Compiled by David Chalmers (Editor) and David Bourget (Assistant Editor), Australian National University. Part of MindPapers. Suggest an entry.

Javascript Menu by Deluxe-Menu.com
		click here for help on how to search

Search tips

There are three kinds of search you can perform:

All fields

This mode searches for entries containing all the entered words in their title, author, date, comment field, or in any of many other fields showing on MindPapers pages.

Surname

This mode searches for entries containing the text string you entered in their author field. Note that the database does not have first names for all authors, so it is preferable to search only by surnames. If you search for a full name or a name with an initial, enter it in the format used internally by MindPapers, namely the "Lastname, Firstname" or "Lastname, F." format.

Advanced

This mode differs from the all fields mode in two respects. First, some information not publicly available on MindPapers is searched, e.g., abstracts and excerpts gathered by the MindPapers crawler, which are not always accurate but can help broaden one's search. Second, you may prefix any term with a '+' or '-' to narrow the search to entries containing it or not containing it, respectively. Terms which are not prefixed by a '+' are not mandatory. Instead, they are weighed depending on their frequency in order to determine the best search results. You may also search for a literal string composed of several words by putting them in double quotation marks (").

Note that short and / or common words are ignored by the search engine.

Try MindPapers to find published items which are available on a subscription basis.

close help

Philosophy of cognitive science :: Issues in cognitive science :: Modularity

• Clark Barrett (2005). Enzymatic computation and cognitive modularity.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Currently, there is widespread skepticism that higher cognitive processes, given their apparent flexibility and globality, could be carried out by specialized computational devices, or modules. This skepticism is largely due to Fodor’s influential definition of modularity. From the rather flexible catalogue of possible modular features that Fodor originally proposed has emerged a widely held notion of modules as rigid, informationally encapsulated devices that accept highly local inputs and whose opera- tions are insensitive to context. It is a mistake, however, to equate such features with computational devices in general and therefore to assume, as Fodor does, that higher cognitive processes must be non-computational. Of the many possible non-Fodorean architectures, one is explored here that offers possible solutions to computational problems faced by conventional modular systems: an ‘enzymatic’ architecture. Enzymes are computational devices that use lock-and-key template matching to iden- tify relevant information (substrates), which is then operated upon and returned to a common pool for possible processing by other devices. Highly specialized enzymes can operate together in a common pool of information that is not pre-sorted by information type. Moreover, enzymes can use molecular ‘tags’ to regulate the operations of other devices and to change how particular substrates are construed and operated upon, allowing for highly interactive, context-specific processing. This model shows how specialized, modular processing can occur in an open system, and suggests that skepti- cism about modularity may largely be due to failure to consider alternatives to the standard model
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://repositories.cdlib.org/postprints/1124/
  http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/anthro/faculty/barrett/barrett-enzymes.pdf
  http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3210&context=postprints
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.0268-1064.2005.00285.x
  
• Clark Barrett & R. Kurzban (2006). Modularity in cognition: Framing the debate.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Modularity has been the subject of intense debate in the cognitive sciences for more than 2 decades. In some cases, misunderstandings have impeded conceptual progress. Here the authors identify arguments about modularity that either have been abandoned or were never held by proponents of modular views of the mind. The authors review arguments that purport to undermine modularity, with particular attention on cognitive architecture, development, genetics, and evolution. The authors propose that modularity, cleanly defined, provides a useful framework for directing research and resolving debates about individual cognitive systems and the nature of human evolved cognition. Modularity is a fundamental property of living things at every level of organization; it might prove indispensable for understanding the structure of the mind as well
• H. Clark Barrett (2005). Enzymatic computation and cognitive modularity.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Currently, there is widespread skepticism that higher cognitive processes, given their apparent flexibility and globality, could be carried out by specialized computational devices, or modules. This skepticism is largely due to Fodor’s influential definition of modularity. From the rather flexible catalogue of possible modular features that Fodor originally proposed has emerged a widely held notion of modules as rigid, informationally encapsulated devices that accept highly local inputs and whose opera- tions are insensitive to context. It is a mistake, however, to equate such features with computational devices in general and therefore to assume, as Fodor does, that higher cognitive processes must be non-computational. Of the many possible non-Fodorean architectures, one is explored here that offers possible solutions to computational problems faced by conventional modular systems: an ‘enzymatic’ architecture. Enzymes are computational devices that use lock-and-key template matching to iden- tify relevant information (substrates), which is then operated upon and returned to a common pool for possible processing by other devices. Highly specialized enzymes can operate together in a common pool of information that is not pre-sorted by information type. Moreover, enzymes can use molecular ‘tags’ to regulate the operations of other devices and to change how particular substrates are construed and operated upon, allowing for highly interactive, context-specific processing. This model shows how specialized, modular processing can occur in an open system, and suggests that skepti- cism about modularity may largely be due to failure to consider alternatives to the standard model
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://repositories.cdlib.org/postprints/1124
  http://repositories.cdlib.org/postprints/1124/
  http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/anthro/faculty/barrett/barrett-enzymes.pdf
  http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3210&context=postprints
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.0268-1064.2005.00285.x
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/mila/2005/00000020/00000003/art00001
  
