Compiled by David Chalmers (Editor) and David Bourget (Assistant Editor), Australian National University. Part of MindPapers. Suggest an entry.

Javascript Menu by Deluxe-Menu.com		All fields Surname Advanced
		click here for help on how to search

Search tips

There are three kinds of search you can perform:

All fields

This mode searches for entries containing all the entered words in their title, author, date, comment field, or in any of many other fields showing on MindPapers pages.

Surname

This mode searches for entries containing the text string you entered in their author field. Note that the database does not have first names for all authors, so it is preferable to search only by surnames. If you search for a full name or a name with an initial, enter it in the format used internally by MindPapers, namely the "Lastname, Firstname" or "Lastname, F." format.

Advanced

This mode differs from the all fields mode in two respects. First, some information not publicly available on MindPapers is searched, e.g., abstracts and excerpts gathered by the MindPapers crawler, which are not always accurate but can help broaden one's search. Second, you may prefix any term with a '+' or '-' to narrow the search to entries containing it or not containing it, respectively. Terms which are not prefixed by a '+' are not mandatory. Instead, they are weighed depending on their frequency in order to determine the best search results. You may also search for a literal string composed of several words by putting them in double quotation marks (").

Note that short and / or common words are ignored by the search engine.

Try MindPapers to find published items which are available on a subscription basis.

close help

Philosophy of cognitive science :: Folk psychology and theory of mind :: Theory of mind, misc

• Kristin Andrews (2003). Knowing mental states: The asymmetry of psychological prediction and explanation.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Perhaps because both explanation and prediction are key components to understanding, philosophers and psychologists often portray these two abilities as though they arise from the same competence, and sometimes they are taken to be the same competence. When explanation and prediction are associated in this way, they are taken to be two expressions of a single cognitive capacity that differ from one another only pragmatically. If the difference between prediction and explanation of human behavior is merely pragmatic, then anytime I predict someone’s future behavior, I would at that moment also have an explanation of the behavior. I argue that advocates of both the theory theory and the simulation theory accept the symmetry of psychological prediction and explanation. However, there is very good reason to believe that this hypothesis is false. Just as we can predict the occurrence of some physical phenomena that we have no explanation for, we are also able to make accurate predictions of intentional behavior without having an explanation. Rather than requiring mental state attribution, I argue that the prediction of human behavior is most often accomplished by statistical induction rather than through an appeal to mental states. However, explanations are not given in these terms
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.yorku.ca/andrewsk/andrews/CONSCIOUSNESS - OCR.pdf
  
• Kristin Andrews (online). The need to explain behavior: Predicting, explaining, and the social function of mental state attribution.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: According to both the traditional model of folk psychology and the social intelligence hypothesis, our folk psychological notions of belief and desire developed in order to make better predictions of behavior, and the fundamental role for our folk psychological notions of belief and desire are for making more accurate predictions of behavior (than predictions made without appeal to folk psychological notions). My strategy in this paper is to show that these claims are false. I argue that we need not appeal to mental states to make predictions of many behaviors, and I will offer a positive account of how we might go about predicting intentional behavior. Finally, I suggest that taken together, the critique of traditional folk psychology along with the alternative account of our predictive practices leads to a new hypothesis. While it may be true that mental state concepts developed in response to social-environmental pressures, I suggest that this pressure was more likely the need to explain behavior, rather than the need to predict it
• Angela Arkway (online). Folk psychological explanation, and causal laws.   (More)
• Angela Arkway (online). The simulation theory and explanations that 'make sense of behavior'.   (More)
• Allison Barnes & Paul Thagard (1997). Empathy and analogy.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: We contend that empathy is best viewed as a kind of analogical thinking of the sort described in the multiconstraint theory of analogy proposed by Keith Holyoak and Paul Thagard (1995). Our account of empathy reveals the Theory-theory/Simulation theory debate to be based on a false assumption and formulated in terms too simple to capture the nature of mental state ascription. Empathy is always simulation, but may simultaneously include theory-application. By properly specifying the analogical processes of empathy and their constraints, we are able to show how the amount of theory needed to empathize is determined
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/620/00/Empathy.html
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000620/
  http://cogsci.uwaterloo.ca/Articles/Pages/Empathy.html
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000620/00/Empathy.html
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:620
  
