Compiled by David Chalmers (Editor) and David Bourget (Assistant Editor), Australian National University. Part of MindPapers. Suggest an entry.

Javascript Menu by Deluxe-Menu.com
		click here for help on how to search

Search tips

There are three kinds of search you can perform:

All fields

This mode searches for entries containing all the entered words in their title, author, date, comment field, or in any of many other fields showing on MindPapers pages.

Surname

This mode searches for entries containing the text string you entered in their author field. Note that the database does not have first names for all authors, so it is preferable to search only by surnames. If you search for a full name or a name with an initial, enter it in the format used internally by MindPapers, namely the "Lastname, Firstname" or "Lastname, F." format.

Advanced

This mode differs from the all fields mode in two respects. First, some information not publicly available on MindPapers is searched, e.g., abstracts and excerpts gathered by the MindPapers crawler, which are not always accurate but can help broaden one's search. Second, you may prefix any term with a '+' or '-' to narrow the search to entries containing it or not containing it, respectively. Terms which are not prefixed by a '+' are not mandatory. Instead, they are weighed depending on their frequency in order to determine the best search results. You may also search for a literal string composed of several words by putting them in double quotation marks (").

Note that short and / or common words are ignored by the search engine.

Try MindPapers to find published items which are available on a subscription basis.

close help

Philosophy of cognitive science :: Issues in cognitive science :: Embodiment and situated cognition

• Michael Anderson (2003). Embodied cognition: A field guide.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The nature of cognition is being re-considered. Instead of emphasizing formal operations on abstract symbols, the new approach foregrounds the fact that cognition is, rather, a situated activity, and suggests that thinking beings ought therefore be considered first and foremost as acting beings. The essay reviews recent work in Embodied Cognition, provides a concise guide to its principles, attitudes and goals, and identifies the physical grounding project as its central research focus
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://portal.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=947654
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/569831.html
  http://www.hum.utah.edu/~bbenham/Phil 3440 Website/Embodied Cognition Article.pdf
  http://www.cs.umd.edu/~mikeoda/papers/AI_Review.pdf
  http://www.dcs.shef.ac.uk/~amanda/anderson.pdf
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?id=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:3949
  http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0004-3702(03)00054-7
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00003949/01/aij1984.pdf
  http://cogprints.org/3949/1/aij1984.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/00043702/2003/00000149/00000001/art00054
  
• Michael Anderson (2006). Embodied cognition: The teenage years.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: A review of Gallagher, S. (2005). How the Body Shapes the Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/4712/01/Gallagher.pdf
  
• Dana Ballard (1991). Animate vision.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.cogsci.rochester.edu/users/faculty/nelson/pubs/abstracts/1989_optnews.html
  http://ftp.cs.rochester.edu/users/faculty/nelson/pubs/abstracts/1989_optnews.html
  http://www.cs.rochester.edu/users/faculty/nelson/pubs/abstracts/1989_optnews.html
  http://192.5.53.208/users/faculty/nelson/pubs/abstracts/1989_optnews.html
  http://portal.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=114341.114344
  
• Andy Clark (1999). Where brain, body and world collide.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: “Where Brain, Body, and World Collide” reprinted by permission of Daedalus, Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, from the issue entitled, “The Brain,” Spring 1998, Vol. 127, No. 2
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.era.lib.ed.ac.uk/handle/1842/1298
  http://pacherie.free.fr/COURS/DEC/clark - where brain body & world collide.pdf
  http://www.cogs.indiana.edu/andy/where.pdf
  http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&se=gglsc&d=5001347474
  http://www.era.lib.ed.ac.uk/handle/1842/1298?mode=full
  http://mitpress.mit.edu/catalog/item/default.asp?ttype=6&tid=14187
  http://www.philosophy.ed.ac.uk/staff/clark/pubs/where.pdf
  http://www.lehigh.edu/~mhb0/cogs7webreadings/clark.brainbodyworld.pdf
  http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S1389041799000029
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/13890417/1999/00000001/00000001/art00002
  
