experience.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: We discuss in some length evidence from the cognitive science suggesting that the representations of objects based on spatiotemporal information and featural information retrieved bottomup from a visual scene precede representations of objects that include conceptual information. We argue that a distinction can be drawn between representations with conceptual and nonconceptual content. The distinction is based on perceptual mechanisms that retrieve information in conceptually unmediated ways. The representational contents of the states induced by these mechanisms that are available to a type of awareness called phenomenal awareness constitute the phenomenal content of experience. The phenomenal content of perception contains the existence of objects as separate things that persist in time and time, spatiotemporal information, and information regarding relative spatial relations, motion, surface properties, shape, size, orientation, color, and their functional properties
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/mila/2006/00000021/00000002/art00003
  http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/118581801/PDFSTART
  
• Susanna Schellenberg (2007). Action and self-location in perception.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: I offer an explanation of how subjects are able to perceive the intrinsic spatial properties of objects, given that subjects always perceive from a particular location. The argument proceeds in two steps. First, I argue that a conception of space is necessary to perceive the intrinsic spatial properties of objects. This conception of space is spelled out by showing that perceiving intrinsic properties requires perceiving objects as the kind of things that are perceivable from other locations. Second, I show that having such a conception of space presupposes that a subject represent her location in relation to perceived objects. More precisely the thesis is that a subject represents her location as the location from which she both perceives objects and would act in relation to objects were she to act. So I argue that perception depends on the capacity to know what it would be to act in relation to objects
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/116/463/603
  http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/116/463/603
  
• Susanna Siegel (online). Particularity and presence in visual perception.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: What is the difference between perception and mere sensation? Take a typical perceptual experience, such as an experience of seeing a fish or a table, and a merely sensory experience, such as the experience of
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~ssiegel/papers/msocproofs.pdf
  http://philreview.dukejournals.org/cgi/reprint/115/3/355
  
• Susanna Siegel (2002). Review of A Theory of Sentience, by Austen Clark.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: First, what it is for a sentient being to sense is for it to employ two distinct capacities: one for representing places-at-times; the other for representing "features" (60, cf. 70). Exercised together, the result is akin to feature-placing, which brings us to the second thesis: what sensory systems represent is that features are instantiated at place-times. Accordingly, sensory systems do not, for instance, attribute properties to objects, such as trees, tables, bodies, or persons (163)
• Susanna Siegel (2005). Subject and object in the contents of visual experience.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: What is the difference between perception and mere sensation? Take a typical perceptual experience, such as an experience of seeing a fish or a table, and a merely sensory experience, such as the experience of ‘seeing stars’ or of enjoying a red phosphene (a phosphene is a kind of afterimage). One difference between these experiences is that in the first case, there is an external object that one sees. But this difference is not the only difference. On the face of it, typical perceptual experiences and mere sensations also differ in their phenomenal character. How can this difference be understood?
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~ssiegel/papers/ppvpO04.htm
  http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~ssiegel/papers/msocproofs.pdf
  http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~ssiegel/papers/msocproofs.pdf
  http://philreview.dukejournals.org/cgi/content/citation/115/3/355
  http://philreview.dukejournals.org/cgi/reprint/115/3/355
  
• Alan Thomas (online). Perceptual knowledge, representation and imagination.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The focus of this paper will be on the problem of perceptual presence and on a solution to this problem pioneered by Kant [1781; 1783] and refined by Sellars [Sellars, 1978] and Strawson [Strawson, 1971]. The problem of perceptual presence is that of explaining how our perceptual experience of the world gives us a robust sense of the presence of objects in perception over and above those sensory aspects of the object given in perception. Objects possess other properties which are, one might say, phenomenologically present even though they are admittedly sensorily absent. The general form of the solution to this problem that Kant developed seems to me to be a neglected resource in contemporary work on perceptual consciousness. Kant solves the problem of perceptual presence by appealing to that which he called the productive use of the imagination. This faculty of mind supplies schematic representations of the object of perception that explains a phenomenological sense of perceptual presence even of those features that are not, in a sense to be further clarified,

The Experience of High-Level Properties

• Riccardo Luccio & Donata Milloni (2004). Perception of causality: A dynamical analysis.   (More)
• Ian Phillips (online). Perception and context.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: I develop a seeming antinomy in relation to the question, Do natural kind properties, strictly speaking, characterize the phenomenology of experience? Or, in Peacockean terms, Are natural kind concepts observational? On the one hand, na
• Jesse J. Prinz (2006). Beyond appearances: The content of sensation and perception.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: There seems to be a large gulf between percepts and concepts. In particular, con- cepts seem to be capable of representing things that percepts cannot. We can conceive of things that would be impossible to perceive. (The converse may also seem true, but I will leave that to one side.) In one respect, this is trivially right. We can conceive of things that we cannot encounter, such as unicorns. We cannot literally perceive unicorns, even if we occasionally
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=paqmMMfP8t0C&oi=fnd&pg=PA434&ots=_ol_BkrzBN&sig=zfUzmJ1ACP__8z5Fzqg5RZFXkqY
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=WUW3sLZ9tIAC&oi=fnd&pg=PA434&ots=I0WFpJu8kx&sig=0I74OWnDgtjtHBs7bm62OoUx5Wk
  
• Susanna Siegel (ms). Misperception.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In discussions of perception and its provision of knowledge, it is common to distinguish what one comes to believe on the basis of perception from the distinctively perceptual basis of one's belief. The distinction can be drawn in terms of propositional contents: there are the contents that a perceiver would normally come to believe on the basis of her perception, on the one hand; and there are the contents properly attributed to perception itself, on the other. Consider the content
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~ssiegel/papers/msp/msp5_02.html
  
• Susanna Siegel (forthcoming). The visual experience of causation.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: How is causation represented in the mind? We often believe that one event has caused another. But can we visually experience two things as causally related? If so, then experiences represent causation. A different question in the vicinity is whether we can ever see that something is causing (or has just caused) something else to happen. In the relevant sense of ‘seeing’ here, seeing is factive – you can see that p only if p. By contrast, experiential representation of properties or relations is not factive, so you can represent that p even if p is not true
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~ssiegel/papers/mscmay06.html
  http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~ssiegel/papers/Siegel_Causation.pdf
  http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/121596730/PDFSTART
  
• Susanna Siegel (2006). Which properties are represented in perception?   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=paqmMMfP8t0C&oi=fnd&pg=PA481&ots=_ol_BkstEK&sig=TKVvhdgHEq_g7Im6rGbcMiYsBFo
  

The Contents of Perception, Misc

• John L. Bell (2000). Continuity and the logic of perception.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: If we imagine a chess-board with alternate blue and red squares, then this is something in which the individual red and blue areas allow themselves to be distinguished from each other in juxtaposition, and something similar holds also if we imagine each of the squares divided into four smaller squares also alternating between these two colours. If, however, we were to continue with such divisions until we had exceeded the boundary of noticeability for the individual small squares which result, then it would no longer be possible to apprehend the individual red and blue areas in their respective positions. But would we then see nothing at all? Not in the least; rather we would see the whole chessboard as violet, i.e. apprehend it as something that participates simultaneously in red and blue
• David J. Chalmers (2006). Perception and the fall from Eden.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In the Garden of Eden, we had unmediated contact with the world. We were directly acquainted with objects in the world and with their properties. Objects were simply presented to us without causal mediation, and properties were revealed to us in their true intrinsic glory
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://consc.net/papers/eden.html
  http://www.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/papers/eden.html
  
• John B. Dilworth (2005). The double content of perception.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Clearly we can perceive both objects, and various aspects or appearances of those objects. But how should that complexity of perceptual content be explained or analyzed? I argue that perceptual representations normally have a double or two level nested structure of content, so as to adequately incorporate information both about contextual aspects Y(X) of an object X, and about the object X itself. On this double content (DC) view, perceptual processing starts with aspectual data Y?(X?) as a higher level of content, which data does not itself provide lower level X-related content, but only an aspectually encoded form of such data. Hence the relevant perceptual data Y?(X?) must be
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/g5445x30v2t81350/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=5253108&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/G5445X30V2T81350.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/synt/2005/00000146/00000003/00006209
  