• Paul Bloom (2006). My brain made me do it.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Shaun Nichols (this issue) correctly points out that current theories of the development of mindreading say nothing about children’s intuitions concerning indeterminist choice. That is, there are numerous theories of how children make sense of belief, desire, and action, but none that appeal to any notion of free will. Nichols suggests two alternatives for why this is the case. It could either be (a) an “outrageous oversight” on the part of developmental psychologists or (b) a principled omission, reflecting a consensus that the notion of indeterminist choice is absent from children’s mindreading processes. Nichols charitably favors the sec- ond alternative
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/brill/jocc/2006/00000006/F0020001/art00011
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/UR611255767V6308.pdf
  
• Radu Bogdan (2001). Developing mental abilities by representing intentionality.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract:   Communication by shared meaning, themastery of word semantics,metarepresentation and metamentation aremental abilities, uniquely human, that share a sense ofintentionality or reference. The latteris developed by a naive psychology or interpretation – acompetence dedicated to representingintentional relations between conspecifics and the world. Theidea that interpretation builds new mentalabilities around a sense of reference is based on three linesof analysis – conceptual, psychological andevolutionary. The conceptual analysis reveals that a senseof reference is at the heart of the abilitiesin question. Psychological data track tight developmentalcorrelations between interpretation and theabilities it designs. Finally, an evolutionary hypothesislooks at why interpretation designed thosenew abilities around a sense of reference
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/synt/2001/00000129/00000002/00322208
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/k48xm0j332453018/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=322208&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/K48XM0J332453018.pdf
  
• Radu Bogdan (2005). Why self-ascriptions are difficult and develop late.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Many philosophers and a few psychologists think that we understand our own minds before we understand those of others. Most developmental psychologists think that children understand their own minds at about the same time they understand other minds, by using the same cognitive abilities. I disagree with both views. I think that children understand other minds before they understand their own. Their self-understanding depends on some cognitive abilities that develop later than, and independently of, the abilities involved in understanding other minds. This is the general theme of this chapter
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.guilford.com/cgi-bin/cartscript.cgi?page=pr/malle.htm&dir=pp/sapp&cart_id=36604.15755
  
• Radu Bogdan (2003). Watch your metastep: The first-order limits of early intentional attributions.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: There is a wide and puzzleful gap between the child’s mastery of first- and recursive or higher-order attributions of attitudes, measured not only in years but also in the cognitive resources involved. Some accounts explain the gap in terms of the maturation of the competencies involved, others invoke the slow development of enabling resources, such as short-term memory, the syntax of sentence embedding or sequential reasoning. All these accounts assume a continuity of competence between first- and higher-order attributions. I disagree and argue, with psychological and neuroscientific support, that there are two distinct (though developmentally overlapping and interacting) competencies, one metaintentional and the other metarepresentational. I focus below on the former and argue that it is egocentric, situated, nonpropositional and thus intrinsically limited to first-order attributions, even when all the enabling resources are in place
• Peter Carruthers (1996). Autism as mindblindness: An elaboration and partial defence.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In this chapter I defend the mind-blindness theory of autism, by showing how it can accommodate data which might otherwise appear problematic for it. Specifically, I show how it can explain the fact that autistic children rarely engage in spontaneous pretend-play, and also how it can explain the executive-function deficits which are characteristic of the syndrome. I do this by emphasising what I take to be an entailment of the mind-blindness theory, that autistic subjects have difficulties of access to their own mental states, as well as to the mental states of other people
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/1193/0/autism.htm
  http://cogprints.org/1193/00/autism.htm
  http://www.philosophy.umd.edu/Faculty/pcarruthers/Autism.htm
  
• Peter Carruthers (1996). Simulation and self-knowledge: A defence of the theory-theory.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In this chapter I attempt to curb the pretensions of simulationism. I argue that it is, at best, an epistemological doctrine of limited scope. It may explain how we go about attributing beliefs and desires to others, and perhaps to ourselves, in some cases. But simulation cannot provide the fundamental basis of our conception of, or knowledge of, minded agency
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/1194/0/Simula~1.htm
  http://cogprints.org/1194/00/Simula~1.htm
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00001194/
  http://cogprints.soton.ac.uk/documents/disk0/00/00/11/94/
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:1194
  
