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Philosophy of cognitive science :: Issues in cognitive science :: Language and thought

• Jose Luis Bermudez (2003). Language and thinking about thoughts.   (More)
• Jose Luis Bermudez (2003). The limits of thinking without words.   (More)
• Darragh Byrne (forthcoming). Three notions of tacit knowledge.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.philosophy.bham.ac.uk/pdf/Byrne/Three notions.pdf
  
• Elisabeth Camp (online). Metaphor in the mind.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Philosophers have often adopted a dismissive attitude toward metaphor. Hobbes (1651, ch. 8) advocated excluding metaphors from rational discourse because they “openly profess deceit,” while Locke (1690, Bk. 3, ch. 10) claimed that figurative uses of language serve only “to insinuate wrong ideas, move the passions, and thereby mislead the judgment; and so indeed are perfect cheats.” Later, logical positivists like Ayer and Carnap assumed that because metaphors like..
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2006.00013.x
  
• John Campbell (1986). Conceptual structure.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: in Charles Travis (ed.), Meaning and Interpretation (Oxford and New York: Blackwell 1986), 159-174
• Peter Carruthers (1998). Distinctively human thinking.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/oso/tinnm/2005/00000001/00000001/art00006
  
• Peter Carruthers (2008). Language in cognition.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In E. Margolis, R. Samuels, and S. Stich (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Cognitive Science. Oxford University Press, 2008
• Peter Carruthers (2002). The cognitive functions of language.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This paper explores a variety of different versions of the thesis that natural language is involved in human thinking. It distinguishes amongst strong and weak forms of this thesis, dismissing some as implausibly strong and others as uninterestingly weak. Strong forms dismissed include the view that language is conceptually necessary for thought (endorsed by many philosophers) and the view that language is _de facto_ the medium of all human conceptual thinking (endorsed by many philosophers and social scientists). Weak forms include the view that language is necessary for the acquisition of many human concepts, and the view that language can serve to scaffold human thought processes. The paper also discusses the thesis that language may be the medium of _conscious_ propositional thinking, but argues that this cannot be its most fundamental cognitive role. The idea is then proposed that natural language is the medium for non-domain-specific thinking, serving to integrate the outputs of a variety of domain-specific conceptual faculties (or central-cognitive ‘quasi-modules’). Recent experimental evidence in support of this idea is reviewed, and the implications of the idea are discussed, especially for our conception of the architecture of human cognition. Finally, some further kinds of evidence which might serve to corroborate or refute the hypothesis are mentioned. The overall goal of the paper is to review a wide variety of accounts of the cognitive function of natural language, integrating a number of different kinds of evidence and theoretical consideration in order to propose and elaborate the most plausible candidate
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://alcor.concordia.ca/~coglab/carruthers.pdf
  http://www.philosophy.umd.edu/Faculty/pcarruthers/BBS full exchange.pdf
  http://www.philosophy.umd.edu/Faculty/pcarruthers/Cognitive-language.htm
  http://www.bbsonline.org/documents/a/00/00/22/49/bbs00002249-00/bbs.carruthers.htm
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=pubmed&list_uids=14598623&dopt=Citation
  http://www.journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0140525X02000122
  http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0140525X02000122
  http://journals.cambridge.org/article_S0140525X02230125
  
• Andrew Chrucky (1990). Sellars on language and thought.   (More)
• Andy Clark (1996). Linguistic anchors in the sea of thought?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Andy Clark is currently Professor of Philosophy and Director of the Philosophy/Neuroscience/Psychology program at Washington University in St. Louis, Missouri. He is the author of two books MICROCOGNITION (MIT Press/Bradford Books 1989) and ASSOCIATIVE ENGINES (MIT Press/Bradford Books, 1993) as well as numerous papers and four edited volumes. He is an ex- committee member of the British Society for the Philosophy of Science and of the Society for Artificial Intelligence and the Simulation of Behavior. Awards include a visiting Fellowship at the Australia National University, Canberra in 1989, and an ESRC Senior Research Leave Fellowship in 1992. He is an Associate of BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES, serves on the editorial boards of the journals
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.philosophy.ed.ac.uk/staff/clark/pubs/linguist.pdf
  