• John B. Dilworth (2005). The twofold orientational structure of perception.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: I argue that perceptual content involves representations both of aspects of objects, and of objects themselves, whether at the level of conscious perception, or of low-level perceptual processing - a double content structure. I present an 'orientational' theory of the relations of the two kinds of perceptual content, which can accommodate both the general semantic possibility of perceptual misrepresentation, and also species of it involving characteristic perceptual confusions of aspectual and intrinsic content. The resulting theoretical structure is argued to be a broadly methodological or logical one, rather than a substantive theory that is open to empirical refutation
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://homepages.wmich.edu/~dilworth/The_Twofold_Orientational_Structure_of_Perception.pdf
  http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/./ftinterface~content=a713997476~fulltext=713240930
  http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/index/K04WW38444V64337.pdf
  http://www.informaworld.com/index/713997476.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/routledg/cphp/2005/00000018/00000002/art00003
  
• J. Dokic (1998). The ontology of perception: Bipolarity and content.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/docs/00/05/33/95/PDF/ijn_00000277_00.pdf
  http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/docs/00/05/33/95/PDF/ijn_00000277_00.pdf
  http://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/documents/disk0/00/00/02/77/ijn_00000277_00/ijn_00000277_00.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/t30547n48814v755/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=167060&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/T30547N48814V755.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/erke/1998/00000048/F0020002/00167060
  
• Simon Prosser (forthcoming). The two-dimensional content of consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In this paper I put forward a representationalist theory of conscious experience based on Robert Stalnaker
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/~sjp7/The two dimensional content of consciousness.pdf
  http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/~sjp7/The two dimensional content of consciousness (draft 1).pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/l45321u169680433/fulltext.pdf
  
• Susanna Siegel (2007). How can we discover the contents of experience?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In this paper I discuss several proposals for how to find out which contents visual experiences have, and I defend the method I
• Susanna Siegel (online). The contents of perception.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~ssiegel/papers/SIEGEL_SAGE.htm
  http://phonline.org/paper.php?keynum=295
  http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/perception-contents/
  
• Konrad Talmont-Kaminski & John D. Collier (2004). Saving the distinctions: Distinctions as the epistemologically significant content of experience.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: To account for a perceived distinction it is necessary to postulate a real distinction. Our process of experiencing the world is one of, mostly unconscious, interpretation of observed distinctions to provide us with a partial world-picture that is sufficient to guide action. The distinctions, themselves, are acorrigible (they do not have a truth value), directly perceived, structured, and capable of being interpreted. Interpreted experience is corrigible, representational and capable of guiding action. Since interpretation is carried out mostly unconsciously and in real time, the two aspects are present in experience together so that it is difficult to separate them out
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://bacon.umcs.lublin.pl/~ktalmont/pdf/Save distinctions.pdf
  
• Brad J. Thompson (2009). Senses for senses.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: If two subjects have phenomenally identical experiences, there is an important sense in which the way the world appears to them is precisely the same. But how are we to understand this notion of 'ways of appearing'? Most philosophers who have acknowledged the existence of phenomenal content have held that the way something appears is simply a matter of the properties something appears to have. On this view, the way something appears is simply the way something appears to be . This identification supports a Russellian theory of phenomenal content, according to which phenomenal content is exhausted by facts about what specific properties are represented by an experience. The present paper motivates and develops an alternative Fregean theory of phenomenal colour content. According to Fregean theories, the phenomenal content that is shared by any two phenomenally identical experiences is a matter of how the world is represented, and need not involve sameness in what is represented. It is argued that ways of appearing are modes of presentations of external properties and objects, and a detailed theory is presented about the nature of the modes of presentation involved in colour experience
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/./ftinterface~content=a905325479~fulltext=713240930
  

Sensory Modalities

Distinguishing the Senses

• Louw Feenstra & Johannes Borgstein (2003). The senses in perspective.   (More)
• Richard Gray (2005). On the concept of a sense.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Keeley has recently argued that the philosophical issue of how to analyse the concept of a sense can usefully be addressed by considering how scientists, and more specifically neuroethologists, classify the senses. After briefly outlining his proposal, which is based on the application of an ordered set of individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for modality differentiation, I argue, by way of two complementary counterexamples, that it fails to account fully for the way the senses are in fact individuated in neuroethology and other relevant sciences. I suggest substantial modifications to Keeley
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/P2V3W4134469106V.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/synt/2005/00000147/00000003/00001334
  
• Brian L. Keeley (2002). Making sense of the senses: Individuating modalities in humans and other animals.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://mugwump.pitzer.edu/~bkeeley/work/PUBS/msos/msos.pdf
  http://mugwump.pitzer.edu/~bkeeley/work/PUBS/msos/MSOS_PAP.HTM
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-362X(200201)99:1<5:MSOTSI>2.0.CO;2-M
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3655759.pdf
  
• Matthew Nudds (online). Is seeing just like feeling? Kinds of experiences and the five senses.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In this paper I am going to argue that two commonly held views about perceptual experience are incompatible and that one must be given up. The first is the view that the five senses are to be distinguished by appeal to the kind of experiences involved in perception; the second is the view
• Matthew Nudds (online). The senses as psychological kinds.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The distinction we make between five different senses is a universal one.¹ Rather than speaking of generically perceiving something, we talk of perceiving in one of five determinate ways: we see, hear, touch, smell, and taste things. In distinguishing determinate ways of perceiving things what are we distinguishing between? What, in other words, is a sense modality?² An answer to this question must tell us what constitutes a sense modality and so needs to do more than simply describe differences in virtue of which we can distinguish the perceptions of different senses. There are many such differences
• Matthew Nudds (2004). The significance of the senses.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Standard accounts of the senses attempt to answer the question how and why we count ?ve senses (the counting question); none of the standard accounts is satisfactory. Any adequate account of the senses must explain the signi?cance of the senses, that is, why distinguishing different senses matters. I provide such an explanation, and then use it as the basis for providing an account of the senses and answering the counting question
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/j.0066-7373.2004.00080.x/abs/
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/1467-9264.t01-1-00002/pdf
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.0066-7373.2004.00080.x
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1467-9264.t01-1-00002
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/paso/2003/00000104/00000001/art00002
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/supa/2004/00000105/00000001/art00002
  
• John O'Dea (forthcoming). A Proprioceptive Account of the Senses.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Representationalist theories of sensory experience are often thought to be vulnerable to the existence of apparently non-representational differences between experiences in different sensory modalities. Seeing and hearing seem to differ in their qualia, quite apart from what they represent. The origin of this idea is perhaps Grice’s argument, in “Some Remarks on the Senses,” that the senses are distinguished by “introspectible character.” In this chapter I take the Representationalist side by putting forward an account of sense modalities which is consistent with that view and yet pays due regard to the intuition behind Grice’s argument. Employing J.J. Gibson’s distinction between exploratory and performatory behaviour, I point to a proprioceptive element in perceptual experience, and identify this as crucial in any account of what makes a particular way of perceiving a sense modality.
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://jodea.net/papers/senses-experience.html
  
• Peter W. Ross (2008). Common sense about qualities and senses.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: There has been some recent optimism that addressing the question of how we distinguish sensory modalities will help us consider whether there are limits on a scientific understanding of perceptual states. For example, Block has suggested that the way we distinguish sensory modalities indicates that perceptual states have qualia which at least resist scientific characterization. At another extreme, Keeley argues that our common-sense way of distinguishing the senses in terms of qualitative properties is misguided, and offers a scientific eliminativism about common-sense modalities which avoids appeal to qualitative properties altogether. I’ll argue contrary to Keeley that qualitative properties are necessary for distinguishing senses, and contrary to Block that our common-sense distinction doesn’t indicate that perceptual states have qualia. A non-qualitative characterization of perceptual states isn’t needed to avoid the potential limit on scientific understanding imposed by qualia
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/18113h050r0x0185/fulltext.pdf
  
• P. Ross (2001). Qualia and the senses.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://web.gc.cuny.edu/cogsci/private/ross-qualia-senses.pdf
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/1467-9213.00243/enhancedabs/
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8094(200110)51:205<495:QATS>2.0.CO;2-U
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8094(200110)51:205<495:QATS>2.0.CO;2-U
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1467-9213.00243
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3543030.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/phiq/2001/00000051/00000205/art00005
  

Vision

• Paul M. Churchland (1995). Machine stereopsis: A feedforward network for fast stereo vision with movable fusion plane.   (More)
• Austen Clark (1996). Three varieties of visual field.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The goal of this paper is to challenge the rather insouciant attitude that many investigators seem to adopt when they go about describing the items and events in their "visual fields". There are at least three distinct categories of interpretation of what these reports might mean, and only under one of those categories do those reports have anything resembling an observational character. The others demand substantive revisions in one's beliefs about what one sees. The ur-concept of a "visual field" is that of the "sum of things seen", but one can interpret the latter in very different ways. The first is the "field of view", or the sum of physical things seen. The second is an array of visual impressions, whose spatial relations are distinct from those of physical phenomena in front of the eyes. The third is an intentional object: the world as it is represented visually. These three categories are described, and various locutions of vision science--such as "optic array", "retinocentric space", "visual geometry", "virtual object" and others--are analyzed and variously located within them. Finally, a recent argument purporting to necessitate the existence of a version two visual field is examined and shown wanting
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://selfpace.uconn.edu/paper/ClarkAusVisall5.pdf
  