• Joseph Cruz (1998). Mindreading: Mental state ascription and cognitive architecture.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The debate between the theory-theory and simulation has largely ignored issues of cognitive architecture. In the philosophy of psychology, cognition as symbol manipulation is the orthodoxy. The challenge from connectionism, however, has attracted vigorous and renewed interest. In this paper I adopt connectionism as the antecedent of a conditional: If connectionism is the correct account of cognitive architecture, then the simulation theory should be preferred over the theory-theory. I use both developmental evidence and constraints on explanation in psychology to support this claim
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/mila/1998/00000013/00000003/art00079
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/mila/1998/00000013/00000003/art00001
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/1468-0017.00079
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1468-0017.00079
  
• Martin Davies & Tony Stone (2003). Psychological understanding and social skills.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In B. Repacholi and V. Slaughter (eds), _Individual Differences in Theory of Mind: Implications for Typical and Atypical_ _Development_. Macquarie Monographs in Cognitive Science. Hove, E. Sussex: Psychology Press, 2003.
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.lsbu.ac.uk/psycho/teaching/pdf/Psychological-Understanding.pdf
  
• Naomi Eilan (2005). Joint Attention, Communication, and Mind.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Sometime around their first birthday most infants begin to engage in relatively sustained bouts of attending together with their caretakers to objects in their environment. By the age of 18 months, on most accounts, they are engaging in full-blown episodes of joint attention. As developmental psychologists (usually) use the term, for such joint attention to be in play, it is not sufficient that the infant and the adult are in fact attending to the same object, nor that the one’s attention cause the other’s. The latter can and does happen much earlier, whenever the adult follows the baby’s gaze and homes in on the same object as the baby is attending to; or, from the age of six months, when babies begin to follow the gaze of an adult. We have the relevant sense of joint attention in play only when the fact that both child and adult are attending to the same object is, to use Sperber and Wilson’s (1986) phrase, ‘mutually manifest’. Psychologists sometimes speak of such jointness as a case of attention being ‘shared’ by infant and adult, or of a ‘meeting of minds’ between infant and adult, all phrases intended to capture the idea that when joint attention occurs everything about the fact that both subjects are attending to the same object is out in the open, manifest to both participants
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=Pj-Tlf_MvKMC&oi=fnd&pg=PA1&ots=G_tnmf8Pm7&sig=-e5_GNR0_zBWgGdpHIxz0GEqfnw
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=DTJMtuAXH6QC&oi=fnd&pg=PA1&ots=4N0eM5eQ5H&sig=6YQcuoLQRN5JSYUfWjx_RPGnbwc
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=Pj-Tlf_MvKMC&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&ots=G_tnmf8Pjg&sig=jQnV2tGdLIasX58LveGlc38WwjU
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=DTJMtuAXH6QC&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&ots=4N0eM5eQ2Q&sig=1w0cVUSuECcWbfUe99rL8ulQfxM
  
• Shaun Gallagher (2004). Understanding interpersonal problems in autism: Interaction theory as an alternative to theory of mind.   (More)
• Michael Gazzaniga & Shaun Gallagher (1998). The neuronal platonist.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Psychology is dead. The self is a fiction invented by the brain. Brain plasticity isn’t all it’s cracked up to be. Our conscious learning is an observation post factum, a recollection of something already accomplished by the brain. We don’t learn to speak; speech is generated when the brain is ready to say something. False memories are more prevalent than one might think, and they aren’t all that bad. We think we’re in charge of our lives, but actually we are not. On top of all this, the common belief that reading to a young child will make her brain more attuned to reading is simply untrue
• Tamar Gendler (2003). On the relation between pretense and belief.   (More)
• Philip Gerrans (1998). The norms of cognitive development.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.arts.adelaide.edu.au/humanities/people/philosophy/gerrans_preprints/ml1998.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/mila/1998/00000013/00000001/art00006
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/mila/1998/00000013/00000001/art00065
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1468-0017.00065
  