• Andy Clark (1998). Magic words: How language augments human computation.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Of course, words aren’t magic. Neither are sextants, compasses, maps, slide rules and all the other paraphenelia which have accreted around the basic biological brains of homo sapiens. In the case of these other tools and props, however, it is transparently clear that they function so as to either carry out or to facilitate computational operations important to various human projects. The slide rule transforms complex mathematical problems (ones that would baffle or tax the unaided subject) into simple tasks of perceptual recognition. The map provides geographical information in a format well-suited to aid complex planning and strategic military operations. The compass gathers and displays a kind of information that (most) unaided human subjects do not seem to command. These various tools and props thus act to generate information, or to store it, or to transform it, or some combination of the three. In so doing, they impact our individual and collective problem- solving capacities in much the same dramatic ways as various software packages impact the performance of a simple pc
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.cogs.indiana.edu/andy/magic.pdf
  http://www.philosophy.ed.ac.uk/staff/clark/pubs/magic.pdf
  http://www.philosophy.ed.ac.uk/staff/clark/pubs/magic.pdf
  http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/courses/concepts/magicwords.html
  http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/courses/concepts/magicwords.html
  
• Andy Clark (2005). Word, niche and super-niche: How language makes minds matter more.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: How does language (spoken or written) impact thought? One useful way to approach this important but elusive question may be to consider language itself as a cognition-enhancing animal-built structure. To take this perspective is to view language as a kind of self-constructed cognitive niche. These self-constructed cognitive niches play, I suggest, three distinct but deeply interlocking roles in human thought and reason. Working together, these three interlocking routines radically transform the human mind, and mark a genuine discontinuity in the space of anitnal minds
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://beta.philosophyonline.org/xtf/data/tss/20-3/tss_0020_0003_0255_0268.pdf
  
• David Cockburn (2001). Language, belief and human beings.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.bbkphilsoc.org.uk/archive/geocities/CockburnPoster.pdf
  
• John Collins (2004). Faculty disputes.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract:   Jerry Fodor, among others, has maintained that Chomsky's language faculty hypothesis is an epistemological proposal, i.e. the faculty comprises propositional structures known (cognized) by the speaker/hearer. Fodor contrasts this notion of a faculty with an architectural (directly causally efficacious) notion of a module. The paper offers an independent characterisation of the language faculty as an abstractly specified nonpropositional structure of the mind/brain that mediates between sound and meaning—a function in intension that maps to a pair of structures that determine soundmeaning convergence. This conception will be elaborated and defended against a number of likely complaints deriving from Fodor's faculty/module distinction and other positions which seek to credit knowledge of language with an empirical or theoretical significance. A recent explicit argument from Fodor that Chomsky must share his conception will be diagnosed and the common appeal to implicit knowledge as a foundation for linguistic competence will be rejected
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/mila/2004/00000019/00000005/art00002
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.0268-1064.2004.00270.x
  
• Marcelo Dascal (2002). Language as a cognitive technology.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: _Ever since Descartes singled out the ability to use natural language appropriately in any given circumstance as the proof_ _that humans – unlike animals and machines – have minds, an idea that Turing transformed into his well-known test to_ _determine whether machines have intelligence, the close connection between language and cognition has been widely_ _acknowledged, although it was accounted for in quite different ways. Recent advances in natural language processing, as_ _well as attempts to create “embodied conversational agents” which couple language processing with that of its natural_ _bodily correlates (gestures, facial expression and gaze direction), in the hope of developing human-computer interfaces_ _based on natural – rather than formal – language, have again brought to the fore the question of how far we can hope_ _machines to be able to master the cognitive abilities required for language use. In this paper, I approach this issue from a_ _different angle, inquiring whether language can be viewed as a “cognitive technology”, employed by humans as a tool_ _for the performance of certain cognitive tasks. I propose a definition of “cognitive technology” that encompasses both_ _external (or “prosthetic”) and internal cognitive devices. A number of parameters in terms of which a typology of_ _cognitive technologies of both kinds can be sketched is also set forth. It is then argued that inquiring about language’s_ _role in cognition allows us to re-frame the traditional debate about the relationship between language and thought, by_ _examining how specific aspects of language actually influence cognition – as an environment, a resource, or a tool. This_ _perspective helps bring together the contributions of the philosophical “linguistic turn” in epistemology and the incipient_ _“epistemology of cognitive technology” It also permits a more precise and fruitful discussion of the question whether, to_ _what extent, and which of the language-based cognitive technologies we naturally use can be emulated by the kinds of_ _technologies presently or in the foreseeable future available.