• John B. Dilworth (2002). Varieties of visual representation.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Pictorial representation is one species of visual representation--but not the only one, I argue. There are three additional varieties or species of visual representation--namely 'structural', 'aspect' and 'integrative' representation--which together comprise a category of 'delineative' rather than depictive visual representation. I arrive at this result via consideration of previously neglected orientational factors that serve to distinguish the two categories. I conclude by arguing that pictures (unlike 'delineations') are not physical objects, and that their multiplicity and modal narrowness motivates a view of them as instead being (one kind of) 'delineatively' represented content or subject matter, as represented by those objects that are (commonly but wrongly, in my view) assumed to be pictures
• Vadim D. Glezer (1989). Vision and mind.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=jmPO2RpoG-kC&oi=fnd&pg=PR7&dq=+Vision+and+mind+Glezer&ots=xGlbLrXyFN&sig=OgwUY1UFR41ZyG5YE_Ke621xzng
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=jmPO2RpoG-kC&oi=fnd&pg=PR7&dq=+Vision+and+mind+Glezer&ots=xGm9OsYuJM&sig=UaVC0fup5vfeEO7MY5x-WFuG2rU
  
• Christopher S. Hill (online). Visual awareness and visual qualia.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Department of Philosophy Brown University Providence, RI 02915
• Tomis Kapitan (1998). Vision, vector, veracity.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: To experience is to undergo a process, to be in a state of receiving input which affords information about our environment. For highly developed beings like ourselves, the inputs determining states of conscious sensory perception are among the most important for our survival. At first glance, these states seem relational, each being a situation wherein a percipient X is passively conscious of something Y--its object, subject-matter, or content--without any apparent effort. Of course, the briefest reflection convinces us that despite a seemingly passive reception of data from without, a good deal of interpretation goes into the making of perceptual judgments, as evidenced by their wide variance in the face of like sensory stimulation. One person looking at the slope of a mountain notices a patch of whitish stones; another sees a flock of sheep grazing. They are distinguished by their different reactions to similar input, whether or not these are best construed as inferences, interpretations, or, simply, differing degrees of attentiveness
• Mohan Matthen (2007). Defining vision: What homology thinking contributes.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The specialization of visual function within biological function is reason for introducing “homology thinking” into explanations of the visual system. It is argued that such specialization arises when organisms evolve by differentiation from their predecessors. Thus, it is essentially historical, and visual function should be regarded as a lineage property. The colour vision of birds and mammals do not function the same way as one another, on this account, because each is an adaptation to special needs of the visual functions of predecessors—very different kinds of predecessors in each case. Thus, history underlies function. We also see how homology thinking figures in the hierarchical classification of visual systems, and how it supports the explanation of visual function by functional role analysis
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/5795753306u46336/fulltext.pdf
  
• Dan Ryder (online). Explaining the "inhereness" of qualia representationally: Why we seem to have a visual field.   (More)
• Eric Schwitzgebel (online). When our eyes are closed, what, if anything, do we visually experience?   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.faculty.ucr.edu/~eschwitz/SchwitzPapers/EyesClosed070910.pdf
  
• Barry Smith (1999). Truth and the visual field.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Abstract The paper uses the tools of mereotopology (the theory of parts, wholes and boundaries) to work out the implications of certain analogies between the 'ecological psychology' of J. J Gibson and the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl. It presents an ontological theory of spatial boundaries and of spatially extended entities. By reference to examples from the geographical sphere it is shown that both boundaries and extended entities fall into two broad categories: those which exist independently of our cognitive acts (for example, the planet Earth, its exterior surface); and those which exist only in virtue of such acts (for example: the equator, the North Sea). The visual field, too, can be conceived as an example of an extended entity that is dependent in the sense at issue. The paper suggests extending this analogy by postulating entities which would stand to true judgments as the visual field stands to acts of visual perception. The judgment field is defined more precisely as that complex extended entity which comprehends all entities which are relevant to the truth of a given (true) judgment. The work of cognitive linguists such as Talmy and Langacker, when properly interpreted, can be shown to yield a detailed account of the structures of the judgment fields corresponding to sentences of different sorts. A new sort of correspondence-theoretic definition of truth for sentences of natural language can then be formulated on this basis
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://wings.buffalo.edu/philosophy/faculty/smith/articles/tvf.html
  

Other Sensory Modalities

• Thomas H. Morton (2000). Archiving odors.   (More)
• Casey O'Callaghan (ms). Pitch.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Some sounds have pitch, some do not. A tuba’s notes are lower pitched than a flute’s, but the fuzz from an untuned radio has no discernible pitch. Pitch is an attribute in virtue of which sounds that possess it can be ordered from “low” to “high”. Given how audition works, physics has taught us that frequency determines what pitch a sound auditorily appears to have
• Casey O'Callaghan (2009). Sounds.   (More)

Molyneux's Problem

• Laura Berchielli (2002). Color, space, and figure in Locke: An interpretation of the Molyneux problem.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_the_history_of_philosophy/v040/40.1berchielli.html
  
• John Campbell (2005). Information-processing, phenomenal consciousness and Molyneux's question.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Ordinary common sense suggests that we have just one set of shape concepts that we apply indifferently on the bases of sight and touch. Yet we understand the shape concepts, we know what shape properties are, only because we have experience of shapes. And phenomenal experience of shape in vision and phenomenal experience of shape in touch seem to be quite different. So how can the shape concepts we grasp and use on the basis of vision be the same as the shape concepts we grasp and use on the basis of touch? I think this is the intuitive puzzle that underlies the question sent by the Dublin lawyer Molyneux to John Locke. This concerns a man born blind, who learns by the use of his touch to discriminate cubes from spheres. Suppose him now to gain the use of his sight. And suppose him to be presented with a cube and a sphere, of nighly the same bigness. Quaere, will he be able to tell, by the use of his vision alone, which is the sphere, and which the cube? (Locke 1975, II/ix/8.)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://ist-socrates.berkeley.edu/~jcampbel/documents/MolyneuxEvans.pdf
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=gVGw15zGdOwC&oi=fnd&pg=PA195&dq=Information-processing,+phenomenal+consciousness+and+Molyneux's+question+Campbell&ots=jnDCOCsEXb&sig=PiRFeI29ae6AKrBSNGN-enNxeZY
  
• John Campbell (1996). Molyneux's question.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: in Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Perception (Philosophical Issues vol. 7) (Atascadero: Ridgeview 1996), 301-318, with replies by Brian Loar and Kirk Ludwig
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=1533-6077(1996)7<301:MQ>2.0.CO;2-3
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=1533-6077(1996)7<301:MQ>2.0.CO;2-3
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/1522914.pdf
  
• John Campbell (2005). Molyneux's question and cognitive impenetrability.   (More)
• Shaun Gallagher (forthcoming). The Molyneux problem.   (More)
• Kirk A. Ludwig (1996). Shape properties and perception.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=1533-6077(1996)7<325:SPAP>2.0.CO;2-G
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=1533-6077(1996)7<325:SPAP>2.0.CO;2-G
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/1522916.pdf
  

Sensory Modalities, Misc

• Casey O'Callaghan (2006). Cross-modal illusions and perceptual content: Lessons from cross-modal illusions.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: I argue that a class of recently-discovered cross-modal illusions gives reason to posit a dimension of content shared across perceptual modalities and to abandon the traditional view according to which perceptual content is exclusively constituted by discrete modality-specific contents
• Casey O'Callaghan (2008). Seeing what you hear: Cross-modal illusions and perception.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Cross-modal perceptual illusions occur when a stimulus to one modality impacts perceptual experience associated with another modality. Unlike synaesthesia, cross-modal illusions are intelligible as results of perceptual strategies for dealing with sensory stimulation to multiple modalities, rather than as mere quirks. I argue that understanding cross-modal illusions reveals an important flaw in a widespread conception of the senses, and of their role in perceptual experience, according to which understanding perception and perceptual experience is a matter of assembling independently viable stories about vision, audition, olfaction, and the rest.
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/121417802/PDFSTART
  