• Mark Bickhard (2003). An integration of motivation and cognition.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpsoc/dmjp/2003/00000001/00000001/art00005
  
• Peter Carruthers (2008). An architecture for dual reasoning.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In J. Evans and K. Frankish (eds.), In Two Minds: dual processes and beyond. Oxford University Press, 2008. (In draft.)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.philosophy.umd.edu/Faculty/pcarruthers/Architecture%20for%20Dual%20Reasoning.pdf
  
• Peter Carruthers (2003). Is the mind a system of modules shaped by natural selection?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This chapter defends the positive thesis which constitutes its title. It argues first, that the mind has been shaped by natural selection; and second, that the result of that shaping process is a modular mental architecture. The arguments presented are all broadly empirical in character, drawing on evidence provided by biologists, neuroscientists and psychologists (evolutionary, cognitive, and developmental), as well as by researchers in artificial intelligence. Yet the conclusion is at odds with the manifest image of ourselves provided both by introspection and by common-sense psychology. The chapter concludes by sketching how a modular architecture might be developed to account for the patently unconstrained character of human thought, which has served as an assumption in a number of recent philosophical attacks on mental modularity
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://philosophy.georgetown.edu/news_events/papers_2002-2003/shaped_modules.rtf
  
• Peter Carruthers (2006). Simple heuristics meet massive modularity.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This chapter investigates the extent to which claims of massive modular organization of the mind (espoused by some members of the evolutionary psychology research program) are consistent with the main elements of the simple heuristics research program. A number of potential sources of conflict between the two programs are investigated and defused. However, the simple heuristics program turns out to undermine one of the main arguments offered in support of massive modularity, at least as the latter is generally understood by philosophers. So one result of the argument will be to force us to re-examine the way in which the notion of modularity in cognitive science should best be characterized, if the thesis of massive modularity isn’t to be abandoned altogether. What is at stake in this discussion, is whether there is a well-motivated notion of ‘module’ such that we have good reason to think that the human mind must be massively modular in its organization. I shall be arguing (in the end) that there is
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.philosophy.umd.edu/Faculty/pcarruthers/Simple-heuristics.pdf
  
• Peter Carruthers (2006). The case for massively modular models of mind.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: My charge in this chapter is to set out the positive case supporting massively modular models of the human mind.1 Unfortunately, there is no generally accepted understanding of what a massively modular model of the mind is. So at least some of our discussion will have to be terminological. I shall begin by laying out the range of things that can be meant by ‘modularity’. I shall then adopt a pair of strategies. One will be to distinguish some things that ‘modularity’ definitely can’t mean, if the thesis of massive modularity is to be even remotely plausible. The other will be to look at some of the arguments that have been offered in support of massive modularity, discussing what notion of ‘module’ they might warrant. It will turn out that there is, indeed, a strong case in support of massively modular models of the mind on one reasonably natural understanding of ‘module’. But what really matters in the end, of course, is the substantive question of what sorts of structure are adequate to account for the organization and operations of the human mind, not whether or not the components appealed to in that account get described as ‘modules’. So the more interesting question before us is what the arguments that have been offered in support of massive modularity can succeed in showing us about those structures, whatever they get called
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/oso/taotm/2006/00000001/00000001/art00001
  