  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/jbp/ijct/2002/00000001/00000001/art00003
  
• Martin Davies (1987). Tacit knowledge and semantic theory: Can a five percent difference matter?   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0026-4423(198710)2:96:384<441:TKASTC>2.0.CO;2-#
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0026-4423(198710)2:96:384<441:TKASTC>2.0.CO;2-#
  http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/XCVI/384/441
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2253842.pdf
  
• Daniel Dennett (2000). Making tools for thinking.   (More)
• Daniel Dennett (1998). Reflections on language and mind.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: A theme that emerged at the Sheffield Conference with particular force, to my way of thinking, was a new way of recognizing, and then avoiding, a seductive bad idea. One of its many guises is what I have called the Cartesian Theater, but it also appears in the roles of Central Processing, or Central Executive, or Norman and Shallice's SAS, or Fodor's non-modular central arena of belief fixation. What is wrong with this idea is not (just) that it (apparently) postulates an _anatomically_ discernible central region of the brain--maximally non-peripheral, one might say--but that it supposes that there is a functionally identifiable _subsystem_ (however located or even distributed in the brain) that has some all too remarkable competences achieved by some all too remarkable means. There are many routes to it. Here is one that starts off in an excellent direction but then veers off. The mistaken fork is not explicitly endorsed by anybody that I can think of, but I daresay it has covertly influenced a lot of thinking on the topic
• Daniel Dennett (1994). The role of language in intelligence.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: We human beings may not be the most admirable species on the planet, or the most likely to survive for another millennium, but we are without any doubt at all the most intelligent. We are also the only species with language. What is the relation between these two obvious facts?
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/rolelang.htm
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000192/
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000192/00/rolelang.htm
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:192
  
• Daniel Dennett (online). Verbal language as a communicative system.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: We human beings may not be the most admirable species on the planet, or the most likely to survive for another millennium, but we are without any doubt at all the most intelligent. We are also the only species with language. What is the relation between these two obvious facts?
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/188/00/verblang.html
  http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/verblang.htm
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000188/00/verblang.html
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?id=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:188
  
• Michael Devitt (2003). Linguistics is not psychology.   (More)
• Jerry Fodor (2003). Review of Bermudez's Thinking Without Words.   (More)
• Keith Frankish (1998). Natural language and virtual belief.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This chapter outlines a new argument for the view that language has a cognitive role. I suggest that humans exhibit two distinct kinds of belief state, one passively formed, the other actively formed. I argue that actively formed beliefs (_virtual beliefs_, as I call them) can be identified with _premising policies_, and that forming them typically involves certain linguistic operations. I conclude that natural language has at least a limited cognitive role in the formation and manipulation of virtual beliefs
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.open.ac.uk/Arts/philos/Virtual_belief_eprint.pdf
  http://libeprints.open.ac.uk/archive/00000118/01/Virtual_belief_eprint.pdf
  
• Christopher Gauker (online). Language and thought.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: If one asks about the relation between thought and language, people expect the issue to concern such matters as whether we think in language, whether creatures without language can "think", and the way language shapes our concepts. In my opinion, there is a much deeper question, which concerns the nature of linguistic communication. Philosophers and linguists standardly conceive of language as basically a means by which speakers convey the content of their thoughts to others. The question is whether that is a correct picture of linguistic communication. This is a question about the relation between thought and language because this standard picture of communication gives propositional thought a certain priority over language. If, as I intend to show, there are reasons to doubt the standard picture, then we cannot expect to make much progress with the more superficial questions without thinking about the nature of linguistic communication
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://host.uniroma3.it/progetti/kant/field/lat-t.htm
  
• Lila Gleitman & Anna Papafragou (2005). Language and thought.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://data.psych.udel.edu/papafragou/Publications/Language and thought-final.pdf
  
• Mitchell Green (web). How do speech acts express psychological states?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: forthcoming in S. L. Tsohatzidis (ed.) John Searle’s Philosophy of Language: Force, Meaning and Mind (Cambridge)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.cambridge.org/catalogue/catalogue.asp?isbn=9780521685344
  
• Steven Gross (2006). Can one sincerely say what one doesn't believe?   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: In _Insensitive Semantics_, Herman Cappelen and Ernie Lepore (C&L) defend Semantic Minimalism and Speech Act Pluralism. Semantic Minimalism concerns the effect of utterance context on _semantic_ content. It holds, in contrast to the views of a wide variety of linguists and philosophers of language, that this effect is limited to fixing the semantic value of the small number of expressions they argue are genuinely context- sensitive: uncontroversial indexicals, demonstratives, tense markers, and perhaps a few others. What’s more, according to C&L, once this context-sensitivity has been accounted for, a (disambiguated) sentence expresses a truth-evaluable proposition. Speech Act Pluralism concerns _speech act_ content: what a speaker says (asserts, claims, etc.) by a particular utterance of a sentence. Among its central claims are: first, that speech act content typically includes an indefinite range of propositions, as evidenced by the indefinite range of accurate indirect speech reports concerning a particular utterance (call this Basic Pluralism); and, second, that speakers do not have privileged access to what they say, nor must they believe what they sincerely say (call this the Controversial Aspect).¹
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://mysite.verizon.net/vze299db/sitebuildercontent/sitebuilderfiles/gross-cap-lep.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/mila/2006/00000021/00000001/art00002
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-0017.2006.00302.x
  