Science of Perception

Modularity and Cognitive Penetrability

• William F. Brewer & Bruce L. Lambert (2001). The theory-ladenness of observation and the theory-ladenness of the rest of the scientific process.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8248(200109)68:32.0.CO;2-H
  http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/resolve?id=doi:10.1086/392907
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3080944.pdf
  
• Jerome S. Bruner (1957). On perceptual readiness.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=50dTR_X6V5AC&oi=fnd&pg=PA108&ots=Nb8T90Phdu&sig=LmETP9CWFNG2Gf9uTCUOTjrwc4s
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=8Biuk1o1Z2wC&oi=fnd&pg=PA108&ots=9LcSpgE-WT&sig=Zx1pEHFnIysExAU0b4Y-Oj_QXik
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=8Biuk1o1Z2wC&oi=fnd&pg=PA108&ots=9LcRtfE0VV&sig=HqbT9fBp0uoNjVix-9VPh7eFkuI
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=8Biuk1o1Z2wC&oi=fnd&pg=PA108&ots=9LcRneJ1WV&sig=3pCYDMawnBLOgwxxZeWYPb6QZ8U
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=8Biuk1o1Z2wC&oi=fnd&pg=PA108&ots=9LcSvgI2XW&sig=Hi2Jm1fi4MKSPtuK2SlALEOKkaE
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=50dTR_X6V5AC&oi=fnd&pg=PA108&ots=Nb8S7-Pidt&sig=eYRJ1YGUR3P4ZeaR57lq2tbayTY
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=8Biuk1o1Z2wC&oi=fnd&pg=PA108&ots=9LcPvdLZWZ&sig=c8KwNTK5MiURUSJEJK7OYJNosDc
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=50dTR_X6V5AC&oi=fnd&pg=PA108&ots=Nb8Rb_Weey&sig=1LLA7twrYXjTa_aMa4cZyXFnDHQ
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=8Biuk1o1Z2wC&oi=fnd&pg=PA108&ots=9LcTrgMWVT&sig=U-s20sUVpZLyokGdaq8pYHlb3tE
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=8Biuk1o1Z2wC&oi=fnd&pg=PA108&ots=9LcQreE1VU&sig=P4UjpnkeYnp7nCFSf8-FLh29Utg
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=50dTR_X6V5AC&oi=fnd&pg=PA108&ots=Nb8U51Pges&sig=n8TI1kjx3B8sepmx36UWnoLJSTE
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=50dTR_X6V5AC&oi=fnd&pg=PA108&ots=Nb8V71Xbds&sig=Sdk0X6yvIiaV-wyREiihr_cRvLk
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=50dTR_X6V5AC&oi=fnd&pg=PA108&ots=Nb8Ub1Tjfv&sig=1qNmw4OA6TnDOfqI4-qTJ17HCII
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/sites/entrez?db=pubmed&uid=13420288&cmd=showdetailview&indexed=google
  
• Paul M. Churchland (1988). Perceptual plasticity and theoretical neutrality: A reply to Jerry Fodor.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8248(198806)55:2<167:PPATNA>2.0.CO;2-8
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8248(198806)55:2<167:PPATNA>2.0.CO;2-8
  http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/resolve?id=doi:10.1086/289425
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/187956.pdf
  
• William Cornwell (2004). Dr.   (More)
• Jerry A. Fodor (1984). Observation reconsidered.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8248(198403)51:1<23:OR>2.0.CO;2-T
  http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/resolve?id=doi:10.1086/289162
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8248(198403)51:1<23:OR>2.0.CO;2-T
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/187729.pdf
  
• Robert S. Lockhart (2000). Modularity, cognitive penetrability and the Turing test.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The Turing Test blurs the distinction between a model and irrelevant) instantiation details. Modeling only functional modules is problematic if these are interconnected and cognitively penetrable
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://psycprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000068/
  
• Zenon W. Pylyshyn (1999). Is vision continuous with cognition? The case for cognitive impenetrability of visual perception.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Although the study of visual perception has made more progress in the past 40 years than any other area of cognitive science, there remain major disagreements as to how closely vision is tied to general cognition. This paper sets out some of the arguments for both sides (arguments from computer vision, neuroscience, Psychophysics, perceptual learning and other areas of vision science) and defends the position that an important part of visual perception, which may be called early vision or just vision, is prohibited from accessing relevant expectations, knowledge and utilities - in other words it is cognitively impenetrable. That part of vision is complex and articulated and provides a representation of the 3-D surfaces of objects sufficient to serve as an index into memory, with somewhat different outputs being made available to other systems such as those dealing with motor control. The paper also addresses certain conceptual and methodological issues, including the use of signal detection theory and event-related potentials to assess cognitive penetration of vision. A distinction is made among several stages in visual processing. These include, in addition to the inflexible early-vision stage, a pre-perceptual attention allocation stage and a post-perceptual evaluation, memory-accessing, and inference stage which provide several different highly constrained ways in which cognition can affect the outcome of visual perception. The paper discusses arguments that have been presented in both computer vision and psychology showing that vision is "intelligent" and involves elements of problem solving". It is suggested that these cases do not show cognitive penetration, but rather they show that certain natural constraints on interpretation, concerned primarily with optical and geometrical properties of the world, have been compiled into the visual system. The paper also examines a number of examples where instructions and "hints" are alleged to affect
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://ruccs.rutgers.edu/faculty/ZPbbs98.html
  http://ruccs.rutgers.edu/ftp/pub/papers/isvision38.html
  http://ruccs.rutgers.edu/ftp/pub/papers/isvision38.html
  http://www.bbsonline.org/documents/a/00/00/04/94/index.html
  http://www.bbsonline.org/Preprints/OldArchive/bbs.pylyshyn.html
  http://www.bbsonline.org/documents/a/00/00/04/94/bbs00000494-00/bbs.pylyshyn.html
  http://www.u.arizona.edu/~mapeters/MP Pubs/Peterson1999d.pdf?url=MP Pubs/Peterson1999d.pdf
  http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=1&fid=30934&jid=BBS&volumeId=22&issueId=03&aid=30933
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=11301517&dopt=Citation
  http://journals.cambridge.org/production/action/cjoGetFulltext?fulltextid=30934
  http://www.journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0140525X99002022
  http://journals.cambridge.org/article_S0140525X99552023
  http://journals.cambridge.org/article_S0140525X99442025
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/149079.html
  http://ruccs.rutgers.edu/faculty/ZPbbs98.html
  http://www.cs.ubc.ca/~mike/papers/Pylyshyn99.pdf
  http://ruccs.rutgers.edu/ftp/pub/papers/bbs1999_reprint
  http://www.bbsonline.org/Preprints/OldArchive/bbs.pylyshyn.html
  http://www.bbsonline.org/documents/a/00/00/04/94/bbs00000494-00/bbs.pylyshyn.html
  http://www.u.arizona.edu/~mapeters/MP Pubs/Peterson1999d.pdf?url=MP Pubs/Peterson1999d.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=11301517&dopt=Citation
  http://www.journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0140525X99002022
  http://journals.cambridge.org/article_S0140525X99552023
  
• Stephen P. Stich & Shaun Nichols (1997). Cognitive penetrability, rationality, and restricted simulation.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-0017.1997.tb00076.x
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1468-0017.00050
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/mila/1997/00000012/00000003/art00050
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/mila/1997/00000012/F0020003/art00004
  http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/119154908/PDFSTART
  

Ecological Approaches to Perception

• Anthony Chemero (2003). An outline of a theory of affordances.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The primary difference between direct and inferential theories of perception concerns the location of perceptual content, the meaning of our perceptions. In inferential theories of perception, these meanings arise inside animals, based upon their interactions with the physical environment. Light, for example, bumps into receptors causing a sensation. The animal (or its brain) performs inferences on the sensation, yielding a meaningful perception. In direct theories of perception, on the other hand, meaning is in the environment, and perception does not depend upon meaning- conferring inferences. Instead the animal simply gathers information from a meaning- laden environment. But if the environment contains meanings, then it cannot be merely physical. This places a heavy theoretical burden on direct theories of perception, a burden so severe that it may outweigh all the advantages to conceiving perception as
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.leaonline.com/doi/abs/10.1207/S15326969ECO1502_5
  http://www.leaonline.com/doi/pdfplus/10.1207/S15326969ECO1502_5
  