• Andy Clark (2005). Beyond the flesh: Some lessons from a Mole cricket.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: What do linguistic symbols do for minds like ours, and how (if at all) can basic embodied, dynamical and situated approaches do justice to high-level human thought and reason? These two questions are best addressed together, since our answers to the first may inform the second. The key move in ‘scaling-up’ simple embodied cognitive science is, I argue, to take very seriously the potent role of human-built structures in transforming the spaces of human learning and reason. In particular, in this paper I look at a range of cases involving what I dub ‘surrogate situations’. Here, we actively create restricted artificial environments that allow us to deploy basic perception-action- reason routines in the absence of their proper objects. Examples include the use of real-world models, diagrams and other concrete external symbols to support dense looping interactions with a variety of stable external structures that stand in for the absent states of affairs
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://mitpress.mit.edu/catalog/item/default.asp?tid=18105&ttype=6
  http://portal.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1106258.1106264
  http://www.cogs.indiana.edu/andy/burrowspaper.pdf
  http://wexler.free.fr/library/files/clark (2006) beyond the flesh. some lessons from a mole cricket.pdf
  https://mitpress.mit.edu/catalog/item/default.asp?tid=18105&ttype=6
  https://www.era.lib.ed.ac.uk/handle/1842/1304
  http://www.era.lib.ed.ac.uk/handle/1842/1304
  http://mitpress.mit.edu/catalog/item/default.asp?ttype=6&tid=18105
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/sites/entrez?db=pubmed&uid=15811229&cmd=showdetailview&indexed=google
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=15811229&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/mitpress/ali/2005/00000011/F0020001/art00014
  
• Andy Clark (1997). Embodiment and the philosophy of mind.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.philosophy.ed.ac.uk/staff/clark/pubs/embmnd.pdf
  http://www.cogs.indiana.edu/iacs/clark.pdf
  https://www.era.lib.ed.ac.uk/handle/1842/1299
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=zYEPifPTQK4C&oi=fnd&pg=PA35&ots=JV2Y-nLQmX&sig=4N3UbsaSe2R7cGvTLr47NaxQJbg
  
• Andy Clark (1998). Embodiment and the philosophy of mind.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Cambridge University Press:1998) P. 35-52. To be reprinted in Alberto Peruzzi (ed) MIND
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.philosophy.ed.ac.uk/staff/clark/pubs/embmnd.pdf
  http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=zYEPifPTQK4C&oi=fnd&pg=PA35&ots=JV2Y-nLSj_&sig=nSWRw4wSd-P38O0hyqZwwf3lF54
  http://www.cogs.indiana.edu/iacs/clark.pdf
  https://www.era.lib.ed.ac.uk/handle/1842/1299
  
• Andy Clark (1999). An embodied cognitive science?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The last ten years have seen an increasing interest, within cognitive science, in issues concerning the physical body, the local environment, and the complex interplay between neural systems and the wider world in which they function. “Physically embodied, environmentally embedded” approaches thus loom large on the contemporary cognitive scientific scene. Yet many unanswered questions remain, and the shape of a genuinely embodied, embedded science of the mind is still unclear. I begin by sketching a few examples of the approach, and then raise a variety of critical questions concerning its nature and scope. A distinction is drawn between two kinds of appeal to embodiment: ‘simple’ cases, in which bodily and environmental properties merely constrain accounts that retain the focus on inner organization and processing, and more radical appeals, in which attention to bodily and environmental features is meant to transform both the subject matter and the theoretical framework of cognitive science
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://psychology.stanford.edu/~lera/273/Clark_TICS_1999.pdf
  http://www.philosophy.ed.ac.uk/staff/clark/pubs/TICSEmbodiment.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=10461197&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/13646613/1999/00000003/00000009/art01361
  