• Steven Gross (2005). Linguistic understanding and belief.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Comment on Dean Pettit, who replies in same issue
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.phil.upenn.edu/~gross2/pettit.pdf
  http://mysite.verizon.net/vze299db/sitebuildercontent/sitebuilderfiles/gross-mind.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/oup/mind/2005/00000114/00000453/art00061
  http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/114/453/61
  
• Benoit Hardy-Vallée & Pierre Poirier (2005). Structured thoughts: The spatial-motor view.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Is thinking necessarily linguistic? Do we _think with words_, to use Bermudez’s (2003) phrase? Or does thinking occur in some other, yet to be determined, representational format? Or again do we think in various formats, switching from one to the other as tasks demand? In virtue perhaps of the ambiguous na- ture of first-person introspective data on the matter, philosophers have tradition- ally disagreed on this question, some thinking that thought had to be pictorial, other insisting that it could not be but linguistic. When any problem divides a community of otherwise intelligent rational thinkers, one suspects some deep conceptual confusion is at play. Indeed, we believe that the conceptual cate- gories used to frame these and related questions are so hopelessly muddled that one could honestly answer “both simultaneously”, or “neither”, depending one what is meant by the alternatives. But let’s get our priorities straight. This paper first and foremost aims at defending what we believe to be a step in that direc- tion of the proper view of thinking, a view we call the spatial-motor view. In order to do so, however, we have found it essential to start by addressing the conceptual confusion just alluded to. Accordingly, the paper proceeds in two steps. First a conceptual step, in which we reconsider some of the traditional categories brought into play when thinking about thinking. Then an empirical step, in which we offer empirical evidence for one of the views conceptually isolated during the first part of the work. Future version of this collaborative work will include a speculative step in which we spin out an evolutionary and developmental scenario whose function it is justify the spatial-motor view by showing how it fits into current evolutionary and developmental theories
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cognitio.uqam.ca/2004/hardypoirier.doc
  http://www.er.uqam.ca/nobel/philuqam/dept/textes/poirierhardy.pdf
  http://thphil.phil-fak.uni-duesseldorf.de/index.php/filemanager/download/271/Hardy.doc
  
• Stevan Harnad (1982). Metaphor and mental duality.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: I am going to attempt to argue, given certain premises, there are reasons, not only empirical, but also logical, for expecting a certain division of labor in the processing of information by the human brain. This division of labor consists specifically of a functional bifurcation into what may be called, to a first approximation, "verbal" and "nonverbal" modes of information- processing. That this dichotomy is not quite satisfactory, however, will be one of the principal conclusions of this chapter, for I shall attempt to show that metaphor, which in its most common guise is a literary, and hence a fortiori a "verbal" phenomenon, may in fact be more a function of the "nonverbal" than the "verbal" mode. (For alternative attempts to account for cognitive lateralization, see e.g. Bever, 1975; Wickelgren, 1975; Pendse, 1978.)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://eprints.resist.ecs.soton.ac.uk/384/
  http://eprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000384/
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00001569/
  http://cogprints.soton.ac.uk/documents/disk0/00/00/15/69/
  http://cogsci.soton.ac.uk/~harnad/Papers/Harnad/harnad82.metaphor.html
  http://www.ecs.soton.ac.uk/~harnad/Papers/Harnad/harnad82.metaphor.html
  http://eprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000384/02/00000482.metaphor.html
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00001569/00/harnad82.metaphor.html
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?id=oai:eprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk:384
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:1569
  
• Henry Jackman (2003). Expression, thought, and language.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: This paper discusses an "expressive constraint" on accounts of thought and language which requires that when a speaker expresses a belief by sincerely uttering a sentence, the utterance and the belief have the same content. It will be argued that this constraint should be viewed as expressing a conceptual connection between thought and language rather than a mere empirical generalization about the two. However, the most obvious accounts of the relation between thought and language compatible with the constraint (giving an independent account of one of either linguistic meaning or thought content and understanding the other in terms of it) both face serious difficulties. Because of this, the following will suggest an alternative picture of the relation between thought and language that remains compatible with the constraint
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.yorku.ca/hjackman/papers/expression.pdf
  http://www.springerlink.com/content/v11h37711023710l/fulltext.pdf
  