• N. K. Logothetis D. A. Leopold (1999). Multistable phenomena: Changing views in perception.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Traditional explanations of multistable visual phenomena (e.g. ambiguous figures, perceptual rivalry) suggest that the basis for spontaneous reversals in perception lies in antagonistic connectivity within the visual system. In this review, we suggest an alternative, albeit speculative. explanation for visual multistability - that spontaneous alternations reflect responses to active, programmed events initiated by brain areas that integrate sensory and non-sensory information to coordinate a diversity of behaviors. Much evidence suggests that perceptual reversals are themselves more closely related to the expression of a behavior than to passive sensory responses: (1) they are initiated spontaneously, often voluntarily, and are influenced by subjective variables such as attention and mood; (2) the alternation process is greatly facilitated with practice and compromised by lesions in non- visual cortical areas; (3) the alternation process has temporal dynamics similar to those of spontaneously initiated behaviors; (4) functional imaging reveals that brain areas associated with a variety of cognitive behaviors are specifically activated when vision becomes unstable. In this scheme, reorganizations of activity throughout the visual cortex, concurrent with perceptual reversals, are initiated by higher, largely non- sensory brain centers. Such direct intervention In the processing of the sensory input by brain structures associated with planning and motor programming might serve an important role in perceptual organization, particularly in aspects related to selective attention
• Jerry Fodor (1986). The modularity of mind.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=e7nrSeibJZYC&oi=fnd&pg=PP11&ots=olYK_zXHbY&sig=G192IInba3L-Xe9YhZmWItFOvzY
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=e7nrSeibJZYC&oi=fnd&pg=PP11&ots=olZHVyTC9-&sig=YJwA2IJN6GSKy3uagbiZ2lxjAjE
  http://ruccs.rutgers.edu/forums/seminar3_spring05/Fodor_1983.pdf
  http://www.getabstract.com/www/general/ShowAbstract.jsp?dataId=4643
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=e7nrSeibJZYC&oi=fnd&pg=PP11&ots=olZIWuWA7_&sig=SkqIZ9W_QqsVZXL_vbN-kbqDweA
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=e7nrSeibJZYC&oi=fnd&pg=PP11&ots=olYK1zTH80&sig=kTK0NyEYMhINuvWZjTYqOg_ipyM
  
• K. Moutoussis, G. A. Keliris, Z. Kourtzi & N. K. Logothetis (2005). A binocular rivalry study of motion perception in the human brain.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The relationship between brain activity and conscious visual experience is central to our understanding of the neural mechanisms underlying perception. Binocular rivalry, where monocular stimuli compete for perceptual dominance, has been previously used to dissociate the constant stimulus from the varying percept. We report here fMRI results from humans experiencing binocular rivalry under a dichoptic stimulation paradigm that consisted of two drifting random dot patterns with different motion coherence. Each pattern had also a different color, which both enhanced rivalry and was used for reporting which of the two patterns was visible at each time. As the perception of the subjects alternated between coherent motion and motion noise, we examined the effect that these alternations had on the strength of the MR signal throughout the brain. Our results demonstrate that motion perception is able to modulate the activity of several of the visual areas which are known to be involved in motion processing. More specifically, in addition to area V5 which showed the strongest modulation, a higher activity during the perception of motion than during the perception of noise was also clearly observed in areas V3A and LOC, and less so in area V3. In previous studies, these areas had been selectively activated by motion stimuli but whether their activity reflects motion perception or not remained unclear; here we show that they are involved in motion perception as well. The present findings therefore suggest a lack of a clear distinction between ‘processing’ versus ‘perceptual’ areas in the brain, but rather that the areas involved in the processing of a specific visual attribute are also part of the neuronal network that is collectively responsible for its perceptual representation
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://psg275.bham.ac.uk/cnil/pdfs/zk_VR_05.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=15924938&dopt=Citation
  http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0042698905001069
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/sites/entrez?db=pubmed&uid=15924938&cmd=showdetailview&indexed=google
  
• Edouard Machery (online). Massive modularity and brain evolution.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Quartz (2002) argues that some recent findings about the evolution of the brain (Finlay & Darlington, 1995) are inconsistent with evolutionary psychologists’ massive modularity hypothesis. In substance, Quartz contends that since the volume of the neocortex evolved in a concerted manner, natural selection did not act on neocortical systems independently of each other, which is a necessary condition for the massive modularity of our cognition to be true. I argue however that Quartz’s argument fails to undermine the massive modularity hypothesis
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00002972/
  http://www.pitt.edu/~machery/papers/Evolutionary Psychology and Brain Evolution_PSA_2006_machery.pdf
  http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00002972/01/Evolutionary_Psychology_and_Brain_Evolution_PSA_2006_machery.pdf
  http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/full/10.1086/525624
  