• Daniel Hutto (2004). Folk psychological narratives and the case of autism.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ajol.info/viewarticle.php?id=14007&jid=190
  http://www.ajol.info/viewarticle.php?id=14007&jid=190&layout=abstract
  
• Robyn Langdon, Martin Davies & Max Coltheart (2002). Understanding minds and understanding communicated meanings in schizophrenia.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Cognitive neuropsychology is that branch of cognitive psychology that investi- gates people with acquired or developmental disorders of cognition. The aim is to learn more about how cognitive systems normally operate or about how they are normally acquired by studying selective patterns of cognitive break- down after brain damage or selective difficulties in acquiring particular cogni- tive abilities. In the early days of modern cognitive neuropsychology, research focused on rather basic cognitive abilities such as speech comprehension or production at the single-word level, reading and spelling, object and face recognition, and short-term memory. More recently the cognitive-neuro- psychological approach has been applied to the study of rather more complex domains of cognition such as belief fixation (e.g. Coltheart and Davies, 2000; Langdon and Coltheart, 2000) and pragmatic aspects of communication (e.g. McDonald and Van Sommers, 1993). Our paper concerns the investigation of pragmatic disorders in one clinical group in which such disorders are common, patients with schizophrenia, and what the study of such people can tell us about the normal processes of communication
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/mila/2002/00000017/F0020001/art00190
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/1468-0017.00190
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1468-0017.00190
  
• Heidi Maibom (2007). Social systems.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: It used to be thought that folk psychology is the only game in town. Focusing merely on what people do will not allow you to predict what they are likely to do next. For that, you must consider their beliefs, desires, intentions, etc. Recent evidence from developmental psychology and fMRI studies indicates that this conclusion was premature. We parse motion in an environment as behavior of a particular type, and behavior thus construed can feature in systematizations that we know. Building on the view that folk psychological knowledge is knowledge of theoretical models, I argue that social knowledge is best understood as lying on a continuum between behavioral and full-blown psychological models. Between the two extremes, we have what I call social models. Social models represent social structures in terms of their overall purpose and circumscribe individuals' roles within them. These models help us predict what others will do or plan what we should do without providing information about what agents think or want. Thinking about social knowledge this way gives us a more nuanced picture of what capacities are engaged in social planning and interaction, and gives us a better tool with which to think about the social knowledge of animals and young children
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/./ftinterface~content=a782007306~fulltext=713240930
  http://www.informaworld.com/index/782007306.pdf
  
• Bertram Malle (2005). Folk Theory of Mind: Conceptual Foundations of Human Social Cognition.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00003315/
  
• Shaun Nichols (2001). Mindreading and the cognitive architecture underlying altruistic motivation.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In recent attempts to characterize the cognitive mechanisms underlying altruistic motivation, one central question is the extent to which the capacity for altruism depends on the capacity for understanding other minds, or ‘mindreading’. Some theorists maintain that the capacity for altruism is independent of any capacity for mindreading; others maintain that the capacity for altruism depends on fairly sophisticated mindreading skills. I argue that none of the prevailing accounts is adequate. Rather, I argue that altruistic motivation depends on a basic affective system, a ‘Concern Mechanism’, which requires only a minimal capacity for mindreading
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/mila/2001/00000016/00000004/art00004
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/mila/2001/00000016/00000004/art00178
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/1468-0017.00178/abs/
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1468-0017.00178
  
• Shaun Nichols (web). Mindreading and the philosophy of mind.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In J. Prinz (ed.) The Oxford Handbook on Philosophy of Psychology. New York: Oxford University Press
• Anna Papafragou (2002). Mindreading and verbal communication.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://papafragou.psych.udel.edu/papers/mind.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/mila/2002/00000017/F0020001/art00189
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/1468-0017.00189
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1468-0017.00189
  