• William James (1892). Thought before language: A deaf-mute's recollections.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.sign-lang.uni-hamburg.de/BibWeb/LiDat.acgi?ID=14907
  http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8108(189211)1:6<613:TBLADR>2.0.CO;2-C
  http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8108(189211)1:6<613:TBLADR>2.0.CO;2-C
  http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2175920.pdf
  
• Kirk Ludwig (1993). Direct reference in thought and speech.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://web.clas.ufl.edu/users/kludwig/web/users/kludwig/Abstracts/Abstract for Direct Reference in Thought and Speech.htm
  
• Edouard Machery, Ron Mallon, Shaun Nichols & Stephen Stich (2004). Semantics, cross-cultural style.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Theories of reference have been central to analytic philosophy, and two views, the descriptivist view of reference and the causal-historical view of reference, have dominated the field. In this research tradition, theories of reference are assessed by consulting one’s intuitions about the reference of terms in hypothetical situations. However, recent work in cultural psychology (e.g., Nisbett et al. 2001) has shown systematic cognitive differences between East Asians and Westerners, and some work indicates that this extends to intuitions about philosophical cases (Weinberg et al. 2001). In light of these findings on cultural differences, two experiments were conducted which explored intuitions about reference in Westerners and East Asians. Both experiments indicate that, for certain central cases, Westerners are more likely than East Asians to report intuitions that are consistent with the causal-historical view. These results constitute prima facie evidence that semantic intuitions vary from culture to culture, and the paper argues that this fact raises questions about the nature of the philosophical enterprise of developing a theory of reference
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.pitt.edu/~machery/papers/verson publiee.pdf
  http://dingo.sbs.arizona.edu/~snichols/Papers/sccs.pdf
  http://eric.ed.gov/ERICWebPortal/recordDetail?accno=EJ730194
  http://www.philosophy.utah.edu/faculty/mallon/Materials/sccs.pdf
  http://hal.ccsd.cnrs.fr/docs/00/05/34/95/PDF/ijn_00000399_00.pdf
  http://www.hum.utah.edu/philosophy/faculty/mallon/Materials/sccs.pdf
  http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/docs/00/05/34/95/PDF/ijn_00000399_00.pdf
  http://www.rci.rutgers.edu/~stich/Publications/Papers/SemanticIntuitions.pdf
  http://www.pitt.edu/AFShome/m/a/machery/public/html/papers/verson publiee.pdf
  http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00001953/01/Semantic_Intutions_-_Final_Draft.pdf
  http://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/documents/disk0/00/00/03/99/ijn_00000399_00/ijn_00000399_00.pdf
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=pubmed&list_uids=15019555&dopt=Citation
  http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0010027703002087
  
• Ruth Millikan (2001). The language-thought partnership: A Bird's eye view.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/02715309/2001/00000021/00000002/art00018
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/oso/1154790/2005/00000001/00000001/art00005
  
• I. M. Schlesinger (1967). A note on the relationship between psychological and linguistic theories.   (More)
• Eric Schwitzgebel (ms). Difficulties in Davidson's arguments against belief without language.   (More)
• Peter Slezak (online). Linguistic explanation and "psychological reality".   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Methodological questions concerning Chomsky’s generative approach to linguistics have been debated without consensus. The status of linguistics as psychology, the psychological reality of grammars, the character of tacit knowledge and the role of intuitions as data remain heatedly disputed today. I argue that the recalcitrance of these disputes is symptomatic of deep misunderstandings. I focus attention on Michael Devitt’s recent extended critique of Chomskyan linguistics and I suggest that his complaints are based on a failure to appreciate the special status of Chomsky’s computational formalisms found elsewhere in cognitive science. Devitt ascribes an intentional conception of representations that Chomsky repudiates and that is independently implausible. I argue that Devitt’s proposed “linguistic reality” as the proper subject matter of linguistics neglects the problems of tokens as opposed to types and he misses the force of Chomsky’s arguments against Behaviourism and nominalism. I suggest that Devitt’s case against intuitions as data misunderstands their standard role throughout perceptual psychology. Finally, of more general interest, I argue that Devitt’s position exemplifies compelling errors concerning mental representation seen throughout cognitive science and philosophy of mind
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://hps.arts.unsw.edu.au/hps_content/staff_homepages/p_slezak_site/Article Links/2007/Slezak_Devitt_2007.doc
  