• Andy Clark (2001). Reasons, robots and the extended mind.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: A suitable project for the new Millenium is to radically reconfigure our image of human rationality. Such a project is already underway, within the Cognitive Sciences, under the umbrellas of work in Situated Cognition, Distributed and De-centralized Cogition, Real-world Robotics and Artificial Life1. Such approaches, however, are often criticized for giving certain aspects of rationality too wide a berth. They focus their attention on on such superficially poor cousins as “adaptive behaviour”, “ecologically sound perception-action routines”, “fast and frugal heuristics” and “fast, fluent real-time real-world action control”2. Is this robbery or revelation? Has 'embodied, embedded' cognitive science simply lost sight of the very phenomena it was meant to explain? Or are we finally seeing rationality aright, as fully continous with various forms of simpler, ecologically situated, adaptive response?
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.cse.unsw.edu.au/~tiinam/clark.pdf
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/599671.html
  http://www.philosophy.ed.ac.uk/staff/clark/pubs/mlrre.pdf
  http://www.cogs.indiana.edu/andy/mlrre.pdf
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/1468-0017.00162
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1468-0017.00162
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/mila/2001/00000016/F0020002/art00162
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/mila/2001/00000015/00000002/art00162
  
• Andy Clark & David Chalmers (1998). The extended mind.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Where does the mind stop and the rest of the world begin? The question invites two standard replies. Some accept the demarcations of skin and skull, and say that what is outside the body is outside the mind. Others are impressed by arguments suggesting that the meaning of our words "just ain't in the head", and hold that this externalism about meaning carries over into an externalism about mind. We propose to pursue a third position. We advocate a very different sort of externalism: an _active externalism_ , based on the active role of the environment in driving cognitive processes
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/320/0/extended.html
  http://www.era.lib.ed.ac.uk/handle/1842/1312
  http://philosophy.wisc.edu/shapiro/Phil554/PAPERS/THE EXTENDED MIND.htm
  http://wexler.free.fr/library/files/clark (1998) the extended mind.pdf
  https://www.era.lib.ed.ac.uk/handle/1842/1312
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:320
  http://www.lps.uci.edu/~johnsonk/philpsych/readings/clark.pdf
  http://consc.net/papers/extended.html
  http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/courses/concepts/clark.html
  http://www.cogs.indiana.edu/andy/TheExtendedMind.pdf
  http://www.philosophy.ed.ac.uk/staff/clark/pubs/TheExtendedMind.pdf
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000320/00/extended.html
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1467-8284.00096
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/anal/1998/00000058/00000257/art00096
  
• Giovanna Colombetti (web). Enaction, Sense-Making and Emotion.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: The theory of autopoiesis is central to the enactive approach. Recent works emphasize that the theory of autopoiesis is a theory of sense-making in living systems, i.e. of how living systems produce and consume meaning. In this chapter I first illustrate (some aspects of) these recent works, and interpret their notion of sense-making as a bodily cognitive- emotional form of understanding. Then I turn to modern emotion science, and I illustrate its tendency to over-intellectualize our capacity to evaluate and understand. I show that this overintellectualization goes hand in hand with the rejection of the idea that the body is a vehicle of meaning. I explain why I think that this over-intellectualization is problematic, and try to reconceptualize the notion of evaluation in emotion theory in a way that is consistent and continuous with the autopoietic notion of sense-making
• Adrian Cussins (1992). Content, embodiment, and objectivity: The theory of cognitive trails.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/101/404/651
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0026-4423(199210)2:101:404<651:CEAOTT>2.0.CO;2-Z
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2254446.pdf
  
• Hubert Dreyfus (online). Overcoming the myth of the mental: How philosophers can profit from the phenomenology of everyday expertise.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Back in 1950, while a physics major at Harvard, I wandered into C.I. Lewis’s epistemology course. There, Lewis was confidently expounding the need for an indubitable Given to ground knowledge, and he was explaining where that ground was to be found. I was so impressed that I immediately switched majors from ungrounded physics to grounded philosophy
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/A617140872RU3224.pdf
  