• Tony Chemero (forthcoming). Information and direct perception: A new approach.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Since the 1970s, Michael Turvey, Robert Shaw, and William Mace have worked on the formulation of a philosophically-sound and empirically-tractable version of James Gibson
• Tony Chemero (2003). Review of ecological psychology in context: James Gibson, Roger Barker, and the legacy of William James' radical empiricism.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=m1Qb4EELzNIC&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&sig=iCPaX8v3lU-9RWH14uKxiV36PK4&prev=http://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&lr=
  
• Tony Chemero (2001). What we perceive when we perceive affordances: Commentary on Michaels (2000), Information, Perception and Action.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In her essay --?Information, Perception and Action--, Claire Michaels reaches two conclusions that run very much against the grain of ecological psychology. First, she claims that affordances are not perceived, but simply acted upon; second, because of this, perception and action ought to be conceived separately. These conclusions are based upon a misinterpretation of empirical evidence which is, in turn, based upon a conflation of two proper objects of perception: objectively with properties and affordances
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.leaonline.com/doi/abs/10.1207/S15326969ECO1302_3
  http://www.leaonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1207/S15326969ECO1302_3
  http://www.leaonline.com/doi/pdfplus/10.1207/S15326969ECO1302_3
  
• Gary Hatfield (1990). Gibsonian representations and connectionist symbol-processing: Prospects for unification.   (More)
• Andrea Scarantino (2003). Affordances explained.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: I examine the central theoretical construct of ecological psychology, the concept of an affordance. In the first part of the paper, I illustrate the role affordances play in Gibson's theory of perception. In the second part, I argue that affordances are to be understood as dispositional properties, and explain what I take to be their characteristic background circumstances, triggering circumstances and manifestations. The main purpose of my analysis is to give affordances a theoretical identity enriched by Gibson's visionary insight, but independent of the most controversial claims of the Gibsonian movement
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00001104/02/Affordances_Explained_Final_Version_May_2003.doc
  http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/resolve?id=doi:10.1086/377380
  http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/full/10.1086/377380
  
• S. Ullman (1980). Against direct perception.   (More)

Construction and Inference in Perception

• Jüri Allik & Kenn Konstabel (2005). G. F. Parrot and the theory of unconscious inferences.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=16196051&dopt=Citation
  http://doi.wiley.com/10.1002/jhbs.20114
  
• Richard L. Gregory (1974). Perceptions as hypotheses.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.journals.royalsoc.ac.uk/index/226W686672226774.pdf
  http://philosophy.arts.unsw.edu.au/students/resources/lecture_notes/PHIL2207/PHIL2207-Week 8.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=6106237&dopt=Citation
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0080-4622(19800708)290:1038<181:PAH>2.0.CO;2-B
  
• Gary Hatfield (2002). Perception As Unconscious Inference.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Consider for a moment the spatial and chromatic dimensions of your visual expe- rience. Suppose that as you gaze about the room you see a table, some books, and papers. Ignore for now the fact that you immediately recognize these objects to be a table with books and papers on it. Concentrate on how the table looks to you: its top spreads out in front of you, stopping at edges beyond which lies un?lled space, leading to more or less distant chairs, shelves, or expanses of ?oor. The books and paper on the table top create shaped visual boundaries between areas of different color, within which there may be further variation of color or visual texture. Propelled by a slight breeze, a sheet of paper slides across the table, and you experience its smooth motion before it ?oats out of sight
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://repository.upenn.edu/ircs_reports/9
  http://www.cis.upenn.edu/~hatfield/uncinf.pdf
  http://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1021&context=ircs_reports
  
• Kirk A. Ludwig (1996). Explaining why things look the way they do.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: How are we able to perceive the world veridically? If we ask this question as a part of the scientific investigation of perception, then we are not asking for a transcendental guarantee that our perceptions are by and large veridical; we presuppose that they are. Unless we assumed that we perceived the world for the most part veridically, we would not be in a position to investigate our perceptual abilities empirically. We are interested, then, not in how it is possible in general for us to perceive the world veridically, but instead in what the relation is between our environment and its properties, of which we have knowledge, on the one hand, and our perceptual mechanisms, on the other, that results in very many, even most of our perceptions being veridical in everyday life

Perception and Neuroscience

• Paul M. Churchland (2005). Chimerical colors: Some phenomenological predictions from cognitive neuroscience.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The Hurvich-Jameson (H-J) opponent-process network offers a familiar account of the empirical structure of the phenomenological color space for humans, an account with a number of predictive and explanatory virtues. Its successes form the bulk of the existing reasons for suggesting a strict identity between our various color sensations on the one hand, and our various coding vectors across the color-opponent neurons in our primary visual pathways on the other. But anti-reductionists standardly complain that the systematic parallels discovered by the H-J network are just empirical correspondences, constructed post facto, with no predictive or explanatory purchase on the intrinsic characters of qualia proper. The present paper disputes that complaint, by illustrating that the H-J model yields some novel and unappreciated predictions, and some novel and unappreciated explanations, concerning the qualitative characters of a considerable variety of color sensations possible for human experience, color sensations that normal people have almost certainly never had before, color sensations whose accurate descriptions in ordinary language appear semantically ill-formed or even self-contradictory. Specifically, these "impossible" color sensations are activation-vectors (across our opponent-process neurons) that lie inside the space of neuronally possible activation-vectors, but outside the central 'color spindle' that confines the familiar range of sensations for possible objective colors. These extra-spindle chimerical-color sensations correspond to no reflective color that you will ever see objectively displayed on a physical object. But the H-J model both predicts their existence and explains their highly anomalous qualitative characters in some detail. It also suggests how to produce these rogue sensations by a simple procedure made available in the latter half of this paper. The relevant color plates will allow you to savor these sensations for yourself
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=bpjAkBrkmu4C&oi=fnd&pg=PA309&ots=JljTspK-Zz&sig=bPi-xVEVBkAvYyvHEx5l3S0Zl54
  http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/./ftinterface~content=a727182509~fulltext=713240930
  http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/index/L803131023766655.pdf
  http://www.informaworld.com/index/727182509.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/routledg/cphp/2005/00000018/00000005/art00001
  
• Walter H. Ehrenstein, Lothar Spillmann & Viktor Sarris (2003). Gestalt issues in modern neuroscience.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: We present select examples of how visual phenomena can serve as tools to uncoverbrain mechanisms. Specifically, receptive field organization is proposed as a Gestalt-like neural mechanism of perceptual organization. Appropriate phenomena, such as brightness and orientation contrast, subjective contours, filling-in, and aperture-viewed motion, allow for a quantitative comparison between receptive fields and their psychophysical counterparts, perceptive fields. Phenomenology might thus be extended from the study of perceptual qualities to their transphenomenal substrates, including memory functions. In conclusion, classic issues of Gestalt psychology can now be related to modern
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.uni-frankfurt.de/fb/fb05/psychologie/allgpsy1/forsch/bezugssysteme/pdf/GestaltIssues0.pdf
  http://www.psychologie.uni-frankfurt.de/fb/fb05/psychologie/abteilungen_und_bereiche/allgpsy1/forsch/bezugssysteme/pdf/GestaltIssues0.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/p8x6061785830614/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/P8X6061785830614.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/axio/2003/00000013/F0020003/05121115
  
• Gary Hatfield (1999). Mental functions as constraints on neurophysiology: Biology and psychology of vision.   (More)
• Jaakko Hintikka & John Symons (2003). Systems of visual identification in neuroscience: Lessons from epistemic logic.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The following analysis shows how developments in epistemic logic can play a nontrivial role in cognitive neuroscience. We argue that the striking correspondence between two modes of identification, as distinguished in the epistemic context, and two cognitive systems distinguished by neuroscientific investigation of the visual system (the "where" and "what" systems) is not coincidental, and that it can play a clarificatory role at the most fundamental levels of neuroscientific theory
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/resolve?PHOS700108PDF
  http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/full/10.1086/367871
  
• Ken Mogi (1997). Response selectivity, neuron doctrine, and Mach's principle in perception.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: manner. The construction of the space-time structure that describes the dynamics of the neural network in a causal manner is a non-trivial problem. I critically review the idea of response selectivity as is applied to
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.sonycsl.co.jp/person/kenmogi/Mach.pdf
  http://www.csl.sony.co.jp/person/kenmogi/Mach.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/l72r54057309lx56.pdf
  