• Peter Slezak (2002). Thinking about thinking: Language, thought and introspection.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: I do not think that the world or the sciences would ever have suggested to me any philosophical problems. What has suggested philosophical problems to me is things which other philosophers have said about the world or the sciences. (G.E. Moore, 1942, p. 14)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.mcox.org/introspect/Slezak-Thinking_Language.pdf
  http://hps.arts.unsw.edu.au/hps_content/staff_homepages/p_slezak_site/Article Links/2002/Slezak_Thinking_2002.doc
  http://hps.arts.unsw.edu.au/hps_content/staff_homepages/p_slezak_site/Article Links/2002/Slezak_Thinking_2002.pdf
  http://www.arts.unsw.edu.au/hps/hps_core_links/staff_homepages/p_slezak_site/Article Links/Slezak-Thinking_Language.pdf
  http://www.arts.unsw.edu.au/hps/sts_core_links/sts_staff_homepages/p_slezak_site/Article Links/Slezak-Thinking _ Language.pdf
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/02715309/2002/00000022/00000003/art00012
  
• Aaron Sloman (1979). The primacy of non-communicative language.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/cogaff/sloman.primacy.inner.language.pdf
  
• David Sosa (1996). Representing Thoughts and Language.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  https://webspace.utexas.edu/deverj/personal/test/representingthoughts.pdf
  
• Jeff Speaks (2003). Three Views of Language and the Mind.   (More)
• Dan Sperber & Deirdre Wilson (1998). The mapping between the mental and the public lexicon.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: We argue that the presence of a word in an utterance serves as starting point for a relevance guided inferential process that results in the construction of a contextually appropriate sense. The linguistically encoded sense of a word does not serve as its default interpretation. The cases where the contextually appropriate sense happens to be identical to this linguistic sense have no particular theoretical significance. We explore some of the consequences of this view. One of these consequences is that there may be many more mentally represented concepts than there are linguistically encoded concepts
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://cogprints.org/2280/0/mapping.htm
  http://cogprints.org/2280/00/mapping.htm
  http://perso.club-internet.fr/sperber/mapping.htm
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00002280/
  http://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/docs/00/05/32/37/HTML/
  http://www.phon.ucl.ac.uk/home/PUB/WPL/97papers/sperber.pdf
  http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00002280/00/mapping.htm
  http://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/docs/00/05/32/37/RTF/ijn_00000036_01.rtf
  http://citebase.eprints.org/cgi-bin/citations?archiveID=oai:cogprints.soton.ac.uk:2280
  http://ftp.phon.ucl.ac.uk/home/deirdre/papers/The mapping between the mental and the public lexion.doc
  http://www.phon.ucl.ac.uk/home/deirdre/papers/The mapping between the mental and the public lexion.doc
  
• Dan Sperber (1994). Understanding verbal understanding.   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/comm/steen/cogweb/Abstracts/SperberB_94.html
  
• Tony Stone & Martin Davies (2002). Chomsky among the philosophers.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: A major recurrent feature of the intellectual landscape in cognitive science is the appearance of a collection of essays by Noam Chomsky. These collections serve both to inform the wider cognitive science community about the latest developments in the approach to the study of language that Chomsky has advocated for almost fifty years now,1 and to provide trenchant criticisms of what he takes to be mistaken philosophical objections to this approach. This new collection contains seven essays, the earliest of which were first published about ten years ago. So the linguistic work that is summarised is within the principles and parameters approach and some of the essays (particularly the first and last) provide an outline of the main ideas of the emerging minimalist programme.2 But this is not primarily a book about the details of recent linguistic theory. Rather, in these essays Chomsky offers a wealth of critical commentary on some of the most influential arguments in the philosophy of mind and language that have appeared over the past two decades or so. Indeed, Chomsky discusses a vast range of philosophical topics and reaches some radical conclusions – that many influential philosophical discussions on language and mind are utterly misconceived and that, for example, the traditional mind-body problem cannot even be coherently stated
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.lsbu.ac.uk/psycho/teaching/pdf/Chomsky-Philosophers.pdf
  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1468-0017.00200
  
• Lawrence Weiskrantz (1997). Thought without language: Thought without awareness?   (More)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://olddavidhume.rutgers.edu/~aleslie/Leslie 1988.pdf
  

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