• Hubert Dreyfus (1996). The current relevance of Merleau-ponty's phenomenology of embodiment.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.itu.dk/people/angermann/speciale/litteratur/thecurrentrelevance.pdf
  http://ejap.louisiana.edu/EJAP/1996.spring/dreyfus.1996.spring.abs.html
  
• Shaun Gallagher (2005). Metzinger's matrix: Living the virtual life with a real body.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Is it possible to say that there is no real self if we take a non-Cartesian view of the body? Is it possible to say that an organism can engage in pragmatic action and intersubjective interaction and that the self generated in such activity is not real? This depends on how we define the concept "real". By taking a close look at embodied action, and at Metzinger's concept of embodiment, I want to argue that, on a non-Cartesian concept of reality, the self should be considered something real, and not simply an illusion
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://psyche.csse.monash.edu.au/symposia/metzinger/Gallagher.pdf
  
• Mark Johnson (1995). Incarnate mind.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract:   We are beings of the flesh. Our sensorimotor motor experience is the basis for the structure of our higher cognitive functions of conceptual cognition and reasoning. Consequently, our subjectivity is intimately tied up with the nature of our embodied experience. This runs directly counter to views of self-identity dominant in contemporary cognitive science. I give an account of how we ought to understand ourselves as incarnates, and how this would change our view of meaning, knowledge, reason, and subjectivity
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/lr827p6h3u417281/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/LR827P6H3U417281.pdf
  
• Nicholas Kushmerick (1997). Software agents and their bodies.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract:   Within artificial intelligence and the philosophy of mind,there is considerable disagreement over the relationship between anagent's body and its capacity for intelligent behavior. Some treatthe body as peripheral and tangential to intelligence; others arguethat embodiment and intelligence are inextricably linked. Softwareagents–-computer programs that interact with software environmentssuch as the Internet–-provide an ideal context in which to studythis tension. I develop a computational framework for analyzingembodiment. The framework generalizes the notion of a body beyondmerely having a physical presence. My analysis sheds light oncertain claims made about the relevance of the body to intelligence,as well as on embodiment in software worlds
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://kushmerick.org/nick/research/download/kushmerick-mm97.ps.gz
  http://www.csa.com/partners/viewrecord.php?requester=gs&collection=TRD&recid=322377CI
  http://portal.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=596734
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/x88n817q72255022/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/X88N817Q72255022.pdf
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=115553&PDF=1
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/mind/1997/00000007/00000002/00115553
  
• L. A. Loren & Eric Dietrich (1997). Merleau-ponty, embodied cognition, and the problem of intentionality.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/index/1AUCYDPQJ1A7XDQ0.pdf
  http://www.informaworld.com/index/1AUCYDPQJ1A7XDQ0.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/tandf/ucbs/1997/00000028/00000005/art00002
  
• Pete Mandik & Andy Clark (2002). Selective representing and world-making.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract:   In this paper, we discuss the thesis of selective representing –- the idea that the contents of the mental representations had by organisms are highly constrained by the biological niches within which the organisms evolved. While such a thesis has been defended by several authors elsewhere, our primary concern here is to take up the issue of the compatibility of selective representing and realism. In this paper we hope to show three things. First, that the notion of selective representing is fully consistent with the realist idea of a mind-independent world. Second, that not only are these two consistent, but that the latter (the realist conception of a mind-independent world) provides the most powerful perspective from which to motivate and understand the differing perceptual and cognitive profiles themselves. And third, that the (genuine and important) sense in which organism and environment may together constitute an integrated system of scientific interest poses no additional threat to the realist conception
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://consc.net/cgi/go.fcgi?id=MANSRA&free=1&u=http://www.cogs.indiana.edu/andy/srwm.pdf
  http://www.cogs.indiana.edu/andy/srwm.pdf
  http://testweb.wpunj.edu/cohss/philosophy/FACULTY/mandik/papers/srwm.PDF
  http://portal.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=596725.596964
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/530333.html
  http://www.philosophy.ed.ac.uk/staff/clark/pubs/srwm.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/WK3VARQJMEANXHT8.pdf
  http://www.kluweronline.com/article.asp?PIPS=406270&PDF=1
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/wk3varqjmeanxht8/fulltext.pdf
  