Psychophysics

• Jeremy Butterfield (1998). Quantum curiosities of psychophysics.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: I survey some of the connections between the metaphysics of the relation between mind and matter, and quantum theory’s measurement problem. After discussing the metaphysics, especially the correct formulation of physicalism, I argue that two state-reduction approaches to quantum theory’s measurement problem hold some surprises for philosophers’ discussions of physicalism. Though both approaches are compatible with physicalism, they involve a very different conception of the physical, and of how the physical underpins the mental, from what most philosophers expect. And one approach exemplifies a a problem in the definition of physicalism which the metaphysical literature has discussed only in the abstract. A version of the paper has appeared in Consciousness and Human Identity, ed. John Cornwell, OUP 1998
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.trin.cam.ac.uk/butterfield/Papers/QmCuriositiesPsychophysicsFeb01.pdf
  http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00000193/00/QMCURIOFEB01.PDF
  
• H. Eisler (1975). Subjective duration and psychophysics.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=1187910&dopt=Citation
  
• J. T. Enns, R. A. Rensink & V. Di Lollo (2000). Competition for consciousness among visual events: The psychophysics of reentrant visual processes.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Advances in neuroanatomy and neurophysiology have called attention to reentrant signalling as the predominant form of communication between brain areas. We propose that explicit use be made of reentrant processing in theories of perception. To show that this can be done effectively in one domain, we report on a series of psychophysical experiments involving a new form of masking, which defies explanation by current feed-forward theories. This masking occurs when a brief display of target plus mask is continued with the mask alone. We report evidence of two masking processes: an early process affected by physical factors such as adapting luminance and contour proximity, and a later process affected by attentional factors such as set size, target pop-out, and spatial pre-cuing. We call this later process masking by
• Steven Horst (2005). Phenomenology and psychophysics.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Recent philosophy of mind has tended to treat
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://shorst.web.wesleyan.edu/papers/HorstPsychophysics.pdf
  http://www.wesleyan.edu/~shorst/papers/HorstPsychophysics.pdf
  http://www.wesleyan.edu/~shorst/papers/shorst.psychophysics.spp97.html
  http://www.phil.canterbury.ac.nz/tom_bestor/e-texts/Horst, Steven - Phenomenolgy and Psychophysics (2000).pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/wg007jw15045555t/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/WG007JW15045555T.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/phen/2005/00000004/00000001/00005852
  
• Max Wertheimer (1923). Laws of organization in perceptual forms.   (More)

Gestalt Theory

• Walter H. Ehrenstein, Lothar Spillmann & Viktor Sarris (2003). Gestalt issues in modern neuroscience.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: We present select examples of how visual phenomena can serve as tools to uncoverbrain mechanisms. Specifically, receptive field organization is proposed as a Gestalt-like neural mechanism of perceptual organization. Appropriate phenomena, such as brightness and orientation contrast, subjective contours, filling-in, and aperture-viewed motion, allow for a quantitative comparison between receptive fields and their psychophysical counterparts, perceptive fields. Phenomenology might thus be extended from the study of perceptual qualities to their transphenomenal substrates, including memory functions. In conclusion, classic issues of Gestalt psychology can now be related to modern
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.uni-frankfurt.de/fb/fb05/psychologie/allgpsy1/forsch/bezugssysteme/pdf/GestaltIssues0.pdf
  http://www.psychologie.uni-frankfurt.de/fb/fb05/psychologie/abteilungen_und_bereiche/allgpsy1/forsch/bezugssysteme/pdf/GestaltIssues0.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/p8x6061785830614/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/P8X6061785830614.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/axio/2003/00000013/F0020003/05121115
  
• Kurt Koffka (1922). Perception: An introduction to the gestalt theory.   (More)
• Steven Lehar (online). Computational implications of gestalt theory: The role of feedback in visual processing.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Neurophysiological investigations of the visual system by way of single-cell recordings have revealed a hierarchical architecture in which lower level areas, such as the primary visual cortex, contain cells that respond to simple features, while higher level areas contain cells that respond to higher order features apparently composed of combinations of lower level features. This architecture seems to suggest a feed-forward processing strategy in which visual information progresses from lower to higher visual areas. However there is other evidence, both neurophysiological and phenomenal, that suggests a more parallel processing strategy in biological vision, in which top-down feedback plays a significant role. In fact Gestalt theory suggests that visual perception involves a process of emergence, i.e. a dynamic relaxation of multiple constraints throughout the system simultaneously, so that the final percept represents a stable state, or energy minimum of the dynamic system as a whole. A Multi-Level Reciprocal Feedback (MLRF) model is proposed to resolve the apparently contradictory concepts, by proposing a hierarchical visual architecture whose different levels are connected by bi-directional feed-forward and feedback pathways, where the computational transformation performed by the feedback pathway between levels in the hiararchy is a kind of inverse of the transformation performed by the corresponding feed-forward processing stream. This alternative paradigm of perceptual computation accounts in general terms for a number of visual illusory effects, and offers a computational specification for the generative, or constructive aspect of perceptual processing revealed by Gestalt theory
• Steven Lehar (2003). Gestalt isomorphism and the primacy of subjective conscious experience: A gestalt bubble model.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: A serious crisis is identified in theories of neurocomputation, marked by a persistent disparity between the phenomenological or experiential account of visual perception and the neurophysiological level of description of the visual system. In particular, conventional concepts of neural processing offer no explanation for the holistic global aspects of perception identified by Gestalt theory. The problem is paradigmatic and can be traced to contemporary concepts of the functional role of the neural cell, known as the Neuron Doctrine. In the absence of an alternative neurophysiologically plausible model, I propose a perceptual modeling approach, to model the percept as experienced subjectively, rather than modeling the objective neurophysiological state of the visual system that supposedly subserves that experience. A Gestalt Bubble model is presented to demonstrate how the elusive Gestalt principles of emergence, reification, and invariance can be expressed in a quantitative model of the subjective experience of visual consciousness. That model in turn reveals a unique computational strategy underlying visual processing, which is unlike any algorithm devised by man, and certainly unlike the atomistic feed-forward model of neurocomputation offered by the Neuron Doctrine paradigm. The perceptual modeling approach reveals the primary function of perception as that of generating a fully spatial virtual-reality replica of the external world in an internal representation. The common objections to this picture-in-the-head concept of perceptual representation are shown to be ill founded. Key Words: brain-anchored; Cartesian theatre; consciousness; emergence; extrinsic constraints; filling-in; Gestalt; homunculus; indirect realism; intrinsic constraints; invariance; isomorphism; multistability; objective phenomenology; perceptual modeling; perspective; phenomenology; psychophysical parallelism; psychophysical postulate; qualia; reification; representationalism; structural coherence
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.bbsonline.org/Preprints/Lehar/Referees/
  http://cns-alumni.bu.edu/~slehar/webstuff/bubw3/bubw3.pdf
  http://cns-alumni.bu.edu/~slehar/webstuff/bubw3/bubw3.html
  http://www.dartmouth.edu/~psych/people/faculty/tse/bladerunnerNEW.pdf
  http://matrix.aklab.psych.ubc.ca/uploads/Christine_ConsciousExperience_TICS.pdf
  http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=1&fid=208840&jid=BBS&volumeId=26&issueId=04&aid=208839
  http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=1&fid=208872&jid=BBS&volumeId=26&issueId=04&aid=208871
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=15067950&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=pubmed&list_uids=15067950&dopt=Citation
  http://journals.cambridge.org/production/action/cjoGetFulltext?fulltextid=208840
  http://www.journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0140525X03000098
  http://journals.cambridge.org/article_S0140525X0326009X
  http://journals.cambridge.org/article_S0140525X03270096
  
• Max Wertheimer (1944). Gestalt theory.   (More)

Science of Perception, Misc

Perception and the Mind

Perception and Thought

• Gl (2004). On perceiving that.   (More)
• Jack C. Lyons (2005). Perceptual belief and nonexperiential looks.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: How things look (or sound, taste, smell, etc.) plays two important roles in the epistemology of perception.1 First, our perceptual beliefs are episte- mically justified, at least in part, in virtue of how things look. Second, whether a given belief is a perceptual belief, as opposed to, say, an infer- ential belief, is also at least partly a matter of how things look. Together, these yield an epistemically significant sense of looks. A standard view is that how things look, in this epistemically significant sense, is a matter of ones present perceptual phenomenology, of what nondoxastic experiential state one is in. On this standard view, these experiential states (a) determine which of my beliefs are perceptual beliefs and (b) are centrally involved in justifying these beliefs
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1520-8583.2005.00061.x
  
• Alva Noe (1999). Thought and experience.   (More)
• James Pryor (online). An epistemic theory of acquaintance.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: For example, suppose you believe squirrels can live an extremely long time, like parrots and tortoises. You think to yourself, The oldest mammal in this town is probably a squirrel. Contrast that case to:

  (2b) believing some animal you seean animal that happens to be the oldest mammal in
  townto be a squirrel