• Christopher Peacocke (2005). Joint attention: Its nature, reflexivity, and relation to common knowledge.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Two parents are watching their son take his first upright steps in learning to walk. Here we have a paradigm of joint attention. The two parents are attending to their son; they are aware of each other’s attention to their son; and all this attention is wholly overt. Everything is in the open, nothing is hidden. In what does this openness consist? Can we characterize it explicitly, without using metaphors?
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=Pj-Tlf_MvKMC&oi=fnd&pg=PA298&dq=Joint+attention+Peacocke&ots=G_tnmg-Sqe&sig=7Coo41EWeonY0WF1wCfXUIoK-wk
  
• Johannes Roessler (2005). Joint attention and the problem of other minds.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=Pj-Tlf_MvKMC&oi=fnd&pg=PA230&ots=G_tnmg-Tm8&sig=piysg_rhpVSOMI25FMBtAiG4GA0
  
• Brian Scholl & Alan Leslie (1999). Modularity, development and "theory of mind".   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Psychologists and philosophers have recently been exploring whether the mechanisms which underlie the acquisition of ‘theory of mind’ (ToM) are best charac- terized as cognitive modules or as developing theories. In this paper, we attempt to clarify what a modular account of ToM entails, and why it is an attractive type of explanation. Intuitions and arguments in this debate often turn on the role of _develop-_ _ment_: traditional research on ToM focuses on various developmental sequences, whereas cognitive modules are thought to be static and ‘anti-developmental’. We suggest that this mistaken view relies on an overly limited notion of modularity, and we explore how ToM might be grounded in a cognitive module and yet still afford development. Modules must ‘come on-line’, and even fully developed modules may still develop _internally_, based on their constrained input. We make these points con- crete by focusing on a recent proposal to capture the development of ToM in a module via _parameterization_
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.cs.colorado.edu/~ctg/classes/lib/cogsci/scholl.pdf
  http://ruccs.rutgers.edu/~aleslie/99-Scholl-Leslie-MindLang.pdf
  http://www.cs.colorado.edu/~duck/ctg/classes/lib/cogsci/scholl.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/mila/1999/00000014/00000001/art00106
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1468-0017.00106?favorite=add
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/1468-0017.00106
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1468-0017.00106
  
• Eric Schwitzgebel (1999). Children's theories and the drive to explain.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.faculty.ucr.edu/~eschwitz/SchwitzAbs/ChsThs.htm
  http://eric.ed.gov/ERICWebPortal/recordDetail?accno=EJ593848
  http://www.faculty.ucr.edu/~eschwitz/SchwitzPapers/ChsThs.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/R3V812R1GP32166T.pdf
  
• Eric Schwitzgebel (1999). Gradual belief change in children.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.karger.com/doi/10.1159/000022637
  http://www.faculty.ucr.edu/~eschwitz/SchwitzAbs/GradBel.htm
  http://www.faculty.ucr.edu/~eschwitz/SchwitzPapers/GradBel.pdf
  http://content.karger.com/ProdukteDB/produkte.asp?Aktion=ShowPDF&ProduktNr=224249&Ausgabe=225903&ArtikelNr=22637
  http://content.karger.com/ProdukteDB/produkte.asp?Aktion=ShowPDF&ProduktNr=224249&Ausgabe=225903&ArtikelNr=22637&filename=22637.pdf
  http://content.karger.com/ProdukteDB/produkte.asp?Aktion=ShowPDF&ArtikelNr=22637&ProduktNr=224249&Ausgabe=225903&filename=22637.pdf
  
• Eric Schwitzgebel (1997). Words About Young Minds: The Concepts of Theory, Representation, and Belief in Philosophy and Developmental Psychology.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In this dissertation, I examine three philosophically important concepts that play a foundational role in developmental psychology: theory, representation, and belief. I describe different ways in which the concepts have been understood and present reasons why a developmental psychologist, or a philosopher attuned to cognitive development, should prefer one understanding of these concepts over another
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.faculty.ucr.edu/~eschwitz/SchwitzPapers/Diss.pdf
  http://webspace.utexas.edu/deverj/personal/test/youngminds.pdf
  https://webspace.utexas.edu/deverj/personal/test/youngminds.pdf
  