• Humberto Maturana (online). Autopoiesis, structural coupling and cognition.   (More)
• Monica Meijsing (ms). Real people and virtual bodies: How disembodied can embodiment be?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: It is widely accepted that embodiment is crucial for any self-aware agent. What is less obvious is whether the body has to be real, or whether a virtual body will do. In that case the notion of embodiment would be so attenuated as to be almost indistinguishable from disembodiment. In this article I concentrate on the notion of embodiment in human agents. Could we be disembodied, having no real body, as brains-in-a-vat with only a virtual body? Thought experiments alone will not suffice to answer this Cartesian question. I will draw on both philosophical arguments and empirical data on phantom phenomena. My argument will proceed in three steps. Firstly I will show that phantom phenomena provide a prima facie argument that real embodiment is not necessary for a human being. Secondly I will give a philosophical argument that real movement must precede the intention to move and to act. Agents must at least have had real bodies once. Empirical data seems to bear this out. Finally, however, I will show that a small number of aplasic phantom phenomena undermines this last argument. Most people must have had a real body. But for some people a partly virtual, unreal, phantom body seems to suffice. Yet though there is thus no knockdown argument that we could not be brains-in-a-vat, we still have good reasons to suppose that embodiment must be real, and not virtual
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00003031/01/REAL_PEOPLE_AND_VIRTUAL_BODIES.preprint.doc
  http://portal.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1236572
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/mgg7237517115026/fulltext.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/index/MGG7237517115026.pdf
  
• Thomas Metzinger (2006). Reply to Gallagher: Different conceptions of embodiment.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Gallagher is right in pointing out that scientific realism is an implicit background assumption of BNO, and that I did not give an independent argument for it. He is also right in saying that science does not _demonstrate_ the existence of certain entities, but that it assumes those entities in a process of explanation and theory formation. However, it is not true that science, as Gallagher writes (p.2), “simply” assumes the reality of certain things: such assumptions are embedded in the context of an attempt to find the_ minimal _ set of ontological assumptions one has to make relative to a set of explanatory goals and relative to a specific data set in a certain domain. This parsimonious spirit is also the