  I said theres a philosophically important di?erence between the (a) examples and the (b) examples. In fact these examples illustrate more than one di?erence. Lets try to disentangle the di?erent di?erences

Perception and Action

• Ned Block (2005). Review of Alva Noe, Action in Perception.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This is a charming and engaging book that combines careful attention to the phenomenology of experience with an appreciation of the psychology and neuroscience of perception. In some of its aimsfor example, to show problems with a rigid version of a view of visual perception as an inverse optics process of constructing a static 3-D representation from static 2-D information on the retina--it succeeds admirably. As No points out, vision is a process that depends on interactions between the perceiver and the environment and involves contributions from sensory systems other than the eye. He is at pains to note that vision is not passive. His analogy with touch is to the point: touch involves skillful probing and movement, and so does vision, although less obviously and in my view less centrally so. This much is certainly widely accepted among vision scientistsalthough mainstream vision scientists (represented, for example, by Stephen Palmers excellent textbook²) view these points as best seen within a version of the inverse optics view that takes inputs as non-static and as including motor instructions (for example, involving eye movements and head movements).³ The kind of point that No raises is viewed as important at the margins, but as not disturbing the main lines of the picture of vision that descendswith many changesfrom the pioneering work of David Marr in the 1980s (and before him, from Helmholtz). But No shows little interest in mainstream vision science, focusing on non-mainstream ideas in the science of perception, specifically ideas from the anti-representational psychologist J.J. Gibson, and also drawing on Wittgenstein and the phenomenology tradition. There is a sense throughout the book of revolution, of upsetting the applecart. This is a review from the point of view of the applecart
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/faculty/block/papers/Shortened_Noe_Review_JoP.pdf
  
• Robert Briscoe (forthcoming). Egocentric Spatial Representation in Action and Perception.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Neuropsychological findings used to motivate the two visual systems hypothesis have been taken to endanger a pair of widely accepted claims about spatial representation in visual experience. The first is the claim that visual experience represents 3-D space around the perceiver using an egocentric frame of reference. The second is the claim that there is a constitutive link between the spatial contents of visual experience and the perceiver’s bodily actions. In this paper, I carefully assess three main sources of evidence for the two visual systems hypothesis and argue that the best interpretation of the evidence is in fact consistent with both claims. I conclude with some brief remarks on the relation between visual consciousness and rational agency.
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://phonline.org/paper.php?keynum=903
  http://cogprints.org/5780/1/ECSRAP.F07.pdf
  http://chn.loyno.edu/philosophy/bios/documents/ECSRAP.F07.pdf
  
• Robert Briscoe (2008). Vision, action, and make-perceive.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Abstract:  In this paper, I critically assess the enactive account of visual perception recently defended by Alva Noë (2004). I argue inter alia that the enactive account falsely identifies an object's apparent shape with its 2D perspectival shape; that it mistakenly assimilates visual shape perception and volumetric object recognition; and that it seriously misrepresents the constitutive role of bodily action in visual awareness. I argue further that noticing an object's perspectival shape involves a hybrid experience combining both perceptual and imaginative elements—an act of what I call 'make-perceive'
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://phonline.org/paper.php?keynum=902
  http://cogprints.org/5781/1/VAMP.MS397.pdf
  http://chn.loyno.edu/philosophy/bios/documents/VAMP.MS397.pdf
  http://chn.loyno.edu/philosophy/bios/documents/VAMP.MS397.doc
  http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/121387369/PDFSTART
  
• John Campbell (2008). Sensorimotor knowledge and naïve realism.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2008.00162.x
  http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/119395227/PDFSTART
  
• Tony Chemero (2001). What we perceive when we perceive affordances: Commentary on Michaels (2000), Information, Perception and Action.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In her essay --?Information, Perception and Action--, Claire Michaels reaches two conclusions that run very much against the grain of ecological psychology. First, she claims that affordances are not perceived, but simply acted upon; second, because of this, perception and action ought to be conceived separately. These conclusions are based upon a misinterpretation of empirical evidence which is, in turn, based upon a conflation of two proper objects of perception: objectively with properties and affordances
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.leaonline.com/doi/abs/10.1207/S15326969ECO1302_3
  http://www.leaonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1207/S15326969ECO1302_3
  http://www.leaonline.com/doi/pdfplus/10.1207/S15326969ECO1302_3
  
• Andy Clark & Josefa Toribio (2001). Sensorimotor chauvinism?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: O'Regan and Noe present a wonderfully detailed and comprehensive defense of a position whose broad outline we absolutely and unreservedly endorse. They are right, it seems to us, to stress the intimacy of conscious content and embodied action, and to counter the idea of a Grand Illusion with the image of an agent genuinely in touch, via active exploration, with the rich and varied visual scene. This is an enormously impressive achievement, and we hope that the comments that follow will be taken in a spirit of constructive questioning. Overall, we have two main reservations
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.philosophy.ed.ac.uk/staff/clark/pubs/noecomm.pdf
  http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=1&fid=125135&jid=BBS&volumeId=24&issueId=05&aid=125134
  http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0140525X01290116
  
• Andy Clark (2006). That lonesome whistle: A puzzle for the sensorimotor model of perceptual experience.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/anal/2006/00000066/00000289/art00004
  http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/118607392/PDFSTART
  
• Andy Clark (1999). Visual awareness and visuomotor action.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.cogs.indiana.edu/andy/VisAwareVisAction.pdf
  https://www.era.lib.ed.ac.uk/handle/1842/1323?mode=simple
  http://www.philosophy.ed.ac.uk/staff/clark/pubs/VisAwareVisAction.pdf
  http://www.philosophy.ed.ac.uk/staff/clark/pubs/VisAwareVisAction.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/1999/00000006/F0020011/987
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/1999/00000006/F0020011/987
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/1999/00000006/f0020011
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/1999/00000006/f0020011
  
• Andy Clark (2006). Vision as dance? Three challenges for sensorimotor contingency theory.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In _Action in Perception _Alva No develops and presents a sensorimotor account of vision and of visual consciousness. According to such an account seeing (and indeed perceiving more generally) is analysed as a kind of skilful bodily activity. Such a view is consistent with the emerging emphasis, in both philosophy and cognitive science, on the critical role of embodiment in the construction of intelligent agency. I shall argue, however, that the full sensorimotor model faces three important challenges. The first is to negotiate a path between two prima facie unsatisfactory readings of the central claim that conscious perceptual experience is constituted by knowledge of patterns of sensorimotor dependence. The second is to convince us that the sensorimotor contribution, in such cases, is actually constitutive of perceptual experience rather than merely causally implicated in the origination of such experience.² And the third is to respond to the important challenge raised by what I will dub 'sensorimotor summarizing' models of the relation between conscious experience and richly detailed sensorimotor routines. According to such models³ conscious perceptual experience only rather indirectly reflects the rich detail of our actual sensorimotor engagements, which are instead lightly sampled as a coarse guide, optimized for planning and reasoning, and geared and filtered according to current needs and purposes
  Additional links for this entry:
  https://www.era.lib.ed.ac.uk/handle/1842/1444?mode=simple
  
• Andy Clark (2001). Visual experience and motor action: Are the bonds too tight?   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.philosophy.ed.ac.uk/staff/clark/pubs/eafinal.pdf
  http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/courses/consciousness/papers/clark.pdf
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8108(200110)110:4<495:VEAMAA>2.0.CO;2-2
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8108(200110)110:4<495:VEAMAA>2.0.CO;2-2
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3182592.pdf
  http://philreview.dukejournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/110/4/495
  
• Shaun Gallagher (online). Perceiving others in action / la perception d'autrui en action.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In a New York Times article last month, entitled Cells that read minds, the neuroscience reporter, Sandra Blakeslee (January 10, 2006) provided a list of all the things that mirror neurons can explain. As we know, mirror neurons, discovered by Rizzolattis group in Parma, are neurons that are activated when we engage in action, and when we perceive intentional movement in another person. According to Blakeslee and the scientists she interviewed, mirror neurons explain not only how we are capable of understanding another persons actions, but also language, empathy, how children learn, why people respond to certain types of sports, dance, music and art, why watching media violence may be harmful and why many men like pornography. Let me set aside the controversial questions about whether mirror neurons can explain all of these things, and accept that mirror neurons are clearly smart little cells. But let me ask whether Blakeslee and her scientists are expressing things in the right way
• Vittorio Gallese (2000). The inner sense of action: Agency and motor representations.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.up.univ-mrs.fr/wcnia/ressources/Gallese_NCC4.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/2000/00000007/00000010/1054
  
