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Philosophy of cognitive science :: Philosophy of neuroscience :: Neurophilosophy

• William Bechtel & Robert McCauley (1999). Heuristic identity theory (or back to the future): The mind-body problem against the background of research strategies in cognitive neuroscience.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Functionalists in philosophy of mind traditionally raise two major arguments against the type identity theory: (1) psychological states are _multiply realizable_ so that there are no one-to-one mappings of psychological states onto neural states and (2) the most that evidence could ever establish is the _correlation_ of psychological and neural states, not their identity. We defend a variant on the traditional type identity theory which we call _heuristic identity theory_ (HIT) against both of these objections. Drawing its inspiration from scientific practice, heuristic identity theory construes identity claims as hypotheses that guide subsequent inquiry, not as conclusions of the research
• Jose Luis Bermudez (2000). The cognitive neuroscience of primitive self-consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Myin, Erik (2000) Direct Self-Consciousness (2)Bermúdez, José Luis (2000) Concepts and the Priority Principle (10)Bermúdez, José Luis (2000) Circularity, "I"-Thoughts and the Linguistic Requirement for Concept Possession (11)Meeks, Roblin R. (2000) Withholding Immunity: Misidentification, Misrepresentation, and Autonomous Nonconceptual Proprioceptive First-Person Content (12)Newen, Albert (2001) Kinds of Self-Consciousness (13)Bermudez, Jose Luis (2000) Direct Self-Consciousness (4)Bermudez, Jose Luis (2000) Prelinguistic Self-Consciousness (5)Gallese, Vittorio (2000) The Brain and the Self: Reviewing the Neuroscientific Evidence (6)Bermudez, Jose Luis (2000) The Cognitive Neuroscience of Primitive Self-Consciousness (7) [Currently Displayed]Robbins, Philip (2000) Paradox Twice Lost (8)Fuller, Gary and Slater, Carol W. (2000) "I"-Thoughts: Criteria, Constitution, and Concept Possession (9)Evans, Cedric Oliver (2000) Prelinguistic Self-Consciousness (3)Bermudez, Jose Luis and Polytechnique, CREA Ecole (1999) The Paradox of Self-Consciousness (representation and Mind) (1)
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://psycprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/perl/local/psyc/makedoc?id=35&type=html
  
• Robert Briscoe (forthcoming). Egocentric Spatial Representation in Action and Perception.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Neuropsychological findings used to motivate the two visual systems hypothesis have been taken to endanger a pair of widely accepted claims about spatial representation in visual experience. The first is the claim that visual experience represents 3-D space around the perceiver using an egocentric frame of reference. The second is the claim that there is a constitutive link between the spatial contents of visual experience and the perceiver’s bodily actions. In this paper, I carefully assess three main sources of evidence for the two visual systems hypothesis and argue that the best interpretation of the evidence is in fact consistent with both claims. I conclude with some brief remarks on the relation between visual consciousness and rational agency.
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://phonline.org/paper.php?keynum=903
  http://cogprints.org/5780/1/ECSRAP.F07.pdf
  http://chn.loyno.edu/philosophy/bios/documents/ECSRAP.F07.pdf
  
• Pete Mandik (online). The introspectibility of brain states as such.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Is the Introspection Thesis true? It certainly isn’t obvious. Introspection is the faculty by which each of us has access to his or her own mental states. Even if we were to suppose that mental states are identical to brain states, it doesn’t follow immediately from this supposition that we can introspect our mental states as brain states. This point is analogous to the following. It doesn’t follow immediately from the mere fact that some distant object is identical to a horse that we can perceive it as a horse. Further, it isn’t obvious that any amount of education would suffice to make some distant speck on the horizon seem like a horse. It may very well be the case that no matter how well we know that some distant speck is a horse; as long as we are sufficiently distant from it we will only be able to see it as a speck. Analogously then, it may very well be the case that no matter how well we know that our mental states are brain states, we will only be able to introspect them as irreducibly mental
• Marvin Minsky (online). Interior grounding, reflection, and self-consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Some computer programs are expert at some games. Other programs can recognize some words. Yet other programs are highly competent at solving certain technical problems. However, each of those programs is specialized, and no existing program today shows the common sense or resourcefulness of a typical two-year-old child—and certainly, no program can yet understand a typical sentence from a child’s first-grade storybook. Nor can any program today can look around a room and then identify the things that meet its eyes
• Alain Morin (2003). The self and its brain: A critical examination of The Face in the Mirror.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: Where is the self located in the brain? This is a question that has intrigued philosophers and scientists for quite some time. Four centuries ago, the French philosopher René Descartes thought that the self resided in the pineal gland, a small structure centrally positioned in the lower brain
• Erik Myin (2000). Direct self-consciousness.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: One can distinguish the descriptive view of self-consciousness from the philosophical framework of the theory of nonconceptual content. Propositional attitudes can be ascribed without commitment to the existence of internal states that bear different species of content. The descriptive view can be coupled to this alternative view
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.cogsci.soton.ac.uk/cgi/psyc/newpsy?11.003
  http://www.cogsci.soton.ac.uk/cgi/psyc/newpsy?11.003
  http://www.cogsci.ecs.soton.ac.uk/cgi/psyc/newpsy?11.003
  http://www.cogsci.ecs.soton.ac.uk/cgi/psyc/newpsy?article=11.003
  http://psycprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000003/02/myin2000.fo
  http://psycprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000003/01/myin2000.txt
  http://psycprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000003/03/myin2000.pdf
  
• Adina Roskies (2002). Neuroethics for the new millennium.   (Abstract & more)
  Abstract: ics. Each of these can be pursued independently to a large extent, but perhaps most intriguing is to contem- plate how progress in each will affect the other. The past several months have seen heightened interest

  _The Ethics of Neuroscience_

  in the intersection of ethics and neuroscience. In the The ethics of neuroscience can be roughly subdivided popular press, the topic grabbed headlines in a May
  Additional links for this entry:
  http://www.dartmouth.edu/~adinar/publications/Neuroethics.pdf
  http://www.neuron.org/content/article/abstract?uid=PIIS0896627302007638
  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=12123605&dopt=Citation
  http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/els/08966273/2002/00000035/00000001/art00763
  http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0896627302007638
  

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