  PSYCHE: http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/

  spirit of SMT, which can be seen as a search for the minimal conditions under which a phenomenal self and a consciously experienced first-person perspective can emerge
• C. Lloyd Morgan (1903). An Introduction to Comparative Psychology.   (More)
• Pierre Poirier (2000). Be there, or be square! On the importance of being there.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: By using the name of one of his first papers (See Clark 1987) for his latest book, Andy Clark proves how consistent his view of the mind has been over his career. Indeed _Being There_ becomes the latest in a ten year effort, laid out over a series of books, to flesh out one of the few comprehensive proposals in philosophy of mind since Fodor’s Representational Theory of Mind (RTM). Each book in the series accentuates one aspect of Clark’s view. The first, _Microcognition_ (Clark 1989), explores the importance of implementation. Except for a few pockets of resistance, the issue of implementation is by now wholly resolved in Clark’s favor but was, at the time, generally hostile to the idea of implementation (or "_mere_ implementation" as it was commonly referred to back then) in studies of the mind. The second, _Associative Engines_ (Clark 1993), stresses the importance of developmental issues, an idea that is still making waves in the cognitive science and neuroscience community (think of the flurry of models and experiments on developing theories of the mind (Carey 1985, Gopnik 1988, Gopnik and Meltzoff 1996). This latest effort argues for the importance of ecological issues, both for our general view of the mind and our explanation models in cognitive science. It explores the importance of being situated in a body and an environment, the importance of being _there_. Although each theme accentuated by Clark's books (implementation, development, and ecology) is generally biological in nature, Clark, unlike other biological views of the mind who tend to stress one biological aspect over the others, constantly manages to balance the different aspects in what amounts to perhaps the only integrated, or at least the most complete to date, biological view of the mind
• S. J. Rosenschein & L. P. Kaelbling (1995). A situated view of representation and control.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.csail.mit.edu/~lpk/papers/sitaut.ps
  http://www.phil.canterbury.ac.nz/tom_bestor/e-texts/Rosenschein and Kaelbing - A Situated View of Representation and Control (1995) sitaut.ps
  http://www.csa.com/partners/viewrecord.php?requester=gs&collection=TRD&recid=0169047CI
  http://www.cs.umbc.edu/pub/gopher/pub/www/courses/graduate/691m/spring02/papers/rosenschein-situated.ps
  http://www.csee.umbc.edu/pub/www/courses/graduate/691m/spring02/papers/rosenschein-situated.ps
  http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/121626.html
  http://www.ai.mit.edu/people/lpk/papers/sitaut.ps
  http://people.csail.mit.edu/lpk/papers/sitaut.ps
  http://www.grapa.cs.huji.ac.il/course/2004/imas/readings/rosenschein-situated.ps
  
• Selinger, Evan, Dreyfus, Hubert & Harry Collins (2007). Interactional expertise and embodiment.   (More)
• Tim van Gelder (1993). The distinction between mind and cognition.   (More)
• A. H. Vera & Herbert Simon (1993). Situated action: A symbolic interpretation.   (More)
• Daniel Weiskopf (online). Embodied cognition and linguistic understanding.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Traditionally, the language faculty was supposed to be a device that maps linguistic inputs to semantic or conceptual representations. These representations themselves were supposed to be distinct from the representations manipulated by the hearer.s perceptual and motor systems. Recently this view of language has been challenged by advocates of embodied cognition. Drawing on empirical studies of linguistic comprehension, they have proposed that the language faculty reuses the very representations and processes deployed in perceiving and acting. I review some of the evidence in favor of the embodied view of language comprehension, and argue that none of it is conclusive. Moreover, the embodied view itself blurs two important distinctions: first, the distinction between linguistic comprehension and its typical consequences; and second, the distinction between representational content and vehicles. Given that these distinctions are well-motivated, we have good reason to reject the embodied view of linguistic understanding
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://shell.cas.usf.edu/~weiskopf/papers/embodied-language.pdf
  
• Robert Wilson & Andy Clark (2006). How to situate cognition: Letting nature take its course.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: 1. The Situation in Cognition 2. Situated Cognition: A Potted Recent History 3. Extensions in Biology, Computation, and Cognition 4. Articulating the Idea of Cognitive Extension 5. Are Some Resources Intrinsically Non-Cognitive? 6. Is Cognition Extended or Only Embedded? 7. Letting Nature Take Its Course
  Additional links for this entry:
  https://www.era.lib.ed.ac.uk/handle/1842/1445?mode=simple
  http://www.ualberta.ca/~philosop/faculty/wilson/sitcog.pdf
  
• Jianhui Zhang & Donald Norman (1994). Representations in distributed cognitive tasks.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.leaonline.com/doi/abs/10.1207/s15516709cog1801_3
  http://wexler.free.fr/library/files/zhang (1994) representations in distributed cognitive tasks.pdf
  http://acad88.sahs.uth.tmc.edu/research/publications/DisRep.pdf
  http://www.leaonline.com/doi/pdfplus/10.1207/s15516709cog1801_3
  http://www.cogsci.rpi.edu/CSJarchive/1994v18/i01/p0087p0122/MAIN.PDF
  

31 displayed