• Kim Sterelny (2004). The triumph of a reasonable man: Stich, mindreading, and nativism.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Humans interpret others. We are able to anticipate both the actions and intentional states of other agents. We do not do so perfectly, but since we are complex and flexible creatures even limited success needs explanation. For some years now Steve Stich (frequently in collaboration with Shaun Nichols) has been both participant in, and observer of, debates about the foundation of these capacities (Stich and Nichols 1992; Stich and Nichols 1995). As a commentator on this debate, Stich (with Nichols) gave explicit and fair-minded sketches of the cognitive architectures presupposed by the various theories of mindreading. As a participant, Stich has mostly been a defender of the theory-theory, the view that normal human agents have an internally represented theory of other agents and they use that theory in interpreting other agents. The main recent rival to this position, simulationism, claims that agents use their own decision-making mechanisms as a model of those of other agents, and derive their predictions by modelling others in something like the way aeronautical engineers derive predictions from the use of scale models in wind-tunnels. Stich has been sceptical about this alternative, for on his view simulation theory makes mistaken predictions about both the development of interpretive competence and about the pattern of interpretive success and failure
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www2.vuw.ac.nz/phil/staff/sterelny-papers/stich.pdf
  http://www.vuw.ac.nz/phil/staff/documents/sterelny-papers/stich.pdf
  
• Stephen Stich & Shaun Nichols (2000). A cognitive theory of pretense.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Recent accounts of pretense have been underdescribed in a number of ways. In this paper, we present a much more explicit cognitive account of pretense. We begin by describing a number of real examples of pretense in children and adults. These examples bring out several features of pretense that any adequate theory of pretense must accommodate, and we use these features to develop our theory of pretense. On our theory, pretense representations are contained in a separate mental workspace, a Possible World Box which is part of the basic architecture of the human mind. The representations in the Possible World Box can have the same content as beliefs. Indeed, we suggest that pretense representations are in the same representational ``code'' as beliefs and that the representations in the Possible World Box are processed by the same inference and UpDating mechanisms that operate over real beliefs. Our model also posits a Script Elaborator which is implicated in the embellishment that occurs in pretense. Finally, we claim that the behavior that is seen in pretend play is motivated not from a ``pretend desire'', but from a real desire to act in a way that ®ts the description being constructed in the Possible World Box. We maintain that this account can accommodate the central features of pretense exhibited in the examples of pretense, and we argue that the alternative accounts either can't accommodate or fail to address entirely some of the central features of pretense. q 2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://ruccs.rutgers.edu/ArchiveFolder/Research Group/Publications/Rethink/rethink.html
  
• Thomas Suddendorf & Claire Fletcher-Flinn (1997). Theory of mind and the origins of divergent thinking.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The development of a `theory of mind' may not only be important for understanding the minds of others but also for using one's own mind. To investigate this supposition, forty children between the ages of three and four were given false-belief and creativity tasks. The numbers of appropriate and of original responses in the creativity test were found to correlate positively with performance on false-belief tasks. This association was robust, as it continued to be strong and significant even when age and verbal intelligence were partialled out. The results support the hypothesis that the metarepresentational skills involved in theory of mind also affect the way children can access and scan their own mental repertoire beyond the areas of currently activated content (i.e. divergent thinking). With the advent of theory of mind a basic cognitive shift takes place in human development, and possibly took place in cognitive evolution
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/727/00/TOM.txt
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000727/
  http://cogprints.soton.ac.uk/documents/disk0/00/00/07/27/
  http://eric.ed.gov/ERICWebPortal/recordDetail?accno=EJ555526
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:727
  
• Michael Tomasello & Hannes Rakoczy (2003). What makes human cognition unique? From individual to shared to collective intentionality.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://email.eva.mpg.de/~rakoczy/pdf/uniquely_human_M&L.pdf
  http://psych.colorado.edu/~colunga/langprosem/Readings/Tomasello+Rakocszy03.pdf
  http://anthropology.tamu.edu/faculty/alvard/anth630/reading/Week 12 Culture and intelligence 2/Tomasello and Rakoczy 2003.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/mila/2003/00000018/00000002/art00001
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1468-0017.00217
  
• Daniel Wegner, H. Gray & K. Gray (2007). Dimensions of mind perception.   (More)

36 displayed