• Alexander Maier, Melanie Wilke, Nikos Logothetis & David Leopold (2003). Perception of temporally interleaved ambiguous patterns.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Background: Continuous viewing of ambiguous patterns is characterized by wavering perception that alternates between two or more equally valid visual solutions. However, when such patterns are viewed intermittently, either by repetitive presentation or by periodic closing of the eyes, perception can become locked or "frozen" in one configuration for several minutes at a time. One aspect of this stabilization is the possible existence of a perceptual memory that persists during periods in which the ambiguous stimulus is absent. Here, we use a novel paradgim of temporally interleaved ambiguous stimuli to explore the nature of this memory, with particular regard to its potential impact on perceptual organization. Results: We found that the persistence of a perceptual configuration was robust to interposed visual patterns and, further, that at least three ambiguous patterns, when interleaved in time, could undergo parallel, stable time courses. Then, using an interleaved presentation paradigm, we established that the occasional reversal in one pattern could be coupled with that of its interleaved counterpart, and that this coupling was a function of the structural similarity between the patterns. Conclusions: We postulate that the stabilization observed with repetitive presentation of ambiguous patterns can be at least partially accounted for by processes that retain a recent perceptual interpretation, and we speculate that such memory may be important in natural vision. We further propose tha the interleaved paradigm introduced here may be of great value to gauge aspects of stimulus similarity that appeal to particular mechanisms of perceptual organization
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.current-biology.com/content/article/fulltext?uid=PIIS0960982203004147
  https://www.current-biology.com/content/article/fulltext?uid=PIIS0960982203004147
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=12842006&dopt=Abstract
  http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0960982203004147
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=12842006&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/09609822/2003/00000013/00000013/art00414
  
• Matteo Mameli (2002). Modules and mindreaders.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: There are many interesting empirical and theoretical issues concerning the evolution of cognition. Despite this, recent books on the topic concentrate on two problems. One is mental modularity. The other is what distinguishes human from non-human minds. While it is easy to understand why people are interested in human uniqueness, it is not clear why modularity is the centre of attention. Fodor (2000) has a nice argument for why people _should_ be interested in modularity
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/R74J5078K853WK5X.pdf
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=334262&PDF=1
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/biph/2001/00000016/00000003/00334262
  
• Ron McClamrock (2003). Modularity.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Marr (for whom the boundary of the visual module the cognitive impenetrability of the systems of
• Jesse Prinz (2006). Is the mind really modular?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: When Fodor titled his (1983) book the _Modularity of Mind_, he overstated his position. His actual view is that the mind divides into systems some of which are modular and others of which are not. The book would have been more aptly, if less provocatively, called _The Modularity of Low-Level Peripheral Systems_. High-level perception and cognitive systems are non-modular on Fodor’s theory. In recent years, modularity has found more zealous defenders, who claim that the entire mind divides into highly specialized modules. This view has been especially popular among Evolutionary Psychologists. They claim that the mind is massively modular (Cosmides and Tooby, 1994; Sperber, 1994; Pinker, 1997; see also Samuels, 1998). Like a Swiss Army Knife, the mind is an assembly of specialized tools, each of which has been designed for some particular purpose. My goal here is to raise doubts about both peripheral modularity and massive modularity. To do that, I will rely on the criteria for modularity laid out by Fodor (1983). I will argue that neither input systems, nor central systems are modular on any of these criteria
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.unc.edu/~prinz/PrinzModularity.pdf
  
• Richard Samuels (2006). Is the human mind massively modular?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Among the most pervasive and fundamental assumptions in cognitive science is that the human mind (or mind-brain) is a mechanism of some sort: a physical device com- posed of functionally specifiable subsystems. On this view, functional decomposition – the analysis of the overall system into functionally specifiable parts – becomes a central project for a science of the mind, and the resulting theories of cognitive archi- tecture essential to our understanding of human psychology
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.kcl.ac.uk/kis/schools/hums/philosophy/staff/r_samuels_papers/Is_the_mind_MM.pdf
  http://kcl.ac.uk/kis/schools/hums/philosophy/staff/r_samuels_papers/Is_the_mind_MM.pdf
  
• Richard Samuels (2000). Massively modular minds: Evolutionary psychology and cognitive architecture.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: What are the elements from which the human mind is composed? What structures make up our _cognitive architecture?_ One of the most recent and intriguing answers to this question comes from the newly emerging interdisciplinary field of evolutionary psychology. Evolutionary psychologists defend a _massively modular_ conception of mental architecture which views the mind –including those parts responsible for such ‘central processes’ as belief revision and reasoning— as composed largely or perhaps even entirely of innate, special-purpose computational mechanisms or ‘modules’ that have been shaped by natural selection to handle the sorts of recurrent information processing problems that confronted our hunter-gatherer forebears (Cosmides and Tooby,192; Sperber, 1994; Samuels, 1998a)
• Lee Spector (2002). Hierarchy helps it work that way.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Jerry Fodor argues, in The mind doesn't work that way (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000, that the computational theory of mind is undermined by the pervasive context sensitivity of human cognition. His objections can be easily met, however, by noting the properties of appropriately structured representation hierarchies
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://hampshire.edu/lspector/pubs/spector-hierarchy.pdf
  http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/index/QLCQR04LXJLPUM31.pdf
  http://www.informaworld.com/index/QLCQR04LXJLPUM31.pdf
  http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/./ftinterface~content=a713690560~fulltext=713240930
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/routledg/cphp/2002/00000015/00000002/art00001
  