• Melvyn A. Goodale & A. David Milner (1992). Separate visual pathways for perception and action.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=d5N4Ei9oqk0C&oi=fnd&pg=PA395&ots=ejRdWR4JnS&sig=3tPM_o4BKfAdIcDQlB7y6utqw2Q
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=d5N4Ei9oqk0C&oi=fnd&pg=PA395&ots=ei_hVW8BpQ&sig=3SYZjocbq5Y0cs3JpTBjZlraqEQ
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=d5N4Ei9oqk0C&oi=fnd&pg=PA395&ots=ei_hSSdInR&sig=_6iza5Fl7ywsh42Mo7-74sXLloQ
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=d5N4Ei9oqk0C&oi=fnd&pg=PA395&ots=ei_hXW8HpV&sig=2Z0Eq-nTSSO6rbjv6Gh49tZgH_M
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=d5N4Ei9oqk0C&oi=fnd&pg=PA395&ots=ejRhSTdDsV&sig=D8nM04pe2oCHKL_-KD-5E_wvZno
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=d5N4Ei9oqk0C&oi=fnd&pg=PA395&ots=ejRgWT9CoO&sig=4VLABY-gDRkeeDTuCHCnqreQbXs
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=d5N4Ei9oqk0C&oi=fnd&pg=PA395&ots=ejRf_T4GrW&sig=p4NgETSpnBneCCPlyJPuG63GGAU
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=d5N4Ei9oqk0C&oi=fnd&pg=PA395&ots=ejReSR9GmX&sig=TadTjdBt-nLX--wqoi0UkwQnY5o
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=d5N4Ei9oqk0C&oi=fnd&pg=PA395&ots=ejRi_VbEmV&sig=WBV4ExTDai7tMrlTTIBUwtaWEHk
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=d5N4Ei9oqk0C&oi=fnd&pg=PA395&ots=ejReYS4GqV&sig=1zty9sE2r9tYWXjfOG9cpuAoCoc
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=d5N4Ei9oqk0C&oi=fnd&pg=PA395&ots=ejRjWW5DrU&sig=0fVyRJXG5RyhaMArNn9ZyHNBVFQ
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=d5N4Ei9oqk0C&oi=fnd&pg=PA395&ots=ejRiUV7JmW&sig=ow96qNDPoT4wx9exRSvKMTwII9w
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=d5N4Ei9oqk0C&oi=fnd&pg=PA395&ots=ejRhYU7KmU&sig=tqB-MhbjM_sDcjYga5VrBN7mp4o
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=1374953&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/sites/entrez?db=pubmed&uid=1374953&cmd=showdetailview&indexed=google
  
• Rick Grush (forthcoming). Skill theory v2.0: Dispositions, emulation, and spatial perception.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: An attempt is made to defend a general approach to the spatial content of perception, an approach according to which perception is imbued with spatial content in virtue of certain kinds of connections between perceiving organism’s sensory input and its behavioral output. The most important aspect of the defense involves clearly distinguishing two kinds of perceptuo-behavioral skills—the formation of dispositions, and a capacity for emulation. The former, the formation of dispositions, is argued to by the central pivot of spatial content. I provide a neural information processing interpretation of what these dispositions amount to, and describe how dispositions, so understood, are an obvious implementation of Gareth Evans’ proposal on the topic. Furthermore, I describe what sorts of contribution are made by emulation mechanisms, and I also describe exactly how the emulation framework differs from similar but distinct notions with which it is often unhelpfully confused, such as sensorimotor contingencies and forward models
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/50478717314t6630/fulltext.pdf
  
• Susan L. Hurley (1998). Active perception and vehicle externalism.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Certain empirical results suggest a way of challenging two natural and widespread assumptions about the mind. One assumption is about the relations between perception and action. This shows up in the widespread conception of perception and action in terms of input and output, respectively. Perception is conceived as input from world to mind and action is conceived as output from mind to world. The other assumption is about the relations between mind and world. It influences various opposed views about whether the contents of the mind are in principle independent of the outside world
• Susan L. Hurley (online). Consciousness in action: Clarifications.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Philosophy of neuroscience may seem an odd thing to do. What can a philosopher add to what neuroscience itself has to say, other than at some very abstract level, far removed from empirical details and the interests of scientists? At some point you take a deep breath, acknowledge the methodological questions, and just go ahead, spurred on by the sheer philosophical interest and excitement abroad in the neurosciences today. So it is very gratifying to a philosopher of neuroscience for such a distinguished neuropsychologist as Marcel Kinsbourne to find added value in the result
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.informaworld.com/index/D4KR70P9T4D0BUT9.pdf
  
• Susan L. Hurley (2001). Perception and action: Alternative views.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract:   A traditional view of perception and action makestwo assumptions: that the causal flow betweenperception and action is primarily linear or one-way,and that they are merely instrumentally related toeach other, so that each is a means to the other.Either or both of these assumptions can be rejected.Behaviorism rejects the instrumental but not theone-way aspect of the traditional view, thus leavingitself open to charges of verificationism. Ecologicalviews reject the one-way aspect but not theinstrumental aspect of the traditional view, so thatperception and action are seen as instrumentallyinterdependent. It is argued here that a betteralternative is to reject both assumptions, resultingin a two-level interdependence view in whichperception and action co-depend on dynamicallycircular subpersonal relations and as a result may bemore than merely instrumentally interdependent. Thisis illustrated by reference to motor theories ofperception and control theories of action
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.warwick.ac.uk/staff/S.L.Hurley/papers/pa.pdf
  http://wexler.free.fr/library/files/hurley (2001) perception and action. alternative views.pdf
  http://www-personal.umich.edu/~lormand/phil/teach/mmm/readings/Hurley - Perception and Action.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/l015777n34g15167/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=271323&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/L015777N34G15167.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/synt/2001/00000129/00000001/00271323
  
• Daniel D. Hutto (2005). Knowing what? Radical versus conservative enactivism.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The binary divide between traditional cognitivist and enactivist paradigms is tied to their respective commitments to understanding cognition as based on knowing that as opposed to knowing how. Using O’Regan’s and No¨e’s landmark sensorimotor contingency theory of perceptual experience as a foil, I demonstrate how easy it is to fall into conservative thinking. Although their account is advertised as decidedly ‘skill-based’, on close inspection it shows itself to be riddled with suppositions threatening to reduce it to a rules-and-representations approach. To remain properly enactivist it must be purged of such commitments and indeed all commitment to mediating knowledge: it must embrace a more radical enactivism
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/m02ltj7008017271/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/M02LTJ7008017271.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/phen/2005/00000004/00000004/00009001
  
• Pierre Jacob (2005). Grasping and perceiving objects.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=bpjAkBrkmu4C&oi=fnd&pg=PA241&ots=JljUmyR0Zu&sig=ng2uUGFbmB1iMyaNBn7tfnpX1Tw
  
• Pierre Jacob (2006). Why visual experience is likely to resist being enacted.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Alva Noë’s version of the enactive conception in _Action in Perception_ is an important contribution to the study of visual perception. First, I argue, however, that it is unclear (at best) whether, as the enactivists claim, work on change blindness supports the denial of the existence of detailed visual representations. Second, I elaborate on what Noë calls the ‘puzzle of perceptual presence’. Thirdly, I question the enactivist account of perceptual constancy. Finally, I draw attention to the tensions between enactivism and two trends in cognitive neuroscience: the two-visual systems model of human vision and the theory of internal forward models of action
• Sean D. Kelly (2002). Merleau-ponty on the body: The logic of motor intentional activity.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/rati/2002/00000015/00000004/art00198
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/rati/2002/00000015/00000004/art00004
  
• Colin Klein & Gabriel Love (2007). Kicking the Kohler habit.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Kohler's experiments with inverting goggles are often thought to support enactivism by showing that visual re-inversion occurs simultaneous with the return of sensorimotor skill. Closer examination reveals that Kohler's work does not show this. Recent work by Linden et al. shows that re-inversion, if it occurs at all, does not occur when the enactivist predicts. As such, the empirical evidence weighs against enactivism
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://tigger.uic.edu/~cvklein/papers/KohlerPhilPsy.pdf
  http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/./ftinterface~content=a782009436~fulltext=713240930
  http://www.informaworld.com/index/782009436.pdf
  
• David A. Leopold & Nikos K. Logothetis (1996). Activity changes in early visual cortex reflect monkeys' percepts during binocular rivalry.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://psych.jwatch.org/cgi/content/full/1996/401/14