• Dan Sperber (2002). In defense of massive modularity.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.sign-lang.uni-hamburg.de/BibWeb/LiDat.acgi?ID=57615
  
• Dan Sperber (2005). Modularity and relevance: How can a massively modular mind be flexible and context-sensitive.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.arts.ualberta.ca/~amorton/gradsem06/Modularity and relevance.doc
  http://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/docs/00/05/35/22/HTML/
  http://www.dan.sperber.com/relevance and modularity.htm
  http://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/documents/disk0/00/00/04/49/ijn_00000449_00/ijn_00000449_00.htm
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/oso/tinnm/2005/00000001/00000001/art00005
  
• Kim Sterelny (2004). Language, modularity, and evolution.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Language is at the core of the cognitive revolution that has transformed that discipline over the last forty years or so, and it is also the central paradigm for the most prominent attempt to synthesise psychology and evolutionary theory. A single and distinctively modular view of language has emerged out of both these perspectives, one that encourages a certain idealisation. Linguistic competence is uniform, independent of other cognitive capacities, and with a developmental trajectory that is largely independent of environmental input (Pinker 1994; Pinker 1997). Thus language is seen as a paradigm of John Tooby and Leda Cosmides’ concept of “evoked culture”: linguistic experience serves only to select a specific item from a menu of innately available options (Tooby and Cosmides 1992). In explaining this concept, they appeal to the metaphor of a jukebox. The human genome pre-stores a set of options, and the different experiences provided by different cultures select different elements out of this option set. I think an appropriate evolutionary perspective on language substantially undercuts this idealisation and the evoked culture model of language. Variability between speakers; the sensitivity of linguistic development to environmental input; and the limits of encapsulation are not noise. They are central to the language and its evolution
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.vuw.ac.nz/phil/staff/sterelny-papers/macdonald.pdf
  http://www.vuw.ac.nz/phil/staff/documents/sterelny-papers/macdonald.pdf
  http://www.victoria.ac.nz/phil/staff/documents/sterelny-papers/macdonald.pdf
  
• Daniel Weiskopf (2002). On Fodor's The Mind Doesn't Work That Way.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The "New Synthesis" in cognitive science is committed to the computational theory of mind (CTM), massive modularity, nativism, and adaptationism. In The mind doesn't work that way , Jerry Fodor argues that CTM has problems explaining abductive or global inference, but that the New Synthesis offers no solution, since massive modularity is in fact incompatible with global cognitive processes. I argue that it is not clear how global human mentation is, so whether CTM is imperiled is an open question. Massive modularity also lacks some of the invidious commitments Fodor ascribes to it. Furthermore, Fodor's anti-adaptationist arguments are in tension with his nativism about the contents of modular systems. The New Synthesis thus has points worth preserving
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/./ftinterface~content=a713690596~fulltext=713240930
  
• Robert Wilson (2008). The drink you have when you're not having a drink.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract:   The Architecture of the Mind is itself built on foundations that deserve probing. In this brief commentary I focus on these foundations—Carruthers’ conception of modularity, his arguments for thinking that the mind is massively modular in structure, and his view of human cognitive architecture
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-0017.2008.00343.x
  http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/120085766/PDFSTART
  
• Robert Wilson (2004). What computers (still, still) can't do: Jerry Fodor on computation and modularity.   (More)
• Robert Wilson (2004). What computations (still, still) can't do: Jerry Fodor on computation and modularity.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Fodor's thinking on modularity has been influential throughout a range of the areas studying cognition, chiefly as a prod for positive work on modularity and domain-specificity. In _The Mind Doesn't Work That Way_, Fodor has developed the dark message of _The Modularity of Mind_ regarding the limits to modularity and computational analyses. This paper offers a critical assessment of Fodor's scepticism with an eye to highlighting some broader issues in play, including the nature of computation and the role of recent empirical developments in the cognitive sciences in assessing Fodor's position

26 displayed